Bismarck

After a few days’ rest we returned again to our former work at the office, accustoming ourselves to it once more, so that everything fell again into the old groove. The only difference for me was that I continued to enjoy the privilege accorded to me at Versailles, of access to all documents of a political character received by or despatched from the Foreign Office. Some of these were entrusted to my diary in the form of short summaries, or longer notices, together with many of my experiences and observations of that period, and an anthology of the tasks set to me by the Chief, which, as formerly, I noted down at once for future use. And now these faded leaves may themselves speak.

March 24th, 1871.—To-day, as also during the last few days, read old and recent despatches and other correspondence. It is reported from Vienna that Beust has been “much affected” by the telegrams exchanged by the Emperors William and Alexander, as from these it would appear as if the forbearance shown by the Austrians up to the last hour were not voluntary. A wire has been sent informing him that the telegram of the German Emperor was a purely personal act, and was despatched without the knowledge of the Minister. M. in Cassel reported that Madame Guisolphe from Versailles had been with Napoleon at Wilhelmshöhe; further, that Count Clary, passing as a M. Bertram, had, shortly before our departure, twice visited Versailles at the instance of the ex-Emperor, and then returned to Wilhelmshöhe; and finally, that Count Meulan had also been there on a visit, and that his communications appeared to afford Napoleon great satisfaction. Horace Rumbold, the English Chargé d’Affaires at St. Petersburg, is stated, in a report from that capital, to be vehemently hostile to Prussia as well as to Russia. According to a despatch sent to Bernstorff on the 17th of March, in which a desire is expressed that Loftus should be recalled, the latter had declared that England forbade the bombardment of Paris, and would know how to prevent it through the influence of the Crown Princess. A communication from Stockholm states that the King of Sweden had also written to General Brincourt of the French Guards, who had formerly been in Metz, and was there made prisoner by the Germans, a letter in which he expressed sentiments of a strongly anti-German character.

March 29th.—A letter from St. Petersburg reports that Oubril has been selected for the Russian Embassy in Paris, and that the Grand Duchess Hélène wishes him to be succeeded in Berlin by Walujeff, and not by the francophil Albedinski—also not by Orloff, who is very sensitive, and whose policy is governed by the treatment which he receives. The Emperor Alexander will nominate Walujeff if the Emperor William desires it, and she, the Grand Duchess, is prepared to communicate his wishes. Field Marshal von Berg, of Warsaw, is understood to be very well affected towards us.

April 7th.—Bucher told me this evening that “the venerable” Abeken drafted the Treaty of Olmütz, which is hardly calculated to add to our respect for the Herr Geheimrath, who passed through the room at the time, whistling as he went.

April 8th.—It is reported from Weimar, with “satisfaction and pleasure,” that for some time past there has been a marked change for the better in the political sentiments of the Grand Duke. “While his Royal Highness has never spoken to the writer on political subjects since the spring of 1866, and always carefully avoided touching upon them even at the most decisive moments, turning the conversation to private matters, he recently at a Court concert spoke to the writer on the internal affairs of the German Empire, and expressed his warm approval of the first parliamentary speech made by the Chancellor against the Ultramontanes.” The report continues: “The Grand Duke returned to the same subject yesterday at dinner, and spoke in high praise of the Chancellor, whom he had desired to thank personally the last time he was in Berlin, but had been unable to find at home.” The communication concludes as follows: “It is to be hoped that the ice is now broken, and that our relations with the Grand Duke will improve.”

It was probably on one of the immediately preceding or following days of April that the Chief gave me the ideas for an article for the press which I here reproduce: “On the formation of the Centre Party, in which Savigny rendered considerable assistance, the public was inclined to believe that the latter, who had been a Government official up to 1866, wished to continue to support the Government. In this view, however, the change which had taken place in his attitude was overlooked. After the first draft of the Constitution of the Confederation he was thought of for the post of Chancellor of the Confederation, which, however, would then practically have had only the importance of a presiding Minister, such as the Austrian representative had formerly been at Frankfurt. But the Diet amended the Constitution so as to make the Chancellor of the Confederation a responsible Minister, and the position became entirely different. It gave the Chancellor complete control of the affairs and policy of the Confederation, and it had never been the intention of the King to appoint Herr von Savigny to such a post. To the latter, however, this was a severe disappointment, aggravated further by physical discomforts, the worst of which was the necessity of again removing from the apartments in the Chancellerie of the Confederation, which he had already occupied and had arranged very comfortably.”

April 10th.—Wollmann told me to-day that recently an indignant communication with documentary enclosures had been received from Fabrice, reporting that ——, who had been acting as Prefect in a French provincial town, had been found guilty of serious misbehaviour. Fabrice had for a long time regarded him as unfit for the post. Now, on his departure, however, he was found in possession of 41,000 francs, which he had concealed in some old clothes, together with a number of silk curtains and chair covers, with which he wished to pack his boxes on leaving. Finally, when receiving money from the French, he allowed the latter less than 3 francs 75 centimes for the thaler, which was the rate at which he paid it over to the Treasury, and put the difference into his own pocket. Hardly credible, yet W. says that he has himself seen the general’s letter.

April 14th.—The Chief wishes to have the sensational stories published by the Avenir de Loire et Cher and the Revue des Deux Mondes contradicted in the press, and the real facts related—but “not in the Berlin papers.” According to these romancers, we took away with us the silver and table linen from Madame Jesse’s house, and the Chancellor tried to extort a valuable clock from the poor oppressed lady. The Minister at the same time gave me the necessary particulars. The article appeared in the Kölnische Zeitung, of the 18th of April.

April 16th.—Wrote the following article for the Kölnische Zeitung, on information received from the Chief: “Is there not a proverb to the effect, What is sauce for the goose is sauce also for the gander? For some considerable time past, the west end of Paris has been bombarded, and, indeed, without previous notice. A hail of shells has fallen on the Turkish Legation, and there has been a similar downpour in the immediate vicinity of the American Legation, so that Mr. Washburne found himself obliged to remove to another part of the city. That is done on behalf of a Government to whom these diplomatists are accredited, yet, lo and behold, they make no complaint. Nor apparently do any of their colleagues. If we Germans had no memory, we should consider this silent resignation quite proper, as no one who takes up his residence in a fortress is justified in protesting if he has to share its fate, a rule which applies to diplomatists as well as to all other mortals. But, having a memory, we may be permitted to ask why did the diplomats residing in Paris shriek and protest so loudly against our bombshells, when the majority of those gentlemen were no longer accredited to any one, and therefore had no official character? We refer to the declaration of eighteen foreign Ministers, Chargés d’Affaires and Consuls-General, dated the 13th of January in the present year, denouncing the bombardment of Paris by the German army, and complaining that the citizens of neutral States were being wounded and exposed to constant danger. It was further urged that the bombardment had been begun without previous notice, thus depriving the diplomats in question of the opportunity of warning their protégés. Feeling their responsibility, they joined in a resolution, which was unanimously adopted, in which they referred to the principles and usages of international law in support of their demand, that measures should be taken to enable them to bring the persons and property of their countrymen into a place of safety. Nothing whatever of this kind has taken place now. Shall we try to solve the riddle by assuming that personal partisanship was the motive of the complaint, partisanship against Germany and for France?”—I then quoted the names of the diplomats who had formerly protested and were now silent.

