Whatever additional reform measures may be suggested by further experience with regard to the publicity and restriction of campaign contributions, two broad general principles would seem to apply in the application of all legislation of this character.
First, the subject is clearly one of state and local as well as of national politics. The two former are subject to the same abuses as the latter. State and local politics are immensely important in themselves. They touch the daily affairs of the great mass of the people much more closely than do national politics. Moreover there is danger that with campaign fund reform in national affairs only, no matter how thorough it might be, the neglect of similar reforms in state and local politics would facilitate the evasion of national law. At least it would seem to make it possible to use large funds in local and state contests in such a way as to help indirectly but very materially the national interests of one or the other party. Fortunately some of our most important states have already provided for a measure of publicity sufficient to reduce this possibility so far as they are concerned. The danger will not be much lessened, however, until their example has been followed generally. Still it is hardly to be regretted that at the present time the major public interest is centred in the great presidential contest. There is no danger that the object lesson voluntarily given by the two national parties in 1908 will be forgotten by the American people either in succeeding presidential campaigns or in our minor state and city elections. But while we are securing the great political front door let us remember that the horse may also be stolen if we neglect to lock the numerous side and back doors.
Secondly, our primary and convention system is subject to the same abuses in the use of money as the election system proper. Indeed in states solid one way or the other it is probable that corrupt practices are more common in connection with nominations, where there may be sharp fighting, than in the subsequent cut and dried election. Organic reforms of a most sweeping character are in process in this field,[98] and when the time is ripe it would seem to be an easy matter to graft upon them the requirement of publicity of nominating expenses and other restrictions upon primary contributions similar in a general way to the restrictions now being imposed upon campaign contributions. A start has already been made in this direction. By a law which went into effect in 1892, Massachusetts established publicity in respect to nominating as well as election expenses. The Garfield Corrupt Practices Act passed by the Ohio legislature of 1896,[99] and unfortunately repealed in 1902, required publicity and limited the expenditure of candidates before conventions and primaries as well as before elections. In 1906, Pennsylvania passed a law[100] containing a list of the legitimate forms of campaign expenditure and requiring statements from candidates for nomination in the primary as well as from candidates for election. Nebraska, Virginia, and Georgia, have also passed laws of this character.[101] In sharp contrast with these movements for better things within our states are the deplorable conditions currently alleged to exist in the greatest of all our nominating institutions,—the National Conventions. It would seem hardly possible to delay much longer reform measures designed to bring about improved conditions in this field.
Considering the many unsettled points with regard to the proper measures for regulating campaign contributions and the necessity for the extension of such reforms to many areas as yet untouched it is evident that we are dealing with a movement which has scarcely made more than a beginning. Even with satisfactory legislation on our statute books the fight will not be completely won. Fortunately it is believed that the argument of unconstitutionality cannot be employed against this movement.[102] Difficulties of administration will have to be met, however, although it is highly improbable that these will be so great as the difficulties occasioned by the execution of other parts of our corrupt practices acts, such for example as the manifold conditions which prevent the complete enforcement of laws against the bribery of voters. Bi-partisan state election boards may take over all ordinary official duties in connection with laws requiring the publicity of, or otherwise limiting, campaign contributions. In this work they may be somewhat aided by the mutual criticism of the parties themselves, although, unfortunately, this is a party function which is very imperfectly performed in the United States. Much good may be accomplished by such voluntary organisations as the New York Association to Prevent Corrupt Practices at Elections. With men of prominence in both of the leading parties in its directorate and membership the Association proposes:
“First, To ascertain whether any judicial proceedings should be brought by the Association’s initiative; that is to say, whether there is apparent evidence of bribery, or of deliberate falsification, concealment, and evasion in the statements [of campaign contributions and expenditures] such as would warrant a judicial inquiry to compel a proper accounting.”
“Second, To secure a permanent record for the Association of the important facts in connection with the statements filed, upon which an opinion may be based as to whether additional corrupt practices legislation ought to be recommended by the Association to the Legislature.”
