CHAPTER IX
THE FIRST USE OF THE AËROPLANE IN WAR—TRIPOLI—THE BALKANS
Manœuvres in peace were the first practical test of the value of aëroplanes in war. The French proved their efficiency in their manœuvres in Picardy as long ago as 1910. The result of their use was a surprise for the military authorities themselves. Before the test it had been considered that an observer in an airship which could hover over the lines of the enemy or over a fortification would have a good chance of being able to bring back to headquarters useful details of what they had seen; but it had been thought by many military experts that the aëroplanist from his forced, rapid movement would not be able to form a mental picture of what actually passed his eyes, that if the retina had recorded the fleeting image on the brain, there would be confusion. The success of the aviator was an example of the truism that experience often does not coincide with preconceived opinion, for the reason that some unknown factor exists, and is only brought to light by the special circumstances of the case. Of all people, the aviator is one who constantly practises sharpness and concentration of sense; his eye and brain have a perpetual habit of harmonious and close-bound working; time to him has an enhanced value; none, like he, has ever learnt the exigencies of the minutes. His whole system becomes acclimatised to the constant maintenance of the equilibrium of his powers, for he has realised that for any negligence he will pay the death penalty. Is it wonder then that the glance of the practised aviator over the far-stretching regions beneath him becomes super-sight? So is it that the best aërial observer is often one who combines in himself the varied occupation of engineer, pilot, and scout, and who in his swift machine, arrow-like, darts above the enemy.
In the case of the military machines at the French manœuvres above mentioned, the work of pilot and observer was often divided; and it was found that the observer generally required some familiarity with flight before acquiring the requisite sharpness of vision.
Generally speaking, in the manœuvres, the information brought back was clear, defined, decisive. The intelligence brought back by cavalry scouts has sometimes been a puzzle to the generals in command—hints suggesting to them probabilities, perhaps, rather than accumulated certainties. But the air scouts brought such definite statements as these: “Have seen infantry hidden in a wood,” “A squadron with machine guns are marching towards ——,” “Seen a company digging trenches at ——,” “The enemy are in full retreat,” etc.
The value of the new arm was manifest in this country in the very first manœuvres in which aëroplanes were used; by its use the plans made were all rapidly discovered and rendered useless! Plans made on the old principle of fighting in the dark, each side ignorant of the operations of the other, fell through once and for all; and it became recognised that the coming of the aëroplane meant the revolution of the methods of conducting war.
But if from the experience of manœuvres the value of aëroplane reconnaissance was patent to expert military authority, the public generally did not realise the value of the new arm until it had been tried in something beyond mimic warfare. This occurred in the Italian war operations in Tripoli. In this war the need of reconnaissance was great; operations had to be carried on in a difficult country, and with an enemy that adopted “tricky” forms of warfare. To Italy belongs the credit of being the first nation to put aëroplanes to the test in war, both for reconnaissance and offensive purposes. The types of aëroplanes used in this war were chiefly Blériot and Nieuport monoplanes; one Etrich monoplane was also included.
Very valuable information was acquired on several occasions by the air scouts, who flew over wide tracts of desert, marking the position of Turks and Arabs, and ascertaining their movements preparatory to making attacks on Italian positions. The aëroplanes were fired upon by the enemy, and sometimes the wings of an aëroplane were riddled by shot without resulting accident, proving that the riddling of the wings, so long as sufficient supporting surface remains, is not the greatest evil to be feared. On one occasion Lieutenant Rossi, while making a reconnaissance, nearly fell into the hands of the Arabs. The motor suddenly stopped, and his machine was rapidly falling; the motor, however, recovered just in time for the aviator to remain in the air, and he was able to return to Tripoli.
Regarding the offensive use of aëroplanes in this war, it was related that Lieutenant Gavotti threw from his machine upon an Arab camp a bomb made of picrate of potash; he was at the time 700 feet above the oasis of Aïn-zara, when he discovered beneath two masses of Arabs, numbering each about 1,500 men. He took out the bomb from a bag at his side with one hand, while with the other he manœuvred the machine, and as he passed over a group of Arabs he dropped the bomb. He could follow its course for a moment or two while he was passing over the bright green verdure of the oasis, but it was speedily lost to sight, while the noise of the motor prevented his hearing the explosion below. He saw, however, a cloud of smoke and the Arabs flying in all directions. This was the first instance on record of bomb throwing from aircraft. Gavotti was himself of opinion that in bomb throwing the operation should be carried out with the aid of two aëroplanes; the one in advance should throw the bomb, the one following observe the result. The one in advance would have to fly at a lower level so as to drop the bomb; the observer following would fly much higher. The dropping of the bomb in this case produced excellent moral effects. When, on a later occasion, the aviators revisited the same spot, there was no trace of Arab encampments. On another occasion Captain Moizo threw two bombs into the Turkish camp near Aïn-zara, which also had the effect of putting the Turks to flight.
A troublesome feature of flight over sandy deserts is found to be the intrusion of sand into the valves and bearings of the engines; but if aëroplanes can be armoured against shot, doubtless a sufficiently light and effective means of protecting the engines against sand can be devised.
Use of aëroplanes was also made in the Balkan war; and it may be noted that before that war broke out Germans went to instruct the Turks in bomb throwing from aircraft. Bulgaria had a hastily formed aviation corps, and it showed itself useful.
It is, however, in the present European war that the large-scale use of aëroplanes is being daily more and more manifested.