Fore-armed

“A free people ought not only to be armed, but disciplined, to which end an uniform and well-digested plan is requisite.”—George Washington.

A plan put forward to solve the defense problem of the United States can be simple in outline, but must become complex in detail. Yet the skein of detail will be readily disentangled if the outlined plan rests upon sound principles. Any departure from proved and accepted postulates of military development will end in disaster.

Today, happily, the majority of the American people are alive to the pressure of preparedness against war. Moreover, they are not likely to be gulled by the inertia or the trickery of politicians. In the end the citizens will demand a system of national defense commensurate with the peril of the republic.

Heretofore, owing to the fact that the greater part of the uninformed public confuse valor with efficiency, it has been difficult to arouse sentiment in favor of increasing the United States military establishment. The old tradition that the farmer would drop his plowshare in the furrow, grasp his fowling piece, rush to the defense of his country and triumph, dies hard. If there still exists in this nation anyone who cherishes this delusion let him discard it forever. You cannot fight against machine guns with pitchforks.

Conditions prevailing in this republic since the presidency of Jefferson have colored the subsequent trend of military development. The people, for some inexplicable reason, have never trusted the regular army. During the Jeffersonian régime the army was reduced almost to the vanishing point—about 3,000 aggregate. Senators and Congressmen gloried in the fact that thus the Treasury of the United States was saved the sum of $522,000 annually, and proclaimed from the capitol the boast that in practically eliminating its armed force this young republic had set a standard for the world, and, because no army existed, all cause for war ceased. Eight years later the Senate and the members of the House of Representatives made an exceedingly hasty and undignified exit before the invader. A concourse of ribald enemy-soldiery seated in the very halls where the solemn lawmakers propounded their sophisms was the answer to the policy of army suppression. Will history repeat itself?

Every plan of national defense must proceed from a discussion of the size of the navy. The peculiar geographical position of the United States makes the naval program of the nation a matter of supreme importance. Wisely Congress has brought into being a body of officers technically trained, and turned over to them the duty of examining the American naval situation in all aspects and furnishing Congress with the result of these investigations, with their recommendations. Unwisely the national legislators have never fully accepted the recommendations of the Naval Board. Battleships bring no votes. In consequence, United States naval strength is entirely unequal to the task of defending the country against an enemy of the first class. Our naval needs can be stated in two sentences. On the Atlantic coast the United States must at all times possess a fleet superior in speed and guns to that which the German nation keeps afloat. On the Pacific seaboard American ships must be greater in number and more efficient than those of Japan. Until this standard is reached, the Panama Canal notwithstanding, United States shores are open to invasion.

Throughout this book it has been the intention to confine the discussion to measures for evolving sufficient land forces for national defense, so no further elaboration of the naval situation will be attempted. But for all those Americans who would inform themselves on the fate of ships in conflict, the author recommends a study of the sea encounters in the present war, and most earnestly suggests a thoughtful perusal of the story of the battle of the Straits of Japan. Herein is a lesson that the United States should take seriously to heart.

The regular army is the only force which could be thrown against an invader. It is the only force approximately ready for the defense of the nation. I say approximately, for the army is sadly deficient in artillery and ammunition.

It is to be regretted that the regular organization of the United States is a mercenary force.

To depend upon hireling troops to repel invasion makes the average citizen shirk the whole question of individual defensive duty. The taxpayer considers he has bought immunity from attack. Certain sums are appropriated each year out of the Treasury for the support of the army and navy. The ordinary citizen takes little interest in the history of these appropriations. That the American citizen is satisfied with the huge cuts made by wrong-headed Congressmen, in both naval and army estimates (carefully prepared by trained officers) is proved by the return of these Congressmen term after term to Washington.

Thus the average voter fails twice in his duty to his country. First, by tacitly denying that it is incumbent upon each citizen of the commonwealth to share in the task of national defense, and second, by indifference to measures which vitally affect national security.

However, so long as the people of the United States put their reliance upon the regular army to secure to them the uninterrupted enjoyment of liberty and the pursuit of happiness, let their first care be to see that the force is equal to the task. The highest authorities agree that an army approximately 250,000 strong would be sufficient for the work. It has been said that under the present opportunities for employment in the United States it would be difficult to recruit the army up to the figure quoted. Whether this is fact or opinion can be determined by test. These handicaps of recruitment would be greatly modified if the army increase contained a sufficiently high proportion of technical troops. In this mechanical age war is highly scientific. One of the great needs of our present organization is the expansion of the engineer corps, signal corps and aeronautical section. The American army is without railway or balloon units and no adequate train corps exists. If the scope of the organization were enlarged as it should be, undoubtedly the popularity of the technical branches, which appeal to the ambitions of the average young man, would attract a sufficient number of recruits gradually to bring the service up to required strength.

