American politics (non-partisan) from the beginning to date

The Crittenden Compromise.

Congress referred the request in the message, to adopt amendments to the constitution recognizing the rights of the Slave States to take slavery into the territories to a committee of thirteen, consisting of five Republicans: Messrs. Seward, Collamer, Wade, Doolittle, and Grimes; five from slaveholding States: Messrs. Powell, Hunter, Crittenden, Toombs, and Davis; and three Northern Democrats; Messrs. Douglas, Bigler, and Bright. The latter three were intended to act as mediators between the extreme parties on the committee.

The committee first met on the 21st December, 1860, and preliminary to any other proceeding, they “resolved that no proposition shall be reported as adopted, unless sustained by a majority of each of the classes of the committee; Senators of the Republican party to constitute one class, and Senators of the other parties to constitute the other class.” This resolution was passed, because any report they might make to the Senate would be in vain unless sanctioned by at least a majority of the five Republican Senators. On the next day (the 22d), Mr. Crittenden submitted to the committee “A Joint Resolution” (the same which he had two days before presented to the Senate), “proposing certain amendments to the Constitution of the United States,” now known as the Crittenden Compromise. This was truly a compromise of conflicting claims, because it proposed that the South should surrender their adjudged right to take slaves into all our Territories, provided the North would recognize this right in the Territories south of the old Missouri Compromise line. The committee rejected this compromise, every one of its five Republican members, together with Messrs. Davis and Toombs, from the cotton States, having voted against it. Indeed, not one of all the Republicans in the Senate, at any period or in any form, voted in its favor.

The committee, having failed to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion, reported their disagreement to the Senate on the 31st December, 1860, in a resolution declaring that they had “not been able to agree upon any general plan of adjustment.”

Mr. Crittenden did not despair of ultimate success, notwithstanding his defeat before the Committee of Thirteen. After this, indeed, he could no longer expect to carry his compromise as an amendment to the Constitution by the necessary two-thirds vote of Congress. It was, therefore, postponed by the Senate on his own motion. As a substitute for it he submitted to the Senate, on the 3d January, 1861, a joint resolution, which might be passed by a majority of both Houses. This was to refer his rejected amendment, by an ordinary act of Congress, to a direct vote of the people of the several States.

He offered his resolution in the following language: “Whereas the Union is in danger, and, owing to the unhappy division existing in Congress, it would be difficult, if not impossible, for that body to concur in both its branches by the requisite majority, so as to enable it either to adopt such measures of legislation, or to recommend to the States such amendments to the Constitution, as are deemed necessary and proper to avert that danger; and whereas in so great an emergency the opinion and judgment of the people ought to be heard, and would be the best and surest guide to their Representatives; Therefore, Resolved, That provision ought to be made by law without delay for taking the sense of the people and submitting to their vote the following resolution [the same as in his former amendment], as the basis for the final and permanent settlement of those disputes that now disturb the peace of the country and threaten the existence of the Union.”

Memorials in its favor poured into Congress from portions of the North, even from New England. One of these presented to the Senate was from “the Mayor and members of the Board of Aldermen and the Common Council of the city of Boston, and over 22,000 citizens of the State of Massachusetts, praying the adoption of the compromise measures proposed by Mr. Crittenden.” It may be proper here to observe that the resolution of Mr. Crittenden did not provide in detail for holding elections by which “the sense of the people” could be ascertained. To supply this omission, Senator Bigler, of Pennsylvania, on the 14th January, 1861, brought in “A bill to provide for taking the sense of the people of the United States on certain proposed amendments to the Constitution of the United States;” but never was he able to induce the Senate even to consider this bill.

President Buchanan exerted all his influence in favor of these measures. In his special message to Congress of the 8th of January, 1861, after depicting the consequences which had already resulted to the country from the bare apprehension of civil war and the dissolution of the Union, he says:

“Let the question be transferred from political assemblies to the ballot-box, and the people themselves would speedily redress the serious grievances which the South have suffered. But, in Heaven’s name, let the trial be made before we plunge into armed conflict upon the mere assumption that there is no other alternative. Time is a great conservative power. Let us pause at this momentous point, and afford the people, both North and South, an opportunity for reflection. Would that South Carolina had been convinced of this truth before her precipitate action! I, therefore, appeal through you to the people of the country, to declare in their might that the Union must and shall be preserved by all constitutional means. I most earnestly recommend that you devote yourselves exclusively to the question how this can be accomplished in peace. All other questions, when compared with this, sink into insignificance. The present is no time for palliatives; action, prompt action is required. A delay in Congress to prescribe or to recommend a distinct and practical proposition for conciliation, may drive us to a point from which it will be almost impossible to recede.

