An Essay towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit, Humour, Railery, Satire, and Ridicule (1744)

Series One:
Essays on Wit


No. 4


[Corbyn Morris] An Essay towards Fixing the True Standards
of Wit, Humour, Raillery, Satire, and Ridicule (1744)


With an Introduction by

James L. Clifford

and

a Bibliographical Note




The Augustan Reprint Society
November, 1947
Price: $1.00

GENERAL EDITORS

Richard C. Boys, University of Michigan
Edward Niles Hooker, University of California, Los Angeles
H. T. Swedenberg, Jr., University of California, Los Angeles


ADVISORY EDITORS

Emmett L. Avery, State College of Washington
Louis I. Bredvold, University of Michigan
Benjamin Boyce, University of Nebraska
Cleanth Brooks, Yale University
James L. Clifford, Columbia University
Arthur Friedman, University of Chicago
Samuel H. Monk, University of Minnesota
James Sutherland, Queen Mary College, London

INTRODUCTION

The Essay here reproduced was first advertised in the London Daily Advertiser as "this day was published" on Thursday, 17 May 1744 (The same advertisement, except for the change of price from one shilling to two, appeared in this paper intermittently until 14 June). Although on the title-page the authorship is given as "By the Author of a Letter from a By-stander," there was no intention of anonymity, since the Dedication is boldly signed "Corbyn Morris, Inner Temple, Feb. 1, 1743 [44]."

Not much is known of the early life of Corbyn Morris. Born 14 August 1710, he was the eldest son of Edmund Morris of Bishop's Castle, Salop. (Alumni Cantabrigienses). On 17 September 1727 he was admitted (pensioner) at Queen's College, Cambridge, as an exhibitioner from the famous Charterhouse School. Exactly when he left the university, or whether he took a degree, is not certain.

Morris first achieved some prominence, though anonymously, with A Letter from a By-stander to a Member of Parliament; wherein is examined what necessity there is for the maintenance of a large regular land-force in this island. This pamphlet, dated at the end, 26 February 1741/42, is a wholehearted eulogy of the Walpole administration and is filled with statistics and arguments for the Mercantilist theories of the day. At the time there was some suspicion that the work had been written either by Walpole himself or by his direction. When the Letter from a By-stander was answered by the historian Thomas Carte, an angry pamphlet controversy ensued, with Morris writing under the pseudonym of "A Gentleman of Cambridge." Throughout, Morris showed himself a violent Whig, bitter in his attacks on Charles II and the non-jurors; and it was undoubtedly this fanatical party loyalty which laid the foundation for his later government career.

The principal facts of Morris's later life may be briefly summarized. On 17 June 1743 he was admitted at the Inner Temple. Throughout the Pelham and Newcastle administrations he was employed by the government, as he once put it, "in conciliating opponents." From 1751 to 1763 be acted as Secretary of the Customs and Salt Duty in Scotland, in which post he was acknowledged to have shown decided ability as an administrator. From 1763 to 1778 he was one of the commissioners of customs. He died at Wimbledon 22 December 1779 (Musgrave's Obituary), described in the Gentleman's Magazine as a "gentleman well known in the literary world, and universally esteemed for his unwearied services and attachment to government."

Throughout his long years of public service he wrote numerous pamphlets, largely on economic and political questions. Merely the titles of a few may be sufficient to indicate the nature of his interests. An Essay towards Deciding the Question whether Britain be Permitted by Right Policy to Insure the Ships of Her Enemies (1747); Observations on the Past Growth and Present State of the City of London (containing a complete table of christenings and burials 1601-1750) (175l); A Letter Balancing the Causes of the Present Scarcity of Our Silver Coin (1757).

It would be a mistake, however, to consider Morris merely as a statistical economist and Whig party hack. A gentleman of taste and wit, the friend of Hume, Boswell, and other discerning men of the day, he was elected F.R.S. in 1757, and appears to have been much respected. In later life Morris had a country place at Chiltern Vale, Herts., where he took an active delight in country sports. One of his late pamphlets, not listed in the D.N.B. account of him, entertainingly illustrates one of his hobbies. The Bird-fancier's Recreation and Delight, with the newest and very best instructions for catching, taking, feeding, rearing, &c all the various sorts of SONG BIRDS... containing curious remarks on the nature, sex, management, and diseases of ENGLISH SONG BIRDS, with practical instructions for distinguishing the cock and hen, for taking, choosing, breeding, keeping, and teaching them to sing, for discovering and caring their diseases, and of learning them to sing to the greatest perfection.

