Successful as he had been in persuading Frederick William to withhold a constitution from Prussia, Metternich could not prevent certain rulers of the minor States from complying with Article XIII. of the Federal Act, and from establishing representative government within their dominions. In 1816, the Liberal Duke of Saxe-Weimar granted a constitution, and his example was followed by the Kings of Bavaria and of Wurtemburg and the Duke of Baden. A wave of Liberalism swept over Northern Germany. The universities were affected profoundly by the new ideas. In their lecture-rooms, professors denounced existing governments and harangued their pupils in the language of demagogues. The agitation culminated, on March 23, 1819, in the murder of the dramatist and publicist Kotzebue, who was said to be in the pay of Russia, by Karl Sand, a student of Jena University and a lecturer to the Burschenschaft. This crime and an attempt to assassinate Ibell, the minister of Nassau, gave Metternich the opportunity for which he had been waiting. In the month of July of this same year he had an interview with Frederick William at Teplitz, in the course of which the King promised never to give Prussia a constitution, to place his confidence only in ministers of the type of Bernstorff and Wittgenstein, and to sanction such repressive measures as the Austrian Chancellor might see fit to suggest. After a conference of the ministers of the different States at Carlsbad, Metternich’s decrees were submitted to the Frankfort Diet, on September 20, 1819, and adopted forthwith.
Under the provisions of the celebrated Carlsbad decrees, the ruler of every German State was bound to appoint commissioners to regulate the universities and to impose a censorship upon all newspapers and matter printed within his dominions. Furthermore, a central tribunal was established at Mainz to inquire into the doings of the secret societies, and upon the members of this court was conferred the power of arresting the subjects of any German sovereign, and of demanding from any law court the production of documents. These decrees, however, did not constitute the sum total of Metternich’s measures of precaution. In November, 1819, he convened a council of German ministers at Vienna, when, under the pretext of defining the functions of the Diet, sixty-five new articles of a repressive character were introduced into the Federal Act. The general effect of the Vienna resolutions, as these measures were termed, was to impose upon the Federation the duty of defending absolutism by force of arms in small States in which the sovereigns might prove incapable themselves of maintaining a despotic form of government.
Metternich’s manipulation of the Diet was the great triumph of his home policy. By converting the Federation from a combination of States into a league of sovereigns against their own subjects, he averted the danger that it might promote the cause of Liberalism or of national unity. From this time forward Metternich, to all appearance, dominated the Court and the Cabinet of Berlin, and held in leading strings the minor princes of the Confederation. Nevertheless, the position of Austria as a German Power was weakening steadily. At the Congress of Vienna he had craftily withdrawn the empire from the post of danger, and had thrust upon Prussia the task of protecting the western flank of Germany. To his secret satisfaction, he saw her pour out her treasure to defend the frontier from which Austria had recoiled. He believed that by his Carlsbad decrees and his Vienna resolutions he had rendered national unity impossible, and had condemned Northern Germany to the political stagnation in which the empire appeared contented to repose. But the enlightened bureaucratic system of Prussia was incomparably superior to that of Austria. In educational matters she was the foremost State in Europe, and already she was drawing the minor States into her system of internal free trade—the famous Zollverein which was to prove so important a factor in the struggle for Prussian hegemony and national unity. Even in 1830, acute observers could perceive that the people were stifling within the narrow confines of their duchies, and that, when the day of Germany’s awakening should come, it would be to the Power standing on guard upon the Rhine that they would look for leadership.[20] But that hour had not yet struck, and, in the question of the attitude to be observed towards France, after the Revolution of July, Prussia, as was her wont, shaped her policy upon that of Austria. The Emperor’s acknowledgment of Louis Philippe carried with it, accordingly, Frederick William’s recognition of the King of the French.
At St. Petersburg it was not until August 19 that any mention of the Revolution of July was allowed to appear in the newspapers. Two days earlier a new levy of two men in five hundred had been called up for service in the army, all Russians had been ordered to leave France, Frenchmen had been refused admission to Russia, and any display of the tricolour had been forbidden. But Lord Heytesbury,[21] the British ambassador, was informed that this increase of military strength had no reference to French affairs, and that the recall of Russian subjects from France was a simple measure of precaution.[22] In the eyes of Nicholas any rising of the people against their lawful sovereign was necessarily a highly offensive proceeding, and in this instance it had the additional disadvantage of disturbing a condition of affairs, the continued duration of which was very favourable to the national policy of Russia. Under the different governments of the Restoration an excellent understanding had been established between the Courts of the Tuileries and of St. Petersburg. The Eastern question, which had brought Russia to the verge of war with England and which had interrupted the smooth course of her relations with Vienna, had, on the contrary, drawn France towards her. When, in the campaign of the previous year, Constantinople had appeared to lie at the mercy of General Diebitsch, politicians as opposed as Chateaubriand and Polignac had been disposed to look upon the situation complacently, in the hope that the disruption of the Turkish Empire might lead to a readjustment of the map of Europe, which might enable France to rectify in her favour the treaties of 1815. Furthermore, since the intervention in Spain, in 1823, there had been little cordiality between the Cabinets of London and Paris. This estrangement had been intensified by the French occupation of Algiers, the one important measure of foreign policy of the last government of the Restoration. These circumstances rendered it very improbable that Russia in the near future would have to confront a coalition of the maritime Powers. But now that a new régime had been set up in France, the possibility of that dreaded contingency would have to be seriously considered.
