100 Ibid. v. p. 111, b. 32-p. 112, a. 2: ἔτι ὁ σοφιστικὸς τρόπος, τὸ ἄγειν εἰς τοιοῦτον πρὸς ὃ εὐπορήσομεν ἐπιχειρημάτων, &c.
101 Ibid. p. 112, a. 2-15. δεῖ δ’ εὐλαβεῖσθαι τὸν ἔσχατον τῶν ῥηθέντων τρόπων· παντελῶς γὰρ ἀπηρτημένος καὶ ἀλλότριος ἔοικεν εἶναι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς.
The epithet σοφιστικὸς τρόπος is probably intended by Aristotle to apply only to this last class of cases.
This paragraph is very obscure, and is not much elucidated by the long Scholion of Alexander (pp. 267-268, Br.).
10. You will recollect that every proposition laid down or granted by the respondent carries with it by implication many other propositions; since every affirmation has necessary consequences, more or fewer. Whoever says that Sokrates is a man, has said also that he is an animal, that he is a living creature, biped, capable of acquiring knowledge. If you can disprove any of these necessary consequences, you will have disproved the thesis itself. You must take care, however, that you fix upon some one of the consequences which is really easier, and not more difficult, to refute than the thesis itself.102
102 Topic. II. v. p. 112, a. 16-23.
11. Perhaps the thesis set up by the respondent may be of such a nature that one or other of two contrary predicates must belong to the subject; e.g., either health or sickness. In that case, if you are provided with arguments bearing on one of the two contraries, the same arguments will also serve indirectly for proof, or for disproof, of the other. Thus, if you show that one of the two contraries does belong to the subject, the same arguments prove that the other does not; vice versâ, if you show that one of them does not belong, it follows that the other does.103
103 Topic. II. vi. p. 112, a. 25-31. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι πρὸς ἀμφω χρήσιμος ὁ τόπος.
12. You may find it advantageous, in attacking the thesis, to construe the terms in their strict etymological sense, rather than in the sense which common usage gives them.104
104 Ibid. a. 32-38: ἔτι τὸ ἐπιχειρεῖν μεταφέροντα τοὔνομα ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον, ὡς μάλιστα προσῆκον ἐκλαμβάνειν ἢ ὡς κεῖται τοὔνομα.
The illustrative examples which follow prove that λόγον here means the etymological origin, and not the definition, which is its more usual meaning.
13. The predicate may belong to its subject either necessarily, or usually, or by pure hazard. You will take notice in which of these three ways the respondent affirms it, and whether that which he chooses is conformable to the fact. If he affirms it as necessary, when it is really either usual or casual, the thesis will be open to your attacks. If he affirms it without clearly distinguishing in which of the three senses he intends it to be understood, you are at liberty to construe it in that one of the three senses which best suits your argument.105
105 Ibid. b. 1-20. This locus seems unsuitable in that part of the Topica where Aristotle professes to deal with theses τοῦ συμβεβηκότος, or theses affirming or denying accidental predicates. It is one of the suppositions here that the respondent affirms the predicate as necessary.
14. Perhaps the thesis may have predicate and subject exactly synonymous, so that the same thing will be affirmed as an accident of itself. On this ground it will be assailable.106
106 Ibid. b. 21-26.
15. Sometimes the thesis will have more than one proposition contrary to it. If so, you may employ in arguing against it that one among its various contraries which is most convenient for your purpose.107 Perhaps the predicate (accidental) of the thesis may have some contrary: if it has, you will examine whether that contrary belongs to the subject of the thesis; and, should such be the case, you may use it as an argument to refute the thesis itself.108 Or the predicate of the thesis may be such that, if the thesis be granted, it will follow as a necessary consequence that contrary predicates must belong to the same subject. Thus, if the thesis be that the Platonic Ideas exist in us, it follows necessarily that they are both in motion and at rest; both perceivable by sense, and cogitable by intellect.109 As these two predicates (those constituting the first pair as well as the second pair) are contrary to each other, and cannot both belong to the same subject, this may be used as an argument against the thesis from which such consequence follows.