Although there is little surviving evidence of Morris's purely literary interests, a set of verses combining his economic and artistic views appeared in a late edition of The New Foundling Hospital for Wit (new edition, 1784, VI, 95). Occasioned by seeing Bowood in Wiltshire, the home of the Earl of Shelburne, the lines are entitled: "On Reading Dr. Goldsmith's Poem, the Deserted Village."

This was the man who at the age of thirty-three brought out An Essay towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit, Humour, Raillery, Satire, and Ridicule. That it was ever widely read we have no evidence, but at least a number of men of wit and judgment found it interesting. Horace Walpole included it in a packet of "the only new books at all worth reading" sent to Horace Mann, but the fulsome dedication to the elder Walpole undoubtedly had something to do with this recommendation. More disinterested approval is shown in a letter printed in the Daily Advertiser for 31 May 1744. Better than any modern critique the letter illustrates the contemporary reaction to the Essay.

Christ Church College, Oxford,  

SIR:

I have examin'd the Essay you have sent me for fixing the true Standards of Wit, Humour, &c. and cannot perceive upon what pretence the Definitions, as you tell me, are censured for Obscurity, even by Gentlemen of Abilities, and such as in other Parts of the Work very frankly allow it's Merit: the Definition of Wit, which presents itself at first, you say is, particularly objected to, as dark and involv'd; in answer to which I beg Leave to give you my plain Sentiments upon it, and which I apprehend should naturally occur to every Reader: In treating upon Wit, the Author seems constantly to carry in his View a Distinction between This and Vivacity: there is a Lustre or Brilliancy which often results from wild unprovok'd Sallies of Fancy; but such unexpected Objects, which serve not to elucidate each other, discover only a Flow of Spirits, or rambling Vivacity; whereas, says he, Wit is the Lustre which results from the quick Elucidation of one Subject, by the just and unexpected Arrangement of it with another Subject.--To constitute Wit, there must not only arise a Lustre from the quick Arrangement together of two Subjects, but the new Subject must be naturally introduced, and also serve to elucidate the original one: the Word Elucidation, though it be not new, is elegant, and very happily applied in this Definition; yet I have seen some old Gentlemen here stumble at it, and have found it difficult to persuade them to advance farther:--I have also heard Objections made to the Words Lustre and Brilliancy of Ideas, though they are Terms which have been used by the Greeks and Romans, and by elegant Writers of all Ages and Nations; and the Effect which they express, is perfectly conceiv'd and felt by every Person of true Genius and Imagination.

The Distinctions between Wit and Humour, and the Reasons why Humour is more pleasurably felt than Wit, are new and excellent: as is the Definition of an Humourist, and the happy Analysis of the Characters of Falstaff, Sir Roger de Coverly, and Don Quixote; But, as you say, the Merit of these Parts is universally allowed; as well as the Novelty, and liberal Freedom of the [word apparently omitted]; which have such Charms in my Eye, as I had long ceased to expect in a Modern Writer.

25 May, 1744
  I am, &c
   J---- W----
    [not identified]

If the "Gentlemen of Abilities" of the day found some of Morris's definitions obscure, modern readers will find them more precise than those of most of his predecessors. All who had gone before--Cowley, Barrow, Dryden, Locke, Addison, and Congreve (he does not mention Hobbes)--Morris felt had bungled the job. And although he apologizes for attempting what the great writers of the past had failed to do, he has no hesitation in setting forth exactly what he believes to be the proper distinctions in the meanings of such terms as wit, humour, judgment, invention, raillery, and ridicule. The mathematician and statistician in Morris made him strive for precise accuracy. It was all very clear to him, and by the use of numerous anecdotes and examples he hoped to make the distinctions obvious to the general reader.

The Essay shows what a man of some evident taste and perspicacity, with an analytical mind, can do in defining the subtle semantic distinctions in literary terms. Trying to fix immutably what is certain always to be shifting, Morris is noteworthy not only because of the nature of his attempt, but because he is relatively so successful. As Professor Edward Hooker has pointed out in an Introduction to an earlier ARS issue (Series I, No. 2), his is "probably the best and clearest treatment of the subject in the first half of the eighteenth century." It may be regretted that political and economic concerns occupied so much of his later life, leaving him no time for further literary essays.