In spite of the Tsar’s military preparations, Lord Heytesbury had no fears that he proposed to attack France. Nicholas informed him that he had directed his ambassador “to remain in Paris, but to remove immediately from the house furnished to the Russian embassy by the government of France.” He was constantly to hold himself in readiness to quit Paris at an hour’s notice, and to leave at once, should the English, the Prussian, the Austrian or the Dutch ambassadors be compelled to depart. “En âme et en conscience he never would consider the Duc d’Orléans in any light except that of a usurper.” Nevertheless he had no intention of intervening, unless France were to attempt to disseminate revolutionary doctrines in other countries or to carry her arms beyond her frontiers.[23] In due course Baron Atthalin arrived at St. Petersburg, bringing with him a letter from Louis Philippe to the Tsar, and, on September 8, was received in private audience by Nicholas. On this occasion the question of the acknowledgment of the King of the French was avoided, the Emperor being resolved to reserve the matter for further consideration. But at Tsarskoye Selo, a week later, Nicholas, whilst regretting that the British government should have so hastily decided to recognize Louis Philippe, gave Lord Heytesbury to understand that his own acknowledgment of the King of the French would not be deferred much longer.[24]
In the meantime, an event had occurred which threatened seriously to aggravate the embarrassments of the situation. The creation of the Kingdom of the Netherlands occupied a most important place in the territorial settlement following the overthrow of Bonaparte. British statesmanship had been largely responsible for the union of Belgium with Holland, and for the formation of a strong State of secondary rank which was to act as a barrier against France. Under Wellington’s advice the great Powers, at their own expense, erected a line of fortresses, connected with Prussian territory upon the left bank of the Rhine, to protect the southern frontier of the new kingdom. From a purely military point of view the plan may have been sound, but to propose to mould the Belgians and the Dutch into a nation was to treat as of no account the differences of race and of religion which divided the two peoples. The Belgians soon began to complain that they were very inadequately represented in all branches of the public service. Questions relating to education, taxation, and the freedom of the press increased their discontent. The Dutch, who could look back proudly upon two centuries of independence, despised them as having been constantly under the dominion of a foreign Power. In 1830 it was generally recognized that the attempt to fuse the two peoples into one nationality had failed. The Belgians, however, still remained loyal to the House of Nassau and desired only administrative separation under the reigning dynasty.
The Revolution of July in Paris created an immense excitement at Brussels. The town was the favourite place of refuge for the political offenders of all countries. Yet in spite of the prevailing unrest the authorities neglected to take the most ordinary precautions against a popular rising. A performance of Scribe’s opera, La Muette de Portici, which treats of the insurrection of the Neapolitans against the Spaniards, furnished the spark which was to cause the explosion. Serious rioting began on the night of August 25, and continued throughout the following day. The military commander appears to have acted with a strange irresolution, and on the 28th, the insurgents being complete masters of the town, a deputation of notables carried a respectful address to the Hague praying for the redress of their grievances. The next three weeks were spent in fruitless attempts to arrange a compromise. The Prince of Orange, who was personally popular, visited Brussels, but his efforts to solve the question met with no success. After the failure of his eldest son’s mission the King consented to dismiss van Maanen, the unpopular governor of Brussels. But this concession was made too late. Encouraged by emissaries of the revolutionary clubs in Paris, and emboldened by the weakness of the government, the advocates of complete separation pressed their demands with increasing violence. At last the King ordered Prince Frederick of Orange to advance from the camp of Vilvorde against the town. On September 23 the attack began. The troops penetrated into the park, but failed to carry the barricades which obstructed the streets beyond. After three days’ fighting the Prince abandoned the struggle and withdrew from the neighbourhood of Brussels. The discomfiture of his army left King William no alternative but to appeal for assistance to the Powers, whilst at Brussels a provisional government declared Belgium independent, and convened a national congress.
This attempt on the part of a neighbouring people to imitate “the glorious days of July” was exceedingly gratifying to the republicans and the military democratic party in Paris. Their orators and journalists loudly declared that the revolt of the Belgians was an opportunity both for extending the French frontiers, and for effecting a breach in the treaties of 1815. Louis Philippe, however, was resolved not to be drawn into an adventure of this kind. He knew that the powers would never tolerate an invasion of the Low Countries, and he realized that the French army was in no condition to oppose a European coalition. Accordingly, as it was not in his power to silence the cries for intervention or to repress the noisy sympathy for the Belgians indulged in by a large section of the press, he determined to give to foreign governments a practical proof of his pacific intentions by despatching to London, as his ambassador, the aged statesman who, sixteen years before, had figured so conspicuously at the Congress of Vienna.
The Prince de Talleyrand was in his seventy-third year. Notwithstanding the great services which, in 1814, he had rendered to the cause of Legitimate Sovereignty, the Bourbons of the elder branch had never been able to forget his conduct under the Republic and the Empire. At the second Restoration he had been appointed President of the Council, but had retired before the Chambre introuvable and the Royalist reaction, and neither Louis XVIII. nor Charles X. had given him a second opportunity of returning to office. Upon the triumph of the popular party in July, he had promptly placed his services at the disposal of Louis Philippe. But, in spite of his Liberal opinions, Talleyrand retained the language, the habits, and the appearance of a noble of the old régime. It might have been expected that all the King’s ingenuity would have been required to impose so fine a gentleman upon a Cabinet, which counted among its members the democratic M. Dupont and the elder M. Dupin, famous for his hobnailed boots and his affectations of middle-class simplicity. Louis Philippe’s ministers, however, were agreed upon the necessity of preserving the peace, and, when it was proposed at the Council table that Talleyrand should be sent to London, no opposition was made to the suggestion. Guizot, who was Minister of the Interior at the time, supposes that those who disliked the appointment must have stated their objections to the King in private.[25]
