THE MACHIAVELIANISM OF THE ANCIENTS.
SECT. I.
I. As we are about to treat in this discourse of the tyrannic doctrine of Machiavel; I believe it will be agreeable to the greatest part of our readers, to have some particular information respecting this man, of whom all the world talks, and whom all the world detests; for by whatever means men make themselves famous, they excite a curiosity to know who and what they were.
II. Nicholas Machiavel, who was a native of Florence, lived in the beginning of the sixteenth century, and was a man of more than middling ingenuity. He wrote the Tuscan language with elegance and propriety, although his knowledge of the Latin was but moderate. He had a good genius for writing comic poetry, which he manifested in various pieces which he wrote for the theatre; and more particularly in one of them, that was represented at Florence with such great applause, that it excited Pope Leo the tenth, as Paulus Jovius informs us, to cause it to be acted at Rome by the same players, and with the same dresses and decorations, with which it had been exhibited at Florence. When the unhappy conspiracy against the family of the Medicis, was set on foot by the Soderinis, Machiavel, who was impeached as an accomplice in it, was put to the question by torture; but either his fortitude, or his innocence, caused him to resist the rigour of that trial without making the least confession. I do not know whether it was before, or after this event, that he was made secretary to the republic, but it is certain, that for the title of historian to it, which was conferred on him together with a good salary, he was totally indebted to the favour of the Medicis; but whether they did this from a conviction of his innocence with respect to the late conspiracy, and were disposed to recompence him by this honourable emolument, for the injury he suffered in the torture; or whether they did it from considering him as an able man whom they had a mind to keep under obligations to them, in order to avail themselves of so good a pen as Machiavel’s in their favour; I say, whichever of these motives they were actuated by, is not quite certain.
III. The conferring this benefit on him, did not prevent new suspicions being entertained of his fidelity, and of his having concurred in another plot concerted by some private individuals, to take away the life of cardinal Julius de Medicis, who afterwards ascended to the popedom, by the name of Clement the seventh. This suspicion was founded entirely, on the repeated applauses, with which both in his writings and private conversations, he had celebrated Brutus and Cassius, as the defenders and vindicators of the liberty of the Roman republic; which at that time, was interpreted as an indirect exhortation to the Florentines to defend their liberty, which the Medicis either in reality or appearance, meditated to suppress. But with all this, either from mere motives of policy, or because the suspicions seemed lightly founded, no proceedings were had against Machiavel. It is confirmed however, that after this time, he passed the remainder of his days in misery and poverty. Perhaps the Medicis, who were secretly displeased with him, thought it more adviseable, instead of bringing him to open punishment, to accomplish their dark revenge, by occult ways and means. It might also happen, that he brought himself to poverty by his own misconduct; but, be this as it will, he hastened his death as many other people have hastened theirs before him, by taking a precautionary medicine to prolong his life, which instead of lengthening, shortened it, and brought him to an untimely end in the year 1530.
IV. Machiavel was of a jocose and satyrical disposition, and was believed to have little or no religion. There are some who say, that when he was near dying, they were under a necessity of employing the authority of the civil magistrate to oblige him to receive the sacraments. We read in many authors, a wanton and insolent impiety of his, under the colour of a joke; that is, his having said, that he had much rather go to hell than heaven; because in heaven he should only meet with fryars, mendicants, and other miserable and groveling people; but that in hell, he should enjoy the company of popes, cardinals, and princes, with whom he could converse of state affairs. Others substitute, for his saying popes, cardinals, and princes, the most eminent philosophers and political writers, such as Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, and Tacitus.
V. He published a variety of books, and among them, the life of Castrucius Castracani, and the history of Florence, which do not obtain the greatest credit with the critics. But the work that made him jointly the most famous and infamous man in the world, was a political tract, intituled, “The Prince;” in which he teaches and recommends to all sovereigns, to reign tyrannically, and to govern their people, without regarding either equity, law, or religion, but sacrificing them all three, together with the public good, to his interest, his will, his caprice, and his own particular grandeur.
SECT. II.
VI. But notwithstanding the principles of this book are so pernicious, there have not been wanting those, who have patronized both the book and the author. Abraham Nicholas Amelot de Houssaye, defends it in the most odious point of view, which is approving his maxims as beneficial to the public, and asserting, that they are only reprobated by ignorant men, who know nothing of politics or reasons of state; and adds, that the same people who now live as private men, and are unacquainted with the management of public business, and at present condemn them, were they by any great and unexpected change of fortune, to arrive at being princes or prime ministers, would approve, and practise them.
VII. There are others, who, although they acknowledge the maxims of Machiavel are pernicious, sanctify the intention of the author. They say, that so far from intending to instruct princes against their people, he only meant to caution the people against the proceedings and arts of tyrants, to the end that princes, seeing the tendency of their schemes liable to be exposed, should be more circumspect in their behaviour, and that the people, by being aware of the arms with which the attacks were made upon liberty, might be the better able to parry the blows. They add further, that Machiavel was under a necessity of using this artful method of warning the people, and of couching his cautions to them, under the veil and figure of teaching princes how to make themselves absolute, because these last, would not have permitted his book to be licenced, if he had openly declared himself inimical to their total independency.
