Chaucer's Works, Volume 2 — Boethius and Troilus

Thanne seide she: 'this is,' quod she, 'the olde question of

the purviaunce of god; and Marcus Tullius, whan he devyded the

divynaciouns, that is to seyn, in his book that he wroot of divynaciouns,

he moevede gretly this questioun; and thou thy-self has y-sought

it mochel, and outrely, and longe; but yit ne hath it nat ben

determined ne y-sped fermely and diligently of any of yow. And

the cause of this derkenesse and of this difficultee is, for that the

moevinge of the resoun of mankinde ne may nat moeven to (that

is to seyn, applyen or ioinen to) the simplicitee of the devyne

prescience; the whiche simplicitee of the devyne prescience, yif

that men mighten thinken it in any maner, that is to seyn, that yif

men mighten thinken and comprehenden the thinges as god seeth

hem, thanne ne sholde ther dwellen outrely no doute: the whiche

resoun and cause of difficultee I shal assaye at the laste to shewe

and to speden, whan I have first y-spended and answered to tho

resouns by which thou art y-moeved. For I axe why thou wenest

that thilke resouns of hem that assoilen this questioun ne ben

nat speedful y-nough ne sufficient: the whiche solucioun, or the

whiche resoun, for that it demeth that the prescience nis nat cause

of necessitee to thinges to comen, than ne weneth it nat that

freedom of wil be destorbed or y-let by prescience. For ne

drawestow nat arguments from elles-where of the necessitee of

thinges to-comen (as who seith, any other wey than thus) but that

thilke thinges that the prescience wot biforn ne mowen nat unbityde?

That is to seyn, that they moten bityde. But thanne, yif

that prescience ne putteth no necessitee to thinges to comen, as

thou thy-self hast confessed it and biknowen a litel her-biforn, what

cause or what is it (as who seith, ther may no cause be) by which

that the endes voluntarie of thinges mighten be constreined to

certein bitydinge? For by grace of positioun, so that thou mowe

the betere understonde this that folweth, I pose, per impossibile,

that ther be no prescience. Thanne axe I,' quod she, 'in as

mochel as apertieneth to that, sholden thanne thinges that comen

of free wil ben constreined to bityden by necessitee?'

Boece. 'Nay,' quod I.

'Thanne ayeinward,' quod she, 'I suppose that ther be prescience,

but that it ne putteth no necessitee to thinges; thanne

trowe I, that thilke selve freedom of wil shal dwellen al hool and

absolut and unbounden. But thou wolt seyn that, al-be-it so that

prescience nis nat cause of the necessitee of bitydinge to thinges

to comen, algates yit it is a signe that the thinges ben to bityden

by necessitee. By this manere thanne, al-thogh the prescience

ne hadde never y-ben, yit algate or at the leeste weye it is certein

thing, that the endes and bitydinges of thinges to comen sholden

ben necessarie. For every signe sheweth and signifyeth only what

the thing is, but it ne maketh nat the thing that it signifyeth. For

which it bihoveth first to shewen, that no-thing ne bitydeth that it

ne bitydeth by necessitee, so that it may appere that the prescience

is signe of this necessitee; or elles, yif ther nere no necessitee,

certes, thilke prescience ne mighte nat be signe of thing that nis

nat. But certes, it is now certein that the proeve of this,

y-sustened by stidefast resoun, ne shal nat ben lad ne proeved by

signes ne by arguments y-taken fro with-oute, but by causes

covenable and necessarie. But thou mayst seyn, how may it be

that the thinges ne bityden nat that ben y-purveyed to comen?

But, certes, right as we trowen that tho thinges which that the

purviance wot biforn to comen ne ben nat to bityden; but that

ne sholden we nat demen; but rather, al-thogh that they shal

bityden, yit ne have they no necessitee of hir kinde to bityden.

