Leopold having let it be known that, were the deputies to refuse to agree to the terms imposed by the conference, he would be driven to abdicate, the Chambers, on November 3, authorized him to conclude a formal treaty of peace and separation upon the basis of the twenty-four articles. This document was accordingly signed in London, on November 15, 1831, by the plenipotentiaries of Belgium and of the five great Powers. The King of Holland refused to be a party to the agreement, but, before the expiration of the armistice, he had been warned that any act of hostility against Belgium would be treated as a declaration of war against the Powers. In addition, by a supplementary article, the contracting parties guaranteed to Belgium the execution of the treaty. Ratifications, it was laid down, were to be exchanged within the space of two months.[170] At various periods during these negotiations Talleyrand had experienced considerable difficulty in persuading the French government to agree to the decisions of the conference. When at last it had reluctantly given its assent to the conditions of separation he was at pains to show the advantages which France would derive from the treaty. The Duchy of Bouillon, he pointed out, no longer formed part of the Duchy of Luxemburg, whilst the incorporation of Arlon with Belgium increased the strength of the French frontier towards Longwy. Furthermore, the cession of half of the Duchy of Luxemburg to Belgium placed the Germanic Confederation at a greater distance from France and, inasmuch as the fortress was no longer to form part of a military system,[171] it would cease to have any importance. With regard to the repartition of the debt, which the French government had objected to as pressing unduly upon Belgium, Talleyrand contended that the general interests of Europe urgently demanded a settlement of the whole question, and that the Belgians, after their wretched display in the summer, had been treated with more generosity than they had any right to expect.[172]
Whilst the conference had been framing the conditions of separation between Holland and Belgium, the French government had brought forward a scheme for a general disarmament. Sébastiani in the summer had proposed a reduction of establishments to a normal peace footing, but had found that the German Powers were unwilling to revert to ordinary conditions of military strength, until the Polish insurrection should be at an end. After the Russian entry in Warsaw, however, the French overtures met with a ready response. The continental Powers agreed to begin disarming on January 1, 1832, and to proceed until their armies should be reduced to their peace establishments. Inasmuch as England had not added to her naval or land forces she could not enter into an agreement to disarm, but Lord Granville was instructed to communicate to Sébastiani the satisfaction which so practical a manifestation of peaceful intentions afforded to the British government.[173]
The question of the demolition of the barrier fortresses had been proceeding side by side with the settlement of the conditions under which Belgium was to be separated from Holland. Talleyrand, however, was not admitted to these negotiations which were conducted between the plenipotentiaries of Great Britain, Austria, Russia and Prussia and those of Belgium. The result of their deliberations was embodied in a document, known as the Fortress Convention, which was signed by the representatives of the five Powers concerned on December 14, 1831. When La Tour-Maubourg had been sent to Brussels, during the French occupation of Belgium, he had been instructed to press for the demolition of the fortifications of Ath, Mons, Menin, Charleroi and Tournay. The Powers, however, elected to preserve the defences of the two last-named towns and to dismantle in their place the works of Philippeville and Marienburg. Palmerston, without doubt, was mainly responsible for this decision which was to create great dissatisfaction in Paris. He was resolved, under no circumstance, to admit the principle of allowing France to have a voice in determining which of the fortresses, erected at the expense of the four Powers, should be destroyed. After her attempts to arrive at a separate understanding with Belgium concerning them, he may have thought that she required to be reminded of the true state of the case. Yet it would appear that the mere fact that her plenipotentiary had not appended his signature to the convention must have made her position in the matter sufficiently clear to the world. But, in persuading the members of the conference to substitute Philippeville and Marienburg for Charleroi and Tournay, Palmerston was not actuated by a desire wantonly to slight France. In the question of the destruction of the Belgian fortresses Grey’s Cabinet was in a very delicate position as regards the Parliament.[174] An embittered opposition was bound to demand to know on what grounds the government proposed to justify its policy of sanctioning the demolition of fortifications, which the greatest captain of the day had pronounced to be necessary to the security of Europe. Now Wellington, it would appear, considered Charleroi and Tournay as of more importance to the defence of Belgium than Philippeville and Marienburg, and Lord Grey and his colleagues could not afford to disregard his opinion. It must be remembered also that, on several occasions during the course of the negotiations, France had shown a strong desire to regain possession of these two places of which she had been deprived after Waterloo, and it was hoped that, were their fortifications to be demolished, they would cease to offer the same attractions to her.[175]
Without doubt the decision of the Powers to deprive France of any voice in the settlement of the question of the fortresses placed her in a very anomalous position. She was a party to the treaty which established the independence, defined the frontiers and guaranteed the neutrality of Belgium, nevertheless Austria, Prussia, Russia and Great Britain had proceeded to conclude at once a separate convention with Belgium against her. By her own action, however, she was debarred from bringing forward this aspect of the case as an argument against her exclusion from the fortress agreement. Far from raising any objections to the conduct of the four Powers in drawing up the protocol of April 17, without consultation with her, she had expressed the greatest satisfaction with its contents. At her request it was communicated to her officially, in order that an allusion might be made to it in the Speech from the Throne. Louis Philippe, in opening the Parliament on July 23, 1831, accordingly announced the early destruction of the barrier fortresses, as a proof that the four Powers had abandoned the system established against France in 1815. In point of fact the apprehensions of her aggressive spirit had been intensified by the Revolution of July and, in deciding to demolish some of the frontier defences of the Low Countries, the Powers had not been actuated by any desire to propitiate the new régime. But once the partition of the Kingdom of the Netherlands had been accomplished, it was recognized that the Belgians alone could not keep in repair and efficiently defend the twenty-three barrier fortresses. Ill-equipped and insufficiently garrisoned they would not have contributed to the protection of Belgium, but would have offered a constant temptation to the French to lay hands upon them. If France, however, chose to imagine that in this matter the policy of the Powers was dictated by a desire to please her, it was unnecessary to inform her that she was labouring under a delusion. It was probably the knowledge that the fiction contained in the paragraph of the King’s Speech, referring to the fortresses, could not be maintained for long, which had induced the French government to attempt to negotiate a separate agreement with Belgium.[176]
Both Palmerston and Stockmar appear to have been convinced that Talleyrand had prompted his government to protest against the fortress convention.[177] But their suspicions with regard to him seem to have been unfounded. In pursuance of his instructions, in his conversations with Grey and Palmerston, he was bound to employ those arguments most calculated to induce them to make some concessions to the wishes of his Court, but his despatches show that he disapproved strongly of the attitude he was directed to adopt. On December 15, in forwarding a copy of the fortress treaty, the contents of which he knew would be exceedingly displeasing to his government, he told Sébastiani plainly that La Tour-Maubourg’s mission to Brussels was largely responsible for the determination of the four Powers to select the fortresses for destruction, without regard to the wishes of France. That affair, moreover, in his opinion, had been managed in a very clumsy fashion. When the government decided to try to arrange a separate understanding with Belgium, it should have conducted its negotiations in the strictest secrecy.[178]
Sébastiani, for the reason which has already been explained, was precluded from objecting openly to the exclusion of France from the fortress convention, and was compelled to confine his protests to remonstrances against the selection of Philippeville and Marienburg for demolition. Talleyrand was instructed to contend that the fortifications of these two places, having been erected before 1815, could not be held to fall within the category of works constructed at the expense of the Powers. Furthermore, he was to urge that it was incompatible with the complete independence of Belgium, which France was anxious to see established, that the Powers should specify which fortresses King Leopold was to dismantle.[179] Talleyrand, however, reported that Lord Palmerston was quite unshaken by these arguments. The British minister gave him clearly to understand that La Tour-Maubourg’s proceedings at Brussels had impressed him most unfavourably. At the same time, pointing out that Philippeville and Marienburg were the fortresses in closest proximity to the frontier of France, he hinted that the French government must have some secret reason for objecting to their demolition. “Nevertheless,” reported Talleyrand, “I still believe that he is well disposed towards us. He is, however, in a difficult position as regards the Commons. . . . We must bring pressure to bear upon the Belgians.”[180] Sébastiani’s fears that the policy of the Powers aimed at the re-establishment of the Holy Alliance, were, he assured him, in language no less emphatic than that used by Granville in Paris, entirely without foundation. Far too much importance, he urged, was attached to the fortress convention. The King’s government, in his opinion, would be well advised to accept it, and to declare publicly that its provisions were in harmony with the protocol of April 17. Russia was no longer occupied with the rebellion of the Poles, and the Northern Courts were evincing a strong disposition to draw together closely. Under these conditions, he regarded it as essential that France should maintain friendly relations with England. “It was a matter of far more real importance than the question of the fortresses.”[181] But his endeavours to soothe the irritation of his government met with no success. He was instructed to announce in London that France, seeing that satisfaction was denied her in the affair of the fortress convention, would refuse to ratify the treaty of separation of November 15, 1831. Furthermore, Casimir Périer, who, on account of Sébastiani’s state of health, had taken charge of the portfolio of Foreign Affairs, declared that, “in view of the general uncertainty respecting the course of events in Belgium and Holland, the signature of the proposed convention of disarmament must be postponed.”[182]
The French agents in the meanwhile had not been idle at Brussels. On December 12 General Tiburce Sébastiani, the brother of the minister, arrived. “Ostensibly,” reported Adair, “he has come to visit this town and Antwerp, but his real purpose is to prevent the accession of the Belgian government to the fortress convention.” This officer certainly brought a letter for Belliard containing instructions which justified the British minister’s conclusions, but his mission appears also to have been connected with some unfounded rumour, which had reached the French government, that the Orangists were about to put into execution their designs against Leopold’s throne.[183] That monarch now found himself once more, as he himself described it, “between the hammer and the anvil.”[184] Louis Philippe[185] wrote indignantly complaining that the agreement of September 8, entered into with La Tour-Maubourg, had not been complied with. In vain Leopold produced the instructions, with which Goblet and Van de Weyer, who had negotiated the convention, had been furnished, and protested that the Belgian plenipotentiaries had been forced to sign, under the threat that the Powers would refuse to ratify the treaty of separation, should they persist in opposing their wishes with respect to the fortresses. General Belliard, at the same time, intimated that, were the Dutch again to attack Belgium, no assistance from France could be expected. To Adair, who, on the other hand, begged him to stand firm, Leopold had expressed his determination to disregard the French objections and to adhere to the convention. But at the threat that, were his Kingdom again to be overrun, France would leave him to his fate, his resolution broke down and Goblet was directed to announce in London that the Belgian ratification of the fortress agreement would be withheld.[186] Stockmar, writing from London, impressed upon King Leopold that his refusal to ratify the convention of December 14 would be eagerly seized upon by the absolute Powers as an excuse for withholding their adhesion to the treaty of separation. Already the news that differences had arisen between France and England, upon the subject of the fortresses, had enabled Metternich to reply to Mr. Forbes, the British chargé d’affaires, who had been instructed to urge him to transmit to London the necessary authority for an exchange of ratifications, that France was holding back and that it was important that all the Powers should act together in the matter. Prince Metternich was torn between his fears that the continued state of uncertainty as to the affairs of the Low Countries might lead to a war, and his desire to propitiate Russia. Nicholas was believed to have counselled the King of the Netherlands to agree to the treaty, but to be resolved, none the less, to withhold his own ratification until that sovereign’s reluctance to accept the conditions of separation should have been overcome.[187] M. Casimir Périer, in the meanwhile, however, was beginning to realize that Palmerston was determined not to yield to the outcry about the fortresses, and that were France, on that account, to decline to ratify the treaty of separation not only would the labours of the London conference for the past year be rendered nugatory, but the good relations which had been established with England would be seriously impaired. Moreover, should the negotiations break down, Lord Grey might be compelled to resign, and he had good reason to apprehend, that a change of government in England would be followed quickly by his own downfall. An important group of deputies in the Chamber gave him their votes, only because they believed that his alliance with the Whigs ensured the maintenance of peace. But this reason for their support of him would disappear on the day on which the Tories should return to office.[188] Under these circumstances Talleyrand was directed to obtain from the representatives of the four Powers “some declaration calculated to reassure the King’s government as to the spirit in which the fortress convention had been drawn up.” This result was achieved by means of a document in which it was affirmed that the arrangements respecting the fortresses were consistent with the independence, neutrality and sovereignty of Belgium, and that that country stood upon an equal footing as regards the five guaranteeing Powers. Casmir Périer declared himself well pleased to receive this empty satisfaction and, forthwith, announced his intention of adhering to the treaty of separation.[189] On January 31, accordingly, the two western Powers exchanged ratifications with Belgium and, at the same time, it was resolved to keep open the protocol, in the hope that the Northern Courts would before long confirm the signatures of their plenipotentiaries.[190]
Scarcely had this difficulty been settled when grave complications arose in another direction. The promises of the Pope, that reforms would be introduced into the administration of local affairs in Romagna, had not been carried out. The intention manifested by the Roman government to disregard its pledges was followed by a recrudescence of unrest in the Legations. M. Casimir Périer, accordingly, proposed that, were foreign intervention to be required to maintain the authority of His Holiness, a French corps should occupy Ancona. But Metternich demurred, and, as an alternative, suggested that a French naval force should be sent to the Adriatic to act in combination with the Austrian squadron. On February 1, however, the news arrived that the Austrians had entered Bologna, whereupon M. Casimir Périer at once ordered a French regiment to be embarked at Toulon for Ancona. Were that town to be occupied by the Austrians before the French expedition could arrive, the troops, Lord Granville was informed in confidence, would be landed at Civita Vecchia. The action of the French government would, M. Casimir Périer declared to the British ambassador, hasten the departure of the Austrians and induce Prince Metternich to press the Court of Rome to adopt those reforms by which alone permanent tranquillity could be established in the Legations.[191]
The more detailed information as to the course of events in Romagna, transmitted by Sainte-Aulaire and the British consul at Rome, suggested the existence of a secret understanding between His Holiness and the Cabinet of Vienna. At Forli the Pontifical troops were reported to have shot down in cold blood peaceful and unarmed inhabitants, and their behaviour created the impression that they were anxious to produce disorder, in order to furnish Cardinal Albani, the Legate, with a pretext for invoking the aid of Austria.[192] Suspicions on this score were heightened by the fact that, although Marshal Radetzky only received the application for assistance on January 23, his orders, in which he styled himself commander-in-chief of the army of Italy, were dated on the 19th, four days before the arrival of the cardinal’s demand for intervention.[193] Upon learning of these proceedings the Comte de Sainte-Aulaire at once notified to Cardinal Bernetti, the State Secretary, that the entry of an Imperial army into the Papal States would be followed by the immediate occupation of Ancona by a French force. Bernetti appears reluctantly to have acquiesced, but, after the expedition had sailed from Toulon, acting, without doubt, at the dictation of the Austrian ambassador, he formally protested against the disembarkation of any French troops within the dominions of the Pope.[194] When the news first reached Vienna that the French had taken steps to occupy Ancona, Metternich, concealing his annoyance, was at pains to impress upon the public that this measure was the result of a previous understanding with Austria.[195] On the other hand, at St. Petersburg the intelligence that the French had intervened in Italy was held to have rendered war inevitable, and Nicholas forthwith declared his intention of giving armed assistance to Austria.[196] From London Talleyrand reported that Palmerston spoke very guardedly when he sought to ascertain the views of the British government upon the matter. In his own opinion, and this aspect of the case he on more than one occasion brought to the notice of M. Casimir Périer, it was much to be regretted that the demonstrations in Italy had taken place before Austria should have ratified the Belgian treaty. The accounts, moreover, of the lawless proceedings of the French commander at Ancona, which soon began to arrive, created a very general alarm. Not only had the troops forced their way into the citadel, but a proclamation was issued by Captain Gallois, drawn up in terms so hostile to Austria, as to amount practically to a declaration of war. That individual, however, who was either a member of, or in league with, the French secret societies, the agents of which were striving to stir up a revolution in Italy, was promptly disavowed and the fact of his recall to France was communicated to foreign governments. Nevertheless, wrote Talleyrand, the affair has created a most painful impression. “The territory of an independent sovereign has been violated at a time of profound peace and the tricolour has been hoisted over a fortress which does not belong to France.”[197] In a conversation which he had had with William IV. at a levée, His Majesty spoke to him most strongly about the impropriety of these proceedings which, ministers also informed him, had greatly increased their difficulties in both Houses. They could have added with perfect truth that their relations with their sovereign had suffered considerably owing to this affair.[198]
The Austrian policy of deliberately encouraging misgovernment in the Italian States and of placing every obstacle in the way of reforms was hateful to Lord Palmerston. Apart from other considerations he was convinced that a continuance of this state of affairs must, sooner or later, drive France to intervene in such a manner as to render a war inevitable with Austria.[199] Already, on February 20, before he had received the news of the arrival of the French expedition at Ancona, he had directed Mr. Seymour, the British minister at Florence, to proceed to Rome “to represent the anxiety of His Majesty’s government to see those causes, which have produced so much difficulty, effectually removed.” He was to urge that no measures would appear “to afford so good a hope of success as a complete adoption of those reforms which were pointed out in the memorandum of May 21, 1831.” Lastly, he was to impress upon Cardinal Bernetti that, “if the reports be true that the ranks of the papal troops, which recently entered the Legations, have been replenished by emptying the prisons of criminals and by calling down the lawless bands from the mountains, the Roman government cannot divest itself of a deep responsibility for the melancholy events which marked the entry into Cesena and Forli. The innocent blood which was wantonly shed in the streets of those towns might well be accepted as a full atonement for the political offences of the people of Romagna.”[200] When the story became known of the manner in which the French entry into Ancona had been carried out, Palmerston readily agreed to do all in his power to soothe the irritation of Austria and to assist to remove the bad impression created by Captain Gallois’ lawlessness. Seymour was further instructed to inform Cardinal Bernetti that the British government was fully satisfied that the French occupation of Ancona was but a temporary measure, which the condition of the Legations had occasioned. He was to reiterate the necessity for the immediate introduction of the promised reforms and “to draw the serious attention of the Roman government to the fact, that the course which it was pursuing with respect to the Legations, had already had the effect of turning the eyes of the population of those provinces towards Austria. . . . The system of administration established in Lombardy and Venetia, although not free from defects, was looked upon with envy by the subjects of the Pope.[201] At Vienna Sir Frederick Lamb was directed to assure Prince Metternich that the occupation of Ancona would cease as soon as His Holiness should have carried out his engagements.[202]
Metternich, reported Lamb, received the news of the French proceedings at Ancona very calmly. He expressed himself as confident that Gallois’ actions would be disavowed by his government. “The Emperor,” he declared, “would be justified in falling upon the French at Ancona, but he was too great a sovereign to receive an insult from the captain of a frigate or the colonel of a regiment.” It was to England that Austria looked for support at this crisis. She ruled the seas and it rested with her to decide whether, or not, France should hold the command of the Mediterranean. About a week after this conversation had taken place Metternich informed Lamb that he was perfectly satisfied with the explanations which Marshal Maison had been instructed to give, and that no demand would be made to the French government for the evacuation of Ancona, so long as the Austrians continued to occupy the Legations.[203]
This condition of affairs was allowed to prevail for some years. Both Powers retained their troops in the Papal States, and the embarrassing necessity under which the French government was placed of making the occupation of Ancona depend upon the presence of an Austrian garrison at Bologna constituted Metternich’s revenge for M. Périer’s intervention in Italy.
The attention of the corps diplomatique had not been concentrated exclusively upon the complications to which the French proceedings at Ancona might give rise. Early in the month of February it was known that Count Orloff had been despatched by the Tsar on a special mission to the Hague. It was in deference to the wishes of Nicholas that the Courts of Vienna and of Berlin had decided to withhold their ratification of the treaty of separation of November 15, 1831, and the keenest curiosity prevailed as to the instructions with which the Tsar’s emissary had been furnished. In respect to the condition of affairs in the Low Countries Russia was in a somewhat peculiar situation as regards England. During the Napoleonic war Russia had borrowed at Amsterdam a sum of 25,000,000 florins. At the peace the King of the Netherlands and the King of Great Britain agreed respectively to bear one-half of the charge of this debt. But it was provided that, should at any time the King of the Netherlands be deprived of his sovereignty over the Belgian provinces, this charge should cease. The contingency referred to in the treaty had come about, under circumstances never contemplated by the statesmen by whom it had been drawn up. They had hoped to give Russia a direct interest in preserving the union, but it was now the British government which desired to see it abolished and the Tsar who wished it to be maintained. Without doubt, according to the letter of the treaty, England was no longer bound to pay a share of the Russian-Dutch loan. Judged by the spirit of it, however, she could not honestly escape from the charge which she had undertaken to bear. This last construction of the agreement was adopted by Palmerston, who admitted the British liability in a new convention, by the terms of which the Tsar guaranteed that, should the stipulations made for the independence and neutrality of Belgium be endangered by the course of events, he would contract no other engagements without a previous agreement with his Britannic Majesty. Palmerston had thus earned the gratitude of the Tsar and had, in addition, made it difficult for him to intervene actively on behalf of the King of Holland.[204] Ministers were debarred, however from referring to this inner history of the affair in Parliament, where their policy in the matter of the Russian loan was severely attacked both by the Tory Opposition and by the Radicals, who deprecated the notion of voting pecuniary assistance to the autocratic government of Russia.
The Count Alexis Orloff, whose journey to the Hague was the subject of so much speculation in the chanceries of Europe, was the natural son of a younger brother of Gregory Orloff, the lover of Catherine II. and a prominent actor in that palace revolution of 1762, which cost the Emperor Peter III. his throne, and very probably his life. After serving in the Napoleonic wars, the Count Alexis had gained the lasting gratitude of his imperial master by his resolute behaviour, which had contributed not a little to upset the designs of the Decembrists, as those military conspirators were termed, who, in 1825, had sought to prevent the accession of Nicholas. Ever afterwards, in consequence, Alexis Orloff was selected by the Tsar for the most delicate and secret missions. No notice of his departure was given to any member of the corps diplomatique at St. Petersburg. Count Nesselrode, after he had started, merely informed Lord Heytesbury that he had been sent to the Hague to extract a categorical statement from the King of the Netherlands as to whether he would accept the treaty of separation, and, in the event of his declaring that he would withhold his consent, to signify to him that he must not look to Russia for support.[205] This was in substance all that Mr. Chad, the British minister at Berlin, could discover about the objects of Orloff’s mission during the Count’s stay in the Prussian capital. But he noted that the general effect of his visit to Berlin had been to incline the Prussian government to espouse more warmly the cause of the King of the Netherlands, a result which, he pointed out, was inconsistent with the purpose which the Tsar’s emissary was alleged to have in view.[206] Fuller information, however, on that score was soon forthcoming from Vienna. On February 25, Sir Frederick Lamb was able to transmit to Lord Palmerston a copy of Orloff’s secret instructions. These contained a clause to the effect that the Emperor of Russia would not recognize the King of the Belgians, until he should have been acknowledged by the King of the Netherlands. Furthermore, the Count was directed to protest against any measures of coercion, which France and England might decide to adopt against Holland, and to declare that the Tsar would regard all concessions, obtained by such means, as null and void. Lastly, whilst in London, whither he was to proceed when he had completed his task at the Hague, Orloff was “to assist by all means in his power the endeavours which, for the past twelve months, Prince Lieven and Count Matuszewic[207] had been making to prevent a union of the British Cabinet with that of the Palais Royal.”[208]
During his stay at Berlin, Orloff tried to win over the Prussian government to the Tsar’s views upon the Belgian question. But his attempts were unsuccessful. Ancillon, the chief minister, was greatly alarmed at the disturbance of the European Concert to which he feared the Russian policy must lead. Were Austria, Prussia and Russia to make their ratification of the separation treaty depend upon the acceptation of its conditions by the King of the Netherlands, the Powers must necessarily fall into two opposing groups: France and Great Britain on the one side, and the three Northern Courts on the other. Rather than help to create so perilous a situation, Prussia would, with much regret be obliged to “aller en avant et de ratifier.” Ancillon seems to have succeeded in extracting from Orloff a promise that he would for the present, at least, refrain from communicating the secret clauses of his instructions to the King of the Netherlands, and to have directed the Prussian minister at St. Petersburg to endeavour to persuade Nicholas to cancel them. Metternich, reported Lamb, regarded the matter in the same light as Ancillon, and was resolved to assimilate his policy to that of the Court of Berlin. It was presumably for the purpose of thwarting the Russian plan that a copy of Orloff’s secret instructions was placed in the hands of the British ambassador.[209]
When France and England had ratified the treaty of separation, Palmerston at once instructed the British representatives at Vienna and at Berlin to urge the Austrian and Prussian Courts to follow the example of the western Powers. Metternich, wrote Lamb, eluded the question, and insisted upon the necessity of waiting to hear the result of Orloff’s mission.[210] At Berlin, Mr. Chad was enjoined to remind M. Ancillon that the action of the Prussian government in refusing to ratify was a violation of its promises.[211] In M. Casimir Périer’s opinion, the policy of the absolute Courts was dictated by the hope that a second rejection of the Reform Bill by the House of Lords might lead to a change of government in England.[212] In the meanwhile, Count Orloff had arrived at the Hague on February 20. At Berlin, he had intimated that under no circumstances would his stay in Holland be prolonged beyond ten days.[213] Nevertheless, the period which he had assigned for the duration of his visit was greatly exceeded. There was reason to believe, however, that communications had reached him from his Court which, if they did not absolutely annul, unquestionably modified his instructions and brought them more into harmony with the views of the constitutional Powers.[214] Without doubt, the repugnance evinced at Vienna and at Berlin to break with the London conference was largely responsible for the changed disposition of Nicholas. But the arrival at St. Petersburg, after Orloff had left, of the draft of a proposed new treaty of separation, in which the King of the Netherlands put forward the most absurd pretensions, would seem to have impressed the Tsar most unfavourably. He appears to have grown very suspicious that the Dutch Court, acting under the inspiration of the French legitimists, was striving to embroil the Great Powers in a war.[215]
Palmerston, under these circumstances, decided to exercise an increased pressure upon the wavering resolution of the Northern Courts. The sittings of the conference, he announced, would be suspended until the signatory Powers of the treaty of separation should have ratified that agreement. Furthermore, on March 16, Sir Charles Bagot, the British ambassador, was instructed to protest against Count Orloff’s continued stay at the Hague.[216] The threat that the London conference would be dissolved appears to have excited considerable alarm at Berlin.[217] Although the obstinacy of the King of the Netherlands was proof against all remonstrances, Palmerston’s action, which had the support of the French government, was probably successful in bringing Orloff’s mission to an end. In any case, on March 22, Verstolk, the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs, officially informed Nicholas’ envoy that the King could not accept the separation treaty of the twenty-four articles as it existed. No sooner had he made this statement than Count Orloff at once handed him the declaration which he had been instructed to deliver. The note in question was to the effect that, although His Imperial Majesty would not participate himself in any measures of coercion to force the King to accept the treaty, he should not oppose those steps which his allies might resolve to take in order to impose its conditions upon Holland. Directly they learnt that Orloff had delivered his declaration, the Austrian and Prussian ministers sent separate notes to M. Verstolk, notifying the adhesion of their respective Courts to the course pursued by the Russian Cabinet. Orloff, two days later, took leave of the King and started for London.[218]
The failure of Orloff’s mission deprived the Austrian and Prussian Cabinets of all reasonable excuse for withholding their assent to the treaty. Indeed, before the Russian agent had taken his departure from the Hague, Metternich informed Sir Frederick Lamb that the Austrian ratification would be forwarded to London without further delay. The presence of the French in Italy, and the fear that the course upon which the absolute Courts had embarked would tend to promote a close alliance between England and France were factors in the situation, which, in the opinion of the British ambassador, had greatly influenced Metternich’s decision.[219] Accordingly, on April 18, at the London Foreign Office the Austrian and Prussian plenipotentiaries exchanged ratifications of the treaty of November 15, 1831, with the representative of Belgium. The Prussian minister, Bülow, had been furnished with a discretionary power either to proceed with the matter or to await the Russian ratification, and he appears to have yielded to the pressure brought to bear upon him by Palmerston and Talleyrand.[220] Both the Prussian and Austrian ratifications were accompanied by reservations with respect to the rights of the Germanic Confederation in Connection with any cession or exchange of a portion of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.[221]
It was resolved, as on former occasions, to keep open the protocol in order that Russia might still be enabled to become a party to the treaty. Lieven and Matuszewic, the Russian plenipotentiaries, had authority to ratify, but with reservations respecting three articles of the treaty which concerned the navigation of the Scheldt, the construction of a road, and the share of the debt to be borne by Belgium. But, were a limited ratification of this description to be accepted, Russia would necessarily be placed in a different situation as regards Belgium to that occupied by the other contracting parties. This was a development to which Palmerston was altogether opposed. On the other hand, he was desirous above all things to avoid the necessity of excluding Russia from the treaty. The rift in the European Concert, which such a result would disclose, must encourage the King of the Netherlands to resist the decisions of the conference and might endanger the general peace. The representatives of the Powers, not excepting Orloff, Lieven and Matuszewic were, however, sincerely anxious to discover a way out of the difficulty. At Brussels it was contended with some reason that the limited ratification of Russia might be held to invalidate the treaty as a whole. But Stockmar, the counsellor of Leopold, pointed out that the existing governments in France and England considered that their acts of ratification bound them indissolubly to the treaty. The struggle over the Reform Bill had, however, entered upon its final stage, and it was doubtful whether Lord Grey and his colleagues would emerge from it successfully. Under these circumstances, urged Stockmar, it was well to remember that both Wellington and Aberdeen had declared that they should not consider the treaty of the twenty-four articles as binding, until it should have been ratified by all the signatory Powers. Were Grey to fall, and were a Tory Cabinet to be formed, Russia very probably might altogether refuse to ratify.[222]
On May 4 the deliberations of the conference at the Foreign Office were prolonged far into the night. Talleyrand’s powers of persuasion, Palmerston’s determined will and skill in argument were alike directed to the task of devising some solution of the problem, which all parties might accept with dignity. The desired result was at last attained by means of an explanation of the purpose of the Russian reservation, which was inserted into the protocol. According to this declaration, the Russian plenipotentiaries asserted that their Court had no other intention than to leave open the matters contained in the three articles in question for subsequent settlement by Holland and Belgium. Under these conditions, Van de Weyer agreed to accept the Russian ratification with the proviso, which was also to be embodied into the protocol, that his Court laid claim to the full benefit of the engagements contracted towards Belgium by the five Powers. That same night Orloff departed from England.[223] Nicholas had been very gratified by the flattering welcome which had been accorded to his favourite in London society.[224] His satisfaction on this point contributed, doubtless, to the happy termination of the negotiation. But the statesmanlike conduct of Van de Weyer was, at the time, little appreciated in political circles in Brussels, where he was censured for accepting the limited ratification of Russia.[225]
CHAPTER IV
THE COERCION OF HOLLAND
The Cabinets of Lord Grey and of M. Casimir Périer had always regarded the execution of the separation treaty as a measure which must necessarily follow its ratification by the five contracting Powers. But, during the spring and early summer of 1832, ministers, both in France and in England, were confronted by an internal situation of exceptional gravity. The Lords, on April 14, had passed the second reading of the third Reform Bill by a narrow majority. On May 7, however, three days after Russia had ratified the Belgian treaty, Lord Lyndhurst successfully carried against the government a motion postponing the clause which disfranchised the boroughs. The Cabinet, therefore, decided to advise the King “to advance to the honour of the peerage such a number of persons as might ensure the success of the Bill in all its essential principles.”[226]
In the early days of the struggle the King had been a keen advocate of parliamentary reform. But the violent opposition which the measure had excited had sensibly altered his feelings. Nor was it only with respect to the Bill that His Majesty was beginning to entertain misgivings. The conduct of foreign affairs had, for some time past, caused him grave anxiety. He perceived, he wrote to Lord Grey, a dangerous tendency on the part of the government to subscribe to all the democratic theories which found favour in Paris. He realized the importance of good relations with France, and he was prepared to admit that it might be due to the existence of such an understanding that war had been avoided in the Belgian question. But he mistrusted France and could not believe that she had abandoned her schemes of conquest and of territorial expansion. He held, therefore, that it was impolitic to “unite too closely with her in the prosecution of measures tending to give umbrage and alarm to other Powers.”[227]
In consequence of these criticisms Lord Grey signified his willingness to resign. But a second letter from the King and a conversation, in which His Majesty assured him that he still enjoyed his full confidence, induced him to remain in office. A fortnight later, however, when the King declined to follow the advice, contained in the Cabinet minute of May 8, to create a sufficient number of peers to enable the Bill to pass, the government resigned. But the excitement throughout the country and the attitude of the House of Commons compelled Lord Lyndhurst and the Duke of Wellington to abandon all hope of forming a ministry. In face of their inability to carry out the task with which he had entrusted them, the King had no alternative but to send for his late ministers and to give them the guarantees, which they made an indispensable condition to their acceptation of office. Lord Grey, however, was spared the necessity of resorting to the powers which the crown had placed at his disposal. In deference to the King’s wishes[228] Wellington and the chief opponents of the measure agreed to stay away from the House, and on June 4, in their absence, the Bill was passed into law.
France was less fortunate. Her domestic difficulties were only temporarily overcome after grave disorder and much bloodshed. The cholera, brought back by the Russian armies from Turkey, had spread westwards. The disease, which made its first appearance in England in the latter months of 1831, did terrible execution in Paris during the spring and summer of 1832. M. Casimir Périer, who had been in bad health for some time past, was its most illustrious victim. His death, on May 16, 1832, was the signal for a furious outburst of hostility on the part of the parliamentary opponents of his system. At the same time the avowed enemies of the Orleans monarchy, both Republican and Carlist, actively prepared to take advantage of the situation. The Society of the Friends of the People, in defiance of the police, held meetings at which armed insurrection was preached openly. “I was present at one of them,” wrote Heinrich Heine, “the smell reminded me of an old file of the Moniteur of 1793 grown dirty from too much reading.”[229]
The funeral, on June 5, of General Lamarque, the most prominent advocate in the Chamber of the union of Belgium with France, was chosen by the revolutionary leaders as a favourable occasion for striking their blow. But the authorities were upon the alert and both regular troops and national guards were quickly upon the scene of action. Nevertheless, it was not until artillery had been brought up that, on the following day, June 6, the great barricade at the Cloître Saint-Merri was stormed and that this formidable insurrection was finally suppressed. Nor was it only in the streets of Paris that the government had to deal with an armed rising. On June 4 the Duchesse de Berri, the mother of the Duc de Bordeaux, the lawful King of France in the eyes of the Carlists, raised the standard of rebellion in La Vendée. But her insurrection, which had been undertaken against the advice of the wiser of the Carlists and of the old Royalist leaders in the West, was, in a few days, stamped out completely. The defence of the Château de la Pénissière, where a handful of Carlist gentlemen made a brave stand against overwhelming odds, imparted, however, a tinge of heroism to this, the last and the least famous of the Royalist rebellions of La Vendée.
Following quickly upon the defeat of the republicans in Paris and of the Carlists in the West, came the news that the Duc de Reichstadt, the heretofore King of Rome, was dying of consumption at Vienna. But Metternich, in transmitting this information, desired that Louis Philippe’s attention should be especially directed “to his successor in the eyes of the Bonapartists.” The young Louis Bonaparte, he begged him to remember, was not under the safeguard of the Emperor of Austria, but, on the contrary, “was deeply involved in all the machinations of the revolutionary societies.”[230] Few people, however, shared Metternich’s forebodings, and the death of the Duc de Reichstadt, which took place on July 22, 1832, was generally considered, even by staunch Imperialists, to have disposed effectually of the chances of a Bonapartist restoration.[231] But neither the successful suppression of two rebellions, nor the decease of a dangerous pretender to the throne could make up for the loss of the President of the Council. The death of M. Casimir Périer had deprived the Cabinet of its strength and prestige. Louis Philippe, whilst doing full justice to the courage and abilities of his late minister, was perhaps not altogether sorry that his masterful personality no longer presided at the council table. The rôle of a constitutional monarch was never to his taste. He longed always to take a direct part in the management of public affairs, and rather liked his people to think that his was the hand which guided the ship of State. He was, therefore, in no great hurry to appoint a new President of the Council. He soon perceived, however, that a prolongation of this state of affairs would be prejudicial to the best interests of the monarchy both at home and abroad.
For the past two months the London conference had been engaged upon fruitless efforts to induce the King of the Netherlands to agree to the separation treaty. Moreover, His Majesty’s obstinacy was not the only difficulty with which the representatives of the Powers had to deal. The Belgians clamoured loudly for the execution of the treaty, and declared that, so long as the Dutch retained possession of Antwerp, they must decline to discuss any modification of its conditions.[232] Oblivious of their disasters of the year before, they even began to talk of ejecting the Dutch by force, and, as though to prove the seriousness of their intentions, proceeded to enrol Polish officers in their army, and to make other warlike preparations.[233]
Although determined that the main conditions of the treaty must be left untouched, the members of the conference were anxious that the minor points in dispute should form the subject of amicable discussions between the Dutch and Belgian representatives. It was on this principle that all their proposals had been made. But neither at the Hague nor at Brussels was any disposition evinced to listen to reasonable suggestions for a compromise.
At last, on July 10, the plenipotentiaries decided to forward their final proposals to the Hague and to announce, at the same time, that, if they were not accepted, no further modifications of the original treaty would be submitted. Little hope, however, was entertained that the King’s obduracy would be overcome without a resort to force. But before proceeding to adopt more active measures the British government decided to dispatch Lord Durham upon a special mission to St. Petersburg. Ill-health had recently compelled Lord Heytesbury to relinquish his post, and his successor had not as yet been appointed. The King of the Netherlands, it was believed, still trusted that the Tsar would intervene on his behalf, should France and England begin hostilities against him. Lord Durham was therefore charged to endeavour to persuade the Emperor Nicholas “to give immediate instructions to the Russian plenipotentiaries at the conference to co-operate cordially and effectually in whatever measures might appear best calculated to effect an early execution of the treaty.” He was to state most positively that France and England, under any circumstances, were resolved to fulfil the engagements which they had contracted towards Belgium. Lastly, he was to explain the views of His Majesty’s government upon Italian, German and Polish affairs.[234]
Seeing that it was the object of the British government to conciliate the Tsar, in order to induce him to take part in measures which could not be otherwise than extremely distasteful to him, it is strange that this particular minister should have been selected for the mission. As one of the most advanced politicians in the Cabinet Lord Durham would hardly seem to have been the person best qualified to propitiate the Emperor Nicholas. But at the time his suitability was perhaps only a secondary consideration. On the question of the creation of peers to enable the Reform Bill to pass, he had seriously differed from Lord Grey, his own father-in-law, and it may have been the wish to avoid a complete rupture between them that prompted his despatch to St. Petersburg. The Emperor, however, whatever may have been the real nature of his feelings with respect to Durham’s appointment, evinced not the slightest resentment. On the contrary, he appeared to be at pains to pay him the greatest honours and, during the whole period of his six weeks’ stay in the Russian capital, the ambassador was the object of his most flattering attentions. Durham, who was highly gratified by the warmth of the Imperial reception and by the marked deference with which he was treated, was, for his part, no less anxious to create a favourable impression. When removed from the turmoil of party politics he rarely failed to display those statesmanlike qualities which he unquestionably possessed. Yet in spite of all his efforts, on this occasion, his embassy, in so far as its immediate objects were concerned, proved a complete failure. Under no circumstances would the Tsar agree to join in any hostile action against Holland. But, whilst the autocrat assured him that such was his irrevocable determination, he told him that he was equally resolved not to oppose those measures which other Powers might see fit to adopt, in order to obtain the execution of the separation treaty.[235] This categorical statement of Nicholas’ intention not to interpose, should coercion be applied to Holland, was the one satisfactory piece of news which Lord Durham was enabled to transmit. In all his conversations the Tsar manifested his extreme dislike of Louis Philippe and expressed his determination to render military assistance to Austria and Prussia, should France attempt to interfere in German affairs.[236] Lord Durham was not long in discovering that no good purpose would be served by adverting to Poland. The greatest indignation prevailed throughout Russia at the conduct of the Poles, and he quite agreed with Lord Heytesbury that the Tsar dared not disregard the national resentment which their insurrection had provoked. Only force, he saw clearly, would induce him to admit that other Powers had a right to interfere with his treatment of his Polish subjects, and England most certainly had no intention of making the question a case for war. He conceived, therefore, that he might depart from the letter of his instructions and confine his observations upon the subject to a mere informal expression to Count Nesselrode of the interest felt by the British government in the general welfare of Poland.[237]