“A common ground on which conciliation and harmony can be produced is surely not unattainable. The proposition to compromise by letting the North have exclusive control of the territory above a certain line, and to give Southern institutions protection below that line, ought to receive universal approbation. In itself, indeed, it may not be entirely satisfactory, but when the alternative is between a reasonable concession on both sides and a dissolution of the Union, it is an imputation on the patriotism of Congress to assert that its members will hesitate for a moment.”

This recommendation was totally disregarded. On the 14th January, 1861, Mr. Crittenden made an unsuccessful attempt to have it considered, but it was postponed until the day following. On this day it was again postponed by the vote of every Republican Senator present, in order to make way for the Pacific Railroad bill. On the third attempt (January 16,) he succeeded, but by a majority of a single vote, in bringing his resolution before the body. Every Republican Senator present voted against its consideration. Mr. Clark, a Republican Senator from New Hampshire, moved to strike out the entire preamble and resolution of Mr. Crittenden, and in lieu thereof insert as a substitute a preamble and resolution in accordance with the Chicago platform. This motion prevailed by a vote of 25 to 23, every Republican Senator present having voted in its favor. Thus Mr. Crittenden’s proposition to refer the question to the people was buried under the Clark amendment. This continued to be its position for more than six weeks, until the day before the final adjournment of Congress, 2d March, when the proposition itself was defeated by a vote of 19 in the affirmative against 20 in the negative.

The Clark Amendment prevailed only in consequence of the refusal of six Secession Senators to vote against it. These were Messrs. Benjamin and Slidell, of Louisiana; Mr. Iverson, of Georgia; Messrs. Hemphill and Wigfall, of Texas; and Mr. Johnson, of Arkansas. Had these gentleman voted with the border slaveholding States and the other Democratic Senators, the Clark Amendment would have been defeated, and the Senate would then have been brought to a direct vote on the Crittenden resolution.

It is proper for reference that the names of those Senators who constituted the majority on this question, should be placed upon record. Every vote given from the six New England States was in opposition to Mr. Crittenden’s resolution. These consisted of Mr. Clark, of New Hampshire; Messrs. Sumner and Wilson, of Massachusetts; Mr. Anthony, of Rhode Island; Messrs. Dixon and Foster, of Connecticut; Mr. Foot, of Vermont; and Mr. Fessenden, of Maine. The remaining twelve votes, in order to make up the 20, were given by Messrs. Bingham and Wade, of Ohio; Mr. Trumbull, of Illinois; Messrs. Bingham and Chandler, of Michigan; Messrs. Grimes and Harlan, of Iowa; Messrs. Doolittle and Durkee, of Wisconsin; Mr. Wilkinson, of Minnesota; Mr. King, of New York; and Mr. Ten Eyck, of New Jersey. The Republicans not voting were Hale of New Hampshire; Simmons of Rhode Island; Collamer of Vermont; Seward of New York, and Cameron of Pennsylvania. They refrained from various motives, but in the majority of instances because they disbelieved in any effort to compromise, for nearly all were recognized leaders of the more radical sentiment, and in favor of coercion of the South by energetic use of the war powers of the government. This was specially true of Hale, Seward, and General Cameron, shortly after Secretary of War, and the first Cabinet officer who favored the raising of an immense army and the early liberation and arming of the slaves.

On December 4th, 1860, on motion of Mr. Boteler of Virginia, so much of President Buchanan’s message as related to the perilous condition of the country, was referred to a special committee of one from each State, as follows:

Corwin of Ohio; Millson of Virginia; Adams of Massachusetts; Winslow of North Carolina; Humphrey of New York; Boyce of South Carolina; Campbell of Pennsylvania; Love of Georgia; Ferry of Connecticut; Davis of Maryland; Robinson of Rhode Island; Whiteley of Delaware; Tappan of New Hampshire; Stratton of New Jersey; Bristow of Kentucky; Morrill of Vermont; Nelson of Tennessee; Dunn of Indiana; Taylor of Louisiana; Davis of Mississippi; Kellogg of Illinois; Houston of Alabama; Morse of Maine; Phelps of Missouri; Rust of Arkansas; Howard of Michigan; Hawkins of Florida; Hamilton of Texas; Washburn of Wisconsin; Curtis of Iowa; Burch of California; Windom of Minnesota; Stout of Oregon.

Messrs. Hawkins and Boyce asked to be excused from service on the Committee, but the House refused.

From this Committee Mr. Corwin reported, January 14th, 1861, a series of propositions with a written statement in advocacy thereof. Several minority reports were presented, but the following Joint Resolution is the only one which secured the assent of both Houses.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT.

Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, two-thirds of both Houses concurring, That the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of said Legislatures, shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as a part of the said Constitution, namely:

Art. XII. No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to Congress the power to abolish or interfere within any State, with the domestic institutions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.

The Legislatures of Ohio and Maryland agreed to the amendment promptly, but events followed so rapidly, that the attention of other States was drawn from it, and nothing came of this, the only Congressional movement endorsed which looked to reconciliation. Other propositions came from the Border and individual states, but all alike failed.

The Peace Convention.

The General Assembly of Virginia, on the 19th of January, adopted resolutions inviting Representatives of the several States to assemble in a Peace Convention at Washington, which met on the 4th of February. It was composed of 133 Commissioners, many from the border States, and the object of these was to prevail upon their associates from the North to unite with them in such recommendations to Congress as would prevent their own States from seceding and enable them to bring back six of the cotton States which had already seceded.

One month only of the session of Congress remained. Within this brief period it was necessary that the Convention should recommend amendments to the Constitution in sufficient time to enable both Houses to act upon them before their final adjournment. It was also essential to success that these amendments should be sustained by a decided majority of the commissioners both from the Northern and the border States.

On Wednesday, the 6th February, a resolution was adopted,^[10] on motion of Mr. Guthrie, of Kentucky, to refer the resolutions of the General Assembly of Virginia, and all other kindred subjects, to a committee to consist of one commissioner from each State, to be selected by the respective State delegations; and to prevent delay they were instructed to report on or before the Friday following (the 8th), “what they may deem right, necessary, and proper to restore harmony and preserve the Union.”

This committee, instead of reporting on the day appointed, did not report until Friday, the 15th February.

The amendments reported by a majority of the committee, through Mr. Guthrie, their chairman, were substantially the same with the Crittenden Compromise; but on motion of Mr. Johnson, of Maryland, the general terms of the first and by far the most important section were restricted to the present Territories of the United States. On motion of Mr. Franklin, of Pennsylvania, this section was further amended, but not materially changed, by the adoption of the substitute offered by him. Nearly in this form it was afterwards adopted by the Convention. The following is a copy: “In all the present territory of the United States north of the parallel of thirty-six degrees and thirty minutes of north latitude, involuntary servitude, except in punishment of crime, is prohibited. In all the present territory south of that line, the status of persons held to involuntary service or labor, as it now exists, shall not be changed; nor shall any law be passed by Congress or the Territorial Legislature to hinder or prevent the taking of such persons from any of the States of this Union to said territory, nor to impair the rights arising from said relation; but the same shall be subject to judicial cognizance in the Federal courts, according to the course of the common law. When any Territory north or south of said line, within such boundary as Congress may prescribe, shall contain a population equal to that required for a member of Congress, it shall, if its form of government be republican, be admitted into the Union on an equal footing with the original States, with or without involuntary servitude, as the Constitution of such State may provide.”

Mr. Baldwin, of Connecticut, and Mr. Seddon, of Virginia, made minority reports, which they proposed to substitute for that of the majority. Mr. Baldwin’s report was a recommendation “to the several States to unite with Kentucky in her application to Congress to call a Convention for proposing amendments to the Constitution of the United States, to be submitted to the Legislatures of the several States, or to Conventions therein, for ratification, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by Congress, in accordance with the provisions in the fifth article of the Constitution.”

The proposition of Mr. Baldwin, received the votes of eight of the twenty-one States. These consisted of the whole of the New England States, except Rhode Island, and of Illinois, Iowa, and New York, all being free States.

The first amendment reported by Mr. Seddon differed from that of the majority inasmuch as it embraced not only the present but all future Territories. This was rejected. His second amendment, which, however, was never voted upon by the Convention, went so far as distinctly to recognize the right of secession.

More than ten days were consumed in discussion and in voting upon various propositions offered by individual commissioners. The final vote was not reached until Tuesday, the 26th February, when it was taken on the first vitally important section, as amended.