And this maystow lightly aperceiven by this that I shal seyn. For

we seen many thinges whan they ben don biforn oure eyen, right

as men seen the cartere worken in the torninge or atempringe or

adressinge of hise cartes or charietes. And by this manere (as

who seith, maystow understonde) of alle othere workmen. Is ther

thanne any necessitee, as who seith, in oure lokinge, that constreineth

or compelleth any of thilke thinges to ben don so?'

Boece. 'Nay,' quod I; 'for in ydel and in veyn were al the

effect of craft, yif that alle thinges weren moeved by constreininge;'

that is to seyn, by constreininge of oure eyen or of oure sight.

Philosophie. 'The thinges thanne,' quod she, 'that, whan men

doon hem, ne han no necessitee that men doon hem, eek tho

same thinges, first or they ben doon, they ben to comen with-oute

necessitee. For-why ther ben somme thinges to bityden, of which

the endes and the bitydinges of hem ben absolut and quit of alle

necessitee. For certes, I ne trowe nat that any man wolde seyn

this: that tho thinges that men doon now, that they ne weren to

bityden first or they weren y-doon; and thilke same thinges,

al-thogh that men had y-wist hem biforn, yit they han free

bitydinges. For right as science of thinges present ne bringeth in

no necessitee to thinges that men doon, right so the prescience of

thinges to comen ne bringeth in no necessitee to thinges to

bityden. But thou mayst seyn, that of thilke same it is y-douted,

as whether that of thilke thinges that ne han non issues and

bitydinges necessaries, yif ther-of may ben any prescience; for

certes, they semen to discorden. For thou wenest that, yif that

thinges ben y-seyn biforn, that necessitee folweth hem; and yif

necessitee faileth hem, they ne mighten nat ben wist biforn, and

that no-thing ne may ben comprehended by science but certein;

and yif tho thinges that ne han no certein bitydinges ben purveyed

as certein, it sholde ben dirknesse of opinioun, nat soothfastnesse

of science. And thou wenest that it be diverse fro the hoolnesse

of science that any man sholde deme a thing to ben other-weys

thanne it is it-self. And the cause of this erroure is, that of alle

the thinges that every wight hath y-knowe, they wenen that tho

thinges been y-knowe al-oonly by the strengthe and by the nature

of the thinges that ben y-wist or y-knowe; and it is al the

contrarie. For al that ever is y-knowe, it is rather comprehended

and knowen, nat after his strengthe and his nature, but after the

facultee, that is to seyn, the power and the nature, of hem that

knowen. And, for that this thing shal mowen shewen by a short

ensaumple: the same roundnesse of a body, other-weys the sighte

of the eye knoweth it, and other-weyes the touchinge. The

lokinge, by castinge of his bemes, waiteth and seeth from afer al

the body to-gidere, with-oute moevinge of it-self; but the touchinge

clyveth and conioineth to the rounde body, and moeveth aboute

the environinge, and comprehendeth by parties the roundnesse.