April 17th.—The Chancellor wishes to have the following inserted in the Kreuzzeitung, with reference to an article in the Standard, as reproduced by the National Zeitung: “The rumour as to a desire being felt here in Berlin, that France and England should no longer be represented in the capital of the German Empire by Ambassadors, but only by simple Ministers, has afforded the Standard an opportunity of arguing in favour of such an alteration, as it ascribes the existing usage mainly to the love of pomp and magnificence peculiar to the Second Empire. We do not know what truth there is in the rumour in question, but the grounds which lead the English newspaper to regard it as probable seem to us very far fetched. Another consideration, however, lies much nearer to hand, namely, whether the old diplomacy, with its formalities and struggles for precedence, which have delayed many a congress for weeks, can under any circumstances maintain its position at the present stage of development of international intercourse. A speed is now required in the transaction of business which was not dreamt of in former times, and railways and telegraphs furnish the means of achieving it. The prerogative which is put forward in support of the maintenance of Ambassadors, namely, their personal access to the Sovereign, is to our thinking largely outbalanced by the mediæval pretensions in the matter of precedence, which a diplomatic representative cannot forego so long as he bears the title of Ambassador, but which nevertheless render him anything but welcome at the Court to which he is accredited, to his colleagues, and to the Government of the country.”

April 18th.—Bucher brings me down the following sketch for an article for Brass (Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung): “Revolutions usually proceed too slowly for the taste of the revolutionaries. Their aspirations fly far in advance of the sluggish reality, and many a soldier of liberty has already had to console himself with Lessing’s observation, according to which there have been at all times, men who had a just idea as to the future of the human race, but who made the mistake of thinking that changes could be produced in months and years for which history required generations and centuries. One of the most remarkable features of the drama which is now being played in France is that the development of affairs proceeds too rapidly for most of the revolutionists, events outstripping the thoughts, wishes, hopes and interests of individuals. On the 12th of March, a popular assembly was elected by universal suffrage throughout the whole country, and a government established by that body. On the 18th of March, the red flag was in all seriousness hoisted in Paris. Garibaldi, on whose appearance before a representative European mob at Geneva some years ago the Alps bowed down their heads in veneration, and who a few years previously had been fondled by the highest circles of the British aristocracy, found himself obliged to decline the leading part for which he had been cast in the drama. It is now the turn of the Poles. The friends of the Poles in London, and the diplomatists of the Hôtel Lambert in Paris, who have been working for that cause for forty years past, cannot bridge the gulf which separates them from General Dombrowski. According to a communication published yesterday, Count Ladislaus Plater will not hear of any solidarity between the Polish emigrants and the Paris Reds—each side must remain responsible for its own actions. Will this communication, however, cause the world to forget that the bulk of these Poles in every country have stood on the side of those parties that fight against the State and undermine social order, and that the fact of their having done so has been proclaimed both by the Polish emigrants themselves and by others as one of their titles to fame? On the contrary, we are convinced that in Count Plater’s protest, the world will recognise an indirect acknowledgment that this has always been the case, and will see in the events on the Lower Danube a new proof that up to the present no change has taken place in this respect.”

Evening.—Called to the Chief, who wishes to have the following inserted in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung:—“A meeting of Catholics of all ranks and professions, which has been held at Munich, has passed a resolution begging King Lewis to use every legal means to avert the dangerous consequences of the dogma of Infallibility, to prohibit its propagation in public educational institutions, and to take speedy and energetic measures for regulating the relations between Church and State in harmony with the Constitution. The petition which was drawn up was signed on the spot by some two hundred persons, and is now being circulated in various places for the purpose of obtaining fresh signatures. Similar petitions are being prepared in most of the Bavarian towns. It was to be expected from the beginning that this movement would extend from the learned classes and the clergy to the general public. The fact that this has occurred at the present moment may unquestionably be attributed to the course taken by that party in the German Reichstag which claims to monopolise the name of Catholic. Its members have now had a proof that they made a mistake when at a political meeting, which was summoned on a purely sectarian basis, they formed themselves into a party which, dismissing all political considerations, assumes an attitude of aggression towards the other parties, and of defiance towards the Federal Government. The first lesson which these gentlemen received through their defeat in the Reichstag does not appear to have led them as yet to a recognition of their error, as instead of seeking for its cause in themselves, they, like all those who have a lust of power, try to make others responsible for it, and pronounce the allied Governments to be guilty of criminal neglect in not rushing to their assistance. Perhaps the movement in Bavaria will convince them. If not, future events will do so. The logic of facts, which wreaks vengeance upon them, will not cease with the present step. The effacement of all political character on the part of the Clericals must bring about an alliance against the latter, between all other parties having political aims, whatever differences may exist amongst them; and the attack which this non-political party has undertaken to make will lead the political groups to adopt the necessary means of defence against future assault.”

According to a report from Munich, the influential Cabinet Councillor Eisenhart, and the Ministers Von Lutz and Von Schlör, manifest a leaning towards the Döllinger movement, and if the latter should develop a tendency to form a community of “Old Catholics”—that is to say, of those who do not accept the dogma of Papal infallibility—the Government would be prepared to protect them in their rights of property. Read a letter from Switzerland, which has been sent to our Minister at Berne with the remark that it has come from a shrewd observer. The letter says that the Germans were themselves in fault for the disorders at the Peace Celebration in Zurich. They had bragged of successes for which they had not fought; and, indeed, up to the present, they had been mere parasites. If the “respectable” Swiss press now confirm the reports of these Germans who put everything in a false light, that is due in the first place to the Liberal party, which wants to make capital out of the affair against the democratic element, and in the second place to the Gothard party, which is acting with the former, and which fears that for some reason Germany may withdraw from the promotion of the Tunnel project.