The enlargement of the field artillery, with the adoption of an additional heavier type of mobile cannon, in view of the lessons of the European war, is a matter that should receive immediate attention. The present artillery complement of the army is sadly inadequate for the usual duties assigned to this arm. It is under-armed and under-munitioned. The artillery, excepting coastal divisions, is the most neglected branch of the service, in view of its military importance. Yet in personnel, it is a true corps d’elite. No officers of the army surpass our “gunners” in professional knowledge and pride in their work.

The present issue of field-piece is an excellent type. It approaches in model the famous French field-gun. But, all told, there are only six regiments of mobile artillery. If in case of emergency it were possible to concentrate the whole of the force against an invader, under the accepted standard organization of foreign armies, our defending cannon would be outnumbered and outranged. With but six artillery regiments, comprising all the batteries in the army of the United States, it is difficult to decide if the situation is more absurd than sad.

In the evolution of warfare brought about by the present conflict it has been found that the heavier type of field-gun, 4.9, or a similar caliber, is absolutely necessary to meet battle conditions. No battery of field artillery in the United States contains such a gun. As for mobile howitzers of the Skoda type, eleven-inch pieces of enormous power and effect, that such guns will be provided is beyond the dreams of the most sanguine enthusiast for United States army improvement.

The above details are only dwelt upon in order to give the citizen a suggestion of the pressing wants of the army. Any scheme of organization should be left in entirety to the decision of the officers who devote their lives to the study of the subject. As has often been said, the United States government pays a number of specialists to draw up plans to meet the problem of defense, and Congress immediately scraps the whole material. Such a proceeding would wreck any ordinary business organization, and it is obvious that it will run this republic on the rocks of military disaster unless remedied. What the regular army needs is more men and more and heavier guns. Let the citizen stand on the broad platform of a correctly proportioned regular army of 250,000 men. Let him impress his views firmly upon his Congressman. Then, at least, the citizen will have fulfilled a large part of his duty to his country.

Before passing to a discussion of the required army reserve, let us consider two points which from personal experience seem to be of importance.

First, in all that I have seen in the different theaters of war, nothing has so much impressed me as the effectiveness of the machine gun. The value of this weapon in defense is well recognized by all belligerents. The English staff have gone to the length of organizing a separate machine-gun corps. As this is essentially a weapon of defense—which is the military problem of the United States—let us follow the lead of England in this matter and create sufficient machine-gun regiments to protect the thousand and one points on American shores where an enemy may be expected to land. The machine gun is cheap and effective. Besides, this measure can be put into operation in a comparatively short time.

My second suggestion is more radical. It deals with the promotion of officers from the ranks in the regular army. The army is the only “business” in the United States that does not offer encouraging chances of advancement from the bottom up. It is possible for an enlisted man to obtain a commission, but experience shows that this method of gaining shoulder straps is the exception rather than the rule. It may not be exact to say West Point is undemocratic in effect, but certainly it is undemocratic in principle. Let it be made a rule that all graduates serve a certain specified time in the ranks before being commissioned, and also make provision for helping the enlisted men to seek advancement in the service. Take innumerable examples of business success and in many instances it will be found that the head of the organization has risen from the humblest position. He knows his work from the closest contact with it and intimate experience. No one thinks of looking askance because the president of the Federal Iron and Steel Company began his career as office boy. Why should not the steps of promotion be as accessible to the private in the army as they are in civil life. Let the young men of the country be stimulated to enter the service, in order to gain commissions. In case of war, a large number of officers would have to be improvised (it is laughable to state that there are 16,000 efficient officers now available in the United States), and although doubling the capacity of West Point is a splendid remedy for officer shortage, it savors of political expediency. Give the self-respecting enlisted man the chance he is entitled to, make the regular army a career, and at once you bring the army closer to the people.

Under the conditions that prevail in the United States, a regular army is the only force that can be considered as first-line troops available for mobilization against invaders. As it is impossible, because of political and economic considerations, to maintain a standing army large enough and strong enough to meet potential foes and definitely defeat them, at all points of the periphery of the United States, and as all potential enemies have armies vastly superior to that of the United States, it is imperative that the regular forces be supplemented by a certain class of reserves.

