Campfire and battlefield

From that time Grant held possession of the Weldon Railroad, and whatever supplies came to the Confederate army by that route had to be hauled thirty miles in wagons. The National army constructed for its own use a railroad in the rear of and parallel with its long line of intrenchments, running from City Point to the extreme left flank. This road was not particular about grades and curves, but simply followed the natural contour of the ground. Then began what is called the siege of Petersburg, which was not a siege in the proper sense of the word, because the Confederate communications were open; but the military preparations and processes were identical with those known as siege operations, and every possible appliance, mechanical or military, that could assist in the work was brought here.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

WASHINGTON IN DANGER.

CONFEDERATE FORCES THREATEN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL—GENERAL GRANT SENDS TROOPS TO ITS DEFENCE—BATTERIES AND INTRENCHMENTS AROUND WASHINGTON—CONFEDERATE FORCES IN SIGHT OF THE DOME OF THE CAPITOL—PRESIDENT LINCOLN EXPOSED TO THE FIRE OF CONFEDERATE SHARP-SHOOTERS—GENERAL EARLY'S RETREAT UP THE SHENANDOAH VALLEY.

Partly to check the movements of General Hunter in the Shenandoah Valley, and partly with the hope that an attack on Washington would cause Grant to withdraw from before Richmond and Petersburg, Lee sent Early's corps into the valley. Hunter, being out of ammunition, was obliged to retire before the Confederates, and Early marched down the Potomac unopposed, and threatened the National capital. Serious fears were entertained that he would actually enter the city, and all sorts of hurried preparations were made to prevent him, department clerks being under arms, and every available man pressed into the service.

The defences of Washington, which had been in course of construction ever since the war began, consisted of sixty-eight enclosed forts or batteries, connected by lines of intrenchments, forming a circle about that city and Alexandria, and being on an average four miles from the centre of the city. These mounted about eight hundred guns and one hundred mortars, and, with their connecting works, were calculated to give fighting room for thirty-five thousand men. But at this time they were manned by not more than thirteen thousand. Some of these were members of the invalid corps, which was formed of soldiers who had been wounded so as to be unfit for the hard duty at the front; others were hundred-day men. There was great excitement in Washington, and serious fears that the Confederates might succeed in marching into the capital.

Gen. Lew Wallace, in command at Baltimore, gathered a body of recruits and went out to meet Early, not with the hope of defeating him, but only of delaying him till a sufficient force could be sent from the Army of the Potomac. Ricketts's division of the Sixth Corps had already set out for Baltimore, and on arriving there immediately followed Wallace. They met the enemy at the Monocacy, thirty-five miles from Washington, July 9, and took up a position on the left bank of the stream, covering the roads to the capital. Wallace had six field guns and a small force of cavalry, and disposed his line so as to hold the bridges and fords as long as possible. The Confederates attacked at first in front, with a strong skirmish line and sixteen guns, and there was bloody fighting at one of the bridges. Then they changed their tactics, marched a heavy force down stream, crossed at a ford out of range of the National artillery, and then marched up stream again to strike Wallace's left flank. That part of the line was held by Ricketts, who changed front to meet the attack, and was promptly reinforced from Wallace's scanty resources. Two assaults in line of battle were repelled, after some destructive fighting, and Wallace determined still to hold his ground, as he was hourly expecting three additional regiments. But the afternoon wore away without any appearance of assistance, and when he saw preparations for another and heavier assault he determined to retreat. While the left was being withdrawn, the right, under General Tyler, was ordered to prevent the remaining Confederate force from crossing at the bridges. The wooden bridge was burned, and the stone bridge was held to the last possible moment, when Tyler also retreated. The missing regiments were met on the road, and there was no pursuit. This action was not important from its magnitude; but in that it probably saved the city of Washington from pillage and destruction, it was of the first importance. Wallace has received high praise for his promptness and energy in fighting a battle of great strategic value when he knew that the immediate result must be the defeat of his own force. He lost about fourteen hundred men, half of whom were prisoners. The Confederates admitted a loss of six hundred.

