Afghanistan

Prior to the reign of Dost Mahommed the defensive power of Afghanistan was represented by an association of tribes whose chieftains offered to the Amir of Kabul, as circumstances dictated, a more or less willing service. Such a system, while making the promotion of any settled organisation impossible, was satisfactory only so long as the Amir of Kabul was able to rely upon the fidelity of the Khans. But in an order of government, in which priority of place was secured by dint of might, each chief, as opportunity offered, rose to proclaim his independence of Kabul. By reason of these constant irruptions of disaffection among the tribes composing the confederacy, few rulers were in a better position than Dost Mahommed to realise the disabilities of such a military system.

The forces over which he exerted complete control were confined to the Kabul territory, although in addition he exercised nominal jurisdiction over the tribal levies of the khanates of Kandahar and Herat. These divisions of the available forces presented the following effective establishment:

At the moment the fighting machine in Afghanistan was composed of those tribal chiefs, district land-owners and priests whose influence was sufficient to regulate the movement of any particular number of followers. At the first news of war the leaders of these several contingents hurried with their following to some central camp, the united strength constituting the army of the district ruler, although the component units of such a force owned allegiance to individual district chiefs rather than to any supreme authority. In addition to this combative force, there was usually another body which, although not drawn from the best material and less numerous, was possessed of greater experience than the main following. Composed of men who were attached to no individual leader, or made up of the numbers of some border ruffian, these auxiliaries participated in the operations for the purposes of loot and from pure love of war and bloodshed. In each case their weapons were of the crudest variety; very frequently the dismounted forces were armed solely with swords, spears and shields, the horsemen carrying matchlocks, flintlocks or ancient pistols. Every one was compelled to furnish his own weapons, the mounted men being responsible for their horses. The militia held the lands on condition of service and were exempt from all taxes on land except the tithe. The men were born fighters and each, so soon as he could wield a spear or manage a fire-arm, attached himself to some district chief. No regular rate of pay was made by the leader to his following who, if they failed to live upon their plunder, were indemnified by small grants of land, by the right of pasturage and by permission to adopt a trade. Upon the part of the chief, too, as between himself and the Khan of the territory, the scale of remuneration was never fixed, the sum varying according to his local influence and the number of men he could bring into the field. This condition of affairs, typical of most Asiatic hordes at the time, had always prevailed in Afghanistan. The success against other native armies of such a system, wherein no precautions were observed and no knowledge of military operations was required, was due to the great élan in attack of the Afghans and to their undoubted courage, more than to any preconceived notion of the art of war.

At the time of the elevation of Campbell to the supreme command of the army of Balkh, the forces in the territory were divided between a combined permanently enlisted body and a militia derived from Uzbeg, Durani and Kabuli tribes. It numbered 29,500 men comprising:

This force of fighting men, ill-organised and untutored, was deficient in central control, its condition not unnaturally reflecting the disorder actually inherent in the system. Under Campbell’s administration, the masses of tribal levies were reduced to an organised basis which contained the elements of the present establishment. The mounted and dismounted sections were formed into cavalry and infantry regiments; while the eighty guns, which were included in the Balkh army, were established by batteries and an elementary knowledge of the principles of drill and tactics imparted to the troops.

In his task of reform Campbell received every encouragement. Although Dost Mahommed himself made no alteration in the Kabul district, he watched with interest the work of reorganisation. Unfortunately, Campbell died before any great progress could be made, his demise being followed within a short space by that of Dost Mahommed in 1863 and Mahommed Afzul Khan in 1867. Nevertheless his influence was abiding, since the spectacle presented by the Balkh forces prompted Shir Ali to adopt an Anglo-Indian model as the working basis for his reorganisation of the Kabul army. In the sixteen years of his reign, between 1863-1879, he continued to introduce improvements founded upon Anglo-Indian drill-books, which he had had translated into Persian and Pushtu. Batteries of field and mountain artillery, and regiments of horse and foot were raised; territorial divisions were formed upon paper and field columns, whose brigade and regimental units corresponded with the Anglo-Indian system, were created. In actual practice these troops were never brigaded together, and officers and men alike were ignorant of parade and musketry exercises. Nevertheless, if their notions of drill were vague, their spirits and their carriage were not unmartial. In detail, and under a general distribution of the regular forces, troops were located—

