Chemical warfare

Modern chemical warfare dates from April 22, 1915. Really, however, it may be said to have started somewhat earlier, for Germany undoubtedly had spent several months in perfecting a successful gas cylinder and a method of attack. The Allies, surprised by such a method of warfare, were forced to develop, under pressure, a method of defense, and then, when it was finally decided to retaliate, a method of gas warfare. “Offensive organizations were enrolled in the Engineer Corps of the two armies and trained for the purpose of using poisonous gases; the first operation of this kind was carried out by the British at the battle of Loos in September, 1915.

“Shortly after this the British Army in the field amalgamated all the offensive, defensive, advisory and supply activities connected with gas warfare and formed a ‘Gas Service’ with a Brigadier General as Director. This step was taken almost as a matter of necessity, and because of the continually increasing importance of the use of gas in the war (Auld).”

At once the accumulation of valuable information and experience was started. Later this was very willingly and freely placed at the disposal of American workers. Too much cannot be said about the hearty co-operation of England and France. Without it and the later exchange of information on all matters regarding gas warfare, the progress of gas research in all the allied countries would have been very much retarded.

While many branches of the American Army were engaged in following the progress of the war during 1915-1916, the growing importance of gas warfare was far from being appreciated. When the United States declared war on Germany April 6, 1917, there were a few scattered observations on gas warfare in various offices of the different branches, but there was no attempt at an organized survey of the field, while absolutely no effort had been made by the War Department to inaugurate research in a field that later had 2,000 men alone in pure research work. Equally important was the fact that no branch of the Service had any idea of the practical methods of gas warfare.

The only man who seemed to have the vision and the courage of his convictions was Van H. Manning, Director of the Bureau of Mines. Since the establishment of the Bureau in 1908 it had maintained a staff of investigators studying poisonous and explosive gases in mines, the use of self-contained breathing apparatus for exploring mines filled with noxious gases, the treatment of men overcome by gas, and similar problems. At a conference of the Director of the Bureau with his Division Chiefs, on February 7, 1917, the matter of national preparedness was discussed, and especially the manner in which the Bureau could be of most immediate assistance with its personnel and equipment. On February 8, the Director wrote C. D. Walcott, Chairman of the Military Committee of the National Research Council, pointing out that the Bureau of Mines could immediately assist the Navy and the Army in developing, for naval or military use, special oxygen breathing apparatus similar to that used in mining. He also stated that the Bureau could be of aid in testing types of gas masks used on the fighting lines, and had available testing galleries at the Pittsburgh experiment station and an experienced staff. Dr. Walcott replied on February 12 that he was bringing the matter to the attention of the Military Committee.

A meeting was arranged between the Bureau and the War College, the latter organization being represented by Brigadier General Kuhn and Major L. P. Williamson. At this conference the War Department enthusiastically accepted the offer of the Bureau of Mines and agreed to support the work in every way possible.

The supervision of the research on gases was offered to Dr. G. A. Burrell, for a number of years in charge of the chemical work done by the Bureau in connection with the investigation of mine gases and natural gas. He accepted the offer on April 7, 1917. The smoothness with which the work progressed under his direction and the importance of the results obtained were the result of Colonel Burrell’s great tact, his knowledge of every branch of research under investigation and his imagination and general broad-mindedness.

Once, however, that the importance of gas warfare had been brought to the attention of the chemists of the country, the response was very eager and soon many of the best men of the university and industrial plants were associated with Burrell in all the phases of gas research. The staff grew very rapidly and laboratories were started at various points in the East and Middle West.

It was immediately evident that there should be a central laboratory in Washington to co-ordinate the various activities and also to considerably enlarge those activities under the joint direction of the Army, the Navy and the Bureau of Mines. Fortunately a site was available for such a laboratory at the American University, the use of the buildings and grounds having been tendered President Wilson on April 30, 1917. Thus originated the American University Experiment Station, later to become the Research Division of the Chemical Warfare Service.

