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Bismarck

Chapter 4: CHAPTER I
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About This Book

A first‑hand diary by a long‑time confidant of the German chancellor, compiling twenty‑five years of official and private intercourse into daily notes, reproduced documents, and restored passages. It chronicles diplomatic negotiations, cabinet deliberations, and episodes from the Franco‑German conflict while interweaving candid character sketches that acknowledge political skill alongside personal faults. The work foregrounds behind‑the‑scenes decision making, the routines and culture of diplomacy, and the personal networks that shaped policy, aiming to provide an eyewitness, document‑based account rather than partisan eulogy or sustained criticism.

CHAPTER I

MY APPOINTMENT AS AN OFFICIAL IN THE FOREIGN OFFICE, AND MY FIRST AUDIENCE WITH BISMARCK—WORK AND OBSERVATIONS UP TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR WITH FRANCE

On February 1st, 1870, while living in Leipzig and engaged in literary work, I received—quite unexpectedly—from Dr. Metzler, Secretary in the Foreign Office of the North German Confederation, who was at that time occupied principally with press matters and with whom I had been in communication since 1867, a short note requesting me to come to Berlin in order to have a talk with him. On my arrival I ascertained, to my great surprise, that Dr. Metzler had recommended me to Herr von Keudell, Councillor of Embassy, who was then in charge of personal and finance matters in the Foreign Office, for a confidential position under the Chancellor of the Confederation, which he, Metzler himself, had previously held, and in which my chief duty would be to carry out the instructions of the Chancellor in press matters. I was to be in immediate communication with the Chancellor. My position for the time being would be what was called “diätarisch,” that is to say without any claim to a pension and without a title. Further details were to be arranged with Herr von Keudell on his return from his honeymoon. For the moment I was only required to declare my readiness in general to accept the offer, and later on I was to formulate my wishes and lay them in writing before Herr von Keudell.

This I did in a letter dated February 4th, in which I emphasised as the most important condition that I should be entirely independent of the Literary or Press Bureau, and that if my capacity for the position should not prove equal to the expectations formed of it I should not be appointed an official in that department. On February 19th I heard from Metzler that my conditions had been in the main agreed to, and that no objections had been raised with regard to that respecting the Literary Bureau. I was to discuss the further arrangements with Keudell himself, and to be prepared to enter upon my duties at once. On February 21st I had a satisfactory interview with the latter, in the course of which we came to an understanding as to terms. On the 23rd I was informed by Keudell that the Chancellor had agreed to my conditions, and that he had arranged for me to call upon Bismarck on the following evening. Next day I took the official oath, and on the same evening, shortly after 8 o’clock, I found myself in the presence of the Chancellor, whom I had only seen at a distance once before, namely, from the Press Gallery of the Reichstag. Now, two years later, I saw him again as he sat in a military uniform at his writing table with a bundle of documents before him. I was quite close to him this time, and felt as if I stood before the altar.

He gave me his hand, and motioned me to take a seat opposite him. He began by saying that although he desired to have a talk with me, he must for the moment content himself with just making my acquaintance, as he had very little time to spare. “I have been kept in the Reichstag to-day longer than I expected by a number of lengthy and tiresome speeches; then I have here (pointing to the documents before him) despatches to read, also as a rule not very amusing; and at 9 o’clock I must go to the palace, and that is not particularly entertaining either. What have you been doing up to the present?” I replied that I had edited the Grenzboten, an organ of practically National Liberal views, which I left, however, on one of the proprietors showing a disposition to adopt a Progressist policy on the Schleswig-Holstein question. The Chancellor: “Yes, I know that paper.” I then went on to say that I had at the instance of the Government taken a position at Hanover, where I assisted the Civil Commissioner, Herr von Hardenberg, in representing Prussian interests in the local press during the year of transition. I had subsequently, on instructions received from the Foreign Office, written a number of articles for different political journals, amongst others for the Preussische Jahrbuecher, to which I had also previously contributed. Bismarck: “Then you understand our politics and the German question in particular. I intend to get you to write notes and articles for the papers from such particulars and instructions as I may give you, for of course I cannot myself write leaders. You will also arrange for others doing so. At first these will naturally be by way of trial. I must have some one especially for this purpose, and not merely occasional assistance as at present, especially as I also receive very little useful help from the Literary Bureau. But how long do you remain here?” and as he looked at his watch I thought he desired to bring the conversation to a close. I replied that I had arranged to remain in Berlin. Bismarck: “Ah, very well then, I shall have a long talk with you one of these days. In the meantime see Herr von Keudell, and also Herr Bucher, Councillor of Embassy, who is well acquainted with all these matters.” I understood that I was now at liberty to go, and was about to rise from my seat when the Chancellor said: “Of course you know the question which was before the House to-day?” I replied in the negative, explaining that I had been too busy to read the reports in the newspapers. “Well,” he said, “it was respecting the admission of Baden into the North German Confederation. It is a pity that people cannot manage to wait, and that they treat everything from a party standpoint, and as furnishing opportunities for speech-making. Disagreeable business to have to answer such speeches, not to say such twaddle! These eloquent gentlemen are really like ladies with small feet. They force them into shoes that are too tight for them, and push them under our noses on all occasions in order that we may admire them. It is just the same with a man who has the misfortune to be eloquent. He speaks too often and too long. The question of German unity is making good progress; but it requires time—one year perhaps, or five, or indeed possibly even ten years. I cannot make it go any faster, nor can these gentlemen either. But they have no patience to wait.” With these words he rose, and again shaking hands I took leave of him for the time.

I was thus enlisted in the ranks of Bismarck’s fellow-workers. An opportunity for the general instructions which he proposed to give me never occurred. I had to enter upon my work at once. Next evening I was twice called in to him to receive instructions for articles. Later on I sometimes saw him still more frequently, and occasionally in the forenoon also—now and then as often as five or even eight times in one day. At these interviews I had to take good care to keep my ears well open, and to note everything with the closest attention, so that two pieces of information or two sets of instructions should not get mixed up. However, I soon found myself equal to this unusually trying task, as Bismarck’s opinions and instructions were always given in a striking form, which it was easy to remember. Besides, he was accustomed to repeat his principal points in other words. Then, again, I made myself all ears, so that, through practice, I gradually succeeded in retaining long sentences, and even whole speeches, practically without omissions, until I had an opportunity of committing them to paper. Bismarck used also to send me, by one of the messengers, documents and newspapers marked with the letter V and a cross, signs which indicated “Press Instructions.” When I found such papers on my desk I looked them through, and subsequently obtained the Chancellor’s directions with regard to them. Furthermore, when I had anything of importance to ask or to submit for his approval, I was allowed to call upon him without previous invitation. I thus practically occupied the position of a “Vortragender Rath” (i.e., an official having direct access to the Chancellor), excepting only that I had neither the title nor the sense of infallibility common to all such Councillors.