And the man him-self, other-weys wit biholdeth him, and

other-weys imaginacioun, and other-weys resoun, and other-weys

intelligence. For the wit comprehendeth withoute-forth the

figure of the body of the man that is establissed in the

matere subiect; but the imaginacioun comprehendeth only the

figure withoute the matere. Resoun surmounteth imaginacioun,

and comprehendeth by universal lokinge the comune spece that

is in the singuler peces. But the eye of intelligence is heyere; for

it surmounteth the environinge of the universitee, and looketh,

over that, by pure subtilitee of thoght, thilke same simple forme

of man that is perdurably in the divyne thoght. In whiche this

oughte greetly to ben considered, that the heyeste strengthe to

comprehenden thinges enbraseth and contieneth the lowere

strengthe; but the lowere strengthe ne aryseth nat in no manere

to heyere strengthe. For wit ne may no-thing comprehende out

of matere, ne the imaginacioun ne loketh nat the universels

speces, ne resoun taketh nat the simple forme so as intelligence

taketh it; but intelligence, that looketh al aboven, whan it hath

comprehended the forme, it knoweth and demeth alle the thinges

that ben under that forme. But she knoweth hem in thilke manere

in the whiche it comprehendeth thilke same simple forme that

ne may never ben knowen to none of that other; that is to seyn,

to none of tho three forseide thinges of the sowle. For it knoweth

the universitee of resoun, and the figure of the imaginacioun,

and the sensible material conceived by wit; ne it ne useth nat nor

of resoun ne of imaginacioun ne of wit withoute-forth; but it

biholdeth alle thinges, so as I shal seye, by a strok of thought

formely, withoute discours or collacioun. Certes resoun, whan it

looketh any-thing universel, it ne useth nat of imaginacioun, nor

of witte, and algates yit it comprehendeth the thinges imaginable

and sensible; for resoun is she that diffinisseth the universel of hir

conseyte right thus:—man is a resonable two-foted beest. And

how so that this knowinge is universel, yet nis ther no wight that

ne woot wel that a man is a thing imaginable and sensible; and

this same considereth wel resoun; but that nis nat by imaginacioun

nor by wit, but it looketh it by a resonable concepcioun. Also

imaginacioun, al-be-it so that it taketh of wit the beginninges to

seen and to formen the figures, algates, al-thogh that wit ne were

nat present, yit it environeth and comprehendeth alle thinges

sensible; nat by resoun sensible of deminge, but by resoun

imaginatif. Seestow nat thanne that alle the thinges, in knowinge,

usen more of hir facultee or of hir power than they doon of the

facultee or power of thinges that ben y-knowe? Ne that nis nat

wrong; for so as every Iugement is the dede or doinge of him

that demeth, it bihoveth that every wight performe the werk and

his entencioun, nat of foreine power, but of his propre power.

The Porche, that is to seyn, a gate of the town of Athenes ther-as

philosophres hadden hir congregacioun to desputen, thilke Porche

broughte som-tyme olde men, ful derke in hir sentences, that is to

seyn, philosophres that highten Stoiciens, that wenden that images

and sensibilitees, that is to seyn, sensible imaginaciouns, or elles

imaginaciouns of sensible thinges, weren empreinted in-to sowles

fro bodies withoute-forth; as who seith, that thilke Stoiciens wenden

that the sowle hadde ben naked of it-self, as a mirour or a clene

parchemin, so that alle figures mosten first comen fro thinges fro

withoute-forth in-to sowles, and ben empreinted in-to sowles: Text:

right as we ben wont som-tyme, by a swifte pointel, to ficchen

lettres empreinted in the smothenesse or in the pleinnesse of the

table of wex or in parchemin that ne hath no figure ne note in it.

Glose. But now argueth Boece ayeins that opinioun, and seith

thus: But yif the thryvinge sowle ne unpleyteth no-thing, that is

to seyn, ne doth no-thing, by his propre moevinges, but suffreth and

lyth subgit to tho figures and to tho notes of bodies withoute-forth,

and yildeth images ydel and veyn in the manere of a mirour,

whennes thryveth thanne or whennes comth thilke knowinge in

our sowle, that discerneth and biholdeth alle thinges? And

whennes is thilke strengthe that biholdeth the singuler thinges;

or whennes is the strengthe that devydeth thinges y-knowe; and

thilke strengthe that gadereth to-gidere the thinges devyded; and

the strengthe that cheseth his entrechaunged wey? For som-tyme

it heveth up the heved, that is to seyn, that it heveth up the entencioun

to right heye thinges; and som-tyme it descendeth in-to

right lowe thinges. And whan it retorneth in-to him-self, it reproeveth

and destroyeth the false thinges by the trewe thinges.

Certes, this strengthe is cause more efficient, and mochel

more mighty to seen and to knowe thinges, than thilke cause that

suffreth and receiveth the notes and the figures impressed in

maner of matere. Algates the passioun, that is to seyn, the

suffraunce or the wit, in the quike body, goth biforn, excitinge and

moevinge the strengthes of the thought. Right so as whan that

cleernesse smyteth the eyen and moeveth hem to seen, or right so

as vois or soun hurteleth to the eres and commoeveth hem to

herkne, than is the strengthe of the thought y-moeved and

excited, and clepeth forth, to semblable moevinges, the speces

that it halt with-inne it-self; and addeth tho speces to the notes

and to the thinges withoute-forth, and medleth the images of

thinges withoute-forth to tho formes y-hidde with-inne him-self.

