A Treatise on the Tactical Use of the Three Arms: Infantry, Artillery, and Cavalry

1. In advancing, in retreat, or at a halt, use every cover that presents itself.

2. Preserve the alignment and the intervals, so far as possible. On open ground, this may be done perfectly. In woods, skirmishers should never, for a moment, lose sight of each other.

3. The security of the flanks should be looked out for by the men near them.

4. Run over exposed ground as quickly as possible.

5. Approach the crest of a hill with great caution.

6. If threatened by artillery alone, advance and kill off the men and horses before they get into battery. When the pieces have got into battery, lie down, if on exposed ground, till they limber up again, and then recommence the fire.

7. A skirmisher, with the new rifled arms, ought, at five hundred yards, to be more than a match for a gun; for, in men and horses, he has a much larger target than the gun has in him.

Again, with the new rifle shells, he may be able to blow up a caisson.

8. Neither should a skirmisher have much to fear from a single horseman. With his bayonet fixed, he would usually be able to defend himself successfully against the trooper, whose sabre is the shorter weapon of the two; more especially, if he will take care to keep on the trooper's left, which is his exposed side.

9. Never lose your calmness. Your power consists, not in rapid firing, but in the accuracy of your aim. Avoid all hurried and violent movements; and never raise your gun till sure of a shot.

10. The aim, according to the Tactics, is made by bringing the gun down, instead of raising it up. However little the soldier may be excited, he will be apt to pull the trigger more or less too soon; that is, while the muzzle is yet too elevated. This is the reason why infantry missiles usually fly too high. The difficulty would not be obviated by causing the aim to be made by raising the piece; for then the same disturbing cause already mentioned, the soldier's excitement, would make the shots fly as much too low, as they now fly too high.

Rapid firing is another cause of this incompleteness of aim. Infantry firing is already too rapid to be effective; so that what is claimed for the new breech-loading weapons as an advantage, that they increase the rapidity of fire, furnishes, on the contrary, a strong objection to them. The effectiveness of the fire of a sharp-shooter, especially, will be usually in inverse, instead of direct proportion to the number of shots he delivers in a given time.

In view of this, and of the tendency to pull the trigger before the muzzle is sufficiently depressed, it has become an established maxim, to

"Aim low,
Fire slow"

The subject will be treated under the following heads:—

1. Artillery has a much longer range than musketry. In order to avail ourselves of this advantage, we must so post it as to overlook all the ground to which its utmost range extends. It therefore requires an elevated position.

2. It has been considered an additional advantage of a commanding position for artillery, that it enables our guns to cover our infantry, attacking or attacked, by firing over their heads.

This was done by the French at Waterloo, apparently with great effect. But the advantage is a doubtful one; for firing over our own troops, especially with cast-shot or shell, is very dangerous to them, and is apt to intimidate them. It moreover furnishes to the enemy a double target. The shot which miss our troops will be apt to fall among the guns behind them; and some of those which do not reach the guns, will probably take effect among the troops in front of them.

3. But very high points are unfavorable positions for batteries. Batteries so placed would not command the ground immediately below them; as guns cannot be depressed to fire below a certain angle without soon destroying their carriages. And this would facilitate their capture; for, once arrived on the ground near them, the assailants could not be injured by their fire. It has been estimated that the slope in front of a battery should not exceed one perpendicular to fifteen base.

4. When guns have to be used as a support to other parts of the line, which is often the case, their capture might lead to serious consequences. They should therefore have the ground clear of all obstacles which may mask their fire, not only in front, but to their right and left.

5. Although the most favorable position for guns is an eminence sloping gradually towards the enemy, an open and level plain is by no means an unfavorable one; for, on such ground, the enemy will be visible at a great distance, and our shot may act by ricochet, which causes more destruction than ordinary point-blank firing.

For ricochet, firm and even ground is requisite; on soft or rough ground it is not attainable.

6. In enfilading the enemy's position, or in raking his advancing columns from head to rear, a grazing fire is the most destructive that can be used. This consists of a long succession of ricochets at low heights. Where the ground is level and firm, we can obtain this fire at a short distance from the enemy; as, on such ground, ricochet shots do not rise much. But where the ground is uneven, to obtain such a fire, a more distant position will be requisite.

7. Muddy ground is unfavorable for artillery. Over such ground, its carriages move slowly, and its fire is less effective. Balls cannot ricochet; and shells often sink into the mud, and thus are either extinguished or explode with but little effect.

Napoleon depended so much on his artillery at Waterloo that, although every moment was precious, he delayed commencing the battle till his chief of artillery had reported the ground, which had been covered by a soaking rain, to be sufficiently dry for the movements and effectiveness of that arm. The three hours' delay thus caused, would have sufficed him to crush Wellington's army before the arrival of the Prussians.

8. Stony ground is a bad location for a battery; for the enemy's shot will scatter the stones around it with more or less fatal effect.

9. Rough or uneven ground immediately in front of a battery is not objectionable, as it will stop the enemy's shot.

10. A battery, when it is possible to avoid it, should not be posted within musket range of woods, bushes, ravines, hedges, ditches, or other cover from which the enemy's sharpshooters might kill off the gunners, or, by a sudden dash, capture the guns.

11. To prevent the enemy from approaching a battery under cover, it should be so placed as to be able to sweep all villages, hollows, and woods, in front and in flank.

12. In taking up a position, a battery should avail itself of all inequalities of the ground, for the shelter of its pieces and gunners, or of its limbers and caissons, at least.

For the same purpose, a battery posted on an eminence should have its pieces some ten paces behind its crest.

13. Where the ground affords no shelter, and where the position of the guns is not likely to be changed, it may be worth while to cover them by an épaulement or breastwork, some three feet, or more, high.

1. In order to be ready to support the flanks of our attacking columns, and to aid in the defence in every part of the field, batteries should be placed at several different points in the line of battle.