Meanwhile other organizations were getting under way. The procurement of toxic gases and the filling of shell was assigned to the Trench Warfare Section of the Ordnance Department. In June, 1917, General Crozier, then Chief of the Ordnance Department, approved the general proposition of building a suitable plant for filling shell with toxic gas. In November, 1917, it was decided to establish such a plant at Gunpowder Neck, Maryland. Owing to the inability of the chemical manufacturers to supply the necessary toxic gases, it was further decided, in December, 1917, to erect at the same place such chemical plants as would be necessary to supply these gases. In January, 1918, the name was changed to Edgewood Arsenal, and the project was made a separate Bureau of the Ordnance Department, Col. William H. Walker, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, being soon afterwards put in command.

While, during the latter part of the War, gas shell were handled by the regular artillery, special troops were needed for cylinder attacks, Stokes’ mortars, Livens’ projectors and for other forms of gas warfare. General Pershing early cabled, asking for the organization and training of such troops, and recommended that they be placed, as in the English Army, under the jurisdiction of the Engineer Corps. On August 15, 1917, the General Staff authorized one regiment of Gas and Flame troops, which was designated the “30th Engineers,” and was commanded by Major (later Colonel) E. J. Atkisson. This later became the First Gas Regiment, of the Chemical Warfare Service.

About this time (September, 1917) the need of gas training was recognized by the organization of a Field Training Section, under the direction of the Sanitary Corps, Medical Department. Later it was recognized that neither the Training Section nor the Divisional Gas Officers should be under the Medical Department, and, in January, 1918, the organization was transferred to the Engineer Corps.

All of these, with the exception of the Gas and Flame regiment, were for service on this side. The need for an Overseas force was recognized and definitely stated in a letter, dated August 4, 1917. On September 3, 1917, an order was issued establishing the Gas Service, under the command of Lt. Col. (later Brigadier General) A. A. Fries, as a separate Department of the A. E. F. in France. In spite of a cable on September 26th, in which General Pershing had said

“Send at once chemical laboratory, complete equipment and personnel, including physiological and pathological sections, for extensive investigation of gases and powders....”

it was not until the first of January, 1918, that Colonel R. F. Bacon of the Mellon Institute sailed for France with about fifty men and a complete laboratory equipment.

Meantime a Chemical Service Section had been organized in the United States. This holds the distinction of being the first recognition of chemistry as a separate branch of the military service in any country or any war. This was authorized October 16, 1917, and was to consist of an officer of the Engineers, not above the rank of colonel, who was to be Director of Gas Service, with assistants, not above the rank of lieutenant colonel from the Ordnance Department, Medical Department and Chemical Service Section. The Section itself was to consist of 47 commissioned and 95 non-commissioned officers and privates. Colonel C. L. Potter, Corps of Engineers, was appointed Director and Professor W. H. Walker was commissioned Lieutenant Colonel and made Assistant Director of the Gas Service and Chief of the Chemical Service Section. This was increased on Feb. 15, 1918 to 227 commissioned and 625 enlisted men, and on May 6, 1918 to 393 commissioned and 920 enlisted men. Meanwhile Lt. Col. Walker had been transferred to the Ordnance and Lt. Col. Bogert had been appointed in his place.

At this time practically every branch of the Army had some connection with Gas Warfare. The Medical Corps directed the Gas Defense production. Offense production was in the hands of the Ordnance Department. Alarm devices, etc., were made by the Signal Corps. The Engineers contributed their 30th Regiment (Gas and Flame) and the Field Training Section. The Research Section was still in charge of the Bureau of Mines, in spite of repeated attempts to militarize it. And in addition, the Chemical Service Section had been formed primarily to deal with overseas work. While the Director of the Gas Service was expected to co-ordinate all these activities, he was given no authority to control policy, research or production.

In order to improve these conditions Major General Wm. L. Sibert, a distinguished Engineer Officer who built the Gatun Locks and Dam of the Panama Canal and who had commanded the First Division in France, was appointed Director of the Chemical Warfare Service on May 11, 1918. Under his direction the Chemical Warfare Service was organized with the following Divisions:

The final personnel authorized, though never reached owing to the signing of the Armistice, was 4,066 commissioned officers and 44,615 enlisted men; this was including three gas regiments of eighteen companies each.