But if Louis Philippe and his ministers were determined to abstain from any intervention in Belgium, they were bound to insist that other Powers should adopt the same attitude. It was, therefore, notified to foreign governments that French policy, in the future, would be based strictly upon the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other nations. It was a system to which both the great parties in England had declared their adherence, and its adoption by France might, in consequence, be expected to facilitate the establishment of cordial relations between the two countries. But the declaration of such a principle could not fail to be highly displeasing to the absolute Courts. Already movements of troops were in progress in the Rhine provinces which suggested an intention on the part of Frederick William of rendering military assistance to his brother-in-law, the King of the Netherlands. Baron Werther, the Prussian ambassador, although still without official credentials, had been instructed to remain in Paris. Molé, Louis Philippe’s first Minister for Foreign Affairs, accordingly arranged to meet him at a private house, where he gave him clearly to understand that the entry of a Prussian army into the Low Countries would be regarded as an act of war directed against France. This threat, which evoked much indignation in Berlin and at Vienna, was effectual in inducing King Frederick William III. to renounce any thoughts, which he may have entertained, of reducing the Belgians to submission by force of arms.[26]
Talleyrand arrived in London on September 24, and in a despatch, sent off the next day, expressed his satisfaction at the reception accorded him.[27] He was accompanied by the Duchesse de Dino, who officiated as hostess at his table, and presided over his household. In 1807, at the conclusion of the campaign in Poland, Talleyrand, then Napoleon’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, had obtained for his nephew, Edmond de Périgord, the hand of Dorothée, the daughter of the last reigning Duke of Courland. After a few years of married life, however, husband and wife agreed to live apart, and Madame Edmond from that time forward took up her residence with Talleyrand. She accompanied him to Vienna, in 1814, and brought back from the Congress the title of Duchesse de Dino. In return for the services he had rendered him, the King of Naples had conferred this dukedom upon Talleyrand, who had asked that the title might be assumed by his nephew. The duchess’ position in Talleyrand’s household was so generally recognized that, upon their arrival in London, King William IV., at Wellington’s request, allowed her to take rank as an ambassadress.[28] The Comte Casimir de Montrond, another frequent guest at Valençay, and at the house in the Rue Saint-Florentin, followed the ambassador to London. Talleyrand’s friendship with this curious individual appears to have begun under the Directory. In the terrible days which preceded the downfall of Robespierre, Montrond had been an inmate of the prison of Saint-Lazare. The fortunate possession of some ready money, a rare commodity at the time, had, however, enabled him to effect his escape, and that of the citizeness Franquetot, the heretofore Aimée de Coigny, Duchesse de Fleury, the heroine of André Chénier’s poem.[29] After this miraculous deliverance, Aimée de Coigny, who under the emigration laws had divorced the Duc de Fleury, married the man to whom she owed her life. But, after a brief and most unsatisfactory experience of matrimony with the gay incroyable, she again contrived to obtain her freedom. Montrond’s introduction to London society appears to date from the year 1812, when, having incurred the grave displeasure of Bonaparte, he succeeded in eluding the French police and in reaching England. He seems to have become very rapidly a well-known and popular member of the fashionable world in London. During all this period of his life he is believed to have been totally without regular means of subsistence, and to have existed solely by play, assisted by an occasional windfall in the shape of employment upon any secret political work which Talleyrand, when in favour, was enabled to procure for him. But from the earliest days of the Monarchy of July his circumstances began to improve. From this time forward he appears to have drawn a pension of about £1000 per annum from the secret service funds of the French Foreign Office.[30] This allowance is said to have been granted him in order that “he should speak well of Louis Philippe in the London clubs.” It was, moreover, strongly suspected that he had obtained knowledge of certain of the King’s proceedings during the emigration which His Majesty had good reasons for wishing to keep secret.[31]
The uneasiness aroused in London by the first news of the insurrection in Brussels developed into serious alarm, when the triumph of the revolutionists over the Royal troops became known. Wellington openly declared that it was a “devilish bad business,”and many people began to fear that a great European war was inevitable.[32] The British government, whilst prepared to accept as an accomplished fact the complete separation of Belgium from the Kingdom of the Netherlands, held that no changes must take place of a nature to interfere with the efficiency of the barrier fortresses, these defences “being necessary for the security of other States.” After drawing up instructions to this effect for Lord Stuart de Rothesay, Aberdeen intimated that the government was desirous of conferring upon the situation “in friendly concert with France and the other Powers.”[33] Talleyrand was of opinion that it was a matter for congratulation that the first offer of co-operation should have come from England, and strongly recommended that the proposal should be responded to cordially. An entirely passive attitude, he wrote, must deprive France “of that influence which they are disposed to ascribe to her over here.”[34]
Meanwhile, in Paris, notices were appearing in the papers calling upon men to enroll themselves to assist their Belgian brothers. The Society of the Friends of the People equipped a battalion which actually set out for the northern frontier. La Fayette was still the recognized leader of the ultra-Liberals, and his house was a meeting-place for the Carbonari and the revolutionists of every country. But he was occupied chiefly in encouraging insurrectionary movements in Spain and Italy. The union of Belgium with France was advocated mainly in the ranks of the Bonapartist or military democratic section of the party. The protestations of Louis Philippe and Comte Molé were probably true that the government in no way favoured their designs, and that strict orders had been given to the prefects to prevent the passage of arms into Belgium. On the other hand, however, their assertions to Lord Stuart were untrue that they were innocent of conniving at the proceedings of the Spanish revolutionists. Broglie and Guizot, both members of the Cabinet, admit that in order to compel the King of Spain to acknowledge Louis Philippe, facilities for assembling their followers upon French territory were accorded to the Spanish insurrectionary leaders. This rather disingenuous policy appears, without question, to have contributed materially to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Paris and Madrid at the end of the month of October.[35]