VIII. They endeavour to prove the probability of this sentiment, by urging, that Machiavel was an utter enemy to tyranny, and a strenuous advocate for the liberty of the republic; and that the whole tenor of his words and actions, conspire to manifest these were his inclinations. His two great and favourite heroes, were Brutus and Cassius, who killed Cæsar to restore Rome to her liberty. He also quotes the tenth chapter of the first book of his discourses, where he speaks strongly against tyrants; and urges further, that he was accused of being an accomplice with the Soderinis in their conspiracy against the family of the Medicis, who were thought at that time, to have an intention of tyrannizing over the republic of Florence; and that he was afterwards, not exempt from being suspected, of having a finger in the conspiracy against the life of cardinal Julius de Medicis. Nardi, a Florentine author who was a contemporary with him, says, that he was closely connected with the contrivers of that plot and design, and also with the rest of the faction, who were in opposition to the Medicis. He then proceeds to say, what view or intention could a man have in favouring and abetting tyrants, who had given so many proofs of his abhorrence of them? or how could the man be suspected of designing to extend the power of princes above their natural sphere, who had always manifested himself an admirer of democracy? he next says, it must follow then of course, that his intention must be different, and very contrary to what the ordinary and superficial sense of his words seem to import. This is the way those reason, who support this opinion.
IX. Finally, there are others, who admit that the maxims of Machiavel are detestable, but waiving the question about what was his intention, they limit their excuse of the author, by affirming, there has not, nor can there arise, any general inconvenience from the publication of them. These say, that Machiavel has broached nothing new; and that his maxims are the same with those you will find inserted in various histories, and which were practised by an infinite number of princes; and what more pernicious effect can they have on him who reads them in Machiavel’s book, than on him who reads them in any other?
X. This is the very excuse which Bocalini puts in the mouth of Machiavel, when he supposes him to be speaking in his own defence before Apollo. He says, I do not pretend to defend my works, but rather to arraign, and condemn them as impious, and full of cruel and execrable documents for the government of states; but provided the doctrine I have written shall appear to be new, or the invention of my brain, I am ready at this moment, to submit to the execution of any sentence, the judges shall think proper to fulminate against me. On the other hand, if my writings contain nothing more than those political precepts, and those rules of state, which I have deduced from the actions and conduct of some princes, the speaking ill of whom would formerly have been punished with death, and, if you will be pleased to permit me, I can now name; I say if this be the case, what justice, what reason can there be, for respecting those as little less than divinities, who have been the authors and inventors of all the furious and desperate maxims of policy which appear in my writings; and of treating me, who have done nothing more than republish them, as an abandoned vagabond, and an Atheist I certainly cannot conceive, why the original should be adored as a saint, and the copy execrated; nor why I deserve to be so persecuted, when the reading of histories, not only tolerated, but recommended, are sufficient to convert to Machiavels, all those who peruse them with a political view.
SECT. III.
XI. But not to leave the reader in suspence, or not to give him occasion to think that I propose these three opinions as problems, I will here declare the judgement I entertain of them. The first is false, shocking, abominable, and only worthy of a second Machiavel. What reason, I won’t say can dictate, but even endure the detestable maxims, that a prince owes more to himself than to the republic? that this last was instituted by nature for the convenience of the prince, and not the prince for the good of the republic? that the right to govern with tyrannic sway, is an appendage, appertaining to the prerogative of the crown? that the untimely and disgraceful deaths of tyrants, ought to be attributed to chance, and not to the divine vengeance or judgements? with others of the same sort.
XI. The second apology, is contradicted by the literal and natural sense of the author’s writings; for if he intended to convey a meaning which was different from these, it is not easy to ascertain what that meaning was. I will admit as good and conclusive, all the arguments that are used to prove Machiavel was an enemy to tyranny. There is no man whatever who does not abhor tyranny, while he contemplates it as a restraint on his own person, or while he is apprehensive part of the weight of it may be loaded on his own shoulders. But many of those who abhor it in general, are friends to it in particular, and especially, if they entertain hopes that the favour of the tyrant will better their fortunes. It is very natural to suppose, this was the state and situation of Machiavel’s mind when he wrote his book. The Medicis at that time ruled the city of Florence; and he imagined that he should sooth and flatter them, by approving and recommending a government, that dispensed with all law, as the means the best calculated to pave the way for the introduction and establishment of despotic power. Perhaps also, he might entertain hopes, that some prince who read his book, might be induced to make him his prime minister, from an expectation, that by having the author of these maxims at his elbow, he might be able to raise his power to the highest pitch of uncontroul and grandeur.
XIII. The excuse, with which it is attempted to defend Machiavel by the third supposition, is manifestly sophistical. It cannot be denied, that we read in a variety of authors, of numbers of princes who have put in practice the doctrine of Machiavel, but there is this great difference between those authors and Machiavel, that they condemn the doctrine, which he adopts and enforces. They, at the same time that they inform you of the fact, inspire you with horror of the maxim; he, when he teaches the maxim, exhorts to the execution of it. How great must his zeal have been to recommend and persuade tyranny, when he had the presumption to propose Moses and David, as examples of tyrannic government? but to this execrable degree of impiety, did Machiavel carry his daring blasphemy.