But what yif that in bodies to ben feled, that is to seyn, in the

takinge of knowelechinge of bodily thinges, and al-be-it so that the

qualitees of bodies, that ben obiecte fro withoute-forth, moeven

and entalenten the instruments of the wittes; and al-be-it so that

the passioun of the body, that is to seyn, the wit or the suffraunce,

goth to-forn the strengthe of the workinge corage, the which

passioun or suffraunce clepeth forth the dede of the thoght in him-self,

and moeveth and exciteth in this mene whyle the formes that

resten withinne-forth; and yif that, in sensible bodies, as I have

seyd, our corage nis nat y-taught or empreinted by passioun to

knowe thise thinges, but demeth and knoweth, of his owne strengthe,

the passioun or suffraunce subiect to the body: moche more

thanne tho thinges that ben absolut and quite fro alle talents

or affecciouns of bodies, as god or his aungeles, ne folwen nat in

discerninge thinges obiect fro withoute-forth, but they accomplisshen

and speden the dede of hir thoght. By this resoun

thanne ther comen many maner knowinges to dyverse and

differinge substaunces. For the wit of the body, the whiche

wit is naked and despoiled of alle other knowinges, thilke wit

comth to beestes that ne mowen nat moeven hem-self her and

ther, as oystres and muscules, and other swiche shelle-fish of the

see, that clyven and ben norisshed to roches. But the imaginacioun

comth to remuable beestes, that semen to han talent to

fleen or to desiren any thing. But resoun is al-only to the linage

of mankinde, right as intelligence is only [to] the devyne nature:

of which it folweth, that thilke knowinge is more worth than thise

othre, sin it knoweth by his propre nature nat only his subiect, as

who seith, it ne knoweth nat al-only that apertieneth properly to his

knowinge, but it knoweth the subiects of alle other knowinges.

But how shal it thanne be, yif that wit and imaginacioun stryven

ayein resoninge, and seyn, that of thilke universel thing that

resoun weneth to seen, that it nis right naught? For wit and

imaginacioun seyn that that, that is sensible or imaginable, it ne

may nat be universel. Thanne is either the Iugement of resoun

sooth, ne that ther nis nothing sensible; or elles, for that resoun

wot wel that many thinges ben subiect to wit and to imaginacioun,

thanne is the concepcioun of resoun veyn and false, which that

loketh and comprehendeth that that is sensible and singuler as

universel. And yif that resoun wolde answeren ayein to thise

two, that is to seyn, to witte and to imaginacioun, and seyn, that

soothly she hir-self, that is to seyn, resoun, loketh and comprehendeth,

by resoun of universalitee, bothe that that is sensible

and that that is imaginable; and that thilke two, that is to seyn,

wit and imaginacioun, ne mowen nat strecchen ne enhansen hem-self

to the knowinge of universalitee, for that the knowinge of

hem ne may exceden ne surmounte the bodily figures: certes, of

the knowinge of thinges, men oughten rather yeven credence to

the more stedefast and to the more parfit Iugement. In this

maner stryvinge thanne, we that han strengthe of resoninge and

of imagininge and of wit, that is to seyn, by resoun and by imaginacioun

and by wit, we sholde rather preyse the cause of resoun; as

who seith, than the cause of wit and of imaginacioun.