This section, on which all the rest depended, was negatived by a vote of eight States to eleven. Those which voted in its favor were Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Tennessee. And those in the negative were Connecticut, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri, New York, North Carolina, New Hampshire, Vermont, and Virginia. It is but justice to say that Messrs. Ruffin and Morehead, of North Carolina, and Messrs. Rives and Summers, of Virginia, two of the five commissioners from each of these States, declared their dissent from the vote of their respective States. So, also, did Messrs. Bronson, Corning, Dodge, Wool, and Granger, five of the eleven New York commissioners, dissent from the vote of their State. On the other hand, Messrs. Meredith and Wilmot, two of the seven commissioners from Pennsylvania, dissented from the majority in voting in favor of the section. Thus would the Convention have terminated but for the interposition of Illinois. Immediately after the section had been negatived, the commissioners from that State made a motion to reconsider the vote, and this prevailed. The Convention afterwards adjourned until the next morning. When they reassembled (February 27,) the first section was adopted, but only by a majority of nine to eight States, nine being less than a majority of the States represented. This change was effected by a change of the vote of Illinois from the negative to the affirmative, by Missouri withholding her vote, and by a tie in the New York commissioners, on account of the absence of one of their number, rendering it impossible for the State to vote. Still Virginia and North Carolina, and Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and Vermont, persisted in voting in the negative. From the nature of this vote, it was manifestly impossible that two-thirds of both Houses of Congress should act favorably on the amendment, even if the delay had not already rendered such action impracticable before the close of the session.

The remaining sections of the amendment were carried by small majorities. The Convention, on the same day, through Mr. Tyler, their President, communicated to the Senate and House of Representatives the amendment they had adopted, embracing all the sections, with a request that it might be submitted by Congress, under the Constitution, to the several State Legislatures. In the Senate this was immediately referred to a select committee, on motion of Mr. Crittenden. The committee, on the next day (28th Feb.), reported a joint resolution proposing it as an amendment to the Constitution, but he was never able to bring the Senate to a direct vote upon it. Failing in this, he made a motion to substitute the amendment of the Peace Convention for his own.

Mr. Crittenden’s reasons failed to convince the Senate, and his motion was rejected by a large majority (28 to 7). Then next in succession came the memorable vote on Mr. Crittenden’s own resolution, and it was in its turn defeated, as we have already stated, by a majority of 20 against 19.

In the House of Representatives, the amendment proposed by the Convention was treated with still less consideration than it had been by the Senate. The Speaker was refused leave even to present it. Every effort made for this purpose was successfully resisted by leading Republican members. The consequence is that a copy of it does not even appear in the Journal.

The refusal to pass the Crittenden or any other Compromise heightened the excitement in the South, where many showed great reluctance to dividing the Union. Georgia, though one of the cotton States, under the influence of conservative men like Alex. H. Stephens, showed greater concern for the Union than any other, and it took all the influence of spirits like that of Robert Toombs to bring her to favor secession. She was the most powerful of the cotton States and the richest, as she is to-day. On the 22d of December, 1860, Robert Toombs sent the following exciting telegraphic manifesto from Washington:

Fellow-Citizens of Georgia: I came here to secure your constitutional rights, or to demonstrate to you that you can get no guarantees for these rights from your Northern Confederates.

The whole subject was referred to a committee of thirteen in the Senate yesterday. I was appointed on the committee and accepted the trust. I submitted propositions, which, so far from receiving decided support from a single member of the Republican party on the committee, were all treated with either derision or contempt. The vote was then taken in committee on the amendments to the Constitution, proposed by Hon. J. J. Crittenden of Kentucky, and each and all of them were voted against, unanimously, by the Black Republican members of the committee.

In addition to these facts, a majority of the Black Republican members of the committee declared distinctly that they had no guarantees to offer, which was silently acquiesced in by the other members.

The Black Republican members of this Committee of Thirteen are representative men of their party and section, and to the extent of my information, truly represent the Committee of Thirty-three in the House, which on Tuesday adjourned for a week without coming to any vote, after solemnly pledging themselves to vote on all propositions then before them on that date.

That committee is controlled by Black Republicans, your enemies, who only seek to amuse you with delusive hope until your election, in order that you may defeat the friends of secession. If you are deceived by them, it shall not be my fault. I have put the test fairly and frankly. It is decisive against you; and now I tell you upon the faith of a true man that all further looking to the North for security for your constitutional rights in the Union ought to be instantly abandoned. It is fraught with nothing but ruin to yourselves and your posterity.

Secession by the fourth of March next should be thundered from the ballot-box by the unanimous voice of Georgia on the second day of January next. Such a voice will be your best guarantee for LIBERTY, SECURITY, TRANQUILLITY and GLORY.

IMPORTANT TELEGRAPHIC CORRESPONDENCE.

Atlanta, Georgia, December 26th, 1860. Hon. S. A. Douglas or Hon. J. J. Crittenden:

Mr. Toombs’s despatch of the 22d inst. unsettled conservatives here. Is there any hope for Southern rights in the Union? We are for the Union of our fathers, if Southern rights can be preserved in it. If not, we are for secession. Can we yet hope the Union will be preserved on this principle? You are looked to in this emergency. Give us your views by despatch and oblige

In reply to your inquiry, we have hopes that the rights of the South, and of every State and section, may be protected within the Union. Don’t give up the ship. Don’t despair of the Republic.