April 20th.—We hear from Vienna that Beust is trying to draw nearer to the Hohenwart and Klerhalm Ministry, as there is now a power in the public life of Austria which is stronger than the Imperial Chancellor, and which, although it now spares him, could at a later moment bring about his fall. Many things which now happen probably have their origin in the Cabinet of the Emperor, and are therefore due to Herr von Braun, who is married to a Frankfurt lady, and who is in regular intercourse with the ex-Senator Bernus, who, in turn, has frequent meetings with Frese. Among the drafts is an instruction to W. in Munich, dated the 18th instant, which runs as follows: “In my telegram of the 7th I referred to the attitude of the Clericals in the Reichstag, where their hostility to the Imperial Government is becoming more evident from day to day. At first it might have been expected that the party which was being formed, even if it had a strongly Catholic tendency, would not subordinate all political questions to sectarian differences, but would, to some extent, join with the Imperial Government upon the basis of Conservative principles and the honourable promotion of the common national interests, supporting it in the same way as the strictly orthodox wing of the Evangelical Church has done, without sacrificing their independence. In consequence of this expectation, the Government had observed a friendly attitude towards the party, and in the debate on the Address had avoided any rejoinder to the plea openly put forward for German intervention in Italy, in order to leave free play to the expression of the various aspirations and views. That debate, and still more those that followed on the introduction of certain fundamental alterations in the constitution of the Empire, showed clearly that the Clerical Party had developed into a close organisation on a purely sectarian basis, and were prepared to sacrifice all national and political interests to those of their creed. The result is that they have made opponents of all the other parties, and particularly of those Catholics who remain faithful to the national cause, finding no support on any side except among the Hanoverian Separatists and the Poles. I greatly regret these tactless and inept proceedings, which aggravate the strain of sectarian differences. I learn that the Clerical Party regards the failure of its efforts to find support in the Federal Council as a sort of declaration of war on the part of the Government. The allied Governments, on the other hand, find that the aggressive tendencies of this party, which is only a continuation of the attitude long since adopted, and, unfortunately, still maintained by the Clerical press, naturally affects their position, and must force them into taking defensive measures of a more effective character, and oblige them on their side to assume the aggressive. The uncompromising attitude of the Clericals greatly promotes the Döllinger movement, and helps to win sympathy for it in circles which previously held aloof from it, where the course taken is regarded as confirmation of the assertion of Döllinger and his friends respecting the incompatibility of Clerical and Ultramontane tendencies with the demands of a national commonweal.” W. was to speak confidentially to Bray in this sense. I find from one of W.’s reports that this has been done. The Bavarian Minister has, indeed, expressed his agreement with the foregoing statement, but the chief cause of his regret is that the foolish course taken by the Clericals in the Reichstag has rendered it impossible for the Government to co-operate with them, a policy which would, in his opinion, have been desirable, and will now oblige it on principle to oppose them. Döllinger, in his opinion, had also gone too far.

April 21st.—This morning the Chief wished to have an article written for the Kölnische Zeitung calling attention to the contrast between the intellectual impotence of the French and their self-conceit, and to the circumstance that in recent times they have always had to trust to foreigners for their salvation—a theme for which he gave me the ideas. The article ran as follows: “The forces at the disposal of the insurgents number about 120,000. In addition to these may be reckoned some 10,000 or 12,000 more or less convinced Republicans who have come from abroad, from the provinces, from Belgium, and from England; and perhaps an equal number of criminals and misdemeanants. A large proportion of the National Guards, who are only serving under compulsion, long for the moment when they shall be obliged to lay down their arms. The remainder consist of workmen who prefer the pay of the Commune, the daily excitement and amusement of chasing former gendarmes and policemen, to a peaceful return to their workshops. That cannot last long. It would be unnatural if, among these thousands of idle workmen and insurgents under duress, a disgust for such a life did not make itself felt, together with a surfeit of the hardships of the soldier’s trade, and a loosening of discipline. For the moment, indeed, Dombrowski, who enjoys a certain popularity, succeeds in holding them together. This is a new symptom of the extraordinary intellectual poverty and weakness of will which characterises the Frenchman of to-day, and particularly the Parisian. They boast of being the centre of civilisation, the focus of the intelligence of our time; and yet, lo and behold, in the recent crises they have always selected foreigners for their leaders, and have sought their salvation abroad! After the fall of the Empire they allowed themselves to be tyrannised by Gambetta. At the same time they placed their hopes in Garibaldi, another Italian, who would now be Dictator in Paris had he desired it. Instead of Garibaldi, they must now depend upon Poles of the notorious guild of ‘barricade heroes’—such as Dombrowski, Okolowitch, &c.; while, finally, there is an almost universal wish entertained by the party of order, who are dissatisfied with the lack of energy manifested at Versailles, that the Germans—again foreigners—should undertake the restoration of law and order.” The following is an almost literal reproduction of the Chancellor’s own words: “Scarcely another people in the whole world would condescend in such a pitiful way to borrow its heroes from abroad. With the exception of these Parisians, who boast of being the cream of civilisation, but who in reality are merely the redskins of the pavement, as empty-headed and weak-willed as savages, none would submit to be driven by energetic, although otherwise insignificant, foreigners towards ends that are in every respect opposed to their own interests. Truly a repulsive and most pitiable degeneracy!”

April 24th.—Called to the Chief this evening, and received instructions and materials for an article in the Kölnische Zeitung, which ran as follows: “If the French ship which came to Glückstadt to convey 40,000 French prisoners of war back to their country was obliged to return without having effected its object, the reasons were very clearly indicated by the Imperial Chancellor in his last speech in the Reichstag. According to the Preliminary Peace, the prisoners were to be surrendered; but, on the other hand, the French Government was not at liberty, until after the signature of the final treaty, to station any troops between the Seine and the Loire, with the exception of 40,000 men in Paris. In consideration of the embarrassment caused to the Government of M. Thiers by the Communist rising, no objection was raised on the part of Germany to the collection of a force of over 40,000 men near Versailles; and, indeed, this measure was for a time endorsed by the liberation of a large number of prisoners. The Germans were, however, under no obligation to do this. On the contrary, their obligation ceased so long as the French Government was not in a position to fulfil its share of the undertaking to establish and maintain a neutral zone between the Seine and Loire. The concessions made on the German side in the matter of the liberation of prisoners were voluntary concessions, mere acts of a complaisance dictated by our own interest, the continuance of which depended entirely upon circumstances, upon the good will manifested at Versailles, and upon the confidence which may be reposed in Berlin, in the loyalty to its treaty engagements, as well as the energy and capacity of the Versailles Government. But there was also another consideration. Notwithstanding the order issued by Favre, all the German prisoners in the hands of the French have not yet been sent back, although their liberation should have taken place immediately after the Convention of the 28th of January. This is doubtless due to the independent position of the French Minister of War, as well as of the Chief of the Admiralty, who have shown a reluctance to discharge strictly and speedily the engagements entered into by Favre and Thiers for the release of some fourteen hundred German officers and soldiers, who are still held as prisoners, as, amongst other matters, for the surrender of the merchant vessels that had not been condemned before the conclusion of the Preliminary Peace. Can the Versailles Government fairly expect us to make further concessions when it has itself contumaciously neglected the fulfilment of its own obligations for fully three months?”

April 29th.—The Minister wishes the following explanation of the “double face” of the Paris Commune inserted in the press: “Many reports from Paris, and all those originating with persons who have access to the Government at Versailles, allude only to one of the tendencies which have contributed to the revolution in Paris and the foundation of the Commune. They represent it, namely, as the work of the cosmopolitan revolutionary spirit and as an attempt to realise socialistic and communistic chimeras. The truth of this is not to be denied. It is a cosmopolitan revolutionary spirit which united under the communistic flag MM. Dombrowski, Okolowitch, Stupny, Landuski, Burnaki and other Polish ‘heroes of the barricades,’ together with the Garibaldians and the crowd of Belgian and English members of the International, and which won for them the sympathies of Bebel and Schraps in the Imperial Diet. It is the grossest form of Communism that has united these champions of revolt, with fifteen to twenty thousand liberated criminals and the rest of the dregs of modern civilisation. But in addition to the fantastic and criminal cravings of which these are the representatives and tools, there is another element involved in the present Revolution that should never be lost sight of. This movement, which is thoroughly well founded, and is supported by order-loving and sensible citizens, aims at a more reasonable municipal organisation by the curtailment of an unnecessary and burdensome State guardianship. This tendency is explained by the history of France. The tyrannous municipal policy of Hausmann, which had a highly prejudicial effect upon the interests of the Corporation of Paris, is a striking example of the evils referred to. If the Parisians were given a municipal constitution approximating to that of the Prussian towns in the Hardenberg period many thoughtful and practical men in Paris who are now opposed to the Versailles Government would be satisfied, and would be no longer inclined to encourage the Revolution by their passive support.”