The Association further intends to exercise the closest scrutiny over such items as “canvassers,” “watchers,” “expenditures for workers,” and so on. Particularly praiseworthy in its platform is the determination to prosecute violations before the courts. Unless some determined agency undertakes this function all campaign fund enactments will promptly sink to the level of those already too numerous American laws which adorn our statute books with ideal maxims but in practice are ignored by our administrators.[103]
Assuming both legislative and administrative activity in campaign fund reform still we must not overestimate the value of the probable results. Only a part of the problem of the support of party machinery and party workers will be solved thereby, but at least it may be said that an important contribution toward the ultimate complete solution of the problem will be made. Bribery and corruption will not be done away with by the reform. They are, as we have seen, much too persistent and extended to yield to any single reform effort. Indeed some forms of bribery may be encouraged by the new practice with regard to campaign contributions. Although it may be made impossible to place men under obligations while they are candidates it will still be possible to buy them, if they are purchasable, after they have been elected. One should remember, however, that if primaries and elections can be purged of corrupt financial influences it is probable that our successful candidates for office will be less open to venal influence than those who win out under the present vicious system. Thoroughgoing campaign fund reform will enable candidates to attain office without assuming financial burdens of such a character as to make it difficult for them to act in a perfectly honest and independent manner. By far the worst evil of the present system is the ease with which it enables men otherwise incorruptible to be placed tactfully, subtly, and—as time goes on—always more completely under obligations incompatible with public duty. Finally campaign fund reform will enable parties to become what democratic theory requires them to be, namely honest interpreters of the popular will instead of crooked agents of sinister influence into which they will otherwise degenerate. Taking the most moderate view of the benefits to arise from such reforms, therefore, it would seem a clear duty of all patriotic citizens and statesmen to work first for the publicity of campaign contributions and afterwards for such other restrictions upon their collection and use as experience may suggest.
FOOTNOTES:
[67] “Present Discontents,” Bohn ed. vol. i, p. 375.
[68] Cf. Jane Addams, “Democracy and Social Ethics,” ch. vii.
[69] Cf. “The Rise and Growth of American Politics,” p. 312.
[70] Cf. “The Rise and Growth of American Politics,” p. 323. He adds that: “No other nation in the world is rich enough for the political experimentation which the United States is carrying on; but when the end crowns the work, its cost may be found to have been small in comparison with the value of the recompense.”
[71] Nevada was the first state to enact legislation of this character. (L. 1895, ch. 103; repealed, 1899, ch. 108.) In the same year a Minnesota law (ch. 277) presented a very detailed definition of legitimate expenses. The laws of Pennsylvania (1906, ch. 17), and of New York (1906, ch. 503), are very significant. Professor Merriam sums them up as follows: “Both provide that no expenses shall be incurred except of the classes authorised in the act. The New York list, which is rather more liberal in this respect than that of Pennsylvania, includes rent of halls and compensation of speakers, music, and fireworks, advertisement and incidental expenses of meetings, posters, lithographs, banners, and literary material, payments to agents to supervise the preparation of campaign articles and advertisements, and furnish information to newspapers; for advertising, pictures, reading material, etc.; for rent of offices and club rooms, compensation of clerks and agents; for attorneys at law; for preparation of lists of voters; for necessary personal and travelling expenses of candidates and committeemen; for postage, express, telegraph, and telephone; for preparing nominating petitions; for workers and watchers at the polls, and food for the same; for transportation of the sick and infirm to the polls.” (“N. Y. State Library Review of Legislation, 1906,” p. 160.) Cf. also Virginia, L. 1903, ch. 98; South Dakota, L. 1907, ch. 146; and California, L. 1907, ch. 350.
In 1907, New York took the further step of limiting the amount of expenditure for a given purpose, ch. 398 of that year providing that not more than three carriages in a city district, nor more than six in other districts, should be used for the transportation of voters. Acting on the same principle Massachusetts in 1908 (ch. 85), prohibited the employment by political committees of more than six persons in a voting precinct or city ward. As the lavish expenditure of campaign funds for service, rents, and commodities may become nothing more than a veiled form of vote buying, the significance of the action of New York and Massachusetts is apparent. The English Act of 1883 contains similar provisions.
