Americans by Choice

Here is another program—of the “Americanization Meeting in honor of those who were admitted to citizenship April 19, 21, 22, 1920,” held in the Union High School at Grand Rapids, Michigan, April 30, 1920, under the auspices of the Grand Rapids Board of Education and the Americanization Society:

Mrs. Henrietta Briggs-Wall of Washington, D. C., has presented admirably the spirit of this movement in a pamphlet proposing a general “New Patriot Plan,” to utilize the Fourth of July throughout the country for the celebration of the “civic birthday,” alike of the native born who, during the past year, have attained the voting age of 21 years, and the newly naturalized foreign born. “In other countries,” says Mrs. Briggs-Wall, “much ado is made over the crowning of kings and queens who attempt to rule over others; there is much more occasion for general rejoicing when newly enfranchised citizens attain their share in the honors and duties of self-government.” The plan proposes in general a Fourth-of-July celebration in every community in America to which the newly enfranchised shall be invited as guests of honor. The author says, among other things:

Criticism, commendation and reform alike, to be either fair or judicious, must bear in mind that the naturalization system which has been built up—and such parts, absurdities, inhumanities, and bureaucratic excrescences as have grown up—under the Naturalization Act of 1906 represents when all is said an honest, diligent, and wholly patriotic effort to make impossible the now almost incredible scandals of former times; to establish and vigilantly maintain proper standards of character and intelligence by which to test those of other nativity who desire to join our fellowship and participate in our sovereignty; and to fit and educate those who are admitted for the better appreciation and performance of the unique privileges and responsibilities of American citizenship. The remediable evils, some of the more conspicuous of which have been indicated, seem to be due in part to survival among us of general race and anti-foreign prejudices, despite our historic professions and democratic traditions; in part to the mere inertia of custom and habit characterizing all governmental institutions; in part to the “personal equation” of those upon whom, in various parts of the country, falls the duty of administering the law.

The experience of these fifteen years has demonstrated that the law, as it stands, is on the whole just and effective for its purposes. Its defects can be remedied; its sound features strengthened and clarified. It is time to modify it in some respects; to standardize the tests and conditions enforced under its provisions, to the end of removing, or anyway diminishing, the opportunity for the erratic operation of “personal equation” and the theories, whims, negligences, together with the illegal and extra-legal practices, in both the executive departments and the courts, of which the aspirant for citizenship is the hapless victim.

VI

PERSONAL EQUATION IN NATURALIZATION

When we speak of the “personal equation” as an important factor in the adoption or rejection of an alien applicant for citizenship, we are likely to be thinking chiefly of the personality of the petitioner; of his character, intelligence, education, social training and experience; of his general fitness and capacity for assimilation of our language, customs, traditions, institutional relations—what we are pleased to call our “fundamental principles.” But this is only a part, and not always or necessarily the most significant and controlling part, of the situation. There are other “personal equations” to be considered. For while it is true in one sense that the applicant does pass into the maw of a machine, constructed “of law rather than of men,” and governed by more or less precise and automatically operating regulations from whose technic the individuals on either side of the process may not materially depart, the fact is that there is hardly any other legal process in our governmental system in which personality—individual ideas, prejudices, idiosyncrasies—plays so large a part. In no other activity of the courts is the individual petitioner so entirely at the mercy of the court, so completely without recourse in the event of a decision against him.

Strictly speaking, the proceeding is judicial; an ex-parte case in an important court, in which a petition is filed with the clerk, comes in due course before the judge in person; evidence is received for and against the granting of the privilege requested, and the judge decides in a formal order and decree, pro or contra; the petition is granted or denied, as the case may be. For every petition is decided and disposed of in some final way, even though it may be continued or postponed once or more. It is doubtful, however, whether anywhere in our judicial procedure—even in the minor courts where so often farcically unjust “law” is inflicted upon defenseless persons—may be found a class of cases departing so far in practice from the apparent simplicity of the theory; where the petitioner is subject to so heavy handicaps of technicality; to so great an extent at the mercy of personal whims and mental limitations, of blunders and negligences—and “red tape”—of persons over whose activities he has not the slightest control, with very little right or opportunity to have beside him anyone to protect him from encroachment upon his rights.

The Constitution of the United States gave to Congress exclusive authority “to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.”[83] It might have been inferred that the intention was to make the process strictly an affair of Federal administration; but Congress did not so construe or utilize the authority. It established, by the original statute and subsequent legislation, uniform standards of requirement as to racial restriction, preliminary period of residence, literacy, and moral qualifications; but in effect it gave the jurisdiction and administration of the law back to the states—not in so many words, to be sure, but by committing the naturalization function to local as well as to Federal judges in every state and territory. Nothing could have been devised more surely to subject the operation of the law to the peculiarities of local conditions and feeling, and to the warps and twists of personal notion.