None of the Powers evinced any intention of responding to the King of Holland’s request for military assistance to subdue the revolted Belgians. The English proposal that a conference should be held to consider the situation was generally regarded as the best solution of the question. “Austria and Prussia,” wrote Talleyrand on October 11, “intend to follow the lead of England with respect to Belgium, and there can be little doubt that Russia will adopt the same course.”[36] The French government at this time was greatly incensed at the conduct of the Cabinet of the Hague. No official appeal for help had been sent to Paris, but in a letter to Louis Philippe the Prince of Orange openly accused the French authorities of encouraging the disturbances in Belgium, and suggested that the King should make a public declaration of his intention not to meddle with the affairs of the Low Countries. In return, the Prince undertook to use all his influence with the Tsar in favour of the acknowledgment of the sovereignty of the King of the French. At a Council of Ministers it was resolved that Talleyrand should be instructed to bring the affair to the notice of the British Cabinet, and that Molé should draw up a note for presentation at the Hague, expressing surprise at the continued silence observed towards the French government. Two days later, however, the news was telegraphed from Strasburg that General Atthalin had passed through the town, bringing with him the Tsar’s recognition of Louis Philippe. But, upon the general’s arrival, the satisfaction caused by this intelligence was diminished by the cold and formal language of Nicholas’s letter, and by his pointed omission to address the King as “his brother,” the designation generally employed by sovereigns in their communications with each other.[37]
The proposal of the English government that a conference should be held upon Belgian affairs having been accepted by the Powers, it remained only to decide upon the town in which the deliberations should take place. London, where for some time past the representatives of Russia, France, and Great Britain had been engaged in settling the frontiers and discussing the future of Greece, appeared to be the capital in which, by reason of its proximity to Brussels, the plenipotentiaries could assemble with the least inconvenience. France alone dissented from this view, and urgently demanded that the conference should be held in Paris. Aberdeen, when Talleyrand communicated to him his instructions upon the subject, would appear to have seen little to object to in the French proposal. Wellington, however, refused to entertain the suggestion, for a moment. It was highly important, the Duke contended, that matters should be settled promptly, and he was confident that he could induce the ministers attending the conference to agree to the French and English proposals, provided they were to meet in London. On the other hand, were Paris to be the scene of their deliberations, they would insist upon referring every question to their respective Courts. Talleyrand, who considered that there was much sound reason in the Duke’s contention, was nevertheless directed to reiterate his demand. But his further representations only evoked the reply that the English Cabinet regarded Paris as un terrain trop agité, and at a subsequent interview, on October 25, in the presence of the ambassadors of Austria and Prussia, the Duke assured him that the Powers were unanimous in opposing the notion of discussing the affairs of the Low Countries amidst the tourbillon révolutionaire of the French capital.[38]
In his conversations with Lord Stuart de Rothesay in Paris, Molé, in order to gain his ends, had recourse to a singular argument. Talleyrand himself, he explained, constituted the true reason why the government was desirous that the Belgian conference should not take place in London. He never would have been accredited to the Court of St. James’ had ministers foreseen how greatly the public would resent his appointment. To allow him to represent France at a very important conference would expose the Cabinet to attacks which must prove fatal to its existence. “This extraordinary reason for objecting to our proposition,”wrote Aberdeen, “does not appear to His Majesty’s government to be entitled to serious consideration.” Molé nevertheless continued to press his point with much warmth, and it was only after several more interviews with Lord Stuart that he began to talk of sending a second plenipotentiary to the London conference to be associated with Talleyrand.[39] This plan, which was probably not put forward seriously, was certainly never carried into execution. At the end of October, the Cabinet was reconstructed, and Molé resigned the portfolio of Foreign Affairs. After his retirement no further allusion appears to have been made to the alleged inconvenience of Talleyrand’s presence at the London conference. Molé was perhaps jealous of allowing him to conduct these important negotiations, in which he probably desired himself to play the chief part. He was a highly cultivated man, with much charm of manner, and of an ancient family, and in Imperial days had enjoyed the favour of the Emperor, and had held important positions. Under the Restoration he had been Minister of Marine in Richelieu’s first administration, and in this capacity had incurred Louis XVIII.’s displeasure by intriguing against his favourite the Duc Décazes.
The Cabinet, known as that of August 11th, had never been a united body. Guizot, Broglie, Molé and Casimir Périer constituted the Conservative element, whilst Laffitte and Dupont were opposed to all measures which savoured of resistance to progress upon democratic lines. The riots of October 17 and 18, in Paris, the mob’s protest against the apparent intention of the government to abolish the death penalty in political cases, in order to save the lives of the imprisoned ex-ministers of Charles X., brought matters to a crisis. Seeing that the King decidedly inclined to the views of Laffitte and the so-called party of laissez-aller the Conservatives, advising him to give the policy of their dissenting colleagues a fair trial, tendered their resignations. Laffitte was accordingly charged with the task of reconstructing the Cabinet.[40]
On November 2, the day on which the composition of the new French ministry was published in the Moniteur, King William IV. formally opened the British Parliament. In the Speech from the Throne, the Belgians were described as “revolted subjects” and the intention was expressed of repressing sternly disturbances at home. In the House of Lords, Grey deprecated the employment of such language, and, in reply, Wellington made his declaration against Reform. A fortnight later, upon a motion of Sir Henry Parnell for referring the Civil List to a select committee, the government was placed in a minority. The Duke thereupon resigned and advised the King to send for Grey. Lord Grey undertook to form a ministry upon the understanding that he was to bring forward a measure of Reform.
CHAPTER III
THE CREATION OF BELGIUM
The accession to power of Lord Grey was an event justly calculated to raise the hopes of those who wished to see more cordial relations established between France and England. The Whigs had been out of office during the whole period of the Imperial wars; they had not been concerned in the territorial settlement at the peace, nor were they responsible for the measures which had been taken to ensure the safe custody of Bonaparte after Waterloo. Many prominent members of the party had avowed their sympathy for France, and, moreover, the revolution of July had, unquestionably, contributed to the overthrow of the Tories. Under the new régime in France political power was to rest with the bourgeoisie. It was by the support of the trading and commercial classes that the Whigs purposed to carry out their scheme of Parliamentary Reform. Nor were these the only circumstances which seemed to indicate that the two countries would, in the future, develop upon parallel lines. Although William IV. had succeeded to the throne legitimately, whilst a revolution had placed the crown upon the head of Louis Philippe, and although no two men could be more different in character, there were, upon the surface, curious points of resemblance between them. Both were, or were supposed to be, Liberals, both were simple and unostentatious in their tastes and habits, both had succeeded sovereigns of reactionary views who had been rigid observers of courtly ceremony and etiquette.