XIV. With regard to the peculiar defence which Bocalina makes for Machiavel, it is easy to see, at whom his malignant expressions point; which he might very well have omitted, because without alluding to any one in so elevated a form of life, he had very near at hand in the person of Cæsar Borgia[2], a man furnished with all the requisites for his purpose, and whom he did not run much hazard of announcing. I mean, that in order to excuse Machiavel from being the inventor of the maxims he published, and to point out some person under whom he had studied and learned them, he could have fixed on no one more proper than that prince, because Cæsar Borgia was without doubt, a man of most iniquitous and tyrannic politics, and capable of committing all sorts of wickedness, provided his doing it would contribute to advance his grandeur; for he was fiery, daring, and cruel, and was besides so furiously ambitious, that were it in his power, he was capable of burning the whole world, for the sake afterwards of domineering absolutely over the ashes of it.
XV. Hermanus Coringius, a protestant author, says, that Machiavel was some time in the service of this prince. If this be true, it is easy to guess from whom he learned what he afterwards committed to writing; and I believe the Italians would not disdain to acknowledge, that their Florentine politician had been instructed by a Spanish master.
XVI. But the truth is, that Machiavel had no occasion to seek for an example, either in him, or in any other of the princes of his own time; for as he was a man pretty well read in history, every age had furnished him with examples in plenty. They mistake little less, who suppose Machiavel learned his maxims from the politicians of his day; than those do, who believe the politics, posterior to Machiavel, were taken from his doctrines.
XVII. But notwithstanding all that can be urged in opposition to it, this second opinion is much entertained and received by people of little reading and short reflection, in which group we may suppose to be comprehended the bulk of mankind. Not a few, when they converse upon this subject, add with a mysterious gravity, and as if they were extracting a profound apophthegm from the inmost recesses of their understandings, that although Machiavel was the master who introduced this doctrine, it has since his time been so much improved upon in courts, that if the master could now come back into the world, he would find it necessary to go to school again.
XVIII. I cannot refrain from laughter, when I hear men discourse in this manner, who, from their education, ought to know and reason better. The maxims of tyrannic policy are as antient in the world, as government or dominion. Machiavelianism owes its first existence to the most antient princes of the earth, and only to Machiavel its name. It is rooted in our nature, and it does not require ages, as moments, when fit occasions present themselves, are equal to bring forth its malignant productions. Nor is the passion of domineering more natural to man, than that of amplifying and extending his dominion. An ambitious man, by attaining to be a prince, does not find his ambition satisfied; but is always desirous of extending his power, exteriorly with respect to the subjects of other states, and interiorly with regard to his own. The love of independence can seldom be contained within reasonable bounds. He who is free from all subjection to other men, aspires at being independent of the laws also.
SECT. IV.
XIX. I am so far from thinking that Machiavel has made the world worse in this respect, or from supposing that the princes of these times, have refined upon the iniquitous politics of Machiavel, that I firmly believe, if we limit our enquiries precisely to Europe, we shall find the sovereigns of it in general, much better than those of the remote ages.
XX. Now-a-days, if it is in contemplation to impose some new burthen on the subject, or to wage war with a neighbouring state, divines and lawyers are consulted upon the justice and propriety of the measure; an enquiry is made, how the laws stand with respect to the subject matter in question, and the archives and records are examined and turned over; and although it often happens, that from the ambitious adulation of the people consulted, a right is attributed to their prince, which in reality does not belong to him, their malice does not impeach his good faith. In former times this was not the case. If a prince was disposed to trample on the rights of his subjects, or to subdue his neighbours, he consulted nobody, nor made any other enquiry or examination, than whether he had force and power sufficient to accomplish what he meditated; and the question was always decided, by his ability or inability to execute what he designed. In times not very distant from our own, and even in the most polished kingdoms, where the true religion has humanized people’s minds, when the person invaded by a powerful prince his neighbour, has represented to him, that his pretensions to what he possesses are just and legal; the invader has laughed at the representation, and answered savagely, in the language that was then become proverbial in the mouths of kings and ministers of state, that the rights of princes were not to be determined by old rolls of parchment, but by burnished arms.
SECT. V.
XXI. The further our memories carry us back through the series of past times, we find this evil the greater; and from hence proceeds that ill opinion, which in early ages was generally entertained of kings. The Romans were struck with amazement, to find the Cappadocians, upon their offering to make their country a free republic, instantly request, that they would permit them to remain under kingly government; which amazement, was occasioned by their considering in a rigorous or strict sense, that mode of rule, as a mark or type of slavery. Cato said, this animal which is called a king, is a great devourer of human flesh; Hoc animal rex carnivorum est. And Flavius Vopiscus, tells us of a Roman buffoon, who pleasantly and keenly remarked, that the effigies of all the good kings that had ever been known in the world, might be carved on a ring. Plato, in his Georgiac dialogue, represents kings as appearing before Rhadamanthus in hell, loaded for the most part with injustices, perjuries, and other wickedness. Aristotle, in his third book on politics, recognizes as tyrannical, the exercise of the regal power, by all, or nearly all, the Asiatic princes; and Livy says, that the most sagacious and penetrating Hannibal, never confided in the promises of kings: fidei regum nihil sane confisus; a legate of the Rhodians also, according to the said Livy, observed, that kings were always desirous of making slaves of their subjects. Thus we have the greatest reason to conclude, that it was a common practice with the princes of those times, to pay no regard to any law, whenever an opportunity offered of augmenting their authority.