From the beginning, in the first general naturalization law enacted after the new republic got under way, the function of admitting new members of the nation has been vested in the courts—a judicial power and activity. So it remains to-day. And with the sole exception of Canada, the United States is unique in respect of this method of naturalization. England, France, and virtually all of the other nations vest the power in some ministerial agency.[84]

A FUNCTION OF LOCAL COURTS

At first glance it might seem fitting and wise to confine the function (if to the courts at all) to the Federal tribunals, in the interest of freedom from local political influence, uniformity of interpretation and practice, and recognition of the fact that citizenship is chiefly a relationship to the nation as a whole. Always, indeed, there has been a considerable body of sentiment in favor of such a change in the practice. Many of the state judges would favor it; some for reasons of principle, but most because they would gladly get rid of a body of duty which to many is irksome and a distasteful interference with their ordinary matters of litigation by duties which they regard as properly more administrative than judicial. No Federal judge will hear of any such addition to their already great burden of work.

The reasons to the contrary are weighty and thus far have been controlling. In the first place, after all is said, an individual, however national his citizenship in the large sense, is politically a unit of the state in which he resides. He does not vote for any strictly Federal officer; the only civic relationships which he bears to the nation as such are those of direct taxation and national military service—and both of those are of comparatively recent establishment. He does not vote for President of the United States, but for a group of Presidential electors who will cast the vote of his state in the Electoral College. When he votes for two Senators and one Representative in Congress, he votes for them as representatives of his own state and Congressional district. The states, as a rule, have been very jealous of every effort to take the direct control of the selection of their citizens out of the hands of officials amenable to local sentiment.

There is another and even better reason, in the fact that the United States courts are relatively few and far between, and the expense of time and travel which would be imposed upon applicants, living elsewhere than in large cities, for having to go (as they do now twice and often more than twice) to the nearest Federal courts would be prohibitive upon all aliens but the most prosperous or those whom some one might have a motive, political or other, for subsidizing in this way. In not a few sparsely settled regions, even as it is now, a petitioner must travel, and take his two witnesses, a total of many hundred miles before he can consummate the process of naturalization and obtain the precious certificate without which he cannot complete his title to his homestead.

The existing law, modified in its allusions to territories which since have become states by the various kinds of legislation relative to their statehood, thus describes the courts which are to have the power to pass upon applications for citizenship:

“PERSONAL EQUATION” OF THE JUDGES

According to the report of the Commissioner of Naturalization for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1919, a total of 2,306 courts of all these kinds have exercised naturalization jurisdiction during that year, and a list of judges, compiled by the Americanization Study from information obtained from the Naturalization Service and from other sources, shows that about 1,450 individual judges, Federal, state, and local, preside in these courts. A grand total of approximately 100,000 cases a year—the figure roughly used in estimating the naturalization business of recent years—would give to each judge an average of about 70 cases a year; but since in the great majority of rural districts this business is exceedingly small—in some cases not more than two or three in a year—and since the bulk of it is in the large cities and in particular regions, such as the mining districts of Pennsylvania, West Virginia, Illinois, etc., certain courts have a very large number of cases, in some instances running into thousands.

In the last analysis, the individual judge is, subject to certain noteworthy restrictions and interferences, the final arbiter in every case. Upon his “personal equation,” his opinions and prejudices, to a great extent depends the reception which the petitioner experiences when he comes into court for the final stage of his initiation as an American citizen.

Obviously, then, it becomes important to ascertain the general attitude of the naturalizing judges throughout the country toward the law as it stands, toward the naturalization process in general, toward the petitioner for citizenship. In the last analysis the judge is a human being, moved by human motives, warped by human prejudices, subject to the same personal, local, and general influences that condition the emotions and actions of the rest of us toward our fellow men.

With this in view, the Americanization Study addressed a questionnaire to each of the approximately 1,400 judges throughout the country entitled[85] to jurisdiction in naturalization proceedings in the 2,300 courts over which from time to time they preside for this purpose. Somewhat less than one-third (423, or about 31 per cent) of the judges thus addressed replied or were accounted for in some manner more or less complete. Any exact or conclusive tabulation of the replies would be impracticable because the questions called for expression of opinions rather than categorical or statistical answers; a large proportion of the judges left one or more of the questions unanswered or qualified their answers in such a way as to preclude the possibility of precise classification. Nevertheless, the results as a whole are highly significant and informing—almost as much so in their negative aspects as in the definite replies evoked.