107 Ibid. vii. p. 112, b. 28-p. 113, a. 19. δῆλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι τῷ αὐτῷ πλείονα ἐναντία συμβαίνει γίνεσθαι. — λαμβάνειν οὖν τῶν ἐναντίων ὁπότερον ἂν ᾖ πρὸς τὴν θέσιν χρήσιμον.
108 Ibid. viii. p. 113, a. 20-23.
109 Topic. II. viii. p. 113, a. 24-32: ἢ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον εἴρηται κατά τινος, οὗ ὄντος ἀνάγκη τὰ ἐναντία ὑπάρχειν· οἷον εἰ τὰς ἰδέας ἐν ἡμῖν ἔφησεν εἶναι· κινεῖσθαί τε γὰρ καὶ ἠρεμεῖν αὐτὰς συμβήσεται, ἔτι δὲ αἰσθητὰς καὶ νοητὰς εἶναι. Aristotle then proceeds to state how this consequence arises. Those who affirm the Platonic Ideas, assign to them as fundamental characteristic, that they are at rest and cogitable. But, if the Ideas exist in us, they must be moveable, because we are moved; they must also be perceivable by sense, because it is through vision only that we discriminate and know differences of form. Waitz observes (in regard to the last pair, καὶ αἰσθηταί): “Nam singulæ ideæ certam quandam rerum speciem et formam exprimunt: species autem et forma oculis cernitur.” I do not clearly see, however, that this is a consequence of affirming Ideas to be ἐν ἡμῖν; it is equally true if they are not ἐν ἡμῖν.
16. We know that whatever is the recipient of one of two contraries, is capable also of becoming recipient of the other. If, therefore, the predicate of the thesis has any contrary, you will examine whether the subject of the thesis is capable of receiving such contrary. If not, you have an argument against the thesis. Let the thesis be, The appetitive principle is ignorant. If this be true, that principle must be capable of knowledge.110 Since this last is not generally admitted, you have an argument against the thesis.
110 Topic. II. vii. p. 113, a. 33-b. 10.
17. We recognize four varieties of Opposita: (1) Contradictory; (2) Contrary; (3) Habitus and Privatio; (4) Relata. You will consider how the relation in each of these four varieties bears upon the thesis in debate.
In regard to Contradictories, you are entitled, converting the terms of the thesis, to deny the predicate of the converted proposition respecting the negation of the subject. Thus, if man is an animal, you are entitled to infer, What is not an animal is not a man. You will prove this to be an universal rule by Induction; that is, by citing a multitude of particular cases in which it is indisputably true, without possibility of finding any one case in which it does not apply. If you can prove or disprove the converted obverse of the thesis — What is not an animal is not a man — you will have proved or disproved, the thesis itself, Man is an animal. This locus is available both for assailant and respondent.111
111 Ibid. viii. p. 113, b. 15-26: ἐπεὶ δ’ αἱ ἀντιθέσις τέσσαρες, σκοπεῖν ἐκ μὲν τῶν ἀντιφάσεων ἐκ τῆς ἀκολουθήσεως καὶ ἀναιροῦντι καὶ κατασκευάζοντι· λαμβάνειν δ’ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, οἷον εἰ ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζῷον, τὸ μὴ ζῷον οὐκ ἄνθρωπος· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων — ἐπὶ πάντων οὖν τὸ τοιοῦτον ἀξιωτέον.
Aristotle’s declaration, that this great logical rule can only be proved by Induction, deserves notice. I have remarked the same thing about his rules for the conversion of propositions, in the beginning of the Analytica Priora. See above, p. 145, seq.