SECT. VI.
XXII. But we should not conclude that this was all done by main force, without the intervention of art or stratagem. The same contrivances, the same artifices, which we read of in Machiavel, and which have been practised by the most crafty tyrants of these latter ages, were exerted in the early ones. Cast your eyes on Romulus, seeking for a specious pretence of justice for taking away the life of his brother, in order to remove this obstacle to his reigning without the danger of a rival, and in security: view his successor, Numa Pompilius also, who was a most consummate hypocrite, affecting exteriorly to appear religious and devout, and to pay a great respect to rites and ceremonies. He pretended to receive visions and revelations from the goddess Egeria, in order that the Roman people, looking upon him as a man favoured in an especial manner by heaven, should not only not dare to entertain thoughts of dethroning him, but permit him to aggrandize himself at his discretion; we have another example of the same sort of policy, in Tullius Hostilius, who succeeded Numa, and introduced with great art, those ostentatious outside appearances, which dazzle the eyes of the world, and are the most efficacious means to make majesty formidable and respectable; for he likewise sought out deceitful pretences, for making war on the neighbouring states: we see Tarquin the Proud also, availing himself of the stratagem of his son Sextus, who, under the pretence of being a fugitive from his father’s cruelty, fled to, and entreated refuge among the Gabians, on whom, after their receiving him kindly, he artfully prevailed to make him their generalissimo, veiled with an absolute power; in consequence of which, he was enabled to fell and betray them. He did so, and they became an easy prey to the Romans.
XXIII. Is not that famous precept of Machiavel’s, that with an enemy reduced to great straits or difficulties, you should take no middle course, but, according as you find it most for your interest, should either ruin him totally, or give him your hand to extricate him out of his danger; punctually conformable to the advice which Herennius gave to his son Pontius, who was general of the Samnites? When this general had shut up the Roman army within the Caudine Forks, he sent information of it to his father, and at the same time desired to have his advice, respecting how he should act by them. The old man answered, that he should generously open the pass, and let them go free, without any condition or limitation whatever, that might be injurious to, or affect either their lives, their liberty, or their honour. Pontius, and all the principal people of the republic who were with the army, believed, that Herennius had not well understood or considered the information that had been sent him, nor apprehended, that the whole Roman army were entirely at their mercy. They therefore sent other messengers or deputies, with instructions to inform him minutely, of the unhappy situation and state of the Roman army, whose lives, without remedy, were at their discretion and disposal. To this he answered, that they should cut all their throats, and not spare a single man of them. Two answers so diametrically opposite, made some of them suspect that the old man was not in his right senses; but notwithstanding this suspicion, as they had for many years respected him as the oracle and soul of the republic, the major part of them began to conjecture, and not without reason, that there was some mystery contained in these contradictory replies, which they did not comprehend, or were not aware of; and they therefore desired, that he would come to the camp and explain himself. He came accordingly, and told them his sentiments; which were, that they should adopt one or other of the extremes, and either gain their affections by an heroic act of generosity, or extirpate them totally, to prevent their ever being able to revenge themselves for whatever indignity they should impose on them. Pontius did not follow the advice of the old man, but took a middle way, which was, to spare their lives, but dismiss them with the loss of their honour, by obliging consuls, officers, and soldiers, to submit to the signal disgrace of passing under the yoke. The result of this was, what might easily have been foreseen and expected, the Romans, stung with the ignominy they had undergone, could not divert their thoughts from meditating revenge, which they after a while determined to take; and breaking through the stipulated conditions, they renewed the war with stronger army, and totally routed and overthrew the Samnites.
XXIV. We must allow, that the determination Pontius took was imprudent; but it does not follow from thence, that we should approve the advice of Herennius; for although the first was insecure, the other was cruel in extreme. He might have fallen upon other expedients, better suited and proportioned to the nature of the case; such as taking hostages, and before permitting the army to depart, obliging them to deliver into their possession, certain towns and districts as pledges, for the faithful performance of their engagements; but the supposing that the faith of stipulations or compacts, would have more influence upon a vain, proud, warlike people, than the indignation conceived for a gross affront offered to their honour, was very idle, and very silly confidence.
XXV. Neither, as I have already said, do I think there was any security in the extreme benign advice of Herennius; for with the Romans, ambition was more powerful than public faith, or the obligations of gratitude. A good testimony to this truth, was their behaviour to the Numantians, which was a true sample of the politics of those times.
SECT. VII.
XXVI. I say of those times, to avoid censuring the Romans singly; for in Greece also, the not performing a promise given, or even sworn to, when the observance of it clashed with the interest of the state, was so common, that a sovereign for having done it, was hardly looked upon to have impeached his character as a just prince, or an honest man.