The newspapers to which the articles thus prepared were supplied were the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, then edited by Brass, which was the semi-official organ, properly speaking; the Spenersche Zeitung, and the Neue Preussische Zeitung. I also frequently sent letters to the Kölnische Zeitung, expressing the Chancellor’s views. During the first months of my appointment Metzler, who had previously contributed to that paper, served as the medium for communicating these articles. Subsequently they were sent direct to the editor, and were always accepted without alteration. In addition to this work I saw one of the writers from the Literary Bureau every forenoon, and gave him material which was sent to the Magdeburger Zeitung and some of the smaller newspapers; while other members of his department furnished portions of it to certain Silesian, East Prussian, and South German organs. I had similar weekly interviews with other, and somewhat more independent, writers. Amongst these I may mention Dr. Bock, who supplied articles to the Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung, and a number of papers in Hanover; Professor Constantine Roeszler, formerly Lecturer at Jena, who subsequently assisted Richthofen at Hamburg and afterwards edited the Staatsanzeiger; and finally Herr Heide, who had previously been a missionary in Australia and was at that time working for the North German Correspondence, which had been founded with a view to influencing the English press.

In addition to this my duties also included the reading of masses of German, Austrian and French newspapers, which were laid upon my table three times daily, and the management and purchase of books for the Ministerial Library. It will therefore be easily understood that while the Chancellor remained in Berlin I had more than enough to attend to. I was engaged not only on week-days, but also on Sundays, from 9 in the morning until 3 in the afternoon, and again from 5 till 10 and sometimes 11 o’clock at night. Indeed, it sometimes occurred that a messenger from the Chancellor came at midnight to call me away from a party of friends or out of my bed in order to receive pressing instructions.

I reproduce here in the form in which they appear in my diary the particulars of a number of more or less characteristic statements and instructions which I received from the Chancellor at that period. They show that the statesman whom I had the honour to serve thoroughly understood the business of journalism, and they further throw a welcome light upon many of the political events of that time.

Some days after the debate in the Reichstag respecting the entrance of Baden into the North German Confederation, to which reference has already been made, and while the matter was still occupying both the attention of the press and of the Chancellor, I find the following entry among my notes:—

February 27th, evening.—Called to see the Minister. I am to direct special attention to the nonsense written by the National Liberal Press on the last sitting of the Reichstag. The Chancellor said:—“The National Liberals are not a united party. They are merely two fractions. Amongst their leaders Bennigsen and Forckenbeck are sensible men, and there are also a couple of others. Miguel is inclined to be theatrical. Loewe, with his deep chest notes, does everything for effect. He has not made a single practical remark. Lasker is effective in destructive criticism, but is no politician. It sounded very odd to hear him declare that they were now too much occupied with Rome in Paris and Vienna to interfere with us in connection with the Baden affair. If it were possible to get those of really Progressist views to act independently, it would make the situation much clearer. Friedenthal’s speech was excellent. I must ask you also to emphasise the following points:—1. The unfairness of the National Zeitung in repeating misunderstandings which I explained and disposed of in my speech. 2. The make-believe support given to my policy by men who were elected for the express purpose of rendering me real assistance. 3. That such politicians either cannot see or intentionally overlook my principal motive, viz., that to admit Baden into the Confederation would bring pressure to bear upon Bavaria, and that it is therefore a hazardous step. Attention should be paid to the situation in France, so that nothing should be done which might endanger the Constitutional evolution of that country, an evolution hitherto promoted in every way from Berlin, as it signifies peace for us. The French Arcadians” (the party that supported Napoleon through thick and thin) “are watching the course of events in Germany, and waiting their opportunity. Napoleon is now well disposed to us, but he is very changeable. We could now fight France and beat her too, but that war would give rise to five or six others; and while we can gain our ends by peaceful means, it would be foolish, if not criminal, to take such a course. Events in France may take a warlike or revolutionary turn, which would render the present brittle metal there more malleable. There was an important point in my speech, which, however, these good people failed to recognise. That was the intimation that in certain circumstances we should pay no regard either to the views of Austria respecting South Germany as a whole, nor to those of France, who objected to the admission of any single South German State into the North German Confederation. That was a feeler. Further measures can only be considered when I know how that hint has been received in Vienna and Paris.”

March 1st.—Count Bismarck wishes me to get the following inserted in the South German newspapers:—“The speech of von Freydorf, the Grand Ducal Minister, in the Baden Diet on the Jurisdiction Treaty with the North German Confederation, has been inspired by an absolutely correct view of the situation. Particular attention should be paid to that portion in which the Foreign Minister of the Grand Duchy declared the policy of Baden to be in perfect accord with that of the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, and also to the manner in which he defined the position of the South German States towards the Treaty of Prague. Through the dissolution of the old Germanic Confederacy, those States have, as a matter of fact, become sovereign States. That treaty gives them liberty (to me: Underline those words!) to form a new union amongst themselves, a South German Confederation, by means of which they may take measures for bringing about a national union with the united North. That treaty involves no prescription, engagement or compulsion whatever to adopt such a course. Any insinuation of that kind with respect to States whose sovereignty has been emphatically recognised would be something absolutely unheard of. In the Swiss war of the Sonderbund, and also in the late American civil war, States were obliged against their own will to remain within a union which they had previously joined, but no one ever saw a sovereign State or Prince required to enter into confederation against their own judgment. The South German States, including half of Hesse, have unquestionably the right—acting either in concert or singly—to endeavour, in co-operation with the North, to advance the cause of national unity. The question is whether the present is a good time to choose. The Chancellor of the North German Confederation answers this question in the negative. But it is only possible by the most wilful garbling of his expressions to maintain that his final aim is not the union of Germany. Partition of German national territory! Calumny! Not a single word of the Chancellor’s justifies that conclusion. As Herr Lasker has not spoken at the instance of the Government of Baden, although his speech would almost convey the impression that he was a Minister of that State, it is difficult to understand where he got that idea. Perhaps it was merely the conceit of the honourable member that led him to make such a statement.”

March 3rd.—The Minister wishes the Kölnische Zeitung first, and afterwards the South German newspapers, to advocate the organisation into one great party of all men of national views in the South German States, so as to get rid of the particularism which had hitherto divided them. “The matter lies much more in their hands,” he said, “than in those of the North German National Liberals. The North German Governments will do all that is possible in a reasonable way in support of the efforts of South Germany. But the South Germans who wish to unite with us must act together and not singly. I want you to reiterate this point again and again. The article must then be printed in the Spenersche Zeitung and in other newspapers to which we have access, and it should be accompanied by expressions of deep regret at the particularism which prevents the union of the various Southern parties that gravitate towards North Germany. A union of the four Southern States is an impossibility, but there is nothing to hinder the formation of a Southern League composed of men of national sentiments. The National party in Baden, the German party in Würtemberg, and the Bavarian Progressist party are merely different names for the same thing. These groups have to deal with different Governments, and some persons maintain that they must consequently adopt different tactics. Their aims are nevertheless identical in all important points. With the best will in the world those three parties, while acting singly, produce but a slight impression. If they desire to go ahead and become an important factor in public affairs, they must combine to form a great and homogeneous South German National party which must be reckoned with on both sides of the Main.”

