Corea: The Hermit Nation

Having been responsible for two great foreign wars fought by Japan, it was natural that at the end of each campaign the position of Corea among nations should be notably altered. The war with the Middle Kingdom blew to pieces the Chinese doctrine of universal sovereignty, besides making the once vassal state independent. In name, at least, Corea was made an empire. The war with Russia annihilated the dogma so long held in Europe, that Asiatic nations exist for conquest and spoliation, with the corollary that “the break-up of China” was imminent. Japanese success in the war of 1894–95 was a vindication of the American doctrine as expounded by men from the United States during a century, and formulated by John Hay—“China for the Chinese.”

Had Corea been a state fitted, by the power of unselfish patriotism and love of industry among her leaders, to survive amid modern political and economic conditions, Japan’s triumph over Russia would have made her all the stronger. Her independence would have been assured, had the virtue of her own sons responded to the opportunity.

On the contrary, the history of Corea since 1866, as outlined on these pages, reveals the fatal weakness of the ruling class in Corea. Instead of giving themselves to patriotic sacrifice and personal industry, the yang-ban, or men of privilege, have made their capital a hot-bed of intrigue and Corea the storm centre of the Far East. Instead of developing their own strength and the nation’s resources, they have plied the arts of cunning and the crafts of the weak. Yet modern civilization, rich in powerful governments, has no place for the weak. Least of all is self-chosen weakness allowable.

Being neither skilful merchants like the Chinese, nor brave warriors like the Japanese, the Corean noblemen—on whom lies [498]the burden of responsibility—might at least have imitated the good example of their island neighbors. In Japan the outstanding event of modern times was the renunciation, in 1871, by 400,000 knights or gentry, of their hereditary pensions paid out of the public treasury.1 After this sacrifice, made in the interests of true patriotism, they put off their swords and silk petticoats, got to work, paid taxes, and began to earn an honest living. Even China has broken with her unsocial past and conceit of perfection, and has entered upon the path of modern civilization.

The Corean yang-ban abused their independence by intrigue. They failed to discern that the petty arts of the plotter endangered their existence as a nation. After her second great war, Japan saw clearly that to allow her neighbor state, wherein there was no sharp distinction between the Court and the Government, to remain, as of old, the hot-bed of intrigue, would jeopard her own existence. She therefore did for Corea what Great Britain has done for Egypt, the United States for Cuba, and the French for Annam. Corea is now numbered among protectorates.

When our narrative closed in September, 1904, the Japanese were building a trunk line of railroad, nearly six hundred miles long, which should traverse the whole peninsula from Fusan to Wiju (Ai-chiu, pp. 181, 364). Port Arthur had not surrendered. The real goal of the Japanese armies, the city of Mukden, containing the mausoleums of the Manchiu dynasty now ruling in Peking, “the possession of which would put the heart of China in the palm of Japan’s hand,” was yet unreached. Yet those who in the early seventies had helped to train the boys who made the public-school army of Japan, had no fear of its ultimate triumph.1

On the 3d of January, 1905, Port Arthur was formally surrendered, and its evacuation completed January 7th. The main Japanese army fronting Mukden was quickly reënforced by Nogi’s division on the left, or west, and by Kawamura’s army, out of Corea, on the right, or east. The great campaign of hard fighting, destined to last nearly a month, opened amid a snow-storm on the 23d of February. By the 28th the fighting was general along the whole front of nearly one hundred miles. On the 10th of March [499]Oku’s columns entered, by the southern gate, the city of Mukden. The Russians lost nearly thirty thousand in dead and over forty thousand prisoners. The Japanese pursuit northward lasted until April 14th.

On the 27th and 28th of March “the battle of The Sea of Japan” took place, in which the Russian armada of thirty-eight modern ships of war was, “by the grace of Heaven and the help of the gods,” annihilated.

By invitation of President Roosevelt, the envoys of the two warring nations, de Witte and Rosen for Russia, and Komura and Takahira for Japan (both of the latter the writer’s former pupils in Tokio), met at Portsmouth, N. H.; whence, in the thirties, had sailed Captain Edmund Roberts, commissioned by President Jackson, and the first American diplomatist in the Far East. The Japanese won a signal diplomatic victory, securing the main points of their contention.

The peace treaty which was signed recognized in the first article Japan’s predominant position in Corea, political, military, economic, as well as her right to supervise that country’s affairs and to protect it, Russia agreeing not to obstruct Japan’s proceedings in any respect. One of the first and worst results for Corea was the immediate entrance within her borders of a horde of low-class, insolent Japanese adventurers, who, by their cruelties and spoliations of natives, nearly neutralized the well-meant plans of good men in Tokio.

Following up the results of the decisive war, the Mikado sent his highly honored servant, Baron Komura, to Peking to arrange matters amicably with China, and then turned his attention to Corea. The protocol of March, 1904 (p. 495), had been quickly followed by the abolition of the Peddlers’ Guild (so long used by pro-Russian intriguers) and by the visit of Marquis Ito, who bore a reassuring message of fraternity and good-will. Mr. I. Megata, one of the most experienced and skilful officers of the Treasury Department in Tokio, was sent to Seoul as financial adviser, and Mr. Durham Dwight Stevens, an American gentleman, who united ability and tact to long and varied experience in diplomacy in the Far East, accepted the post of assistant at the Corean Foreign Office. These gentlemen, like all their predecessors, encountered insuperable difficulties in dealing with a government that was [500]nominally carried on at the Council Board, but in reality directed from the harem or by clan factions in secret intrigue.

Occupied so seriously with other matters, few attempts were made at first by the Japanese Government in the interest of real reforms that could benefit the Corean people. Meanwhile, it must be repeated, tens of thousands of the Mikado’s subjects, many of them of the most truculent temper and disreputable character, crowded into the peninsula, committing acts of rapine and brutality which neutralized many of the best measures of wise statesmen. When the proposition, approved of in Tokio, was made that all uncultivated land in the peninsula should be open to Japanese occupation and enterprise, and the water rights and supply be shared by these aliens, the Corean people, as a body, made systematic protest. All the circumstances considered, this sudden act of virtual spoliation was a colossal blunder. In the eyes of the Coreans it was not only “stealing water from another man’s field”—so terrible a crime in lands of rice culture, where irrigation is a vital necessity—but the theft of the very soil itself. At once a storm of opposition arose that swept the peninsula from end to end. The Corean Emperor was besieged with petitions to resist the Japanese demands. A society called Po-an, for the preservation of safety and peace, was formed, which met in Seoul in excited discussion, and began the propagation of what seemed to the Japanese authorities a campaign of sedition. The meetings of the Po-an were broken up by the police, and the Japanese garrison of Seoul was augmented to six thousand men. Though other Corean societies were formed, the excitement died out, the Japanese not pushing their scheme, the Corean noblemen showing little or no real patriotism, and the people little power of persistent unity. On October 13, 1904, General Hasegawa took control of the military situation.

Yet it is the simple truth to state that while the Japanese soldier, superb in discipline and noble in human qualities, is respected by the Corean, the low Japanese, who so often proves himself a rascal, is feared and despised. It is unfortunate that these disreputable characters were so long under such slight control from Tokio. On the other hand, notwithstanding that Japan, in the treaty of 1904, had guaranteed the independence of Corea, yet the Government in Seoul, choked by palace cliques, languished [501]in chronic feebleness. Unable to keep order at home, to pay its legation bills abroad, or to separate itself from that “Forbidden Interior” of mystery in the boudoir inhabited by a mob of women, eunuchs and hangers-on, which curses China, Corea, and so long cursed old Japan in both Yedo and Kioto, what guarantee was there for the peace of Asia and the world? For the preservation of this, the Mikado’s Government was responsible, while every complication in Corea involved Japan also.

After long deliberation, the statesmen in Tokio agreed that the surest exit out of the labyrinthine difficulty was to take charge of Corea’s foreign relations and place a controller-general at the capital, with subordinates at the chief cities and seaports, leaving internal affairs to be directed from Seoul. The Mikado despatched Marquis Ito—“patient, able, and authoritative”—to Seoul.

On the 17th of November, 1905, the Corean Emperor’s minister, Pak Che Soon, and the Mikado’s representative, Hayashi, signed a treaty, of which the following is the official translation into English:

The Governments of Japan and Corea, desiring to strengthen the principle of solidarity which unites the two Empires, have with that object in view agreed upon and concluded the following stipulations to serve until the moment arrives when it is recognized that Corea has attained national strength:—

Article I. The Government of Japan, through the Department of Foreign Affairs at Tokio, will hereafter have control and direction of the external relations and affairs of Corea, and the diplomatic and consular representatives of Japan will have the charge of the subjects and interests of Corea in foreign countries.

Art. II. The Government of Japan undertake to see to the execution of the treaties actually existing between Corea and other Powers, and the Government of Corea engage not to conclude hereafter any act or engagement having an international character, except through the medium of the Government of Japan.

Art III. The Government of Japan shall be represented at the Court of His Majesty the Emperor of Corea by a Resident General, who shall reside at Seoul, primarily for the purpose of taking charge of and directing matters relating to diplomatic affairs. He shall have the right of private and personal audience of His Majesty the Emperor of Corea. The Japanese Government shall also have the right to station Residents at the several open ports and such other places in Corea as they may deem necessary. Such Residents shall, under the direction of the Resident General, exercise the powers and functions hitherto appertaining to Japanese Consuls in Corea, and shall perform such duties as may be necessary in order to carry into full effect the provisions of this agreement. [502]

Art. IV. The stipulations of all treaties and agreements existing between Japan and Corea not inconsistent with the provisions of this agreement shall continue in force.

Art. V. The Government of Japan undertake to maintain the welfare and dignity of the Imperial House of Corea.

In faith whereof the undersigned, duly authorized by the Governments, have signed this agreement and affixed their seals.

[Signed] Hyashi Gonsuke,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.

[Signed] Pak Che Soon,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

November 17, 1905.

Whatever may be the real history of the transfer thus made or the means taken to secure the document, it is certain that the governments of Europe and America were very prompt in withdrawing their legations from Seoul and in acknowledging Japan’s supremacy. In Washington the minds of the President and Secretary of State were quickly made up, because of the local eccentricities of Corean envoys, unable to pay their grocery bills, and despite the representations of more than one private emissary. On the accession of Theodore Roosevelt to the presidency by the election of the people and his change of diplomatic assistants, Minister Horace N. Allen, long our able representative in Seoul, was succeeded, in 1905, by Mr. Edwin Vernon Morgan, who had had experience in Samoa, Corea, Russia, and China. He being appointed to another position, the American legation in Seoul ceased, while the consul-general and consuls were retained as before.

Meanwhile, under the energetic action of the Resident General Ito, real reforms were inaugurated and disorderly Japanese characters arrested and either sent out of the country or made to give pledges for good behavior. The whole prospect of things brightened.

At a banquet given in his honor by his countrymen in Seoul, April 8, 1906, the Marquis Ito spoke as follows:

“According to what His Corean Majesty has repeatedly condescended to say to me, I may be permitted to believe that I have the honor to enjoy his confidence and trust in no small measure. He has on more than one occasion been pleased to assure me that he wished to rely upon my loyal services for the regeneration of [503]the Corean Administration. His Majesty has also given orders to his Ministers to carry out this work of regeneration under my direction and guidance. As for the Corean Ministers, they have assured me of their determination to do their utmost to this end; they say that an opportunity like the present will not occur again, and, as a matter of fact, they are now actively engaged in the work of regeneration.”

Apparently these words were as honestly applauded by the Corean Emperor’s servants as they were believed to be true by the speaker himself. In mutual confidence, Corean military officers were duly appointed, and both General Hasegawa and the Marquis Ito left with them for Japan, to witness the grand review of the returning victorious Japanese armies from Manchuria, which was held in Tokio April 30th.

The opportunity for intrigue and conspiracy created by the absence of the two great men was too tempting to be lost by the factions of the boudoir and its inmates. The Corean Conservative and Progressive parties kept warring among themselves, hatching plots in which even the emperor’s privy councillors, palace eunuchs, and officers of the Imperial household were active. Two lines of policy looking to domestic and foreign disturbance were mapped out by the conspirators. One utilized the distress and almost chronic troubles in the southwestern provinces, the other was based on the hope of Russian intervention. The plot was planned by yang-ban in the palace itself.

In Chung Chong Do (p. 194) a Min and in Chulla Do (p. 199) a Choi nobleman led the insurrections. Antiquated muskets, matchlocks, swords, and spears were laid in store against the Japanese. In Kang-wen Do (p. 208), also, troubles were reported. Four police (out of the 350 then in all Corea) were sent from the Residency in Seoul, but they were killed or driven away. The Corean provincial troops being supine, two companies of Japanese infantry were sent to the city. Attacking in daylight in order to spare the peaceful non-combatants, the soldiers blew up the gates with dynamite. After some street fighting the city was in the hands of the military, 69 Coreans being killed and 145 made prisoners. It was hoped that this affair would end further insurrection.

But in a land so long governed by the sorcerer, where the [504]means of communication are slight and the people lack education and mental initiative, news travels slowly. Choi, in the more southern city, held out. Murderous attacks on Japanese settlers and fishermen continued. The Wi-pion party, representing inveterate conservatism, sided with the insurgents, while the Il Ching-hoi, or Liberal Progressive, set to work to unearth evidence and expose the Conservative plotters. Giving information at the Residency in Seoul, five high officers, Kim, Choi, Min, Hong, etc., of the Corean Court or Government, including a eunuch, were arrested. The twofold plan, first, to make the world believe that the whole Corean people was opposed to the Japanese protectorate, and second, to enlist Russian cooperation, was exposed. One immediate result of forcing the Japanese military hand was the quick surrender of Choi to Corean soldiers in Chulla Do. In his camp was found authorization from Seoul, sealed with the vermilion seal of the palace, to raise troops. Thus collapsed the plot for internal disturbance.2

The prospect of drawing Russia again into hostilities which might free Corea from the Japanese yoke shows the weak spot in the Russo-Chinese negotiations of Ignatieff in 1860 (p. 371). In the delimitation of frontiers then made, a strip of country containing nearly 3,000 square miles, called Han-do, or Island Circuit, between the Tumen and its affluent, the Hai-lan River, which, beginning about seventy-five miles from the sea, flows nearly parallel, was left as neutral territory to be uninhabited. This region is shown on the maps (pp. 210, 365), and though the Chinese characters describe an island, it is interfluvial only. In reality the land, being very fertile, did in course of time attract many settlers, both Chinese and Corean. When Russia began to assert her strenuous policy in the Far East, she demanded that this neutral strip should be cleared of Coreans, or that all settlers in this region between the rivers should be enrolled as Chinese subjects. The Japanese War coming on in 1904, nothing further was done. Since Russia, by the Portsmouth treaty, controls the railways of Kirin, she may by holding this region control the trade routes to the seaboard. [505]

Here then was the bait to make the Russian bear bite. One of the Kims, an anti-Japanese ultra-conservative, secured a commission from the Corean Emperor appointing him virtually governor of this Hai-lan region. At Vladivostok, through the infamous pro-Russian Li Yong Ik and M. Pavloff, the late envoy of the Czar in Corea, the Court of St. Petersburg was to be sounded on the possibility of gaining control of this strategic territory.

If it be asked, what ground of hope Kim Hseung-mun had of success, it must be remembered that while all other foreign consuls in Corea, under the new order of things, had received their exequaturs, or authorizations, from the Emperor of Japan, the new Russian Consul-General, M. Plancon, claimed that he should be recognized by the Corean and not the Japanese emperor, thus ignoring Corea’s denunciation of her old treaty with China and the convention of November 17, 1905. The Russian envoy, for a little while or until he withdrew his contention, consciously or unconsciously, gave encouragement to the Corean conspirator, Kim. This whole plot to embroil Russia and Japan was frustrated, getting no further than the palace, while the surrender of Choi in Chulla Do was made sure by the arrest, on the night of June 8th, of the chief conspirators as they were leaving the palace. The Liberals had turned state’s evidence.

Without impeaching the Corean Emperor, the Japanese Government removed his evil advisers and resolved to persevere in using what authority he still possesses for the good of the Corean people—as their protectors see it.

That policy requires the public finance of Corea to be known in ledgers and budgets, with strict accountability for every dollar; the purging of the palace, and the thorough differentiation of Court and Government, and of the “boudoir” from the council table; the creation of a public school system; the building of a railway from Ping An to Gen san; a coinage and stable monetary system; the reform of prison methods and the judiciary; the reclamation of the vast quantities of waste land; the encouragement of all moral forces; the development of trade, commerce, and industry; and last, but not least, the severe handling of unprincipled and truculent Japanese; or, in general, a policy of righteousness and conciliation that must overcome the traditional hatred between the Coreans and the Japanese. To make the [506]yang-ban get to work and earn their own living will be the great blessing to this long-oppressed land. If Japan can satisfy the enlightened judgment of the world that Corea is exploited for the good primarily of the Coreans and not the Japanese, humanity will approve and rejoice. The accomplished author of “The Passing of Korea,” which contains the severest arraignment of the Japanese thus far made, passes this verdict on the situation:

“The Koreans have awakened to the fact that this, which should have been their first consideration many years ago, is now their last resort, and they are clamoring for education.… Korea can gain nothing by holding back and offering to the plans of Japan a sulky resistance. They are face to face with a definite condition, and theories as to the morality of the forces which brought about the condition are wholly academic.” [507]