“It is the doctrine of irresponsibility which the Cabinet of Stockholm professes with regard to the sale of these war vessels, which excites the most lively representations on the part of the undersigned.”—Note of 15 July 1825: Ibid., p. 480.
Mark the words, “the doctrine of irresponsibility.” Then, again, the minister says in other words worthy of consideration at this moment:—
“The Swedish Government on this occasion, creating this new kind of commerce, determined to furnish ships of war indiscriminately to every purchaser, even to private individuals without guaranty,—establishing, as it seems to indicate, that the commercial benefits of these sales are for the State a necessity of an order superior to political considerations the most elevated, as to moral obligations the most respectable.”—Note of 9 September, 1825: Ibid., p. 486.
I ask if these words are not applicable to the present case? Did it not become the Government of the United States at this time, when making these large sales, almost gigantic, so that its suspicion was necessarily aroused, to institute inquiry into the real character of the purchaser? Was it not put on its guard? Every morning told us of war unhappily raging in Europe. Could there be doubt that these large purchases were for the benefit of one of the belligerents? Was our Government so situated that for the sake of these profits it would neglect political considerations called in this dispatch the most elevated, as moral obligations the most respectable? Was it ready to assume the responsibility characterized by the Spanish minister in a case less plain, as “an act of hostility,” a “violation of the rights of sovereignty,” a “political scandal”?
PARLIAMENTARY LAW ON THE APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL COMMITTEES OF THE SENATE.
Two Protests against the Competency of the Senate Committee to Investigate the Sale of Arms to France; March 26 and 27, 1872.
March 26, 1872, Mr. Sumner appeared before the Committee to investigate the sale of arms by the United States during the French and German War, in response to a communication signed by the chairman of the Committee requesting his attendance. After reading this communication, Mr. Sumner proceeded to read and file a protest in the following terms:—
PROTEST.
Personally, I object to no examination. Willingly would I submit to the most searching scrutiny, not only in the present case, but in all my public life. There is not an act, letter, or conversation at any time, that I would save from investigation. I make this statement, because I would not have the protest I deem it my duty to offer open to suspicion that there is anything I desire to conceal or any examination I would avoid.
But appearing before the Committee on an invitation which is in the nature of a summons, to testify in the investigation originally moved by me into the sale of arms to France, I am obliged to consider my duty as a Senator. Personal inclinations, whatever they may be, cannot be my guide. I must do what belongs to a Senator under the circumstances of the case.
Before answering any questions, I am constrained to consider the competency of the Committee which has summoned me. It is of less importance what these questions may be, although there are certain obvious limitations, to which I will allude at the outset.
The examination of a Senator by a Committee of the Senate on a matter outside of the Senate, and not connected with his public duties, is sustained by precedents,—as when Mr. Seward and Mr. Wilson were examined with reference to the expedition of John Brown;[25] but any examination with regard to his public conduct, and especially with regard to a matter which he has felt it his duty to lay before the Senate in the discharge of his public duties, is of very doubtful propriety. In his public conduct a Senator acts on his responsibility, under sanction of an oath, and the Constitution declares that “for any speech or debate” he “shall not be questioned in any other place.” This inhibition, while not preventing questions of a certain character, must limit the inquiry; but the law steps forward with its own requirements, according to which it is plain that a Senator cannot be interrogated, first, with regard to his conference with other Senators on public business, and, secondly, with regard to witnesses who have confidentially communicated with him.
Referring to the most approved work on the Law of Evidence,—I mean that of Professor Greenleaf,—we find under the head of “Evidence excluded from Public Policy”[26] at least four different classes of cases, which may enlighten us in determining the questions proper for Senators.
1. Communications between a lawyer and client. And are not the relations of Senators, in the discharge of their public duties, equally sacred?
2. Judges and arbitrators enjoy a similar exemption with regard to matters before them.
3. Grand jurors, embracing even the clerk and prosecuting officer, cannot be examined on matters before them.
4. Transactions between the heads of Departments and their subordinate officers are treated as confidential.
Plainly, the conferences of a Senator, in the discharge of his public duties, cannot be less protected.
