An account of the battle of Wilson's Creek, or Oak Hills, fought between the Union troops, commanded by Gen. N. Lyon and the Southern, or Confederate troops, under command of Gens. McCulloch and Price, on Saturday, August 10, 1861, in Greene county, Missouri

At Mrs. Chambers’ house, four miles south of Springfield, Col. Sigel and his two guards halted and procured a drink of water, and then rode away to Springfield, as rapidly as their jaded horses could carry them. Sigel himself arrived at Springfield with but one orderly.

Only the cavalry under Carr and Farrand, the one piece of artillery, two caissons and about 150 infantry came off in anything like order, and these followed down the wire road some miles to the west and then turned off due north and united with Sturgis’ column, near the Little York road. Only four pieces of artillery were captured at the time of the charge on the hill, for those were all that were in position. The two others were in the rear. In attempting to get one of them away a wheel horse was killed, and the drivers abandoned the gun, after first spiking it as best they could. The gun that was saved was first abandoned out on the Fayetteville road, and hauled off at first by hand a short distance, Capt. Flagg employing the prisoners and soldiers as artillery horses.

Concerning the retreat of that portion of Sigel’s force which went to the westward, Lieut. Chas. E. Farrand (then of the Second Regular Infantry) commanding the company of cavalry before mentioned, writes:—

Upon finding myself with my company alone, I retired in a southerly direction, and accidentally meeting one of the guides (Mr. Crenshaw), who had been employed in taking us to the enemy’s camp, I forcibly detained him until I could collect some of the troops, whom I found scattered and apparently lost. I halted my company and got quite a number together, and directed the guide to proceed to Springfield, via Little York. After proceeding a short distance, we came upon one of the pieces which had been taken from Col. Sigel. Although the tongue of the limber was broken, one horse gone, and one of the remaining three badly wounded, we succeeded in moving it on. Some distance in advance of this we found a caisson, also belonging to Col. Sigel’s battery. I then had with me Sergt. Bradburn, of company D, 1st cavalry, and Corporal Lewis and Private Smith, of my own company (C, 2d dragoons). My company being some distance in advance, I caused the caisson to be opened, and on discovering that it was full of ammunition, I determined to take it on. I and the three men with me tried to prevail upon some of the Germans to assist us in clearing some of the wounded horses from the harness, but they would not stop. After considerable trouble, my small party succeeded in clearing the wounded horses from the harness, hitching in two more and a pair of small mules I obtained, and moved on, Corporal Lewis and Private Smith driving, while Sergt. Bradburn and I led the horses. After reaching the retreating troops again I put two other men on the animals, and joined my company with my three men. Before reaching Springfield it became necessary to abandon the caisson,[9] in order to hitch the animals to the piece. This was done after destroying the ammunition it contained. Lieut. Morris, adjutant to Col. Sigel’s command, assisted me in procuring wagons, which we sent back on the road after the wounded.

The route of retreat taken by Lieut. Farrand and Capt. Flagg, and the fragments of Sigel’s command, 400 in all, was down the wire road a short distance, and then north to the Mt. Vernon road. While marching northward this body of disordered men was only within two or three miles of the entire Southern army for three or four hours. Why Generals Price and McCulloch did not send out a small force of mounted men and take prisoner every man, which could very easily have been done, is inexcusable, certainly.

DR. S. H. MELCHER’S ACCOUNT.

Mention has been made of Dr. Samuel H. Melcher, who as assistant surgeon of Col. Salomon’s 5th Missouri (Dr. E. C. Franklin, being surgeon), was present at the battle of Wilson’s Creek with Sigel’s command. To the writer hereof Dr. Melcher, now of Chicago, sends his recollections of the events of the memorable contest. After narrating the preliminary movements of Sigel, substantially as heretofore given, Dr. Melcher says:—

* * * Gen. Sigel soon gave the order to fire, which was responded to with rapidity, but our guns being on an elevation, and the Confederates being in a field which sloped toward the creek, the shots passed over their heads, creating a stampede but doing little, if any, damage to life or limb. In vain I and others urged the artillerymen to depress the guns. Either from inability to understand English, or, in the excitement, thinking it was only necessary to load and fire, they kept banging away till the whole camp was deserted. * * * The command then moved on till it reached the Fayetteville road and Sharp’s house. While the command was taking position, I with my orderly, Frank Ackoff, 5th Missouri, went into the abandoned Arkansas camp where I found a good breakfast of coffee, biscuit and fried green corn. * * * Most of the tents were open—a musket with fixed bayonet being forced into the ground, but up, and the flap of the tent held open by being caught in the flint lock. At that time, besides a few Confederate sick, there were in the camp Lieut. Chas. E. Farrand, in command of the dragoons, and his orderly. Half an hour later, some straggling parties from the 3d and 5th Missouri, set fire to some wagons and camp equipage.