Semblable thing is it, that the resoun of mankinde ne weneth

nat that the devyne intelligence bi-holdeth or knoweth thinges to

comen, but right as the resoun of mankinde knoweth hem. For

thou arguest and seyst thus: that yif it ne seme nat to men that

some thinges han certein and necessarie bitydinges, they ne

mowen nat ben wist biforn certeinly to bityden. And thanne

nis ther no prescience of thilke thinges; and yif we trowe that

prescience be in thise thinges, thanne is ther no-thing that it ne

bitydeth by necessitee. But certes, yif we mighten han the Iugement

of the devyne thoght, as we ben parsoneres of resoun, right

so as we han demed that it behoveth that imaginacioun and wit

be binethe resoun, right so wolde we demen that it were rightful

thing, that mannes resoun oughte to submitten it-self and to ben

binethe the divyne thoght. For which, yif that we mowen, as

who seith, that, yif that we mowen, I counseyle, that we enhanse us

in-to the heighte of thilke sovereyn intelligence; for ther shal

resoun wel seen that, that it ne may nat biholden in it-self. And

certes that is this, in what maner the prescience of god seeth alle

thinges certeins and diffinisshed, al-thogh they ne han no certein

issues or bitydinges; ne this is non opinioun, but it is rather the

simplicitee of the sovereyn science, that nis nat enclosed nor

y-shet within none boundes.

The beestes passen by the erthes by ful diverse figures. For

som of hem han hir bodies straught and crepen in the dust, and

drawen after hem a tras or a foruh y-continued; that is to seyn, as

nadres or snakes. And other beestes, by the wandringe lightnesse

of hir winges, beten the windes, and over-swimmen the spaces of

the longe eyr by moist fleeinge. And other beestes gladen hem-self

to diggen hir tras or hir steppes in the erthe with hir goings

or with hir feet, and to goon either by the grene feldes, or elles to

walken under the wodes. And al-be-it so that thou seest that

they alle discorden by diverse formes, algates hir faces, enclined,

hevieth hir dulle wittes. Only the linage of man heveth heyeste

his heye heved, and stondeth light with his up-right body, and

biholdeth the erthes under him. And, but-yif thou, erthely man,

wexest yvel out of thy wit, this figure amonesteth thee, that axest

the hevene with thy righte visage, and hast areysed thy fore-heved,

to beren up a-heigh thy corage; so that thy thoght ne be nat

y-hevied ne put lowe under fote, sin that thy body is so heye

areysed.

Therfor thanne, as I have shewed a litel her-biforn, that al

thing that is y-wist nis nat knowen by his nature propre, but by

the nature of hem that comprehenden it, lat us loke now, in as

mochel as it is leveful to us, as who seith, lat us loke now as we

mowen, which that the estat is of the devyne substaunce; so that

we mowen eek knowen what his science is. The commune Iugement

of alle creatures resonables thanne is this: that god is eterne.

Lat us considere thanne what is eternitee; for certes that shal

shewen us to-gidere the devyne nature and the devyne science.

Eternitee, thanne, is parfit possessioun and al-togidere of lyf

interminable; and that sheweth more cleerly by the comparisoun

or the collacioun of temporel thinges. For al thing that liveth in

tyme it is present, and procedeth fro preterits in-to futures, that is

to seyn, fro tyme passed in-to tyme cominge; ne ther nis no-thing

establisshed in tyme that may enbracen to-gider al the space of

his lyf. For certes, yit ne hath it taken the tyme of to-morwe, and

it hath lost the tyme of yisterday. And certes, in the lyf of this

day, ye ne liven no more but right as in the moevable and

transitorie moment. Thanne thilke thing that suffreth temporel

condicioun, al-thogh that it never bigan to be, ne thogh it never

cese for to be, as Aristotle demed of the world, and al-thogh that

the lyf of it be strecched with infinitee of tyme, yit algates nis

it no swich thing that men mighten trowen by right that it is

eterne. For al-thogh that it comprehende and embrace the space

of lyf infinit, yit algates ne embraceth it nat the space of the lyf

al-togider; for it ne hath nat the futures that ne ben nat yit, ne it

ne hath no lenger the preterits that ben y-doon or y-passed. But

thilke thing thanne, that hath and comprehendeth to-gider al the

plentee of the lyf interminable, to whom ther ne faileth naught of

the future, and to whom ther nis naught of the preterit escaped

nor y-passed, thilke same is y-witnessed and y-proeved by right to

be eterne. And it bihoveth by necessitee that thilke thing be

al-wey present to him-self, and compotent; as who seith, al-wey

present to him-self, and so mighty that al be right at his plesaunce;

and that he have al present the infinitee of the moevable tyme.