This rule is equally imperative with regard to witnesses who have confidentially communicated with a Senator. Here again I quote Professor Greenleaf, who quotes the eminent English judge of the close of the last century, Lord Chief-Justice Eyre, as follows:—
“There is a rule which has universally obtained on account of its importance to the public for the detection of crimes, that those persons who are the channel by means of which that detection is made should not be unnecessarily disclosed.”[27]
Then the learned professor proceeds:—
“All were of opinion that all those questions which tend to the discovery of the channels by which the disclosure was made to the officers of justice were, upon the general principles of the convenience of public justice, to be suppressed; that all persons in that situation were protected from the discovery.”[28]
These words are explicit, and nobody can question them.
I am led to make these remarks and adduce these authorities because, perusing the testimony of Mr. Schurz, I find that he was interrogated on these very matters; and since I, too, am summoned as a witness, I desire to put on record my sense of the impropriety of such questions. It is important that they should not become a precedent. And here again I declare that I have nothing to conceal, nothing that I would not willingly give to the world under any examination and cross-examination; but I am unwilling to aid in the overthrow of a rule of law which stands on unquestionable grounds of public policy. Especially is it important in the Senate, where, without such protection, a tyrannical majority might deter a minority from originating unwelcome inquiries.
From these preliminaries I proceed to consider the competency of the present Committee. Requested as a Senator to appear before you, I deem it my duty to protest against the formation and constitution of the Committee as contrary to unquestionable requirements of Parliamentary Law; and I ask the Committee to receive this protest as my answer to their letter of invitation. I make this more readily because in my speech in the Senate, February 28, 1872, entitled “Reform and Purity in Government, Neutral Duties, Sale of Arms to Belligerent France,”[29] I have set forth what moved me to the inquiry, being grounds of suspicion, which, in my judgment, rendered the most searching inquiry by a committee friendly to inquiry absolutely necessary.
The general parliamentary rule in the appointment of special committees requires that they should be organized so as to promote the business or inquiry for which the committee is created. This requirement is according to obvious reason, and is sustained by parliamentary authorities. In familiar language, a proposition is committed to its friends and not to its enemies.
In illustration of this rule, we are told that members who have spoken directly against what is called “the body of the bill,” meaning, of course, the substance of the inquiry, are not expected to serve on the committee, but, should they be so nominated, to decline. Their presence on a committee is not unlike participation in a trial by a judge or juror interested in the result.
Very little reflection shows how natural is this rule as an instrument of justice. The friends of a measure, or the promoters of an inquiry, though in the majority on a committee, can do no more than adduce evidence that exists, so that the business cannot suffer through them,—while those unfriendly to a measure, or hostile to an inquiry, may, from lukewarmness, or neglect, or possible prejudice, fail to present the proper evidence or recognize its just value, so that the business will suffer. In legislation, plainly, those who believe an inquiry necessary are the most proper persons to conduct it, and being so, they are selected by Parliamentary Law.
This rule may be traced in the history of Parliament anterior to the settlement of our country. The ancient statement was simply that “those against the bill should not be on the committee.” The meaning of the rule is distinctly seen in historic cases, which I proceed to adduce.
In the House of Commons, as far back as November 7, 1601, in the reign of Queen Elizabeth, on the commitment of a bill relating to misdemeanors, the entry in the Journal mentions that it was delivered to a certain member, and then says, “and Mr. Serjeant Harris to be exempted out of the Committee, because he spake against the body of the Bill,” according to the ancient order in Parliament.[30] In other words, a speech against a measure disqualified the learned member, so that, according to the expressive words, he was “exempted out of the Committee.”
Again, in the case of the commitment of a bill affecting the city of London, which came up November 11, 1601, on the question whether the members for London, known to be against the bill, could be of the Committee, the rule of the House was stated in these positive words: “That those against the Bill should be no Committees.” Of course, this rule was not merely of form, but of substance. It meant that those really against the measure were not proper for the Committee, all of which appeared in the recorded debate and proceedings that ensued. A leading member, Mr. Wiseman, said:—
“The House allowing of this Bill to be committed are, in my opinion, to disallow any that will be against the Body of the Bill for being Committees.”
Sir Edward Hobby followed:—
“And for my own opinion, I think that he that is against the Body of the Bill can be no Committee.”
The report then proceeds:—
“Then the Speaker stood up and said, ‘… All that will have a man that hath been against the Body of the Bill to be a Committee, let them show their opinions by saying Yea.’ And not one said Yea. ‘All that will not, say No.’ And all said No.”