Read over to the Minister, at his request, an article which he ordered yesterday and for which he gave me the leading ideas. It was to be dated from Paris, and published in the Kölnische Zeitung. He said:—“Yes, you have correctly expressed my meaning. The composition is good both as regards its reasoning and the facts which it contains. But no Frenchman thinks in such logical and well-ordered fashion, yet the letter is understood to be written by a Frenchman. It must contain more gossip, and you must pass more lightly from point to point. In doing so you must adopt an altogether French standpoint. A Liberal Parisian writes the letter and gives his opinion as to the position of his party towards the German question, expressing himself in the manner usual in statements of that kind.” (Finally Count Bismarck dictated the greater part of the article, which was forwarded by Metzler in its altered form to the Rhenish newspaper.)

In connection with this task the Minister said to me the day before:—“I look at the matter in this way. A correspondent in Paris must give his opinion of my quarrel with Lasker and the others over the Baden question, and bring forward arguments which I did not think it desirable to use at that time. He must say that no one could deem it advisable in the present state of affairs in Bavaria, when the King seems to be so well disposed, to do anything calculated on the one hand to irritate him, and on the other to disturb the Constitutional movement in France—which movement tended to preserve peace while it would itself be promoted by the maintenance of peace. Those who desire to advance the cause of liberty do not wish to go to war with us, yet they could not swim against the stream if we took any action in South Germany which public opinion would regard as detrimental to the interests and prestige of France. Moreover, for the present the course of the Vatican Council should not be interfered with, as the result for Germany might possibly be a diversion. We must wait for these things,” he added. “I cannot explain that to them. If they were politicians they would see it for themselves. There are reasons for forbearance which every one should be able to recognise; but Members of Parliament who cross-question the Government do not usually regard that as their duty.”

The second portion of the article which the Minister dictated runs as follows:—“Whoever has had an opportunity of observing here in Paris how difficult the birth of the present Constitutional movement has been, what obstacles this latest development of French political life has to overcome if it is to strike deep roots, and how powerful are the influences of which the guiding spirit only awaits some pretext for smothering the infant in its cradle, will understand with what anxiety we watch the horizon abroad and what a profoundly depressing effect every little cloud there produces upon our hopes of a secure and peaceful development of the new régime. It is the ardent wish of every sincere adherent of the Constitutional cause in France that there should now be no diversion abroad, no change on the horizon of foreign politics, which might serve if not as a real motive at least as a pretext for crying down the youthful Constitutionalism of France, while at the same time directing public attention to foreign relations. We believe that the Emperor is in earnest, but his immediate entourage, and the creatures whom he has to employ, are watching anxiously for some event which shall enable them to compel the Sovereign to abandon a course which they resent. These people are very numerous, and have during the eighteen years of the Emperor’s reign grown more powerful than is perhaps believed outside France. Whoever has any regard for the Constitutional development of the country can only hope that no alteration, however slight, shall occur in the foreign relations of France to serve as a motive or pretext for that reaction which every opponent of the Constitution is striving to bring about.”

Between the directions for these articles, which I here bring together as they relate to the same subject, I received others, some of which I may also reproduce.

March 4th.—The Boersen Zeitung contained an article in which it was alleged that in Germany only nobles were considered competent to become Ministers. This the Count sent down to me to be refuted in a short article, expressing surprise at such a statement. “An absurd electioneering move!” the Chancellor said. “Whoever wishes to persuade the world that in Prussia the position of Minister is only open to the aristocracy, and that capable commoners have absolutely no chance of attaining to it, must have no memory and no eyes. Say that under Count Bismarck no less than three commoners have, on his recommendation, been appointed Ministers within a short period, namely Delbrück, Leonhard and Camphausen. Lasker, it is true, has not yet been appointed.”

I wrote this short article immediately; but the Chancellor was not pleased with it. “I told you expressly,” he said, “to mention the names of Delbrück, Leonhard and Camphausen, and that their appointments were due to my personal influence. Go straight to the point, and don’t wander round about it in that way! That is no use! A pointless article! They are just the cleverest of the present Ministers. The attack on Lasker is also out of place. We must not provoke people unnecessarily. They are right when they complain of bullying.” The reference to Lasker consisted merely of his own words as given above.

March 5th.—The Vossische Zeitung contained a bitter attack, which culminated in the following remark: “Exceptional circumstances—and such must be acknowledged to exist when working men are treated to breech-loaders, and Ministers are hanged on street lamps—cannot be taken as a rule for the regular conduct of affairs.” The Count received this article from the Literary Bureau of the Ministry of State (where extracts from the newspapers were made for him), although it might well have been withheld, as not much importance attaches to the scoldings of “Tante Voss.” The Count sent for me, read over the passage in question, and observed: “They speak of times when Ministers were hanged on street lamps. Unworthy language! Reply that such a thing never occurred in Prussia, and that there is no prospect of its occurring. In the meantime it shows towards what condition of affairs the efforts of that newspaper are tending, which (under the auspices of Jacoby and Company) supplies the Progressist middle classes of Berlin with their politics.”

Called in again later to the Count. I am to go to Geheimrath Hahn and call his attention to the question of capital punishment, which in view of the approaching elections should be dealt with in the Provinzial-Correspondenz in accordance with the policy of the Government, who desire its retention. The Minister said: “I am firmly convinced that the majority of the population is opposed to its abolition. Were it otherwise it would of course be possible to do away with it. It is a mere theory—the sentimentality of lawyers in the Reichstag—a party doctrine which has no connection with the life of the people, although its advocates are constantly referring to the people. Tell him that, but be cautious in dealing with him. He is somewhat conceited—bureaucratic. Do it in a diplomatic way. You must let him think that those are his own ideas. Otherwise we shall not get anything useful out of him. Let me know afterwards what he says.”

March 6th.—Have seen Hahn. He is of opinion that it is yet too early to deal with this matter. It will probably end in a compromise, capital punishment being only retained for murder. The attitude of the Liberals in the elections can only be influenced after the decision in the Reichstag. In the meantime he has instructed the Literary Bureau to refute the article in the National Zeitung, and to show how sterile the present Parliament would be if it allowed the long wished for Criminal Code to be wrecked upon this question of capital punishment. Report this to the Minister. He is of opinion that Hahn is mistaken. “It is necessary to act in a diplomatic way in this case,” he observed. “One must present an appearance of determination up to the last moment; and if one wants to secure a suitable compromise, show no disposition to give way; besides, Hahn must have no other policy than mine. I shall speak to Eulenburg, and get him to set Hahn straight. This must be put down at once. We must think in good time about the elections.”

March 7th.—Sent Brass (Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung) an article written by Bucher under instructions from the Minister, showing that the majority in the Reichstag does not represent public opinion nor the will of the people, but only the opinions and desires of the Parliamentary party.

Called to the Count in the evening, when he said: “I want you to secure the insertion in the press of an article somewhat to the following effect: For some time past vague rumours of war have been current throughout the world for which no sufficient ground exists in fact, or can be even suggested. The explanation is probably to be sought in Stock Exchange speculation for a fall which has been started in Paris. Confidential whispers are going about with regard to the presence of Archduke Albrecht in the French capital which are calculated to cause uneasiness; and then, naturally enough, these rumours are shouted aloud and multiplied by the windbags of the Guelph press.”