In the present facsimile edition, for reasons of space, only the Introduction and the main body of the Essay are reproduced. Although Morris once remarked to David Hume that he wrote all his books "for the sake of the Dedications" (Letters of David Hume ed. Greig, I, 380), modern readers need not regret too much the omission of the fulsome 32 page dedication to Walpole (The Earl of Orford). Morris insists at the beginning that the book was inspired by a fervent desire of "attempting a Composition, independent of Politics, which might furnish an occasional Amusement" to his patron. The praise which follows, in which Walpole is said to lead "the Empire of Letters," is so excessive as to produce only smiles in twentieth century readers. Walpole is praised for not curbing the press while necessarily curbing the theatre, his aid to commerce, indeed almost every act of his administration, is lauded to the skies. The Church of England, in which "the Exercise of Reason in the solemn Worship of God, is the sacred Right, and indispensible Duty, of Man," receives its share of eulogy. In every connection the Tories are violently attacked.

The Dedication ends in a peroration of praise for Walpole's public achievements which "shall adorn the History of Britain," and for his "Private Virtues and all the softer Features" of his mind. His home of retirement is referred to in the lines of Milton:

 "Great Palace now of Light!
 Hither, as to their Fountain, other Stars
 Repairing, in their golden Urns, draw Light;
 And here [sic] the Morning Planet gilds her Horns."
   [P.L. 7. 363-66]

"Thus splendid, and superior, your Lordship now flourishes in honourable Ease, exerting universal Benevolence...." But in dedications, as in lapidary inscriptions, as Dr. Johnson might have agreed, a writer need not be upon oath.

At the end of the Essay Morris reprinted two essays from The Spectator, Nos. 35 and 62, and William Congreve's "An Essay concerning Humour in Comedy. To Mr. Dennis" (Congreve's Works, ed. Summers, III, 161-68). Since these are readily available, they have not been included in this edition.

The present facsimile is made from a copy owned by Louis I. Bredvold, with his kind permission.

James L. Clifford

Columbia University

Please paste the following in your copy of Corbyn Morris's
Essay towards Fixing the True Standards of Wit....
(ARS, Series One, No. 4)

ERRATA

AN

 ESSAY

Towards Fixing the

TRUE STANDARDS

OF

Wit, Humour, Raillery,
Satire, and Ridicule.

To which is Added, an

 ANALYSIS

Of the Characters of

An Humourist, Sir JohnFalstaff, Sir Roger
De Coverly, and Don Quixote.

Inscribed to the Right Honorable

Robert Earl of Orford.

By the Author of a
LETTER from a BY-STANDER.

---- Jacta est Alea.

LONDON:
Printed for J. Roberts, at the Oxford-Arms, in Warwick-
lane; and W. Bickerton, in the Temple-Exchange,
near the Inner-Temple-Gate, Fleet-Street.
M dcc xliv.  [Price 2s.]

INTRODUCTION.

AN Attempt to describe the precise Limits of Wit, Humour, Raillery, Satire and Ridicule, I am sensible, is no easy or slight Undertaking. To give a Definition of Wit, has been declared by Writers of the greatest Renown, to exceed their Reach and Power; and Gentlemen of no less Abilities, and Fame, than Cowley, Barrow, Dryden, Locke, Congreve, and Addison, have tryed their Force upon this Subject, and have all left it free, and unconquered. This, I perceive, will be an Argument with some, for condemning an Essay upon this Topic by a young Author, as rash and presumptious. But, though I desire to pay all proper Respect to these eminent Writers, if a tame Deference to great Names shall become fashionable, and the Imputation of Vanity be laid upon those who examine their Works, all Advancement in Knowledge will be absolutely stopp'd; and Literary Merit will be soon placed, in an humble Stupidity, and solemn Faith in the Wisdom of our Ancestors.

Whereas, if I rightly apprehend, an Ambition to excell is the Principle which should animate a Writer, directed by a Love of Truth, and a free Spirit of Candour and Inquiry. This is the Flame which should warm the rising Members of every Science, not a poor Submission to those who have preceded. For, however it may be with a Religious Devotion, a Literary One is certainly the Child of Ignorance.

However, I must acknowledge, that where I have differed from the great Authors before mentioned, it has been with a Diffidence, and after the most serious and particular Examination of what they have delivered. It is from hence, that I have thought it my Duty, to exhibit with the following Essay, their several Performances upon the same Subject, that every Variation of mine from their Suffrage, and the Reasons upon which I have grounded it, may clearly appear.