XXVII. Agesilaus, king of Sparta, was one of the most celebrated princes of antiquity; and although he was an eminent warrior, placed his principal glory in being thought a lover of virtue and justice. To one who called the sovereign of Persia the great monarch, he answered sharply, he who is not better than me, is not a greater king than myself. He was exceedingly sober, patient of labour, and such a respecter of the Gods, that he would not permit even his enemies, who had taken refuge in the temples, to be forced from their sanctuary; and was besides, so averse to dress and finery, that there was scarce a soldier in his army, more humbly or simply cloathed than himself. But this saint of Paganism, made not the least scruple of violating the public faith, when by the violation he expected to derive some advantage to the state. By means of one of his emissaries he, in profound peace, surprized and seized on the city of Thebes; and although in Sparta, the justice of the action was somewhat disputed, as soon as it was shewn, that the keeping the place was of importance to the kingdom, they immediately consented to send a garrison to maintain the citadel. In his expedition to Egypt, he abandoned king Taco, in whose pay and service he and his Lacedæmonian troops were engaged, and joined the rebel Nectanebus, without making any other excuse for this treachery, than that he found it for the interest of his country.
XXVIII. Aristides, the Cato of the Athenians, who by way of eminence they called the Just, having caused his country to swear to a certain thing, and having in the name of it sworn to it himself likewise, persuaded them afterwards to violate the oath, because the observance of it would be productive of some inconvenience to them. Plutarch, who cites Theophrastus as his author, adds, that to serve his country he did many iniquitous things. Such were the just men of Greece, and such was their policy.
SECT. VIII.
XXIX. I well know, that in the opinion of many people, this political money is current in our times, and that it is frequently said, the words and promises of those who have the supreme management of affairs, should not remain in force for any longer time than they are found not to clash with the interests of the state. I have read of an Italian prince, who, when he was negotiating a peace with a powerful monarch, requested among other conditions, the restitution of a large part of his territories, which had been taken from him during the war, to which request, the ambassador of the monarch answered, what reliance can the king my master place on the fidelity of your highness, in case he gives you all you ask? to which the prince replied:—Assure him, that I will pledge my word to him to fulfil my engagements, not in quality of a sovereign, for in that capacity, whenever favourable opportunities offer, it behoves me to sacrifice every thing to my grandeur, and the interests of my state; but as a gentleman, and a man of honour.
XXX. But after all, this assurance contains in it a large portion of hyperbole; for I firmly believe, the majority of the princes of this day, are scrupulous about breaking the treaties they have entered into; although it be true, that at every turn, you will hear them reciprocally accusing each other of being the infringers of them; but it seldom happens, that either of the parties can so clearly make out the justice of his cause, as not to leave room for a difference of opinion on the subject. Thus they both go upon probabilities, and also upon the strength of probabilities, accuse each other. If either of them happens to be a person of so enlarged a conscience, as knowingly, and without scruple, to trample on all the obligations of equity, justice, and public faith, he endeavours notwithstanding to save appearances, and to seek some specious pretence for his behaviour. This shews, that he is ashamed of what he does, and would gladly hide the odium of his actions for fear of being pointed at, which would not happen, if breaking their words was so common among princes, and so little scrupled by them, as some would persuade us.
XXXI. I know very well, that an anonymous French author, asserted a few years ago, that Don Ferdinand the Catholic, being told that Louis the twelfth of France complained he had twice deceived him, replied, By the Lord! the French man lies, for it was not twice, but ten times that I deceived him. If such a thing ever happened, we may suppose, that our Don Ferdinand prided himself in perfidy. But these are mere gossips tales, and such as prudent people pay no regard to. I suppose, that before this joke or tale, could arrive at the ears of the French man who wrote it, from the mouth of Don Ferdinand, it must necessarily pass through the mouths of a hundred different people; and we may conclude, that out of that hundred, at least ninety of them were more capable of framing it, than Don Ferdinand was of uttering it.
XXXII. But admitting this was true, all that can be inferred from it is, that among a great number of princes of our times, here and there one of them, has without shame or blushing, practised lying and deceit in the affairs of state; whereas among the antients, this was very frequent and common; for all, or nearly all of them, seem to have stamped on their hearts, that sentence of Chorebus: Dolus, an virtus, qius in hoste requirat? or some other like it.
SECT. IX.
XXXIII. But our surprize will cease at their acting in this manner, when we reflect, that that great philosopher and oracle of antiquity, the divine Plato, by his doctrine, taught, that it was lawful for those who had the management of public affairs, to lye, whenever it could be of use to the interests of the state. Igitur rempublicam administrantibus præcipue, si quibus aliis, mentiri licet, vel hostium, vel civium, causa ad communem civitatis utilitatem. Reliquis autem à mendacio abstinendum est. (lib. III. de Repub.) If the princes of antiquity had so able a master, and one of so great authority, what loss could they be at for want of a Machiavel?