Wher-for som men trowen wrongfully that, whan they heren that

it semede to Plato that this world ne hadde never beginninge

of tyme, ne that it never shal han failinge, they wenen in this

maner that this world be maked coeterne with his maker; as who

seith, they wene that this world and god ben maked togider eterne,

and that is a wrongful weninge. For other thing is it to ben y-lad

by lyf interminable, as Plato graunted to the world, and other

thing is it to embrace to-gider al the present of the lyf interminable,

the whiche thing it is cleer and manifest that it is propre to the

devyne thoght.

Ne it ne sholde nat semen to us, that god is elder thanne

thinges that ben y-maked by quantitee of tyme, but rather by

the propretee of his simple nature. For this ilke infinit moevinge

of temporel thinges folweth this presentarie estat of lyf unmoevable;

and so as it ne may nat countrefeten it ne feynen it ne be evenlyke

to it for the inmoevabletee, that is to seyn, that is in the

eternitee of god, it faileth and falleth in-to moevinge fro the simplicitee

of the presence of god, and disencreseth in-to the infinit

quantitee of future and of preterit: and so as it ne may nat han

to-gider al the plentee of the lyf, algates yit, for as moche as it

ne ceseth never for to ben in som maner, it semeth som-del to us,

that it folweth and resembleth thilke thing that it ne may nat

atayne to ne fulfillen, and bindeth it-self to som maner presence

of this litel and swifte moment: the which presence of this litel

and swifte moment, for that it bereth a maner image or lyknesse

of the ay-dwellinge presence of god, it graunteth, to swiche maner

thinges as it bitydeth to, that it semeth hem as thise thinges han

y-ben, and ben.

And, for that the presence of swich litel moment ne may nat

dwelle, ther-for it ravisshed and took the infinit wey of tyme, that

is to seyn, by successioun; and by this maner is it y-doon, for that

it sholde continue the lyf in goinge, of the whiche lyf it ne mighte

nat enbrace the plentee in dwellinge. And for-thy, yif we wollen

putten worthy names to thinges, and folwen Plato, lat us seye

thanne soothly, that god is eterne, and the world is perpetuel.

Thanne, sin that every Iugement knoweth and comprehendeth by

his owne nature thinges that ben subiect un-to him, ther is soothly

to god, al-weys, an eterne and presentarie estat; and the science

of him, that over-passeth al temporel moevement, dwelleth in the

simplicitee of his presence, and embraceth and considereth alle

the infinit spaces of tymes, preterits and futures, and loketh, in

his simple knowinge, alle thinges of preterit right as they weren

y-doon presently right now. Yif thou wolt thanne thenken and

avyse the prescience, by which it knoweth alle thinges, thou ne

shal nat demen it as prescience of thinges to comen, but thou

shalt demen it more rightfully that it is science of presence or of

instaunce, that never ne faileth. For which it nis nat y-cleped

"previdence," but it sholde rather ben cleped "purviaunce," that

is establisshed ful fer fro right lowe thinges, and biholdeth from

a-fer alle thinges, right as it were fro the heye heighte of thinges.

Why axestow thanne, or why desputestow thanne, that thilke

thinges ben doon by necessitee whiche that ben y-seyn and

knowen by the devyne sighte, sin that, forsothe, men ne maken

nat thilke thinges necessarie which that they seen ben y-doon in

hir sighte? For addeth thy biholdinge any necessitee to thilke

thinges that thou biholdest presente?'

'Nay,' quod I.