Congress, amid excitement which the above dispatches indicate, and which was general, remained for several weeks comparatively inactive. Buchanan sent messages, but his suggestions were distrusted by the Republicans, who stood firm in the conviction that when Lincoln took his seat, and the new Congress came in, they could pass measures calculated to restore the property of and protect the integrity of the Union. None of them believed in the right of secession; all had lost faith in compromises, and all of this party repudiated the theory that Congress had no right to coerce a State. The revival of these questions, revived also the logical thoughts of Webster in his great reply to Hayne, and the way in which he then expanded the constitution was now accepted as the proper doctrine of Republicanism on that question. No partisan sophistry could shake the convictions made by Webster, and so apt were his arguments in their application to every new development that they supplied every logical want in the Northern mind. Republican orators and newspapers quoted and endorsed, until nearly every reading mind was imbued with the same sentiments, until in fact the Northern Democrats, and at all times the Douglas Democrats, were ready to stand by the flag of the Union. George W. Curtis, in Harper’s Weekly (a journal which at the time graphically illustrated the best Union thoughts and sentiments), in an issue as late as January 12th, 1872, well described the power of Webster’s grand ability^[11] over a crisis which he did not live to see, Mr. Curtis says:—

“The war for the Union was a vindication of that theory of its nature which Webster had maintained in a memorably impregnable and conclusive manner. His second speech on Foot’s resolution—the reply to Hayne—was the most famous and effective speech ever delivered in this country. It stated clearly and fixed firmly in the American mind the theory of the government, which was not, indeed, original with Webster, but which is nowhere else presented with such complete and inexorable reason as in this speech. If the poet be the man who is so consummate a master of expression that he only says perfectly what everybody thinks, upon this great occasion the orator was the poet. He spoke the profound but often obscured and dimly conceived conviction of a nation. He made the whole argument of the civil war a generation before the war occurred, and it has remained unanswered and unanswerable. Mr. Everett, in his discourse at the dedication of the statute of Webster, in the State-House grounds in Boston in 1859, described the orator at the delivery of this great speech. The evening before he seemed to be so careless that Mr. Everett feared that he might not be fully aware of the gravity of the occasion. But when the hour came, the man was there. ‘As I saw him in the evening, if I may borrow an illustration from his favorite amusement,’ said Mr. Everett, ‘he was as unconcerned and as free of spirit as some here have often seen him while floating in his fishing-boat along a hazy shore, gently rocking on the tranquil tide, dropping his line here and there with the varying fortune of the sport. The next morning he was like some mighty admiral, dark and terrible, casting the long shadow of his frowning tiers far over the sea, that seemed to sink beneath him; his broad pennant streaming at the main, the Stars and Stripes at the fore, the mizzen, and the peak, and bearing down like a tempest upon his antagonist, with all his canvas strained to the wind, and all his thunders roaring from his broadsides.’ This passage well suggests that indescribable impression of great oratory which Rufus Choate, in his eulogy of Webster at Dartmouth College, conveys by a felicitous citation of what Quintilian says of Hortensius, that there was some spell in the spoken word which the reader misses.”

As we have remarked, the Republicans were awaiting the coming of a near and greater power to themselves, and at the same time jealously watching the movements of the friends of the South in Congress and in the President’s Cabinet. It needed all their watchfulness to prevent advantages which the secessionists thought they had a right to take. Thus Jefferson Davis, on January 9th, 1860, introduced to the senate a bill “to authorize the sale of public arms to the several States and Territories,” and as secession became more probable he sought to press its passage, but failed. Floyd, the Secretary of War, was far more successful, and his conduct was made the subject of the following historic and most remarkable report:-

Transfer of U. S. Arms South In 1859–60.

Report (Abstract of) made by Mr. B. Stanton, from the Committee on Military Affairs, in House of Representatives, Feb. 18th, 1861.

The Committee on Military Affairs, to whom was referred the resolution of the House of Representatives of 31st of December last, instructing said committee to inquire and report to the House, how, to whom, and at what price, the public arms distributed since the first day of January, A. D. 1860, have been disposed of; and also into the condition of the forts, arsenals, dock-yards, etc., etc., submit the following report:

That it appears from the papers herewith submitted, that Mr. Floyd, the late Secretary of War, by the authority or under color of the law of March 3d, 1825, authorizing the Secretary of War to sell any arms, ammunition, or other military stores which should be found unsuitable for the public service, sold to sundry persons and States 31,610 flint-lock muskets, altered to percussion, at $2.50 each, between the 1st day of January, A. D. 1860, and the 1st day of January, A. D., 1861. It will be seen from the testimony of Colonel Craig and Captain Maynadier, that they differ as to whether the arms so sold had been found, “upon proper inspection, to be unsuitable for the public service.”

