Ancient rhetoric and poetic

The pedagogy of rhetoric, more constant and more pervasive than that of most subjects still taught, demands historical interpretation, and thus extensive and consecutive survey.[1] Summary of its history has conveyed little of its vitality; but analysis of two cardinal documents will show, first, what the constant tradition of teaching was typically throughout the great classical centuries, and secondly what the teaching of rhetoric was destined to become, with almost equal constancy and pervasiveness, during the centuries of decadence. For each of these traditions there is fortunately, besides much other testimony, a typical text. Quintilian, writing long after rhetoric had ceased to function as an instrument of assembly government, nevertheless comprehends its best older tradition and the whole scope of its classical development in a great work of pedagogy, De institutione oratoria (about 95 A.D.). Seneca the Elder, who died about the time of Quintilian’s birth, had already recorded from memory and notes in his Controversiæ that particular application of the ancient schooling which in the generation before Quintilian was already infecting the old rhetoric, and through which the teaching of both Greek and Roman schools was to be dwarfed and perverted. Quintilian, though writing later than Seneca, preserves ancient rhetoric as a ripe whole; Seneca, though earlier, isolates the germ of its decay.

I. QUINTILIAN ON THE TEACHING OF RHETORIC (DE INSTITUTIONE ORATORIA)[2]

A. Tabular View[3]

B. The Terms

Quintilian’s survey is in the traditional terms of classical rhetoric. These demand the more attention because translation has often missed the specific meanings attached to recognized technical terms. “Institutes of Oratory,” never precisely rendering his title, is now almost meaningless. Institutio Oratoria means The Teaching of Rhetoric and announces not so much a manual for students as a survey for teachers. Of the pedagogical terms, grammatica and grammaticus may still be rendered “grammar” and “grammarian” only if they are understood to have wider scope. Prælectio (I. viii) describes the habitual introductory exposition of a passage of poetry by grammaticus, or less commonly of a passage of oratory by rhetor (II. v). Materia, meaning generally “material,” means often technically (II. vi. vii) a prescribed outline, as French matière still does in pedagogical use. Declamatio (II. x) was quite different from “declamation.” It was speaking, usually extempore, on an assigned hypothetical case, and grew, as will appear below, from an exercise for boys to an exhibition of virtuosity by men.

Of the five traditional parts of rhetoric (III. iii), the first, inventio, does not mean “invention”; it means, in Aristotelian language, the discovery of all the extrinsic means of persuasion, or more simply, survey of the material and forecast. Dispositio (collocatio) refers not to the arrangement of details, but to the plan of the whole. Elocutio means “elocution” in the sense borne by that word before the nineteenth century. It is sufficiently rendered by “style” and is always conceived in two aspects: (1) electio, the choice of words, including “figures of speech”; and (2) compositio, the arrangement of words in clauses and sentences, including rhythm and harmony—in a word, sentence-movement. Compositio does not mean, though it is often translated, “composition” in the wide sense now current. For the latter the term is dispositio. Memoria ranges far beyond memorizing. It embraces the speaker’s whole command of his material in the order of his constructive plan and in relation to rebuttal, and was most stressed for speeches unwritten. Pronuntiatio and actio cover the whole field of delivery, including all that is now often called “elocution,” from the placing of the voice to the handling of the body.

In detail, status (III. vi), meaning generally and simply “status,” refers technically to a classifying system for determining “the nature of the case” (see 3. a, in the tabular view above). Of its three divisions, coniectura, having nothing to do with “conjecture,” denotes a main issue of fact; finis, a main issue of definition; qualitas, a more general issue of morals or policy. Narratio (IV. ii) means never “narration” in the sense assigned by recent text-books, always either “statement of the facts” or, more generally, “exposition.” These and other technical terms have been guarded, in the tabular view above and in the interpretations below, by adding the Latin originals.

C. Typical Doctrine

(1) Elementary Exercises

The tradition of grammatica as having the twofold function of forming right speech and of expounding poetry[4] continued for centuries.[5] Traditional also are the first exercises in composition.[6] A chapter (x) on the concurrence of other studies toward a rounded education,[7] and one on elocution (xi), close a preliminary pedagogy so suggestive as to be still studied to-day.