Philosophie. 'Certes, thanne, if men mighte maken any digne

comparisoun or collacioun of the presence devyne and of the

presence of mankinde, right so as ye seen some thinges in this

temporel present, right so seeth god alle thinges by his eterne

present. Wher-fore this devyne prescience ne chaungeth nat the

nature ne the propretee of thinges, but biholdeth swiche thinges

present to him-ward as they shullen bityde to yow-ward in tyme

to comen. Ne it confoundeth nat the Iugement of thinges; but

by o sighte of his thought, he knoweth the thinges to comen, as

wel necessarie as nat necessarie. Right so as whan ye seen

to-gider a man walken on the erthe and the sonne arysen in

the hevene, al-be-it so that ye seen and biholden that oon and

that other to-gider, yit natheles ye demen and discernen that that

oon is voluntarie and that other necessarie. Right so thanne the

devyne lookinge, biholdinge alle thinges under him, ne troubleth

nat the qualitee of thinges that ben certeinly present to him-ward;

but, as to the condicioun of tyme, forsothe, they ben future. For

which it folweth, that this nis noon opinioun, but rather a stedefast

knowinge, y-strengthed by soothnesse, that, whanne that god

knoweth anything to be, he ne unwot nat that thilke thing wanteth

necessitee to be; this is to seyn, that, whan that god knoweth any

thing to bityde, he wot wel that it ne hath no necessitee to bityde.

And yif thou seyst heer, that thilke thing that god seeth to

bityde, it ne may nat unbityde (as who seith, it mot bityde), and

thilke thing that ne may nat unbityde it mot bityde by necessitee,

and that thou streyne me by this name of necessitee: certes,

I wol wel confessen and biknowe a thing of ful sad trouthe, but

unnethe shal ther any wight mowe seen it or come ther-to, but-yif

that he be biholder of the devyne thoght. For I wol answeren

thee thus: that thilke thing that is future, whan it is referred

to the devyne knowinge, thanne is it necessarie; but certes, whan it

is understonden in his owne kinde, men seen it is outrely free,

and absolut fro alle necessitee.

For certes, ther ben two maneres of necessitee. That oon

necessitee is simple, as thus: that it bihoveth by necessitee, that

alle men be mortal or deedly. Another necessitee is conditionel,

as thus: yif thou wost that a man walketh, it bihoveth by necessitee

that he walke. Thilke thing thanne that any wight hath y-knowe

to be, it ne may ben non other weyes thanne he knoweth it to be.

But this condicioun ne draweth nat with hir thilke necessitee

simple. For certes, this necessitee conditionel, the propre nature

of it ne maketh it nat, but the adieccioun of the condicioun

maketh it. For no necessitee ne constreyneth a man to gon,

that goth by his propre wil; al-be-it so that, whan he goth,

that it is necessarie that he goth. Right on this same maner

thanne, yif that the purviaunce of god seeth any thing present,

than mot thilke thing ben by necessitee, al-thogh that it ne have

no necessitee of his owne nature. But certes, the futures that

bityden by freedom of arbitre, god seeth hem alle to-gider present.

Thise thinges thanne, yif they ben referred to the devyne sighte,

thanne ben they maked necessarie by the condicioun of the

devyne knowinge. But certes, yif thilke thinges be considered

by hem-self, they ben absolut of necessitee, and ne forleten nat ne

cesen nat of the libertee of hir owne nature. Thanne, certes,

with-oute doute, alle the thinges shollen ben doon which that

god wot biforn that they ben to comen. But som of hem comen

and bityden of free arbitre or of free wille, that, al-be-it so that

they bityden, yit algates ne lese they nat hir propre nature in

beinge; by the which first, or that they weren y-doon, they

hadden power nat to han bitid.'

Boece. 'What is this to seyn thanne,' quod I, 'that thinges ne

ben nat necessarie by hir propre nature, so as they comen in alle

maneres in the lyknesse of necessitee by the condicioun of the

devyne science?'