Granting the building up of the standing army will be properly carried out, the question of national existence depends upon the correct solution of the problem of the American secondary army. The author is firmly of the opinion that universal service is the only democratic and logical solution of the problem. For some reason the average man in civil life confounds universal military training with “militarism.” From a study of the chapters dealing with the French, Australian and Swiss systems it is seen that the two ideas can be sharply differentiated. Militarism—or, to give it the correct designation, Prussianism—exists in Germany because it is fostered by an autocratic government. Conditions in France are absolutely the reverse. In Switzerland the army is a most popular institution. If the American people could divest themselves of the preconceived notion that military service is servile, and that the liberties guaranteed them under the Constitution were infringed by submitting to discipline, the problem of defense would solve itself.

The great fault of militarism is the creation of officer privilege. The officer caste is a relic of feudalism. In the middle ages it was the knight and lord who, by divine right, commanded troops in battle and it is a suspicion that somehow this condition still holds which prejudices Americans as a class against military discipline. If this prejudice could be overcome, every United States citizen would surely bear his share in the defense of national integrity. To do so efficiently he would have to perfect himself in certain military duties. In practice he would have to become an integral part of the national army. When all is said, the army approximates any other business. It is not given to every man to be a boss. Some must be employees. Every American recognizes the reasons for discipline in his business. A little familiarity with army life will show him the imperative need of this same quality in a properly organized system of defense. Gradually, it is to be hoped, the civilian fear of military regulation will fade. Then, with the awakening to the unpreparedness of our country, universal service will be a fact instead of a remote dream.

Meanwhile let us examine what substitute scheme will fill the want of general liability to military training.

Two projects present themselves: First, the utilization of the National Guard as a federal reserve, and, second, the organization of federal volunteers. Before entering into the merits of either plan let us remember the broad lines upon which the European armies are organized. Turning back to the chapters dealing with the various forces, we see that all have, first, the standing army; second, the reserve army (Landwehr); and, third, the Home Guard (Landsturm). With minor modifications this is the standard arrangement in all the armies. Do we not get the hint for the solution of our difficulties from this scheme? From the foundation of the republic the National Guard and the militia have been the home-guard troops. This function has been traditional. In those states that have made an effort to bring guard regiments up to a high standard of efficiency, considerable local pride is lavished on the various organizations. Under existing conditions it would seem that we have here the answer to one part of the preparedness problem. Let the National Guard and militia be the force corresponding to the Landsturm in the foreign armies. With the present units as a basis it would be a comparatively simple expedient to bring all the National Guard regiments under central control and establish interstate standards that would insure a homogeneous force. Federal command of all guard and militia units is essential in this plan. But such command need not in ordinary times interfere with state military development. The function of the state authority would be to bring the guard force up to perfection in line duties. This involves a change in administration and some modifications of present systems; but no serious obstacle blocks the path to the development of efficient battalions properly trained, armed and equipped, under their own officers. Incidentally, it should be exacted of all guard and militia officers, that they serve a specified period with the regular army.

It is unnecessary to elaborate the many details governing the establishment of this third-line defense force. Suffice to say that in all particulars it should be made to conform to regular army standards in so far as possible.

There are three suggestions, nevertheless, that may be put forward:

First: The strength of the National Guard in each state to be proportionate to population and federal aid to be strictly apportioned according to the number of guardsmen actually undergoing training.

Second: All training to be in the field, following the Swiss plan, armory training to be reduced to a minimum.

Third: All officers in time of war above the rank of major to be assigned from a supplementary reserve of the regular army.

In accordance with this third clause, when called into federal service, the state battalions will retain their own line officers, but will be furnished staff and general officers from the regular establishment. In time of peace, certain officers of the United States army will, in addition to their other duties, be assigned to regiments, brigades and divisions of the guard. Whenever the guard is united for federal service, during such periods of training as may be determined upon, these regular officers will officiate in their superior capacities. Otherwise the guard will be under state command.

Such, in outline, is a plan for utilizing the present forces pertaining to the various states and encouraging the establishment of other state troops. The principle of this organization is that state troops are primarily a home guard. They are, in fact and tradition, the third line. Any radical departure from the original plan of service will certainly bring complications sure to impair the strength of the national-defense control.