The New Jersey law of 1906 (ch. 208) contains a long list of prohibited expenditures, including payments for entertainment, for fitting up club rooms for social or recreative purposes, or providing uniforms for any organised club, and the payment for insertion of articles in newspapers and magazines unless labelled as paid articles.
[72] Cf. also the Oregon law proposed by initiative petition and adopted June 1, 1908.
[73] New York now requires full reports from committees also (ch. 502, L. 1906).
[74] Iowa, L. 1907, ch. 50, followed New York’s example.
[75] “Republican Campaign Text Book,” 1908, p. 25. In his message at the beginning of the second (i. e., the first regular) session of the Sixty-first Congress on December 7, 1909, President Taft returns to the subject as follows:
“I urgently recommend to Congress that a law be passed requiring that candidates in elections of Members of the House of Representatives, and committees in charge of their candidacy and campaign, file in a proper office of the United States Government a statement of the contributions received and of the expenditures incurred in the campaign for such elections, and that similar legislation be enacted in respect to all other elections which are constitutionally within the control of Congress.”
The passage in the foregoing, italicised by the writer, is noteworthy in that it indicates a step in advance by the president. His speech of acceptance referred to contributions only, whereas the message of December 7, 1909, demands publicity of expenditures as well as of party income.
[76] New York Tribune, November 24, 1908, p. 3. The Cincinnati Enquirer of November 22, 1908, said that approximately 20,000 persons contributed to the Republican fund. Possibly the discrepancy is due to the inclusion in the latter figure of contributors to the finance committees of the Republican National Committee in the several states, which as noted above collected $620,150.
[77] Cincinnati Commercial-Tribune, November 23, 1908. According to the New York Tribune of November 24, 1908, p. 3, in which is given a list of contributors to the Republican fund in sums of $500 and upward the larger contributors to the Republican fund were as follows: C. P. Taft, $110,000; Union League Club, New York, $34,377, Larz Anderson and G. A. Garrotson, each $25,000; Union League Club, Philadelphia, $22,500; Andrew Carnegie and J. P. Morgan each $20,000. In addition to these there were fifteen contributors of sums of between $6000 and $15,000 inclusive; twenty-four contributors of $5000 each; thirty-four of sums between $2500 and $4000 inclusive; twenty of $2000 each; twenty-eight of sums between $1250 and $1500 inclusive; one hundred and nineteen contributors of $1000 each; ten of between $750 and $900 inclusive; and two hundred and fifty contributors of $500 each.
The Democrats made a preliminary report of contributions on October 15, and daily reports thereafter until the election. As the newspapers did not state clearly whether the later figures regarding contributions were inclusive or additional it is difficult to summarise the larger contributions accurately. According to the New York Times of October 14, Tammany Hall sent a check for $10,000 to the Democratic National Committee. The general report issued October 15, showed the following contributors in excess of $2000: C. J. Hughes, $5000; W. J. Bryan, Profits of the Commoner, $4046; Nathan Straus, $2500; National Democratic Club, $2500; Norman E. Mack, $2000; Sen. W. A. Clark, $2000; George W. Harris, $2000. Some of the foregoing were reported as making contributions after October 15, and if other contributions reported at various times were not repetitions the list of contributors of $2000 and over would be somewhat increased. On October 29, the New York Times reported a gift of $10,000 from Herman Ridder, Treasurer of the Democratic Committee, and gifts of $9000 each from his three sons, Victor, Bernard, and Joseph. A contribution of $3000 from E. F. Goltra was also reported on this date. In addition to the foregoing, five contributions of between $1000 and $1500, and thirty-three of a thousand dollars each were reported. According to the Cincinnati Commercial-Tribune of October 16, Democratic newspapers collected almost $100,000 out of the $248,000 obtained up to that date. The New York Times of October 31, noted that one paper, The New Orleans States, had collected a total of $22,000, said to be the record contribution for any one newspaper.
[78] “The Dollars Behind the Ballots,” World To-day, vol. xv (1908), p. 946.
[79] Cf. p. 145, supra.