April 30th.—Yesterday and to-day read a number of interesting documents treating of negotiations with Cluseret, the present general of the Commune, and took note of them for future use. In the first of these, dated the 10th instant, Fabrice was instructed by telegraph to say in reply to Cluseret that he would listen to any overtures which the latter might desire to make to him, and bring them to the knowledge of the Chancellor. The telegram then continued: “If he should then call upon you it might be possible, without actually negotiating, to lead him to say how the Commune would propose to raise the money for us. You might also be able to bring home to him the helplessness of the whole affair, and in that way form an opinion as to the prospects of an attempt at mediation between Paris and Versailles. In reply to a despatch of the 21st of April, in which Fabrice says that the Commune has no money, and that in order to raise some it has already seized upon the property of societies and individuals, the Chief said that the general should nevertheless sound them as to the surrender of Paris to us, but only for purposes of information and report. The idea that the Commune could be really considered solvent had been entirely foreign to the telegram of the 10th instant. It was only a reconnaissance for the purpose of ascertaining the intentions and resources of the holders of power in Paris. Fabrice reports from Soissy on the 27th instant that Holstein, who had remained behind with him, had had a meeting with Cluseret, and that the Commune was disposed to pay a sum of 500,000,000 francs, of which 300,000,000 was in hand, in the form of securities belonging to the city, while the remaining 200,000,000 could be raised by the sale of the Octroi dues. In return for this the Germans would be required to abstain from taking any part in the stoppage of supplies, and not to deliver any of the forts occupied by them to the Versailles Government. A desire was also expressed that we should endeavour to bring about an understanding as to a modus vivendi between the two belligerent parties. There was a twofold basis upon which this could be effected. One was that the city should be disarmed, but should not be occupied by the troops of the Versailles Government, and that it should be granted a communal administration, together with security against a recurrence of Hausmann or Pietri Budgets. The second was the dissolution of the present National Assembly, which had exhausted its mandate, and a fresh appeal to France, whose decision would be accepted by Paris. Cluseret had described the Socialist and other excesses as a phase of this ‘drôle de mouvement’ which had now passed away. He treated the military siege of the city as an impossibility, but begged, in the event of Versailles being, in spite of all human probability, victorious, that they should not be permitted to destroy Paris. This, as well as the expectation that we might mediate, was only a desire on their part, and not one of the conditions of payment. The Frenchman then observed that negotiations with us would subject him to less suspicion in Paris than would negotiations with the Versailles Government. He further promised to release all German prisoners as soon as he was informed who and where they were, and also to move at once for the liberation of the Archbishop, whose imprisonment was an inheritance from the first phase of the movement. Finally, he repeated that the only important points were our neutrality and the abstention from interference with their supplies, as from a military standpoint the Versailles people caused him no anxiety.”

The Chief replied on the same day, that from this it appeared, if Cluseret’s views could be accepted as authoritative in Paris, that mediation between the latter and Versailles was not hopeless; those views being more moderate than he had expected, particularly with regard to disarmament. Fabrice might try to ascertain what Favre thought of the first alternative. In the meantime our attitude should be made to correspond with Cluseret’s expectations by observing neutrality, and taking no part in the maintenance of the cordon round Paris. A despatch setting forth the reasons for this course would be sent to him, Fabrice, that day. The telegram concluded: “The demands of the French negotiators in Brussels with respect to the five milliards and the Eastern Railway show qu’on se moque de nous.”

These telegrams were supplemented by a further communication dated the day before yesterday, which said that Fabrice should keep up the relations that had been established with Cluseret, and should try to ascertain whether he was of opinion that in case of the disarmament of the city and its non-occupation by the Versailles troops it could be garrisoned by our soldiers. If that were the case it would be desirable to make a serious endeavour to mediate with Versailles. Communal independence, after the fashion of the Prussian municipal regulations, was not in itself an unreasonable demand, if no efforts were made to secure communistic adjuncts. Perhaps it would be possible to sever the reasonable communal movement from the international one. If in doing this we succeeded in occupying Paris with the approval of the two parties, guaranteeing communal independence until the French had come to an understanding among themselves, and intervening with a strong hand in restoring domestic peace in France, we should improve our own position and gain fresh securities against possible bad faith at Versailles. In these circumstances Fabrice was to avoid taking sides in any way against the Parisians.

The despatch mentioned in the last telegram of the 27th of April, which was to be forwarded by courier on the same day, began by referring to a telegram from Fabrice, according to which Favre begged in a formal Note that the French troops might be permitted to pass through our lines over the Northern Railway and force their way into Paris; further, that the German military authorities should call upon the insurgents to disarm the enceinte, in accordance with the Convention of the 28th of January; and, finally, that the French army might be permitted to pass through the district and gate of St. Ouen. It runs as follows: “The French Government requests us to permit the passage of their troops through St. Ouen. This lies within the neutral zone, where the presence of both armies is forbidden by the Convention of the 28th of January. In order to enable us to agree to this we should be convinced that any arrangements we may come to with the French Government would be carried out by the latter. This conviction has been shaken by the dilatoriness of the French in the fulfilment of previous obligations, and by certain indications of a tendency to place an arbitrary interpretation, contrary to their true sense, upon stipulations that are now in force. The French Government is in arrears with the greater part of the money payable for the maintenance of our troops, with the release of German prisoners of war, and with the issue of clear and peremptory instructions to the Governors of the Colonies and the Commanders of the naval stations in Eastern Asia for the suspension of hostilities. The disposition to put a construction upon agreements which they never had, as well as to extend and override them without an understanding with us, is betrayed by the collection of 140,000 troops, where they are only justified in having 100,000; in the attempt to reduce the war indemnity by making payments below par; and in what, to my astonishment, appears to be the manifestation of a desire for the commencement of the evacuation of the districts occupied by us. If the French Government should really assert that we are bound, upon the payment of the first half milliard, and before the conclusion of a definitive peace, to any sort of evacuation, that circumstance would destroy all my confidence in its loyalty, as during the negotiations no other view was ever held than that a definitive peace must precede any evacuation by us of this side of the Seine.

“It was then supposed that the conclusion of a definitive peace would take place previous to any payment by France. M. Thiers expressed his intention to commence his financial operations after a lapse of two months at the earliest, and considered that the definitive treaty would be concluded in from four to six weeks. There was no question that the whole present occupation was regarded as a guarantee to us for the conclusion of the definitive peace; and the terms clearly show that all the evacuation yet to take place was subordinated to the final peace, and that the payments only affected the various stages of these evacuations. The sentence following these stipulations, according to which the evacuation is to take place after the conclusion of peace and after the payment of the first half milliard, was not contained in the original text. M. Thiers wished to have it concluded, and M. Favre considered it superfluous. I declared myself in favour of its inclusion, as on the day before I had agreed that a comparatively large and important stage of the evacuation should be made dependent upon this first payment, which might be reckoned on the basis of the proportion between the entire territory occupied and the whole five milliards. M. Thiers kept me to my word, which I acknowledged; but there was never any question of the evacuation of this side of the Seine before the ratification of the definitive treaty of peace.