The nominal strength of each infantry regiment was 800 men, although daily parade seldom mustered more than 600 men. The state of the cavalry regiments was 300 men, the complete return of the regular forces of Afghanistan at this epoch being:

Of the horse it is only possible to say that in all respects they were a bad imitation of the Indian light cavalry, reproducing even their Hussar saddles and steel scabbards. Their appointments, equally with the infantry, were almost hopeless and their drill quite unsuited to their order. Foot drill was the conventional exercise; and, since all horses were sent out to graze during the summer months, mounted drill was practised only during the cold weather, when through lack of food the animals were too poor in condition to be put through their facings. The horses were undersized and generally procured from the Turcoman steppes, but man and beast were equally valueless. No less unsatisfactory were the Afghan artillery, although, from the numerical strength of the Amir’s ordnance, a very false idea might be formed of the actual value of his artillery. Many of the guns were useless; for others there was no ammunition; while the equipment and carriages of the field guns were of the most obsolete pattern.

Besides these so-called troops, the Amir had always available the jezailchis, who were formerly the only infantry in the country. They were light troops, armed with matchlock and jezail, accustomed to hill warfare and perhaps as good skirmishers as were to be found at this time in Asia. Experience had taught them to be judges of ground and distance, while instinct made them chary of ambush. These were of two classes. The one class was in the service of the Amir, on a nominal salary of five rupees per mensem, which was paid in grain. These men were armed by the State and mustered some 3500 men, employed in holding forts and posts throughout the country. They were commanded by Sadbashis and Dahbashis, captains of hundreds and heads over tens, who received a proportionately higher rate of pay. The other class, the immediate following of the different chiefs, may be considered as a local militia. They were assigned rent-free a piece of land in lieu of pay; and, as a rule, these several bodies of militia numbered in each instance between 1000 and 1500 men.

The Irregular Afghan Horse, as they existed at this time, are even more difficult than the jezailchis to compute. They were not particularly numerous, although Kandahar and its dependencies could furnish 8000; Ghazni, 5000; Kabul, including Jelalabad, Logar and the Koh-i-Daman, 15,000; while Balkh, with its Uzbeg population, returned 10,000. These men were the equal of any undisciplined horsemen in Asia; mounted upon small but wiry horses, carrying a perfect arsenal of weapons, among which shield, spear, matchlock, sword, pistol and knife were prominent, they were always rough and invariably ready for the field. Capable of undergoing great fatigue and exceedingly harassing to a flying foe, they were, when led by a determined chief, anything but contemptible in a mêlée.

In spite of the excellent beginnings which had been made by Shir Ali, the condition of the army at the time of his accession placed a very heavy burden upon the shoulders of Abdur Rahman. Handicapped by internal dissensions, it was not until he had established as paramount his authority over the tribes that he was able to turn attention to the crude structure which had been built by his predecessor. Elaborating the handiwork of Shir Ali by many personal touches, he gradually shaped the whole system to his own mould. To every regiment of cavalry and infantry he attached complementary engineer, medical and commissariat details, so that each unit was complete in itself and independent of its brigade. In a measure and as the outcome of this initiative Abdur Rahman became the actual founder of the army of Afghanistan. Recognising the many deficiencies in the military system, he increased its potential significance by substituting for the old feudal levies one central army, paid, created and controlled directly by himself. With implacable severity he chastised his enemies, breaking up their powers of resistance and developing his own position, until the foundations of his earlier work became the permanent supports to a military autocracy. Regiment after regiment was added to the permanent strength of his military establishment as opportunity offered; while, in addition, 50,000 pack-mules and pack-ponies were set aside as a park of transport, and immense reserves of grain were stored in readiness at Herat, Kandahar and Kabul. Monthly pay-sheets were drawn up, by which generals of the first class received six hundred Kabuli rupees monthly, a brigadier two hundred and fifty, a colonel of cavalry two hundred, a major one hundred and twenty, captains of cavalry eighty, of infantry and artillery thirty, down to corporals of foot, who received ten rupees. The rank and file were paid partly in kind, a trooper getting sixteen rupees in cash and four rupees’ worth of grain, a private of foot five rupees in cash and three rupees’ worth of grain. Every regiment was to have a chaplain (mullah), a physician (hakim) and a surgeon (yarrah). To some extent bribery and corruption were suppressed. A corps of signallers was formed and a body of sappers and miners instructed in the art of entrenchment, bridge-building and road-making. Further, the gunners were taught the technique of their matériel, while the Kabul regiments were put through courses of musketry and the elemental mysteries of tactics and strategy were disclosed to their officers.