[80] As final corrections were being made upon these pages the continental press announces the passage of a publicity measure by Congress. Unfortunately the writer is unable to secure details upon which to base a judgment of the new law. That publicity before election was not provided for is, in his opinion, to be regretted. On the other hand the enactment as federal law of a measure of this character represents a decided victory for a principle capable of great expansion. In this connection the able and persistent propagandist work of the National Publicity Law Association under the presidency of Mr. Perry Belmont deserves the warmest commendation. Noteworthy also is the fact that the Association includes in its membership many of the most distinguished leaders of both political parties.—Paris, July 1, 1910.
[81] According to the English Corrupt and Illegal Practice Prevention Act of 1883, bribery as the unauthorised act of an agent renders the election invalid and disqualifies the candidate from representing the constituency in which the offence was committed for seven years. While the penalty may seem drastic it has the good effect of compelling candidates to scrutinise expenditures in their behalf with a degree of anxious care seldom duplicated on this side of the Atlantic.
[82] Missouri, L. 1907, p. 261. This law was declared unconstitutional in 1908, however, on the ground that it impaired liberty of press and speech. Ex parte Harrison, 110 S. W. 709.
[83] A similar provision was included in the Massachusetts law of 1892.
[84] A Michigan law which went into effect in 1892 (Repealed, ch. 61, 1901) provided that all expenditures on behalf of candidates, with few exceptions, should be made through the party committees.
[85] Following the four states which took action in 1897, Kentucky forbade corporate contributions in 1900. In 1905, Minnesota (ch. 291) made it a felony for an officer of a business corporation to vote money to a campaign fund. Wisconsin in the same year (ch. 492) made it a felony for a corporation to contribute to political parties for the purpose of influencing legislation or promoting or defeating the candidacy of persons for public office. New York in 1906, (ch. 239) prohibited political contributions by corporations and made violation of the act a misdemeanor. Alabama, Iowa, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Texas were the five states which forbade corporate contributions in 1907, and the following eleven were reported as specifically prohibiting contributions from life insurance companies in that year: Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Carolina, North Dakota, Tennessee, and West Virginia. In 1908, Ohio, Georgia, Massachusetts, and Mississippi also forbade corporate contributions. Altogether to the end of 1908, seventeen states had forbidden corporate contributions in general, and eleven had specifically forbidden contributions from life insurance companies.
[86] Massachusetts, L. 1908, ch. 85.
[87] Ohio, L. 1896, p. 123; repealed, L. 1902, p. 77.
[88] Nebraska in L. 1899, ch. 29, fixed the same maxima and minima as the Garfield Act. The sliding scale principle was employed in the English Act of 1883.
[89] California, L., 1893, ch. 2; Missouri, L. 1893, p. 157; Montana, Penal Code, 1895, sec. 80 ff.; Minnesota, L. 1895, ch. 277; and New York, L. 1907, ch. 584.
[90] New York, L. 1895, 155; Connecticut, L. 1895, 338.
[91] California, L. 1907, ch. 350.
[92] New York, L. 1906, ch. 503.
[93] Cf. p. 177, supra.
[94] See p. 250, supra.
[95] Cf. p. 246, supra.
[96] Wisconsin, L. 1897, 358.
[97] Cf. President Arthur T. Hadley’s discussion of “The Constitutional Position of Property in America” in the Independent of April 16, 1908.
[98] Cf. Professor C. Edward Merriam’s “Primary Elections.”
[99] Laws of 1896, p. 123. The repeal was due to minor defects in the law which could easily have been corrected by amendment.
[100] Laws of 1906, ch. 17.
[101] Nebraska, L. 1901, 30; Virginia L. 1903, ch. 98; Georgia, L. 1908, 63.
[102] An able argument on this point is presented by Mr. Perry Belmont in his “Publicity of Election Expenditures,” North American Review, vol. clxxx (1905), p. 166. For many of the most important facts cited in the preceding pages of this study the writer is indebted to Mr. Belmont’s valuable article.
[103] Cf. the Association’s searching “Report of Examination of Election Expense Statements, 1908;” also its leaflet on “Future Plans to Prevent Corrupt Practices.”