“Should the French entertain any doubt on this point your Excellency will explain to M. Favre that I would rather advise his Majesty to immediately renew hostilities than submit to such a falsification of the spirit in which the Versailles negotiations were conducted.

“The decision of his Majesty with respect to our expected co-operation, direct or indirect, will depend, on the one hand, upon military considerations which are still under discussion, as well as upon the contents of the French official overtures announced in your Excellency’s telegram No. 196. On the other hand, we must take advantage of the present situation with the object of removing every uncertainty which the French may endeavour to read into our agreements. Should your Excellency really have occasion to suppose, as would appear to me from the contents of your reports of the 22nd and 23rd instant, that the French intend to interpret the treaty of peace as if the sentence in Article 3—L’evacuation des départements—s’opèrera graduellement après la ratification du traité de paix definitif—were modified by that which follows it, separated only by a semi-colon: après le versement—la rive droite, in such a way that the words of the first sentence, from après to definitif, would be rendered of no effect for the territory in question, your Excellency will please demand from the French Government, in the form of an ultimatum, a clear explanation upon this point. Were this to be refused I should lose all faith in its intention to honourably fulfil its treaty obligations, and it would then become desirable to renew the military operations as early as possible. We will not permit ourselves to be cozened out of our present position, but will, on the contrary, hold fast to it until the definitive peace has been concluded to our satisfaction. We have made these stipulations in order that we may be able to bring pressure to bear with this object. So long as the obligations undertaken, but not yet fulfilled, by France with respect to the indemnity and the prisoners of war remain unfulfilled, and so long as the above-mentioned doubt as to the intentions of the French Government respecting the interpretation of the preliminary peace and the conclusion of a definitive treaty is not removed, I must advise his Majesty against every form of support for the Versailles Government; and instead of any such support, I must recommend that a demand be at once addressed to the French authorities to reduce the number of their troops in accordance with the terms of the treaty, or to be prepared for a renewal of hostilities.”

May 1st.—According to a communication of yesterday’s date, from Fabrice, Colonel de la Haye had said to him, that probably a memorial from Thiers would be received, and not the Note from Favre, which had been announced, and that Favre had repeatedly declared that France was now fulfilling the obligations which she had undertaken, would continue to do so, and was prepared to conclude peace, and to recognise the preliminaries as merely intended to lead up to it. In return, he asked for permission to attack Paris by way of Epinay, and the Northern Railway line, through St. Denis, and that the Commune should be called upon, in accordance with the Convention, to withdraw its troops from the enceinte. The colonel requested Fabrice to inform the Chancellor of this. Should the latter decline, the French Government would be able to say, in the presence of Europe, that it had discharged its duty to the best of its ability, but that Germany prevented it from offering an effective resistance to the insurrection. Favre declared that he had exhausted all his resources, and that it was now necessary to know whether Prussia wished to favour the Government or the Commune. De la Haye had expressed a strong desire that Fabrice should not communicate this statement to the Chief, before the receipt of Thiers’ memorial. Fabrice, first of all, begged the Frenchman to hasten the despatch of the letter, but, also before that was done, to explain to Favre the significance and consequences of the demand which he expected us to make upon the Commune for the disarmament of the enceinte, a point upon which Favre did not, at the moment, appear to be quite clear. To this the Prince replied immediately, that we were not bound by any Convention to help the French Government, although we were justified in demanding from it the disarmament of the enceinte, and eventually enforcing the same, if we found it to be in our interest. The latter, however, was not the case. We had no interest in overthrowing the opponents of the French Government at the cost of German blood, so long as that Government did not carry out the stipulations of the preliminary treaty, but sought, on the contrary, to alter them to our prejudice. With the object of dissipating the mistrust that had arisen in this way, by means of a personal discussion of stronger guarantees, or of a fixed term for the payment of the five milliards, the Chancellor finally proposed to Favre that they should meet at Frankfurt or Mainz on any day he chose to select. As I saw later, Favre telegraphed that he would be in Frankfurt on Friday, and the Chief replied that he would arrive there on Saturday—perhaps because he considers Friday unlucky.

May 2nd, evening.—On the instructions of the Prince wrote an article for the Kölnische Zeitung, which was dated from Lagny, and was based on the foregoing despatch and other information. It was to be submitted for approbation upstairs to-morrow, before being despatched. It ran as follows: “The conduct of the French Government in the matter of the execution of the preliminaries of peace is quite enigmatic, not to use the stronger term of prevarication. In the position which it occupies towards the insurrection in the capital, which is growing more and more serious, it stands in urgent need of the good will of the Germans, of their indirect assistance, or, at least, of their neutrality. Yet up to the last few days it has shown itself extremely remiss in the fulfilment of the treaties concluded with us in January and March, quibbling in a very suspicious way over their most important stipulations, seeking in Brussels, as we hear, to enforce views which, if adopted in the definitive treaty, would bring about a change, by no means favourable to Germany, of the basis secured by us in the preliminary peace at Versailles. Moreover, it would appear that these unacceptable proposals are brought forward merely with the object of protracting the negotiations, and, in the interval thus gained, of securing, through the suppression of the insurrection of the Paris Communists, a position which would perhaps permit them, with some hope of success, to demand easier terms from those who have the control of our policy. M. Thiers’ Government only paid the maintenance money in a tardy way, and under the pressure of threats from the Germans. It temporised with the liberation of the German prisoners who still remain in France, and it shirked in like manner the just demands of the Germans for the surrender of the prize vessels that had not been condemned before the conclusion of the preliminary peace. There is reason to believe that it collected more troops near Versailles than had been agreed to in Berlin in view of so desperate a conflict with a powerful insurrection. It expressed an opinion that we were bound to evacuate the forts of St. Denis and Charenton—not after the ratification of the definitive peace, but after the receipt by us of the first half milliard. Finally, it caused proposals to be made in Brussels respecting the payment of the five milliards which were in no sense justified by the preliminary treaty, and which, if accepted—a thing utterly inconceivable—would delay the payment to a late period, and, besides, would leave Germany only four-fifths, and perhaps only three-fifths, of the war indemnity guaranteed in the agreement of the 26th of February. It is not to be wondered at if these and other similar facts have shaken the confidence which was felt at first on the German side in the loyalty of the leading French statesmen, if suspicion has begun to be felt, and if some disinclination exists to continue the favours which have already been extended to the French Government in dealing with the insurrection—favours which the latter sorely needed, and, it seems, formally asked for—until mistrust has been dispelled by explanations of an unequivocal character, or, perhaps, entirely removed by fresh guarantees. It is reported that the Chief of the Executive has been left in no doubt upon this point, and it is now stated here that M. Favre, who is understood to have given least ground for want of confidence, will in a few days have a conference with Prince Bismarck, for the purpose of giving explanations and coming to an understanding. It will take place, as we hear, at Frankfurt. It is to be hoped that this meeting will clear up the situation and hasten the conclusion of a definitive peace.”