March 11th.—The Count wants an article in the National Zeitung to be answered in this sense: “The Liberals in Parliament always identify themselves with the people. They maintain, like Louis XIV. with his L’état c’est moi, that ‘We are the People.’ There could hardly be a more absurd piece of boasting and exaggeration. As if the other representatives, the Conservatives in the country, and the great numbers who belong to no party, were not also part of the nation, and had no opinions and interests to which regard should be paid!”

Evening.—The Minister, referring to a statement in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, remarked: “There is much ado about the decided attitude taken up by Beust against the Curia. According to the report published by Brass he has expressed himself very emphatically respecting its latest action, in a note which the Ambassador read to the Secretary of State. That must be refuted, weakened. Do it in a letter from Rome to the Kölnische Zeitung. Say: ‘We do not know if the analysis of the despatch in question (which has made the round of the papers, and which was first published by The Times) is correct,[2] but we have reason to doubt it.’ Trautmansdorf (the Austrian Ambassador to the Holy See) has read no note and has received no instructions to make any positive declaration, but is on the contrary acting in accordance with his own convictions—and it is known that he is very clerical and not at all disposed to radical measures. He has communicated to Cardinal Antonelli such parts of the information that reached him from Vienna as he thought proper, and he certainly made that communication in as considerate a form as possible. It cannot therefore have been very emphatic.”

Later.—Attention is to be directed, at first in a paper which has no connection with the Government, to the prolonged sojourn of Archduke Albrecht in Paris as a suspicious symptom. In connection with it rumours have been circulated in London of an understanding between France and Austria. Our papers should afterwards reproduce these hints.

March 12th.—In the afternoon Bucher gave me the chief’s instructions to order the Spanish newspaper, Imparcial. (This is of some importance, as it doubtless indicates that even then we had a hand in the question of electing the new King. On several occasions subsequently I secured the insertion in non-official German papers of translations which Bucher brought me of articles in that newspaper against the candidature of Montpensier.)

March 13th.—The Chancellor wishes to have it said in one of the “remote” journals (that is, not notoriously connected with the Government) that the Pope has paid no regard to the representations of France and Austria respecting the principal points which should be decided by the Council. He would not have done so even if those representations had been expressed in a more emphatic form than they actually were. Neither Banneville nor Trautmansdorf was inclined to heartily defend the cause of the State against the Ultramontanes. This disposes of the news of the Mémorial Diplomatique to the effect that at the suggestion of Count Daru the Curia has already given an affirmative answer. That report is absolutely false, as is nearly all the news published by the paper in question. It is much the same with Count Beust’s note to the Papal Government. (“Quote the word ‘note,’” added the Minister.) It was only a despatch, and, doubtless, a very tame one.

March 16th, evening.—Called up to the Minister, who lay on the sofa in his study. “Here,” he said (pointing to a newspaper). “They complain of the accumulation of labour imposed upon Parliament. Already eight months’ hard work! That must be answered. It is true that members of Parliament have a great deal to do, but Ministers are still worse off. In addition to their work in the two Diets the latter have an immense amount of business to transact for the King and the country both while Parliament is sitting and during the recess. Moreover, members have the remedy in their own hands. If those who do not belong to the Upper Chamber will abstain from standing for election both to the Prussian and the Federal Diet they will lighten their task sufficiently. They are not obliged to sit in both Houses.”

March 21st.—I am to call attention in the semi-official organs to the fact that the Reichstag is discussing the Criminal Code far too minutely and slowly. “The speakers,” observed the Count, “show too great a desire for mere talk, and are too fond of details and hair-splitting. If this continues the Bills will not be disposed of in the present Session, especially as the Budget has still to be discussed. The President might well exercise stricter control. Another unsatisfactory feature is that so many members absent themselves from the sittings. Our newspapers ought to publish regularly lists of such absentees. Please see that is done.”

Called up again later and commissioned to explain in the press the attitude of Prussia towards those Prelates who oppose the Curia in Rome. The Chancellor said: “The newspapers express a desire that the Government should support the German Bishops on the Council. You should ask if those writers have formed a clear idea as to how we should set about that task. Should Prussia perhaps send a Note to the Council, or to Antonelli, the Papal Minister, who does not belong to that body? or is she to secure representation in that assembly of Prelates, and protest (of course in vain) against what she objects to? Prussia will not desert those Bishops who do not submit themselves to the yoke, but it is for the Prelates in the first place to maintain a determined attitude. We cannot take preventive measures, as they would be of no value, but it is open to us to adopt a repressive policy in case a decision is come to in opposition to our wishes. If, after that decision has been arrived at, it should prove to be incompatible with the mission and interests of the State, then existing legislation, if found inadequate, can be easily supplemented and altered. The demand that the Prussian Government should support the more moderate Bishops is a mere empty phrase so long as no practical means of giving effect to it can be discovered. Moreover, the course which I now indicate will in any case be ultimately successful, although success may not at once be completely achieved.”

March 25th.—The Chief wishes Klaczko’s appointment in Vienna to be discussed. He said to me: “Beust intends in that way to revive the Polish question. Point to the journalistic activity of that indefatigable agitator, and to his bitter hatred both of ourselves and Russia. Quote Rechenberg’s confidential despatch of the 2nd of March from Warsaw, where he says that the Polish secret political societies which are engaged at Lemberg in preparing for a revolution, with the object of restoring Polish independence, have sent a deputation to Klaczko congratulating him on his appointment to a position where he is in direct communication with the Chancellor of the Empire. Send the article first to the Kölnische Zeitung, and afterwards arrange for similar articles in the provincial newspapers. We must finally see that this reaches Reuss (the Ambassador in St. Petersburg), in order that he may get it reproduced in the Russian press. It can also appear in the Kreuzzeitung, and it must be brought up again time after time in another form.”

Afternoon.—Geheimrath Abeken desires me, on the instructions of the Minister, to take note of the following document, which is apparently based on a despatch: “It is becoming more and more difficult to understand the attitude of the Austrian Government towards the Council. All the organs of public opinion are on the side of the Austrian Bishops, who are making such a dignified and decisive stand in Rome. The reports which the Government thought well to allow the press to publish respecting the steps which they have taken in Rome were in harmony with this attitude. The news from Rome, however, speaks only of the tameness and indecision with which the Government’s policy is being carried into execution. The most contradictory accounts are now coming in. It is said that the Austrian Ambassador has supported the action of the French Ambassador, which is known not to have been very effective. Expressions have been attributed to Count Beust showing that, in his opinion, the only effectual course would be for all the Powers to take common or collective action. On the other hand, it is asserted that he gave a negative answer, reciting different objections, to the proposal of another Catholic State (Bavaria) to join it in a decisive declaration in Rome. In presence of this indecision on the part of the Catholic Powers the Bishops will doubtless be obliged to follow their own consciences and decide for themselves what their course of action is to be. We are convinced however that if the Prelates themselves resolved to make a determined stand on behalf of their consciences the situation would immediately undergo a change in their favour, and that ultimately no Government would desert its own Bishops even if they were in a minority.

