FOOTNOTES
f1 As it was not expedient to set up Chinese type in England, special Chinese notes at the end of the book have been prepared in Japan, in which are found all the Chinese characters considered by the author useful for scholars’ reference. The superior figures throughout the present work point to the Chinese notes in the Appendix.
f2 One of the popular lectures prepared by the author for students of Buddhism, 1911. It was first published in The Eastern Buddhist, under the title, “Zen Buddhism as Purifier and Liberator of Life.” Since it treats of Zen in its general aspect, I have decided to make it serve as Introduction to this book.
f4 The founder of the Rinzai School of Zen Buddhism, died 867.
f5 The founder of the Ummon School of Zen Buddhism, died 996.
f6 Literally, an old clumsy gimlet of the Ch‘in dynasty.
f7 Zen has its own way of practising meditations so called, for the Zen methods are to be distinguished from what is popularly or Hinayanistically understood by the term. Zen has nothing to do with mere quietism or losing oneself in trance. I may have an occasion to speak more about the subject elsewhere.
f8 See also the Essay entitled, “Practical Methods of Zen Instruction.”
f9 Originally a mosquito driver in India.
f10 A bamboo stick a few feet long.
f11 Also a stick or baton fancifully shaped and made of all kinds of material. It means literally “as one wishes or thinks,” (cinta, in Sanskrit).
f12 This reminds one of the remarks made by the master Ten (Chan), of Hofuku (Pao-fu), who, seeing a monk approach, took up his staff and struck a pillar, and then the monk. When the monk naturally cried with pain, said the master, “How is it that this does not get hurt?” (See Chinese Notes, [1.25].)
f13 Hekiganshu is a collection of one hundred “cases” with Seccho’s (Hsüeh-tou) poetical comments and Yengo’s partly explanatory and partly critical annotations. The book was brought to Japan during the Kamakura era, and ever since it is one of the most important text-books of Zen, especially for the followers of the Rinzai school.
f14 Gutei was a disciple of Tenryu (T‘ien-lung), probably towards the end of the T‘ang dynasty. While he was first residing in a small temple, he had a visit from a travelling nun, who came right into the temple without removing her headgear. Carrying her staff with her, she went three times around the meditation chair in which Gutei was sitting. Then she said to him, “Say a word of Zen, and I shall take off my hat.” She repeated this three times, but Gutei did not know what to say. When the nun was about to depart, Gutei suggested, “It is growing late, and why not stay here over night?” Jissai (Shih-chi), which was the name of the nun, said, “If you say a word of Zen, I shall stay.” As he was still unable to say a word, she left.
This was a terrible blow on poor Gutei, who pitifully sighed: “While I have the form of a man, I seem not to have any manly stamina!” He then resolved to study and master Zen. When he was about to start on his Zen “wanderings” he had a vision of the mountain god who told him not to go away from his temple, for a Bodhisattva in flesh would be coming here before long and enlighten him in the truth of Zen. Surely enough a Zen master called Tenryu (T‘ien-lung) appeared the following day. Gutei told the master all about the humiliating experience of the previous day and his firm resolution to attain the secrets of Zen. Tenryu just lifted one of his fingers and said nothing. This however was enough to open Gutei’s mind at once to the ultimate meaning of Zen, and it is said that ever since Gutei did or said nothing but just holding up a finger to all the questions that might be asked of him concerning Zen.
There was a boy in his temple, who seeing the master’s trick imitated him when the boy himself was asked about what kind of preaching his master generally practised. When the boy told the master about it showing his lifted little finger, the master cut it right off with a knife. The boy ran away screaming in pain when Gutei called him back. The boy turned back, the master lifted his own finger, and the boy instantly realised the meaning of the “one finger Zen” of Tenryu as well as Gutei.
f15 Compare this with the statement made by the sixth patriarch himself when he was asked how it was that he came to succeed the fifth patriarch “Because I do not understand Buddhism.” Let me also cite a passage from the Kena-Upanishad, in which the readers may find a singular coincidence between the Brahman seer and those Zen masters, not only in thought but in the way it is expressed:
Lao-tzŭ, founder of Taoist mysticism, breathes the same spirit when he says: “He who knows it speaks not, he who speaks knows not.”