2. In a defensive battle especially, as it is uncertain on what point the enemy will mass his principal attack, the artillery should usually be distributed through the whole line.

3. A line of battle has been compared to the front of a fortification, of which the infantry is the curtain, and the artillery batteries the bastions.

4. The lighter guns should be placed on the salient points of our line, from which they can be more easily withdrawn; the heavier guns, constituting the stationary batteries, on the more retired points.

5. Pieces should not be placed in prolongation with troops; for this would be giving the enemy a double mark. Artillery posted in front of other troops will draw a fire on them. When a battery must be placed in front of the line, let the infantry in rear of it clear the ground by ploying into double columns.

6. Never place artillery so as to impede the movements of the other two arms. A battery posted in front of the centre would often hamper the movements of the infantry; besides being peculiarly exposed to a converging fire from the enemy's batteries.

7. The safest position for a battery is on that wing which is most secure from a flank attack.

But guns should re-enforce the weaker points, thus making the enemy attack the strongest ones.

Therefore, where a wing is weak, place the largest number of guns there, to support it. If we have one wing entirely uncovered, of four batteries, for instance, we should give three to the uncovered wing.

8. Of the heavy batteries, one, at least, should be placed in the first line, so that we may be able to open an effective fire on the enemy at the earliest possible moment.

9. The prompt use, at the proper moment, of the reserve, may decide the battle. The movements of heavy artillery, therefore, are too slow for the reserve, which should have most of the light pieces. Horse artillery is especially suitable for it.

10. Guns near an infantry square should be posted at its angles. If the square is charged by cavalry, the gunners run into the square, after filling their ammunition pouches, which they take in with them, as well as their sponges and other equipments. The limbers and caissons are sent to the rear; or, if there is no time to do this, they may be brought into the square. If this is impossible, they may be formed into a barricade.

At Waterloo, on the French cavalry's retiring from their charges on the enemy's squares, the British gunners rushed out from the squares in which they had taken refuge, and plied their guns on the retiring squadrons.

1. If the enemy's batteries are concentrated in one position, by placing our own batteries properly we may obtain a powerful cross-fire on them.

2. It is always advantageous to so dispose our batteries as to take those of the enemy in enfilade, or obliquely (en écharpe, as it is called).

At the battle of Murfreesboro', in December, 1862, a rebel battery, being taken in enfilade by one of our own, was silenced in about five minutes.

3. So, also, if we can obtain an oblique or enfilading fire on his troops, it will be very destructive. A flanking battery, raking the enemy's position, is often enough, of itself, to decide a battle.

Thus, the battle of Chippewa was finally decided by our getting a gun or two in a flanking position, enabling us to enfilade the British line.

So, at the battle of Shiloh, the rebels' triumphant advance on the evening of the first day was effectually checked by the fire of our gun-boats Tyler and Lexington, which had taken an enfilading position opposite their right flank.

4. For this reason, we must never post one of our own batteries so that the enemy's guns will take it obliquely, or in flank; unless, indeed, by doing so, we may probably obtain some important and decisive effect before it can be destroyed, or made unserviceable.

5. Batteries should be so placed as to command the whole ground in our front, even almost up to our bayonets, and so as to be able to direct their fire towards every point; at all events, so that a fire can be kept up on the enemy till he is within short musket-range.

It is manifest that the best position for a battery, to enable it to effectually cover the entire ground in our front, would not be in our line of battle, but in advance of one of its flanks, from which it could take the enemy's troops advancing over it, in enfilade.

6. Artillery fire from an unexpected quarter always has a powerful moral effect. Two guns, even, hoisted up to a place where the enemy does not dream of there being any, may have a decisive effect.

1. The best mode of posting batteries is in the form of a crescent, its horns pointing towards the enemy, or forming the sides of a re-entering angle; for this gives a convergent fire to the enemy's divergent one.

Its inconvenience is, the exposure of its flanks to attack, or to enfilade. Therefore, when such a position is adopted, its flanks must be protected by natural obstacles or by artificial defences.

2. Batteries, or parts of batteries, should be at supporting distances from each other; that is, not over six hundred yards apart, so as to effectually cover the whole ground between them, in case of need, with grape and canister. When rifled guns are used, this distance may be increased.

3. A long line of guns in our line of battle is objectionable; for, if it should become necessary to withdraw them, they would leave a dangerous interval.

4. It is dangerous to collect a great many pieces in one battery, especially in the beginning of an action, when the enemy is fresh, for it strongly tempts him to capture it. When used, such a battery should have powerful supports to protect it, or should be sheltered by a village, a defile, or other cover, occupied beforehand.

5. Although, to be used offensively, guns should be in strong masses, in order to strike a decisive blow on some single point; this is by no means the case when used defensively; for,

(1.) It is only when guns are more or less scattered over different parts of the field, that they can be made to give a cross-fire on the enemy's advancing columns, or on any part of his line.

(2.) If the position where they are massed does not happen to be attacked, they become useless, while stripping the rest of the line.

(3.) If they are captured, all the artillery is lost at once, as happened to the Austrians at the battle of Leuthen, causing their defeat.

6. A certain number of pieces of horse-artillery must always be kept in reserve, so that, if an artillery fire at any point should be suddenly wanted, it may be furnished with the least possible delay.

7. Guns of various calibres should never be in the same battery, to prevent confusion as to the respective ranges, and in the supply of their ammunition.

8. An independent section or battery should never consist of howitzers alone, for the proper fire of these pieces is too slow to be effective in repulsing an attack on them.

9. There should always be wide intervals between the pieces; otherwise the battery would offer too good a mark to the enemy.

1. So far as is possible, guns should be kept hidden from the enemy till the moment of opening on him. They may be masked by the ground, or other cover, natural or artificial, or by troops placed in front of them. The surprise will add much to their effect. Moreover, concealed, they will be less exposed to be taken. Nothing discourages troops more than the loss of a battery at the beginning of an action.