“Bismarck has already explained to the Prussian Ambassador in Paris that he is prepared to support every initiative taken on the Catholic side in the matter of the Council. He at the same time discussed the subject with Benedetti, expressing himself in a similar sense, but in the meantime making no positive proposal. On the other hand, he asked incidentally whether it might not be desirable to consider in a general conference the attitude to be adopted by the various Governments towards the Council. Benedetti replied that such a course would only hasten the Council’s decision. Bismarck urged that a conference might be useful, even were it no longer possible to influence the Council, and were the question to be considered merely how far the injurious effects of its decisions on the peace of Church and State could be minimised.

“Benedetti sent a report of this informal conversation to Paris, representing it as a proposal to hold a conference. Daru replied in a despatch which pointed out the difficulty of carrying that idea into execution. Who should take part in the conference? Russia maintained such an unfriendly attitude towards the Catholic Church, and Italy was so hostile to the Curia that they could hardly join in any common action. Spain wished to confine herself to the repression of any eventual breach of the laws of the country, and England ignored the official declarations of the Roman Church. Many Powers had Concordats, while others occupied a more independent position towards the Curia, therefore, in that respect also, an understanding would be difficult. Finally, Daru feared that Rome, on hearing of an intended conference, would reply with a fait accompli. For these reasons he declined the proposal. He would, however, like to afford the other Powers an opportunity of supporting the measures taken by France on her own initiative. In case he received a negative answer to his demand that France should be represented on the Council he would officially communicate to the other Governments his declaration to the Secretary of State, Cardinal Antonelli, that the rights and interests of the State would be defended against any encroachment on the part of the Spiritual Power, and urge them to support his action in Rome. Bismarck thanked Daru for this communication, and said that the Government at Berlin (when it had satisfied itself that such a course on the part of France was calculated to promote the interests of Prussian Catholics) would endeavour to strengthen the impression made thereby; and that further communications were awaited with interest.

“The French Government looks forward with anxiety to the consequences of the Council, but hesitates to take any serious and decisive measures, and is not disposed to enter upon any common action with the other Powers. Bray, at Munich, seemed less disinclined to such a course. He thought a declaration might possibly be made that the Government considered the œcumenical and authoritative character of the Council to be affected by the promulgation of the dogma of infallibility notwithstanding the opposition of a minority of the Bishops, as also the legal position assured to the Prelates under the Concordats, and that the dogma in question was to be regarded as null and void. Bray was anxious that Austria should join in this declaration. Beust, however, would not consent, as he believed that such a declaration would merely induce the Council to come to an unanimous decision which would then be binding upon the Governments. An unequivocal attitude of any kind is not to be expected from Vienna.

“If the Catholic Governments will not take the initiative the question remains what course the Bishops themselves will adopt. We hold to the principle of not acting directly and in our own name with the Roman See, while at the same time powerfully and steadfastly supporting every effort made by the Catholics themselves, and particularly by the German Bishops to prevent illegal changes being made in the constitution of the Catholic Church, and to preserve both Church and State from a disturbance of the peace. We do not find ourselves called upon to take up a prominent attitude towards the Council; but our readiness to support energetically every well-meant effort of the Catholic Powers, whose duty it is to intervene in the first place, or of the Bishops within the Council, remains unaltered.”

Evening.—I am to refer to England and the way in which the press is treated there. “The Liberals always appeal to English example when they want to secure some fresh liberty for the press. Such appeals, it is well known, rest largely upon mistaken notions. It would be desirable to examine more closely the Bill which has just been passed for the preservation of order in Ireland. What would public opinion in Germany, and particularly what would the people of Berlin say, if our Government could proceed against any of our democratic journals, even against the most violent, according to the following provisions, and that too without even a state of minor siege? Then quote the provisions, and add that the Bill was carried by a large majority.”[3]

March 28th.—The Chancellor desires that the question of the Council should be again dealt with somewhat to the following effect: “The press has repeatedly expressed a desire to know what position will be taken by Prussia towards the policy of the majority of the Council, and several proposals have been made in this connection. In our opinion the answer to that question is to be found in the character of Prussia as a Protestant Power. In that capacity Prussia must leave the initiative in this matter to the Catholic Governments who are more directly threatened. If these do not take action the question remains what course the Bishops who form the minority in the Council will adopt, a question which will be answered by the immediate future. If the Catholic Governments decide to take steps against the majority of the Council, Prussia ought to join in that action if she considers it to be in the interests of her Catholic subjects. But it is less the duty of Prussia than of any other State to rush into the breach.... If the Bishops defend the constitution of their Church, their episcopal rights, and peace between Church and State in a fearless and determined protest against the encroachments of the Ultramontane party in the Council, it may then be confidently hoped that the Prussian Government will extend to them a powerful support.”

Some of the last sentences repeated almost literally the conclusion of the document brought to me by Abeken.

March 30th.—The Count sent down a report from Rome for use in the press. This report says: “The tourists who visited St. Peter’s on the 22nd instant were several times disturbed by a dull noise which rolled through the aisles like a storm, proceeding from the direction of the Council Chamber. Those who remained a little longer saw individual Bishops, with anxious looks, hurriedly leave the church. There had been a terrible scene amongst the reverend fathers. The theme de erroribus, which was laid before the Council about three weeks ago and then returned to the Commission, was again being discussed in an amended form. This discussion had now lasted five or six (eight) days. Strossmayer criticised one of the paragraphs of the Proemium which characterised Protestantism as the source of all the evils which now infect the world in the forms of pantheism, materialism, and atheism. He declared that this Proemium contained historical untruths, as the errors of our time were much older than Protestantism. The Humanist movement, which had been imprudently protected by the highest authority (Pope Leo X.) was in part responsible for them. The Proemium lacked the charity due to Protestants. (First uproar.) It was, on the contrary, amongst Protestants that Christianity had found its most powerful defenders, such as Leibnitz and Guizot, whose meditations he should wish to see in the hands of every Christian. (Renewed and increased uproar, while closed fists are shown at the speaker, and cries are heard of ‘Hæreticus es! Taceas! Descendas! Omnes te condemnamus!’ and now and then ‘Ego eum non condemno!’) This storm also subsided, and Strossmayer was able to proceed to another point, namely, the question to which the Bishops referred in their protest, that is to say, that a unanimous vote is indispensable for decisions on dogma. Strossmayer’s remarks on this theme caused the indignation of the majority to boil over. Cardinal Capalti interrupted him. The assembly raged like a hurricane. After a wordy war of a quarter of an hour’s duration between the speaker and the Legates, Strossmayer retired, three times repeating the words: ‘Protestor non est concilium.’ It is worthy of note that a Congregation has been held to-day at which the Bishop of Halifax and others are understood to have expressed views similar to those of Strossmayer and that no attempt was made to interrupt them. It would therefore appear as if the storm raised against the Bishop of Bosnia were a party manœuvre with the object of ruining the most important of the Princes of the Church.”

March 31st.—Commissioned by the Chief to tell Zitelmann (an official of the Ministry of State in charge of press matters) that the newspaper extracts which his office prepares for submission to the King (through the Minister) should be better sifted and arranged. Those that are suitable for the King are to be gummed on to separate sheets and detached from those that are not suitable for him. Particularistic lies and stupidities, such as those from Kiel of the 25th and Cassel of the 28th, belong to the latter category and must not be laid before him. If he sees that kind of thing printed in black on white he is apt to believe it. He does not know the character of those papers.

