Fig. 15.—Setting Up a Smoke Barrage with Smoke Pots.
Not expecting the battle to be nearly continuous as it was for three weeks, the men, as before stated, were all put in the front line the morning of the attack. This resulted in their nearly complete exhaustion the first week, since they fought or marched day and night during nearly the whole time. Taking a lesson from this, in later attacks only half the men were put in the line in the first place, no matter if certain sectors had to be omitted. Fully as good results were obtained because, as the men became worn out, fresh ones were sent in and the others given a chance to recuperate. Officers relate many different occurrences showing the discipline and character of these gas troops. On one occasion where a battalion of infantry was being held up by a machine gun nest, volunteers were called for. Only two men, both from the gas regiment, volunteered though they were joined a little later by two others from the same regiment, and these four took the guns. While it was not considered desirable for gas troops to attempt to take prisoners, yet the regiment took quite a number, due solely to the fact that they were not only with the advancing infantry but at times actually in front of it. On another occasion a gas officer, seeing a machine gun battalion badly shot up and more or less rattled, took command and got them into action in fine shape.
At this stage the Second Army was formed to the southeast of Verdun and plans were drawn for a big attack about November 14. The value of gas troops was appreciated so much that the Second Army asked to have British gas troops assigned to them since no American gas troops were available. Accordingly in response to a request made by the American General Headquarters, the British sent 10 companies of their gas troops. These reached the front just before the Armistice, and hence were unable to carry out any attacks there.
This short history of the operations of the First Gas Regiment covers only the high spots in its organization and work. It covers particularly its early troubles, as those are felt to be the ones most important to have in mind if ever it be necessary again to organize C. W. S. troops on an extensive scale. The Regiment engaged in nearly 200 separate actions with poisonous gases, smoke and high explosives, and took part in every big battle from the second battle of the Marne to the end of the War. They were the first American troops to train with the British, and were undoubtedly the first American troops to take actual part in fighting the enemy as they aided the British individually and as entire units in putting off gas attacks, in February and March, 1918. It would be a long history itself to recite the actions in which the First Gas Regiment took part and in which it won distinction.[16]
No better summary of the work of this Regiment can be written than that of Colonel Atkisson in the four concluding paragraphs of his official report written just after the Armistice:
“The First Gas Regiment was made up largely of volunteers—volunteers for this special service. Little was known of its character when the first information was sent broadcast over the United States, bringing it to the attention of the men of our country. The keynote of this information was a desire for keen, red-blooded men who wanted to fight. They came into it in the spirit of a fighting unit, and were ready, not only to develop, but to make a new service. No effort was spared to make the organization as useful as the strength of the limited personnel allowed.
“The first unit to arrive in France moved to the forward area within eight weeks of its arrival, and, from that time, with the exception of four weeks, was continuously in forward areas carrying on operations. The third and last unit moved forward within six weeks of its arrival in France, and was continuously engaged until the signing of the Armistice.
“That the regiment entered the fight and carried the methods developed into execution where they would be of value, is witnessed by the fact that over thirty-five percent of the strength of the unit became casualties.
“It is only fitting to record the spirit and true devotion which prompted the officers and men who came from civil life into this Regiment, mastered the details of this new service, and, through their untiring efforts and utter disregard of self, made possible any success which the Regiment may have had. It was truly in keeping with the high ideals which have prompted our entire Army and Country in this conflict. They made the motto of ‘Service,’ a real, living, inspiring thing.”
Supply
As previously stated it was decided early that the Chemical Warfare Service should have a complete supply service including purchase, manufacture, storage and issue, and accordingly separate supply depots were picked out for the Gas Service early in the fall by Col. Crawford. Where practicable these were located in the same area as all other depots though in one instance the French forced the Gas Service to locate its gas shell and bomb depot some fifteen miles from the general depots through an unreasonable fear of the gas.