2. A desultory and indiscriminate artillery fire will accomplish nothing. To effect any thing important, it must be concentrated on some object; and the fire must be persevered in till the desired effect has been produced.

3. It is a general principle that artillery should not reply to the enemy's batteries, unless compelled to by their effect on our own troops. To obtain the most decisive effects from artillery fire, it should be directed on the enemy's troops, instead of his guns.

4. If it should become advisable to silence one of his batteries, it will be done more promptly and effectually by the employment, for this purpose, of two of our own batteries, than of a single one.

5. There is usually great advantage in keeping our batteries constantly shifting their position; for then—

(1.) They have the effect of a surprise, by opening on the enemy at some unexpected point.

(2.) They make the enemy believe our guns to be more numerous than they really are.

(3.) They are in less danger of being captured.

But these changes of position are attended with this inconvenience, that they expose the horses to be taken in flank by the enemy's batteries and sharpshooters.

6. The movements of a battery in the field should be as rapid as possible; for, while moving, it is helpless and exposed.

Moreover, celerity of movement and accuracy of fire will often more than compensate for inferiority in the number of guns; as was the case at the battle of Palo Alto, in the Mexican War, where the enemy's guns outnumbered ours two to one.

1. When used to prepare for an attack of infantry or cavalry, artillery concentrates as much fire as possible on the point where the attack is to be made, in order to overcome the resistance there, and thus make success easy.

2. When there are several points on which our fire should be directed, we must not batter them all at once, but concentrate our whole fire on them in succession.

3. In attack, artillery should not be split up among different brigades or divisions; else no decisive result can be expected from it. Whole batteries, used together, will have a more telling effect than if scattered over the field in separate sections.

In no case should less than two pieces be used together; for, while one piece is being loaded, the piece and its gunners need the protection of another one ready to be discharged.

4. Pieces in support of an infantry column of attack should never be in its rear, but on its flanks, near its head, in which position it will best encourage the infantry. But if a battery have already a position from which it can afford to the attack effective assistance, it should remain in it; sending a few pieces to accompany the infantry, which always greatly values artillery support.

5. Powerful effects may be produced by the sudden assemblage of a great number of guns on some particular point. This was a favorite manœuvre of Napoleon; who, by his rapid concentration of immense batteries of light artillery on the important point, usually obtained the most decisive results. At Wagram, for instance, when Macdonald's column was ready to make its great charge on the Austrian centre, Napoleon suddenly massed one hundred guns in front of his own centre, and made it advance in double column at a trot, then deploy into line on the leading section, and concentrate its fire on the villages forming the keys to the enemy's position, in front of his right and left wings respectively; each battery opening its fire on arriving at half-range distance. The effect was overwhelming.

6. The nearer artillery delivers its fire, the more powerful, of course, are its effects. Horse artillery, in sufficient strength, attacking the enemy at short grape-shot distance, say within three hundred or four hundred yards, may lose half its pieces, but with the other half it will probably decide the battle at that point.

At Palo Alto, Duncan's rapid closing with his guns to less than half range, drove back the Mexican right wing, which could not stand the destructive fire.

7. Horse artillery does not usually attempt to follow up cavalry in its attack; but takes a position to cover its retreat, if repulsed, or to push forward in support, in case of success.

8. When cavalry has to debouch from a defile, horse artillery may render it most effectual assistance, by taking a position that will enable the cavalry to form without fear of being charged and destroyed while forming.

1. Artillery should always reserve its fire till the enemy's real attack.

2. It should play on that portion of the hostile force that threatens us most.

3. It should wait till the enemy has come within destructive distance, and then open on his columns with a concentrated fire.

4. It should protect our troops while manœuvring, and accompany them in retreat.

5. We must subdivide our batteries whenever we wish to obtain cross-fires on a débouché, or on the head of an advancing column, or on the ground in front of a weak part of our line. By so doing, we compel the enemy to divide his own artillery in order to reply to our fire.

6. A sudden concentration of a great number of guns at some particular point may be used with the same decisive effect in a defensive, as in an offensive battle; though in this case, artillery plays, for the time being, a part strictly offensive.

At the battle of Friedland, where the French were attacked by the Russians in overwhelming numbers, Ney's corps was driven back by a terrific concentrated fire, in front and in flank, from the Russian batteries on the opposite side of the river; its own artillery being too feeble to stand before them. Seeing this, Napoleon instantly ordered all the guns of the different divisions of the corps next to Ney's, on the left, to be united and thrown in one mass in front of Ney's corps. Taking post at some hundred paces in front, these batteries, by their powerful fire, soon silenced the Russian batteries; then advancing on the Russian troops that had crossed the river to within grape-shot range, they made frightful havoc in their deep masses. The French infantry, profiting by this, rushed forward and captured the village of Friedland, driving the enemy in their front over the bridges, which they then burned. This was decisive of the battle; for the whole Russian army was then driven into the river.

So, at the battle of Kunersdorff, in 1759, after Frederick's left and centre had driven the Russians, and captured seventy guns and many prisoners, Soltikoff promptly massed the whole artillery of his right wing at a single point behind a ravine, which, by its concentrated fire, swept away the flower of the Prussian army in their efforts to force its passage; and Frederick was badly defeated.

7. When compelled to retreat, guns should retire successively, in echelons of batteries, half-batteries, or sections, in order that the fire of one may cover the limbering up and retreat of another.

Besides the mutual support thereby afforded, these successive face-abouts of artillery have a powerful moral effect on the pursuing enemy, already more or less disorganized by success.

It would be well for some pieces in each echelon to be kept loaded with canister, so as to drive the enemy back if he should press very close.