Early now marched on Washington, and on the 12th was within a few miles of it, where some heavy skirmishing took place with a force sent out by Gen. Christopher C. Augur. His nearest approach was at Fort Stevens, directly north of the city. General Early says in his memoir: "I rode ahead of the infantry and arrived in sight of Fort Stevens a short time after noon, when I discovered that the works were but feebly manned. Rodes, whose division was in front, was immediately ordered to bring it into line as rapidly as possible, and move into the works if he could." This is supposed to have been Early's golden opportunity, which he somehow missed, for the capture of Washington. His own explanation is this: "My whole column was then moving by flank, which was the only practicable mode of marching on the road we were on; and before Rodes's division could be brought up we saw a cloud of dust in the rear of the works toward Washington, and soon a column of the enemy filed into them on the right and left, and skirmishers were thrown out in front, while an artillery fire was opened on us from a number of batteries. This defeated our hopes of getting possession of the works by surprise, and it became necessary to reconnoitre. Rodes's skirmishers were thrown to the front, driving those of the enemy to the cover of the works, and we proceeded to examine the fortifications in order to ascertain if it was practicable to carry them by assault. They were found to be exceedingly strong. The timber had been felled within cannon range all round, and left on the ground, making a formidable obstacle, and every possible approach was raked by artillery. On the right was Rock Creek, running through a deep ravine, which had been rendered impassable by the felling of the timber on each side, and beyond were the works on the Georgetown pike, which had been reported to be the strongest of all. On the left, as far as the eye could reach, the works appeared to be of the same impregnable character. This reconnoissance consumed the balance of the day. The rapid marching, which had broken a number of the men who were weakened by previous exposure, and had been left in the valley and directed to be collected at Winchester, and the losses in killed and wounded at Harper's Ferry, Maryland Heights, and Monocacy, had reduced my infantry to about eight thousand muskets. Of those remaining, a very large number were greatly exhausted by the last two days' marching, some having fallen by sunstroke; and I was satisfied, when we arrived in front of the fortifications, that not more than one-third of my force could have been carried into action. After dark on the 11th, I held a consultation with Major-Generals Breckenridge, Rodes, Gordon, and Ramseur, in which I stated to them the danger of remaining where we were, and the necessity of doing something immediately, as the probability was that the passes of the South Mountain and the fords of the upper Potomac would soon be closed against us. After interchanging views with them, being very reluctant to abandon the project of capturing Washington, I determined to make an assault at daylight next morning. During the night a despatch was received from Gen. Bradley Johnson, from near Baltimore, informing me that two corps had arrived from General Grant's army, and that his whole army was probably in motion. As soon as it was light enough to see, I rode to the front and found the parapets lined with troops. I had, therefore, reluctantly to give up all hopes of capturing Washington, after I had arrived in sight of the dome of the Capitol."

Early's information was correct, as Grant had sent to Washington the remainder of the Sixth Corps, and also the Nineteenth Corps, which had just arrived from Louisiana.

During the fighting at Fort Stevens, President Lincoln was in the fort, and was exposed to the fire of the Confederate sharp-shooters. General Wright had the greatest difficulty in persuading him to leave his dangerous position, and could not do so until an officer standing near the President had been struck down by a shot from the enemy. Even then, Mr. Lincoln persisted in looking over the parapet to see what was going on, and when finally the Sixth Corps men drove back the enemy he was as excited and jubilant in the cheering as any of those around him.