I take this important precedent from Townshend’s “Historical Collections: or, An Exact Account of the Proceedings of the Four Last Parliaments of Q. Elizabeth,” pp. 208, 209. The same account is found also in D’Ewes’s “Journals of all the Parliaments during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth,” pp. 634-35.
Thus, on submission of the question by the Speaker, the House unanimously decided that they would “not have a man that hath been against the Body of the Bill to be a Committee.” According to the report, “All said No”; and that unanimous “No” is the voice of Parliamentary Law, repeated ever since. The phrase “against the Body of the Bill” is strong and suggestive, showing the purpose to exclude those who were unfriendly to the measure.
Following the history of the rule, we meet it again, as stated by Hakewel in his “Modus tenendi Parliamentum,” published in 1671:—
“He that speaketh directly against the body of the bill may not be named a committee; for he that would totally destroy will not amend.”[31]
Here again is the declared purpose to save the measure from the hands of enemies.
Then follows a case remarkable for words which have become familiar in Parliamentary Law. It was that of Colonel Birch, who, February 11, 1677, brought into Parliament a Bill for Settling a Public Register for Lands in the several Counties, and in his remarks said:—
“I begged you formerly not to put the child to a nurse that cared not for it. For it was formerly committed to two lawyers, and the thing was lost.”[32]
Here the commitment of a bill for reform in law to “two lawyers” was condemned, because they were a nurse that did not care for it; and the casual remark of the author of the bill has become historical. There is good law as well as sense in his saying, that a child is not put to a nurse that cares not for it. Parliamentary Law, in the creation of special committees, always seeks those who care for the business, whatever it may be. One against an inquiry, or believing that there is no occasion for it, is repudiated by this rule, so just and benign, and also so venerable with years.
The preparation of articles of impeachment against the Earl of Danby, Lord High Treasurer in the reign of Charles the Second, December 21, 1678, presented the same rule in another aspect. It was no longer a bill, but an inquiry or investigation, when the Speaker said:—
“No man, by the ancient rules of the House, is to be of a committee of a thing he is against.”[33]
Here the language is somewhat broadened, though in entire keeping with the other cases. A man cannot be on a committee “of a thing he is against.” In other words, if he is against the inquiry for which a committee is created, he cannot be on it. And here again good faith requires that the rule should be observed not merely in form, but in substance.
These cases were analyzed and adopted by Mr. Jefferson in his authoritative “Manual”; so that they have become American Parliamentary Law, as obligatory here as in England. Speaking always by their essential reason, but with the weight of precedent also, they are not less binding than if promulgated with an enacting clause.
Mr. Jefferson furnishes other and most important words of his own:—
“And when any member who is against the bill hears himself named of its committee, he ought to ask to be excused.”[34]
This is the language of our Manual, declaring the duty of a member who hears himself named of a committee on a bill he is against. Of course the general rule is applicable to any other matter referred to a committee. The words are, “he ought to ask to be excused.” Of course his continuance on the committee, or any attempt to exercise its duties, is a violation of Parliamentary Law, unless you are ready to discard this positive injunction.
Mr. Jefferson then adds, by way of illustration:—
“Thus, March 7, 1606, Mr. Hadley was, on the question being put, excused from being of a committee, declaring himself to be against the matter itself.”[35]
And our great authority declares that this is “a constant rule.”[36]
Such is Parliamentary Law; and Mr. Jefferson has answered in advance the possible objection, that this is English and not American. After saying, in his preface to the “Manual,” that the Senate has given to these rules “the sanction of their approbation,” he announces “the law of proceedings in the Senate as composed of the precepts of the Constitution, the regulations of the Senate, and, where these are silent, of the rules of Parliament.” Such, according to him, is the law of our proceedings. The “Manual” which he presents he hopes others may fill up, “till a code of rules shall be formed for the use of the Senate, the effects of which may be accuracy in business, economy of time, order, uniformity, and impartiality.” The last word is “impartiality,” which, doubtless, is a main object to be secured.
Any one disposed to neglect these rules will find a warning from Mr. Jefferson. In his opening chapter he quotes these words from the famous Speaker Onslow:—
“That these forms, as instituted by our ancestors, operated as a check and control on the actions of the majority, and that they were in many instances a shelter and protection to the minority against the attempts of power.”