8. The protection afforded by artillery in retreat is very powerful, as it keeps the enemy constantly at a distance.

A fine example of the use of it for this purpose occurred just before the battle of Pea Ridge, in March, 1862. A rear-guard of six hundred men, under General Sigel, was retreating before a force of four regiments of infantry and cavalry, that followed and attacked it on every side. Sigel disposed his guns in echelons, the one of which nearest the enemy played on his attacking squadrons with grape and shell, which suddenly checked them. Instantly profiting by their temporary hesitation, the echelon limbered up and galloped away to another position, while the next echelon, again checking the enemy by its fire, followed its example. By this means, Sigel, cutting his way through a vastly superior force, succeeded, after a retreat of ten miles, in rejoining the main body with but trifling loss.

9. If driven to the last extremity, the gunners should try, at least, to save the horses, and to blow up the caissons they have to abandon.

At the battle of La Rothière, in 1814, where Napoleon, with thirty-two thousand men, was overwhelmed by one hundred thousand Allies, and was obliged to leave fifty guns on the field, he succeeded in bringing off all his gunners and horses.

1. It is an important rule that artillery should play on the enemy's troops, without attending to his batteries, except in urgent cases.

2. Against a deployed line, whether marching by the front or by a flank, case-shot, that is, grape, canister, and spherical case (sometimes called shrapnel), are most suitable; as these all scatter, right and left, to a considerable distance.

The best effect of canister is within two hundred yards. Beyond three hundred and fifty yards, it should not be used.

The best effect of grape is within four hundred yards. Over six hundred yards, it is not very effective.

Spherical case is effective at much greater distances, its range being nearly equal to that of solid shot.

Against a line of infantry at a greater distance than six hundred yards, spherical case should be used, chiefly, if not exclusively; as being more likely to be effective than ball.

3. But case-shot are unsuitable against a column, as they consist of a number of small balls which have not momentum enough to penetrate into it to any depth. When the enemy advances in columns, solid shot should plough through them from head to rear, a cross-fire being obtained upon them when possible.

4. Especially should round-shot be used against a close column rushing to attack us through a defile. Grape and canister might sweep down the leading ranks, but the mass of the column sees not the destructive effect; and being carried forward by the pressure of the ranks behind, continues to rush on till the battery is carried, though with more or less loss.

At the battle of Seven Pines, on one occasion, when the rebels were advancing in close columns, they were plied with grape and canister from two of our batteries with but little effect. Every discharge made wide gaps in their leading ranks, but these were instantly filled again, and the columns pressed on.

A round-shot, on the other hand, comes shrieking and tearing its way through the entire column, carrying destruction to the very rear-most ranks. The hesitation produced is not limited to the leading ranks, but extends throughout the column. Thus both the actual and the moral effect of ball on a close column is much superior to that of grape or canister.

At the bridge of Lodi, the Austrian gunners plied the French column with grape. If they had used round-shot instead, it is doubtful whether Bonaparte would have succeeded in carrying the bridge.

5. But a direct fire with ball on the head of a column of attack would be much assisted by the fire of a few light pieces taking it in flank. And, for this fire in flank, case-shot would be powerfully effective; for, from their wide scattering, both their actual and their moral effects would extend through the whole column, from front to rear.

6. A battery with guns enough to keep up a continuous fire has little to fear from an open attack on it by infantry alone. Napoleon observed that no infantry, without artillery, can march one thousand yards on a battery of sixteen guns, well directed and served; for, before clearing two-thirds of the way, they will have been all killed, wounded, or dispersed.

This remark was made in reference to smooth-bore guns; the new rifled guns should be still more destructive.

7. Against skirmishers, as they offer but a poor mark for ball, grape and canister should alone be used.

1. The ground round a battery should be so obstructed as to prevent the enemy's cavalry from closing on it; but in the case of a light battery, intended for manœuvre, so far only as this can be done without impeding the movements of the battery itself.

2. On being threatened by cavalry, a light battery may sometimes promptly change its position to one where the cavalry would attack it at great disadvantage. For instance, if posted on an eminence, and cavalry should attempt to carry it by charging up the slope, instead of awaiting the charge in a position which would allow the cavalry to recover breath, and form on the height, it might run its pieces forward to the very brow of the slope, where the cavalry, having lost their impetus, and with their horses blown, would be nearly helpless and easily repulsed.

3. At a distance, the most effective fire on cavalry is with howitzers, on account of the terror and confusion caused among the horses by the bursting of the shells.

On the cavalry's flanks, when within four hundred or five hundred yards, the fire with grape would be most effective.

4. The last discharge should be of canister alone, and made by all the pieces at once, when the battery should be swiftly withdrawn.

5. If the cavalry succeed in reaching the pieces before their withdrawal, the gunners may find temporary refuge under the carriages.

1. As guns in the field should generally play on troops instead of batteries, there should be a reserve of horse artillery to take the enemy's batteries in flank, in case of need, as well as for other purposes.

2. Though the ordinary use of artillery is against infantry and cavalry only, special circumstances may render it expedient that a certain portion of it should respond to the enemy's batteries. In this case, not over one-third should be used for that purpose.

3. When we have guns in abundance, it might be sometimes advisable, by using several batteries at once, to silence the enemy's guns, before beginning to play on his troops.

4. Artillery properly plays on the enemy's guns—

(1.) At the moment of their coming into action, for then they are so exposed that our fire will be peculiarly effective, and perhaps to such a degree as to prevent their opening on us.

(2.) When our troops move forward to attack, in order to draw away from them the fire of the enemy's batteries, or, at least, to render it unsteady, inaccurate, and ineffective; and

(3.) Generally, when his guns are causing us very great damage.

5. Against guns, solid shot or shells only should be used, since they alone are capable of inflicting any serious injury on either guns or their carriages: solid shot, by their great weight and momentum; shells, by their bursting.

But within three hundred or four hundred yards, grape and canister would soon destroy the gunners and the horses.