Manufacture of Gases. Due to the time required and the cost of manufacturing gases, an early decision became imperative as to what gases should be used by the Americans, and into what shells and bombs they should be filled. As there was no one else working on the subject the sole responsibility fell upon the Chief of the Gas Service. The work was further complicated by the fact that the British and French did not agree upon what gases should be used. The British condemned viciously Vincennite (hydrocyanic acid gas with some added ingredients) of the French, while the French stated that chloropicrin, used by the British principally as a lachrymator, was worthless. Fries felt the tremendous responsibility that rested upon him and finally after much thought and before coming to any conclusion, wrote the first draft of a short paper on gas warfare. In that paper he took up the tactical uses to which gases might be put and then studied the best and most available gases to meet those tactical needs.
Without stating further details it was decided to recommend the manufacture and use of chlorine, phosgene, chloropicrin, bromoacetone and mustard gas. As the gas service was also charged with handling smoke and incendiary materials, smoke was prescribed in the proportion of 5 per cent of the total chemicals to be furnished. The smoke material decided upon was white phosphorus.
The paper on Gas Warfare was then re-drafted and submitted to the French and British and written up in final form prescribing the gases above mentioned on October 26. Following this a cable was drawn and submitted to the General Staff. After many conferences and some delay the cable went forward on November 3.
Cable 268, November 4, 1917
Paragraph 12. For chief of Ordnance. With reference to paragraph 2 my cablegram 181, desire prompt information as to whether recommendation is approved that phosgene, chloropicrin, hydrocyanic acid, and chlorine be purchased in France or England and filling plants established in France for filling shells and bombs with those gases.
Subparagraph A. Reference to your telegram 253, recommend filling approximately 10 per cent all shells with gases as given below, but that filling plants and gas factories be made capable of filling a total of 25 per cent. Unless ordinary name is given, gases are designated by numbers in chemical code War Gas investigations. Of 75 millimeter shells fill 1 per cent Vincennite, 4 per cent phosgene or trichloromethyl chloroformate, 2 per cent chloropicrin, 2½ per cent mustard gas, ½ per cent with bromoacetone and ½ per cent with smoke material. According to French 75 millimeter steel shells should not be filled with Vincennite more than three months before being used. No trouble with other gases or other sized shells except that bromoacetone must be in glass lined shells. Of 4.7 inch shells fill 5 per cent with phosgene or trichloromethyl chloroformate, 2 per cent with chloropicrin, 2½ per cent with mustard gas, ½ per cent with bromoacetone and ½ per cent with smoke material. Provide same percentage for all other shells up to and including 8 inch caliber as for 4.7 inch shells. 4 inch Stokes’ mortar will use same gases and smoke shells and in addition thermit. 8 inch projector bombs will use the same as the Stokes’ mortar and also oil to break into flame on bursting. Cloud gas cylinders will be filled with 50 or 60 per cent phosgene, mixed with 40 to 50 per cent chlorine, or phosgene and some other gas. Renew recommendation that filling plants be established in France to provide sudden shifts in gas warfare of all kinds, as well as for filling all 4 inch Stokes’ mortar bombs, 8 inch projector bombs and cloud gas cylinders. It is strongly recommended that efforts be made to produce white phosphorus on large scale for its usefulness both as smoke screens and to produce casualties.
Subparagraph B. For the Adjutant General of the Army. With reference to paragraph 2, my cablegram 181, desire information as to whether recommendation is approved that an engineer officer assisted by Professor Hulett be assigned to Gas Service in Washington to handle all orders and correspondence concerning gas.
Subparagraph C. For Surgeon General. With reference to paragraph 2 your cablegram 205, and paragraph 2, my cablegram 181, what is status of chemical laboratory for France? Also have the 12 selected Reserve Officers for training in gas defense sailed for France?
Subparagraph D. With reference to paragraph 17 your cablegram 165 and paragraph 2 my cablegram 181, Tissot has constructed simpler model of his mask for attachment to any box. Have ordered 6 which will be completed in two weeks, 3 of which will be forwarded at once. A simple type such as this may prove useful for large number of troops. Letter of permission to manufacture Tissot masks being forwarded.
Subparagraph E. With reference to paragraph 8 your cablegram 143, and paragraph 4 your cablegram 247, in considering charcoal and other fillers for canister of box respirator it should be remembered that the front is very damp, the air being nearly saturated during greater part of winter, fall and spring.