“England,” wrote Talleyrand in a despatch in which he reviewed the situation created by the change of government, “is the country with which France should cultivate the most friendly relations. Her colonial losses have removed a source of rivalry between them. The Powers still believe in the divine right of kings; France and England alone no longer subscribe to that doctrine. Both governments have adopted the principle of non-intervention. Let both declare loudly that they are resolved to maintain peace, and their voices will not be raised in vain.”[41]
Lord Palmerston, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was in his forty-sixth year. From 1811 he had continuously held the post of Secretary-at-War in succeeding Tory administrations until the year 1828, when, with other Canningites, he had seceded from the Duke of Wellington. He was an excellent linguist; indeed, in the opinion of so competent a critic as Victor Cousin, there were not twenty Frenchmen who could lay claim to his knowledge of their language.[42] In the course of a visit which he had paid to Paris, in the year 1829, Palmerston had made the acquaintance of most of the prominent members of the Liberal party under the Restoration. From his conversations with these men, who were now the masters of France, he had carried away the conviction that they chafed bitterly at the treaties of 1815 and were determined, at the first opportunity, to extend the French frontiers to the Rhine. General Sébastiani, who, on November 15, had succeeded Marshal Maison as Minister for Foreign Affairs, had, whilst in opposition, been one of the loudest advocates of a policy of expansion.[43] The recollection of his boastful language and of the aggressive schemes which he had heard him propound was always present in Palmerston’s memory, and was sensibly to influence his conduct of his first negotiations with the French government.
The general outlook in Europe in the autumn of 1830 augured ill for the continued maintenance of peace. Great military preparations were reported to be in progress in Russia. Marshal Diebitsch, the hero of the recent war with Turkey, was at Berlin upon a mission which, although it was described, as “wholly extra official,”[44] excited considerable apprehension in Paris. Insurrectionary movements, the repercussion of the Revolution of July, had taken place in Saxony and other States of Northern Germany. Metternich was said “to have proposed certain armaments to the Diet, wholly out of proportion to the necessities of the situation.” The King of Prussia, although he was universally credited with a sincere desire for peace, was suspected, nevertheless, “of preparing quietly for war.” The alarm was not dispelled by the assurances which, in London, Prince Lieven gave to both Palmerston and Talleyrand that the Russian armament was merely a measure of precaution necessitated by treaty obligations with the King of the Netherlands, and that, under no circumstances, would his Imperial master take action except in combination with the Powers.[45] On December 1 the French Chamber voted supplies for a considerable increase of the army.
The suspicion that the three Northern Courts were meditating an unprovoked attack upon France was unfounded. As Lord Heytesbury pointed out, the cholera, which had made its appearance in the Tsar’s dominions, threw an insuperable obstacle in the way of recruiting upon a large scale. Russia indeed, he considered, might almost be looked upon as hors de combat.[46] Nor was Metternich proposing to begin hostilities against France. “Austria’s task,” he instructed Esterhazy, the ambassador in London, “consists in suppressing any insurrectionary movement in Italy.” But should the French interpose in favour of the revolutionists, their action must be resisted vigorously. It was expedient, therefore, for the three great continental Powers to hold their armies in readiness. “The British government must be brought to understand that Austria cannot accept the principle of non-intervention. England, as an insular State, can adhere to it without danger, but when adopted by France it imperils the existence of neighbouring Powers. The proclamation of such a doctrine can be compared only to the complaints of thieves about the interference of the police.”[47] But, although the absolute Courts were certainly innocent of any desire to provoke a war deliberately, there were serious elements of danger in the situation. The King of the Netherlands, without doubt, looked upon the outbreak of a great European war as the only chance of regaining his Belgian provinces. Charles X. was once more installed quietly in his old quarters at Holyrood, but his adherents, the Legitimists, or Carlists, as they were more usually termed, were convinced that a war must prove fatal to the new régime in France. Talleyrand suspected that they were in league with the military party in Paris, and suggested that an agent should be sent over to London to watch them. He had no complaints to make about the assistance afforded him by the Home Secretary, who placed all the information he could obtain about them at his disposal, but, “in a country in which the police system was so bad, such reports had little value.”[48]
At the Congress of Vienna nearly the whole of those territories, known as the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, had been constituted into the Kingdom of Poland and assigned to the Tsar. Under the terms of the treaty, which was guaranteed by the Five Powers, the crown of the Kingdom was to be hereditary in the Imperial family of Russia. The Poles, however, were to be granted a constitution, and were to be allowed to maintain a national army. These stipulations were duly carried out by Alexander. But, as the Tsar’s Liberalism waned, the first conditions were considerably modified, and, after the accession of Nicholas, the Poles appear to have suspected, with perhaps good reason, that the Imperial Cabinet purposed to abolish gradually all their special privileges. Suddenly, on November 28, 1830, an insurrection broke out at Warsaw. The Viceroy, the Grand Duke Constantine, was driven from the town and several of his generals were murdered. The revolution spread rapidly through the country, and, after some vain attempts to negotiate a compromise, the Grand Duke retreated across the frontier with his Russian troops. On December 5, Chlopicki, a popular Polish general, who had served with distinction under Bonaparte, was proclaimed Dictator. Nicholas, whilst collecting his troops to reconquer his revolted kingdom, declared that the French revolutionary propaganda and the creation of Lancastrian schools[49] were responsible for the insurrection.[50]
The rebellion evoked the utmost enthusiasm in Paris. The designation of “the Frenchmen of the North,” which it became the fashion to apply to the Poles, tickled the national vanity. It was remembered that they had remained true to Bonaparte in his misfortunes, and that the unsympathetic treatment which they had experienced at the hands of the sovereigns at Vienna had been the penalty of their fidelity. Moreover, it was a natural consequence of their hatred of the treaties of 1815 that Frenchmen should feel drawn towards those countries which, like Poland or Italy, had cause for dissatisfaction with the conditions settled at the Congress of Vienna. Unquestionably this was the secret of much of that sympathy for “oppressed nationalities” which, from 1830 onwards, manifested itself so keenly in France. The war party and other factions hostile to the monarchy encouraged the popular ferment. Lord Stuart de Rothesay was disposed to think that Louis Philippe and his ministers regarded the excitement with secret approval, in the hope that it would distract public attention from the impending trial of the ex-ministers of Charles X.[51] In addition to Polignac himself three members of the Cabinet, who had signed the ordinances of July, had failed to escape abroad. The King, however, notwithstanding that the populace called furiously for their heads, was determined to save their lives. This merciful intention he was enabled to carry out successfully. On December 21 the peers adjudged them guilty of high treason but, in deference to Louis Philippe’s wishes, sentenced them only to perpetual confinement. Meanwhile Montalivet, the Minister of the Interior, had personally conducted the prisoners back to Vincennes, where they were lodged in safety before the mob, which thronged all the approaches to the Luxembourg, realized that it had been baulked of its prey. The satisfactory conclusion of this momentous trial was followed by an event of no less happy augury for the future. Nettled by a resolution of the Chamber affecting his position, La Fayette retired from the command of the national guard. The government accepted his resignation with grave misgivings, but, to the general surprise, the fickle multitude saw their hero replaced by Mouton de Lobau with comparative indifference.