May 3rd.—The foregoing article was returned to me unaltered from upstairs, and is now on its way to Cologne. Among the documents received, the following is of importance: F. reports from Soissy, on the 1st instant, that on the previous day Cahn, who is now attached to the Swiss Embassy, was authorised at the instance of Cluseret to go through the French prisons to find what Germans were detained there, in order that they may be set at liberty. Cluseret had also stated that he had proposed the liberation of the Archbishop. It was true that part of the Committee was opposed to this measure, but the life of his Eminence was nevertheless perfectly safe. A meeting with Cluseret was arranged for on the 1st instant. Cahn, however, came instead, and reported that Cluseret was now replaced by Captain Rossel as Minister of War for the Commune. Cahn was then instructed to see the latter, and ask him whether he maintained the decision of his predecessor as to the liberation of the German prisoners, and to seriously warn him against any ill-treatment of the Archbishop. The telegram adds that this will give the Commune an opportunity of entering into relations with us. If they do not avail themselves of it, doubtless an anti-German intrigue will have had something to do with the fall of Cluseret. The supply of provisions for Paris is seriously retarded on the north side, owing to the exceptional vigilance of the French administration, which is very well informed.

According to a report from St. Petersburg of the 26th of April, the King of Denmark has written to the Tsarevna, asking her to beg the Emperor Alexander to bring up the question of North Schleswig in Berlin. The Grand Duchess did not give her father’s letter to the Emperor himself, but applied to the Empress, who afterwards communicated its contents to him. Although the Emperor Alexander had said nothing on the subject to R., he nevertheless observed that he greatly desired to have a talk with the Emperor William, and hoped to see him in June either in Berlin or at Ems. The Grand Duchess Hélène informed R. of this, and asked what reply she should give to the Tsarevna, who had repeatedly inquired whether he had not said anything on this affair. The Grand Duchess was of opinion that our Government, whose German sentiments were doubted by no one, could now in its hour of triumph more easily make concessions than before. The matter might one day become unpleasant, and counter-concessions of a commercial character (?) could now be demanded from Denmark, which would secure the position of individual Germans in the territory to be ceded. R. replied that Germany would be prepared to make concessions, but that Denmark would not be satisfied with what could be granted. The reason of the Emperor Alexander’s great anxiety to see the affair settled is that he knows how eagerly the Danish Court stimulates the anti-German sentiments of the heir to the Russian throne. The same authority reports that the French Government, through the Marquis de Gabriac, their present representative in St. Petersburg, has complained to Gortschakoff that we are no longer as friendly as we were, and requested him to mediate between France and ourselves. This request was, however, declined, attention being called to the obligations undertaken in the preliminary peace, the fulfilment of which was the right means of securing the good will of Germany. At a Court ball the Emperor Alexander also observed to the marquis: “Remplissez d’abord loyalement vos engagements et après je serai votre avocat, si vous aurez des raisons de plainte. Aujourdhui ces raisons je ne les vois pas.”

May 4th.—The Chancellor, who leaves for Frankfurt to-morrow, wishes the Kölnische Zeitung to write somewhat as follows on the object of the journey: “The personal conference between Prince Bismarck and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, the necessity of which has been felt for some considerable time past, will have begun by the time these lines go to press. To-morrow morning at 8 o’clock the Imperial Chancellor, accompanied by the Councillors of Embassy Bucher, Count Hatzfeldt, and the Attaché Count Wartensleben, will leave for Frankfurt, where Jules Favre will probably have already arrived. Apparently the French have come to understand that their interests urgently require the removal of the suspicions which have arisen in regard to their good faith since the arrangement at Versailles. We ourselves must also know exactly where we stand with them. It is necessary to hasten the conclusion of a definitive peace. Some progress must finally be made in that matter, and France must cease to imagine that we will allow ourselves to be kept dangling in suspense, or to be imposed upon and manœuvred into an unfavourable position. She must respect our rights and not endeavour by pettifogging subterfuges to whittle down, or perhaps, indeed, disown the consequences of the preliminary peace. It may be taken for granted that the principal subjects to be dealt with at Frankfurt will be the manner of payment of the war indemnity of five milliards of francs, the surrender of the German merchant vessels which were not condemned by the Prize Courts before the signature of the preliminary treaty, the position of the Eastern Railway—which, after the Versailles arrangement, can no longer be regarded as an open question, although it has been treated as such by the Government of M. Thiers—and finally the regulation of the frontier. On the German side, however, it will be sought first of all to clear up the situation, and hasten the negotiations for peace, which have been brought to a standstill through the unjustifiable demands of the French. It is to be hoped that the Frankfurt negotiations will open the eyes of those members of the French Government who have not yet succeeded in thoroughly understanding the position of affairs, and in recognising the legitimacy of the claims based upon it from the German standpoint, and their necessity from the French standpoint. In all probability they will not fail to receive a serious and unequivocal reminder of this necessity from our side.”

May 6th.—Again a few comic episodes to break the monotony of these grave affairs. Prince Peter of Oldenburg, who seems to be a very ancient gentleman, writing from St. Petersburg, sent the Chief a memoir which he forwarded to the Emperor on the 1st of April (not as a joke for All Fools’ Day), in which, after proclaiming his strictly monarchical, legitimist, conservative and religious principles, he argues, in an extremely prolix and nebulous fashion, in favour of perpetual peace, and begs the Chancellor to summon a Conference for the Abolition of War. This magnum opus ought to be laid in its author’s coffin. Wollmann says that Abeken is in the habit of keeping the envelopes of letters from the King in order, as he is reported to have said, “that the handwriting of his Imperial and Royal master should not be trampled upon by muddy shoes.” He is said to have whole bundles of these relics in his possession. Very touching! Bucher afterwards confirmed the fact that Abeken had actually delivered himself of the above remark. He appears to have acquired this tender sentimentality during his stay in the East. He ought to have been Councillor of Embassy to the Dalai Lama.

May 14th.—The Chief is again here. Count Wartensleben, who was with him at Frankfurt, told me to-day that he had been out driving with the Chancellor several times outside the town, and while they were walking about in the woods the latter gave him numerous particulars of his negotiations with the Frenchmen. “Once,” said the Count, who by the way is a very pleasant young man, “in speaking of the German negotiators at Brussels, he remarked to me, ‘It is very unlucky for those gentlemen that we cannot conclude our business there.’ (Possibly on account of the gratuities in the way of orders.) ‘I am particularly sorry for poor Balan. But what can one do? The snipe must be shot where it rises.’ Another time (it was after the first conference with Favre and Pouyer-Quertier) he looked very fagged and worried, and on my asking him about it he replied that the French had proved exceptionally obstinate. He told me then how he managed to secure himself an ally against them. He said, ‘I proposed to Favre to bring M. Goulard to the Conference as he was a member of the National Assembly. Favre was at first greatly surprised at this suggestion, and would not hear of it. I pointed out to him, however, that it would be to his own advantage. Goulard would feel flattered and would be grateful to him, and would furthermore as one of the negotiators support him, Favre, in the National Assembly. Favre thereupon consented.’ But it was also of great advantage for the Chief (continued Wartensleben), as when Favre finally consented, the little gentleman in the white necktie and high stand-up collar was also grateful to him for being admitted to the negotiations, and when the two others were inclined to refuse something he always spoke in favour of giving way—it could be managed, he would himself take the responsibility for it, he thought that one really might agree to it. Eventually Favre thanked the Chief formally for his advice to include Goulard.”