The following Ode upon Wit is written by Mr. Cowley.

O D E
O F 
W I T. 

The Spirit and Wit of this Ode are excellent; and yet it is evident, through the whole, that Mr. Cowley had no clear Idea of Wit, though at the same time it shines in most of these Lines: There is little Merit in saying what Wit is not, which is the chief Part of this Ode. Towards the End, he indeed attempts to describe what it is, but is quite vague and perplex'd in his Description; and at last, instead of collecting his scatter'd Rays into a Focus, and exhibiting succinctly the clear Essence and Power of Wit, he drops the whole with a trite Compliment.

The learned Dr. Barrow, in his Sermon against foolish Talking and Jesting, gives the following profuse Description of Wit.

But first it may be demanded, What the Thing we speak of is? Or what the Facetiousness (or Wit as he calls it before) doth import? To which Questions I might reply, as Democritus did to him that asked the Definition of a Man, 'Tis that we all see and know. Any one better apprehends what it is by Acquaintance, than I can inform him by Description. It is indeed a Thing so versatile and multiform, appearing in so many Shapes, so many Postures, so many Garbs, so variously apprehended by several Eyes and Judgments, that it seemeth no less hard to settle a clear and certain Notion thereof, than to make a Portrait of Proteus, or to define the Figure of the fleeting Air. Sometimes it lieth in pat Allusion to a known Story, or in seasonable Application of a trivial Saying, or in forging an apposite Tale: Sometimes it playeth in Words and Phrases, taking Advantage from the Ambiguity of their Sense, or the Affinity of their Sound: Sometimes it is wrapp'd in a Dress of humorous Expression: Sometimes it lurketh under an odd Similitude: Sometimes it is lodged in a sly Question, in a smart Answer, in a quirkish Reason, in a shrewd Intimation, in cunningly diverting, or cleverly retorting an Objection: Sometimes it is couched in a bold Scheme of Speech, in a tart Irony, in a lusty Hyperbole, in a startling Metaphor, in a plausible Reconciling of Contradictions, or in acute Nonsense; Sometimes a scenical Representation of Persons or Things, a counterfeit Speech, a mimical Look or Gesture passeth for it. Sometimes an affected Simplicity, sometimes a presumptuous Bluntness giveth it Being. Sometimes it riseth from a lucky Hitting upon what is Strange; sometimes from a crafty wresting obvious Matter to the Purpose. Often it' consisteth in one knows not what, and springeth up one can hardly tell how. Its ways are unaccountable, and inexplicable, being answerable to the numberless Rovings of Fancy, and Windings of Language. It is, in short, a Manner of Speaking out of the simple and plain Way (such as Reason teacheth, and proveth Things by) which by a pretty, surprizing Uncouthness in Conceit or Expression, doth affect and amuse the Fancy, stirring in it some Wonder, and breeding some Delight thereto. It raiseth Admiration, as signifying a nimble Sagacity of Apprehension, a special Felicity of Invention, a Vivacity of Spirit, and Reach of Wit, more than vulgar; it seeming to argue a rare Quickness of Parts, that one can fetch in remote Conceits applicable; a notable Skill that he can dextrously accommodate them to the Purpose before him; together with a lively Briskness of Humour, not apt to damp those Sportful Flashes of Imagination. (Whence in Aristotle such Persons are termed epidexioi, dexterous Men, and eutropoi, Men of facile or versatile Manners, who can easily turn themselves to all Things, or turn all Things to themselves.) It also procureth Delight, by gratifying Curiosity with its Rareness, or Semblance of Difficulty. (As Monsters, not for their Beauty, but their Rarity; as juggling Tricks, not for their Use, but their Abstruseness, are beheld with Pleasure;) by diverting the Mind from its Road of serious Thoughts, by instilling Gaiety, and Airiness of Spirit; by provoking to such Disposition of Spirit in Way of Emulation, or Complaisance; and by seasoning Matters otherwise distasteful or insipid, with an unusual and thence grateful Tange.