Weak in artillery—there being few trained gunners—the cannon, partly of English, partly of native manufacture and of various ages and patterns, were the time-honoured relics of Dost Mahommed and Shir Ali. The infantry rifles of the regulars also were of different makes, varying from the old two-grooved Brunswick to the Martini-Henry. The tribal forces were largely armed with matchlocks. Assisted by the subsidies which he received from the Government of India, Abdur Rahman swept away the rubbish and collected an immense stock of modern ordnance supplies. Over and above the quantity held against the immediate mobilisation of the standing forces, by importation and manufacture he piled up a vast reserve of rifles, field-pieces and guns of large calibre with their requisite ammunition, doubtless very varied in their character and including every sort of pattern from Krupp field-pieces to Maxim, Nordenfeldt and Hotchkiss quick-firers. For this purpose he erected in Kabul itself the necessary works, imparting to the position of Afghanistan by these means and for the first time in its history some element of security, and creating an army which required only to be supervised with the same watchfulness by his successor to attain ultimately as near to perfection as any purely native organisation can arrive. Ordnance factories—with a weekly output of two guns, one hundred and seventy-five rifles and a varying quantity of small arms ammunition—workshops, and an arsenal existing to-day in Kabul prove the inflexible determination of his plans. In furtherance of them, it was his idea to fashion an army which, apportioned between regulars and tribal levies, would number 1,000,000 men. There was to be a permanent regular force of 300,000 men, with an established ammunition reserve of 500 rounds to each field-piece and 5000 rounds to every rifle. Moreover, many months before his death the ordnance supplies, amassed in Kabul, sufficed for a very large proportion of such a force, at the same time exceeding the amount necessary for the requirements of the existing field and garrison forces. Had Abdur Rahman only survived a few years longer, it is indisputable that a force of a million fighting men, more or less trained but at least efficiently armed, would have been secured, although it may be doubted whether, save under the press of dire necessity, he would have ventured to issue weapons to them or to place more than a quarter of this number actually in the field.

At his demise the numbers of the forces available were considerably below the million standard. At that time the peace strength of the regular army was estimated at 150,000 men, distributed between the military centres of Herat, Kabul, Kandahar, Mazar-i-Sharif, Jelalabad, Asmai, the region of the Upper Oxus, and in detachments on frontier duty along the Russo-Afghan, Perso-Afghan and Indo-Afghan boundaries. This force was composed as follows:

The many flaws in the system which Abdur Rahman had created were emphasised at his death, in part by the indifference of Habib Ullah to matters military, but in the main by organic difficulties emanating from reactionary influences in the environment of the throne. Broadly speaking, the army and administration of Afghanistan were too centralised to be continuous unless the reins of government had passed into the hands of a man as fearless and able as Abdur Rahman was. Habib Ullah is a man of different mould; and as a consequence on the death of Abdur Rahman the absolutism of his rule suffered material contraction.

It is to be regretted that the late Amir, while evolving out of a heterogeneous collection of warring tribes a settled and independent country, failed to bequeath to his son any portion of his own singular abilities. As a consequence, the order of government in Kabul is neither so unquestioned nor substantial as it was, for the men whose services assisted Abdur Rahman to effect his life’s work have dropped out—from death or through inability to serve Habib Ullah. Faults, inherent in the character of the Afghans and particularly prominent in the present Amir, have thus measured the success which befel Abdur Rahman by the span of that ruler’s life, until it is really but little more than the shell of the former edifice which now remains.