Before the end of July, it was known in London that the King of the Netherlands was determined to reject the proposals which the conference had declared must be the last which could be submitted to him. Nevertheless Palmerston, encouraged seemingly by the language of Van Zuylen, the Dutch plenipotentiary, decided to make a further attempt to avert the necessity of an appeal to force.[238] Accordingly, he drew up a fresh scheme for the settlement of the points in dispute, and showed it confidentially to the Dutch representative. Van Zuylen professed to be on the whole well satisfied with Palmerston’s proposals, and held out distinct hopes that they might serve as the basis of a definite agreement between Holland and Belgium. But, before any progress could be made in the matter, it was necessary to induce the Belgians to abandon their declared intention of refusing to negotiate, until the Dutch should have evacuated the citadel of Antwerp. In order to try to persuade the Belgian government to adopt a less uncompromising attitude, Baron Stockmar, early in August, proceeded to Brussels as the semi-official representative of the conference. King Leopold’s confidential adviser saw clearly that the Belgians must appear in a very unfavourable light should the negotiations break down, owing to their obstinate refusal to recede from the position they had taken up. He had never approved of the policy of the Meulinäer Cabinet, and had always deprecated the warlike preparations upon which that minister had ostentatiously embarked. As he constantly pointed out to the King, the chances of success in a single-handed contest with Holland were necessarily very doubtful. Moreover, under any circumstances, the Great Powers were pledged to intervene to put an end to the struggle, and, in such a case, Belgium, if the aggressor, would certainly be dealt with very harshly. One measure, however, which Stockmar had constantly advocated, was now an accomplished fact. In the month of May, the Princess Louise, a daughter of the King of the French, had been affianced to Leopold, and the marriage had been duly celebrated on August 9, at the Château de Compiègne. But the newly married king showed as little disposition to adopt the counsels of his father-in-law[239] as he had those of the sagacious Stockmar. Indeed, the language of many leading Belgians at this period suggested that they were encouraged to defy the Powers, from the security which they considered was assured to them by the family ties uniting their sovereign to the reigning House in France.[240] Leopold, without doubt, had no share in so dangerous an illusion, but his ministers had pledged themselves to the Chambers to insist upon the surrender of Antwerp as a preliminary to any fresh negotiations, and he seems to have thought that it would be too unpopular a step to dismiss them on that account. Stockmar returned to London on August 18. His visit to Brussels had failed in its object, but he still continued to press his views upon King Leopold. A prolongation of the status quo constituted, he argued, no disadvantage to Belgium. Although it was the case that the Dutch held the citadel of Antwerp, which, by the terms of the treaty, should have passed out of their possession, their retention of it was counterbalanced by the Belgian occupation of parts of Limburg and Luxemburg, which, under the conditions of separation, had been assigned to Holland. Moreover, even the absolute Powers were prepared to admit that a continued refusal on the part of the Court of the Hague to evacuate Antwerp, would justify the Belgians in declining to pay their share of the public debt, jointly contracted by the two countries before their separation. Before long, the force of this reasoning began to be appreciated at Brussels, where both Adair and La Tour-Maubourg, the British and French ministers, were using their best endeavours to persuade the King to conform to the wishes of their respective governments. In diplomatic circles the conviction was gaining ground that the King of the Netherlands was merely trifling with the Powers, and that he had still no intention of bringing the negotiations to a conclusion.[241] Should these suspicions prove correct, Leopold probably realized that it must be to his advantage to display a readiness to meet the wishes of the conference, at a time when the members of it would necessarily be heartily disgusted at the dilatory and evasive attitude adopted by the Cabinet of the Hague.
Under the influence of these various considerations his resolution rose to the required point.[242] The Meulinäer government was dismissed, General Goblet was appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, and powers were transmitted to Van de Weyer to enter into negotiations with the Dutch plenipotentiary upon the basis of the new proposals, Le thème de Lord Palmerston, as they were called by the diplomatists.
Accordingly, on September 20, M. Van de Weyer officially informed the conference that he was authorized to discuss with the Dutch plenipotentiaries the points in dispute between the two countries. But in a note dated the same day, Van Zuylen, ignoring completely the thème de Lord Palmerston, claimed the execution of the treaty on the terms set forth in the Dutch counter proposal of June 30. The conference, thereupon, called upon him definitely to state whether he was empowered to negotiate with Belgium in accordance with the proposals submitted by the British plenipotentiary. To this demand he returned an answer which was unanimously held to be highly unsatisfactory, and, on October 1, in consequence, the representatives of the five Powers met to consider the steps which should now be taken to bring matters to a conclusion. As had been foreseen, it was clear at once that the prospects of arriving at an agreement were hopeless. According to the absolute Powers, coercion must be confined to a declaration authorizing the Belgians to withhold payment of their share of the Dutch-Belgian debt, until the citadel of Antwerp should be handed over to them. France and England, on the other hand, deriding the notion that pressure of this kind would suffice to overcome the obstinacy of the King of the Netherlands, called for the application of sterner measures. To this demand the plenipotentiaries of the northern Powers opposed the irrevocable resolution of their respective Courts not to participate in any hostile acts against Holland. In face of this irreconcilable divergence of opinion, the conference broke up, the representatives of France and England announcing the intention of their governments to take steps to ensure the prompt execution of the terms of the separation treaty.[243]