This Description, it is easy to perceive, must have cost the Author of it a great deal of Labour. It is a very full Specimen of that Talent of entirely exhausting a Subject, for which Dr. Barrow was remarkable; and if the Point was, to exhibit all the various Forms and Appearances, not of Wit only, but of Raillery, Satire, Sarcasms, and of every Kind of Poignancy and Pleasantry of Sentiment, and Expression, he seems to have perfectly succeeded; there being perhaps no Variety, in all the Extent of these Subjects, which he has not presented to View in this Description.--But he does not pretend to give any Definition of Wit, intimating rather that it is quite impossible to be given: And indeed from his Description of it, as a Proteus, appearing in numberless various Colours, and Forms; and from his mistaking, and presenting for Wit, other different Mixtures and Substances, it is evident that his Idea of it was quite confused and uncertain: It is true, he has discovered a vast Scope of Fertility of Genius, and an uncommon Power of collecting together a Multitude of Objects upon any Occasion, but he has here absolutely mistaken his work; for instead of exhibiting the Properties of Wit in a clearer Light, and confuting the false Claims which are made to it, he has made it his whole Business to perplex it the more, by introducing, from all Corners, a monstrous Troop of new unexpected Pretenders.

Dryden, in the Preface to his Opera, entitled, The State of Innocence, or Fall of Man, gives the following Decree upon Wit.

The Definition of Wit, (which has been so often attempted, and ever unsuccessfully by many Poets) is only this: That it is a Propriety of Thoughts and Words; or in other Terms, Thoughts and Words elegantly adapted to the Subject.

If Mr. Dryden imagined, that he had succeeded himself in this Definition, he was extremely mistaken; for nothing can be more distant from the Properties of Wit, than those he describes. He discovers no Idea of the Surprize, and Brilliancy of Wit, or of the sudden Light thrown upon a Subject. Instead of once pointing at these, he only describes the Properties of clear Reasoning, which are a Propriety of Thoughts and Words;--Whereas Wit, in its sudden Flashes, makes no Pretension to Reasoning; but is perceived in the pleasant Surprize which it starts, and in the Light darted upon a Subject, which instantly vanishes again, without abiding a strict Examination.

The other Definition he gives, which is, Thoughts and Words elegantly adapted to the Subject, is very different from the former, but equally unhappy.

For Propriety, in Thoughts and Words, consists in exhibiting clear, pertinent Ideas, in precise and perspicuous Words.

Whereas Elegance consists in the compt, well pruned and succinct Turn of a Subject.

The Object of the First, is to be clear, and perspicuous; whence it often appears in pursuit of these, not compt or succinct: Whereas the Essence of Elegance is to be compt and succinct, for the Sake of which Ornaments it often neglect Perspicuity, and Clearness.--In short, a Propriety of Thoughts and Words, may subsist without any Elegance; as an Elegance of Thoughts and Words may appear without a perfect Propriety.

The last Definition, as it is thus very different from the former is also equally unhappy: For Elegance is no essential Property of Wit. Pure Wit resulting solely from the quick Elucidation of one Subject, by the sudden Arrangement, and Comparison of it, with another Subject.--If the two Objects arranged together are elegant, and polite, there will then be superadded to the Wit, an Elegance and Politeness of Sentiment, which will render the Wit more amiable. But if the Objects are vulgar, obscene, or deformed, provided the first be elucidated, in a lively Manner, by, the sudden Arrangement of it with the second, there will be equally Wit; though, the Indelicacy of Sentiment attending it, will render such Wit shocking and abominable.

It is with the highest Respect for the great Mr. Locke, that I deliver his Sentiments upon this Subject.

And hence, perhaps, may be given some Reason of that common Observation, that Men who have a great deal of Wit, and prompt Memories, have not always the clearest Judgment or deepest Reason: For Wit lying most in the Assemblage of Ideas, and putting those together with Quickness and Variety, wherein can be found any Assemblance or Congruity, thereby to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the Fancy. Judgment, on the contrary, lies quite on the other side; in separating carefully one from another, Ideas, wherein can be found the least Difference, thereby to avoid being missed by Similitude, and by Affinity to take one thing for another. This is a Way of proceeding quite contrary to Metaphor and Allusion; wherein for the most Part lies that Entertainment and Pleasantry of Wit, which strikes so lively on the Fancy, and therefore is acceptable to all People, because its Beauty appears at first Sight, and there is required no Labour of Thoughts to examine what Truth, or Reason, there is in it. The Mind, without looking any further, rests satisfied with the Agreeableness of the Picture, and the Gaiety of the Fancy. And it is a kind of an Affront to go about to examine it by the severe Rules of Truth, and good Reason, whereby it appears, that it conflicts in something that is not perfectly conformable to them.