Lately, Habib Ullah has shown signs of awakening to the responsibilities of his position; and it is to be hoped that, under pressure from recent political circumstances, he may abandon the foolish indulgence to which hitherto he has been a slave. Indications of this spirit are not very pronounced, but their manifestation does not come a moment too soon. In the main they are associated with military matters, although certain measures deal exclusively with the administration. Among the former, orders have been given to the leather factories in Kabul to manufacture 300,000 sets of infantry equipment and an agent has been despatched to India to purchase gear for the mounted branches of the service. At best these activities are no promise of an abiding interest in his service and, indeed, they are discounted by his refusal to hearken to advice. At the present time the army of Afghanistan, in its existing condition, admittedly possesses in a high degree the qualities of endurance, courage and mobility; but, in spite of its modern guise, it lacks discipline and cohesion and, as a fighting machine, is liable upon these grounds to be thrown quickly out of gear. Under these circumstances the observation may perhaps be hazarded that it would be as well before equipping it with first-class material to make sure that the men were sufficiently organised to understand its use. At present modern weapons are unknown to the great bulk of the forces of Afghanistan; and it cannot be denied that the absence of this quality makes it more of a menace to itself than to an enemy. Hitherto, there has been greater variety than method in the Afghan military equipment, irregularity of pattern distinguishing alike rifle, field-piece and ammunition, while the education of the officers and the training of the men has been neglected.

The continuation of these imperfections is due primarily to the inability of the Amir of Afghanistan to rely upon the loyalty of his troops. At the same time, their existence appertains to every Oriental army which is placed solely in native custody. They have always been a feature of the Afghan service. The condition of the garrison in the capital perhaps reveals some little superiority over those which are placed further afield, but it can be affirmed quite truly that the military qualities of Afghanistan proceed entirely from the inborn fanaticism of its people and not from the practical organisation of its active state. Nevertheless under conditions applicable to mountain warfare the Afghan army could become an invaluable auxiliary; although its capacity, as well as its determination, to offer any prolonged resistance are matters of doubt. Defects could be removed by re-organisation; good qualities enhanced by careful training under British officers or by the despatch of selected Afghan officers and men for training with our own troops.

In spite of the obduracy of Habib Ullah over this point, he has made known his intention of falling back upon the support of the Indian Government when his own arms have been defeated. This contingency, which is liable to arise at the outset of a war with any foreign power, imposes upon the Government of India a thankless burden, in no way lessened by the proposal of the Amir to create in Kabul an Afghan Staff College, and the determination of the Imperial Government to avoid insistence upon what is, by no means, an unreasonable precaution. As matters rest at present unless change is introduced the preposterous conceit, which distinguishes the Afghans, is destined to receive an unwelcome shock. Nevertheless the Amir cannot be persuaded to place his military affairs in the hands of the Indian Government; since, now that the Japanese have beaten the Russians and, in the mind of the Amir, the Imperial Government is frightened at the Russian Government, the Afghans argue, having defeated British arms, that they are now superior to the Japanese. Therefore, they deny us the possession of any point of advantage in their country, a consummation which, while not quite that towards which our diplomacy has been directed, may be ascribed to the results, in combination, of a policy of friendly missions and half measures. Now that we have given Habib Ullah permission to import without check unlimited supplies of arms and ammunition the disadvantages of such a situation increase rather than diminish; as it exists so close to the Indian frontier and in a way in which it cannot be controlled by the Indian Government, it behoves the Imperial Government to come to a definite decision at once with regard to its line of action in relation to Afghanistan.

Curiously enough in another direction, the construction of fortresses, Abdur Rahman was more neglectful. If he improved the lines of communication and re-organised the state of the army he built but few forts, relying almost entirely upon those which already had been constructed. Nowadays with the exception of the Kabul positions, Dehdadi, Mazar-i-Sharif and Baldak Spin, the two latter of which he built to command the approaches to Balkh and Kandahar, there are no modern forts in the kingdom. Those that do exist are made of mud and are of insufficient strength to withstand bombardment. The great majority serve merely as garrison depôts and are without interest save as interesting ruins.

The list is as follows:

The following routes indicate briefly the principal lines of communication in Afghanistan.

I.
BALKH TO HERAT.