6. Our fire on a hostile battery would not only be very effective when it is coming into action, but at all other times when its flanks are exposed; as in limbering up to move off, or in a flank march. On these occasions we should use grape, if near enough; otherwise, spherical case would be generally the best.

7. When possible to avoid it, a field battery should not be opposed to a battery of position, or, generally, a battery of light guns to one of heavy guns. For even when the numbers of pieces on the two sides are equal, the enemy's superiority in range and in weight of metal would give him such advantage in the duel that our own battery would soon be destroyed or silenced.

1. It is important not to commence the fire till our guns are in sure range—

(1.) Because a harmless fire serves but to embolden the enemy and discourage our own troops.

(2.) Because artillery ammunition should never be wasted. The fate of a battle will sometimes depend on there being a sufficient supply of it at a particular moment.

2. The usual maximum distances at which smooth-bore field guns may open fire with any considerable effect, are—

What these distances are in respect to rifled guns, it does not appear to be yet definitively settled. The extreme range of the new rifled six-pounders is said to be three thousand yards; of the twelve-pounders, four thousand five hundred yards.

3. Guns are usually fired by order, and not by salvos, or volleys; and never as soon as loaded, unless delay be dangerous. Artillery fire is formidable only in proportion to its accuracy; and this is attainable only by a cool and calculated aim.

4. Artillery fire should never cease through the whole line at once. This would have a discouraging effect on our own troops, and an inspiriting one on the enemy's. Especially must this not be done when we are about to execute any manœuvre; for it would be sure to call the enemy's attention to it.

Therefore, if a particular battery has to change its position, it must not cease the fire of all its pieces at once; for, besides its disquieting effect on our troops, it would notify the enemy of the movement.

5. In covering an attack, our guns should keep up their fire till the moment it would begin to endanger our advancing columns.

6. By a ricochet fire, artillery is said to increase its effect, from one-fourth to one-half. It is especially effective in enfilading a line of troops, a battery, or the face of a work taken in flank.

Ricochet shots have also great moral effect.

7. When used against breastworks of rails or logs of wood, guns should be fired with moderate or shattering charges; so as more surely to demolish them, and, at the same time, to increase the destructive effect of the fire by scattering the splinters.

In view of the frequent necessity of battering such defences, and of using a ricochet fire, which also requires small charges of powder, it would be an improvement in our artillery service to make a certain proportion of the ammunition in each gun limber to consist of cartridges of half the usual size.

8. In bombarding a village during a battle, if our object be to set fire to and destroy it, this will be best accomplished with shells. If we wish merely to drive the enemy from it, solid shot from heavy calibres will be necessary, which will more surely reach and destroy his troops, wherever they may show themselves.

9. The moral effect, both of solid shot and of shells, is much greater than that of grape or other case-shot, from their more fearful effects on the human frame, and from the great number of men that a single ball or shell will kill or fatally wound. One twelve-pound solid shot has been known to kill forty-two men, who happened to be exactly in its range.

10. Ball and shell should be used—

(1.) When the enemy is at a distance.
(2.) When he is in mass.
(3.) When he is in several lines.
(4.) When his line may be enfiladed.

11. In silencing a battery, our fire should be concentrated on one piece at a time, while some of our guns throw spherical case, from a raking position, if possible, on the gunners.

12. Though grape has a much less range than ball, yet within four hundred yards, on account of its scattering, its effect is superior to it.

The fire of guns double shotted with ball and a stand of grape, is fearfully destructive when used at a short distance to repel a charge.

13. It is artillerymen's point of honor not to abandon their pieces till the last extremity. They should always remember that when the enemy is closing on them, the last discharge will be the most destructive of all, and may suffice to repulse the attack and turn the tide of battle.

In our attack on Quebec, in our War of Independence, on the near approach of our assaulting column, the British gunners fled from their pieces; but the one who fled last, before leaving, discharged his gun, which was loaded with grape. The discharge killed and wounded several of our men; among them the brave General Montgomery, who was leading the column in person. The effect was decisive. The assailants fell back, panic-struck at the loss of their commander; and our attack failed.

14. To prevent our own captured pieces from being turned on us by the enemy, it is the artillerymen's last duty, when it has become evident that the guns cannot be saved, to spike them. The operation requiring but a few moments, it can rarely be omitted without disgrace.

1. Artillery must always be protected from the mêlée, in which it is helpless whether against infantry or cavalry; and should therefore have a strong support.

2. A portion, at least, of every artillery support, should consist of sharpshooters, whose fire will be the most effective in driving off skirmishers sent forward to threaten or attack the guns, or to pick off the gunners.

3. Batteries must be secured on both flanks, and their supports will be posted with that view; on one or on both flanks, according to circumstances, and more or less retired.

4. A support should never be directly in rear of the battery, where it would be in danger, not only of receiving the shots aimed at the battery, but also of killing the gunners belonging to it, as has repeatedly happened during the late war.

5. A battery and its support owe each other mutual protection. Therefore, when an infantry support, after holding the enemy in check, to enable the battery to limber up and retire, is obliged, in its turn, to retreat, the battery should take such a position as will enable it to cover the retreat by its fire.

6. A battery consisting of any considerable number of pieces may be able, sometimes, to dispense with a support.

During the battle of Uclès, in Spain, in 1809, the French artillery, under General Senarmont, had been left behind, owing to the badness of the roads. The Spaniards came down upon it in large force. On their approach, the guns were formed in square, and, by their fire on every side, defended themselves successfully, and finally repulsed the enemy.

So, at Leipsic, in 1813, when the grand battery of the Guard, which had been left temporarily without a support, was charged by the Russian hussars and Cossacks, Drouot, its commander, rapidly drew back its flanks till they nearly met; and the cavalry were soon repulsed by its fire.

7. At the battle of Hanau, in 1813, Drouot's eighty guns were charged by the Allied cavalry. Having no supports, he placed his gunners in front of them with their carbines. This checked the cavalry, who were then covered with grape, which drove them back to their lines.