(2) Declamatio

The counsels to rhetor (II) imply a warm atmosphere of promotion and a general habit of collaboration.

The teacher should frankly and fully show how. His criticism should beware of setting up inhibitions. To be promotive, he should find something to praise, and, besides explaining why he would have this out or that changed, should illuminate by interposing something of his own. Sometimes it will be helpful to give whole treatments which the boy may imitate without losing faith in his own (II. iv). In short, the teacher’s declamatio should be a model for his students (II. v).

The same promotive guidance appears in the assigning of outlines (materiæ), less and less ample as the pupils advance, for written composition (II. vi). This writing was generally for practise, not for casting a particular speech in form to be memorized. Sometimes, says Quintilian, the boys may recite what they have written out; but generally learning by heart is better spent on the orators and historians than on their own work (vii).

The declamatio recommended by Quintilian is speaking from outline on hypothetical cases. The more elementary assignments, for deliberative speeches, were called suasoriæ; the more advanced, for forensic speeches, controversiæ. Both he treats only as school exercises. Within these limits he recommends declamatio as an important pedagogical discovery.

Evidently the declamatio that Quintilian recommends is not the declamatio that he heard about him. He wishes to recall to its original purpose what was already out of hand. Originally, he implies, it defined that general practise in debating which must have been as common in the ancient teaching as in modern universities. But already, as he also admits by implication, it had become quite different. Already it was established both as a special exercise and as a special form of public speaking. With the narrowing of the field of public discussion, the large old rhetoric surveyed by Quintilian had been narrowed more and more toward an artificial combination of forensic ingenuity with dramatic imagination. Instead of training youth to lead in public policy and to secure justice for individuals, declamatio had become an end in itself, the rhetor’s own kind of oratory. As an exhibition of skill it was his easiest means of winning pupils, and of holding them by letting them exhibit themselves. The inherent vice of artificiality, which Quintilian admits by implication, he nevertheless assigns entirely to perverted educational practise. He would recall declamatio from invention to actuality, and from display to exercise. That his warning was already too late is evident from Seneca (see section II of this chapter). Meantime one of the chief opportunities for perversion will be found in the prosopopœiæ described next.

The pervasive classical inculcation of appropriateness (see also XI. i) was carried into declamatio through specific exercises known generally as prosopopœiæ (προσωποποιίαι). Their idea was an imaginative entering into the character, the emotional as well as the intellectual habit, of the person for whom one was speaking (fictæ alienarum personarum orationes, VI. i. 25). In more elementary form, sometimes called ethopœiæ (ἠθοποιίαι) they bade the student say what Priam must have said to Achilles, or Sulla on renouncing the dictatorship, or some other character of history or fiction on a critical occasion; and they began even with the boy’s amplification of fables and myths.[8] As applied to declamatio (suasoriæ and controversiæ) they are thus described by Quintilian:

(3) Status

Quintilian’s chapter (III, vi) on status is one of his most important, both as specific doctrine and as typical of ancient method. He has simplified a pedagogical device which, while it had been hampered by too analytical subdivision, had long vindicated itself as one of the most effective applications of the ancient theory of systematic guidance. Status, meaning the essential character of the case as it appeared to preliminary survey of all the material and all the bearings, had come to denote a uniform system for determining that essential character by leading questions. To gauge the sufficiency of his preparation and the line of his argument, to bring to bear not only his particular investigation, but the whole fund of his experience, the student was to ask himself what the case meant to him as a whole. He must interpret it as resting mainly on one of three issues: (1) of fact (an sit); (2) of definition (quid sit); or (3) of general considerations, as of right or expediency (an recte sit). The first was called status coniecturalis, or coniectura; the second, status definitivus, or finis; the third, status generalis, or qualitas.[11] Even if two of these entered, or all three, one must always be the focus.

This sort of forecast, surveying the whole trend, the ancients regarded as so vital that they reduced it to a system. The classified status is typical of their pedagogy of rhetoric. Their teaching of inventio did not stop with investigation; it promoted reflection directly and guided it so systematically that no essential aspect could be ignored. Such questioning for focus and line in our day of statistical accumulation is not less, but more valuable.