XXXIV. It is true, that Plato only allowed lying to be lawful, in cases where it might be conducive to advance the public good; Machiavel advises it, whenever it can be useful to serve the particular interests of a tyrant. Thus Plato was a bad moralist, and Machiavel a bad man. But this difference in the character of the matters, does not prevent tyrants from making the same use of the doctrine of Plato, for the purpose of serving their particular conveniencies, that disinterested princes may do for the good of the public, because a tyrant, always endeavours to make the people believe, that every thing he does to advance his own grandeur, is transacted with a view of promoting their interest; and if at any time he is detected in a lye, he will pretend that he lyed for the public good, and quote the doctrine of Plato to justify his conduct; but in case this doctrine of Plato’s should appear too limited or confined for tyrants, as in truth it is, they may be supplied with a much more copious and enlarged system, in the writings of Plato’s disciple Aristotle.
XXXV. I do not mean to say, that Aristotle was an abettor of perverse policy, or that he wrote with a design of instructing tyrants in the methods by which they might make themselves absolute, and support themselves by tyrannic rule, but only mean to declare, that in the fifth book of his Politics, cap. 11. he did it without intending it, or without being aware that he was doing it. In this chapter, which is a pretty long one, not only those two famous maxims, Oderint dum metuant, Divide ut imperes, are exactly pointed out and applied; but all, or very near all the others, which are published by the Florentine author, in his book intitled Il Principe, are to be found in this chapter of Aristotle’s. I have never seen Machiavel’s book, but only the capital maxims of it, as they are cited by other authors; but hear Hermanus Conringius, who has read both that and Aristotle. He says, Nicholas Machiavel, that trumpeter of political arts, cannot, nor does not, teach his prince any arcana or secrets, for promoting or maintaining tyrannic dominion, which many hundred years before, had not been taught by Aristotle in his fifth book of Politics; and it is not improbable, but that cunning teacher and promoter of wickedness, transcribed from Aristotle, although he concealed the plagiary, all that he published in his own book; but there is a remarkable difference in the application the two masters make of their doctrine, which is, that Machiavel advises all princes without distinction, to pursue and practise what he teaches; whereas Aristotle declared more justly and frankly, his to be fit and necessary for tyrants only. (Conring. Introduct. ad Politic. Aristotelis, cap. III.)
XXXVI. But let the truth prevail. I say the same of both Aristotle and Machiavel, which is, that neither of them were the inventors of systems of perverse policy; for that they copied them, from the actions of the kings of Persia and Egypt; from the Archelaus’s and Philips of Macedon; from the Phalaris’s, the Agathocles’s, the Hierones, and Dionysius’s of Sicily; from the Perianders, from the Pisistratus’s, and other political pests of Greece.
SECT. X.
XXXVII. Nor can I perceive such profundity or acuteness, in these so much applauded maxims, either of Aristotle, or Machiavel, as may render it worth the while of a politician of special perspicuity, to bestow much time in reading or studying them; as a moderate understanding, without their help, will enable a man to acquire all they teach; nor is there any thing necessary to carry them into execution, but a hardened and a perverted heart.
XXXVIII. The maxim, that a tyrant must be supported by making himself feared, and not trust to the love of his subjects, is as clear as day-light; for how can those, whom he is continually oppressing with a hard slavery, have any love for him? And it follows of course, that he must treat them as he would enemies, and endeavour to keep them poor, as every one knows, that the more you impoverish your enemy, the more you deprive him of the means of injuring you.
XXXIX. It is also an immediate consequence deducible from the same principle, that it will be proper for him to put more confidence in strangers, than his own subjects; for who but a stupid person, would confide in one, who he knows is fired with indignation against him? The necessity of keeping a number of emissaries in such a situation, to inform him of the words and actions of those whom he suspects are not his friends, would occur to every rustic, and is what is daily practised by rustics in their way; for if one of these suspects any man to be his enemy, he is continually observing his conduct, watching his motions, and as far as he is able, prying into his designs. The advantages of religious and virtuous appearances, to command respect, are manifest to every young girl; and the art of fomenting discords, and encouraging opposite factions in a state, in order to preserve the balance of power equal between them, may be learned from the tumblers and rope-dancers, who support themselves, by keeping the weights at the opposite ends of their poles in equilibrio.
XL. It was said of Catherine of Medicis, who with the nicest caution, and greatest vigilance, continued to put this contrivance in practice for a long time, that she studied Machiavel every day, and that she had always his book in her hand, or else laying by her, which occasioned a satyrical writer to call it the New Testament of the queen; but perhaps this was said of her, on account of her being obliged to have recourse to the before-named arts. But in order to do this, what necessity was there for her having such a master at her elbow? The posture and situation of affairs, pointed out sufficiently to a person of the abilities and penetration of that queen, the utility of dispensing some favours to the heretics, and by conciliating their good-will, causing their weight to serve as a counterpoize to the power of the catholics, of whom she was jealous and apprehensive, but always taking care at the same time to declare and profess, that in point of faith she was a catholic, to prevent the affections of that party from being weaned and estranged from her.
XLI. There have not been wanting those, who have attributed the same policy to Constantine the Great, who, at the same time that he was favouring Christianity, kept Gentiles in his ministry, and filled posts of importance with them. But this we should suppose was an act of necessity, because it was incumbent on him to proceed with caution, in so great and arduous a work, as that of the conversion of the whole Roman empire. If he had endeavoured to beat down Paganism at a blow, and by open force and violence, he might possibly never have been able to accomplished it.