Early retreated up the valley, carrying with him considerable plunder, and was followed some distance until the pursuing force was withdrawn. The Sixth and Nineteenth Corps were ordered to rejoin Grant's army, and were on their way to it when it was learned that Early was again advancing. Grant now determined to finish him and clear the valley, and accordingly sent General Sheridan to command in that quarter, in August. Meanwhile, a part of Early's force had been struck at Winchester by a force under General Averell, who defeated it and captured four guns and about four hundred men. Three days later, Early defeated a force under Gen. George Crook, and drove it across the Potomac, after which he sent his cavalry, under Generals McCausland and Bradley T. Johnson, to make a raid into Pennsylvania. McCausland, in the course of his raid, burned Chambersburg, the particulars of which have been given in another chapter.

This raid created a panic among the inhabitants of western Maryland and southern Pennsylvania, many of whom fled from their homes, driving off their cattle and carrying whatever they could.

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

SHERIDAN IN THE SHENANDOAH.

IMPORTANCE OF THE VALLEY—HUNTER ASKS TO BE RELIEVED—SHERIDAN'S CAREER—GRANT'S INSTRUCTIONS—INTERFERENCE AT WASHINGTON—LINCOLN GIVES GRANT A HINT—SHERIDAN MARCHES ON WINCHESTER—MINOR ENGAGEMENTS—SHERIDAN'S OPPORTUNITY—BATTLE OF THE OPEQUAN—EARLY GOES WHIRLING THROUGH WINCHESTER—BATTLE OF FISHER'S HILL—DESTRUCTION IN THE VALLEY—ACTION AT TOM'S BROOK—BATTLE OF CEDAR CREEK.

It had become plainly evident that something must be done to cancel the whole Shenandoah Valley from the map of the theatre of war. The mountains that flanked it made it a secure lane down which a Confederate force could be sent at almost any time to the very door of Washington; while the crops that were harvested in its fertile fields were a constant temptation to those who had to provide for the necessities of an army. General Grant took the matter in hand in earnest after Early's raid and the burning of Chambersburg. His first care was to have the separate military departments in that section consolidated, his next to find a suitable commander, and finally to send an adequate force. He would have been satisfied with General Hunter, who was already the ranking officer there; but Hunter had been badly hampered in his movements by constant interference from Washington, and knowing that he had not the confidence of General Halleck, he asked to be relieved, since he did not wish to embarrass the cause. In this, Grant says, Hunter "showed a patriotism that was none too common in the army. There were not many major-generals who would voluntarily have asked to have the command of a department taken from them on the supposition that for some particular reason, or for any reason, the service would be better performed." Grant accepted his offer, and telegraphed for General Sheridan to come and take command of the new department. Sheridan was on hand promptly, and was placed at the head of about thirty thousand troops, including eight thousand cavalry, who were named the Army of the Shenandoah.

Sheridan was now in his thirty-fourth year; and Secretary Stanton, with a wise caution, made some objection, on the ground that he was very young for a command so important. He had not stood remarkably high at West Point, being ranked thirty-fourth in his class when the whole number was fifty-two; but he had already made a brilliant record in the war, winning his brigadier-generalship by a victory at Booneville, Mo., and conspicuous for his gallantry and skill at Perryville, Murfreesboro', Chickamauga, and Missionary Ridge, and for his bold riding around Lee's army in the spring campaign of 1864. Under him and Custer, Crook, Merritt, and Kilpatrick, the cavalry arm of the National service, weak and inefficient at the opening of the war, had become a swift and sure weapon against the now declining but still defiant Confederacy. It had been noted by everybody that Grant exhibited an almost unerring judgment in the choice of his lieutenants.

In his instructions, which were at first written out for Hunter and afterward transferred to Sheridan, Grant said: "In pushing up the Shenandoah Valley, where it is expected you will have to go first or last, it is desirable that nothing should be left to invite the enemy to return. Take all provisions, forage, and stock wanted for the use of your command. Such as cannot be consumed, destroy. It is not desirable that the buildings should be destroyed—they should rather be protected; but the people should be informed that so long as an army can subsist among them recurrences of these raids must be expected; and we are determined to stop them at all hazards."