(4) The Parts of a Speech

The traditional parts of an oration Quintilian discusses (IV-VI) under their traditional subdivisions. The exordium (IV. i), for instance, may be drawn from the case, from the persons, from the occasion, or from rebuttal of one’s opponent; and its threefold aim is to remove prejudice, to win attention, and to open the way for understanding.[12] But Quintilian often constructively recombines the traditional items, and often interprets them from teaching experience. The statement of facts (narratio, IV. ii) is not limited to pure exposition; even rehearsal may contribute to persuasion. Its cardinal virtue of clearness he reasserts in rebuke of those students whom an itch to be always impressive makes impatient of the obligation.

That the statement of facts should be brief does not permit its being either abrupt or meager. That it should sound true implies that it should be in character, i.e., that it should be dramatically consistent and convincing, and also that it should lead into the argument. Similarly practical are the warnings against making the division (IV. v) too minute and against letting it hamper emotional appeal or interrupt progressive coherence. To his conspectus of the ancient classification of proof (V) Quintilian adds (xiii) the following shrewd maxims for rebuttal:

(5) Plan

Quintilian’s discussion of dispositio (VII) is like that of other ancient treatises in confining itself to plan in general. Without specific doctrine for the promotion of cogency as progressive coherence, it carries forward the system of status as determining the main line of argument. That the ancients appreciated and practised what is now taught in American schools and colleges as the lore of paragraphs is evident in their best composition, notably in the orations of Cicero. The decline from such progressive coherence among the later declamatores is one of the marks of decadence (see section II, below). But how the lore was taught we are left to infer. The elementary working out of what is now unfortunately called a detached paragraph, i.e., of a single short composition, is prescribed in the chria (I. ix) much as in modern manuals; but that does not touch the art of composing a sustained speech by paragraphs. In the cogency of mounting by stages we miss the typical systematic instruction. Some of this must have been inculcated through assigned outline (materia, page 67 above), some of it by the rhetor’s oral teaching. Quintilian’s instruction as to the close of the exordium is a clear hint of what is now taught as paragraph emphasis.

There are, indeed, other hints; but that so important an aspect of composition should not be a distinct topic even in Quintilian’s constructive pedagogy leaves the ancient lore of dispositio too analytical to be sufficient for modern teachers.

(6) Style Analyzed

Quintilian’s long discussion of style (elocutio, VIII-XI) opens with one of his best sayings, “let care in words be solicitude for things”;[13] and the whole introduction is an admirable answer to the old quibble about form and substance. If he thereupon proceeds for two books by the usual categories, he at least avoids the subdivision that had become excessive, and provides a convenient guide to the voluminous classical lore of elocutio.[14] Typical is his introduction, under sentence-movement (compositio, IX. iv), to the doctrine of sentence close (clausula).

(7) Style Promoted

Having followed the usual analysis of style, Quintilian proceeds (X) to constructive promotion, to the ways of gaining secure control (firma facilitas; see the tabular view, page 66). “We who contemplate oratorical power, not mountebank volubility, have to inculcate both range and discrimination” (copia cum iudicio, X. i. 8). So the vivid impressions that come through the ear should be supplemented by critical reading. The reading of poetry promotes concrete realization, heightening of style, emotional appeal, and aptness in characterization.[15] From imitation Quintilian passes (X. iii) to writing for practise in style. Since this, like deep plowing, is for a better yield, he goes into specific counsels.

In transition Quintilian observes that meditation (cogitatio, X. vi) for speaking without writing can go so far as to fix not only the order of points, which is enough, but even the connection of words. The value to the speaker of practise in writing is to make channels (formæ) for such meditation. Since meditation must always leave a margin for improvisation, the plan must be such as may be easily left and resumed. In other words, to give the speaker secure control, the plan must be progressive. Iterating this in the next chapter,[17] Quintilian adds that the other main means to extempore power is concrete realization.[18]

Writing gives speaking precision; speaking gives writing ease (X. vii. 29). From this summary of their general relations in education, Quintilian passes to the use of writing in the preparation of a particular speech.