May 15th.—On the instructions of the Chief, wrote to Brass respecting an article in No. 113 of the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, that the Prince did not consider it proper for a journal which was praised in another paper to reproduce this praise, and he positively prohibited all such misconduct in future.

May 17th.—Yesterday and to-day again read a number of telegrams and other documents received and despatched, which threw light on the Frankfurt negotiations and recent events in Paris. The Chief had from Frankfurt addressed an inquiry to Fabrice as to whether he believed that progress had been made in the fusion between the Comte de Chambord and the Princes of the House of Orleans, and whether it had a prospect of success. Count Arnim thought it had. The Republican form of government in France was more to our advantage, and therefore he would not oppose it unless he were compelled to. A telegram to Moltke on the 18th instant informed him that the Chief hoped to bring about the conclusion of a definitive peace at Frankfurt. Some of the conditions would, however, be that we should assist as far as possible in promoting the speedy occupation of Paris, which would then be in our interest, without exposing our men to danger, and in particular that we should consider the question of the passage of the French troops through our lines, of calling upon the Commune to evacuate the enceinte, of cutting off the supply of provisions, and of immediately liberating 20,000 prisoners of war for use in Algeria and the larger towns of the south. In case it were possible to secure at Frankfurt a peace which should receive the approbation of the Emperor, Moltke was requested to take the necessary preparatory measures for the above purposes. A short telegram of the same day, addressed to Thile and which was to be communicated to Delbrück, says that on the two preceding days the Chief was engaged in negotiations for fifteen hours, and had sent Favre a “strong ultimatum.” Another telegram reports to the Emperor that, according to the French Ministers, the stability of the present Government will in a great measure depend upon the speedy conclusion of the definitive treaty of peace. On the 11th a further telegram was sent to Moltke saying that, from Fabrice’s reports, the French generals, believing they could themselves dispose of the Communists, would endeavour so to arrange matters that they could dispense with our co-operation. But in that case also it would be desirable to mass our troops near Paris, as we could thus bring pressure to bear upon the French National Assembly in connection with the ratification of the treaty which would be discussed in about ten days, by exciting the apprehensions of that body as to the decision which we might take if the treaty were rejected.

Again a comic interlude between the serious scenes of the drama. Fabrice sends a report from Lieutenant von Mirbach, of the Guards, at St. Denis, which reached him through General von Pape, with the extremely naïve marginal note: “Most obediently submitted for kind consideration with the object of promoting the accession to the French throne of Prince Frederick Charles.” The document in question was to the following effect. Persons of all ranks and conditions, and quite recently an Attaché of the American Embassy, had inquired whether it was true that Prince Frederick Charles had been selected as the Regent of France. As far back as the winter a party had been formed with that object. Merchants, bankers, manufacturers, many citizens of standing and repute, “including even noblemen,” wished to offer the throne to the Prince, and were sure of the support of their friends, their employees, and of a part of the press. “Influential agents and leaders of the National Guard, and even some important members of the Commune, are understood to be well disposed towards this plan. The American inquired whether a deputation from this ‘Prussian’ party would be well received.” The writer had been informed by the “rich M. Vincent,” the Commandant of the National Guard in Versailles, and by M. de Bastide, that the same scheme had been discussed in that town. Obviously some one has been playing off a joke on the lieutenant, for, although we live in an age of miracles, it would be a miracle of miracles if a French party were now found to desire for their ruler a nephew of our old Master, after the efforts made by France to prevent the election as King of Spain of the Prince of Hohenzollern, who is only a remote relative of the Emperor William.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Third Army Corps in Compiègne has been informed that a conference took place on the 11th instant at Soissy between General von Schlotheim and General Borel, the chief of MacMahon’s staff.

“MacMahon desires to deliver the main attack on Paris on the west front of the enceinte, from the Bois de Boulogne or Billancourt against the bastion of the Point du Jour. In order to prevent the insurgents from continuing their resistance in the city from point to point, he wishes, at the same time—that is, during the same night—to endeavour to surprise the north front, and seize some positions in the north of Paris. Ten or twelve thousand men would be employed for this purpose, who would start in the evening from Gemevilliers, and march by way of Villeneuve, La Garonne and St. Denis, as also through Epinay, St. Denis, and Aubervilliers, towards the gates of La Chapelle and La Villette. With the assistance of some of the commandants of the National Guard, with whom an understanding was being entered into, and by taking advantage of the railway, and of the numerous conveyances which still frequented the main roads, it was considered possible to bring small detachments of trustworthy troops right into the city. In case the attack were repulsed, MacMahon binds himself to withdraw all the troops employed by him along the same route, on the same day, behind the rayon on this side, that is to say, behind the left bank of the Seine. By this means the proximity of French and German troops for any length of time would be avoided. Permission could hardly be refused for the French troops to march through St. Denis, although they are on no account to be allowed to tarry or post reserves there. General Borel was obviously desirous of preventing all co-operation on the part of the German troops and of the forts occupied by us, and gave it clearly to be understood that he regarded such direct support as undesirable on political grounds. He did not believe the insurgents would venture to pursue the storming parties in case the latter did not succeed—an opinion which is also shared here—and he positively denied that the French Commander-in-Chief intended to bombard the north front, or to proceed to a regular attack upon it if the surprise were to fail. As, according to these overtures, the French were prepared to forego our co-operation, and our own forces in and behind the forts are quite sufficient, I have, as already reported in a telegram of the 10th instant, given up the idea of a concentration of further troops outside Paris. In accordance with the wishes of the French Government, I consider it desirable in the first place to avoid everything that would attract the attention of the insurgents to the north front, and thereby endanger the success of the surprise. At the same time we consider it necessary to avert, as far as possible, all accidental losses to our troops should the insurgents, after repelling an attack, open fire with their artillery on the retiring French columns. In the event of his Majesty the Emperor and King afterwards expressly ordering the German troops to co-operate in the attack on Paris, I venture to express the humble opinion that, in view of the situation at the present moment, when the resistance is already organised and the insurgents are accustomed to fire, a simple bombardment of the enceinte would scarcely secure our object. It might then be desirable to proceed against the nearest gates and bastions with a battering train posted on the plateau of Romainville, and probably an occupation of the enceinte would only be attended with decisive success after we had advanced as far as Buttes Chamont, as this position commands the greater part of the northern half of Paris.”

Bucher informed me this evening that Professor Aegidi of Bonn has entered the Foreign Office as Councillor in charge of press matters, and is to undertake the appointment of agents, journalists, and other such gentlemen. He added: “Something has already been said in the newspapers on the subject. One newspaper contained a note, which had doubtless been provided by Aegidi himself, to the effect that he would replace Abeken, who had begun to grow old and weak. That ruffled our friend very considerably, and he grew as red as a turkey-cock as he remarked: ‘In such circumstances one can only wish to retire at once on his pension.’” Bucher further stated that Aegidi had been recommended by Keudell, whose cousin he had married, and who had previously secured him the position at Bonn after he had failed in Hamburg. In conclusion Bucher said: “Keudell has already appointed many useless people and expended large sums upon them. For example, some time ago he took up a Dane, whom he employed as an agent and richly remunerated, but who did absolutely nothing.” I recalled the case of Rasch, and B. said that he too had advised against employing him, describing him as a conceited blockhead to Keudell, who nevertheless sent him to Garibaldi with 20,000 thalers.