Ought not our gunners also to have carbines slung on their backs for such emergencies? Against infantry, our guns would often need no other support. The carbines could be used to reply to the enemy's skirmishers; and the example just cited shows that, thus equipped, artillerymen may sometimes successfully defend their pieces even against cavalry.

We shall consider—

1. The formations of cavalry for battle are either—

(1.) In deployed lines.
(2.) Lines of regiments, in columns of attack doubled on the centre.
(3.) A mixed formation of lines and columns.
(4.) Echelons of lines or columns; or—
(5.) Deep columns.

2. Deployed lines are not objectionable in principle. They are often not advisable; but are sometimes necessary.

But long, continuous lines should always be avoided; being unfavorable to rapid manœuvring, which cavalry is constantly called upon to execute in the field.

3. Cavalry has, in its horses, an unreasoning element, which is not controllable, like men; and is therefore much more easily thrown into disorder than infantry. For this reason, when deployed, it should always be in two lines; the second behind the first; the first line deployed, and the second in columns of squadrons by platoons. There should be also a reserve at a few hundred paces behind the second line.

The second line should be near enough to the first to be able to support it, if checked; but not so near as to partake in its disorder, if repulsed.

4. Cavalry should be always in column when expecting to manœuvre, or to be called on to make any rapid movement; this being the formation best adapted for celerity.

5. Cavalry deploys in lines—

(1.) When preparing for a charge in line.

(2.) When preparing for any attack requiring the utmost possible width of front; as where the enemy is to be suddenly surrounded.

(3.) When it becomes necessary in order to prevent our troops from being outflanked by the enemy's.

(4.) When exposed to continued artillery fire, which is much less destructive on a line than on a column.

6. Cavalry should always present a front at least equal to the enemy's; otherwise, its flank, which is cavalry's weak point, will be exposed to attack. When inferior in numbers, we may extend our line by leaving intervals, more or less wide, between its different corps. Any hostile squadrons that may attempt to pass through these intervals to take the line in rear, could be taken care of by the second line.

7. The best formation in respect to mobility is a line of regiments in columns by squadrons, doubled on the centre; corresponding to infantry double columns.

8. The mixed formation of lines and columns is more manageable than simple lines. Which of these two is preferable depends upon the ground, and upon all the other circumstances of the case.

9. The order in echelons is as good in attack as in retreat; since the echelons mutually support each other.

10. Decidedly the most objectionable of all cavalry formations is that in deep columns:

(1.) From the almost entire loss which it involves of its sabres, which are cavalry's peculiar and most effective weapon.

(2.) From the long flanks which it exposes to attack.

11. The formation in one rank, instead of two, has been introduced by the new Cavalry Tactics, though it has been as yet but partially adopted in the field.

This innovation has two advantages. It doubles the number of sabres to be used against the enemy; and it enables the cavalry to cover double the ground; thus doubling, also, its power to outflank, which is a valuable advantage, especially when opposed to cavalry.

Its disadvantage is, that it must, more or less seriously, impair the solidity and vigor of the cavalry charge proper; in which a whole line, with "boot to boot" compactness, comes at once to the shock, like some terrific mechanical engine; and in which the riders in the front rank are compelled to dash on with full speed to the last; knowing that if they slacken rein, even for a moment, they would be ridden over by the rear-rank men one yard behind them. From there being no rear-rank to fill up the gaps caused, during the charge, by the enemy's missiles, or by casualties occasioned by obstacles of the ground, the charging line must generally arrive on the enemy broken and disunited, or as foragers. The moral effect of such a charge on our own men will be unfavorable, as they will not realize the certainty of mutual support at the critical moment; and its moral effect on the enemy must be decidedly inferior to that produced by a charge that is at once swift, solid, and compact.

But the force of this objection is somewhat weakened, by the consideration that the compact charge of "cavalry of the line" must hereafter be comparatively rare, in consequence of the introduction of rifled artillery and infantry weapons, with their greatly increased accuracy and range; which ought to cause such slaughter in a line or column of charging cavalry, that, if it arrive at all to the shock, it would generally be only in scattered groups.

12. In advancing over wooded, or other obstructed ground, it may be necessary to break the line into company columns of fours, as in the infantry manœuvre of advancing by the flanks of companies.

As the cavalry column of fours corresponds to the march of infantry by the flank, the use of this formation in action is open to the same objections that have been already pointed out as applying to flank marches by infantry.

1. The value of cavalry on the battle-field consists chiefly in its velocity and mobility. Its strength is in the sabre-point and spurs.

2. Its charge is accompanied with a powerful moral effect, especially upon inexperienced troops. But,

3. Cavalry has but little solidity, and cannot defend a position against good infantry. For, if it remain passive on the ground it is to hold, the infantry will soon destroy it by its fire, to which it cannot, with any effect, reply; and if it attack at close quarters, the infantry, by means of its defensive formations, will be able, at least, to hold its ground, and probably repulse its charges by a reserved fire. So that the cavalry will finally have no alternative but to retire.

4. It is exposed and helpless during a change of formation; like artillery limbering up, or coming into action.

5. On its flanks, it is the weakest of all arms. A single squadron attacking it suddenly in flank, will break and rout cavalry of ten times its number.

At the battle of the Pyramids, Napoleon kept a few squadrons in rear of either flank, which, on his line being charged by a formidable body of Mamelukes, vastly superior to his own cavalry in numbers, horses, and equipments, nevertheless suddenly fell on their flanks and destroyed them.

6. Cavalry is never so weak as directly after a successful charge; being then exhausted, and in more or less disorder.

1. A part of our cavalry must be so posted as to secure our flanks; remaining in column behind the wings, till the enemy's movements require its deployment.

If one wing is covered by natural obstacles, give the cavalry to the uncovered wing; posting it in rear of the flank battalion of the second line.