Philosophie. 'This is the difference,' quod she; 'that tho

thinges that I purposede thee a litel heer-biforn, that is to seyn,

the sonne arysinge and the man walkinge, that, ther-whyles that

thilke thinges been y-doon, they ne mighte nat ben undoon;

natheles, that oon of hem, or it was y-doon, it bihoved by necessitee

that it was y-doon, but nat that other. Right so is it

here, that the thinges that god hath present, with-oute doute they

shollen been. But som of hem descendeth of the nature of

thinges, as the sonne arysinge; and som descendeth of the power

of the doeres, as the man walkinge. Thanne seide I no wrong,

that yif these thinges ben referred to the devyne knowinge, thanne

ben they necessarie; and yif they ben considered by hem-self,

thanne ben they absolut fro the bond of necessitee. Right so as

alle thinges that apereth or sheweth to the wittes, yif thou referre

it to resoun, it is universel; and yif thou referre it or loke it

to it-self, than is it singuler. But now, yif thou seyst thus, that

yif it be in my power to chaunge my purpos, than shal I voide the

purviaunce of god, whan that, peraventure, I shal han chaunged

the thinges that he knoweth biforn, thanne shal I answere thee

thus. Certes, thou mayst wel chaunge thy purpos; but, for as

mochel as the present soothnesse of the devyne purviaunce biholdeth

that thou mayst chaunge thy purpos, and whether thou

wolt chaunge it or no, and whiderward that thou torne it, thou ne

mayst nat eschuen the devyne prescience; right as thou ne mayst

nat fleen the sighte of the presente eye, al-though that thou torne

thy-self by thy free wil in-to dyverse acciouns. But thou mayst

seyn ayein: "How shal it thanne be? Shal nat the devyne

science be chaunged by my disposicioun, whan that I wol o thing

now, and now another? And thilke prescience, ne semeth it nat

to entrechaunge stoundes of knowinge;"' as who seith, ne shal it

nat seme to us, that the devyne prescience entrechaungeth hise dyverse

stoundes of knowinge, so that it knowe sum-tyme o thing and sum-tyme

the contrarie of that thing?

'No, forsothe,' quod I.

Philosophie. 'For the devyne sighte renneth to-forn and seeth alle

futures, and clepeth hem ayein, and retorneth hem to the presence

of his propre knowinge; ne he ne entrechaungeth nat, so as thou

wenest, the stoundes of forknowinge, as now this, now that; but

he ay-dwellinge comth biforn, and embraceth at o strook alle thy

mutaciouns. And this presence to comprehenden and to seen

alle thinges, god ne hath nat taken it of the bitydinge of thinges

to come, but of his propre simplicitee. And her-by is assoiled

thilke thing that thou puttest a litel her-biforn, that is to seyn,

that it is unworthy thing to seyn, that our futures yeven cause of

the science of god. For certes, this strengthe of the devyne

science, which that embraceth alle thinges by his presentarie

knowinge, establissheth maner to alle thinges, and it ne oweth

naught to latter thinges; and sin that these thinges ben thus,

that is to seyn, sin that necessitee nis nat in thinges by the devyne

prescience, than is ther freedom of arbitre, that dwelleth hool and

unwemmed to mortal men. Ne the lawes ne purposen nat

wikkedly medes and peynes to the willinges of men that ben

unbounden and quite of alle necessitee. And god, biholder and

for-witer of alle thinges, dwelleth above; and the present eternitee

of his sighte renneth alwey with the dyverse qualitee of oure

dedes, despensinge and ordeyninge medes to goode men, and

torments to wikked men. Ne in ydel ne in veyn ne ben ther nat

put in god hope and preyeres, that ne mowen nat ben unspeedful

ne with-oute effect, whan they ben rightful.

Withstond thanne and eschue thou vyces; worshipe and love

thou virtues; areys thy corage to rightful hopes; yilde thou

humble preyeres a-heigh. Gret necessitee of prowesse and vertu

is encharged and commaunded to yow, yif ye nil nat dissimulen;

sin that ye worken and doon, that is to seyn, your dedes or your

workes, biforn the eyen of the Iuge that seeth and demeth alle

thinges.' To whom be glorye and worshipe by infinit tymes. Amen.