General Sibert brought with him not only an extended experience in organizing and conducting big business, but a strong sympathy for the work and an appreciation of the problem that the American Army was facing in France. He very quickly welded the great organization of the Chemical Warfare Service into a whole, and saw to it that each department not only carried on its own duties but co-operated with the others in carrying out the larger program, which, had the war continued, would have beaten the German at his own game.

More detailed accounts will now be given of the various Divisions of the Chemical Warfare Service.

Administration Division

The Administration Division was the result of the development which has been sketched in the preceding pages. It is not necessary to review that, but the organization as of October 19, 1918 will be given:

The administrative offices were located in the Medical Department Building. The function of most of the sections is indicated by their names.

The Industrial Relations Section was created to care for the interests of the industrial plants which were considered as essential war industries. Through its activity many vitally important industries were enabled to retain, on deferred classification or on indefinite furlough, those skilled chemists without which they could not have maintained a maximum output of war munitions.

In the same way the University Relations Section cared for the educational and research institutions. In this way our recruiting stations for chemists were kept in as active operation as war conditions permitted.

Another important achievement of the Administration Section was to secure the order from The Adjutant General, dated May 28, 1918, that read:

“Owing to the needs of the military service for a great many men trained in chemistry, it is considered most important that all enlisted men who are graduate chemists should be assigned to duty where their special knowledge and training can be fully utilized.

“Enlisted men who are graduate chemists will not be sent overseas unless they are to be employed on chemical duties....”

While this undoubtedly created a great deal of feeling among the men who naturally were anxious to see actual fighting in France, it was very important that this order be carried out in order to conserve our chemical strength. The following clipping from the September, 1918, issue of The Journal of Industrial and Engineering Chemistry shows the result of this order.

“Chemists in Camp

Research Division

The American University Experiment Station, established by the Bureau of Mines in April, 1917, became July 1, 1918 the Research Division of the Chemical Warfare Service. For the first five months work was carried out in various laboratories, scattered over the country. In September, 1917, the buildings of the American University became available; a little later portions of the new chemical laboratory of the Catholic University, Washington, were taken over. Branch laboratories were established in many of the laboratories of the Universities and industrial plants, of which Johns Hopkins, Princeton, Yale, Ohio State, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard, Michigan, Columbia, Cornell, Wisconsin, Clark, Bryn Mawr, Nela Park and the National Carbon Company were active all through the war.

At the time of the signing of the armistice the organization of the Research Division was as follows:

The chief functions of the Research Division were:

The relation of the various sections may best be shown by outlining the general procedure used when a new toxic substance was developed.

The substance in question may have been used by the Germans or the Allies; it may have been suggested by someone outside the station; or the staff may have thought of it from a search of the literature, from analogy or from pure inspiration. The Offense Research Section made the substance. If it was a solid it was sent to the Dispersoid Section, where methods of dispersing it were worked out. When this had been done, or, at once, if the compound was a liquid or vapor, it was sent to the Toxicological Section to be tested for toxicity, lachrymatory power, vesicant action, or other special properties. If these tests proved the compound to have a high toxicity or a peculiar physiological behavior, it was then turned over to a number of different sections.

The Offense Research Section tried to improve the method of preparation. When a satisfactory method had been found, the Chemical Production or Small Scale Manufacturing Section endeavored to make it on a large scale (50 pounds to a ton) and worked out the manufacturing difficulties. If further tests showed that the substance was valuable, the manufacture was then given to the Development Division or the Gas Offense Production Division for large scale production.

Meanwhile the Analytical Section had been working on a method for testing the purity of the material and for analyzing air mixtures, and the Gas Mask Section had run tests against it with the standard canisters. If the protection afforded did not seem sufficient, the Defense Chemical Section studied changes in the ingredients of the canister or even developed a new absorbent or mixture of absorbents to meet the emergency. If a change in the mechanical construction of the canister was necessary, this was referred to the Mechanical Research Section; this work was especially important in case the material was to be used as a toxic smoke.

The compound was also sent to the Pyrotechnic Section, which studied its behavior when fired from a shell, or, if suitable, when used in a cylinder. If it proved stable on detonation, large field tests were then made by the Proving Division, in connection with the Pyrotechnic and Toxicological Sections of the Research Division, to learn the effect when shell loaded with the compound were fired from guns on a range, with animals placed suitably in or near the trenches. The Analytical Section worked out methods of detecting the gas in the field, wherever possible.

The Medical Division, working with the Toxicological and Pharmacological Sections, studied pathological details, methods of treating gassed cases, the effect of the gas on the body, and in some cases even considered other questions, such as the susceptibility of different men.

If the question of an ointment or clothing entered into the matter of protection, these were usually attacked by several Sections from different points of view.

Out of the 250 gases prepared by the Offense Chemical Research Section, very few were sufficiently valuable to pass all of these tests and thus the number of gases actually put into large scale production were less than a dozen. This had its advantages, for it made unnecessary a large number of factories and the training of men in the manufacturing details of many gases. As one British report stated, “The ultimate object of chemical warfare should be to produce two substances only; one persistent and the other non-persistent; both should be lethal and both should be penetrants.” They might well have added that both should be instantly and powerfully lachrymatory.

Since most of the work of the Research Division will be covered in detail in later chapters, only a brief summary of the principal problems will be given here.

The first and most important problem was the development of a gas mask. This was before Sections had been organized and was the work of the entire Division. After comparing the existing types of masks it was decided that the Standard Box Respirator of the British was the best one to copy. Because we were entirely new at the game that meant work on charcoal, soda-lime, and the various mechanical parts of the mask, such as the facepiece, elastics, eyepieces, mouthpiece, noseclip, hose, can, valves, etc. The story of the “first twenty thousand” is very well told by Colonel Burrell.[12]

The story of mustard gas is given later. It probably occupied more time and thought on the part of the Research Division, as well as that of Edgewood Arsenal and the Development Division, than any other gas.

Diphenylchloroarsine led to the preparation of a series of arsenic compounds, some more easily prepared and more or less effective.

Cyanogen chloride and cyanogen bromide, reported by the Italians as having been used by the Germans, were extensively studied.

The Inorganic Section was early interested in special incendiary materials which were developed for bombs, shells, darts and grenades, and which were later taken over by the Pyrotechnic Section, and finally adopted by the Ordnance Department.

In discussing the work one can very well start with the Offense Section. This Section had two aims in view always, to develop methods of making the gases used by the Germans more economically than they were making them, and to develop better gases if possible. When we entered the war, chlorine, phosgene and chloropicrin were the lethal gases used, while bromoacetone and xylyl bromide were the lachrymators. It was not a difficult matter to prepare these. But the introduction of mustard gas in the summer of 1917 and of diphenylchloroarsine in the autumn of the same year, not only made our chemists ponder over a manufacturing method, but also so revised our notions of warfare that the possibility of using other substances created the need for extensive research. The development of bromobenzylcyanide by the French likewise opened a new field among lachrymatory substances.

Colored rockets and smokes were developed for the Navy and Army. The smoke box was also studied but the work was taken over by the Pyrotechnic Section.

A large amount of pure inorganic research on arsine and arsenides, fluorine, hydrofluoric acid and fluorides, cyanides, cyanogen sulfide and nitrogen tetroxide was carried out, sometimes successfully and at other times with little or no success.

The Analytical Section not only carried out all routine analyses but developed methods for many new gases.

The Offense Section worked in very close contact with the Small Scale Manufacturing Section (Chemical Production Section). Often it happened that a method, apparently successful in the laboratory, was of no value in the plant. Small scale plants were developed for mustard gas, hydrocyanic acid, cyanogen chloride, arsenic trichloride, arsenic trifluoride, magnesium arsenide, superpalite and bromobenzylcyanide.

The Chemical Defense Section, organized January, 1918, was occupied with problems relating to protection, such as charcoal, soda-lime, and special absorbents, eyepieces, smoke filters, efficiency of absorbents, and special work with mustard gas.

Charcoal demanded extensive research. Raw materials required a world-wide search, carbonizing methods had to be developed, and impregnating agents were thoroughly studied. This story is told in Chapter XIII.

Soda-lime was likewise a difficult problem. Starting with the British formula, the influence of the various factors was studied and a balance between a number of desirable qualities, absorptive activity, capacity, hardness, resistance to abrasion, chemical stability, etc., obtained. The final product consisted of a mixture of lime, cement, kieselguhr, sodium permanganate and sodium hydroxide.

Equally valuable work was performed in the perfection of two carbon monoxide absorbents for the Navy. The better of these consisted of a mixture of suitably prepared oxides which acts catalytically under certain conditions, and causes the carbon monoxide to react with the oxygen of the air. Since there are color changes connected with the iodine pentoxide reaction (the first absorbent) it has been possible to develop this so as to serve as a very sensitive detector for the presence of carbon monoxide in air.

While the question of smoke filters was so important that it occupied the attention of several Sections, the Defense Section developed, as a part of its work, a standard method of testing and comparing filters, and did a great deal of work on the preparation of paper for this purpose.

Various problems related to mustard gas were also studied. The question of a protective ointment was solved as successfully as possible under the circumstances, but was dropped when it appeared doubtful if under battlefield conditions of concentration and length of exposure, any ointment offered sufficient protection to pay for the trouble of applying it. The removal of mustard gas from clothing was investigated, especially by the accelerating effect of turkey red oil. Another phase of the work concerned the destruction of mustard gas on the ground, while a fourth phase related to the persistency of mustard (and other gases) on the field of battle.

The Gas Mask Research Section concerned itself largely with developing methods of testing canisters and with routine tests. When one considers the number of gases studied experimentally, the large number of experimental canisters developed, all of which were tested against two or more gases, and further that the Section assisted in the control of the production at Long Island City, it is seen that this was no small job. In addition, the effect of various conditions, such as temperature, humidity, ageing, size of particles, were studied in their relation to the life of absorbents and canisters. Man tests and mechanical tests will be discussed in a later chapter. Other studies were concerned with weathering tests of gas mask fabrics, mustard gas detector, and covering for dugout entrances (dugout blankets), which were impregnated with a mixture of mineral and vegetable oils. In studying the course of gases through a canister the “wave front” method was of great value in detecting defects in canister design and filling.

The Pyrotechnic Section was composed of a number of units, each with its own problem. The gas shell was studied, with special reference to the stability of gases and toxic solids, both on storage and on detonation. Extensive work was carried out on smoke screens—a Navy funnel, an Army portable smoke apparatus, using silicon tetrachloride, a grenade, a Livens, and various shell being developed for that purpose. The smoke screen was adapted to the tank and the airplane as well as to the funnel of a ship. Several types of incendiary bombs and darts were perfected. The liquid fire gun was studied but the results were never utilized because of the abandonment as useless of that form of warfare. Various forms of signal lights, flares, rockets and colored smokes were studied and in most cases specifications were written. Extensive studies were also carried out on gas shell linings, from which a lead and an enamel lining were evolved. Many physical properties of war gases and their mixtures were determined.

The Dispersoid Section studied the production of smokes or mists from various solid and liquid substances. Apparatus were developed to study the concentration of smoke clouds and their rate of settling. The efficiency of various filters and canisters was determined, and among other things, a new smoke candle was perfected.

Mechanical research at first was related to design and construction of a canister and mask, based on the English type. During the latter part of 1917 the Tissot type of mask was studied and then turned over to the Gas Defense Division. A Navy Head Mask and canister was perfected. The horse mask was developed along the lines of the British type, and also a dog mask of the same general nature. Horse boots were also constructed, though they never were used at the front. Many Ordnance and Pyrotechnic problems were also successfully completed, not the least of which was a noiseless gas cylinder. This section developed the first special poison gas suit, composed of an oilcloth suit, a mask and helmet and a special canister.