Whilst the Committee do not deem it important to decide this question, they say, that in their judgment it would require a very liberal construction of the law to bring these sales within its provisions.

It also appears that on the 21st day of November last, Mr. Belknap made application to the Secretary of War for the purchase of from one to two hundred and fifty thousand United States muskets, flint-locks and altered to percussion, at $2.15 each; but the Secretary alleges that the acceptance was made under a misapprehension of the price bid, he supposing it was $2.50 each, instead of $2.15.

Mr. Belknap denies all knowledge of any mistake or misapprehension, and insists upon the performance of his contract.

The present Secretary refuses to recognize the contract, and the muskets have not been delivered to Mr. Belknap.

Mr. Belknap testifies that the muskets were intended for the Sardinian government.

It will appear by the papers herewith submitted, that on the 29th of December, 1859, the Secretary of War ordered the transfer of 65,000 percussion muskets, 40,000 muskets altered to percussion, and 10,000 percussion rifles, from the Springfield Armory and the Watertown and Watervliet Arsenals, to the Arsenals at Fayetteville, N. C., Charleston, S. C., Augusta, Ga., Mount Vernon, Ala., and Baton Rouge, La., and that these arms were distributed during the spring of 1860 as follows:

All of these arms, except those sent to the North Carolina Arsenal,^[12] have been seized by the authorities of the several States of South Carolina, Alabama, Louisiana and Georgia, and are no longer in possession of the United States.

It will appear by the testimony herewith presented, that on the 20th of October last the Secretary of War ordered forty columbiads and four thirty-two pounders to be sent from the Arsenal at Pittsburg to the fort on Ship Island, on the coast of Mississippi, then in an unfinished condition, and seventy columbiads and seven thirty-two pounders to be sent from the same Arsenal to the fort at Galveston, in Texas, the building of which had scarcely been commenced.

This order was given to the Secretary of War, without any report from the Engineer department showing that said works were ready for their armament, or that the guns were needed at either of said points.

It will be seen by the testimony of Captain Wright, of the Engineer department, that the fort at Galveston cannot be ready for its entire armament in less than about five years, nor for any part of it in less than two; and that the fort at Ship Island will require an appropriation of $85,000 and one year’s time before it can be ready for any part of its armament. This last named fort has been taken possession of by the State authorities of Mississippi.

The order of the late Secretary of War (Floyd) was countermanded by the present Secretary (Holt) before it had been fully executed by the shipment of said guns from Pittsburg.^[13]

It will be seen by a communication from the Ordnance office of the 21st of January last, that by the last returns there were remaining in the United States arsenals and armories the following small arms, viz:

Of these 60,878 were deposited in the arsenals of South Carolina, Alabama, and Louisiana, and are in the possession of the authorities of those States, reducing the number in possession of the United States to 480,687.

Since the date of said communication, the following additional forts and military posts have been taken possession of by parties acting under the authority of the States in which they are respectively situated, viz:

• Fort Moultrie, South Carolina.
• Fort Morgan, Alabama.
• Baton Rouge Barracks, Louisiana.
• Fort Jackson, Louisiana.
• Fort St. Philip, „
• Fort Pike, Louisiana.
• Oglethorpe Barracks, Georgia.

And the department has been unofficially advised that the arsenal at Chattahoochee, Forts McRea and Barrancas, and Barracks, have been seized by the authorities of Florida.

To what further extent the small arms in possession of the United States may have been reduced by these figures, your committee have not been advised.

The whole number of the seaboard forts in the United States is fifty-seven; their appropriate garrison in war would require 26,420 men; their actual garrison at this time is 1,334 men, 1,308 of whom are in the forts at Governor’s Island, New York; Fort McHenry, Maryland; Fort Monroe, Virginia, and at Alcatraz Island, California, in the harbor of San Francisco.

From the facts elicited, it is certain that the regular military force of the United States, is wholly inadequate to the protection of the forts, arsenals, dock-yards, and other property of the United States in the present disturbed condition of the country. The regular army numbers only 18,000 men when recruited to its maximum strength, and the whole of this force is required for the protection of the border settlements against Indian depredations. Unless it is the intention of Congress that the forts, arsenals, dock-yards and other public property, shall be exposed to capture and spoliation, the President must be armed with additional force for their protection.