I am to secure the insertion in the press of the following particulars, which have reference to a paragraph in a newspaper which the Minister did not name to me. It is a well-known fact that Howard, the English representative at Munich, although he is married to a Prussian lady (Schulenberg), exercises, in opposition to the views of his own Government, a decidedly anti-Prussian influence, not so much in a pro-Austrian as in a Guelph sense. He was Minister at Hanover up to the events of 1866.

April 1st.—The Minister’s birthday. When I was called to him in the evening his room was perfumed with flowers presented to him. He lay on the sofa, booted and spurred, smoking a cigar, and reading newspaper extracts. After receiving my instructions, I offered my congratulations, for which he thanked me, reaching me his hand. “I hope,” he said, “we shall remain together for a very long time.” I replied that I hoped so too, that I could find no words to say how happy I felt to be near him, and to be able to work for him. “Well,” he answered, smiling, “it is not always so pleasant, but you must not notice every little thing.”

My instructions referred to Lasker and Hoverbeck. They were as follows:—“Just take Lippe and Lasker as your subject for once. Lasker has, it is true, been taken to task for one of his latest utterances by Bennigsen, the chief of his fraction, but it can do no harm to deal with the affair once more in the press—and repeatedly. He, like Lippe, wants the Constitution to be placed above our national requirements. Les extrêmes se touchent. Lippe is the representative of the Particularistic Junkers with the tendency to absolutism, Lasker that of the Parliamentary Junkers with Particularistic leanings. Vincke, who was just such another, succeeded, with his eternal dogmatism, in ruining and nearly destroying a great party in a few months, notwithstanding favourable circumstances. Please send the article to the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung for publication, and let it be afterwards reproduced in another form by the Literary Bureau.” (...)

April 4th.—It was well that I carried out the Minister’s orders at once. On being called to him this morning he received me with the words: “I asked you recently to write an article on the subject of Lippe and Lasker. Have you done so?” I replied “Yes, Excellency, and it has already appeared. I did not submit it to you as I know that you see the Norddeutsche daily.” He then said, “I have had no time as yet, I will look it up immediately.”

In a quarter of an hour I was again sent for, and on appearing before him the Minister said: “I have now read the article—it was amongst the extracts. It is excellent, exactly what I wished. Let it now be circulated and reproduced in the provincial journals. In doing so it may be further remarked that if Count Bismarck were to charge Lasker and his fraction with Particularism—I do not mean all the National Liberals, but principally the Prussians, the Lasker group—the accusation would be well founded. Lippe has also laid down the principle that the Prussian Diet is independent of the Federal Diet.”

The Minister then continued: “Here is the Kölnische Zeitung talking of excitability. It alleges that I have manifested an excitability which recalls the period of ‘conflict.’ That is not true. I have merely repelled passionate attacks in the same tone in which they were delivered, according to the usual practice in Parliament. It was not Bismarck but Lasker and Hoverbeck who took the initiative. They began again with offensive personal attacks, and I begged of them in a friendly way not to return to that style. Ask whether the writer had not read the report of the sitting, as it showed that it was not Count Bismarck who picked this quarrel. Apart from its pleadings on behalf of the claims of Denmark, the Kölnische Zeitung was a sensible newspaper. What had Count Bismarck done to it that it should allow its correspondents to send such a garbled account of the facts? Moreover, Bennigsen had reprimanded Lasker. They now themselves recognised that the tone they adopted was wrong, as Lasker came to me on Saturday to excuse himself.”

April 6th.—Under instructions from the Minister I dictated the following paragraph to Doerr for circulation through the Literary Bureau: “The position of the Bishops who form the opposition in the Council does not appear to be satisfactory, if one may judge from the attitude of the Catholic Governments and particularly of the Vienna Cabinet. Probably Count Beust has not yet made up his mind in this matter. He seems to have sent somewhat energetic remonstrances to the Ambassador in Rome, but it is obvious that Count Trautmansdorf has delivered them in a very diluted form. According to certain newspapers the Austrian Chancellor has also endeavoured to bring about a common action of the Powers, while others report an incident which renders it doubtful whether any such attempt has been made. The French also maintain an attitude of exceptional prudence and reserve, and the Bishops would thus appear to stand well nigh alone.... The initiative must come from the Bishops themselves.”

Between the 6th and the 10th of April I wrote an article on the question of North Schleswig from the Minister’s instructions. This attracted great attention on its publication in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, principally on the ground that there seemed to be no occasion for its appearance at a time when the political horizon was absolutely clear. (It may possibly have arisen through a Russian reminder and approval of the pretended claims of Denmark.) The article was to the following effect: “It is a wilful falsehood to maintain that according to the peace of Prague the population of North Schleswig has to decide the question of the frontier. Prussia alone, and no one else, is authorised to do that. Moreover, the Treaty of Prague does not mention North Schleswig at all, but only refers, quite vaguely, to the northern districts of Schleswig, which is something quite different. The parties to the treaty were not called upon, and, as the wording selected by them proves, never intended to deal with any such conception as ‘North Schleswig,’ and have not even used that term. But the Danes and their friends have so long and so persistently endeavoured to make the world believe that paragraph 5 of the treaty stipulated for the cession of North Schleswig, that they have come to believe it themselves.

“The Prussians alone have to decide as to the extent of those districts. Prussia has no further political interest in negotiating with Denmark if the latter is not content with the concessions which the former is prepared to make. Finally, only Austria has a right to demand that the matter shall be settled in any form.... If Prussia and Austria,” so concluded the Minister’s directions, “now come to an understanding as to cancelling that paragraph of the treaty—probably on the basis of further concessions on the part of Prussia—absolutely no one has any right to object.” Two articles were to be written on this subject, one for the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, in which the reference to Austria was to be omitted, and one for the Spenersche Zeitung, which was to contain it.

April 12th.—The Count desires to have an article written for the Kölnische Zeitung, part of which he dictated to me. It ran as follows: “The Constitutionnel speaks of the way in which French manners are being corrupted by foreign elements, and in this connection it mentions Princess Metternich and Madame Rimsky-Korsakow. It would require more space than we can afford to this subject to show in its true light all the ignorance and prejudice exhibited by the writer of this article, who has probably never left Paris. Princess Metternich would not act in Vienna as she is represented by the Constitutionnel to have acted in Paris; and Madame Rimsky-Korsakow is not a leader of society in St. Petersburg. The contrary must be the case. Paris must be responsible if the two ladies so conduct themselves, and exercise such an influence as the French journal asserts they do. As a matter of fact the idea that Paris is the home and school of good manners is now only to be met with in other countries, in old novels, and amongst elderly people in the most remote parts of the provinces. It has long since been observed, and not in European Courts alone, that the present generation of Frenchmen do not know how to behave themselves. In other circles it has also been remarked that the young Frenchman does not compare favourably with the youth of other nations, or with those few countrymen of his own who have, far from Paris, preserved the traditions of good French society. Travellers who have visited the country at long intervals are agreed in declaring that the forms of polite intercourse, and even the conventional expressions for which the French language so long served as a model, are steadily falling into disuse. It is therefore quite conceivable that the Empress Eugénie, as a sensitive Spaniard, has been painfully affected by the tone and character of Parisian society, but it would show a lack of judgment on her part if, as stated by the Constitutionnel, she sought for the origin of that evil abroad. But we believe we are justified in directly contradicting that statement, as we know that the Empress has repeatedly recommended young Germans as models for the youth of France. The French show themselves to be a decadent nation, and not least in their manners. It will require generations to recover the ground they have lost. Unfortunately, so far as manners are concerned, all Europe has retrograded.”