But of all the questions which threatened to disturb the peace of Europe, that of Belgium, by reason of the conflict of national interests to which it gave rise, was by far the most delicate. It is not without cause that, for centuries, the Low Countries have been the chief battle ground of the Powers. Bonaparte is supposed to have described the possession of Antwerp as “a loaded pistol held at England’s head.” Unquestionably, during the great war, England had had experience of the difficulties of watching the coastline of Belgium and Holland united to that of France. The lesson had not been thrown away upon Lords Grey and Palmerston, who were fully determined to resist, at all costs, the acquisition of any portion of the Low Countries by a first-class military Power. On the other hand France had excellent reasons for objecting to the system under which the Kingdom of the Netherlands had been created, and the barrier fortresses erected. In the words of General Lamarque, the chief parliamentary spokesman of the war party, these defences constituted, within four days’ march of Paris, a tête de pont behind which the armies of a hostile coalition might assemble at leisure. Moreover, France, in 1815, had been deprived of the fortresses of Marienburg and Philippeville, both of which had been incorporated into the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and it was hoped that in any scheme of re-arrangement these two places would be restored to her. All supporters of the new monarchy were keenly alive to the immense satisfaction with which the smallest modification of the hated treaties of 1815 would be received throughout the country. Men of moderate views, such as Charles de Rémusat and Guizot, looked upon “a brilliant diplomatic triumph” or “some acquisition of territory towards Belgium” as conditions essential to the stability of the Orleans throne.[52] On the other hand, it was the policy of Austria, Prussia and Russia, as it was that of Great Britain, to preserve intact the territorial settlement of 1815 and to resist the aggrandisement of France. But the attitude of the Northern Courts was also greatly influenced by the marriages which connected the King of the Netherlands and the Prince of Orange with the Royal family of Prussia and the Imperial House of Russia. In addition to these considerations of relationship the sympathies of the absolute sovereigns necessarily went out to a monarch struggling with a rebellion of his subjects, and they could not but be reluctant to participate in measures tending to legalize a revolution.
The first sitting of the conference of the five Powers upon Belgian affairs took place at the Foreign Office in London, on November 4, on which occasion it was decided to impose an armistice upon the contending parties. According to the protocol, the Dutch and Belgian armies “were to retire behind the line which, previous to the treaty of May 30, 1814, separated the possessions of the sovereign prince of the United Provinces from the territories which have since been joined to them.”[53] No further step of much importance was taken until December 20, when Talleyrand proposed that the conference should proclaim the independence of Belgium.[54] After a discussion of seven hours’ duration, the objections of the plenipotentiaries of the absolute Powers were withdrawn, and the plan was acceded to unanimously. A month later, on January 20, 1831, the frontiers of Holland and Belgium were defined, and Belgium was declared neutral under the guarantee of the Powers. At the sitting of January 27, the plenipotentiaries apportioned the share of the general debt which each State would be called upon to bear.[55]
The difficult question of selecting a sovereign for Belgium was not lost sight of, whilst the delimitation of frontiers had been proceeding. As early as October 19, Molé informed Lord Stuart in confidence that M. Gendebien had brought proposals from the provisional government in Brussels for the enthronement of one of Louis Philippe’s younger sons. But he assured the British ambassador that, as France was about to confer upon the situation with the other Powers, the offer would not be entertained for a moment.[56] Again Talleyrand, on November 7, reported that “a kind of agent of the provisional government” was in London seeking to ascertain whether the elevation to the Belgian throne of the Duc de Leuchtenberg, a son of Eugène de Beauharnais, would be permitted.[57] At first the Powers, France included, had regarded the enthronement of the Prince of Orange as the safest solution of the difficulty. But after the bombardment of the town of Antwerp by the Dutch, at the end of October, he became very unpopular, and, on November 24, the national congress at Brussels resolved that all members of the House of Orange-Nassau should be excluded from the throne.[58] In consequence, possibly, of this action by the Belgian deputies, Lords Grey and Palmerston appear to have mentioned the Archduke Charles of Austria to Talleyrand as a suitable candidate. But he objected, reminding them that his enthronement would constitute a restoration, which the most famous of Whigs had once described as “the worst of revolutions.” Moreover, Metternich, who had no desire to extend the influence of Austria in that direction, soon afterwards declared that the Archduke would decline the crown, both for himself and for his children, were it to be offered to him.[59] Talleyrand himself appears to have been the first to suggest that Leopold of Saxe-Coburg might with advantage be chosen to rule over the new State.[60] In putting forward this plan he seems to have been actuated chiefly by a desire to please the British government, but, for reasons which will be explained later, his proposal met with very little response. Meanwhile, the language of Mauguin and Lamarque in the Chamber, and the evident intention of the military party to object to any settlement which should not admit of the future union of Belgium with France, were rapidly impelling Louis Philippe to adopt an attitude of opposition to Great Britain and the other Powers.[61]
At the first sitting of the conference it had been decided that M. Bresson, the first secretary of the French embassy in London, and Mr. Cartwright, who held a similar position at the British embassy at the Hague, should act as the commissioners of the Powers at Brussels. Cartwright, however, had soon been recalled in order that he might assume the duties of British minister at Frankfort, and Lord Ponsonby had been sent to take his place at Brussels. Ponsonby was the brother-in-law of Lord Grey and was reputed to be the handsomest man of his time. There was a story that as a youth he had been set upon by the mob in the Rue Saint-Honoré, in the early days of the revolution, and that it was only the protests of the women, that he was too good-looking to be hanged, which had saved him from “la lanterne.” Canning is said to have sent him to Buenos Ayres, in 1826, upon his first diplomatic mission of importance, in order to please George IV., whose peace of mind was disturbed by Lady Cunningham’s too evident admiration of him.[62] In Belgium, at this time, the two chief political parties were the French party, consisting of the advocates of a union with France, and the Orange party, the members of which favoured the enthronement of the Prince of Orange. The first were unquestionably by far the most numerous, but the Orangists, who were to be found chiefly in business and commercial circles, were not without power and influence. Bresson, from the first moment of his arrival at Brussels, appears to have identified himself closely with the aspirations of the French party, whilst Ponsonby espoused no less zealously the cause of the Prince of Orange.[63] There was, thus, keen rivalry and apparently much personal dislike between these two representatives of the conference.