2. When cavalry is posted on the flanks, it should not usually be on the first line of infantry. If it is to be used for attack, it is better to keep it retired from view till the last moment, in order to strengthen its attack by the powerful moral effect of a surprise. And, used defensively, it will be best posted on the flanks of the second line; since, in advancing to charge, it must have a clear space in its front of at least two hundred or three hundred yards, to enable it to act with freedom and vigor.

3. But if a position can be found for cavalry in front, where it would not be too much exposed, this may sometimes enable it to exercise an important moral effect, by threatening the flank of such of the enemy's troops as may be sent forward to attack.

At the battle of Leipsic, in 1813, the Wurtemburg cavalry was launched against Blucher's Prussian cavalry. But, seeing the Prussians drawn up not only in front, but opposite their flank, they lost confidence, charged feebly, and too late. They were consequently repulsed and driven back on the Marine Battalion, which they threw into confusion.

So, at the battle of Prairie Grove, in December, 1862, the First Iowa Cavalry, which was held in reserve, by its mere presence, caused every attempt of the rebels' flanking regiments to be abandoned.

4. In order not to impede the manœuvres of the infantry, cavalry should not fill intervals in the lines, or be placed between the lines.

It is dangerous when the ground is such as to require the cavalry in the centre of the first line; for, if it is beaten, a gap is left through which the enemy may penetrate. At the battle of Blenheim, in 1704, Marlborough owed his victory, in great measure, to the Allies' forcing back the cavalry forming the centre of the French army; thus turning the whole of its right wing, and compelling the infantry posted at Blenheim to surrender.

5. Yet cavalry should always be near enough to the infantry to take immediate part in the combat; and although it should not be posted in the intervals between infantry corps, it may debouch through them, in order to attack more promptly.

At the battle of Friedland, the Russian cavalry charged a French infantry division. Latour Maubourg's dragoons and the Dutch cuirassiers, riding through the battalion intervals, charged the Russians in turn, and drove them back on their infantry, throwing many of them into the river.

6. When both wings are uncovered, the best place for the cavalry will usually be in rear of the centre of the second line; whence it can be sent in the shortest time to either wing.

7. Cavalry should not be scattered over the field in small detachments, but be kept massed at one or more suitable points; as behind the centre, or behind one wing, or both wings. A small cavalry force should be kept entire; or it will have very little chance of effecting any thing whatever.

Cavalry of the line, to produce its decisive effects, must be used in heavy masses. In the beginning of the Napoleonic wars, the French cavalry was distributed among the divisions. Napoleon's subsequent experience led him to give it more concentration, by uniting in one mass all the cavalry belonging to each army corps; and, finally, these masses were again concentrated into independent cavalry corps; leaving to each army corps only cavalry enough to guard it.

8. For tactical operations in the field, cavalry insufficient in number is scarcely better than none at all, as it can never show itself in presence of the enemy's cavalry, which would immediately outflank and destroy it, and must keep close behind its infantry.

At the opening of Napoleon's campaign of 1813, he had but very little cavalry to oppose to the overwhelming masses of this arm possessed by the Allies. In consequence of this, he could make no use of it whatever; and the tactical results of the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen were far inferior to those habitually obtained in his former victories, and were purchased with much greater loss.

9. Small bodies of cavalry threatened by the enemy's cavalry in greatly superior force, may sometimes be saved by taking refuge in an infantry square, as practised by Napoleon at the battle of the Pyramids.

10. Cavalry should remain masked as long as possible; for it produces most effect when its position and movements are hidden, so that a strong force may suddenly be brought upon a weak point.

For this reason, a flat, open country is less favorable for this arm than plains with undulations, hills with gentle slopes, woods, villages, and farms; all these being so many facilities for screening cavalry from view.

11. Cavalry should never be brought to the front, except to engage. It is unfortunate when the ground is such as to prevent this; for cavalry, compelled to remain inactive under fire, is in great danger of becoming demoralized.

12. As to the ground:

(1.) Cavalry must not rest its flank on a wood, a village, or other cover for an enemy, till it has been occupied by our own troops. If compelled to do so, it should send out patrols to reconnoitre and observe. Its position is no longer tenable from the moment the enemy appears within striking distance on its flank.

(2.) It must not be posted on the very ground it is to defend, but in rear of it; as it acts effectively only by its charge.

Attacking cavalry must have favorable ground in front; defending cavalry, in rear. An obstacle in either case may be fatal.

1. The flanks of cavalry lines or columns are always exposed. They should, therefore, be protected by supports of light cavalry, which can act promptly and swiftly. When behind a line, these supports should be usually in open column, so as to be able to wheel, without a moment's delay, into line.

2. The most effectual mode of protecting the flank of a line or column of cavalry is by means of squadrons in rear, formed in echelons extending outwards; as this exposes the enemy's cavalry that may attempt to charge the main body in flank to be immediately charged in flank themselves; which would be destruction. For this purpose, irregular cavalry may be as effective as any other.

3. This cavalry support or reserve behind the flanks may sometimes play an important offensive part. The enemy's first line, the instant after either making or receiving a charge, is always in greater or less disorder; and a vigorous charge then made on it in flank by our own flank reserve, would have a decisive effect.

4. Cavalry should never engage without a support or reserve in rear, not only to guard its flanks, but also to support it when disorganized by a successful charge.

5. So, when engaged in skirmishing order, being then very much exposed, it must always be protected, like infantry skirmishers, by supports in close order.

6. It has been already seen that, although cavalry may carry a position, it cannot hold it, if attacked by infantry. When used for such a purpose, therefore, it should always be accompanied by an infantry support.

The French cavalry succeeded in carrying the plateau of Quatre Bras; but, having no infantry with it to reply to the terrible fire of the Allied infantry from the surrounding houses, it was compelled to retire, and yield it again to the enemy.