It is to be observed that Mr. Locke has here only occasionally, and passantly, delivered his Sentiments upon this Subject; but yet he has very happily explained the chief Properties of Wit. It was his Remark First, that it lies for the most Part in assembling together with Quickness and Variety Objects, which possess an Affinity, or Congruity, with each other; which was the first just Information obtained by the literary World, upon this Subject.

As to what he adds, That the Intention, and Effects, of this Assemblage of similar Objects, is to make up pleasant Pictures, and agreeable Visions in the Fancy, it is, as I humbly apprehend, not quite perfect: For the Business of this Assemblage is not merely to raise pleasant Pictures in the Fancy, but also to enlighten thereby the original Subject.--This is evident; because in such Assemblages, the only Foundation upon which the new Subject is suddenly introduced, is the Affinity, and consequently the Illustration, it bears to the first Subject.--The Introduction of pleasant Pictures and Visions, which present not a new Illustration, and Light, to the original Subjects, being rather wild Sallies of Vivacity, than well-aimed, apposite Strokes of Wit.

It is Mr. Locke's Conclusion, at last, That Wit consists in something that is not perfectly conformable to Truth, and good Reason.--This is a Problem of some Curiosity; and I apprehend Mr. Locke's Determination upon it to be right:--For the Direction of Wit is absolutely different from the Direction of Truth and Good Reason; It being the Aim of Wit to strike the Imagination; of Truth and Good Reason, to convince the Judgment: From thence they can never be perfectly coincident.

It is however true, that there may be Instances of Wit, wherein the Agreement between the two Objects shall be absolutely just, and perceived to be such at the first Glance. Such Instances of Wit, will be then also Self- evident Truths. They will both agree in their obvious, and quick Perspicuity; but will be still different in this, that the Effort of the One is to strike the Fancy, whereas the Other is wholly exerted in gratifying the Judgment.

The Sentiments of Mr. Addison upon Wit, are professedly delivered in the Spectator Nº. 62. annexed to the following Essay. He has there justly commended Mr. Locke's Description of Wit; but what he adds, by Way of Explanation to it, that the Assemblage of Ideas must be such as shall give Delight, and Surprize, is not true, in regard to the Former, Delight being no essential Property of Wit; for if the original Subject be unpleasant, or deformed, the sudden unexpected Arrangement of a similar Object with it, may give us Surprize, and be indisputably Wit, and yet be far from creating any Delight.

This Gentleman has also given the following Example, in order to illustrate the Necessity there is, that Surprize should be always an Attendant upon Wit. "When a Poet tells us, the Bosom of his Mistress is as white as Snow, there is no Wit in the Comparison; but when he adds, with a Sigh, that it as cold too, it then grows to Wit." --To compare a Girl's Bosom to Snow for its Whiteness I apprehend to be Wit, notwithstanding the Authority of so great a Writer to the contrary. For there is a Lustre resulting from the natural and splendid Agreement between these Objects, which will always produce Wit; such, as cannot be destroyed, though it will quickly be rendered trite, by frequent Repetition.

This Problem, How far Surprize is, or is not, necessary to Wit, I humbly apprehend, may be thus solved.--In Subjects which have a natural and splendid Agreement, there will always be Wit upon their Arrangement together; though when it becomes trite, and not accompanied with Surprize, the Lustre will be much faded;--But where the Agreement is forced and strained, Novelty and Surprize are absolutely necessary to usher it in; An unexpected Assemblage of this Sort, striking our Fancy, and being gaily admitted at first to be Wit; which upon frequent Repetition, the Judgment will have examined, and rise up against it wherever it appears;--So that in short, in Instances where the Agreement is strained and defective, which indeed are abundantly the most general, Surprize is a necessary Passport to Wit; but Surprize is not necessary to Wit, where the Agreement between the two Subjects is natural and splendid; though in these Instances it greatly heightens the Brillancy.

The subsequent Remark of Mr. Addison, That the Poet, after saying his Mistress's Bosom is as white as Snow, should add, with a Sigh, that it is as cold too, in order that it may grow to Wit, is I fear, very incorrect. For as to the Sigh, it avails not a Rush; and this Addition will be found to be only a new Stroke of Wit, equally trite, and less perfect, and natural, than the former Comparison.