SECT. XI.
XLII. I say the same, of all the other rules of practices of tyrannic and deceitful policy. What ability or penetration does it require, to invade with an armed force, the territories of a neighbouring prince or republic, and surprize some of the fortified towns of those, who thinking themselves secure, and relying upon the faith of an established peace, are off their guard, and not prepared to resist the attack? To accomplish this, requires nothing more, than for a man to become compleatly callous to the fear of God, and to have lost all sense of shame of the world. To find a plausible pretence for doing it, is the most easy thing imaginable, for a child of ten years old, is never at a loss for such a one, whenever he is disposed from motives of interest, or through fickleness, to break a little friendship or connexion he has engaged in.
XLIII. The barbarous maxim, of getting rid of brothers or relations, to remove the most dangerous apprehensions of, or incitements to, insurrections, does not require ingenuity to execute it, but cruelty only. We see the Ottoman emperors have practised it in a variety of ways; some have taken away the lives of their brothers and relations, others have deprived them of sight, and others of liberty, by shutting them up in close confinement. They were all equally apprized of the importance of preventing the danger, but they were not all equally fierce and cruel. Thus in proportion to the degrees of their barbarity, or their fears, their rigour in the practice of the maxim, was greater or less. Mahomed the third, when he mounted the throne, not satisfied with putting to death his whole twenty-one brothers, ordered ten Sultanas, likewise, who were then pregnant, to be thrown into the sea and drowned; whereas others, have contented themselves with confining those who were related to them in a prison, with reasonable accommodations appertaining to it. This great difference in their conduct, did not proceed from their distinct political ideas, but from the diversity of their tempers and dispositions.
XLIV. As we are now treating on this subject, this seems a proper occasion, for taking notice of a common error and opinion, which prevails among many people with respect to the Ottoman emperors, viz. that the bloody maxim of sacrificing their own brothers to their safety, in order to their possessing the throne in security, is peculiar to the Ottoman race. This barbarous and atrocious policy, is much more ancient than the stock of Ottoman princes, and was more generally practised by other royal families than by them. Plutarch, speaking of those kings who were the successors of Alexander, and among whom the vast conquests of that hero were divided, says, that cruel maxim was so universally adopted by their descendants, that they considered it as an invariable political axiom, and as a self-evident first principle, indispensably necessary to be adhered to, and which followed of course, with as much certainty as geometrical postulata. Fratrum parricidia, ut petitiones geometræ fumunt, sic concedebantur, habitanturque, communis quædam petitio ad securitatem, & Regia. Plutarch. in Demetrio.
XLV. I do not know whether the soil and climate of Asia is not more naturally adapted for the production of these political monsters, than that of Europe, for we have seen in all times, the princes of the Asiatic regions, more addicted to pursue tyrannic and cruel maxims than those of Europe. By confining one’s attention immediately to the present times, what appears to me is, that the Europeans, who for the most part have some knowledge of Machiavel, commonly found their governments upon principles of justice and moderation; and that the oriental people, who do not know that there ever was such a man as Machiavel in the world, most frequently, practise the very same perverse maxims, which this master of wickedness taught; and I think the Chinese, are the only orientals who are an exception to this general rule.
SECT. XII.
XLVI. I would not have it understood by what I have said, that I think the reading of Machiavel would not be pernicious; for it would without doubt be so to many, and especially if their dispositions incline them to the side of ambition. There have been, and ever will be, an infinite number of tyrants, who never heard of, or read Machiavel’s book, intituled The Prince; but that book may probably have made tyrants of many, who never would have been such without perusing it; and it would have the same effect in the hands of a weak prince, that the mouth of an evil counsellor would have applied to his ear.
XLVII. One of the most atrocious and treacherous acts ever recorded in history, and one that has made the greatest noise in the world, was, the unworthy putting to death of the great Pompey, which was occasioned intirely, by young Ptolemy who was then king of Egypt, having at the time it was committed, a Machiavel by his side, in the person of the depraved Theodotus.
XLVIII. Pompey, after being routed in the battle of Pharsalia, and becoming a fugitive from Cæsar and his fortune, thought no asylum could be more convenient and safe for him, than the kingdom of Egypt; because the prince who then reigned there, was indebted to him, for the great favour of having reinstated his father on that throne, from whence he had been cast down by his own subjects. On the confidence of this service, he steered for Alexandria, and upon entering the port, sent to inform the king of his arrival, and beg that protection from him, which he had so just a right to demand. The king summoned a council to deliberate on the matter, in which the majority of votes, were for doing what was honourable and right, and gave it as their opinion, that the unfortunate hero should be entertained and protected. But Theodotus, who had got the ascendency over the young king, and who had more influence with him than every body else, suggested to him, that he should not only not grant Pompey his protection, but that he should take away his life also.
XLIX. But let us hear from Lucan, the reasons of convenience, on which that depraved politician grounded his advice for perpetrating so horrid and atrocious an act of treachery, in order, that by comparing them with those of Machiavel, we may discern, whether the principles of the Florentine master were well understood in those times. But it is proper to observe, that Lucan makes the eunuch Photinus the author of the advice, instead of Theodotus; whereas other writers do not make Photinus the adviser, but assisted by the general Aquilas, the executor of the wickedness; and some others again, attribute to this last, a great part, if not the whole of the suggestion.