f16 The conception of Dharmakāya apart from the physical body (rūpakāya) of the Buddha was logically inevitable, as we read in the Ekottara-Āgama, XLIV., “The Life of the Śākyamuni-Buddha is extremely long, the reason is that while his physical body enters into Nirvana, his Law-body exists.” But the Dharmakāya could not be made to function directly upon suffering souls, as it was too abstract and transcendental; they wanted something more concrete and tangible towards which they could feel personally intimate. Hence the conception of another Buddha-body, that is, Sambhogakāya-Buddha or Vipākaja-Buddha, completing the dogma of the Triple Body (Trikāya).
f17 The absolute faith Shinran had in the teaching of Hōnen as is evidenced in this quotation proves that the Shin sect is the result of Shinran’s inner experience and not the reasoned product of his philosophy. His experience came first, and to explain it to himself as well as to communicate it to others, he resorted to various Sutras for verification. The Teaching, Practice, Faith, and Attainment was thus written by him giving an intellectual and scriptural foundation to the Shin-shu faith. In religion as in other affairs of human life, belief precedes reasoning. It is important not to forget this fact when tracing the development of ideas.
f18 This was very well understood by the Buddha himself when he first attained Enlightenment; he knew that what he realised in his enlightened state of mind could not be imparted to others, and that if it were imparted they could not understand it. This was the reason why he in the beginning of his religious career expressed the desire to enter into Nirvana without trying to revolve the Wheel of the Dharma. We read in one of the Sutras belonging to the Agama class of Buddhist literature, which is entitled Sutra on the Cause and Effect in the Past and Present (fas. II.): “My original vows are fulfilled, the Dharma [or Truth] I have attained is too deep for the understanding. A Buddha alone is able to understand what is in the mind of another Buddha. In this age of the Five Taints (pañca-kashāyā), all beings are enveloped in greed, anger, folly, falsehood, arrogance, and flattery; they have few blessings and are stupid and have no understanding to comprehend the Dharma I have attained. Even if I make the Dharma-Wheel revolve, they would surely be confused and incapable of accepting it. They may on the contrary indulge in defamation, and, thereby falling into the evil paths, suffer all kinds of pain. It is best for me to remain quiet and enter into Nirvana.” In the Sutra on the Story of the Discipline, which is considered an earlier translation of the preceding text and was rendered into Chinese by an Indian Buddhist scholar, Ta-li and a Tibetan, Mang-siang, in A.D. 197, no reference is yet made to the Buddha’s resolution to keep silent about his Enlightenment, only that what he attained was all-knowledge which was beyond the understanding and could not be explained, as its height was unscalable and its depth unfathomable, containing the whole universe in it and yet penetrating into the unpenetrable”.... Cf. the Mahāpadāna Suttanta (Dīgha Nikāya, XIV), and the Ariyapariyesana Suttam (Majjhima, XXVI).
f19 Cf. Saṁyukta Āgama (Chinese), Fas. XXXII.
f20 That the personality of the Buddha was an object of admiration and worship as much as, or perhaps more than, his extraordinary intellectual attributes, is gleaned throughout the Agama literature. To quote one or two instances: “When Subha-Mānava Todeyyaputta saw the Blessed One sitting in the woods, the Brahman was struck with the beautiful serenity of his personality which most radiantly shone like the moon among the stars; his features were perfect, glowing like a golden mountain; his dignity was majestic with all his senses under perfect control, so tranquil and free from all beclouding passions, and so absolutely calm with his mind subdued and quietly disciplined.” (The Middle Āgama, fas. XXXVIII.) This admiration of his personality later developed into the deification of his being, and all the evils moral and physical were supposed to be warded off if one thought of him or his virtues. “When those beings who practised evil deeds with their bodies, mouths, or minds, think of the merits of the Tathagata at the moment of their deaths, they would be kept away from the three evil paths and born in the heavens; even the vilest would be born in the heavens.” (The Ekottara Āgama, fas. XXXII.) “Wherever Śramaṇa Gautama appears, no evil spirits or demons can approach him; therefore let us invite him here and all those evil gods [who have been harrassing us] would by themselves take to their heels.” (Loc. cit.) It was quite natural for the Buddhists that they later made the Buddha the first object of Recollection (smṛti), which, they thought, would keep their minds from wandering away and help them realise the final aim of the Buddhist life. These statements plainly demonstrate that while on the one hand the teaching of the Buddha was accepted by his followers as the Dharma beautiful in the beginning, beautiful in the middle, and beautiful in the end, his person was on the other hand regarded as filled with miraculous powers and divine virtues, so that his mere presence was enough to create a most auspicious atmosphere not only spiritually but materially.
f21 When the Buddha entered Nirvana, the monks cried, “Too soon has the Tathagata passed away, too soon has the World-honoured One passed away, too soon has the Great Law died out; all beings are forever left to misery; for the Eye of the World is gone.” Their lamentation was beyond description, they lay on the ground like great trees with roots, stems, and branches all torn and broken to pieces, they rolled and wriggled like a slain snake. Such excessive expressions of grief were quite natural for those Buddhists whose hearts were directed towards the personality of their master more than towards his sane and rationalistic teachings, Cf. the Pali Parinibbāna-suttanta.
f22 For a more or less detailed account of the various Buddhist schools that came up within a few centuries after the Buddha, see Vasumitra’s Samayabhedo-paracana-cakra. Professor Suisai Funahashi recently published an excellent commentary on this book.
f23 Cf. The Sukhāvatī-vyūha (edited by Max Müller and B. Nanjio), p. 7, where we have: “Buddhasvaro anantaghoshah,” that is, the Buddha’s voice is of infinite sounds. See also the Saddharma-puṇḍarīka (p. 128) where we read: “Svareṇa caikena vadāmi dharmam,” I preach the law with one voice. The parable of the water of one taste (ekarasaṁ vāri) variously producing herbs, shrubs, and others, is very well known among the Mahayanists.
f24 Here we find the justification of a “mystic” interpretation of the sacred books of any religion. The Swedenborgian doctrine of Correspondence thus grows illuminating. The philosophy of Shingon mysticism somewhat reflects the idea of correspondence, though naturally it is based on a different set of philosophical ideas. Varieties of interpretation are always possible in anything not only because of the presence of the subjective element in every judgment, but because of infinite complications of objective relationship.
f25 Cf. such Sutras as the Tevijja, Mahāli, Brahmajāla, etc. in the Dīgha Nikāya. See also the Sutta Nipāta, especially the Atthakavagga, which is one of the earliest Buddhist texts in our possession at present. There we read about “Ajjhattasanti” (inward peace) which cannot be attained by philosophy, nor by tradition, nor by good deeds.
f26 That the Buddha never neglected to impress his disciples with the idea that the ultimate truth was to be realised by and in oneself, is evidenced throughout the Agamas. Everywhere we encounter with such phrases as “without depending upon another, he believed, or thought, or dissolved his doubts, or attained self-confidence in the Law.” From this self-determination followed the consciousness that one had all one’s evil leakages (āsrava) stopped or drained off, culminating in the realisation of Arhatship—which is the goal of Buddhist life.
f27 The Dialogue of the Buddha, Sacred Books of the Buddhists, Vol. II., p. 29.
f28 In fact, the term, prajñā or in pañña Pali, is not an exclusive possession of the Mahayanists, for it is also fully used by their rival disciples of the Buddha. The latter however failed to lay any special emphasis on the idea of enlightenment and its supreme significance in the body of Buddhism, and as the consequence Prajñā was comparatively neglected by the Hinayanists. Mahayanism on the other hand may be designated as the religion of Prajñā par excellence. It is even deified and most reverently worshipped.
f29 This is no other than “the opening of the pure eye of the Dharma” (virajaṁ vītamalaṁ dhamma-cakkhum udapādi), frequently referred to in the Agamas when one attains to Arhatship.
f30 Read, for instance, chap. XV., entitled “Duration of Life of the Tathagata.”
f31 Dhammanadam, 153, 154.
f32 Ata etasmāt kāraṇan mahāmate mayedam uktaṁ: yāṁ ca rātriṁ tathāgato ’bhisambuddho yāṁ ca rātriṁ parinirvāsyati atrāntara ekam api aksharaṁ tathāgatena na udāhṛitaṁ na udāharishyati.—Laṅkāvatāra, Chap. III., p. 144. See also Chapter VII., p. 240. (For this reason, O Mahāmati, I say unto you: During the time that elapsed between the night of the Tathagata’s Enlightenment and the night of his entrance into Nirvana, not one word, not one statement was given out by him.)
f33 According to Aśvaghosha’s Awakening of Faith, Ignorance means the sudden awakening of a thought (citta) in consciousness. This may be variously interpreted, but as long as Ignorance is conceived, not as a process requiring a certain duration of time, but an event instantaneously taking place, its disappearance which is enlightenment must also be an instantaneous happening.
f34 This is the usual formula given as the qualification of an Arhat, to be met with throughout the Nikāyas.
f35 Chapter II., “On Skilfullness.”
f36 In this connection it may not be amiss to say a word about what is known in Buddhism as the “act of no-effort or no-purpose” (anābhogacaryā) or “the original vows of no-purpose” (anābhogapraṇidhāna). This corresponds, if I judge rightly, to the Christian idea of not letting the right hand know what the left hand is doing. When spirit attains to the reality of enlightenment and as a result is thoroughly purified of all defilements, intellectual and affective, it grows so perfect that whatever it does is pure, unselfish, and conducive to the welfare of the world. So long as we are conscious of the efforts we make in trying to overcome our selfish impulses and passions, there is a taint of constraint and artificiality, which interferes with spiritual innocence and freedom, and love which is the native virtue of an enlightened spirit cannot work out all that is implied in it and meant to be exercised for the preservation of itself. The “original vows” are the content of love and begin to be operative, anabhoga (un-purposely), only when enlightenment is really creative. This is where religious life differs from mere morality, this is where the mere enunciation of the Law of Origination (pratītya-samutpāda) does not constitute Buddhist life, and this is where Zen Buddhism maintains its reason of existence against the alleged positivism of the Hinayana and against the alleged nihilism of the Prajñā-pāramitā school.
f37 Dialogues of the Buddha, Part III., p. 35.
f38 Dialogues of the Buddha, Part I., p. 82.
f39 The Pali text that will correspond to this Chinese Sutra in the Dīrgha-Āgama is the Kevaddha Sutta, but the passage quoted here is missing. See also the Lohicca (Lou-chê) and Sāmañña-phala in the Chinese Āgamas, in which the Buddha tells how essential the life of a recluse is to the realisation of enlightenment and the destruction of the evil passions. Constant application, earnest concentration, and vigilant watchfulness—without these no Buddhists are ever expected to attain the end of their lives.
f40 The rendering is by Rhys Davids who states in the footnote: “The word I have here rendered ‘earnest contemplation’ is Samadhi, which occupies in the Five Nikayas very much the same position as faith does in the New Testament; and this section shows that the relative importance of Samādhi, Paññā, and Śīla played a part in early Buddhism just as the distinction between faith, reason, and works did afterwards in Western theology. It would be difficult to find a passage in which the Buddhist view of the relation of these conflicting ideas is stated with greater beauty of thought, or equal succinctness of form.” But why conflicting?
f41 One hundred and eight samadhis are enumerated in the Mahāvyutpatti. Elsewhere we read of “innumerable samadhis.” Indians have been great adepts in this exercise, and many wonderful spiritualistic achievements are often reported.
f42 This series of dhyanas has also been adopted by Buddhists, especially by Hinayanists. No doubt the Mahayana conception of dhyana is derived or rather has developed from them, and how much it differs from the Hinayana dhyanas will be seen later as we go on. The detailed description of these dhyanas is given in the Agamas; see for instance the Sāmañña-phala Sutta in which the fruits of the life of a recluse are discussed. These mental exercises were not strictly Buddhistic, they were taught and practised more or less by all Indian philosophers and mendicants. The Buddha, however, was not satisfied with them, because they would not bring out the result he was so anxious to have, that is, they were not conducive to enlightenment. This was the reason why he left his two old teachers, Arada and Udraka, under whom he first began his homeless life.
f43 For example, the ten subjects for meditation are: Buddha, Dharma, Sangha, Morality, Charity, Heaven, Serenity, Breathing, Impermanence, and Death. The five subjects of tranquillisation are: Impurity, Compassion, Breathing, Origination, and Buddha. The four subjects of recollection are: Impurity of the Body, Evils of the Senses, Constant Change of Thought, and Transitoriness of Existence.
f44 Laṅkāvatāra, Nanjo Edition, p, 77.
f45 There is however a Sutra in the Saṁyukta Āgama, fas. XXXIII., p. 93b (Anguttara-Nikāya, XI., 10), dealing with true dhyana (ājānīya-jhāna) which is to be distinguished from untrained dhyana (khaḷuṅka-jhāna). The latter is compared to an ill-disciplined horse (khaḷuṅka) kept in the stable that thinks nothing of his duties but only of the fodder he is to enjoy. In a similar way dhyana can never be practised successfully by those who undertake the exercise merely for the satisfaction of their selfish objects; for such will never come to understand the truth as it is. If emancipation and true knowledge are desired, anger, sleepiness, worrying, and doubt ought to be got rid of, and then the dhyana can be attained that does not depend upon any of the elements, or space, or consciousness, or nothingness, or unthinkability—the dhyana that is not dependent upon this world or that world or the heavenly bodies, or upon hearing or seeing or recollecting or recognising—the dhyana that is not dependent upon the ideas of attachment or seeking—the dhyana that is not in conformity with knowledge or contemplation. This “true dhyana” then as is described in this Sutra in the Nikayas, is more of the Mahayana than of the Hinayana so called.
f46 Kern’s translation,” Sacred Books of the East,” Vol. XXI., pp. 299–300.
f47 For this and the following, see the Essay entitled, “History of Zen Buddhism from Bodhi-Dharma to Hui-nêng,” p. 151 ff.
f48 The story of Enlightenment is told in the Dīgha-Nikāya, XIV., and also in the Introduction to the Jātaka Tales, in the Mahāvastu, and the Majjhima-Nikāya, XXVI. and XXXVI., and again in the Samyutta-Nikāya, XII. In detail they vary more or less, but not materially. The Chinese translation of the Sutra on the Cause and Effect in the Past and Present, which seems to be a later version than the Pali Mahāpadāna, gives a somewhat different story, but as far as my point of argument is concerned, the main issue remains practically the same. Aśvaghosha’s Buddhacarita is highly poetical. The Lalita-vistara belongs to the Mahayana. In this Essay I have tried to take my material chiefly from The Dialogues of the Buddha, translated by Rhys Davids, The Kindred Sayings, translated by Mrs. Rhys Davids, Majjhima-Nikāya, translated by Sīlācāra, and the same by Neumann, the Chinese Āgamas and others.
f49 The idea that there were some more Buddhas in the past seems to have originated very early in the history of Buddhism as we may notice here, and its further development, combined with the idea of the Jātaka, finally culminated in the conception of a Bodhisattva, which is one of the characteristic features of Mahayana Buddhism.
The six Buddhas of the past later increased into twenty-three or twenty-four in the Buddha-vamsa and Prajñā-pāramitā and even into forty-two in the Lalita-vistara. This idea of having predecessors or forerunners seems to have been general among ancient peoples. In China, Confucius claimed to have transmitted his doctrine from Yao and Shun, and Laotzŭ from the Emperor Huang. In India, Jainism which has, not only in the teaching but in the personality of the founder, many similarities to Buddhism, mentions twenty-three predecessors, naturally more or less corresponding so closely to those of Buddhism.
f50 It is highly doubtful that the Buddha had a very distinct and definite scheme for the theory of Causation or Dependence or Origination, as the Paṭicca-samuppāda is variously translated. In the present Sutra, he does not go beyond Viññāna (consciousness or cognition), while in its accepted form now the Chain starts with Ignorance (avijjā). We have however no reason to consider this tenfold Chain of Causation the earliest and most authoritative of the doctrine of Paṭicca-samuppāda. In many respects the Sutra itself shows evidence of a later compilation. The point I wish to discuss here mainly concerns itself with the Buddha’s intellectual efforts to explain the realities of life by the theory of causation. That the Buddha regarded Ignorance as the principle of birth-and-death and therefore of misery in this world, is a well-established fact in the history of Buddhism.
f51 Cakkhu literally means an eye. It is often found in combination with such terms as paññā (wisdom or reason), buddha, or samanta (all-round), when it means a faculty beyond ordinary relative understanding. As was elsewhere noticed, it is significant that in Buddhism, both Mahayana and Hinayana, seeing (passato) is so emphasised, and especially in this case the mention of an “eye” which sees directly into things never before presented to one’s mind is quite noteworthy. It is this cakkhu or paññā-cakkhu in fact that, transcending the conditionality of the Fourfold Noble Truth or the Chain of Origination, penetrates (sacchikato) into the very ground of consciousness, from which springs the opposition of subject and object.
f52 Here as well as in the next verse, “the truth” stands for Dharma.
f53 We have, besides this, another verse supposed to have been uttered by the Buddha at the moment of Supreme Enlightenment; it is known as the Hymn of Victory. It was quoted in my previous Essay on Zen Buddhism and the Doctrine of Enlightenment. The Hymn is unknown in the Mahayana literature. The Lalita-vistara has only this:
f54 The Mahāvyutpatti, CXLII., gives a list of thirteen terms denoting the act of comprehending with more or less definite shades of meaning: buddhi, mati, gati, mataṁ, dṛishtaṁ, abhisamitāvī, samyagavabodha, supratividdha, abhilakshita, gatiṁgata, avabodha, pratyabhijñā, and menire.
f55 Franz Pfeiffer, p. 312, Martensen, p. 29.
f56 Translated by Bhikkhu Sīlācāra. The original Pali runs as follows:
f57 Ordinarily, the Chain runs as follows: 1. Ignorance (avijjā, avidyā), 2. Disposition (sankhāra, saṁskāra), 3. Consciousness (viññāna, vijñāna), 4. Name and Form (nāmarūpa), 5. Six Sense-organs (saḷāyatana, saḍāyatana), 6. Touch (phassa, sparśa), 7. Feeling (vedana), 8. Desire (taṇhā, tṛshṇā), 9. Clinging (upādāna), 10. Becoming (bhāva), 11. Birth (jāti), and 12. Old Age and Death (jarāmaranaṁ).
f58 The Buddhacarita, Book XIV.
f59 Nānañ ca pana me dassanaṁ udapādi akuppā me ceto-vimutti ayaṁ antimā jāti natthi dāni punabbhavo.
f60 “Thus knowing, thus seeing,” (evam jānato evam passato) is one of the set phrases we encounter throughout Buddhist literature, Hinayana and Mahayana. Whether or not its compilers were aware of the distinction between knowing and seeing in the sense we make now in the theory of knowledge, the coupling is of great signification. They must have been conscious of the inefficiency and insufficiency of the word “to know” in the description of the kind of knowledge one has at the moment of enlightenment. “To see” or “to see face to face” signifies the immediateness and utmost perspicuity and certainty of such knowledge. As was mentioned elsewhere, Buddhism is rich in terminology of this order of cognition.
f61 Tassa evam jānato evam passato kāmāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccati bhavāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccati avijjāsavāpi cittaṁ vimuccati, vimuttasmiṁ vimuttamit ñāṇaṁ hoti. Khina jāti vusitaṁ brahmacariyaṁ kataṁ karanīyam nāparaṁ itthattāyāti pajānāti.
f62 The Brahmajāla Sutta, p. 43. Translation by Rhys Davids.
f63 The idea of performing miracles systematically through the power acquired by self-concentration seems to have been greatly in vogue in India even from the earliest days of her civilisation, and the Buddha was frequently approached by his followers to exhibit his powers to work wonders. In fact, his biographers later turned him into a regular miracle-performer, at least as far as we may judge by the ordinary standard of logic and science. But from the Prajñā-pāramitā point of view, according to which “because what was preached by the Tathagata as the possession of qualities, that was preached as no-possession of qualities by the Tathagata, and therefore it is called the possession of qualities,” (yaishā bhagavan lakshaṇasampat tathāgatena bhāshitā alakshaṇasampad eshā tathāgatena bhāshita; tenocyate lakshaṇasampad iti), the idea of performing wonders acquires quite a new signification spiritually. In the Kevaddha Sutta, three wonders are mentioned as having been understood and realised by the Buddha: the mystic wonder, the wonder of education, and the wonder of manifestation. The possessor of the mystic wonder can work the following logical and physical impossibilities: “From being one he becomes multiform, from being multiform he becomes one: from being visible he becomes invisible: he passes without hindrance to the further side of a wall or a battlement or a mountain, as if through air: he penetrates up and down through solid ground as if through water: he walks on water without dividing it, as if on solid ground: he travels cross-legged through the sky like the birds on wing: he touches and feels with the hand even the moon and sun, beings of mystic power and potency they be: he reaches even in the body up to the heaven of Brahma.” Shall we understand this literally and intellectually? Cannot we interpret it in the spirit of the Prajñā-pāramitā idealism? Why? Taccittam yacittam acittam. (Thought is called thought because it is no-thought.)
f64 The questions are: Is the world eternal? Is the world not eternal? Is the world finite? Is the world infinite? Potthapāda-Sutta.
f65 Cf. Dhammapada, v. 385. “He for whom there is neither this nor that side, nor both, him, the fearless and unshackled, I call indeed a Brahman.”
f66 Sutta-nipāta, v, 720. Sanantā yanti kussobbhā, tunḥī yāti mahodadhi.
f67 The Majjhima-Nikāya, 140, Dhātuvibhangasuttam. Asmīti bhikkhu maññitam etaṁ; Ayam aham asmīti maññitam etaṁ; Bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Na bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Rūpī bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Arūpī bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Saññī bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Asaññi bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ; Nevasaññi-nasaññi bhavissan ti maññitam etaṁ.
f68 Majjhima Nikāya, 22.
f69 Cf. Sutta-Nipāta, v. 21. “By me is made a well-constructed raft, so said Bhagavat, I have passed over to Nirvana, I have reached the further bank, having overcome the torrent of passions; there is no further use for a raft: therefore, if thou like, rain, O sky!”
f70 I left here “dharmas” untranslated. For this untranslatable term, some have “righteousness,” some “morality,” and some “qualities.” This is as is well known a difficult term to translate. The Chinese translators have rendered it by fa,[3.3] everywhere, regardless of the context. In the present case, “dharma” may mean “good conduct, “prescribed rules of morality,” or even “any religious teaching considered productive of good results.” In the Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra, Chapter 1, reference is also made to the transcending of both “adharma” and “dharma,” saying: “Dharmā eva prahātavyāḥ prāgevādharmāḥ.” And it is explained that this distinction comes from falsely asserting (vikalpagrahaṇam) the dualism of what is and what is not, while the one is the self-reflection of the other. You look into the mirror and finding an image thereon you take it for a reality, while the image is yourself and nobody else. The one who views the world thus, has the rightful view of it, ya evam pasyati sa samyakpasyati. Indeed, when he takes hold of ekāgra (one-pointedness or oneness of things), he realises the state of mind in which his inner wisdom reveals itself (svapratyātmāryajñānagocara) and which is called the Tathāgatagarbha. In this illustration “dharma” and “adharma” are synonyms of being (sat) and non-being (asat) or affirmation (asti) and negation (nāsti). Therefore, the abandoning of dharma and adharma (dharmādharmayoḥ prahāṇaṁ) means the getting rid of dualism in all its complexities and implications. Philosophically, this abandoning is to get identified with the Absolute, and morally to go beyond good and evil, right and wrong. Also compare Sutta-Nipāta, verse 886, where dualism is considered to be the outcome of false philosophical reasoning “Takkañ ca diṭṭhisu pakappayitvā, saccaṁ musā ti dvayadhammam āhu.”
f71 Abridged from the Majjhima Nikāya, 22, p. 139. Cf. also the Samyutta Nikāya, XII., 70. p. 125.