According to Wellington, Napoleon frequently used his cavalry in seizing positions, which were then immediately occupied by infantry or artillery.

1. Cavalry generally manœuvres at a trot. At a gallop, disorder is apt to take place, and exhaustion of strength that will be needed in the charge.

2. The ordinary use of cavalry is to follow up infantry attacks and complete their success. It should never be sent against fresh infantry; and should generally, therefore, be reserved until towards the last of the action.

Napoleon, who, by concentrating his cavalry into considerable masses, had enabled himself to use it on the battle-field as a principal arm, sometimes produced great effects by heavy cavalry charges at the very beginning of the action.

But, though Napoleon's splendidly trained heavy cavalry might sometimes break a well-disciplined infantry without any preparatory artillery fire, it would be dangerous to attempt this with cavalry inferior to it in solidity; and the new rifled weapons would seem to render the cavalry charges of his day no longer practicable.

3. Cavalry may be hurled against the enemy's infantry—

(1.) When it has been a long time engaged, and therefore exhausted.

(2.) When it has been shattered by artillery.

And always should be—

(1.) When it is manœuvring.

(2.) When the attack would be a surprise.

(3.) When its ranks begin to waver, or when it manifests any unequivocal symptom of hesitation or intimidation.

In the three latter cases, success will usually be certain; in the two former ones, quite probable: but, in most other cases, a cavalry charge will succeed, perhaps, only one time in ten.

4. The chief duties of cavalry in a defensive battle are—

(1.) To watch the enemy's cavalry, to prevent its surprising our infantry.

(2.) To guard our troops from being outflanked.

(3.) To defend our infantry and artillery while manœuvring.

(4.) To be ready to charge the enemy the instant his attack on our troops is repulsed.

5. Used offensively, it must promptly attack—

(1.) The enemy's flanks, if uncovered.

(2.) His infantry, when, from any cause, its attack would probably succeed.

(3.) All detachments thrown forward without support.

6. When cavalry has routed cavalry, the victorious squadrons should at once charge in flank the infantry protected by the cavalry just beaten. The great Condé, when only twenty-two years of age, by this means, won the victory of Rocroi.

7. Deployed as skirmishers, by their noise, dust, and smoke, cavalry may furnish a good screen for our movements.

8. Cavalry skirmishers scout their corps, to prevent the enemy reconnoitring it too closely.

9. When a cavalry rear-guard has to defend, temporarily, a defile, a bridge, or a barricade, a part should dismount, and use their carbines till the rest are safe.

So, a cavalry vanguard, by its fire, dismounted, may prevent the enemy from destroying a bridge.

In these, and in similar cases, the cavalrymen should habitually dismount, in order to render their fire effective; acting and manœuvring as skirmishers.

1. The success of cavalry in battle depends on the impetuosity of its charge, and its use of the sabre. When deployed as skirmishers, mounted or dismounted, its proper weapon is the carbine or pistol; and in individual combats, these weapons may occasionally be very useful. But when acting as cavalry proper, in any compact formation, it must rely on the sabre. The aim with a pistol or carbine in the hands of a mounted man is so unsteady, that the fire of a line of cavalry is generally ineffective; and there are few occasions where it should be resorted to. When cavalry has learned to realize that these are not its true arms, and that it is never really formidable but when it closes with the enemy at full speed and with uplifted sabre, it has acquired the most important element of its efficiency.

2. Cavalry should, therefore, not fight in columns, as most of its sabres would thereby become useless. But if a facing about to retreat is feared, an attack in column would prevent it. It is said, also, that a column is more imposing than a line. If so, it might have a greater moral effect on the enemy.

3. When cavalry are deployed as skirmishers, as a curtain to hide our movements, they should be in considerable number, with small intervals, and should make as much noise, and smoke, and dust as possible. When the charge is sounded, the skirmishers wait and fall in with the rest.

4. The great rule in cavalry combats is to cover our own flanks, and gain the enemy's; for these are his and our weakest points.

5. When the enemy's cavalry is already in full charge on our infantry, it is too late for our cavalry to charge it with much prospect of success. In such a case, it would be better to defer our own charge till the moment that the enemy's is completed; for our success then would be certain.

6. Cavalry attacks cavalry in line, in order to have the more sabres, and, if possible, to outflank the enemy.

7. If we can manœuvre so as to attack the enemy's cavalry in flank, our success will be certain.

Military history affords hundreds of instances in proof of this proposition. At one of the battles in Spain, for example, in 1809, fifteen hundred French horse, by charging four thousand Spanish cavalry in flank, completely cut it in pieces.

8. Cavalry never waits in position to be charged by cavalry. Its only safety is in meeting the charge with a violent gallop; it would otherwise be sure to be overthrown.

When hostile cavalries thus meet each other, there is usually but small loss on either side. A certain number of troopers are usually dismounted; but the colliding masses somehow ride through each other, allowing but little time for the exchange of points and cuts.

Thus cavalry can defend itself against cavalry only by attacking; which it must do even when inferior to the enemy in number.

9. To attack artillery, cavalry should be in three detachments; one-fourth to seize the guns; one-half to charge the supports; and the other fourth as a reserve.

The first party attacks in dispersed order, as foragers, trying to gain the flanks of the battery. The second party should manœuvre to gain the flanks of the supports.

10. Where a cavalry attack can be masked, so as to operate as a surprise, a battery may be taken by charging it in front. The formidable Spanish battery in the Pass of Somosierra, was finally carried by a dash of Napoleon's Polish Lancers upon it, suddenly profiting of a temporary fog or mist. But, in ordinary cases, when cavalry has to charge a battery in front, its fire should be drawn by our own guns or infantry, immediately before the charge begins.

11. In an attack on an intrenchment, the office of cavalry can rarely be any thing else than to repulse sorties from the work, and to cut off the enemy's retreat from it.