This cable is given in full to show that not later than November 4, 1917, it was known in the United States not only what gases would be required but also in what shells, bombs, guns and mortars each would be used. While a small quantity of Vincennite was recommended in this cable, another cable sent within a month requested that no Vincennite whatever be manufactured. This decision as to gases and guns in which they were to be used, while very progressive, proved entirely sound and remained unchanged, with slight exceptions due to new discoveries, until the end of the war. Without a thorough understanding of tactics a proper choice of gases could not have been made. This fact emphasizes the necessity of having a trained technical army man at the head of any gas service.
Due to the absence of a Chemical Warfare Service in the United States at this time, a very great deal of the information sent from France, whether by cable or by letter, never reached those needing it.
Smoke. About the first of December after a study of results obtained by the British and the Germans in the use of smoke in artillery shells for screening purposes, the Gas Service decided that much more smoke than had been stated in cable 268 to the United States was desirable. The General Staff, however, refused to authorize any increase, but did allow to be sent in a cable a statement to the effect that a large increase in smoke materials might be advisable for smoke screens, and that accordingly the amount of phosphorus needed in a year of war would probably be three or four times the one and a half million pounds of white phosphorus stated to have been contracted for by the Ordnance Department in the United States. This advanced position of the Gas Service in regard to smoke proved sound in 1918, when every effort was made to increase the quantity of white phosphorus available and to extend its use in artillery shells including even the 3 inch Stokes’ mortar.
Fig. 16.—Troops Advancing Behind a Smoke Barrage (Phosphorus).
Overseas Repair Section No. 1. During the latter part of November, 1917, Overseas Repair Section No. 1, under the command of Captain Mayo-Smith, Sanitary Corps, with four other officers and 130 men, arrived in France. Since mask development and manufacture in the United States was still under the Medical Department, this mask repair section was organized as a part of the Sanitary Corps. As there were at that time no masks to be repaired and no laboratory equipment or buildings for that purpose on hand and none likely to be for months to come, Captain Mayo-Smith was assigned to duty under Colonel Crawford, Chief Gas Officer with the Line of Communication, in Paris. A site for a mask repair plant was located at Châteauroux, and a site for a gas depot at Gievres was investigated. Inasmuch as there was at that time greater need for men to learn the handling of poisonous gases than to repair masks, some 40 or 50 of the company were put in gas shell filling plants at Aubervilliers and Vincennes in the suburbs of Paris, while later still others were assigned to Pont de Claix near Grenoble. The remainder of the company were used in the Gas Depot at Gievres and in the office in Paris.
It was not until the latter part of June, 1918, that the mask repair plant began operations. In the meantime these men did very valuable work in shell filling and in learning the manufacture of gases. Several of them were sent to the United States, some of them remaining throughout the war to aid in gas manufacture and in shell filling.
Construction Division, Gas Service. The Construction Division under Colonel Crawford in Paris made complete plans for phosgene manufacturing plants, for shell filling plants and for the Mask Repair Plant. These plans included a complete layout of the work for all persons to be employed in the plants. During this same time a very careful study of the possibilities for manufacturing gas for filling shell in France was made.
Finally about March 1, in accordance with the strong recommendations of these men, Fries reported to General Pershing in person that the manufacture of gas as well as the filling of shell in France was inadvisable from every point of view and accordingly he recommended that gas manufacture and shell filling in France be given up. General Pershing strongly approved the recommendation and a cablegram was at once sent to the United States to that effect. The main reason for this action was the lack of chlorine, since chlorine was the principal ingredient of nearly all poisonous gases then in use. Chlorine takes, besides salt, electric power and lots of it. Electric power requires coal or water power. Neither of the latter sources were available in France. This question was gone into very thoroughly. The only place where power might have been developed was in a remote spot near Spain, and the outlook there was such that it appeared impossible to begin the manufacture of chlorine under two years. On the other hand the shipment of chlorine from the United States required from 75 per cent to 100 per cent of the tonnage required to ship the manufactured gases themselves, to say nothing of the labor, raw materials, and the machinery that would have had to be shipped in order to manufacture gas in France.
Mustard Gas. As previously stated Mustard Gas was first used by the Germans against the British at Ypres on the nights of July 11 and 12, 1917. It was not used much against the French until more than two months later. Indeed, gas was never used by the Germans to the same extent against the French as against the English. There are probably two reasons for this; first, the Germans had a deeper hatred for the British than the French; second, the British morale was higher than the French in 1917, and the German thought that if he could break down this British morale, he could win the war.
The first attack came as a surprise and accordingly got an unusually large number of casualties. As previously stated the casualties numbered about 20,000 in about six weeks. This number was considered so serious that the beginning of the series of attacks against Ypres in the fall of 1917, was delayed by the British for 10 days or two weeks until they could study better how to avoid such great losses from mustard gas. While the composition of the gas was known within two or three days, as well as the laboratory method by which it was first manufactured by Victor Meyer in 1886, it took some 11 months to develop reliable and practical methods of manufacturing it on a large scale. The Inter-allied Gas Conference in September, 1917, gave a great deal of attention to mustard gas and methods of combating it both from the view point of prevention and of curing those gassed by it.
Just following the close of that conference a cable was sent to the United States asking the possibility of manufacturing ethylene chlorhydrin, the principal element in the manufacture of mustard gas by the only process then known. Later, that is about the middle of October, a cablegram was sent urging investigation into the manufacture of this gas. It is believed a great deal of time might have been saved had the policy of undue secrecy not been adopted by the British and others before the Americans entered the war. In fact we were only told in whispers the formula for mustard gas, and where a description of it could be found in German chemistries. This was arrant nonsense since if the Germans had gotten all mustard gas information then in the hands of the British they would have received far less information than they already possessed on mustard gas.
Fig. 17.—“Who Said Gas?”
Whether the information sent to the United States on mustard gas ultimately proved of any great value is an open question since the methods adopted in the United States were very greatly superior to those used in England and in France. It probably helped by suggestion rather than by actual details of design. Anyhow it all emphasizes the difficulties encountered in war when so vital a substance as mustard gas must be investigated after the enemy has begun using it on a large scale.
Delay of British Masks. As December 1 approached, and as nothing further had been heard of the order for 300,000 British Respirators placed about the middle of October, a telegram was sent to England asking if deliveries would be made as required in the order for the masks. This order required the first 75,000 to be delivered December 1, 1917. In reply it was stated that the British could not furnish these masks, and that they understood that the Americans were just beginning a large output of masks in the United States. An exchange of cablegrams with the United States showed that no masks could be expected from there for 3 to 5 months. Moreover it became increasingly evident that the Americans were going into the battle line sooner than at first contemplated. Another cablegram was then sent to England urging the delivery of these masks. The reply was to the effect that the English Government could not deliver the masks because they did not have enough for their own use. This situation was very serious. Unless the order for 300,000 masks placed with the British could be filled, we were facing the necessity of sending American troops into the front line with only the French M-2 mask. While the M-2 mask was then the only mask used by the French, it was well known to afford practically no protection against the high concentrations of phosgene obtained from cloud or projector attacks. And it was just such attacks as these that our men would encounter in the front line during training. Accordingly arrangements were made for a hurried trip to England.
Colonel Harrison of the British Royal Engineers was in charge of the British manufacture of masks and it is desired here to express appreciation of his uniform courtesy and great helpfulness. He exhibited their methods and facilities and assured us they could meet any requirements of ours for masks up to a half million, or even more if necessary, provided they were given time to establish additional facilities. Finally after a further exchange of cables the masks were obtained.
During December, 1917 and January, 1918, when every effort was being made to hurry a lot of masks from Havre—Havre being the British supply base in France from which the masks were issued to the United States, the severe cold and snow had so disorganized French traffic that it was extremely difficult to get cars moving at all. In an effort to get the masks, priority of shipment was obtained and two or three officers were assigned to convoy the cars. Notwithstanding convoying, one carload of 4,000 masks, mainly threes and fours, became lost and only turned up five weeks later. To make matters worse the British were sending us very many more of the small sized No. 2 masks than we could use. The loss of this carload of 4,000 number threes and fours was all but a tragedy. Indeed, in order to get the First Brigade of the First Division equipped in time it was necessary to take a large number of masks already issued to men of the Second Brigade. These masks were first thoroughly washed and disinfected and then re-issued.
This all emphasizes the great difficulties that are encountered when a new and vital service must be organized in war 4,000 miles overseas without material, home supplies, or men to draw from. This struggle to get sufficient masks to keep all men fully equipped remained very acute until in July, 1918, when the arrival of hundreds of thousands of masks from the United States made the situation entirely safe. Even then the necessity of weakening the elastics and shortening the rubber tubing of the mouthpieces on some 700,000 masks, doubled up our work tremendously, and added enormously to our troubles in getting masks to the front in time.
Notwithstanding these troubles the Chemical Warfare Supply Service never failed and finally forged to the very forefront of all American supply services. Its method of issuing supplies to troops at the front has been adopted as the standard for American field armies of the future.
Technical
Gas Laboratory in Paris. Early in January, 1918, the first members of the Chemical Service Section, National Army, under the command of Colonel R. F. Bacon, arrived in France and reported for duty. Previously, a laboratory site at Puteaux, a suburb of Paris, had been selected. This plant had been built by a society for investigation into tuberculosis. Previous to the arrival of the Chemical Service Section, information had been requested from the United States by cable as to the size of the laboratory section to be sent over. The reply stated that the number would probably total about 100 commissioned and enlisted. The site at Puteaux was accordingly definitely decided upon. Just following this decision two cables, one after the other, came from the United States recommending certain specified buildings in Paris for the laboratory. It was found upon investigation in both cases that the buildings were either absolutely unsuited or unfinished. This was another case of trying to fight a war over 4,000 miles of cable. Colonel Bacon was made head of the Technical Division, which position he held throughout the war.
Fig. 18.—Shaper for Opening Captured Gas Shell.
Technically Trained Men. In January, 1918, in response to a cable from the United States a request had been made on the French Government to send six of their ablest glass blowers to the United States to aid in making glass lined shells. The French Gas authorities said that it would be impossible to send those or indeed any other men trained in the manufacture or handling of poisonous gases or gas containers as they did not have enough such men for their own work. Accordingly a cablegram was drafted and sent to the United States, requesting that 50 men experienced in various lines of technical and chemical work be sent to France. The French authorities said they would put them in any factories, laboratories or experimental places that the Chief of the Gas Service desired. A second inquiry about these men was sent but nevertheless no answer was ever received and no men were sent.
Protection Against Particulate Clouds. Just at this time, about the first of February, 1918, the danger that the Germans might devise some better method of sending over diphenylchloroarsine than by pulverizing it in high explosive shell was felt to be serious. The British had just then perfected protection against diphenylchloroarsine by employing unsized sulfate wood pulp paper—48 to 60 layers being required. This number of layers was found to be necessary as they are very thin and porous. The British had developed a method of putting this paper around a canister and yet keeping the canister small enough to fit into the knapsack by reversing its position therein; that is, putting the canister in the compartment of the knapsack made for the face piece and putting the face piece in the other compartment. Some of our own officers and enlisted men were sent to England to work with the British on this and an order given them for 200,000 of the protected canisters. They improved on the methods of the British and as it was found that sulfate paper was very scarce, investigations were made to see if any of it could be manufactured in France. Very soon thereafter such a place was located near the city of Nancy. Following this a cablegram was sent to the United States giving complete specifications for making this diphenylchloroarsine protection. From this cablegram successful samples were made though somewhat more bulky than those developed in England. Very few, however, of these were made in the United States due, we were informed, to the poor quality of the sulfate paper. Work was however begun energetically in the United States on other methods of protection against diphenylchloroarsine.
Numbers of Chemists Needed. It was figured that out of a total force of some 1,400 gas officers there would be needed in the A. E. F., exclusive of those in regiments, approximately 200 chemists, i.e., about 15 per cent of the whole. We arranged to have a good chemist on each Division, Corps and Army Staff, and a certain number with the gas troops. It was proposed to put 20 to 40 in the laboratory in Paris and not to exceed 20 at the experimental field. This subject of personnel is touched on for the reason that a few people seem to have the idea that the Chemical Warfare Service should be made up of chemists exclusively. This is very far from being true. It was and is believed that the Chemical Warfare Service should be composed of men from every walk of life. In three positions out of every four in the field a good personality combined with energy, hard work and common sense count for more than mere technical training.
Hanlon (Experimental) Field. As early as December 15, 1917, it was decided that an experimental field in France was necessary, and a letter was written to the General Staff requesting authority to establish one. After considerable delay the authority was granted and search for a site begun. This was no easy task. While the French were loading millions of gas shells at the edge of Paris, they appeared unwilling at first to have us establish a gas experimental field except in abandoned or inaccessible spots. Finally a very good site was found and agreed to by the French some 7 miles south of General Headquarters. Just when we were ready to start work the French discovered that the proposed field included a portion of one of their artillery firing ranges. They then suggested another site within 3 miles of General Headquarters. This was a rather fortunate accident as the site suggested was a better one than at first picked out. The field was roughly rectangular from 7 to 8 miles in length, and 3 to 4 miles in width. The total area was about 20 square miles. The work of this experimental field proved a great success and was rapidly becoming the real center of the Gas Service in France.
The old saying that the history of a happy country is very brief applies to this story of the Technical Section of the Gas Service in France. Its work did not begin as early as that of the other sections, and as considerable of it was of a nature that could be put off without immediate fatal effects, the Section was enabled to grow without the very serious drawbacks encountered by other Sections of the Gas Service.
Nevertheless its usefulness was very great. Those of the Technical Section either at the experimental field or at the laboratory were charged with the opening of all sorts of known and unknown gas and high explosive shells, fuses and similar things to determine their contents and their poisonous or explosive qualities. This was work of a very technical nature, and at the same time highly dangerous.
As stated elsewhere, the determination of the life of the masks became one of the problems which the laboratory was trying to solve. Hundreds of canisters were tested, and hundreds per month would have continued to have been tested throughout the remainder of the war had the war gone into 1919. It was on the Technical Section that devolved the duty of determining at the earliest possible moment the physical properties as well as the physiological effects of any new gas.
Also on that Section fell the preliminary reports as to the probable usefulness in war of a new gas whether sent over by the enemy or suggested by our own Technical men, or those of our Allies. This was indeed a task by itself, as it required a wide knowledge of the methods of using gases, methods of manufacturing them, and methods of projecting them on the field of battle.
In addition, it was the duty of the Technical Section to keep the Chief of the Service fully informed on all the latest developments in gases and to get that information in shape so that the Chief with his increasingly wide range of duties would be enabled to keep track of them without reading the enormous amount ordinarily written.
A much earlier start on technical work would have proved of immense advantage. In case of another war, the technical side of chemical warfare should be taken up with the very first expedition that proceeds to the hostile zone. Had that been done in France, we would have had masks and gases and proper shells and bombs at least six months before we did.
Intelligence
While Intelligence was for a long time under the Training or Technical Divisions, it finally assumed such importance that it was made a separate Division. It was so thoroughly organized that by the time of the Armistice the Chief of the Division could go anywhere among the United States forces down to companies and immediately locate the Gas Intelligence officer.
Intelligence Division. This work was started by Lieutenant Colonel Goss within a month after he reported in October, 1917. The Intelligence Division developed the publication of numerous occasional pamphlets and also a weekly gas bulletin. So extensive was the work of this Division that three mimeograph machines were kept constantly going. The weekly bulletin received very flattering notice from the British Assistant Chief of Gas Service in the Field. He stated that it contained a great deal of information he was unable to get from any other source.
Among other work undertaken by this Intelligence Division was the compilation of a History of the Chemical Warfare Service in France. This alone involved a lot of work. In order that this history might be truly representative, about three months before the Armistice both moving and still pictures were taken of actual battle conditions, as well as of numerous works along the Service of Supplies.
Without going into further detail it is sufficient to say that when the Armistice was signed there were available some 200 still pictures, and some 8,000 feet of moving picture films. Steps were immediately taken to have this work continued along definite lines to give a complete and continuous history of the Chemical Warfare Service in France in all its phases.
The intelligence work of the Gas Service, while parallel to a small extent with the General Intelligence Service of the A. E. F., had to spread to a far greater extent in order to get the technical details of research, manufacture, development, proving, and handling poisonous gases in the field. It included also obtaining information at the seats of Government of the Allies, as well as from the enemy and other foreign sources.
The most conspicuous intelligence work done along these lines was by Lieutenant Colonel J. E. Zanetti, who was made Chemical Warfare liaison officer with the French in October, 1917. He gathered together and forwarded through the Headquarters of the Chemical Warfare Service to the United States more information concerning foreign gases, and foreign methods of manufacturing and handling them, than was sent from all other sources combined. By his personality, energy and industry he obtained the complete confidence of the French and British. This confidence was of the utmost importance in enabling him to get information which could have been obtained in no other way. Suffice to say that in the 13 months he was liaison officer with the French during the war, he prepared over 750 reports, some of them very technical and of great length.
As a whole, the Intelligence Division was one of the most successful parts of the Chemical Warfare Service. Starting 2½ years after the British and French, the weekly bulletin and occasional papers sent out by the Chemical Warfare Service on chemical warfare matters came to be looked upon as the best available source for chemical warfare information, not alone by our own troops but also by the British.
Medical
The Medical Section of the Chemical Warfare Service was composed of officers of the Medical Department of the Army attached to the Chemical Warfare Service. These were in addition to others who worked as an integral part of the Chemical Warfare Service, either at the laboratory or on the experimental field in carrying out experiments on animals to determine the effectiveness of the gases.
The Medical Section was important for the reason that it formed the connecting link between the Chemical Warfare Service and the Medical Department. Through this Section, the Medical Department was enabled to know the kinds of gases that would probably be handled, both by our own troops and by the enemy, and their probable physiological effects.
Colonel H. L. Gilchrist, Medical Department, was the head of this Section. It was through his efforts that the Medical Department realized in time the size of the problem that it had to encounter in caring for gas patients. Indeed, records of the war showed that out of 224,089 men, exclusive of Marines, admitted to the hospitals in France, 70,552 were suffering from gas alone. These men received a total of 266,112 wounds, of which 88,980, or 33.4 per cent, were gas. Thus ⅓ of all wounds received by men admitted to the hospital were gas. While the records show that the gas cases did not remain on the average in the hospitals quite as long as in the case of other classes of wounds, yet gas cases became one of the most important features of the Medical Department’s work in the field.
The Medical Section, through its intimate knowledge of what was going on in the Chemical Warfare Service as well as what was contemplated and being experimented with, was enabled to work out methods of handling all gas cases far in advance of what could have been done had there been no such section. One instance alone illustrates this fully. It became known fairly early that if a man who had been gassed with mustard gas could get a thorough cleansing and an entire change of clothing within an hour after exposure, the body burns could be eliminated or largely decreased in severity. This led to the development of degassing units. These consisted of 1,200 gallon tanks on five-ton trucks equipped with a heater. Accompanying this were sprinkling arrangements whereby a man could be given a shower bath, his nose, eyes and ears treated with bicarbonate of soda, and then be given an entire change of clothing. These proved a very great success, although they were not developed in time to be used extensively before the war closed.
There is an important side to the Medical Section during peace, that must be kept in mind. The final decision as to whether a gas should be manufactured on a large scale and used extensively on the field of battle depends upon its physiological and morale effect upon troops. In the case of the most powerful gases, the determination of the relative values of those gases so far as their effects on human beings is concerned is a very laborious and exacting job. Such gases have to be handled with extreme caution, necessitating many experiments over long periods of time in order to arrive at correct decisions.