A telegram of the 15th instant from Fabrice states that the French had demanded in a despatch that the cordon drawn round Paris should be made complete so far as the German troops were concerned, as it was important that the leaders of this criminal undertaking (the Commune) should not escape the hands of justice. In reply to the French Government, Fabrice said that Borel had come to no understanding with the Third Army Corps respecting a blockade of the city. If the cordon was to be drawn at an early date, it would have to be preceded by an arrangement of that kind. The Chief telegraphed at once that, according to the understanding arrived at in Frankfurt, we were bound to completely isolate Paris as soon as the French desired it, to permit the Versailles troops to march through our lines, and to call upon the Commune to withdraw from the enceinte. We were not bound, however, to emphasise this demand by force of arms. But the three points in question must be carried into effect by the Commander-in-Chief, as we should otherwise commit a breach of the agreement entered into with the French Government.

It previously appeared from a pencil minute by Abeken on a report from Fabrice that we had offered, or that the French had demanded, something more than this, namely, in addition to the complete isolation of the city and the passage of the French troops through our lines, we should, in case the French Government asked for our support, give it in the shape of an artillery attack upon the enceinte, and, if the French storming parties were to fail, use all our forces to prevent a pursuit on the part of the Parisians.

May 20th.—According to a report from Stuttgart of the 17th instant, von Wachter, the Würtemberg Minister for Foreign Affairs, had remarked that King Charles now considered Würtemberg not to have been properly treated in connection with the Frankfurt treaty of peace (on the previous day he had known nothing about it), and he appeared to feel hurt at this. The Würtemberg Minister at Munich has reported that the treatment of Bavaria in connection with the conclusion of peace is greatly blamed in competent circles there, and that Count Quadt has been instructed to give expression to this dissatisfaction. It is doubtless Bavaria, therefore, that has altered the sentiments of Würtemberg.

Count von F., who has been in London, has informed Balan that the French Ambassador to the English Court, as well as the Duc de Grammont, have attracted a great deal of attention by their want of tact. The former had remarked to the Count in a reproachful tone that the Socialists in Paris had been principally recruited in Belgium. Grammont predicted the approaching return of Napoleon to France, and added, “Et alors on va bientôt mettre fin à cette ridicule chose qu’on appelle la Belgique.” Prince Napoleon, on the other hand, had observed to the Count that the neutrality of Belgium was an advantage to France during the last war. Baron Baude, the French Minister in Brussels, had stated in the presence of the English Minister d’Anethan that immediately after the Versailles troops had taken possession of Paris the National Assembly would proclaim the Comte de Chambord as King.

May 24th.—To-day read and noted down the draft of a despatch by the Chief respecting the International, and joint action on the part of the Governments against this organisation of the Socialist party. This is to be utilised in the press. The despatch is dated the 7th instant, and is addressed to Schweinitz in Vienna. Drafted at first by Abeken, the Chancellor struck out all but eight or ten lines, and then completed it in his own hand. Thus transformed it reads as follows: “The events that have occurred in Paris during the last few weeks and days, have disclosed in the most unmistakable fashion the common organisation of the Socialistic elements in European countries, and the dangers with which the State is threatened by that organisation. In Germany the influence of the Communistic working class associations is evident in the large centres of industry in our western provinces, and particularly in the manufacturing districts of Saxony. Herr Bebel, a member of Parliament, who is said to receive pecuniary support for his agitation from the funds of the late King of Hanover, has in the Reichstag given open expression to the criminal intentions of his party. Certain symptoms would go to show that in Austria, and indeed in Vienna itself, this agitation is making way among the workers. If your Excellency considers that the desire, and indeed the necessity, of opposing these movements of disaffection is felt by the Imperial Austro-Hungarian Government, please initiate a confidential discussion of ways and means. In my opinion, the first step would be an exchange of views respecting the extent and direction of the Socialist organisation, and the recognition of the principle that Socialist menaces to life and property, such as have been carried into execution in Paris, belong to the category of ordinary crime, and not to that of political offences.”

I here add the contents of some other documents on the same subject received and despatched later.

Writing on the 3rd of June, R. reported that the Emperor Alexander said to him that he intended to discuss with the Emperor William and the Chief the question of the means by which the European monarchies could be protected from the Socialist danger, and in particular from the International. In his opinion all the Governments of Europe should unite and assist one another in the struggle against this enemy. The Emperor will have a memorial on the subject drawn up by the Minister of Justice, in which, in particular, evidence will be adduced with the object of proving that the members of these Socialistic associations should be treated, not as political offenders, but as ordinary criminals.

During the second week of June, Bucher was much occupied in studying the International; and despatches drawn up by him were sent to Florence, Brussels, Vienna, and London. These were intended to pave the way for a joint intervention of the Governments against the agitation of the Communists. That addressed to Brassier St. Simon was dated the 9th of June, and that to Bernstorff the 14th. The following passage occurred in the former: “However much the ultimate aims of the revolutionary elements may differ in various countries, according to the conditions of the latter, yet their immediate purpose is in every instance the same, namely, the overthrow of the existing order in the State. It therefore follows that all existing Governments have a common interest in opposing them. When the State is defeated by the revolutionary movement in any one country, as was the case in Paris for two months, its power will be reduced in all other countries, and that of its opponents proportionately increased.”

On the 12th of June, the Chief’s answer, in which he gave an account of the steps already taken, was despatched to R. He had first sent the enclosed despatch to General von Schweinitz, and afterwards caused the latter to speak to Count Andrassy, who (perhaps in consequence of a private request on the part of the Chief) had already mooted the subject confidentially, in the same way as he had done to Count Beust. He (the Chief) then had copies of the despatch sent to the representatives of the Empire in Brussels, Florence, Dresden, and London, with the addition in each instance of some further observations more applicable to the special conditions of the country in question. In Brussels he had had attention called to the fact that Belgium, on account of its geographical position and its condition in regard to languages and industry, was most exposed to danger; that in the year 1868, on the occasion of the first International Congress of the Working Classes, Belgium was the scene of the first proclamation of Communism; and that, according to the statement of the leaders of the Paris Commune, Belgium had been chosen as the next field for their practical operations. In Florence he pointed out that the great associations which kept up disturbances in Italy, if they did not follow the same ends as the Communists, were still at one with them in their immediate task, namely, the overthrow of the existing Government and form of State, and were intimately associated with them, as was evident from the appearance of the Garibaldians in Paris. In Dresden it was pointed out that the industrial districts of Saxony furnished the largest contingent of Socialist members to the Reichstag. And, finally, in London it was shown that there the Communist associations, which had in the fifties given rise to criminal trials in Germany and France, together with the international union of the working classes, an offspring of that association, were founded in London, which was their official centre.

Count Waldersee (at present interim representative of Germany at Versailles) has been instructed to inform M. Jules Favre, in connection with his circular of the 6th instant, of our readiness to co-operate. All these communications contained as an enclosure an article from The Times, apparently based on official information.