L. But whether Theodotus, Aquilas, or Photinus, was the first who suggested the treacherous cruelty, is not material to the main question. The arguments used with Ptolemy, to incite him to the deed, were as follow: That great as his father’s obligations were to Pompey, he ought to consider, that he owed more to himself than he did to him; that Fortune had declared itself in favour of Cæsar, and against Pompey, and that it would be the height of imprudence to take part with that side, to whom Fortune was averse; that although it was true, the affording Pompey an asylum had the appearance of an honest action, still, princes ought not to attend to what was honest, but to what was useful; that the monarch, who is desirous of confining his operations within the limits of justice, is more a slave of the laws, than a master of his dominions; that the supreme power is paramount to all law, nor can it acknowledge any subjection; that it was beyond a doubt, the affording Pompey protection in his kingdom, would soon bring on him, the invincible arms of Cæsar, and the power of the whole Roman empire; against which attack, he would be unable to make the slightest resistance; that he already, as far as his ability went, had complied with his obligations to Pompey, by wishing that he might be victorious; but now that Cæsar had won the day, he ought to attach himself to die conqueror, and endeavour to court his favour, by taking away the life of Pompey; that pursuing the medium, of neither receiving nor destroying him, would be the worst resolution they could take, for that by such a determination, they would lose the useful, without attaining the honest; that Cæsar would always look upon him as an enemy, who having had it in his power, should neglect to destroy his rival, although all the rest of the world should regard him as ungrateful, for refusing to protect his benefactor. It was also suggested, that it would not be difficult to assign a religious motive for destroying Pompey, and to cover the cruelty of the action under that pretence; for it might be alledged, that he was sacrificed to the goddess of Fortune, who had already declared herself adverse to the unhappy hero; that this sacrifice seemed not only to be dictated by religion, but justice also; for that protecting Pompey under such circumstances, in the kingdom of Egypt, and in the manner he wished, would infallibly, by provoking the indignation of Cæsar, bring on it ruin and desolation, and that he ought therefore to be proceeded against with fire and sword, as against an avowed enemy of the state.
LI. I ask now, if Nicholas Machiavel, placed at the ear of the king of Egypt in that conjuncture, and under the like circumstances, could have said more? Thus there always were Machiavels, and they were always pernicious and did mischief, when concerned in the administration of public affairs, not only to the people at large, but most commonly to the princes themselves, whose exaltation or security they endeavoured to promote, by the practice and adoption of impious and cruel maxims.
LII. I believe, that although all who read the relation we have just been discussing, will abominate the advice of Theodotus, as base, tyrannical, violent, inhuman, and atrocious; there are many of those who attend to nothing but temporal convenience, will think it salutary; but observe, that instead of this, it was extremely hurtful and injurious. They perpetrated the murder of the great Pompey, by adding to the act of cruelty, another of treachery, which was coaxing him to come ashore, by an assurance, that the king had engaged his royal word that his life should be safe. What was the result of all this? That Ptolemy obtained the hoped for friendship of Cæsar? That Theodotus, Aquilas, and Photinus, were rewarded for the great service they had done him, by freeing him for ever from the apprehension of so formidable an enemy as Pompey? No, nothing of this sort fell out in consequence of the base act; but it happened, that in a few days after, Ptolemy in a most tragical manner, lost his kingdom and his life, and that the three authors and executors of the murder of Pompey, Theodotus, Aquilas, and Photinus, died miserably; which consequences are produced, either by impious maxims tending naturally to bring on misfortunes, or by the interposition of the Supreme Providence, which superintends and watches over human affairs, and with an especial design, fulminates his wrath on the authors of such wickedness, in a manner, that serves to make them scarecrows to terrify, as well as examples to warn others.
SECT. XIII.
LIII. I am fully persuaded, that if the case on which the council of king Ptolemy deliberated, had been referred to the politicians of our Europe, and in our age, that not one of them would have advised the putting to death of Pompey; but it is likely there would have been very few of them so generous, as to recommend the receiving and protecting him. In truth, although not only generous, but hazardous resolutions, may be appendages to the punctilios of princes, and may spring from that source, they are very rarely suggested to them by their counsellors. Thus, if a point of this sort was to be discussed by the council of a king now-a-days, the consideration of the danger of protecting Pompey on the one hand, and the scandal of sacrificing him to the resentment of Cæsar on the other, would most probably have determined them to pursue the middle way, of neither entertaining nor injuring him, and would have left to his own election, the choice of another asylum, and to his fortune, the good or bad exit from his troubles; nor do I doubt but that in the court of Ptolemy there were some, and possibly the major part, of this opinion. Notwithstanding this, if I had been a member of that council, I should have given my vote for the most benign, not only as the most honest, but the most useful and beneficial resolve they could have fallen upon; and I even think, it would have had great weight with the king, if any one of those who assisted at it, had recommended to him the protection of Pompey, for the reasons, supported with some such arguments as follow, which altogether I shall call