The Manufacturing Development Section had general charge of the defense problems, and really acted as an emergency section, filling in as occasion demanded. They developed mustard gas clothing and a horse mask. They constructed a hydrogen plant at Langley Field, assisted in solving the difficulties relating to Batchite charcoal at Springfield, Mass., and co-operated in the study of paper and felt as filtering materials for smokes. Towards the close of the war the Section was interested in the application of the gas mask to the industries.

The Physiological work is discussed under the Medical Division.

The Editorial Section received reports from all the other Sections, from which a semi-monthly report was written, and distributed to authorized representatives of the Army and Navy and to our Allies. Reports were also received from abroad and the information thus received was made available to the Research Division. As the number of reports increased the work was collected together into monographs on the various war gases, absorbents, smokes, etc. After the signing of the armistice these were revised and increased in number, so that about fifty were finally turned over to the Director of the Chemical Warfare Service.

Gas Defense Division

The story of the Gas Defense Division is largely the story of the gas mask. Colonel (then Mr.) Bradley Dewey was in charge of the “first twenty thousand.” Soon after that work was undertaken, he was commissioned Major in the Gas Defense Division of the Sanitary Corps and was placed in charge of the entire manufacturing program. The work of the Division included the development and manufacture as well as the testing and inspection of gas masks, and other defense equipment. The magnitude of the work is seen from the following record of production: 5,692,000 completed gas masks, 3,614,925 of which were produced at the Long Island City Plant, while the remainder were assembled at the Hero Manufacturing Company’s Plant at Philadelphia, 377,881 horse masks, 191,388 dugout blankets, 2,450 protective suits and 1,773 pairs of gloves, 1,246 tons of protective ointment, 45,906 gas warning signals (largely hand horns), 50,549 trench fans and many oxygen inhalators.

Successfully used by the Gas Defense Division to stimulate care in every part of the operation of the manufacture of Gas Masks.]

The story of the “first twenty thousand” has already been told on page 43. That these masks were far from satisfactory is no reflection upon the men who made them. Even with the standard design of the British as a pattern, it was impossible to attain all the knowledge concerning gas masks in two months. The experience gained in this struggle enabled the Army to take up the manufacture of gas masks, in July, 1917, with a more complete realization of the seriousness of the task. The masks were not lost, either, for they were sent to the various camps as training masks and served a very useful purpose.

The first order after this was for 1,100,000 masks, to be completed within a year from date. For this production there was authorized one major, two captains, and ten lieutenants. How little the problem was understood is evident when we realize that in the end there were 12,000 employees in the Gas Defense Plant at Long Island City, N. Y. The first attempts were to secure these through existing concerns. The Hero Manufacturing Company of Philadelphia undertook the work and carried on certain portions of it all through the War. Experience soon showed, however, that because of the necessity for extreme care in the manufacture and inspection of the mask, the ordinary commercial organization was not adapted to carry on their manufacture on the scale necessitated by the Army program. Consequently, on Nov. 21, 1917, the Secretary of War authorized the establishment of a government operated plant, and experienced officials were drawn from New York, Chicago, Boston and other manufacturing centers to carry on the work. Buildings in Long Island City, not far from the chemical plant (charcoal and soda lime) at Astoria, were taken over by the officers of the Gas Defense Service, until in July, 1918, five large buildings were occupied, having a total floor space of 1,000,000 square feet (23 acres). The organization grew from the original thirteen officers until it included some 12,000 employees of whom about 8,500 were women. Because of the care required in all the work, attempt was made to secure, as far as possible, those who had relatives with the A. E. F. The thought was that their personal interest in the work would result in greater care in manufacture and inspection. The personnel was unique in that the authority was apparently divided between civilian and military, but there was no friction because of this. The efficiency of the entire organization is shown by the fact that the masks manufactured at Long Island City cost fifty cents less per mask than those manufactured under contract.