Mr. Jefferson follows this quotation by declaring “the forms and rules of proceeding” to be “the only weapons by which the minority can defend themselves,” and by which “the weaker party can be protected from those irregularities and abuses which these forms were intended to check, and which the wantonness of power is but too often apt to suggest to large and successful majorities.”
Thus is the parliamentary rule which forbids a person unfriendly to the business of the committee, whatever it may be, whether bill or inquiry, from serving on the committee, one of those inhibitions by which public business is promoted, by which impartiality is secured, and especially by which a minority is shielded against the wantonness of power.
“The Congressional Globe” makes it easy to apply what has been said to several of this Committee. Unless the law, as illustrated by ancient cases, and adopted by Mr. Jefferson, is entirely neglected, unless the rule so frequently enunciated is set at defiance or treated as a sham, there are at least three serving on the Committee in violation of Parliamentary Law. In undertaking to serve, they were undoubtedly oblivious of the time-honored requirement, or did not appreciate its stringency.
Not only every Senator, but the whole country has an immeasurable interest in the preservation of those rules by which what Mr. Jefferson justly calls “the wantonness of power” is restrained, and minorities are protected against majorities. Any shock to them, as in the present case, becomes a precedent by which liberty and justice suffer. As a Senator appearing before this Committee at their request, I deem it my duty to file this Protest, in the sincere hope, that, whatever may be the result of the present inquiry, the open violation of Parliamentary Law in the formation and constitution of the Committee will not be permitted to become a precedent hereafter. When law is sacrificed, individuals may for a moment seem to triumph, but it is at the cost of a great safeguard for the good of all.
Charles Sumner.
Senate Chamber, March 26, 1872.
On motion of Mr. Carpenter, of the Committee, it was ordered that a subpœna in regular form be issued to Mr. Sumner, returnable the next day, to be served by the Sergeant-at-Arms; which was duly issued and served.
March 27th, Mr. Sumner appeared, and, after the reading of the subpœna, proceeded to read a second Protest.
SECOND PROTEST.
Since reading and filing my Protest yesterday, I have received by the hands of the Sergeant-at-Arms a subpœna commanding me to appear before this Committee. In answer to this subpœna, I now appear.
It is my duty to declare that my judgment as originally set forth in my Protest is in no respect altered by this subpœna. I do not think the Committee more competent to-day than yesterday. I still find several occupying seats on the Committee in violation of an unquestionable rule of Parliamentary Law. The record shows that they signalized themselves in the Senate by open speech against the pending inquiry and those who brought it forward, or, according to the language of the old rule, “against the thing,” and therefore disqualified themselves as much as a judge who has been counsel in a case, or a juror who has declared his opinion beforehand. This disqualification is not founded on argument or inference, but on peremptory rule, traced back many generations, illustrated by numerous authorities, and constituting part of what Mr. Jefferson calls the “code” for the government of the Senate, having, as he says, “the sanction of their approbation.”
Besides the authorities which I cited yesterday, there are two others from our own country, which I deem it my duty to adduce. The first is that of Cushing’s “Lex Parliamentaria Americana” or “The Law and Practice of Legislative Assemblies in the United States.” Here we learn how completely a committee is placed by Parliamentary Law in the hands of the mover, thus:—
“It became the established practice for the member upon whose motion a committee had been ordered, to move the names of the members to compose it,—being, of course, of his own selection: his own name being among them, and perhaps the first named on the list. If he felt any delicacy in moving his own name, the motion might be made by some friend: as on the occasion of the appointment of the committee to prepare articles of impeachment against Lord Melville, which had been ordered on the motion of Mr. Whitbread, that gentleman was first appointed one of the committee on the motion of Lord Temple, and then on the motion of Mr. Whitbread the other members of the committee (Lord Temple being one) were appointed.”[37]
As this was a case of investigation, it is a precedent for us now. But our Committee was constituted in a very different manner. Mr. Cushing vindicates the practice of allowing the mover of a proposition himself to nominate the committee for the consideration of the House, saying:—
“That the House, by adopting the resolution for the committee, has signified its willingness that the subject should be so considered or investigated; that the member nominating the committee must be supposed to feel as strong an interest in the proper consideration of the subject as any one, and also to possess or to be willing to obtain the knowledge necessary to enable him to decide upon the qualifications of the members he selects.”[38]
In this vindication the careful and elaborate author shows how completely the early rule is recognized. The same learned authority, while stating the English and American Parliamentary Law, shows how the examination is conducted:—
“When an inquiry is instituted and an examination of witnesses undertaken by the House in its inquisitorial capacity, it is customary for the member on whose motion or suggestion the inquiry has been engaged in, or for some of the members voting with him for the inquiry, to take the lead in the examination of the witnesses, … or, in other words, to examine the witnesses in chief.”[39]
Plainly, according to this usage, Mr. Schurz, and not Mr. Hamlin, should take the lead and examine the witnesses in chief.