The secure control that Quintilian seeks to promote, that firma facilitas which is the subject of the whole tenth book, is evidently quite different from mere fluency. With the gift of gab in boys he has long ago expressed his impatience. “Impromptu garrulity, without the meditation that the master intends, almost without hesitation in rising to speak, is really the brag of a mountebank” (II. iv. 15). He not only presupposes, he specifically inculcates, most careful preparation.

(8) Memory

In this preparation the importance that he gives to writing, not only for general practise, but for the composition of a particular speech, may seem greater than is warranted by experience. Even so he is far from supporting those who represent classical oratory as having been generally written and memorized.[20] That the urgencies of public address could be met by that method is a priori a difficult assumption; and even the spread of the oratory of display in his time, and his own professorial fondness for finish of style, did not lead Quintilian to urge memorizing generally and unreservedly. Rather what he offers under memoria (XI. ii) has the usual wide ancient scope. It should be read in its connection with what he has already taught (X. vi. vii, page 80 above) about cogitatio.

Devices and exercises for training and applying such a faculty (XI. ii. 8-35) are summed up (36) under the two principles of divisio and compositio, definiteness of outline and definiteness of sentence movement. The former is thus iterated for the third time (see X. vi. vii) as essential. The importance of the latter lies in the fact that the mind more readily retains settled rhythms (39). As verse is easier to memorize than prose, so periodic rhythms than unperiodic.[23] Thus Quintilian faces finally the question of learning by heart. That it was a question, even for Quintilian, shows that classical practise was divided, as modern practise is, by differences both in talent and in the field of habitual exercise.

D. Scope and Plan

The comprehensive program announced by Quintilian in his proem is carried through. No other ancient treatise is so exhaustive.[24] Including all the traditional topics, he proceeds upon the classical theory of systematic guidance, but makes the important contribution of pedagogical order. For his plan is progressive. Though sometimes anxiously analytical in subdivision, he is constructive in making his main line not the survey of the subject, but the development of the student. The traditional five parts of rhetoric stand out clearly; but they cover only about half of the space, and they do not determine the plan. Rather Quintilian proceeds from less to more, from boyhood through adolescence to manhood. His idea is to widen and deepen the practise of public speaking as it opens more and more to the growing speaker. Aristotle’s philosophy of rhetoric begins with the speaker as theoretically the efficient cause; Quintilian’s pedagogy ends with the speaker as practically the efficient result. So, before entering upon definitions, he devotes two books to practical exercises, beginning not with the subject, but with the boy.[25] So, after he has defined the field and scope, he expounds inventio as in practise it expands, and links it with dispositio. So the two books in which elocutio is traditionally analyzed are followed by the two that show practically how it may be achieved; and these two are the culmination, the final application of all the preceding doctrine. His Institutio is faithfully what its title proposes, a pedagogy of rhetoric.

That it keeps its place in the history not only of rhetoric, but of education is due, of course, to Quintilian’s cogency; it is due also to the largeness of the subject. Rhetoric, for the fortunate few who alone could aspire to leadership, comprised most of the higher systematic education. The scope so brilliantly vindicated by Cicero[26] is taken by Quintilian as a matter of course. Thus his work is in more than one aspect a general pedagogy. Thus also rhetoric itself, to fulfil his demands and follow his methods, must keep his conception of bringing to bear the whole man. The narrowing of rhetoric in practise arose from the narrowing of public life and meant the narrowing of education.

II. DECLAMATIO IN SENECA,[27] TACITUS, AND PLINY

A. Declamatio

The declamatio exhibited by Seneca, though already established, was fairly new at Rome.[28] Cicero, writing about the time of Seneca’s birth, still uses declamare, declamatio, and controversia[29] in their older general senses. His approval of practise speaking on hypothetical cases was apparently of something like our modern “moot courts.” Controversiæ of the Senecan sort he knew only in their incipiency.[30]

Tacitus, writing his Dialogus de oratoribus about 81 A.D., a few years before Quintilian’s Institutio, shows clearly that the specialized controversiæ, from being common, had become pervasive almost to the extent of monopoly. From the older, Ciceronian position of comprehensive training his Messalla derides declamatio and all its works.