* * * The four guns were in the front, supported by the 3d Missouri, with the cavalry and dragoons on the left in the timber. The 5th Missouri was in reserve, except Co. K, Capt. Sam’l A. Flagg, which was further in the rear, guarding some thirty or forty prisoners. At this time, scattering shots were heard at some distance in our front, but no heavy firing. Armed men, mostly mounted, were seen moving on our right in the edge of the timber. * * *

It was smoky, and objects at a distance could not be seen very distinctly. Being at some distance in front of the command, I saw a body of men moving down the valley toward us, from the direction we last heard Gen. Lyon’s guns. I rode back, and reported to Gen. Sigel that troops were coming, saying to him, “They look like the 1st Missouri.” [Iowa?] They seemed moving in a column. * * * By this time, Sigel could see them. Not seeing their colors, I suggested to Sigel that he had better show his, so that if it was our men they might not mistake us—Sigel’s brigade not being in regulation uniform. Gen. Sigel turned and said: “Color-bearer, advance with your colors, and wave them—wave them three times.” As this order was being obeyed, Lieut. Farrand, with his orderly, arrived from the Arkansas camp, each bearing a rebel guidon, which they had found, and with which they rode from the right of the line, near Sharp’s house, directly in front of the color-bearer of Sigel’s regiment. Then there was music in the air. A battery we could not see opened with grape, making a great deal of noise as the shot struck the fence and trees, but not doing much damage, as far as observed, except to scare the men, who hunted for cover like a flock of young partridges, suddenly disturbed. The confusion was very great, many of the men saying, “It is Totten’s battery! It is Totten’s battery!” The impression seemed to be general that Totten was firing into us, after seeing the rebel guidons of Farrand, as it was the common understanding that the Confederates had no grape, and these were grape shot, certainly.[10]

Gen. Sigel now evidently thought of retreat, as the only words I heard from him were, “Where’s my guides?” [Instances of individual cowardice among Sigel’s officers are here given.] I assisted Lieut. Emile Thomas (now of St. Louis), the only officer of his company that had the grit to stay, to reform the men. I do not know if we could have succeeded, had not a Confederate cavalry battalion suddenly appeared in our front, on the line of retreat. For a moment the two commands gazed upon each other, and then came a terrible rattle of musketry, and a great hubbub and confusion in the direction of Sigel’s command, which was just around a bend in the road to our rear.

In a twinkling, men, horses, wagons, guns, all enveloped in a cloud of dust, rushed toward us, and in spite of Lieut. Thomas’s utmost efforts, Company F started with all speed down the Fayetteville road toward the Confederate cavalry. The latter, seeming to think that they were being charged upon, wheeled and got out of the way very quickly! The bulk of Gen. Sigel’s command turned to the east and were followed by a Confederate command, that captured one gun at the creek, many prisoners, and left a considerable number of killed and wounded along the road.

Perhaps one-third of the command went southwest, and halted at the next house beyond Sharps’ on the Fayetteville road, and here Dr. Smith, who was Gen. Rains’ division surgeon, came up, with a long train of wagons and coaches, and was captured, but at once released on my intervention. [After this, Dr. Melcher accompanied Dr. Smith to the battle-field.] * * * The one gun that was abandoned on the Fayetteville road was really saved by Capt. Flagg, whose men drew the gun by hand till they found some horses, and the Confederate prisoners carried the ammunition in their arms. * * * They came into Springfield the same evening by way of Little York.

Sigel’s reasons for his defeat must here be given. He states that he tried to obey his orders to attack the enemy in the rear and to cut off his retreat. This he did, but he also cut off his own retreat very nearly, a circumstance he had not counted upon.

The time of service of one of his two regiments of infantry, the 5th Missouri, Salomon’s, had expired some days before the battle and they had clamored to go home. On the first of August he had induced them to remain with the army eight days more. This latter term had expired the day before the battle. The men therefore were under no obligations to fight, except that they had marched out to do so, and when the time came, suddenly remembered that “they did not have to fight.” The 3d regiment, Sigel’s own, was not the old 3d, that fought at Carthage; that regiment, its time having expired, had been mustered out, and the new regiment was composed of 400 new recruits and of but a few other men who had seen service. The men serving the artillery were new recruits who knew next to nothing of gunnery, and were commanded by two lieutenants whose only experience as artillerists had been in the Prussian army in a time of peace. Again it is stated that only about half of the companies were officered by men with commissions, which Sigel says, was the fault of the three months’ service.