For example, it is interesting to observe the difference not only in the ratio of replies received to the number of judges questioned, but in the character of the replies as regards general strictness or liberality of attitude, in the various parts of the country. The first point is to be seen in the following list of naturalization districts, with the approximate number of judges in each and the number of them heard from:

Pittsburgh District.--Comprising Western Pennsylvania, Western New York, West Virginia, Ohio, Maryland (counties of Allegheny, Frederick, Garrett, and Washington), Kentucky (counties of Campbell and Kenton).

Washington District.--Comprising the District of Columbia, Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky (except the counties of Campbell, Jefferson, and Kenton), Louisiana, Maryland (except the counties of Allegheny, Frederick, Garrett, and Washington), Mississippi, North Carolina, Porto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee (except Shelby County), Texas, and Virginia.

St. Louis District.--Comprising Arkansas, Oklahoma, Missouri, Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, Shelby County, Tennessee, and Southern Illinois.

Chicago District.--Comprising Northern Illinois, Indiana, Southern Wisconsin, Jefferson County, Kentucky, Southern Peninsula of Michigan, and Mackinac County, Michigan.

St. Paul District.--Comprising Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Northern Wisconsin, Northern Peninsula of Michigan (except Mackinac County).

Denver District.—Comprising Colorado, New Mexico, Wyoming, Utah, and the counties of Bannock, Bear Lake, Bingham, Bonneville, Custer, Franklin, Fremont, Jefferson, Lemhi, Madison, Oneida, and Power, Idaho.

San Francisco District.—Comprising California, Arizona, and Nevada.

Seattle District.—Comprising Washington, Oregon, Montana, and Idaho (except as assigned to Denver).

Recapitulation

Percentage of Replies

It would be perilous to generalize from these figures as to the interest of judges in various parts of the country in the study of the problems involved in naturalization. Silence does not necessarily imply indifference; moreover, the courts in large centers of population are overburdened with ordinary litigation, and it is not surprising that there should be procrastination or entire failure in responding to a more or less elaborate questionnaire. Nevertheless, there is food for reflection in the fact that the lowest percentages of exhibited interest are in the East and South—the highest west of the Mississippi River.

The judges who did reply to the questionnaire represent on the whole both wide experience and substantial interest in the subject. Of those who state the number of naturalization cases coming before them in an average year, more than 100 passed upon 100 cases or more—not including the very large numbers passed by a few in acceptance of soldiers under the “military naturalization law”; at least as many more had from 50 to 100 cases a year (160 between 10 and 100); only 67 reported less than 10. Upward of 400 judges, each answering for himself, undoubtedly afford a reasonably reliable cross-section of the opinion of the naturalizing agency of the government.

BIRD’S-EYE VIEW OF THE QUESTIONNAIRE

The questions which were asked, and the general nature of the replies to each, give a bird’s-eye view of the principal phases of the problem, and a fair notion of the degree to which the judges may be regarded as liberal or conservative and alive to the situation. The questions and the figures given after each speak for themselves:

GENERAL TREND OF JUDGES’ OPINIONS

The returns of this questionnaire, from a sufficiently representative cross-section of the naturalizing agency of the government, self-selected by the operation of substantial personal interest in the problems embodied in the situation (as evidenced by taking the pains to express opinion), make clear the opinion of the judges on several important points, and may be summarized substantially as follows:

(1) The judges on the whole believe that the present law requires no drastic amendment in principle; they believe that the naturalizing function should remain with the courts; should not be confined to the Federal courts, and should be exercised in the open courtrooms as it is at present. And this, notwithstanding the fact that the function adds materially to the burden of ordinary litigation.

(2) In the matter of attitude toward both petitioners and their witnesses, the judges are in the main liberal and humane, judging of absence during the five years’ probationary period chiefly with regard to the occasion for the absence and the continuing intention to become an American citizen, and the witnesses’ knowledge of the petitioner by the practical facts in the case.

(3) An overwhelming majority of the judges favor mitigation of the technicalities now surrounding the proceeding by permitting the substitution of witnesses and the supplying of evidence to convince the court, by means of depositions covering portions of the period of residence within the state in which the petition is filed. It may be added that very many of the judges would accept testimony of the same character as that which they would receive in any other sort of proceeding before the court to establish any fact.

(4) A majority of the judges require of petitioners proof of ability to read the English language; some require also ability to write it—although the law requires only ability to speak it. There is a marked weight of opinion in favor of requiring reading; some also advocate writing—even among the judges who do not now require it because the present law does not. The judges are about evenly divided as to the desirability of a uniform educational test. Most of those who oppose it emphasize the fact that, in the selection of citizens, character and general reputation are more important than book learning; that a bad man is made only the more dangerous by education. A majority of the judges would favor a required course of instruction, and would accept as prima-facie evidence of intellectual fitness a school certificate of the successful completion of such a course. Increasingly, such certificates are in fact accepted by courts all over the country.