The condition of things at Washington—where Halleck always, and Stanton sometimes, interfered with orders passing that way—is vividly suggested by a despatch sent in cipher to Grant at this time, August 3. Mr. Lincoln wrote: "I have seen your despatch, in which you say, 'I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also.' This I think is exactly right, as to how our forces should move. But please look over the despatches you may have received from here, even since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of any one here of 'putting our army south of the enemy,' or of 'following him to the death' in any direction. I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted unless you watch it every day and hour, and force it." This caused Grant to go at once to Maryland and put things in train for the vigorous campaign that he had planned in the valley of the Shenandoah. Perhaps Mr. Lincoln had found a way to give Halleck also an impressive hint; for the very next day that general telegraphed to Grant: "I await your orders, and shall strictly carry them out, whatever they may be."

Grant, who had all confidence in Sheridan, wrote to him: "Do not hesitate to give command to officers in whom you repose confidence, without regard to claims of others on account of rank. If you deem Torbert the best man to command the cavalry, place him in command, and give Averell some other command, or relieve him from the expedition and order him to report to General Hunter. What we want is prompt and active movements after the enemy, in accordance with the instructions you have already had. I feel every confidence that you will do the very best, and will leave you, as far as possible, to act on your judgment, and not embarrass you with orders and instructions." In accordance with this, Torbert was made Sheridan's chief of cavalry, and Merritt was given command of Torbert's division. When Grant visited Sheridan, before the battle of the Opequan, he carried a plan of battle in his pocket; but he says he found Sheridan so thoroughly ready to move, with so perfect a plan, and so confident of success, that he did not even show him his plan or give him any orders, except authority to move.

Early, whose main force was on the south bank of the Potomac, above Harper's Ferry, still had a large part of his cavalry in Maryland, where they were loading their wagons with wheat on the battlefield of Antietam, and seizing all the cattle that the farmers had not driven off beyond their reach. But these were now recalled. As soon as Sheridan could get his force well in hand, he moved it skilfully southward toward Winchester, in order to threaten Early's communications and draw him into a battle. Early at once moved his army into a position to cover Winchester, but was unwilling to fight without the reinforcements that were on the way to him from Lee's army; so he retreated as far as Fisher's Hill to meet them, and was followed by Sheridan, who was about to attack there when warned by Grant to be cautious, as the enemy was too strong for him. He therefore withdrew to his former position on Opequan Creek, facing west toward Winchester and covering Snicker's Gap, through which reinforcements were to come to him. Here he was attacked, August 21, and after a fight in which two hundred and sixty men on the National side were killed or wounded, he drew back to a stronger position at Halltown. He had complained, in a letter to Grant, that there was not a good military position in the whole valley south of the Potomac. In his retrograde movement, as he reported, he "destroyed everything eatable south of Winchester."

Early reconnoitred the position at Halltown and found it too strong to be attacked, but for three or four weeks remained with his whole force at the lower end of the valley, threatening raids into Maryland, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, breaking the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad and the Chesapeake Canal, keeping the authorities at Washington in a constant state of anxiety, and all the time inviting attack from Sheridan. There were frequent minor engagements, mainly by cavalry, with varying results. In one, Custer's division only escaped capture by crossing the Potomac in great haste. In another, a force under Gen. John B. McIntosh captured the Eighth South Carolina infantry entire—though that regiment now consisted of but one hundred and six men. It had probably consisted of a thousand men at the outset, and the wear and tear of three years of constant warfare had reduced it, like many others on either side, to these meagre proportions.

Grant and Sheridan were in perfect accord as to the best policy, and they pursued it steadily, in spite of the uneasiness at Washington, the complaints of the Maryland farmers, and the criticisms of the newspapers. They knew that with the Army of the Potomac constantly busy in his front, feeling out for new positions beyond Petersburg, or massing north of the James in close proximity to Richmond, or threatening to break through his centre, the time must come when Lee would recall a part of the forces that he had sent to the valley, and that would be the moment for Sheridan to spring upon Early. The opportunity arrived on the 19th of September, when Lee had recalled the command of R. H. Anderson, with which he had reinforced Early in August, and Early, as if to double his danger, had sent a large part of his remaining troops to Martinsburg, twenty miles away. Grant's order to Sheridan at this juncture was "Go in," and Sheridan promptly went in.

The various movements of the two armies had brought them around to substantially the same positions that they held in the engagement of August 21—Early east of and covering Winchester, Sheridan along the line of Opequan Creek, which is about five miles east of the city. Sheridan's plan was to march straight on Winchester with his whole force, and crush Early's right before the left could be withdrawn from Martinsburg to assist it. He set his troops in motion at three o'clock in the morning, to converge toward the Berryville pike, a macadamized road crossing the Opequan, passing through a ravine, and leading into Winchester. Wilson's cavalry secured the crossing of the stream, and cleared the way through the ravine for the infantry; but there was, as usual, some difficulty in moving so many troops by a single road, and it was midday before the battle began. This delay gave Early an opportunity to bring back his troops from Martinsburg and unite his whole force in front of Winchester. Sheridan's infantry deployed under a heavy artillery fire from Early's right wing, and advanced to the attack, when the battle began almost simultaneously along the whole line, and was kept up till dark. There were no field-works, the only shelter being such as was afforded by patches of woodland and rolling ground, and the fighting was obstinate and bloody. The usual difficulty of preserving the line intact while advancing over broken ground was met, and wherever a gap appeared it was promptly taken advantage of. In one instance, a Confederate force led by Gen. Robert E. Rodes drove in between the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, crumbled their flanks, and turned to take the Nineteenth in reverse; but at this juncture a division of the Sixth Corps under Gen. David A. Russell, coming forward to fill the gap, struck the flank of the intruding Confederate force in turn, enfiladed it with a rapid fire of canister from the Fifth Maine battery, and sent it back in confusion, capturing a large number of prisoners. In this movement Generals Rodes and Russell were both killed. On the National right the fighting was at first in favor of the Confederates, and that wing was temporarily borne back some distance.

Sheridan now brought up his reserves, which he had intended to move south of Winchester to cut off retreat, and sent them into the fight on his right flank, while the cavalry divisions of Merritt and Averell, under Torbert, came in by a detour and struck Early's left, pushing back his cavalry and getting into the rear of a portion of his infantry. From this time Sheridan drove everything before him. The Confederates found some shelter in a line of field-works near the town, but were soon driven out, and fled through the streets in complete rout and confusion. But darkness favored them, and most of them escaped up the valley. Their severely wounded were left in Winchester. The National loss was nearly five thousand men. The Confederates lost about four thousand—including two generals, Rodes and Godwin—with five guns and nine battle-flags. Early established a strong rear guard, and managed to save his trains.

This battle, which in proportion to the numbers engaged was one of the most destructive of the war, had its many curious and valorous incidents. Near its close General Russell received a bullet in his breast, but did not mention it even to his staff officer, and continued urging forward and encouraging the troops. A little later, in the very moment of victory, a fragment of shell tore through his heart. Lieut. Morton L. Hawkins, of the Thirty-fourth Ohio Regiment, writes: "Here fell badly wounded our gallant division commander, Gen. I. H. Duval; and while crossing a cornfield, and just before reaching the edge of the sanguinary Red Bud, the chivalrous and manly Carter, at the head of Company D, my old regiment, fell dead at my feet, struck in the forehead with a musket ball; but never faltering, with our eyes fixed on the enemy, who at that time were advancing to the opposite side of the Red Bud, we pushed on, amid a shower of musketry that was simply murderous. Emerging on the opposite bank, we ascended the elevation and met them face to face. Then ensued a hand-to-hand contest. The ranks of Union and Confederate regiments mingled indiscriminately, the colors of both floating in the breeze together, the blue and the gray, man to man. Duval had been carried to the rear with a musket ball in his thigh, but Col. R. B. Hayes, since President of the United States, assumed the command of the division, and by his presence in the battle wreck encouraged his men to deeds of daring. Cool and vigilant, he sat upon his horse amid that leaden rain, while scores of veterans on either side went down around him. Finally the tide turned in our favor. Down the hill, hotly pressed by the Union men, went that valiant band of rebels. The day was won. The flag of the old Thirty-fourth never looked so beautiful, nor was borne so proudly, as on that glorious day, when in the thickest of the fight its shadow fell on its brave defenders."

In contrast with this is the entry in the journal of a Confederate officer who was wounded and captured: "I never saw our troops in such confusion before. Night found Sheridan's hosts in full and exultant possession of much-abused, beloved Winchester. The hotel hospital was full of desperately wounded and dying Confederates. The entire building was shrouded in darkness during the dreadful night, and sleep was impossible, as the groans, sighs, shrieks, prayers, and oaths of the wretched sufferers, combined with my own severe pain, banished all thought of rest. Our scattered troops, closely followed by the large army of pursuers, retreated rapidly and in disorder through the city. It was a sad, humiliating sight."

General Early attributes his defeat largely to the fact that his cavalry was inferior in both numbers and equipments to the National cavalry that opposed it.

The news of this battle was received with unmeasured enthusiasm in the Army of the Potomac, in Washington, and at the North, where every newspaper repeated in its bold head-lines Sheridan's expression that he had "sent Early whirling through Winchester."

President Lincoln telegraphed to General Sheridan: "Have just heard of your great victory. God bless you all, officers and men. Strongly inclined to come up and see you." General Grant telegraphed: "I congratulate you and the army serving under you for the great victory just achieved. It has been most opportune in point of time and effect. It will open again to the Government and to the public the very important line from Baltimore to the Ohio, and also the Chesapeake Canal. Better still, it wipes out much of the stain upon our arms by previous disasters in that locality. May your good work continue, is now the prayer of all loyal men."

For this brilliant success, Sheridan was advanced to the grade of brigadier-general in the regular army.

When Early retreated southward after this battle of the Opequan (or battle of Winchester as the Confederates called it), he took up a position at Fisher's Hill, where the valley is but four miles wide. As Sheridan had said, there was no really good military position in the valley, unless for a much larger army than either he or Early commanded. At Fisher's Hill, the Confederate right rested on the North Fork of the Shenandoah, and was sufficiently protected by it; but for the left there was no natural protection. Early's men set to work vigorously constructing intrenchments and preparing abatis. Sheridan followed promptly, his advance guard skirmishing with the Confederate pickets and driving them through Strasburg. There was an eminence overlooking the Confederate intrenchments, and after a sharp fight this was gained by the National troops, who at once began to cut down the trees and plant batteries. When Sheridan had thoroughly reconnoitred the position, he planned to send the greater part of his cavalry through the Luray Valley to get into the rear of the Confederates and cut off retreat; then to attack in front with the Sixth and Nineteenth Corps, while Crook, with the Eighth Corps, should make a detour and come in on the enemy's left flank. The ground was so broken that the manoeuvres were necessarily slow, and it was almost sunset when Crook reached Early's flank. But the little daylight that remained was used to the utmost advantage. Crook came out of the woods so suddenly and silently that the Confederates at that end of the line were simply astounded. Their works were taken in reverse, and their dismounted cavalry was literally overrun. The forward movement of the troops in front was prompt, the right of the Sixth Corps joining properly with the left of Crook's, and everywhere Sheridan and his lieutenants were with the men, repeating the command to push forward constantly, without stopping for anything. The result was a complete rout of the Confederates, who fled in confusion once more up the valley, leaving sixteen of their guns behind. But Sheridan's plan for their capture was foiled because his cavalry, meeting a stout resistance from Early's cavalry, failed to get through to their rear. Pursuit was made in the night, but to no purpose. In this battle, which was fought on the 22d of September, the National loss was about four hundred; the Confederate, about fourteen hundred.

For the next three days the retreat was continued, Sheridan's whole force following rapidly, and often being near enough to engage the skirmishers or exchange shots with the artillery. Early went to Port Republic to meet reinforcements that were on the way to him from Lee's army, and there stopped. Sheridan halted his infantry at Harrisonburg, but sent his cavalry still farther up the valley. The column under Torbert reached Staunton, where it destroyed a large quantity of arms, ammunition, and provisions, and then tore up the track of the Virginia Central Railroad eastward to Waynesboro', and pulled down the iron bridge over the stream at that point. Here it was attacked in force, and retired. Grant wanted the movement continued to Charlottesville; but Sheridan found serious difficulties in his lack of supplies and transportation so far from his base. He adopted the alternative of rendering the valley untenable for any army that could not bring its provisions with it, and Grant had repeated his early instructions, saying, "Leave nothing for the subsistence of an army on any ground you abandon to the enemy." On the 5th of October the march down the valley was begun. The infantry went first, and the cavalry followed, being stretched entirely across the valley, burning and destroying, as it went, everything except the dwellings. Sheridan said in his report: "I have destroyed over two thousand barns filled with wheat, hay, and farming implements; over seventy mills filled with flour and wheat; have driven in front of the army over four thousand head of stock, and have killed and issued to the troops not less than three thousand sheep."

Early, being reinforced, now turned and pursued Sheridan. At Tom's Brook, on the 7th, the National cavalry under Torbert, Merritt, and Custer engaged the Confederate cavalry under Rosser and Lamont. After a spirited engagement Rosser was driven back twenty-five miles, and Torbert captured over three hundred prisoners, eleven guns, and a large number of wagons—or, as was said in the report, "everything they had on wheels."

Sheridan halted at Cedar Creek, north of Strasburg, and put his army into camp there, while he was summoned to Washington for conference as to the continuation of the campaign, leaving General Wright in command. Early, finding nothing in the valley for his men and horses to eat, was obliged to do one thing or another without delay—advance and capture provisions from the stores of his enemy, or retreat and give up the ground. He chose to assume the offensive, and in the night of the 18th moved silently around the left of the National line, taking the precaution to leave behind even the soldiers' canteens, which might have made a clatter. In the misty dawn of the 19th the Confederates burst upon the flank held by Crook's corps, with such suddenness and vehemence that it was at once thrown into confusion and routed. They were among the tents before anybody knew they were coming, and many of Crook's men were shot or stabbed before they could fairly awake from their sleep. The Nineteenth Corps was also routed, but the Sixth stood firm, and the Confederates themselves became somewhat broken and demoralized by the eagerness of the men to plunder the camps. Wright's Sixth Corps covered the retreat; and when Sheridan, hearing of the battle and riding with all speed from Winchester, met the stream of fugitives, he deployed some cavalry to stop them, and inspired his men with a short and oft-repeated oration, which is reported as, "Face the other way, boys! We are going back to our camps! We are going to lick them out of their boots!" This actually turned the tide; a new line was quickly formed and intrenched, and when Early attacked it he met with a costly repulse. In the afternoon Sheridan advanced to attack in turn, sending his irresistible cavalry around both flanks, and after some fighting the whole Confederate line was broken up and driven in confusion, with the cavalry close upon its heels. All the guns lost in the morning were retaken, and twenty-four besides. In this double battle the Confederate loss was about thirty-one hundred; the National, fifty-seven hundred and sixty-four, of whom seventeen hundred were prisoners taken in the morning and hurried away toward Richmond. Among the losses in this battle on the National side were Brig.-Gens. Daniel D. Bidwell, Charles R. Lowell, J. H. Hitching, and George D. Welles, and Col. Joseph Thoburn, all killed; on the Confederate side, Major-Gen. Stephen D. Ramseur, killed.

The explanation of Early's well-planned attack upon the camp is found in the fact that the Confederates had a signal station on Massanutten Mountain from which everything in Sheridan's army could be seen. On the day before the battle Gen. John B. Gordon climbed to that signal station, where with his field-glass he says, "I could distinctly see the red cuffs of the artillerymen. In front of the Belle Grove mansion I could see members of Sheridan's staff coming and going. I could not imagine a better opportunity for making out an enemy's position and strength. I could even count the men who were there. I marked the position of the guns, and the pickets walking to and fro, and observed where the cavalry was placed." The explanation of the surprise is, that the Confederates by careful approach captured a picket and obtained the countersign. They then proceeded to capture more of the pickets, exchanged clothes with them and put their own men on guard. This, of course, enabled them to open the door of the camp, so to speak, in perfect silence for their approaching army.

The story of Sheridan's return, and how he changed the defeat into a victory, as here told, is that which is generally received. But some of his soldiers say it is more dramatic than strictly truthful. They say that when he arrived General Wright already had restored order, and had the Sixth Corps in perfect condition for an advance movement. Still there is no doubt that the presence of Sheridan brought with it an inspiration, and gave vigor to the movement when it was made. Col. Moses M. Granger, of the One Hundred and Twenty-second Ohio Regiment, which was in the Sixth Corps, says: "When Sheridan arrived, the line in position consisted of the cavalry, with its right on the pike; the second division, Sixth Corps, with its left on the pike; then Hayes, with part of the Army of West Virginia; and next to him our Second Brigade, third division, Sixth Corps. I had no watch with me, but at the time, I supposed that we connected with Getty not far from ten o'clock in the forenoon. As our breakfast had been very early and hasty, we now advanced the dinner hour, made coffee, and soon felt refreshed—ready for anything. While we were in this state of good feeling, General Sheridan, attended by Major A. J. Smith, came riding along the line. Just in my rear, as I was sitting on a stump, he drew rein, returned our salute, gave a quick look at the men, and said: 'You look all right, boys! We'll whip 'em like —— before night!' At this, hearty cheers broke out, and he rode on, passing from the rear to the front of our line, through the right wing of my regiment, and thence westward, followed ever by cheers. Instantly all thought of merely defeating an attack upon us ended. In its stead was a conviction that we were to attack and defeat them that very afternoon.... Thus before Sheridan arrived Wright had given orders for the establishment of a strong and well-manned line, and made it certain that the rebel advance must there stop. What Wright might or would have done if Sheridan had remained at Winchester, I cannot tell. Called from his bed to fight an enemy already on his flank and rear and partly within his lines, his promptness and decision enabled him to withdraw from Early's grasp almost all that was not in his hands before Wright's eager haste brought him from bed to battle. When his black horse brought Sheridan to our lines on that October forenoon, Wright turned over to him an army ready, eager, and competent to win success that afternoon."

Sheridan's campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah was now practically ended, and the people of the loyal North were no longer obliged to call it the Valley of Humiliation.

An incident of this campaign inspired one of the most vigorous and popular of the war poems, entitled "Sheridan's Ride." We quote two stanzas:

CHAPTER XXXIX.

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION.

EFFORTS TOWARD PEACE—THE FRÉMONT CONVENTION—THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION—NOMINATION OF LINCOLN AND JOHNSON—THE DEMOCRATIC CONVENTION—ITS DENUNCIATION OF THE WAR—NOMINATION OF McCLELLAN AND PENDLETON—FRÉMONT WITHDRAWS—CHARACTER OF THE CANVASS—THE HOPE OF THE CONFEDERATES—THE ISSUE AS POPULARLY UNDERSTOOD—ELECTION OF LINCOLN—MARYLAND ABOLISHES SLAVERY—THE HIGHEST ACHIEVEMENT OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.