In regard to Contraries, you will study the thesis, to see whether the contrary of the predicate can be truly affirmed respecting the contrary of the subject, or whether the contrary of the subject can be truly affirmed respecting the contrary of the predicate. This last alternative occurs sometimes, but not often; in general the first alternative is found to be true. You must make good your point here also by Induction, or by repetition of particular examples. This locus will serve either for the purpose of refutation or for that of defence, according to circumstances. If neither of the two alternatives above-mentioned is found correct, this is an argument against the thesis.112
112 Topic. II. viii. p. 113, b. 27-p. 114, a. 6. λαμβάνειν δὲ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς, ἐφ’ ὅσον χρήσιμον. — σπάνιον δὲ τὸ ἀνάπαλιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων συμβαίνει, ἀλλὰ τοῖς πλείστοις ἐπὶ ταὐτα ἡ ἀκολούθησις. εἰ οὖν μητ’ ἐπὶ ταὐτὰ τῷ ἐναντίῳ τὸ ἐναντίον ἀκολουθεῖ μήτε ἀνάπαλιν, δῆλον ὅτι οὐδὲ τῶν ῥηθέντων ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ ἕτερον τῷ ἑτέρῳ.
In regard to Habitus and Privatio, the rule is the same as about Contraries; only that the first of the two above alternatives always holds, and the second never occurs.113 If sensible perception can be predicated of vision, insensibility also can be predicated of blindness; otherwise, the thesis fails.
113 Ibid. p. 114, a. 7-12.
In regard to Relata, the inference holds from the correlate of the subject to the correlate of the predicate. If knowledge is belief, that which is known is believed; if vision is sensible perception, that which is visible is sensibly perceivable. Some say that there are cases in which the above does not hold; e.g., That which is sensibly perceivable is knowable; yet sensible perception is not knowledge. But this objection is not valid; for many persons dispute the first of the two propositions. This locus will be equally available for the purpose of refutation — thus, you may argue — That which is sensibly perceivable is not knowable, because sensible perception is not knowledge.114
114 Ibid. a. 13-25.
18. You will look at the terms of the proposition, also, in regard to their Derivatives, Inflections, &c., and to matters associated with them in the way of production, preservation, &c. This locus serves both for proof and for refutation. What is affirmable of the subject, is affirmable also of its derivatives: what is not affirmable of the derivatives, is not affirmable of the subject itself.115
115 Ibid. ix. p. 114, a. 26-b. 5. δύστοιχα, πτώσεις, τὰ ποιητικὰ καὶ φυλακτικά — δῆλον οὖν ὅτι ἑνὸς ὁποιουοῦν δειχθέντος τῶν κατὰ τὴν αὐτὴν συστοιχίαν ἀγαθοῦ ἢ ἐπαινετοῦ, καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα δεδειγμένα γίνεται. — b. 23: ὧν μὲν γὰρ τὰ ποιητικὰ ἀγαθά, καὶ αὐτὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν, ὧν δὲ τὰ φθαρτικὰ ἀγαθά, αὐτὰ τῶν κακῶν.
19. Arguments may often be drawn, both for proof and for refutation, from matters Similar or Analogous to the subject or predicate of the thesis. Thus, if one and the same cognition comprehends many things, one and the same opinion will also comprehend many things. If to possess vision is to see, then also to possess audition is to hear. If to possess audition is not to hear, then neither is to possess vision to see. The argument may be urged whether the resemblance is real or only generally supposed. Sometimes, however, the inference will not hold from one to many. Thus, if to know is to cogitate, then to know many things should be to cogitate many things. But this last is impossible. A man may know many things, but he cannot cogitate many things; therefore, to know is not to cogitate.116
116 Topic. II. x. p. 114, b. 25-36: πάλιν ἐπὶ τῶν ὁμοίων, εἰ ὁμοίως ἔχει, — καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τῶν δοκούντων· χρήσιμος δ’ ὁ τόπος πρὸς ἄμφω· — σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἐφ’ ἑνὸς καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ πολλῶν ὁμοίως ἔχει· ἐνιαχοῦ γὰρ διαφωνεῖ.