It may also be observed, That Mr. Addison has omitted the Elucidation of the original Subject, which is the grand Excellence of Wit. Nor has he prescribed any Limits to the Subjects, which are to be arranged together; without which the Result will be frequently the Sublime or Burlesque; In which, it is true, Wit often appears, but taking their whole Compositions together, they are different Substances, and usually ranked in different Classes.

All that Mr. Congreve has delivered upon Wit, as far as I know, appears in his Essay upon Humour, annexed to this Treatise. He there says, "To define Humour, perhaps, were as difficult, as to define Wit; for, like that, it is of infinite Variety". --Again, he afterwards adds, "But though we cannot certainly tell what Wit is, or what Humour is, yet we may go near to shew something, which is not Wit, or not Humour, and yet often mistaken for both". --In this Essay, wherein he particularly considers Humour, and the Difference between this, and Wit, he may be expected to have delivered his best Sentiments upon both: But these Words, which I have quoted, seem to be as important and precise, as any which he has offered upon the Subject of Wit. As such, I present them, without any Remarks, to my Reader, who, if he only goes near to be edified by them, will discover a great Share of Sagacity.

The Sentiments of these eminent Writers upon Wit, having thus been exhibited, I come next to the Subject of Humour. This has been defined by some, in the following Manner, with great Perspicuity.-- Humour is the genuine Wit of Comedies,--which has afforded vast Satisfaction to many Connoissures in the Belles Lettres; especially as Wit has been supposed to be incapable of any Definition.

This Subject has also been particularly considered by the Spectatator Nº. 35. inserted at the End of the following Essay. Mr. Addison therein gravely remarks, that "It is indeed much easier to describe what is not Humour, than what it is;" which, I humbly apprehend, is no very important Piece of Information.--He adds, "And very difficult to define it otherwise, than as Cowly has done Wit, by Negatives." This Notion of defining a Subject by Negatives, is a favourite Crotchet, and may perhaps be assumed upon other Occasions by future Writers: I hope therefore I shall be pardoned, if I offer a proper Explanation of so good a Conceit;--To declare then, That a Subject is only to be Defined by Negatives, is to cloath it in a respectable Dress of Darkness. And about as much as to say, That it is a Knight of tenebrose Virtues; or a serene Prince, of the Blood of Occult Qualities.

Mr. Addison proceeds, "Were I to give my own Notions of Humour, I should deliver them after Plato's Manner, in a Kind of Allegory; and by supposing Humour to be a Person, deduce to him, all his Qualifications, according to the following Genealogy: Truth was the Founder of the Family, and the Father of Good Sense; Good Sense was the Father of Wit, who married a Lady of a collateral Line called Mirth, by whom he had Issue Humour". --It is very unfortunate for this Allegorical Description, that there is not one Word of it just: For Truth, Good Sense, Wit, and Mirth, represented to be the immediate Ancestors of Humour; whereas Humour is derived from the Foibles, and whimsical Oddities of Persons in real Life, which flow rather from their Inconsistencies, and Weakness, than from Truth and Good Sense; Nor is Wit any Ancestor of Humour, but of a quite different Family; it being notorious that much Humour may be drawn from the Manners of Dutchmen, and of the most formal and dull Persons, who are yet never guilty of Wit. Again, Mirth is not so properly the Parent of Humour, as the Offspring.--In short, this whole Genealogy is a nubilous Piece of Conceit, instead of being any Elucidation of Humour. It is a formal Method of trifling, introduced under a deep Ostentation of Learning, which deserves the severest Rebuke.--But I restrain my Pen, recollecting the Visions of Mirza, and heartily profess my high Veneration for their admirable Author.

The Essay upon Humour, at the End of this Treatise, written by Mr. Congreve, is next to be considered. It appears, that at first he professes his absolute Uncertainty in regard to this Subject; and says, "We cannot certainly tell what Wit is, or what Humour is." But yet, through his whole Piece, he neglects the Subject of Humour in general, and only discourses upon the Humour, by which he means barely the Disposition, of Persons: This may particularly appear from the following Words.

"A Man may change his Opinion, but I believe he will find it a Difficulty to part with his Humour; and there is nothing more provoking than the being made sensible of that Difficulty. Sometimes we shall meet with those, who perhaps indifferently enough, but at the same time impertinently, will ask the Question, Why are you not merry? Why are you not gay, pleasant, and chearful? Then instead of answering, could I ask such a Person, Why are you not handsome? Why have you not black Eyes, and a better Complexion? Nature abhors to be forced.