(5) The judges are emphatically opposed to the abolition of the declaration of intention, the ratio of expressions in the negative being approximately three to one. The declaration is regarded by the judges of the widest experience as having a moral value of great importance, and as affording indispensable notice to the government and the public of the alien’s intention to apply for “active membership.”

(6) With regard to married women, the judges are two to one in favor of permitting their naturalization as individuals, regardless of the action of their husbands, and nearly as much so in favor of reserving to American-born women their citizenship, notwithstanding their marriage to aliens. As regards the latter point, most of those expressing themselves in the affirmative insert the proviso that the woman must continue her domicile in this country.

(7) Opinion is in the negative as regards naturalization of “any individual personally fit, regardless of race or color.” Most of the judges interpret the question as applying to Chinese and Japanese. A Southern judge holds that “since citizenship has been granted to the African race, there is no reason for withholding it from any other.” Those who vote in the affirmative do so on the ground that even membership in the Mongolian racial groups should not exclude persons who can show personal fitness for citizenship; nevertheless, the vote in the negative is more than two to one.

(8) The judges are not clear with regard to the suggestion of a standard test for all prospective voters, native or foreign born, by which even native Americans at the age of twenty-one years should pass at least the same examination as an alien applicant before being armed with the ballot. Nevertheless, nearly two to one of those who spoke on that point favor the establishment of such a test.

(9) Military naturalization is the subject of grave doubt. The vote is about evenly divided—a shade toward the negative—but nearly as many judges are doubtful or noncommittal as are either favorable or opposed to the measure. It should be said, however, that those most emphatically satisfied with what was done in this regard are those who had the most experience with it.

THE CLERKS OF THE COURTS

The clerks of the courts in many ways are not less important in the experience of the petitioning alien than either the judges or the naturalization examiner. Upon the clerk, more than upon anyone else, in the vast majority of cases, depends scrutiny of the declaration of intention; usually he actually makes out the declaration for the alien; if he is careful and familiar with the routine of form and fact he makes it out, or sees that it is made out, correctly; if he regards the whole business as a nuisance, has a prejudice against immigrants as such or against the particular race represented by this particular alien, or doesn’t like this individual, if he has had a controversy with the Naturalization Service or is, for some other reason, in an unfriendly mood, or if, as is more likely to be the case, he is simply careless or unfamiliar with the technic of the business—having very little of it to do—the interests of the alien may suffer accordingly. The courts do not give the alien the benefit of any allowance for clerical or other errors made or permitted by the clerk if they relate in the slightest degree to any material fact; the alien must guard himself against any such error, or bear the consequences alone. In fact, the courts have repeatedly held, as it is expressed in a brief in the case of Mulcrevy vs. San Francisco, in the United States Supreme Court, that the duties in connection with naturalization performed by clerks of courts “are not appurtenant to the office of clerk of court.... All of their transactions with the Bureau of Naturalization, and these include almost all of their service, are performed without any reference to the court.”[86] In many instances, the clerks are greatly annoyed by having this citizenship work thrust upon them; they take no pleasure in having been “freely designated by Congress to serve the purposes of the Federal government,” or in being thus “instrumentalities or agencies of the Federal government,” as the Mulcrevy brief puts it, and perform their duties in a careless, grudging, and ill-natured spirit.

In most of the rural districts, naturalization business is very light; sometimes there will be only two or three cases a year; there are even courts in which a year or two might pass without any at all. In such instances the labor is trivial; but for that very reason the clerk is not alive to the importance of details, and the ratio of mistakes may be the greater for that reason.

In the large cities, where the naturalization business is heavy, there are usually deputy clerks devoting virtually all of their attention to it; they keep in practice, and avoid errors. But it is to be remembered that because this work is not “appurtenant to the office of clerk of court,” neither the United States nor the state contributes anything whatever to the remuneration of the clerk. The alien pays for that, in a manner well calculated to create an undesirable relationship all the way round. The clerk is put in this regard largely at the mercy of the Naturalization Service, and the result is not a happy one—as might very well be expected.

THE QUESTION OF ADEQUATE CLERICAL FORCE

The report of the New York State Commission of Immigration, transmitted to the Legislature April 5, 1909, after the present system had been in operation about two years, dealt with this matter in connection with its comment upon delays in the naturalization business in the courts, especially of New York City, which is attributed chiefly to insufficiency of clerical force, due, in its finding, to the operation of the following provision of the naturalization law: