Charles Sumner: his complete works, volume 19 (of 20)

and he quotes Lucan also, who shows a soldier exclaiming:—

The old Antigonus, who, when besieging a city, laughed at a man who brought him a dissertation on Justice, and Pompey, who exclaimed, “Am I, when in arms, to think of the laws?”[79]—these seem to be the models for our Government on the coasts of San Domingo.

USURPATION OF WAR POWERS CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION.

The same spirit which set at defiance great principles of International Law, installing force instead, is equally manifest in disregard of the Constitution of the United States; and here one of its most distinctive principles is struck down. By the Constitution it is solemnly announced that to Congress is given the power “to declare war.” This allotment of power was made only after much consideration, and in obedience to those popular rights consecrated by the American Revolution. In England, and in all other monarchies at the time, this power was the exclusive prerogative of the Crown, so that war was justly called “the last reason of kings.” The framers of our Constitution naturally refused to vest this kingly prerogative in the President. Kings were rejected in substance as in name. The One-Man Power was set aside, and this kingly prerogative placed under the safeguard of the people, as represented in that highest form of national life, an Act of Congress. No other provision in the Constitution is more distinctive, or more worthy of veneration. I do not go too far, when I call it an essential element of Republican Institutions, happily discovered by our fathers.

Our authoritative commentator, Judge Story, has explained the origin of this provision, and his testimony confirms the statement I have made. After remarking that the power to declare war is “not only the highest sovereign prerogative, but that it is in its own nature and effects so critical and calamitous that it requires the utmost deliberation and the successive review of all the councils of the nation,” the learned author remarks with singular point, that “it should be difficult in a Republic to declare war,” and that, therefore, “the coöperation of all the branches of the legislative power ought upon principle to be required in this, the highest act of legislation”; and he even goes so far as to suggest still greater restriction, “as by requiring a concurrence of two thirds of both Houses.”[80] There is no such conservative requirement; but war can be declared only by a majority of both Houses with the approbation of the President. There must be the embodied will of the Legislative and the Executive,—in other words, of Congress and the President. Not Congress alone, without the President, can declare war; nor can the President alone, without Congress. Both must concur; and here is the triumph of Republican Institutions.

But this distinctive principle of our Constitution and new-found safeguard of popular rights has been set at nought by the President; or rather, in rushing to the goal of his desires, he has overleaped it, as if it were stubble.

In harmony with the whole transaction is the apology, which insists that the President may do indirectly what he cannot do directly,—that he may, according to old Polonius, “by indirections find directions out,”—in short, that, though he cannot declare war directly, he may indirectly. We are reminded of the unratified treaty, with its futile promise “against foreign interposition,”—that is, with the promise of the War Powers of our Government set in motion by the President alone, without an Act of Congress. Here are the precise terms:—

Now nothing can be clearer than that this provision, introduced on the authority of the President alone, was beyond his powers, and therefore brutum fulmen, a mere wooden gun, until after the ratification of the treaty. Otherwise the President alone might declare war, without an Act of Congress, doing indirectly what he cannot do directly, and thus overturning that special safeguard which places under the guardianship of Congress what Story justly calls “the highest sovereign prerogative.”

Here we meet another distinctive principle of our Constitution. As the power to declare war is lodged in Congress with the concurrence of the President, so is the power to make a treaty lodged in the President with the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate. War is declared only by Congress and the President; a treaty is made only by the President and two thirds of the Senate. As the former safeguard was new, so was the latter. In England and all other monarchies at the time, the treaty-making power was a kingly prerogative, like the power to declare war. The provision in our Constitution, requiring the participation of the Senate, was another limitation of the One-Man Power, and a new contribution to Republican Institutions.

“The Federalist,” in an article written by Alexander Hamilton, thus describes the kingly prerogative:—

Such was the well-known kingly prerogative which our Constitution rejected. Here let “The Federalist” speak again:—

Then, again, after showing that a treaty is a contract with a foreign nation, having the force of law, “The Federalist” proceeds:—

Thus does this contemporary authority testify against handing over to “the sole disposal” of the President the delicate and momentous question in the unratified treaty.

Following “The Federalist” is the eminent commentator already cited, who insists that “it is too much to expect that a free people would confide to a single magistrate, however respectable, the sole authority to act conclusively, as well as exclusively, upon the subject of treaties”; and that, “however proper it may be in a monarchy, there is no American statesman but must feel that such a prerogative in an American President would be inexpedient and dangerous,”—that “it would be inconsistent with that wholesome jealousy which all republics ought to cherish of all depositaries of power”; and then he adds:—

The learned author then dwells with pride on the requirement of the Constitution, which, while confiding the power to the Executive Department, “guards it from serious abuse by placing it under the ultimate superintendence of a select body of high character and high responsibility”; and then, after remarking that “the President is the immediate author and finisher of all treaties,” he concludes, in decisive words, that “no treaty so formed becomes binding upon the country, unless it receives the deliberate assent of two thirds of the Senate.”[86]

Nothing can be more positive. Therefore, even at the expense of repetition, I insist, that, as the power to declare war is under the safeguard of Congress with the concurrence of the President, so is the power to make a treaty in the President with the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate,—but the act of neither becomes binding without this concurrence. Thus, on grounds of authority, as well as of reason, is it clear that the undertaking of the President to employ the War Powers without the authority of Congress was void, and every employment of these War Powers in pursuance thereof was a usurpation.

If the President were a king, with the kingly prerogative either to declare war or to make treaties, he might do what he has done; but being only President, with the limited powers established by the Constitution, he cannot do it. The assumption in the Dominican treaty is exceptional and abnormal, being absolutely without precedent. The treaty with France in 1803 for the cession of Louisiana contained no such assumption; nor did the treaty with Spain in 1819 for the cession of Florida; nor did the treaty with Mexico in 1848, by which the title to Texas and California was assured; nor did the treaty with Mexico in 1853, by which new territory was obtained; nor did the treaty with Russia in 1867 for the cession of her possessions in North America. In none of these treaties was there any such assumption of power. The Louisiana treaty stipulated that possession should be taken by the United States “immediately after the ratification of the present treaty by the President of the United States, and in case that of the First Consul shall have been previously obtained.”[87] The Florida treaty stipulated “six months after the exchange of the ratification of this treaty, or sooner, if possible.”[88] But these stipulations, by which possession on our part, with corresponding responsibilities, was adjourned till after the exchange of ratifications, were simply according to the dictate of reason, in harmony with the requirement of our Constitution.

The case of Texas had two stages: first, under an unratified treaty; and, secondly, under a Joint Resolution of Congress. What was done under the latter had the concurrence of Congress and the President; so that the inchoate title of the United States was created by Act of Congress, in plain contradiction to the present case, where the title, whatever it may be, is under an unratified treaty, and is created by the President alone. Here is a manifest difference, not to be forgotten.

During the pendency of the treaty, there was an attempt by John Tyler, aided by his Secretary of State, John C. Calhoun, to commit the United States to the military support of Texas. It was nothing but an attempt. There was no belligerent intervention or act of war, but only what Benton calls an “assumpsit” by Calhoun. On this “assumpsit” the veteran Senator, in the memoirs of his Thirty Years in the Senate, breaks forth in these indignant terms:—

The indignant statesman, after exposing the unconstitutional charlatanry of the attempt, proceeds:—

Mr. Nelson, Secretary of State ad interim, wrote Mr. Murphy, our Minister in Texas, under date of March 11, 1844, that “the employment of the Army or Navy against a foreign power with which the United States are at peace is not within the competency of the President.”[91]

Again Benton says:—

In the face of this indignant judgment, already the undying voice of history, the “assumpsit” of John C. Calhoun will not be accepted as a proper example for a Republican President. But there is not a word of that powerful utterance by which this act is forever blasted that is not strictly applicable to the “assumpsit” in the case of Dominica. If an engagement to fight Mexico for Texas, while we were at peace with Mexico, was nothing less than war with Mexico, so the present engagement to fight Hayti for Dominica, while we are at peace with Hayti, is nothing less than war with Hayti. Nor is it any the less “a crime against God and man and our own Constitution” in the case of Hayti than in the case of Mexico. But the present case is stronger than that which aroused the fervid energies of Benton. The “assumpsit” here has been followed by belligerent intervention and acts of war.

President Polk, in his Annual Message of December, 1846, paid homage to the true principle, when he announced that “the moment the terms of annexation offered by the United States were accepted by Texas, the latter became so far a part of our own country as to make it our duty to afford protection and defence.”[93] And accordingly he directed those military and naval movements which ended in war with Mexico. But it will be observed here that these movements were conditioned on the acceptance by Texas of the terms of annexion definitively proposed by the United States, while our title had been created by Act of Congress, and not by the President alone.

Therefore, according to the precedents of our history, reinforced by reason and authority, does the “assumpsit” of the treaty fail. I forbear from characterizing it. My duty is performed, if I exhibit it to the Senate.

But this story of a violated Constitution is not yet complete. Even admitting some remote infinitesimal semblance of excuse or apology during the pendency of the treaty, all of which I insist is absurd beyond question, though not entirely impossible in a quarter unused to constitutional questions and heeding them little,—conceding that the “assumpsit” inserted in the treaty by the Secretary of State had deceived the President into the idea that he possessed the kingly prerogative of declaring war at his own mere motion,—and wishing to deal most gently even with an undoubted usurpation of the kingly prerogative, so long as the Secretary of State, sworn counsellor of the President, supplied the formula for the usurpation, (and you will bear witness that I have done nothing but state the case,)—it is hard to hold back, when the same usurpation is openly prolonged after the Senate had rejected the treaty on which the exercise of the kingly prerogative was founded, and when the “assumpsit” devised by the Secretary of State had passed into the limbo of things lost on earth. Here there is no remote infinitesimal semblance of excuse or apology,—nothing,—absolutely nothing. The usurpation pivots on nonentity,—always excepting the kingly will of the President, which constitutionally is a nonentity. The great artist of Bologna, in a much admired statue, sculptured Mercury as standing on a puff of air. The President has not even a puff of air to stand on.

Nor is there any question with regard to the facts. Saying nothing of the lapse of the treaty on the 29th March, 1870, being the expiration of the period for the exchange of ratifications, I refer to its formal rejection by the Senate, June 30, 1870, which was not unknown to the President. In the order of business the rejection was communicated to him, while it became at once matter of universal notoriety. Then, by way of further fixing the President with this notice, I refer to his own admission in the Annual Message of December last, when he announces that “during the last session of Congress a treaty for the annexation of the Republic of San Domingo to the United States failed to receive the requisite two-thirds of the Senate,” and then, after denouncing the rejection as “folly,” he proceeds as follows:—

Thus by the open declaration of the President was the treaty rejected, while six months after the rejection he asks for a Commission to negotiate a new treaty, and an appropriation to defray the expenses of the Commission; and not perceiving the inapplicability of the Texas precedent, he proposes to do the deed by Joint Resolution of Congress. And yet during this intermediate period, when there was no unratified treaty extant, the same belligerent intervention has been proceeding, the same war-ships have been girdling the island with their guns, and the same naval support has been continued to the usurper Baez,—all at great cost to the country and by the diversion of our naval forces from other places of duty, while the Constitution has been dismissed out of sight like a discharged soldier.

Already you have seen how this belligerent intervention proceeded after the rejection of the treaty; how on the 21st July, 1870, Commodore Green reported that “a withdrawal of the protection of the United States and of the prospect of annexation at some future time would instantly lead to a revolution headed by Cabral”; how on the 28th August, 1870, Lieutenant Commander Allen reported Baez as “requesting the presence of a vessel on the north side of the island on account of an intended invasion by Cabral”; how at the same time the usurper cries out that he “deems the presence of a ship-of-war in the Bay of Manzanillo of immediate importance”; how on the 3d September, 1870, Commander Irwin reported that Baez “feared an outbreak,” and appealed to the Commander to “bring him some of his men that were at Azua,” which the obliging Commander did; how under date of September 2, 1870, the usurper, after declaring the necessity of a man-of-war at the port of San Domingo, says that “none would be more convenient than the Yantic for the facility of entering the river Ozama, owing to her size”; and how again under date of October 8, 1870, the usurper writes still another letter “to reiterate the necessity of the vessels now in that bay [Samana] coming to these southern coasts.” All these things you have seen, attesting constantly our belligerent intervention and the maintenance of Baez in power by our Navy, which became his body-guard and omnipresent upholder, and all after the rejection of the treaty. I leave them to your judgment without one word of comment, reminding you only that no President is entitled to substitute his kingly will for the Constitution of our country.

In curious confirmation of the first conclusion from the official document, the letter of Captain Temple to Mr. Wade should not be forgotten. This letter has found its way into the papers, and if not genuine, it ought to be. It purports to be dated, Tennessee, Azua Bay, February 24, 1871. Here is the first paragraph:—

It will be seen that the gallant Captain does not hesitate to recognize the existing rights of Cabral under the Laws of War, and to warn against any journey by members of the Commission across the island to Hayti,—as, if taken by Cabral’s people, they could be hung to the nearest tree by sentence of drum-head court-martial, “according to all the rules of civilized warfare”; and the Captain gives the reason: “For they belong to a nation that, through the orders of its Executive to the naval vessels here, has chosen to take part in the internal conflicts of this country.” Here is belligerent intervention openly recognized by the gallant Captain, and without the authority of Congress. If the gallant Captain wrote the letter, he showed himself a master of International Law whom Senators might do well to follow. If he did not write it, the instructive jest will at least relieve the weariness of this discussion.

SUMMARY.

Mr. President, as I draw to a close, allow me to repeat the very deep regret with which I make this exposure. Most gladly would I avoid it. Controversy, especially at my time of life, has no attraction for me; but I have been reared in the school of duty, and now, as of old, I cannot see wrong without trying to arrest it. I plead now, as I have often pleaded before, for Justice and Peace.

In the evidence adduced I have confined myself carefully to public documents, not travelling out of the record. Dispatches, naval orders, naval reports,—these are the unimpeachable authorities. And all these have been officially communicated to the Senate, are now printed by its order, accessible to all. On this unanswerable and cumulative testimony, where each part confirms the rest, and the whole has the harmony of truth, I present this transgression. And here it is not I who speak, but the testimony.

Thus stands the case. International Law has been violated in two of its commanding rules, one securing the Equality of Nations, and the other providing against Belligerent Intervention,—while a distinctive fundamental principle of the Constitution, by which the President is deprived of a kingly prerogative, is disregarded, and this very kingly prerogative is asserted by the President. This is the simplest statement. Looking still further at the facts, we see that all this great disobedience has for its object the acquisition of an outlying tropical island, with large promise of wealth, and that in carrying out this scheme our Republic has forcibly maintained a usurper in power that he might sell his country, and has dealt a blow at the independence of the Black Republic of Hayti, which, besides being a wrong to that Republic, was an insult to the African race. And all this has been done by kingly prerogative alone, without the authority of an Act of Congress. If such a transaction, many-headed in wrong, can escape judgment, it is difficult to see what securities remain. What other sacred rule of International Law may not be violated? What other foreign nation may not be struck at? What other belligerent menace may not be hurled? What other kingly prerogative may not be seized?

On another occasion I showed how these wrongful proceedings had been sustained by the President beyond all example, but in a corresponding spirit. Never before has there been such Presidential intervention in the Senate as we have been constrained to witness. Presidential visits to the Capitol, with appeals to Senators, have been followed by assemblies at the Executive Mansion, also with appeals to Senators; and who can measure the pressure of all kinds by himself or agents, especially through the appointing power, all to secure the consummation of this scheme? In harmony with this effort was the Presidential Message, where, while charging the Senate with “folly” in rejecting the treaty, we are gravely assured that by the proposed acquisition “our large debt abroad is ultimately to be extinguished,”—thus making San Domingo the pack-horse of our vast load.

Then, responding to the belligerent menace of his Admiral, the President makes a kindred menace by proposing nothing less than the acquisition of “the island of San Domingo,” thus adding the Black Republic to his scheme. The innocent population there were startled. Their Minister here protested. Nor is it unnatural that it should be so. Suppose the Queen of England, in her speech at the opening of Parliament, had proposed in formal terms the acquisition of the United States; or suppose Louis Napoleon, in his speech at the opening of the Chambers, during the Mexican War, while the French forces were in Mexico, had coolly proposed the acquisition of that portion of the United States adjoining Mexico and stretching to the Atlantic, and, in support of his proposition, had set forth the productiveness of the soil, the natural wealth that abounded there, and wound up by announcing that out of this might be paid the French debt abroad, which was to be saddled upon the coveted territory. Suppose such a proposition by Louis Napoleon or by the English Queen, made in formal speech to Chambers or Parliament, what would have been the feeling in our country? Nor would that feeling have been diminished by the excuse that the offensive proposition crept into the speech by accident. Whether by accident or design, it would attest small consideration for our national existence. But the Haytians love their country as we love ours; especially are they resolute for national independence. All this is shown by the reports which reach us now, even if their whole history did not attest it.

The language of the President in charging the Senate with “folly” was not according to approved precedents. Clearly this is not a proper term to be employed by one branch of the Government with regard to another, least of all by the President with regard to the Senate. Folly, Sir! Was it folly, when the Senate refused to sanction proceedings by which the Equal Rights of the Black Republic were assailed? Was it folly, not to sanction hostilities against the Black Republic without the authority of Congress? Was it folly, not to sanction belligerent intervention in a foreign country without the authority of Congress? Was it folly, not to sanction a usurpation of the War Powers under the Constitution? According to the President, all this was folly in the Senate. Let the country judge.

Thus do we discern, whether on the coasts of San Domingo or here at Washington, the same determination, with the same disregard of great principles, as also the same recklessness toward the people of Hayti, who have never injured us.

PRESENT DUTY.

In view of these things, the first subject of inquiry is not soil, climate, productiveness, and possibilities of wealth, but the exceptional and abnormal proceedings of our own Government. This inquiry is essentially preliminary in character. Before considering the treaty or any question of acquisition, we must at least put ourselves right as a nation; nor do I see how this can be done without retracing our steps, and consenting to act in subordination to International Law and the Constitution of the United States.

Beside the essential equity of such submission, and the moral dignity it would confer upon the Republic, which rises when it stoops to Law, there are two other reasons of irresistible force at this moment. I need not remind you that the Senate is now occupied in considering how to suppress lawlessness within our own borders and to save the African race from outrage. Surely our efforts at home must be weakened by the drama we are now playing abroad. Pray, Sir, with what face can we insist upon obedience to Law and respect for the African race, while we are openly engaged in lawlessness on the coasts of San Domingo and outrage upon the African race represented by the Black Republic? How can we expect to put down the Ku-Klux at the South, when we set in motion another proceeding kindred in constant insubordination to Law and Constitution? Differing in object, the two are identical in this insubordination. One strikes at national life and the other at individual life, while both strike at the African race. One molests a people, the other a community. Lawlessness is the common element. But it is difficult to see how we can condemn, with proper, whole-hearted reprobation, our own domestic Ku-Klux, with its fearful outrages, while the President puts himself at the head of a powerful and costly proceeding operating abroad in defiance of International Law and the Constitution of the United States. These are questions which I ask with sorrow, and only in obedience to that truth which is the requirement of this debate. Nor should I do otherwise than fail in justice to the occasion, if I did not declare my unhesitating conviction, that, had the President been so inspired as to bestow upon the protection of Southern Unionists, white and black, one half, nay, Sir, one quarter, of the time, money, zeal, will, personal attention, personal effort, and personal intercession, which he has bestowed on his attempt to obtain half an island in the Caribbean Sea, our Southern Ku-Klux would have existed in name only, while tranquillity reigned everywhere within our borders. [Applause in the galleries.]

Mr. Sumner. Another reason for retracing the false steps already taken will be found in our duty to the African race, of whom there are four millions within our borders, recognized as equal before the Law. To these new-found fellow-citizens, once degraded and trampled down, are we bound by every sentiment of justice; nor can we see their race dishonored anywhere through our misconduct. How vain are professions in their behalf, if we set the example of outrage! How vain to expect their sympathy and coöperation in the support of the National Government, if the President, by his own mere will, and in the plenitude of kingly prerogative, can strike at the independence of the Black Republic, and degrade it in the Family of Nations! All this is a thousand times wrong. It is a thousand times impolitic also; for it teaches the African race that they are only victims for sacrifice.

Now, Sir, as I desire the suppression of the Ku-Klux wherever it shows itself, and as I seek the elevation of the African race, I insist that the Presidential scheme, which instals a new form of lawlessness on the coasts of San Domingo, and which at the same time insults the African race represented in the Black Republic, shall be arrested. I speak now against that lawlessness on the coasts of San Domingo, of which the President is the head; and I speak also for the African race, which the President has trampled down. Is there any Senator in earnest against the Ku-Klux? Let him arrest the present lawlessness on the coasts of San Domingo. Is there any Senator ready at all times to seek the elevation of the African race? Here is the occasion for his best efforts.

On the question of acquisition I say nothing to-day, only alluding to certain points involved. Sometimes it is insisted that emigrants will hurry in large numbers to this tropical island when once annexed, and thus swell its means; but this allegation forgets, that, according to the testimony of History, peaceful emigration travels with the sun on parallels of latitude, and not on meridians of longitude, mainly following the isothermal line, and not turning off at right-angles, whether North or South. Sometimes it is insisted that it will be better for the people of this island, if annexed to our Republic; but this allegation forgets the transcendent question, Whether it is better for them, better for the African race, better for Civilization, that the Black Republic should be absorbed out of sight, instead of being fostered into a successful example of self-government for the redemption of the race, not only on the Caribbean islands, but on the continent of Africa? Then, again, arises that other question, Whether we will assume the bloody hazards involved in this business, as it has been pursued, with the alternative of expenditures for war-ships and troops, causing most painful anxieties, while the land of Toussaint L’Ouverture listens to the constant whisper of Independence? And there is still that other question of debts and obligations, acknowledged and unacknowledged, with an immense claim by Hayti and an unsettled boundary, which I have already called a bloody lawsuit.

Over all is that other question, Whether we will begin a system, which, first fastening upon Dominica, must, according to the admission of the plenipotentiary Fabens made to myself, next take Hayti, and then in succession the whole tropical group of the Caribbean Sea,—so that we are now to determine if all the islands of the West Indies shall be a component part of our Republic, helping to govern us, while the African race is dispossessed of its natural home in this hemisphere. No question equal in magnitude, unless it be that of Slavery, has arisen since the days of Washington.

These questions I state only. Meanwhile to my mind there is something better than belligerent intervention and acts of war with the menace of absorption at untold cost of treasure. It is a sincere and humane effort on our part, in the spirit of peace, to reconcile Hayti and Dominica, and to establish tranquillity throughout the island. Let this be attempted, and our Republic will become an example worthy of its name and of the civilization which it represents, while Republican Institutions have new glory. The blessings of good men will attend such an effort; nor can the smile of Heaven be wanting.

And may we not justly expect the President to unite in such a measure of peace and good-will? He that ruleth his spirit is greater than he that taketh a city; and so the President, ruling his spirit in subjection to the humane principles of International Law and the Constitution of his country, will be greater than if he had taken all the islands of the sea.

PERSONAL RELATIONS WITH THE PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY OF STATE.
AN EXPLANATION IN REPLY TO AN ASSAULT.

TO THE READER.

NOTE.

STATEMENT.

While I was under trial before the Senate, on articles of impeachment presented by the Senator from Wisconsin, [Mr. Howe,] I forbore taking any part in the debate, even in reply to allegations, asserted to be of decisive importance, touching my relations with the President and Secretary of State. All this was trivial enough; but numerous appeals to me from opposite parts of the country show that good people have been diverted by these allegations from the question of principle involved. Without intending in any way to revive the heats of that debate, I am induced to make a plain statement of facts, so that the precise character of those relations shall be known. I do this with unspeakable reluctance, but in the discharge of a public duty where the claims of patriotism are above even those of self-defence. The Senate and the country have an interest in knowing the truth of this matter, and so also has the Republican party, which cannot be indifferent to pretensions in its name; nor will anything but the completest frankness be proper for the occasion.

In overcoming this reluctance I am aided by Senators who are determined to make me speak. The Senator from Wisconsin, [Mr. Howe,] who appears as prosecuting officer, after alleging these personal relations as the gravamen of accusation against me,—making the issue pointedly on this floor, and actually challenging reply,—not content with the opportunity of this Chamber, hurried to the public press, where he repeated the accusation, and now circulates it, as I am told, under his frank, crediting it in formal terms to the liberal paper in which it appeared, but without allusion to the editorial refutation which accompanied it. On still another occasion, appearing still as prosecuting officer, the same Senator volunteered, out of his own invention, to denounce me as leaving the Republican party,—and this he did, with infinite personality of language and manner, in the very face of my speech to which he was replying, where, in positive words, I declare that I speak “for the sake of the Republican party,” which I hope to save from responsibility for wrongful acts, and then, in other words making the whole assumption of the Senator an impossibility, I announce, that in speaking for the Republican party it is “because from the beginning I have been the faithful servant of that party and aspire to see it strong and triumphant.”[95] In the face of this declared aspiration, in harmony with my whole life, the Senator delivered his attack, and, assuming to be nothing less than Pope, launched against me his bull of excommunication. Then, again playing Pope, he took back his thunder, with the apology that others thought so, and this alleged understanding of others he did not hesitate to set above my positive and contemporaneous language that I aspired to see the Republican party strong and triumphant. Then came the Senator from Ohio, [Mr. Sherman,] who, taking up his vacation pen, added to the articles of impeachment by a supplementary allegation, adopted by the Senator under a misapprehension of facts. Here was another challenge. During all this time I have been silent. Senators have spoken, and then rushed into print; but I have said nothing. They have had their own way with regard to me. It is they who leave me no alternative.

It is alleged that I have no personal relations with the President. Here the answer is easy. I have precisely the relations which he has chosen. On reaching Washington in December last, I was assured from various quarters that the White House was angry with me; and soon afterward the public journals reported the President as saying to a Senator, that, if he were not President, he “would call me to account.” What he meant I never understood, nor would I attribute to him more than he meant; but that he used the language reported I have no doubt, from information independent of the newspapers. I repeat that on this point I have no doubt. The same newspapers reported, also, that a member of the President’s household, enjoying his peculiar confidence, taking great part in the San Domingo scheme, had menaced me with personal violence. I could not believe the story, except on positive, unequivocal testimony. That the menace was made on the condition of his not being an Army officer I do not doubt. The member of the household, when interrogated by my excellent colleague, [Mr. Wilson,] positively denied the menace; but I am assured, on authority above question, that he has since acknowledged it, while the President still retains him in service, and sends him to this Chamber.

During this last session, I have opposed the Presidential policy on an important question,—but always without one word touching motives, or one suggestion of corruption on his part, although I never doubted that there were actors in the business who could claim no such immunity. It now appears that Fabens, who came here as plenipotentiary to press the scheme, has concessions to such amount that the diplomatist is lost in the speculator. I always insisted that the President was no party to any such transaction. I should do injustice to my own feelings, if I did not here declare my regret that I could not agree with the President. I tried to think as he did, but I could not. I listened to the arguments on his side, but in vain. The adverse considerations multiplied with time and reflection. To those who know the motives of my life it is superfluous for me to add that I sought simply the good of my country and Humanity, including especially the good of the African race, to which our country owes so much.

Already there was anger at the White House when the scheme to buy and annex half an island in the Caribbean Sea was pressed upon the Senate in legislative session under the guise of appointing a Commission, and it became my duty to expose it. Here I was constrained to show how, at very large expense, the usurper Baez was maintained in power by the Navy of the United States to enable him to sell his country, while at the same time the independence of the Black Republic was menaced,—all of which was in violation of International Law, and of the Constitution of the United States, which reserves to Congress the power “to declare war.” What I said was in open debate, where the record will speak for me. I hand it over to the most careful scrutiny, knowing that the President can take no just exception to it, unless he insists upon limiting proper debate, and boldly denies the right of a Senator to express himself freely on great acts of wrong. Nor will any Republican Senator admit that the President can impose his own sole will upon the Republican party. Our party is in itself a Republic with universal suffrage, and until a measure is adopted by the party no Republican President can make it a party test.

Much as I am pained in making this statement with regard to the President, infinitely more painful to me is what I must present with regard to the Secretary of State. Here again I remark that I am driven to this explanation. His strange and unnatural conduct toward me, and his prompting of Senators, who, one after another, have set up my alleged relations with him as ground of complaint, make it necessary for me to proceed.

We were sworn as Senators on the same day, as far back as 1851, and from that distant time were friends until the San Domingo business intervened. Nothing could exceed our kindly relations in the past. On the evening of the inauguration of General Grant as President, he was at my house with Mr. Motley in friendly communion, and all uniting in aspirations for the new Administration. Little did Mr. Motley or myself imagine in that social hour that one of our little circle was so soon to turn upon us both.

Shortly afterward Mr. Fish became Secretary of State, and began his responsible duties by appealing to me for help. I need not say that I had pleasure in responding to his call, and that I did what I could most sincerely and conscientiously to aid him. Of much, from his arrival down to his alienation on the San Domingo business, I possess the written record. For some time he showed a sympathy with the scheme almost as little as my own. But as the President grew in earnestness the Secretary yielded, until tardily he became its attorney. Repeatedly he came to my house, pleading for the scheme. Again and again he urged it, sometimes at my house and sometimes at his own. I was astonished that he could do so, and expressed my astonishment with the frankness of old friendship. For apology he announced that he was the President’s friend, and took office as such. “But,” said I, “you should resign rather than do this thing.” This I could not refrain from remarking, on discovery, from dispatches in the State Department, that the usurper Baez was maintained in power by our Navy. This plain act of wrong required instant redress; but the Secretary astonished me again by his insensibility to my appeal for justice. He maintained the President, as the President maintained Baez. I confess that I was troubled.