"The two famous Philosophers of Ephesus and Abdera, have their different Sects at this Day. Some weep, and others laugh at one and the same Thing.

"I don't doubt but you have observed several Men laugh when they are angry; others, who are silent; some that are loud; yet I cannot suppose that it is the Passion of Anger, which is in itself different, or more or less in one than t'other, but that it is the Humour of the Man that is predominant, and urges him to express it in that Manner. Demonstrations of Pleasure, are as various: One Man has a Humour of retiring from all Company, when any thing has happened to please him beyond Expectation; he hugs himself alone, and thinks it an Addition to the Pleasure to keep it a Secret, &c."

All which, I apprehend, is no more than saying; That there are different Dispositions in different Persons.

In another Place, he seems to understand by Humour, not only the Disposition, but the Tone of the Nerves, of a Person, thus,

"Suppose Morose to be a Man naturally splenetic, and melancholy; is there any thing more offensive to one of such a Disposition (where he uses the Word instead of Humour) than Noise and Clamour? Let any Man that has the Spleen (and there are enough in England) be Judge. We see common Examples of this Humour in little every Day. 'Tis ten to one, but three Parts in four of the Company you dine with, are discomposed, and started at the cutting of a Cork, or scratching of a Plate with a Knife; it is a Proportion of the same Humour, that makes such, or any other Noise, offensive to the Person that hears it; for there are others who will not be disturbed at all by it."

At this Rate every Weakness of Nerves, or Particularity of Constitution, is Humour.

It is true, he justly points out in another Place the different Sentiments, which ought to be adapted to different Characters in Comedy, according to their different Dispositions, or, as he phrases it, Humours: As for Instance, he very rightly observes, That a Character of a splenetic and peevish Humour, Should have a satirical Wit. A jolly and sanguine Humour should have a facetious Wit. --But still this is no Description of what is well felt, and known, by the general Name of Humour.

However, as what I have already quoted, may appear to be only his looser Explanations, it will be necessary to deliver his more closed and collected Sentiments upon this Subject. These he gives in the following Words,

"I should be unwilling to venture, even in a bare Description of Humour, much more to make a Definition of it; but now my Hand is in, I will tell you what serves me instead of either. I take it to be, A singular and unavoidable Manner of doing or saying any thing, peculiar and natural to one Man only, by which his Speech and Actions are distinguished from those of other Men."

--This Description is very little applicable to Humour, but tolerably well adapted to other Subjects.--Thus, a Person, who is happy in a particular Grace, which accompanies all his Actions, may be said to possess a singular and unavoidable Manner of doing or saying any thing, peculiar and natural to him only, by which his Speech and Actions are distinguished from those of other Men. And the same may be said of a Person of a peculiar Vivacity, Heaviness, or Awkwardness.--In short, this Description is suited to any Particularity of a Person in general, instead of being adapted to the Foibles and whimsical Oddities of Persons, which alone constitute Humour.

These are the only Pieces upon Wit, and Humour, which have fallen within my Knowledge; I have here fairly delivered them at length; and from the Respect which is due to such eminent Writers, have distinctly and deliberately examined the Merit of each.--As to my own Performance, which is now submitted to the Public, I have to wish, that it may gain a candid and strict Examination. It has been my Endeavour to give Definitions of the Subjects, upon which I have treated; A Plan the most difficult of all others to be executed by an Author; But such an one, as I apprehend, deserves to be more generally introduced, and established. If once it was expected by the Public, that Authors should strictly define their Subjects, it would instantly checque an Inundation of Scribbling. The desultory Manner of Writing would be absolutely exploded; and Accuracy and Precision would be necessarily introduced upon every Subject.

This is the Method pursued in Subjects of Philosophy; Without clear and precise Definitions such noble Advances could never have been made in those Sciences; And it is by the Assistance of these only, that Subjects of Polite Literature, can ever be enlightened and embellished with just Ornaments. If Definitions had been constantly exacted from Authors there would not have appeared one hundreth Part of the present Books, and yet every Subject had been better ascertained.--Nor will this Method, as some may imagine, be encumbered with Stiffness; On the contrary, in illustrating the Truth of Definitions there is a full Scope of the utmost Genius, Imagination, and Spirit of a Writer; and a Work upon this Plan is adorned with the highest Charms appearing with Propriety, Clearness, and Conviction, as well as Beauty.