Louis Philippe would never appear seriously to have entertained the notion of allowing one of his younger sons to accept the crown of Belgium, or of consenting to the union of Belgium with France. Lord Grey had given Talleyrand, who had been directed to sound the British government upon the subject, clearly to understand that the enthronement of a French prince would be regarded as a case for war—a declaration, which, in the words of Sébastiani, “had at least the merit of frankness.”[64] Of all the possible candidates for the Belgian crown Louis Philippe justly considered the Duc de Leuchtenberg to be the most undesirable. To have allowed any one connected with the Bonaparte family to become King of Belgium would have been exceedingly dangerous to the French monarchy. “There are no personal objections to him,” wrote Sébastiani to Bresson, “but all considerations must give way before the raison d’état.”[65] The candidate for whose success Louis Philippe was in reality most anxious, and whose selection Sébastiani instructed both Bresson and Talleyrand to advocate cautiously, was Prince Charles of Naples. This young prince was a Neapolitan Bourbon, a brother of the Duchesse de Berri and a nephew of the French queen, Marie Amélie, and Louis Philippe was always as desirous as any king of the old régime to promote the aggrandizement of his family. But when Talleyrand mentioned his name to Lord Grey he was told at once that his connection with the reigning House in France constituted an insuperable objection,[66] whilst from Brussels Bresson reported that “the Prince of Naples had no following.”[67]
A second attempt, on the part of the provisional government at Brussels to persuade Louis Philippe to accept the crown for his son, was made in December 1830. On that occasion M. Van de Weyer carried the proposal to Paris. British hostility was to be overcome by the marriage of Nemours, the young prince whom it was proposed to elevate to the throne, to an English princess, and by the conversion of Antwerp into a free port and by the destruction of its fortifications.[68] Louis Philippe declined the offer, but the already-mentioned instructions sent to Talleyrand to ascertain the views of the British government upon the subject were probably a consequence of Van de Weyer’s mission. Bresson, however, soon after he had received Sébastiani’s despatch, informing him of the King’s determination to refuse the crown for his son, expressed great fear lest Leuchtenberg should be selected. His candidature was, he reported, the result of a Bonapartist intrigue organized in Paris, but the Belgians were tired of their unsettled condition and were anxious that a ruler of some kind should be chosen.[69] Some ten days later he forwarded intelligence of a more precise and of a yet more disquieting nature. The French party, led by M. Gendebien, in consequence of the refusal of Nemours, had now definitely adopted Leuchtenberg as their candidate. Moreover, three notorious Bonapartist generals, Excelmans, Lallemand and Fabvier, were reported to have arrived at Namur and Liège. This news was followed the next day by a despatch in which he complained of Ponsonby’s activity on behalf of the Prince of Orange and, at the same time, accused him of being favourable to the election of Leuchtenberg.[70]
Louis Philippe was genuinely disquieted by Bresson’s news. He was resolved, he told Lord Granville, who, early in January, had replaced Lord Stuart de Rothesay at the British embassy, to send the Comte de Flahaut to London to impress upon the government the keen anxiety with which he regarded the march of events at Brussels. By existing treaties, he reminded him, no member of the Bonaparte family was allowed to live in Belgium, and, in the course of conversation, he hinted that a Neapolitan prince would be the best king for the new State.[71] Flahaut was a distinguished general officer of the empire and was, besides, the admitted father of that half-brother of Louis Napoleon, who was to acquire celebrity under the name of the Duc de Morny. During the greater part of the Restoration period Flahaut had lived in London, where his attractive manners and charm of conversation had made him a popular member of society. Moreover, during his residence in England, he had married Miss Mercer Elphinstone, a great heiress of her day.[72] The mission, upon which he was now despatched to London, was not confined merely to the communication to the British government of Louis Philippe’s fears respecting a Bonapartist candidate for the Belgian throne. But, as his instructions are not to be found among the diplomatic papers of the period, the exact nature of the proposals he was empowered to make can only be conjectured. In a private letter to Granville, on February 8, Palmerston speaks of a suggested offensive and defensive alliance between France and Great Britain “which was to be kept an entire secret from all the world,” to which proposal he had replied, “that these alliances are not popular in England, but that if France were attacked unjustly, England would be found upon her side.”[73] From the despatches of Granville and of Talleyrand it may be inferred with certainty that some scheme was on foot whereby France was to acquire a part of Belgium and, in return for her consent to this plan, England was to have the right of garrisoning Antwerp, which was to be declared a free port.[74] Talleyrand, whilst favourable to the idea of converting Antwerp into a Hanseatic town, was very much opposed to the notion of assisting England to regain a footing upon the continent. It would be too high a price to pay, he contended, even for so popular a measure as the extension of the French frontiers into Belgium.[75]
Whilst Flahaut was thus engaged in London, Colonel the Marquis de Lawoëstine, a former aide-de-camp of Sébastiani and a Belgian of good family, had been despatched to Brussels. In his case also the precise object of his errand can only be surmised. It is clear, however, that M. Juste[76] is mistaken in supposing that he was sent to urge the national congress to elect the Duc de Nemours. “In general,”wrote Sébastiani to Bresson, when announcing the despatch of Lawoëstine, “you must say as little as possible about his mission, but you need make no mystery about it to Lord Ponsonby,”[77] a sentence which precludes the possibility that his journey to Brussels can have been connected with the election of a son of Louis Philippe. Without doubt Lawoëstine was primarily charged to combat the candidature of Leuchtenberg, but it would seem that he was directed quietly to oppose Prince Charles of Naples to him. “It will be difficult,” answered Bresson upon receipt of Sébastiani’s despatch, “to keep secret the object of Lawoëstine’s mission. The candidature of Prince Charles of Naples has been talked about and the factions in Paris are working against him. Even M. de Mérode[78] is threatening to abandon Prince Charles and to vote in favour of the Duc de Leuchtenberg.”[79]