20. There are various loci for argument, arising from degrees of Comparison — more, less, equally. One is the argument from concomitant variations, which is available both for proof and for disproof. If to do injustice is evil, to do more injustice is more evil. If an increase in degree of the subject implies an increase in degree of the predicate, then the predicate is truly affirmed; if not, not. This may be shown by Induction, or repetition of particular instances.117 Again, suppose the same predicate to be affirmable of two distinct subjects A and B, but to be more probably affirmable of A than of B. Then, if you can show that it does not belong to A, you may argue (à fortiori) that it does not belong to B; or, if you can show that it belongs to B, you may argue (à fortiori) that it belongs also to A. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable respecting the same subject but with unequal degrees of probability, then, if you can disprove the more probable of the two, you may argue from thence in disproof of the less probable; and, if you can prove the less probable, you may argue from thence in proof of the more probable. Or, if two distinct predicates be affirmable respecting two distinct subjects but with unequal degrees of probability, then, if you can disprove the more probable you may argue from thence against the less probable; and, if you can prove the less probable, you are furnished with an argument in proof of the more probable.118 If the degrees of probability, instead of being unequal, are equal or alike, you may still, in the cases mentioned, argue in like manner from proof or disproof of the one to proof or disproof of the other.119
117 Ibid. b. 37-p. 115, a. 5: εἰσὶ δὲ τοῦ μᾶλλον τόποι τέσσαρες, εἷς μὲν εἰ ἀκολουθεῖ τὸ μᾶλλον τῷ μᾶλλον, — χρήσιμος δὲ πρὸς ἄμφω ὁ τόπος· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου ἐπιδόσει ἡ τοῦ συμβεβηκότος ἐπίδοσις, καθάπερ εἴρηται, δῆλον ὅτι συμβέβηκεν, εἰ δὲ μὴ ἀκολουθεῖ, οὐ συμβέβηκεν. τοῦτο δ’ ἐπαγωγῇ ληπτέον.
118 Topic. II. x. p. 115, a. 5-14.
119 Ibid. a. 15-24: ἐκ τοῦ ὁμοίως ὑπάρχειν ἢ δοκεῖν ὑπάρχειν, &c.
21. Another locus for argument is, that ex adjuncto. If the subject, prior to adjunction of the attribute, be not white or good, and if adjunction of the attribute makes it white or good, then, you may argue that the adjunct must itself be white or good. And you might argue in like manner, if the subject prior to adjunction were to a certain extent white or good, but became more white or more good after such adjunction.120 But this locus will not be found available for the negative inference or refutation. You cannot argue, because the adjunction does not make the subject white or good, that therefore the adjunct itself is not white or not good.121
120 Ibid. xi. p. 115, a. 26-33.
121 Ibid. a. 32-b. 2.
22. If the predicate be affirmable of the subject in greater or less degree, it must be affirmable of the subject simply and absolutely. Unless the subject be one that can be called white or good, you can never call it more white or more good. This locus again, however, cannot be employed in the negative, for the purpose of refutation. Because the predicate cannot be affirmed of the subject in greater or less degree, you are not warranted in inferring that it cannot be affirmed of the subject at all. Sokrates cannot be called in greater or less degree a man; but you cannot thence infer that he is not called a man simply.122 If the predicate can be denied of the subject simply and absolutely, it can be denied thereof with every sort of qualification: if it can be affirmed of the subject with qualification, it can also be affirmed thereof simply and absolutely, as a possible predicate.123 This, however, when it comes to be explained, means only that it can be affirmed of some among the particulars called by the name of the subject. Aristotle recognizes that the same predicate may often be affirmed of the subject secundum quid, and denied of the subject simply and absolutely. In some places (as among the Triballi), it is honourable to sacrifice your father; simply and absolutely, it is not honourable. To one who is sick, it is advantageous to undergo medical treatment; speaking simply and absolutely (i.e., to persons generally in the ordinary state of health), it is not advantageous. It is only when you can truly affirm the proposition, without adding any qualifying words, that the proposition is true simply and absolutely.124
122 Ibid. b. 3-10.
123 Ibid. b. 11-35. εἰ γὰρ κατά τι ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ἁπλῶς ἐνδέχεται.
124 Topic. II. xi. p. 115, b. 33: ὥστε ὃ ἂν μηδενὸς προστιθεμένου δοκῇ εἶναι καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρὸν ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιοῦτων, ἁπλῶς ῥηθήσεται.