But over all it is claimed that Sigel’s complete defeat was the result of an attack of vastly superior forces, the flower of McCulloch’s army, that was permitted to approach fatally near under the mistake that they were friends instead of enemies.

As explaining and detailing something of the retreat of that wing of Sigel’s command which turned to the east, the following statement of Captain (now General) E. A. Carr, who, as previously stated, commanded the advance guard of Sigel’s brigade, may be found of interest:—

“At about 9 o’clock Capt. Carr received word that Sigel’s infantry were in full flight and that he was to retreat with all haste. After galloping away as best he could for about a mile and a half to the rear, Carr came upon Sigel at the spring where the army had halted the first night when returning from Dug Spring some days before. After a brief consultation it was decided to move south on the Fayetteville road until there was a chance to go out and circle around the pursuing enemy and then strike for Springfield. There were then present at the spring Sigel, Carr, Lieut.-Col. Albert, Carr’s 56 cavalry, 200 of Sigel’s badly demoralized infantry, one piece of artillery, and two caissons. After “retiring” rather hastily for a mile or so a body of cavalry was observed in front, and Sigel sent Carr up to see the condition of affairs and report at once. Arriving at the front Carr discovered that the Confederate cavalry were coming in from the right and forming across the road, to stop the retreating Federals and send them back to the care of McCulloch’s division again. Reporting at once to Sigel, that officer directed Carr to turn off at the first right-hand road, which happened to be near the point where he (Carr) then stood. Retreating along this road in a brisk walk Sigel asked Carr to march slowly so that the footmen could keep up. Carr replied that unless they hurried forward they would be cut off at the crossing of Wilson’s Creek, and that the infantry ought to march as fast under the circumstances as a horse could walk. Sigel then said, “Go on, and we will keep up.” On arriving at the creek, however, and looking back, Carr saw that the infantry had not kept up, but that a large body of Texas and Arkansas cavalry was moving down and would form an unpleasant junction with him in a few seconds. “To use a Westernism,” says Gen. Carr, “there was no time for fooling then, and as I had waited long enough on the slow-motioned infantry to water my horses, and they were not yet in sight, I lit out for a place of safety which I soon reached, and after waiting another while for Sigel, I went on to Springfield. I was sorry to leave Sigel behind, in the first place, but I supposed all the time he was close to me until I reached the creek, and then it would have done no good for my company to have remained and been cut to pieces also, as were Sigel and his men, who were ambuscaded and all broken up, and Sigel himself narrowly escaped.”

CHAPTER III.
THE BATTLE OF WILSON’S CREEK.—Concluded.

The Southern Side of the Story—The Part Taken by McCulloch’s Army—Preparations for a March on Springfield—A Light Rain Interferes—The Federal Attack—A Complete Surprise—McCulloch Thinks it “Another of Rains’ Scares!”—The Fight Against Lyon—Order of Battle—McCulloch Comes to the Rescue—The Missourians in Battle—Detailed Account of the Fighting—The Beginning of the End—Victory!—No Pursuit of the Retreating Federals—McCulloch’s Destruction of Sigel—After the Famous Victory—Comparative Strength and Losses of the Two Armies—The Federal Strength—The Confederate Strength—Price’s Army by Divisions—The Federal Loss by Regiments and Battalions—The Confederate Loss by Divisions—Disposing of the Dead—The Home Guards at Springfield—The Retreat from Springfield—Care of the Federal Wounded—The Army Sets out—Hundreds of Citizens Follow it—The Confederates Enter Springfield—McCulloch’s Proclamation—Price’s Proclamation—Joy and Congratulations.

THE SOUTHERN SIDE OF THE STORY.

As one side, the Northern, or Federal, or Union side, of the battle of Wilson’s Creek has been told it is but proper that the other, the Southern or Confederate, or secession side, should be given. The statements herein made have been derived from the most authentic sources possible to be consulted. The writer returns his sincere thanks to those Confederate officers, scattered from the Iowa line to the Rio Grande, who have responded to his request for information so promptly and so fully, and in such well written letters.

THE PART TAKEN BY M’CULLOCH’S ARMY.

It will be remembered that Gen. McCulloch had at last yielded to Gen. Price’s persistent and positive demands, and had agreed to march against Lyon at Springfield on the night of August 9th and attack him on the morning of the 10th. The march was to be made in four columns and to be begun at 9 o’clock at night.