In the opinion of the Committee the law of February 28th, 1795, confers upon the President ample power to call out the militia, execute the laws and protect the public property. But as the late Attorney-General has given a different opinion, the Committee to remove all doubt upon the subject, report the accompanying bill, etc.

OTHER ITEMS.

Statement of Arms distributed by Sale since the first of January, 1860, to whom sold and the place whence sold.

The arms were all flint-lock muskets altered to percussion, and were all sold at $2.50 each, except those purchased by Captain G. Barry and by the Phillips county volunteers, for which $2 each were paid.

The Mobile Advertiser says: “During the past year 135,430 muskets have been quietly transferred from the Northern Arsenal at Springfield alone, to those in the Southern States. We are much obliged to Secretary Floyd for the foresight he has thus displayed in disarming the North and equipping the South for this emergency. There is no telling the quantity of arms and munitions which were sent South from other Northern arsenals. There is no doubt but that every man in the South who can carry a gun can now be supplied from private or public sources. The Springfield contribution alone would arm all the militiamen of Alabama and Mississippi.”

General Scott, in his letter of December 2d, 1862, on the early history of the Rebellion, states that “Rhode Island, Delaware and Texas had not drawn, at the end of 1860, their annual quotas of arms for that year, and Massachusetts, Tennessee, and Kentucky only in part; Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi and Kansas were, by order of the Secretary of War, supplied with their quotas for 1861 in advance, and Pennsylvania and Maryland in part.”

This advance of arms to eight Southern States is in addition to the transfer, about the same time, of 115,000 muskets to Southern arsenals, as per Mr. Stanton’s report.

Governor Letcher of Virginia, in his Message of December, 1861, says, that for some time prior to secession, he had been engaged in purchasing arms, ammunition, etc.; among which were 13 Parrott rifled cannon, and 5,000 muskets. He desired to buy from the United States Government 10,000 more, when buying the 5,000, but he says “the authorities declined to sell them to us, although five times the number were then in the arsenal at Washington.”

Had Jefferson Davis’ bill relative to the purchase of arms become a law, the result might have been different.

This and similar action on the part of the South, especially the attempted seizure and occupation of forts, convinced many of the Republicans that no compromise could endure, however earnest its advocates from the Border States, and this earnestness was unquestioned. Besides their attachment to the Union, they knew that in the threatened war they would be the greatest sufferers, with their people divided neighbor against neighbor, their lands laid waste, and their houses destroyed. They had every motive for earnestness in the effort to conciliate the disagreeing sections.

The oddest partisan feature in the entire preliminary and political struggle was the attempt, in the parlance of the day, of “New York to secede from New York”—an oddity verified by Mayor Wood’s recommendation in favor of the secession of New York city, made January 6th, 1861. The document deserves a place in this history, as it shows the views of a portion of the citizens then, and an exposition of their interests as presented by a citizen before and since named by repeated elections to Congress.

Mayor Wood’s Secession Message.

To the Honorable the Common Council:

Gentlemen:—We are entering upon the public duties of the year under circumstances as unprecedented as they are gloomy and painful to contemplate. The great trading and producing interests of not only the city of New York, but of the entire country, are prostrated by a monetary crisis; and although similar calamities have before befallen us, it is the first time that they have emanated from causes having no other origin than that which may be traced to political disturbances. Truly, may it now be said, “We are in the midst of a revolution bloodless AS YET.” Whether the dreadful alternative implied as probable in the conclusion of this prophetic quotation may be averted, “no human ken can divine.” It is quite certain that the severity of the storm is unexampled in our history, and if the disintegration of the Federal Government, with the consequent destruction of all the material interests of the people shall not follow, it will be owing more to the interposition of Divine Providence, than to the inherent preventive power of our institutions, or the intervention of any other human agency.

It would seem that a dissolution of the Federal Union is inevitable. Having been formed originally on a basis of general and mutual protection, but separate local independence—each State reserving the entire and absolute control of its own domestic affairs, it is evidently impossible to keep them together longer than they deem themselves fairly treated by each other, or longer than the interests, honor and fraternity of the people of the several States are satisfied. Being a Government created by opinion, its continuance is dependent upon the continuance of the sentiment which formed it. It cannot be preserved by coercion or held together by force. A resort to this last dreadful alternative would of itself destroy not only the Government, but the lives and property of the people.

If these forebodings shall be realized, and a separation of the States shall occur, momentous considerations will be presented to the corporate authorities of this city. We must provide for the new relations which will necessarily grow out of the new condition of public affairs.

It will not only be necessary for us to settle the relations which we shall hold to other cities and States, but to establish, if we can, new ones with a portion of our own State. Being the child of the Union, having drawn our sustenance from its bosom, and arisen to our present power and strength through the vigor of our mother—when deprived of her maternal advantages, we must rely upon our own resources and assume a position predicated upon the new phase which public affairs will present, and upon the inherent strength which our geographical, commercial, political, and financial pre-eminence imparts to us.