The first actual shipment (overseas) of box respirators was made from the Gas Defense Plant on March 4, 1918. From this date the production increased by leaps and bounds. As mentioned above, between this date and November 26, when the last mask was manufactured, 3,146,413 masks of the box respirator type were passed through final inspection in the plant. The greatest daily production, 43,926 masks, was reached on October 26, 1918. The process of manufacture will be discussed under the chapter on the Gas Mask.

During the last half of 1918 the Kops Tissot mask was manufactured. This mask had been perfected during the months preceding August, 1918, when its manufacture was started. Considerable difficulty was encountered in its production, but the first mask was completed on September 14, and between that time and the Armistice, 189,603 masks of this type had been manufactured.

Along with this manufacturing development went the building up of an elaborate procurement force charged with the responsibility of providing parts to be assembled at the Gas Defense Plant and at the Hero Manufacturing Company. This Section faced a hard and intricate task, but, though there were instances where the shortage of parts temporarily caused a slowing down of production, these were remarkably rare. Not only had the parts to be standardized, and specifications written, but a field inspection force had to be trained in order that the finished parts might be suitable for the final assembly plant. The problem was further complicated by the fact that the design was constantly changing, as improvement followed improvement. Officers, trained in inspection in a day, were sent out to train inspectors in the industrial centers.

In February, 1918, shortly before the German drive commenced, requisitions were received for sample lots of oiled mittens and oiled union suits as protection against mustard gas. These were prepared in quantity and sent to the front, as was also a considerable amount of chloride of lime for neutralizing the mustard gas in the field.

Another phase of the work consisted of the Field Testing Section, which was organized to provide field testing conditions for the regular product and for the development organization. Later there were added a preliminary course of training for officers for overseas duty in chemical warfare, the military training of the Gas Defense officers located in and near New York and the training of boat crews engaged in carrying offensive gas supplies. The Field Testing Section rendered valuable service in pointing out weaknesses of designs as developments took place and especially those uncomfortable features of the masks which were apparent only through long wear. During the course of this work the section built a complete trench system in the Pennsylvania Railroad yards with an elaborate dugout, the equal of any of the famous German quarters on the Western front.

The chapters on Charcoal, Soda-Lime and the Gas Mask must be read in this connection to gain an idea of the work carried out by this Division. It is summed up in the statement that American soldiers were provided with equipment which neutralized the best effects of German chemical knowledge as evidenced by the offensive methods and materials employed.

The organization of the Gas Defense Division, as of Nov. 11, 1918, was as follows:

Edgewood Arsenal

The Ordnance Department, in making plans for a shell filling plant, thought to interest existing chemical firms in the manufacture of the required toxic materials. As plans developed, however, difficulties arose in carrying out this program. The manufacture of such material at private plants necessitated its shipment to the filling plant at Edgewood. The transportation of large quantities of highly toxic gases seemed attended with great danger. The Director General of Railroads ruled that all such shipments must be made by special train, a very expensive method of transportation. Still more serious objections were encountered in the attempt to enlist the co-operation of existing firms. They recognized that the manufacture of such material would be attended by very great danger; that the work would be limited to the duration of the war; and that the processes involved, as well as the plants necessary for carrying out their processes, would have little post-war value. Moreover, such firms as had the personnel and equipment were already over-worked. With a few exceptions (notably the American Synthetic Color Company, the Oldbury Electro-Chemical Co., Zinsser & Co., and the Dow Chemical Company) they were unwilling to undertake work of this character on any terms whatever.

Early in December, 1917, therefore, it was decided to erect, on the site of the shell filling plant, such chemical plants as would be necessary to furnish the toxic materials required for filling the shell. The Arsenal is situated in an isolated district, twenty miles east of Baltimore, Maryland, on the Pennsylvania Railroad, and comprises 3,400 acres. Since the main line of the Pennsylvania Railroad runs on one side of the tract, while on another is the Bush River, only a few miles from its mouth in Chesapeake Bay, the tract was ideally situated for shipping. This site was referred to, at first, as “Gunpowder Reservation,” but on May 4, 1918, the name was officially changed to “Edgewood Arsenal.”