III.
Such are the chief among the thirty-seven Loci which Aristotle indicates for debating dialectically those theses in which the predication is only of Accident — not of Genus, or Proprium, or Definition. He proceeds (in the Third Book of the Topica) to deal separately with one special branch of such theses, respecting Expetenda and Fugienda: where the question put is, Of two or more distinct subjects, which is the more desirable or the better? The cases supposed are those in which the difference of value between the two subjects compared is not conspicuous and unmistakeable, but where there is a tolerably near approximation of value between them, so as to warrant doubt and debate.125
125 Ibid. III. i. p. 116, a. 1-12: Πότερον δ’ αἱρετώτερον ἢ βέλτιον δυεῖν ἢ πλειόνων, ἐκ τῶνδε σκεπτέον. &c.
We must presume that questions of this class occurred very frequently among the dialectical debates of Aristotle’s contemporaries; so that he thinks it necessary to give advice apart for conducting them in the best manner.
1. Of two good subjects compared, that is better and more desirable which is the more lasting; or which is preferred by the wise and good man; or by the professional artist in his own craft; or by right law; or by the multitude, all or most of them. That is absolutely or simply better and more desirable, which is declared to be such by the better cognition; that is better to any given individual, which is declared to be better by his own cognition.126
126 Topic. III. i. p. 116, a. 13-22.
2. That is more desirable which is included in the genus good, than what is not so included; that which is desirable on its own account and per se, is better than what is desirable only on account of something else and per accidens; the cause of what is good in itself is more desirable than the cause of what is good by accident.127
127 Ibid. a. 23-b. 7.
3. What is good absolutely and simply (i.e., to all and at all times) is better than what is good only for a special occasion or individual; thus, to be in good health is better than being cut for the stone. What is good by nature is better than what is good not by nature; e.g., justice (good by nature), than the just individual, whose character must have been acquired.128 What is good, or what is peculiarly appurtenant, to the more elevated of two subjects is better than what is good or peculiar to the less elevated. Good, having its place in the better, prior, and more exalted elements of any subject, is more desirable than good belonging to the derivative, secondary, and less exalted; thus, health, which has its seat in proper admixture and proportion of the fundamental constituents of the body (wet, dry, hot, cold), is better than strength or beauty — strength residing in the bones and muscles, beauty in proper symmetry of the limbs.129 Next, an end is superior to that which is means thereunto; and, in comparing two distinct means, that which is nearer to the end is the better. That which tends to secure the great end of life is superior to that which tends towards any other end; means to happiness is better than means to intelligence; also the possible end, to the impossible. Comparing one subject as means with another subject as end, we must examine whether the second end is more superior to the end produced by the first subject, than the end produced by the first subject is superior to the means or first subject itself. For example, in the two ends, happiness and health, if happiness as an end surpasses health as an end in greater proportion than health surpasses the means of health, then the means producing happiness is better than the end health.130
128 Topic. III. i. p. 116, b. 7-12.
129 Ibid. b. 12-22: καὶ τὸ ἐν βελτίοσιν ἢ προτέροις ἢ τιμιωτέροις βέλτιον, οἷον ὑγίεια ἰσχύος καὶ κάλλους. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ὑγροῖς καὶ ξηροῖς καὶ θερμοῖς καὶ ψυχροῖς, ἁπλῶς δ’ εἰπεῖν ἐξ ὧν πρώτων συνέστηκε τὸ ζῷον, τὰ δ’ ἐν τοῖς ὑστέροις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἰσχὺς ἐν τοῖς νεύροις καὶ ὀστοῖς, τὸ δὲ κάλλος τῶν μελῶν τις συμμετρία δοκεῖ εἶναι.