With our aggrieved brethren of the Slave States, we have friendly relations and a common sympathy. We have not participated in the warfare upon their constitutional rights or their domestic institutions. While other portions of our State have unfortunately been imbued with the fanatical spirit which actuates a portion of the people of New England, the city of New York has unfalteringly preserved the integrity of its principles in adherence to the compromises of the Constitution and the equal rights of the people of all the States. We have respected the local interests of every section, at no time oppressing, but all the while aiding in the development of the resources of the whole country. Our ships have penetrated to every clime, and so have New York capital, energy and enterprise found their way to every State, and, indeed, to almost every county and town of the American Union. If we have derived sustenance from the Union, so have we in return disseminated blessings for the common benefit of all. Therefore, New York has a right to expect, and should endeavor to preserve a continuance of uninterrupted intercourse with every section.

It is, however, folly to disguise the fact that, judging from the past, New York may have more cause of apprehension from the aggressive legislation of our own State than from external dangers. We have already largely suffered from this cause. For the past five years, our interests and corporate rights have been repeatedly trampled upon. Being an integral portion of the State, it has been assumed, and in effect tacitly admitted on our part by nonresistance, that all political and governmental power over us rested in the State Legislature. Even the common right of taxing ourselves for our own government, has been yielded, and we are not permitted to do so without this authority.***

Thus it will be seen that the political connection between the people of the city and the State has been used by the latter to our injury. The Legislature, in which the present partizan majority has the power, has become the instrument by which we are plundered to enrich their speculators, lobby agents, and Abolition politicians. Laws are passed through their malign influence by which, under forms of legal enactment, our burdens have been increased, our substance eaten out, and our municipal liberties destroyed. Self-government, though guaranteed by the State Constitution, and left to every other county and city, has been taken from us by this foreign power, whose dependents have been sent among us to destroy our liberties by subverting our political system.

How we shall rid ourselves of this odious and oppressive connection, it is not for me to determine. It is certain that a dissolution cannot be peacefully accomplished, except by the consent of the Legislature itself. Whether this can be obtained or not, is, in my judgment, doubtful. Deriving so much advantage from its power over the city, it is not probable that a partizan majority will consent to a separation—and the resort to force by violence and revolution must not be thought of for an instant. We have been distinguished as an orderly and law-abiding people. Let us do nothing to forfeit this character, or to add to the present distracted condition of public affairs.

Much, no doubt, can be said in favor of the justice and policy of a separation. It may be said that secession or revolution in any of the United States would be subversive of all Federal authority, and, so far as the Central Government is concerned, the resolving of the community into its original elements—that, if part of the States form new combinations and Governments, other States may do the same. California and her sisters of the Pacific will no doubt set up an independent Republic and husband their own rich mineral resources. The Western States, equally rich in cereals and other agricultural products, will probably do the same. Then it may be said, why should not New York city, instead of supporting by her contributions in revenue two-thirds of the expenses of the United States, become also equally independent? As a free city, with but nominal duty on imports, her local Government could be supported without taxation upon her people. Thus we could live free from taxes, and have cheap goods nearly duty free. In this she would have the whole and united support of the Southern States, as well as all the other States to whose interests and rights under the Constitution she has always been true.

It is well for individuals or communities to look every danger square in the face, and to meet it calmly and bravely. As dreadful as the severing of the bonds that have hitherto united the States has been in contemplation, it is now apparently a stern and inevitable fact. We have now to meet it with all the consequences, whatever they may be. If the Confederacy is broken up the Government is dissolved, and it behooves every distinct community, as well as every individual, to take care of themselves.

When Disunion has become a fixed and certain fact, why may not New York disrupt the bands which bind her to a venal and corrupt master—to a people and a party that have plundered her revenues, attempted to ruin her commerce, taken away the power of self-government, and destroyed the Confederacy of which she was the proud Empire City? Amid the gloom which the present and prospective condition of things must cast over the country, New York, as a Free City, may shed the only light and hope of a future reconstruction of our once blessed Confederacy.

But I am not prepared to recommend the violence implied in these views. In stating this argument in favor of freedom, “peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must,” let me not be misunderstood. The redress can be found only in appeals to the magnanimity of the people of the whole State. The events of the past two months have no doubt effected a change in the popular sentiment of the State and National politics. This change may bring us the desired relief, and we may be able to obtain a repeal of the law to which I have referred, and a consequent restoration of our corporate rights.