Just after dark a light rain fell, and it was very dark and a heavy rain storm seemed to be coming up. McCulloch well knew that many of the Missouri troops were not supplied with cartridge boxes, or cartridges either, and that if they moved out from under shelter and it rained hard, as it promised to do, their ammunition would become wet and unserviceable, carried, as much of it would be, in powder-flasks, cotton sacks and shot-pouches. There was also danger that in the Egyptian darkness that had settled down over the land the marching columns would get lost or bewildered, and not come up to the proper place at the proper time. Accordingly, just as some of the troops were preparing to start, McCulloch countermanded the order to march at that time, and the army lay down to sleep, holding itself in readiness to move, however, the men with their guns by their sides. Not much sleep was had, however, for lack of all proper accommodations, and because of the myriads of mosquitoes on the warpath that night up and down the valley of Wilson’s creek.

Had Gen. Price been left to himself the day of the 9th, he would have taken “my Missouri boys” that night and marched toward Springfield over the very route that Lyon took from Springfield to the Confederate camp, via the Mt. Vernon road and over the prairie, and the two armies, Price’s and Lyon’s, would have met, to each other’s surprise, about midnight, somewhere near the present site of Dorchester.

In his official report to the Confederate Secretary of War, Gen. McCulloch states that his effective force at the battle of Wilson’s Creek was 5,300 infantry, 6,000 cavalry, and fifteen pieces of artillery. The majority of the cavalry were armed only with rifles, revolvers, shot-guns, and old flint-lock muskets. There were hundreds of other horsemen along with the army, that were so imperfectly armed as to be of but little efficiency, and during the battle were only in the way.

THE FEDERAL ATTACK.

Col. T. L. Snead states that on the night of the 9th he sat up all night at Gen. Price’s headquarters, which were on the side of the creek, at the foot of the sloping, rocky, black-jack hills on whose summit the main battle was fought. About daybreak Gen. Price got up in great impatience and sent for McCulloch, who soon afterward arrived, accompanied by Col. James McIntosh (of the 2d Arkansas Mounted Riflemen), his assistant adjutant-general. “Gen. Price and I were just sitting down to breakfast,” says Col. Snead, “and they sat down with us.”

As the officers were eating, a messenger came running up from the front, where Gen. Rains’ division was posted, a mile or more away, and said that the Yankees were advancing, full 20,000 strong, and were on Rains’ line already, peppering his camp with musketry. “O, pshaw,” said McCulloch, laughingly, “that’s another of Rains’ scares,” alluding to the Dug Springs affair. “Tell Gen. Rains I will come to the front myself directly,” he added. The three officers went on eating, and in a minute or two another messenger came up and reported that the Federals were not more than a mile away, and had come suddenly upon Rains’ men as they lay on their arms and had driven them back. McCulloch again said, “O, nonsense! That’s not true;” but just then Rains’ men could be seen falling back in confusion. Gen. Price rose up and said to Col. Snead, “Have my horse saddled, and order the troops under arms at once.” He had hardly spoken when Totten’s battery unlimbered and sent its first shot, and about the same instant Sigel’s guns opened.

Dispositions for battle were quickly made. Price was ordered to move at once towards Rains with the rest of the Missourians. Pearce was ordered to form on Price’s left. Very soon Totten’s battery was in plain sight on the top of the hills in front and pounding away, while Sigel’s guns in the rear plainly gave notice that the Federals were on all sides.

The surprise was perfect. Most of the Southern troops were asleep. The few pickets that were out had mostly been called in to prepare for the early march, and this enabled Lyon to get close to the line,—upon the skirmishers, in fact,—before being discovered. The troops hurried out as fast and as best they could. The majority of Price’s Missourians had their horses with them. Nearly every secessionist, upon enlisting, wanted to ride and did ride. The idea of walking was distasteful in more ways than one,—it was laborious, to begin with, and it was considered somewhat plebeian and disgraceful. And the horsemen, so many of them, proved a serious disadvantage to the Southern cause. They stripped the country in many parts of this State and west of the Mississippi, not only of provisions but of forage and provender, cumbered the roads, and often in battle did more harm than good. At Wilson’s Creek the horses became frightened and unmanageable, and at one time they and some of their riders came near stampeding the entire Southern army. Hundreds of them tried to escape from the field by the Fayetteville road, but found it held by Sigel and his Germans.

THE FIGHT AGAINST LYON.

The Missourians under Rains were first attacked by Lyon. Rains had his division under arms and in line with commendable promptness. A great many of his men scattered, it is true, but the majority were soon in ranks and fighting the enemy. Rains’ division was a large one, including all the men from the populous secession counties of Saline, Lafayette, Jackson, Johnson, and Pettis, and it held that part of the line in front of Totten’s battery. Gen. Price instantly ordered the other division commanders,—Slack, McBride, Clark and Parsons,—to move their infantry and artillery rapidly forward to the support of Rains. Rains’ second brigade was in the extreme advance, and consisted of some 1,200 or 1,500 men, mounted and dismounted, temporarily under the command of Col. Cawthorn.

Slack’s division of Northwest Missourians was the first to come up, and under the personal direction of Gen. Price himself, who had come to the front, took position on Rains’ left, and became instantly engaged. In a few minutes afterwards came John B. Clark’s division and formed to the left of Slack. Then came M. M. Parsons’ division, with Col. Kelly’s regiment or brigade at the head, and went into line to the left of Clark. Then came the division of Gen. J. H. McBride, who took position on the left of Col. Kelly and commanded a flank movement on the right of the enemy, which movement was unsuccessful. (It cannot be learned in what part of the field the forces of Gen. A. E. Steen, of the 5th division, Missouri State Guard, did duty.)

In this position, by Gen. Price’s orders, and led by him in person at the first, the entire line advanced in the direction of the enemy, under a continuous fire from Lyon’s infantry and Totten’s battery, until it reached a position within range of its own guns when the Federal fire was returned, the double-barreled shotguns getting in their work now very effectively. After a few minutes steady firing the Missourians were driven back.

M’CULLOCH COMES TO THE RESCUE.

Meantime Gen. McCulloch had hurried to the lower end of the valley where his division was encamped, and the impetuous Texan chieftain speedily brought out of camp Col. Hebert’s Louisiana regiment, and McIntosh’s Arkansas mounted riflemen, and hastened to the rescue of the Missourians. This force went to the east side of Wilson’s Creek and coming up to the fence enclosing Ray’s cornfield, the Arkansas riflemen dismounted, and they and the Louisianians leaped over the fence and charged through the corn upon the Federals (Plummer’s battalion) and drove them back upon the main line with loss. This fight in the cornfield was one of the severest of the day, and when it was ended many a corn blade and stalk and tassel had been torn with bullets, and many a dead man lay in the furrows. For no sooner had the Federal infantry been driven back than Dubois’ battery opened on the Confederates in the field whose surface had never been disturbed by any thing ruder than Farmer Ray’s plow. But now it was soon plowed by shot and shell, and death gathered a full harvest where only the husbandmen had reaped before. The two regiments were driven back with some loss and considerable confusion, but soon reformed and taken charge of by McCulloch in person, who led them to another part of the field.

McCulloch had also ordered up Woodruff’s battery, which had engaged Totten and was doing excellent service. During the period of the fight in the cornfield, Price’s Missourians were endeavoring to sustain themselves in the center, and were hotly engaged on the sides of the height upon which the enemy was posted. Early in the fight, the 1st Regiment of Arkansas Mounted Rifles, which had been driven out of its camp by Sigel, and had formed a few hundred yards to the north, was brought up by Price’s order to the support of Gen. Slack, and formed on his left. Here it fought during the battle, led in person by its commander. Col. T. J. Churchill,[11] who had two horses killed under him. The regiment’s loss was 42 killed and 155 wounded. One captain (McAlexander) and three lieutenants were among the killed. The 2d Arkansas Mounted Rifles, Col. B. T. Embry, also fought with the Missourians against Lyon, losing 11 killed and 44 wounded.

Then came the “forward and back” period of fighting described in the Federal account, which lasted for hours. Sometimes the advantage was with one party, sometimes with the other. The firing, both of infantry and artillery, was incessant. Many deeds of gallantry and heroism were performed—enough to immortalize the memory of any one of the perpetrators.

One unfortunate thing, brought about by the battle, was the fact that it produced, or rather made conspicuous, a large crowd of liars who are yet wont to brag and bluster about the various deeds of valor they performed at Wilson’s Creek, while the chances are that instead of displaying any remarkable quality of bravery or feat of extraordinary value, they were skulking in the bushes or sitting securely under cover somewhere, not firing a gun or harming an enemy. This is true of both sides. Pity ’tis that any man who wore either the blue or the gray should be a liar, but pity ’tis ’tis true. Deeds worthy of Rome or Sparta—aye, worthy of America, were rendered that day of battle on Wilson’s creek, but these shameless liars one often meets with did none of them.

From nearly every quarter of Missouri had come the Missourians who this day fought under the flag of the grizzly bears and against the stars and stripes. Slack had men from off the Iowa line; John B. Clark had men from the Northeast (properly belonging to Harris’ division, not then south of the Missouri) whose homes were in sight of Hannibal and of the great Mississippi farther to the north. Men fought who, when at home, could stand in their door-yards and look westward over on the prairies of the then territory of Nebraska. Many of McBride’s division were from Southeastern Missouri, from the swamps of Pemiscot, from the cypress forests of Dunklin. From the cities—from the warehouses, the counting-rooms and the law offices of St. Louis, St. Joseph and other Missouri towns, had come some men to fight against what they believed to be Federal tyranny and usurpation, and for the honor of old Missouri and the rights of the South. And men fought under Price that day whose feet were on “their native heath,” whose homes were in this county, in sight of the battle-ground.

And they all fought well, those in line, whether advancing or retreating, firing or falling back. Not any better than the Federals, perhaps, but fully as well. There were some stragglers on both sides—not all of the cowards were in but one army.

When early in the engagement Gen. Clark sent a mile and a half to the rear for his regiment of cavalry, Col. James P. Major, commanding, that officer was attacked by Sigel at the moment of receiving the order and driven back into the woods with all his force. After reforming and starting toward the front where Lyon was, to join their own division, Major’s men were all broken up by large bodies of other horsemen, who, seeking to escape from Totten’s grape and Dubois’ shells and the Kansas men’s musket balls, rode through Major’s ranks in all directions, dividing the forces and communicating their own terror to those about them, so that the colonel was left with only one company.

Assisted by Clark’s adjutant-general, Col. Casper W. Bell, of Brunswick, Chariton county, and Capt. Joseph Finks, the colonel (Major) succeeded in getting up some 300 men with whom he returned to the rear and assisted in the defeat of Sigel. The remainder of those who could be formed into line (and many of them could when they found that the only road leading out of camp was held by Sigel), were taken charge of by Lieut. Col. Hyde and advanced to the front where Lyon was, but while preparing to charge the Federal left they were driven back by Dubois’ battery and some infantry.

At last, after Price’s line had advanced half a dozen times and been driven back as often, and after the fight had been going on nearly six hours and victory was not yet certain for either side, McCulloch came back from whipping Sigel and brought with him the Louisianians, Carroll’s (Arkansas) and the greater portion of Greer’s (Texas) cavalry, Col. Tom P. Dockery’s 5th Arkansas infantry, McIntosh’s 2d Arkansas rifle regiment, under Lieut. Col. Embry, Gratiot’s 3d Arkansas regiment, and McRae’s regiment. Reid’s battery was also brought up.

THE BEGINNING OF THE END.

The terrible fire of musketry was now kept up along the whole side and top of the hill on which the enemy was posted. Masses of infantry fell back and again rushed forward. The summit of the hill was covered with the dead and wounded. Both sides were fighting with all desperation for the victory. Gens. Price and McCulloch were among their men animating them by their voice, their presence, and their example. Price was slightly wounded but would not leave the field.

To relieve the infantry McCulloch resolved to make a diversion in their favor with the cavalry. Accordingly a portion of Carroll’s and Greer’s regiments, and a mass of Missourians were formed to go up the valley and fall upon the Federal left, but, as before stated, Dubois’ battery and the Federal infantry scattered the horsemen before they could get fairly into line.

VICTORY!

At this critical moment, when the fortunes of the day seemed at the turning point, McCulloch ordered forward his reserves and threw them into the scale. Forward came the rest of Pearce’s Arkansas division, Gratiot’s and Dockery’s regiments, on the run and cheering. Into the thickest of the fight and throwing away their “tooth-picks,” as their huge knives were called relied solely on their muskets, and did most effective work in the center of the line. Reid’s battery was also ordered forward, and Hebert’s Louisianians were again called into action on the left of it. Guibor’s battery, of Parson’s division, opened with canister on the Federals, and terrible was the din and the slaughter.

Now the battle became general and violent and bloody. Hot as a furnace was the hollow in which the Confederates fought, made so by the blazing August sun overhead. Hot as a Tophet it became, made so by gunpowder, and lead and iron, and sweat and blood. Probably no two opposing forces ever fought with greater desperation, as the Confederate line was advanced on the last charge. But Lyon was killed, Totten’s battery moved to the rear, and soon the entire Federal force left the field in possession of the Southerners.

The battle ended suddenly, “as quick as a clap of thunder ceases,” one describes it, and for some time after the Federals had retreated it was not certain to the Confederates how the battle had gone. Another attack by the blue-coats was expected and prepared for. Gradually the ground in front where Totten’s battery had stood was occupied, and then a line of skirmishers, pushing cautiously to the front, discovered that the victory was theirs. No attempt at pursuit was made, although McCulloch had 6,000 cavalry, whose horses were fresh and rested, and had not sweat a hair that day. That the Federals were not pursued, and in their jaded and exhausted condition cut off from Springfield and captured on the high prairies west of town, seems inexcusable, even to this day, to those posted in the facts.

The Federal officers plainly assert that the reason they were not pursued was because the Confederates were so badly hurt themselves that they could not do so; and further it is claimed that had Lyon lived a Federal victory would have been gained, and Price and McCulloch driven from the field. It is certain (on the authority of Col. Snead), that Price wished McCulloch to pursue, but the latter, for reasons of his own, would not. Then Price resumed command of the Missouri State Guard, and then he would not pursue, for reasons of his own.

M’CULLOCH’S DESTRUCTION OF SIGEL.

When Sigel came upon the southern end of the Confederate camp the troops he encountered were Churchill’s Arkansas regiment, Greer’s Texas Rangers, and about 700 mounted Missourians under command of Col. James P. Major and Col. Benjamin Brown, of Ray county, the latter the President of the Missouri State Senate. These troops, taken unawares, were speedily pushed back up the valley across the Fayetteville road. It was at this point of the line,—the Confederate right is faced toward the east,—where McCulloch’s Confederates were stationed. When Lyon first opened and alarmed the camp, McCulloch hastened back from Price headquarters, and took up two of his best regiments (Hubert’s and McIntosh’s), to the assistance of his comrade-commander. The absence of these troops weakened the position of McCulloch very materially, and Sigel had matters his own way for a time. Pearce’s division of Arkansas State troops were put in position, somewhat in reserve.

When McCulloch became fully aware that the Federal attack on the south or right was so formidable and so fraught with danger to the entire army, he brought back the Louisiana and Arkansas regiments, and forming them with some of Pearce’s division, and Major’s and Brown’s cavalry, advanced to attack Sigel. The Louisianians and McIntosh’s regiment had got the worst of it, in the end, in the fight in Ray’s cornfield, but they came up to the work now in brave style. The attack was being made on Sigel’s and Salomon’s regiments, and the four guns of Schaeffer and Schuetzenbach. There was only scattering firing on the part of the Federals, who mistook the character of the advancing hosts. It was no fault of McCulloch’s men, however, that Sigel was deceived. The Louisianians were not to blame that they were mistaken for the Iowa regiment because of their dress.[12]

On they came, regardless of the short-sightedness of their foes, and not knowing or caring anything about their enemies’ mistakes until they were within almost grappling distance of Sigel’s cannon, when they sprang forward, and with one well contrived and well managed charge swept everything before them. Then followed the events heretofore described—the vain attempts to rally—the disorderly panic-stricken flight—the captures and the pursuit. It must not be forgotten that just before the charge was made, Reid’s Arkansas battery opened on the unsuspicious Federal Germans, and they were already in confusion when the Confederate infantry and cavalry were precipitated upon them. Capt. Hiram Bledsoe’s Missouri battery, from Lafayette county, with “Old Sacramento,” a noted 12-pounder, and three other guns, also did effective work against Sigel, under direction of Col. Rosser, or Weightman’s brigade.

As soon as Sigel’s destruction had been fairly accomplished (which occupied but a few minutes) McCulloch left the flying fragments to be looked after by sundry detachments of the cavalry, and returned with his infantry and a great deal of the cavalry to the assistance of Gen. Price. In the last efforts against Lyon’s column, McCulloch’s troops took a conspicuous part, as before detailed; and of course but for the part taken by McCulloch’s and Pearce’s men the victory could not have been won.

AFTER THE FAMOUS VICTORY.

Dies iræ! O, the moaning and wailing that were all over the land west of the great Fathers of Waters when the full tidings of the battle of Wilson’s Creek were learned! From Dubuque and Baton Rouge, from Iowa and Texas, from Louisiana and Kansas, and from every county of Missouri, there went up a sobbing prayer from many a household for strength to bear the bereavement of a father, a husband, a brother or a son slain that 10th of August, 1861, down by the beautiful little stream in the Ozarks.