From the 13th of April to the 28th of May I did not see the Minister. He was unwell, and left for Varzin on Easter Eve. It was said at the Ministry that his illness was of a bilious character, and was due to the mortification he felt at the conduct of the Lasker fraction, together with the fact that he had spoilt his digestion at a dinner at Camphausen’s.

On the 21st of May the Minister returned to Berlin, but it was not until seven days later that I was called to him. He then gave me the following instructions: “Brass (the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung) must not plead so strongly for the Austrians nor speak so warmly of the Government of Napoleon. In the case of Austria we have to adopt a benevolently expectant attitude, yet the appointment of Klaczko and his connection with the Ministry is for us a suspicious symptom. The appointment of Grammont to the French Foreign Office is not exactly agreeable to us. The Czechs must be treated with all possible consideration; but, on the other hand, we must deal with the Poles as with enemies.”

I afterwards asked as to his health. He said he still felt weak, and would not have left Varzin if things had not looked so critical in Parliament. As soon as matters were once more in order there, he would be off again, if possible on an early day, in order to undertake a cure with Karlsbad water, going to some seaside resort.

On being called to the Count on Whit Sunday I found him highly indignant at the statement of a correspondent of the Kölnische Zeitung, who reported that there was a scarcity of labour in the Spandau cartridge factory. “Therefore unusual activity in the preparation of war material!” he said. “If I were to have paid two visits to the King at Ems it would not cause so much anxiety abroad as thoughtless reports of this kind. Please go to Wehrmann and let him ascertain at the Ministry of War if they are responsible for that article, and if possible get them to insert a correction in the Kölnische Zeitung or in the Norddeutsche, as it must appear in an influential paper.”

A diary entry on an undated slip of paper, but written in May: “Bohlen yesterday bantered Bucher about his ‘Easter mission,’ which appears to have been to Spain.”

On the 8th of June the Minister again left Berlin for Varzin.

Immediately on the commencement of the difficulties with France respecting the election to the Spanish throne of the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern, letters and telegrams began to arrive which were forwarded by Bucher under instructions from the Chief. These consisted in part of short paragraphs and drafts of articles, as well as some complete articles which only required to be retouched in the matter of style, or to have references inserted with regard to matters of fact. These directions accumulated, but owing to the spirit and energy inspired by the consciousness that we were on the eve of great events, and that it was an honour to co-operate in the work, they were promptly dealt with, almost all being disposed of on the day of their arrival. I here reproduce some of these instructions, the order of the words and expressions in the deciphered telegrams being slightly altered, while the remainder are given exactly as they reached me.

July 7th, evening.—A telegram to me from Varzin: “The semi-official organs should indicate that this does not seem to be the proper time for a discussion of the succession to the Spanish throne, as the Cortes, who are alone entitled to decide the question, have not yet spoken. German Governments have always respected Spanish independence in such matters, and will do so in future, as they have no claim or authority to interfere and lay down regulations for the Spaniards. Then, in the non-official press, great surprise should be expressed at the presumption of the French, who have discussed the question very fully in the Chamber, speaking as if that assembly had a right to dispose of the Spanish throne, and apparently forgetting that such a course was as offensive to Spanish national pride as it was conducive to the encouragement of Republican tendencies. This may be safely construed into a further proof of the false direction which the personal régime is taking. It would appear as if the Emperor, who has instigated this action, wanted to see the outbreak of a new war of succession.”

A letter from Bucher, which was handed to me on the evening of the 8th of July, further developed the idea contained in the last sentence of the foregoing telegram. This letter ran: “Previous to 1868 Eugénie was pleased to play the part of an obedient subject to Isabella, and since the September revolution that of a gracious protectress. She unquestionably arranged the farce of the abdication, and now, in her rage, she incites her consort and the Ministers. As a member of a Spanish party she would sacrifice the peace and welfare of Europe to the intrigues and aspirations of a corrupt dynasty.

“Please see that this theme, a new war of succession in the nineteenth century, is thoroughly threshed out in the press. The subject is inviting, especially in the hands of a correspondent disposed to draw historical parallels, and more particularly parallels ex averso. Have the French not had experience enough of Spain with Louis XIV. and Napoleon, and with the Duc d’Angoulême’s campaign for the execution of the decrees of the Verona Congress? Have they not excited sufficient hatred by all those wars and by the Spanish marriage of 1846?

“Bring personal influence to bear as far as possible on the editors who have been intimidated by the Stock Exchange, representing to them that if the German press takes up a timid and hesitating attitude in presence of the rhodomontades of the French, the latter will become more insolent and put forward intolerable demands in other questions affecting Germany still more closely. A cool and determined attitude, with a touch of contempt for those excited gentlemen who would like to slaughter somebody, but do not exactly know whom, would be the most fitting means for putting an end to this uproar and preventing serious complications.”

Bucher added: “Protestants were still sent to the galleys under the Spanish Government which was overthrown in 1868.”

Another communication of Bucher’s from Varzin of the same date runs: “The precedents furnished by Louis Philippe’s refusal of the Belgian throne on behalf of the Duc de Nemours in 1831, on the ground that it would create uneasiness, and by the protest which England would have entered against the marriage of the Duc de Montpensier to the sister of Queen Isabella, are neither of them very applicable, as the Prince of Hohenzollern is not a son of King William, but only a remote connection, and Spain does not border on Prussia.”

The following was a third subject received from Varzin on the same day: “Is Spain to inquire submissively at the Tuileries whether the King whom she desires to take is considered satisfactory? Is the Spanish throne a French dependency? It has already been stated in the Prussian speech from the throne that our sole desire in connection with the events in Spain was that the Spanish people should arrive at an independent decision for the maintenance of their own prosperity and power. In France, where on other occasions so much is said of national independence, the attempt of the Spanish people to decide for themselves has immediately revived the old diplomatic traditions which led to the Spanish war of succession 160 years ago.”

On the same day, the 8th of July, a telegram was also received from the Chancellor by the Secretary of State, and it was handed to me for my information. It was to the following effect: “I have now before me in the despatch of Count Solms the official text of the Duc de Grammont’s speech, and I find his language more brusque and presumptuous than I had anticipated. I am in doubt whether that is due to stupidity or the result of a decision taken beforehand. The probability of the latter alternative seems to be confirmed by the noisy demonstrations which will most likely render it impossible for them to draw back. I am reluctant to protest officially against Grammont’s speech on international grounds, but our press should attack it very severely, and this should be done in as many newspapers as possible.”

July 9th.—A telegram from Bucher to the Secretary of State, saying that the direction to the press to deal with Grammont’s speech in very strong language is not to apply to the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung.