The reason given in this locus for superior estimation is a very curious one: the fundamental or primary constituents rank higher than compounds or derivatives formed by them or out of them. Also, the definition of beauty deserves attention: the Greeks considered beauty to reside more in proportions of form of the body than in features of the face.
130 Ibid. b. 22-36.
Again, that which is more beautiful, honourable, and praiseworthy per se, is better than what possesses these same attributes in equal degree but only on account of some other consequence. Thus, friendship is superior to wealth, justice to strength; for no one values wealth except for its consequences, whereas we esteem friendship per se, even though no consequences ensue from it.131
131 Ibid. b. 33-p. 117, a. 4.
Where the two subjects compared are in themselves so nearly equal that the difference of merit can hardly be discerned, we must look to the antecedents or consequents of each, especially to the consequents; and, according as these exhibit most of good or least of evil, we must regulate our estimation of the two subjects to which they respectively belong.132 The larger lot of good things is preferable to the smaller. Sometimes what is not in itself good, if cast into the same lot with other things very good, is preferable to another thing that is in itself good. Thus, what is not per se good, if it goes along with happiness, is preferable even to justice and courage. The same things, when taken along with pleasure or with the absence of pain, are preferable to themselves without pleasure or along with pain.133 Everything is better, at the season when it tells for most, than itself at any other season; thus, intelligence and absence of pain are to be ranked as of more value in old age than in youth; but courage and temperance are more indispensably required, and therefore more to be esteemed, in youth than in old age. What is useful on all or most occasions is more to be esteemed than what is useful only now and then; e.g., justice and moderation, as compared with courage: also that which being possessed by every one, the other would not be required; e.g., justice is better than courage, for, if every one were just, courage would not be required.134
132 Topic. III. i. p. 117, a. 5-15.
133 Ibid. a. 16-25.
134 Ibid. a. 26-b. 2.
Among two subjects the more desirable is that of which the generation or acquirement is more desirable; that of which the destruction or the loss is more to be deplored; that which is nearer or more like to the Summum Bonum or to that which is better than itself (unless indeed the resemblance be upon the ridiculous side, in the nature of a caricature, as the ape is to man135); that which is the more conspicuous; the more difficult to attain; the more special and peculiar; the more entirely removed from all bad accompaniments; that which we can best share with friends; that which we wish to do to our friends, rather than to ordinary strangers (e.g., doing justice or conferring benefit, than seeming to do so; for towards our friends we prefer doing this in reality, while towards strangers we prefer seeming to do so136); that which we cannot obtain from others, as compared with that which can be hired; that which is unconditionally desirable, as compared with that which is desirable only when we have something else along with it; that of which the absence is a ground of just reproach against us and ought to make us ashamed;137 that which does good to the proprietor, or to the best parts of the proprietor (to his mind rather than his body);138 that which is eligible on its own ground, rather than from opinion of others; that which is eligible on both these accounts jointly, than either.139 Acquisitions of supererogation are better than necessaries, and are sometimes more eligible: thus, to live well is better than life simply; philosophizing is better than money-making; but sometimes necessaries are more eligible, as, e.g., to a starving man. Speaking generally, necessaries are more eligible; but the others are better.140
135 Ibid. p. 117, b. 2-17. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ εἰ ἐπὶ τὰ γελοιότερα εἴη ὅμοιον, καθάπερ ὁ πίθηκος τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, τοῦ ἵππου μὴ ὄντος ὁμοίου· οὐ γὰρ κάλλιον ὁ πίθηκος, ὁμοιότερον δὲ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ.
136 Ibid. b. 20-p. 118, a. 5. ἃ πρὸς τὸν φίλον πρᾶξαι μᾶλλον βουλόμεθα ἢ ἃ πρὸς τὸν τυχόντα, ταῦτα αἱρετώτερα, οἷον τὸ δικαιοπραγεῖν καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ δοκεῖν· τοὺς γὰρ φίλους εὖ ποιεῖν βουλόμεθα μᾶλλον ἢ δοκεῖν, τοὺς δὲ τυχόντας ἀνάπαλιν.