The other parliamentary authority to which I refer is Hon. R. M. T. Hunter, former Speaker of the House of Representatives. In his valedictory speech, March 3, 1841, this gentleman, who brought thought and study to the discharge of his public duties, took occasion to explain the principles governing the formation of committees, and all must admit that he did it with a clearness and philosophy not surpassed in parliamentary history. According to him, those having the affirmative of a proposition should have the direction of the committee. Speaking generally, he says:—
“The party upon which it naturally devolves to propose a question ought to have the power, it would seem, to present its proposition in the shape for which it is willing to be responsible; and as the different parties hold the affirmative according to the nature of the question, so ought the constitution of the committees to be varied.”
Then, in language precisely applicable to the present case, the Speaker says:—
“In committees of investigation it is equally clear that the opposition, who hold the affirmative, should have the majority and the power.”[40]
This instructive statement is in admirable harmony with the rule, as declared in early times, that those “against the thing” cannot go on the committee,—and that a measure, like a child, is not put to a nurse that cares not for it. The old Parliamentarians were less philosophical than the American Speaker, but each meant the same thing. The prime object is opportunity and fair play for those bringing forward a proposition, or holding the affirmative. A committee organized to sustain the negative is the very committee described as a nurse that cares not for the child, and therefore is a committee not tolerated by Parliamentary Law.
Thus from all quarters—beginning with the distant in time, embracing Jefferson, the father of American Parliamentary Law, Cushing, its most authoritative American expounder, and not forgetting an American Speaker—proceeds concurring testimony to the parliamentary rule requiring an inquiry to be placed in the hands of its friends; especially is it necessary that the chairman, who directs the inquiry and examines the witnesses, should be known as one of its friends.
Therefore I must be pardoned, if I renew my Protest against the competency of the present Committee. I protest against it as constituted in flagrant violation of Parliamentary Law; and I protest especially against the acting Chairman, who undertakes to direct this inquiry and to examine witnesses, as not coming within the conditions established by rule, by usage, and by reason. The record shows that he did not move the inquiry, nor did he coöperate with the mover, or take any part in sustaining him, while in open speech he showed himself “against the thing.” I object to the acting Chairman as to a judge or juror disqualified to sit in a court.
I make this second Protest with infinite reluctance. But the Committee leave me no alternative. In their invitation, in the nature of a summons, and now in their subpœna, they compel me to declare my objection to their competency. Seeing it as clearly as I do, and feeling it as strongly as I do, I cannot avoid expressing it. If I do so twice, it is because the Committee have laid me twice under this obligation. Beyond that sentiment of duty which is with me a rule of life, I am encouraged to this effort by the hope that, even if the present Committee cannot be corrected in conformity with Parliamentary Law, its incompetency is so clearly exposed that it will be powerless hereafter as a precedent. If obliged to witness the present dishonor of a time-honored rule, I would at least save this safeguard for the future.
In thus declaring my profound sense of the wrong that has been attempted, I do all in my power to maintain Parliamentary Law inviolate. I regret that I cannot do more.
With this explanation, and yielding to the command of the Committee, I offer myself for examination on matters proper for inquiry; but I do it under protest.
Charles Sumner.
Senate Chamber, 27th March, 1872.
Mr. Carpenter moved that the two Protests be returned to Mr. Sumner, as disrespectful to the Committee. On a subsequent day the motion was withdrawn.
BOOKS ON THE FREE LIST.
Remarks in the Senate on moving an Amendment to a Tariff Bill, March 27, 1872.
On the question of concurrence in an amendment made in Committee of the Whole relative to the free list, Mr. Sumner said:—
I move to amend that amendment by adding after the provision as to books, as arranged alphabetically in the free list,—
Books in the ancient and foreign languages.