Lawoëstine, after “seeing all the chief people,”appears to have returned to Paris to lay before the King the urgency of the situation, whilst the tone of Bresson’s despatches, during the next few days, became yet more alarming. The bust of the Duc de Leuchtenberg, he reported, had been crowned at the theatre amidst cries of “Vive August 1er, Roi des Belges.” Only, he considered, by the nomination of the Duc de Nemours could Leuchtenberg be combated effectually.[80] Bresson himself, probably on either January 25 or 26, seems to have paid a hurried visit to Paris. On February 1 the national congress was to proceed to elect a King for Belgium, and, presumably, he wished to obtain fuller instructions as to the attitude he was to adopt in the different eventualities which might arise. By this time the 11th protocol of the London conference, that of January 20, 1831, defining the boundaries of Holland and Belgium, had been received by Lord Ponsonby and himself for communication to the provisional government. The conditions of separation, as laid down in that document, fell far short of the hopes of the Belgians. They claimed the districts of Luxemburg and Limburg, but the Powers assigned these provinces to Holland. The King of the Netherlands was also Grand Duke of Luxemburg and as such was a member of the Germanic Confederation. His position had been recognized by the conference which, in its protocol of December 20, 1830, had formally declared its incompetence to interfere with territories forming part of the Confederation, a decision which excited equal dissatisfaction in Paris and in Brussels. If she could not obtain Luxemburg for herself, France hoped to see this province withdrawn from the Germanic Confederation and handed over to Belgium.
On January 29 Bresson reported his return to Brussels, having performed the journey from the French capital in twenty-five hours. He would appear to have been empowered by Louis Philippe himself to assure the members of the national congress that, were Nemours to be elected, he would be allowed to accept the crown. It is probable, however, that he was instructed only to resort to this step should he find it impossible to oppose Leuchtenberg successfully by other means. It may be inferred that neither Bresson nor Lawoëstine felt any enthusiasm about the election of a Neapolitan Bourbon, and were only too anxious to bestir themselves actively on behalf of a French prince. “Ponsonby supports Leuchtenberg as leading up to the Prince of Orange,” wrote Bresson on the day of his return.[81] “The effect of Lord Ponsonby’s communication to the congress of the protocol of January 20 has been very great,” reported Lawoëstine, who also was back in Brussels. “The only way of preventing the election of the Duc de Leuchtenberg is by bringing forward the Duc de Nemours. Even at the risk of a war with the Powers this course should be adopted. Belgium would be with us heart and soul, and we should begin the campaign in possession of the 23 frontier fortresses, all of which are provided with an immense matériel.”[82]
On receipt of this news from his agents at Brussels Sébastiani, in order, presumably, to influence the national congress in favour of the French candidate, despatched a letter to Bresson the contents of which were intended for communication to the Belgian deputies. In this document, dated February 1, Sébastiani stated that France could not give her consent to the delimitation of frontiers or to the apportionment of the debt, as laid down in the 11th and 12th protocols of the London conference, unless these conditions should be deemed satisfactory by both the States concerned. The French government, holding that the conference had been convened for purposes of mediation only, could not allow it to assume a different character.[83] On February 3 the Duc de Nemours was elected King of the Belgians, and a deputation started at once for Paris to communicate the news officially to Louis Philippe.
In the meantime Sébastiani, on February 2, had informed Talleyrand that, were the Belgians to elect a son of Louis Philippe for their King, he would decline to accept the crown, but the occasion was to be utilized for bringing forward the Prince of Naples. He was confident that, in order to escape from the complications entailed by Nemours’ election, the Powers, at present hostile to the Neapolitan prince, would look upon his enthronement as a happy alternative. On February 4 he again affirmed the King’s intention of declining the crown for his son, but his despatch of the following day was replete with complaints of Ponsonby’s efforts upon behalf of the Prince of Orange, a course of conduct which, he declared, would inevitably lead to civil war. Were serious disturbances to break out in Belgium, France would be driven to intervene, and it was, therefore, necessary for Lords Grey and Palmerston to understand that the situation was extremely critical.[84]
Talleyrand, however, was doing all in his power to convince his government of the disastrous effect which the rumours from Brussels were having upon public opinion in London. His declaration to the conference, on February 7, that the King of the French would refuse the crown of Belgium for his son had made a very good impression, and it had induced the plenipotentiaries to guarantee that, were Leuchtenberg to be elected, he would not be acknowledged by their respective Courts.[85] But, on the same day, he reported that the Cabinet, after a prolonged sitting, had resolved to declare war upon France, should the crown of Belgium be accepted by Nemours, and he begged Sébastiani to reflect most seriously upon the consequences of a naval conflict. Bresson’s behaviour at Brussels, he complained, had placed him in a very difficult position, and if the King could not see his way to follow his advice, his continued presence in London could no longer serve any useful purpose, Montrond, who by his desire was returning to Paris, would tell the King and his ministers that in London, at the clubs and in society, the prospects of a war with France were the chief topic of conversation.[86]