More difficult in every way is the solving of the problem of creating a second-line force. In principle the troops supplementing the standing army should be the bulk of the fighting strength of the nation. In numbers it should conform to the size of potential expeditionary forces of invasion. Any strength less than 500,000 cannot be considered. In the author’s opinion only a force of such size could save the capital from capture or prevent the capitulation of New York. On the Pacific seaboard, eliminating the question of the defense of the insular possessions, no smaller force could hold the coast and retain Alaska. Thus the immediate task of the United States is to bring into being 500,000 armed and disciplined fighting men. How can this be done?

Compulsory service being out of the question for the time, the safety of the nation must rest upon volunteers. Here we are at once confronted with the query, Can the nation recruit such a number of volunteers in time of peace? In the opinion of certain authorities such recruitment is impossible. But this is opinion, not fact. Before condemning the plan for raising a force that of its own volition comes to the defense of the country, some test should be made of its practicability. The plan means sacrifice, but it would be a sad indictment of American loyalty to take it for granted that the majority of United States citizens are so ignorant or indifferent to the question of defense that they put personal safety before national security.

In order to bring into existence the second line of the American army, the country must be aroused to a sense of its helplessness, and the individual duty each man owes to the commonwealth. To accomplish this I frankly suggest advertising.

Let the facts be known. Put the question squarely up to the young men upon whose shoulders the responsibility of defense rests and let them decide the matter for themselves. Obviously the advertising material must be honest on all counts and scrupulously exact. Nothing of an alarming nature should be emphasized. Simply state the case of the country as now situated; give the strength of the armies of neighboring nations, reproduce the bald statements of what these armies could do if so disposed, and finally, without boasting, indicate the ideals of the United States, the responsibility for maintaining the Monroe Doctrine, and how this responsibility might conflict with the ambitions of other nations.

A volunteer force to be successfully maintained must be popular. This fact must be kept in mind in considering the organization of the suggested second-line army. You have seen, in the chapters dealing with the Swiss and Australian systems, how service is looked upon as an honor. Such an ideal can be built up with an American volunteer force. Let us follow the minute-men tradition. Indicate a standard up to which all who serve must live. Make the second line a corps d’elite. Create a spirit of self-respect as the first requisite of the minute man. Make it a moral as well as a military force. Herein is the germ of success for the army of defense.

Before many years the effect of the training and discipline obtained in such a force would make itself felt in national economic life. Employers will quickly discern the advantages of employees who know the significance of obedience, promptness, neatness and self-respect. In time, a discharge from the minute-men army would be a recommendation bringing preferential employment to all who hold it. As help for entrance into positions where military qualities are necessary, such as express messengers, policemen and watchmen in the great industrial plants and similar occupations, there is no better preliminary training.

To model a working plan for the volunteer army is not the purpose of this book. Systems that have been successfully employed abroad are explained in detail. From the data in hand a competent board of officer and civilian experts can devise a scheme suitable for the United States. Only one prayer is offered in this connection—preserve the whole organization from any taint of partisan politics.

In the arrangement of a volunteer army plan the author has but two suggestions which he puts forward as the result of personal experience:

First: Initiate a course of musketry practice in public schools. Such a course need only be elementary, and include a knowledge of handling and caring for the army rifle, with some gallery practice. It would have for its object the familiarizing of the boy with the weapon which some day he might have to use in defense of his home. No longer does the average boy in the United States have the chance to “go hunting,” as was the case a generation ago. Thus the familiarity with firearms, which was a characteristic of the American people, is gradually being lost. It is to offset this that the suggestion is made.

The second recommendation is that the naturalization laws be changed so that no foreigner can have the right of suffrage until he has served the allotted term in the volunteer army. The right of the vote is the highest privilege of a citizen of this republic. It invests every American with a responsibility in national life. Through the exercise of his vote the citizen shares the weal or woe of his country. No stranger should be granted this exalted right until he is grounded in habits of loyalty to his adopted land. It is not wise to delude ourselves about the standard of patriotism of the average immigrant. He comes to this country from motives of self-interest. His later acts spring from the same causes and not from a sense of obligation to the foster nation.

There is much more that could be written on this subject of preparedness against war. Here the author has only tried to embody certain suggestions on the question that have been the result of a number of years’ study and observation of things military. If he has in some slight way turned the thoughts of his fellow citizens into channels of reflection, the object of this book is fulfilled. Yet before writing finis the author must once more record his opinion that national integrity and the opportunity for maintaining American world standards lie solely in the adoption of universal liability to military or naval training. In the councils of nations, a power is respected only in proportion to its strength.