I have letters very often from learned professors in different parts of the country, complaining of the cost of books that they are constrained to purchase in order to carry on their studies and to enable them to teach. This is the case with Greek professors, professors in all the languages, ancient and modern. It is also the case with men of science, who desire works in the Continental languages; they complain bitterly of the expense to which they are put.
Now, if I can have the attention of the Senate one moment, I will endeavor to show that these works cannot come in competition with any books here at home. Certainly they cannot with regard to any considerable interest. I think, if these could be put on the free list, an essential service would be done; the revenue would lose very little, and no considerable interest in our country would suffer. I hope, therefore, there can be no question but that the Senate will allow this to be adopted.
Mr. Morrill [of Vermont]. I trust this amendment will not be adopted. It is evidently an old acquaintance of the Senate. I think the Senator from Massachusetts has always moved it whenever he has had an opportunity.
To the argument advanced by Mr. Morrill in support of this objection,—namely, “that the school-books of America should be American in character, and printed and published by American publishers,”—Mr. Sumner replied:—
Mr. President,—The argument of my friend is against English books, and not books in ancient or foreign languages. At any rate, the chief point of his argument was addressed to works in the English language. He called our attention, for instance, to Smith’s “Dictionary of the Bible,” an English work; and he knows well, that, as it is a recent work, it is not on our free list, and the amendment which I move does not touch it. My amendment concerns books in the ancient languages, and in foreign languages, that is, in the languages of modern Europe; and the single point of the Senator is school-books. Now I ask whether we should not do all we can to make the school-books as cheap as possible? Will the Senator put a protective duty on school-books?—make the child with “shining morning face” as he goes to school pay a duty? I would have the school-books as cheap as possible. But then how few are the school-books that would come in under this provision?
My amendment reaches the large amount of works concerning science and literature and jurisprudence in ancient and in foreign languages; and why should these be subjected to a duty? Why should those scholars, those enlightened professional men who import these books, be subjected to this additional expense? Sir, I honor the man, whether of scholarship, of science, or of a profession, who imports these works of learning. He is a benefactor to his country. Every such work becomes a fountain in the neighborhood: but I would not put a duty on that fountain; I would unseal it; I would open it, and let it flow as amply as possible.
Mr. Morrill [of Maine]. I should like to ask the Senator from Massachusetts whether there are any books in foreign languages that are not published in this country. Are not all the books in the ancient languages published in this country?
Mr. Sumner. I beg to call the Senator’s attention to the boundless annual literature of Germany, where the volumes are counted by the thousand,—to the extensive literature of France, where the volumes are counted by the thousand,—to the less ample literature of Spain and Italy, with numerous publications, all of which, if imported, pay a duty. Now I wish to encourage that importation.
Mr. Morrill. I understood the Senator’s argument to be in favor of ancient books.
Mr. Sumner. It is also, certainly.
Mr. Morrill. My inquiry is, whether those books are not all republished in this country.
Mr. Sumner. Not at all. For instance, take most of the considerable works of scholarship in German, annually produced, bearing on the classics; they are not republished in our country, but our professors import them at cost. Then take another class of works, on science, in the German language, in the French language,—I would say also in the Italian language, for there are some excellent contributions to science as well as to literature in the Italian language,—those, if imported, pay a duty; but they do not come into competition with anything printed here. Why, then, should they pay a duty? Why not encourage their importation? Why not help the man of science, or the learned professor, who aspires to enlarge his library in this way? I have said that I regard such a person as a benefactor. I wish to give him my thanks, and my help, if I can. The best help I can give him is to try to save him from this additional tax.
Mr. Sumner’s Amendment was rejected,—Yeas 12, Nays not counted.
THE NASBY LETTERS.
Introduction to the Collection,[41] April 1, 1872.
Beyond the interest in these letters as another instance of a peculiar literature,—illustrated by Major Jack Downing, Sam Slick, and the genius of Hosea Biglow,—they have an historic character from the part they performed in the war with Slavery, and in advancing Reconstruction. Appearing with a certain regularity and enjoying an extensive circulation, they became a constant and welcome ally. Unquestionably they were among the influences and agencies by which disloyalty in all its forms was exposed, and public opinion assured on the right side. It is impossible to measure their value. Against the devices of Slavery and its supporters, each letter was like a speech, or one of those songs which stir the people. Therefore they belong to the political history of this critical period.