There they lay, strewn all about over the ground, with faces white and waxen, or clotted with blood, these men who had died to please the politicians. In cosy, shady nooks where fairies might delight to dwell; out in the glare of the blazing sun, festering and corrupting; in cornfields with blade and tassel waving above them, in dells and glens, and vales, and on the hillsides—dead men everywhere. With a tiny bullet hole a baby’s finger might stop, marring no feature and mangling no limb; with bowels torn out, with faces shattered, heads torn to pieces, handsome countenances distorted into ghastly, grinning objects—dead men everywhere.

Wounded men everywhere. Crawling about, delirious with pain and agony; lying prone and almost motionless, staring up into the blue sky, dying slowly and making no sign; shrieking, groaning, cursing, praying, imploring help, begging for a bandage, for water, lying quietly, laughing even,—wounded men everywhere. In hospitals, under trees, in tents, in houses, in stables, with surgeons probing and cutting and carving and sawing and clumsily bandaging; in ambulances jolting off towards Springfield; limping along to hide and escape another hurt—wounded men everywhere.

Blood everywhere. On the blades and the silks of the corn; on the leaves of the pretty green bushes.

Staining the velvet moss on the hillsides; purpling in puddles in the pathways and by the roadsides; reddening the lucid waters of bonnie Wilson’s creek; flecking the wheels of the guns and daubing the stocks of the muskets; clinging in loathsome gouts to the stems of wild flowers—blood everywhere—human blood—and the best blood of the Republic, too.

COMPARATIVE STRENGTH AND LOSSES OF THE TWO ARMIES.

The strength of both of the contending armies at the battle of Wilson’s Creek is here given as nearly as it has been possible to obtain it. It is believed that the Federal strength has been very definitely learned; that of the combined Southern forces has been approximated in regard to two or three commands in McCulloch’s division.

FEDERAL STRENGTH.

According to the reports of the company commanders on the morning of the 9th of August, there were in the column that marched under Gen. Lyon exactly 3,721 men of all arms, infantry, cavalry, and artillery, not including the two companies of home guards under Capts. Wright and Switzler.

Sigel’s column consisted of 17 companies of infantry (8 of the 3d Missouri and 9 of the 5th Missouri), numbering 912 men; six pieces of artillery, 85 men; and two companies of cavalry, 121 men;—Total of Sigel’s column, 1,118.

Total Federal strength, 4,839—with Wright’s and Switzler’s home guards, 5,000.

CONFEDERATE STRENGTH.

Without giving exact details, Gen. McCulloch says, in his official report to Gen. Cooper, Adjutant General of the Confederate States: “My own effective force was 5,300 infantry, Woodruff’s and Reed’s batteries, and 6,000 horsemen.” Total, about 11,550.

Gen. Price’s division was composed of the following subdivisions:—

July 30, at Cassville, Gen. McCulloch reported his force and that of Gen. Pearce, as numbering in aggregate 5,700, “nearly all well armed.” (Rebellion Records, vol. 3, series I, p. 622). Gen. Pearce loaned the Missourians six hundred stand of arms. Afterwards, McCulloch received Greer’s South Kansas Texas cavalry of 1,100 men, and one or two independent companies from Arkansas, making his and Pearce’s forces combined, number about 7,000 men. In round numbers the Southern troops numbered about 12,000 at the battle of Wilson’s Creek; the Federal or Union forces, 5,000.

THE FEDERAL LOSS.

As officially reported, and on file at this day, was as follows:

Of the wounded forty-eight are known to have died of their injuries afterward, making the actual loss in killed 283.

The principal Federal officers killed were Gen. Lyon; Capt. Carey Gratz, 1st Missouri; Capt. A. L. Mason, 1st Iowa.

Wounded.—Gen. Sweeney; Col. Deitzler, 1st Kansas, (twice); Col. Mitchell, 2d Kansas; Lieut. Col. Merritt, 1st Iowa; Lieut. Col. Andrews, 1st Missouri; Adjt. Waldron, 1st Iowa; Capt. Plummer, of the regulars.

CONFEDERATE LOSS—PRICE’S ARMY.

Gen. Slack’s Division.—Col. John T. Hughes’ brigade, killed 36; wounded 70 (many mortally); missing 30. Among the killed were C. H. Bennett, adjutant of Hughes’ regiment; Capt. Chas. Blackwell, of Carroll county, and Lieut. Hughes. Col. Rive’s brigade lost 4 killed, and 8 wounded; among the killed were Lieut. Col. Austin, of Livingston county, a member of the Legislature, and Capt. Engart.