At last, some time in June, 1870, a few weeks before the San Domingo treaty was finally rejected by the Senate, the Secretary came to my house about nine o’clock in the evening and remained till after the clock struck midnight, the whole protracted visit being occupied in earnest and reiterated appeal that I should cease my opposition to the Presidential scheme; and here he urged that the election which made General Grant President had been carried by him, and not by the Republican party, so that his desires were entitled to especial attention. In his pressure on me he complained that I had opposed other projects of the President. In reply to my inquiry, he named the repeal of the Tenure-of-Office Act, and the nomination of Mr. Jones as Minister to Brussels, both of which the President had much at heart, and he concluded with the San Domingo treaty. I assured the Secretary firmly and simply, that, seeing the latter as I did with all its surroundings, my duty was plain, and that I must continue to oppose it so long as it appeared to me wrong. He was not satisfied, and renewed his pressure in various forms, returning to the point again and again with persevering assiduity that would not be arrested, when at last, finding me inflexible, he changed his appeal, saying, “Why not go to London? I offer you the English mission. It is yours.” Of his authority from the President I know nothing. I speak only of what he said. My astonishment was heightened by indignation at this too palpable attempt to take me from my post of duty; but I suppressed the feeling which rose to the lips, and, reflecting that he was an old friend and in my own house, answered gently, “We have a Minister there who cannot be bettered.” Thus already did the mission to London begin to pivot on San Domingo.

I make this revelation only because it is important to a correct understanding of the case, and because the conversation from beginning to end was official in character, relating exclusively to public business, without suggestion or allusion of a personal nature, and absolutely without the slightest word on my part leading in the most remote degree to any such overture, which was unexpected as undesired. The offer of the Secretary was in no respect a compliment or kindness, but in the strict line of his endeavor to silence my opposition to the San Domingo scheme, as is too apparent from the facts, while it was plain, positive, and unequivocal, making its object and import beyond question. Had it been merely an inquiry, it were bad enough, under the circumstances; but it was direct and complete, as by a plenipotentiary.

Shortly afterward, being the day immediately following the rejection of the San Domingo treaty, Mr. Motley was summarily removed,—according to present pretence, for an offending not only trivial and formal, but condoned by time, being a year old: very much as Sir Walter Raleigh, after being released from the Tower to conduct a distant expedition as admiral of the fleet, was at his return beheaded on a judgment of fifteen years’ standing. The Secretary, in conversation and in correspondence with me, undertook to explain the removal, insisting for a long time that he was “the friend of Mr. Motley”; but he always made the matter worse, while the heats of San Domingo entered into the discussion.

At last, in January, 1871, a formal paper justifying the removal and signed by the Secretary was laid before the Senate.[96] Glancing at this document, I found, to my surprise, that its most salient characteristic was constant vindictiveness toward Mr. Motley, with effort to wound his feelings; and this was signed by one who had sat with him at my house in friendly communion and common aspiration on the evening of the inauguration of General Grant, and had so often insisted that he was “the friend of Mr. Motley,”—while, as if it was not enough to insult one Massachusetts citizen in the public service, the same document, after a succession of flings and sneers, makes a kindred assault on me; and this is signed by one who so constantly called me “friend,” and asked me for help. The Senator from Missouri [Mr. Schurz] has already directed attention to this assault, and has expressed his judgment upon it,—confessing that he “should not have failed to feel the insult,” and then exclaiming, with just indignation, “When such things are launched against any member of this body, it becomes the American Senate to stand by him, and not to attempt to disgrace and to degrade him because he shows the sensitiveness of a gentleman.”[97] It is easy to see how this Senator regarded the conduct of the Secretary. Nor is its true character open to doubt, especially when we consider the context, and how this full-blown personality naturally flowered out of the whole document.

Mr. Motley, in his valedictory to the State Department, had alluded to the rumor that he was removed on account of my opposition to the San Domingo treaty. The document signed by the Secretary, while mingling most offensive terms with regard to his “friend” in London, thus turns upon his “friend” in Washington:—