Of publications during the war, none had such charm for Abraham Lincoln. He read every letter as it appeared, and kept them all within reach for refreshment. This strong liking illustrates his character, and will always awaken an interest in the letters. An incident in my own relations with him shows how easily he turned from care to humor.
I had occasion to see President Lincoln very late in the evening of March 17th, 1865. The interview was in the familiar room known as his office, and also used for cabinet meetings. I did not take leave of him until some time after midnight, and then the business was not entirely finished. As I rose, he said, “Come to me when I open shop in the morning; I will have the order written, and you shall see it.” “When do you open shop?” said I. “At nine o’clock,” he replied. At the hour named I was in the same room that I had so recently left. Very soon the President entered, stepping quickly with the promised order in his hands, which he at once read to me. It was to disapprove and annul the judgment and sentence of a court-martial in a case that had excited much feeling. While I was making an abstract of the order for communication by telegraph to the anxious parties, he broke into quotation from Nasby. Finding me less at home than himself with his favorite humorist, he said pleasantly, “I must initiate you,” and then repeated with enthusiasm the message he had sent to the author: “For the genius to write these things I would gladly give up my office.”
Rising from his seat, he opened a desk behind, and, taking from it a pamphlet collection of the letters already published, proceeded to read from it with infinite zest, while his melancholy features grew bright. It was a delight to see him surrender so completely to the fascination. Finding that I listened, he read for more than twenty minutes, and was still proceeding, when it occurred to me that there must be many at the door waiting to see him on graver matters. Taking advantage of a pause, I rose, and, thanking him for the lesson of the morning, went away. Some thirty persons, including Senators and Representatives, were in the antechamber as I passed out.
Though with the President much during the intervening time before his death, this was the last business I transacted with him. A few days later he left Washington for City Point, on the James River, where he was at the surrender of Richmond. April 6th I joined him there. April 9th the party returned to Washington. On the evening of April 14th the bullet of an assassin took his life.
In this simple story Abraham Lincoln introduces Nasby.
Charles Sumner.
Washington, April 1st, 1872.
ADVICE TO THE COLORED PEOPLE.
Letter to the National Convention of Colored People at New Orleans, April 7, 1872.
Washington, April 7, 1872.
MY DEAR SIR,—In reply to your inquiry, I make haste to say, that, in my judgment, the Colored Convention should think more of principles than of men,—except so far as men stand for principles. Above all, let them insist on the rights of their own much-abused and insulted people.
It is absurd for anybody to say that he “accepts the situation,” and then deny the equal rights of the colored man. If the “situation” is accepted in good faith, it must be entirely,—including not merely the abolition of Slavery and the establishment of equal suffrage, but also all those other rights which are still denied or abridged. There must be complete equality before the law, so that in all institutions, agencies, or conveniences, created or regulated by law, there can be no discrimination on account of color, but a black man shall be treated as a white man.
In maintaining their rights, it will be proper for the Convention to invoke the Declaration of Independence, so that its principles and promises shall become a living reality, never to be questioned in any way, but recognized always as a guide of conduct and a governing rule in the interpretation of the National Constitution, being in the nature of a Bill of Rights preceding the Constitution.
It is not enough to “proclaim liberty throughout all the land unto all the inhabitants thereof.” Equality must be proclaimed also; and since both are promised by the great Declaration, which is a national act, and as from their nature they should be uniform throughout the country, both must be placed under the safeguard of national law. There can be but one liberty and one equality, the same in Boston and New Orleans, the same everywhere throughout the country.
The colored people are not ungenerous, and therefore will incline to any measures of good-will and reconciliation; but I trust no excess of benevolence will make them consent to any postponement of those equal rights which are still refused. The disabilities of colored people, loyal and long-suffering, should be removed before the disabilities of former Rebels; or at least the two removals should go hand in hand.
It only remains that I should say, “Stand firm!” The politicians will then know that you are in earnest, and will no longer be trifled with. Victory will follow soon, and the good cause be secure forever.
Meanwhile accept my best wishes for the Convention, and believe me, dear Professor,
Faithfully yours,
Charles Sumner.
To Professor John M. Langston, Washington.
DIPLOMATIC AGENTS OF THE UNITED STATES NOT TO ACCEPT GIFTS FROM FOREIGN POWERS.
Remarks in the Senate, May 2, 1872.