Another telegram of the same date to Thile, which he brought to me: “Any one intending to summon a Congress to deal with a debatable question ought not first to threaten a warlike solution in case the opposite party should not agree to his wishes.”

Further, the Secretary of State handed me a telegram from Berlin to the Chancellor, which was returned by the latter with comments. I was to get these circulated in the non-official journals. The telegram was to the effect that Grammont had stated, in reply to an interpellation by Cochery, that Prim had offered the Spanish throne to the Hereditary Prince of Hohenzollern, (Remark: “He can do nothing of the kind. Only the Cortes,”) and that the Prince had accepted it. (Remark: “He will only declare himself after he has been elected.”) The Spanish people has not yet, however, expressed its wishes. (Remark: “That is the main point.”) The French Government do not recognise the negotiations in question. (Remark: “There are no negotiations excepting those between Spain and the eventual candidates for the throne.”) Grammont therefore begged that the discussion might be postponed, as it was purposeless for the moment. (Remark: “Very.”) The French Government would maintain the neutral attitude which they had observed up to the present, but would not permit a foreign Power to place a Prince upon the Spanish throne, (“Hardly any power entertains such an intention, except perhaps France,”) and endanger the honour and dignity of France. They trusted to the wisdom of the Germans, (Remark: “Has nothing to do with it,”) and to the friendship of the Spanish people. (Remark: “That is the main point.”) Should they be deceived in their hopes they would do their duty without hesitation or weakness. (Remark: “We also.”)

Bucher sent me a whole packet of sketches for articles:—

1. “If Spain records her decision to establish a government which shall be peaceful, and tolerant in religious matters, and which may be expected to be friendly to Germany, who is also devoted to peace, can it be in our interest to prevent the execution of that resolve, and for that purpose to take measures of doubtful legality? Shall we, because of a threat of war made in pursuit of an arbitrary and dynastic object, take steps to frustrate a reorganisation of Spanish affairs advantageous to Germany? Is it not rather an act of insolent presumption on the part of France to address such a demand to Germany? Obviously France lacks either the courage or the means to enforce her views at Madrid; and it appears from Grammont’s speech of the 4th of July that in her anger at what has happened in Spain she is prepared to throw herself upon Germany in a blind fit of rage. That speech is to a certain extent a declaration of war against the person of the Prince of Hohenzollern, in case he should decide to accept the offer of the Spanish people. France demands that Prussia shall undertake the office of policeman in case a German Prince who has attained his majority shows a disposition to meet the wishes of the Spaniards. For a North German Government to interfere with a citizen who should wish to exercise his right to emigrate and adopt the Spanish nationality would raise a very questionable point of law from a constitutional standpoint. Even if such a power existed, the dignity of Germany would demand that it should only be applied in her own interests. The calm consideration of those interests is not in the least affected by the warlike threats of a neighbouring State, which, instead of arguments, appeals to its 400,000 soldiers. If France lays claim in this manner to the guardianship of adjoining nations, the maintenance of peace can for the latter be only a question of time, which may be decided at any moment. On Grammont’s appointment to the French Foreign Office it was feared in many quarters that the choice by the Emperor Napoleon of a statesman who was only remarkable for his personal impetuosity and his hostility to Germany indicated a desire to secure for himself greater liberty in breaking the peace. Unfortunately the haughty and aggressive tone of the Duke’s speech is not calculated to remove the apprehensions entertained at that time. He is not a minister of peace, but rather the instrument of a personal policy which shrinks from no responsibility. In itself the question as to who is to be the ruler of Spain is not one for which Germany would go to war. But the French demand that the German Government, in opposition to its own interests, should put artificial difficulties in the way of the Spaniards manifests a depth of self-conceit which scarcely any government amongst the independent States of Europe could submit to at the present day. We seek no quarrel, but if any one tries to force one upon us he will find us ready to go through with it to the bitter end.”

2. In another article (there was too much material to be disposed of in one) the following considerations were to be developed. This was not to be communicated to the official organs, but either to the Kölnische Zeitung or the Spenersche Zeitung, while it was to be given in a curtailed form to Hahn’s Literary Bureau. “If the candidature of Alphonso had up to the present any prospect of success in Spain, it would have been most prejudicially affected by the foolish uproar raised in France, which stamped it with a French official character. No worse service could be done to that Prince than to represent him as a French candidate. Montpensier had already suffered under the reproach that he was a Frenchman. The Bourbons had formerly been imposed upon the Spaniards, and had proved themselves no blessing. The manner in which the succession to the throne is now discussed in France would offend a nation even less proud than the Spaniards.”

3. “Between the years 1866 and 1868, and particularly before the fall of Isabella, France schemed a great deal against Germany with Austria, Italy, and also with Spain. Those intrigues were set at nought by the Revolution of September, to which Count Bismarck referred when he said at that time in Parliament that the danger of war, which had been very imminent, had been dispelled by an unforeseen event. So long as France maintains her warlike intentions towards Germany, she will desire to see on the Spanish throne a dynasty favourable to those schemes, possibly an Ultramontane one, as in case of an attack on Germany it would make a difference of about 50,000 men to France whether she had a benevolent, or at least a neutral neighbour on the other side of the Pyrenees or one whose attitude might be suspected. It is true that France has nothing to fear directly from Spain if the French, who for the past eighty years have been unable to make up their own minds, and who cannot govern themselves, would give up the attempt to play the part of tutor to other nations. Let the period 1848–1850 in France be compared with that of 1868–1870 in Spain, and the comparison will not be to the advantage of the nation qui marche à la tête de la civilisation.”

4. “England is accustomed to look upon the Peninsula as a dependency of her own, and doubtless believes that her influence can be more easily made to prevail in a state of insecurity than under the rule of a powerful dynasty. It is not wise of the English to recall certain incidents of Spanish history, a course in which they are followed by the French newspapers. The Spanish version of the history of the wars against the First Napoleon is very different to the English one. In Buen Retiro every traveller is shown the site of a once prosperous porcelain manufactory, which was needlessly burned to the ground by the British allies of Spain.”

5. Still another subject. “Very pleased with the article in the Spenersche Zeitung (this was addressed to me). Please again call attention in a somewhat similar manner to the impetuosity of Grammont therein referred to. What is the real ground for all this alarm? A paragraph in the Agence Havas to the effect that the affair had been settled without the concurrence of the Cortes. It is probable that the French Government itself had this paragraph inserted, and it was, moreover, concocted in complete ignorance of the Spanish Constitution and of the laws governing the election of a King. This, which was the only new feature, was a barefaced invention. It had already been mentioned in all the papers that Prim’s speech of the 11th of June referred to the Prince of Hohenzollern, and that had caused no excitement in France. Is the present agitation then a coup monté? Does the French Government insist upon a ‘row’? Has Louis Napoleon chosen Grammont in order to pick a quarrel with us? At any rate he has been unskilful in his treatment of this question. The general moral to be drawn as often as possible is: the French Government is, after all, not quite so shrewd as people believe. The French have succeeded in many things with the assistance of 300,000 soldiers, and owing to that success they are regarded as immensely clever. Is that really so? Circumstances show that it is not.”