APPENDIX.
GENERAL FUJII’S STUDY OF THE RUSSIAN ARMY.
General Fujii, Commandant of the Staff College and Chief of General Kuroki’s Staff, wrote this interesting study of the Russian soldier, on the eve of the war. I commend it to the attention of military students as a valuable psychological document and a model of direct and terse expression.
“Our enemy is he who burned the city of Moscow and conquered the great army of Napoleon by cold, and hunger, and exposure; who fought against China with the allied forces of England and France, and who in 1877 defeated the Turks. For nearly thirty years Russia has encountered no foe, so that Europe knows nothing of her fighting capacity. It is clear, however, from careful study of former wars and from the present organisation, training, discipline, and morale of the soldiers, as well as from the education of their officers, that the Russian troops are by no means so good as many critics imagine.
Let me point out their good and bad qualities:—
The training of the men is too formal. Lack of initiative and of independent action is the weakest point of all their officers, if we except the Staff and the officers of the Guards who are a little better in that respect.
The physical strength of the men is great—especially in their legs; their shooting is not very bad; their discipline is maintained not by training so much as by the remnant of feudal influence, yet they are not in any way chivalrous. They are, in short, imperfectly educated, strongly religious, and a naïve sort of people. Therefore, if there be a great hero to lead them and set them an example in the field they are not men to fear death, as was seen at Plevna, where they piled up corpses for earthworks and dashed into the enemy’s trenches. Yet, if they meet any little reverse they are at once terrified and panic stricken, and run away in confusion. It is, therefore, necessary to frighten them at the beginning, whenever we meet them.
Strength and courage are their characteristics in battle, and we must, therefore, always be cool and careful, and never venture on any rash movement.
Attacks on a small scale they like to make in the night or at dawn.
They appear to have little practice in independent firing, and are fond of firing volleys at any distance. Such firing is not very effective.
Sometimes they occupy a position on the enemy’s flank and try to enfilade. This they call a ‘rifle fort.’
If they have even a trifling success they will strive to take the utmost advantage of it. We have to remember always that they must be beaten at the outset, however slight may be our victory.
Their outposts are usually stationed at a considerable distance from the main body, especially when they occupy a defensive position.
Their infantry often charge with the bayonet—but they have little skill in the use of the bayonet, and none at all in individual encounter.
Their infantry is not clever in making use of natural objects for cover, and fights awkwardly in uneven and mountainous country, though on the plain it is very clever.
Russian cavalry and sometimes infantry when retreating set fire to the villages, so that we cannot expect to find shelter and supplies in places they have evacuated.
The Cossacks often attack transport trains and lines of communication, and it is always necessary to keep close watch on both flanks. If once successful in these attacks they will make many attempts.
The Cossacks made no heroic movement in the war of 1877, and their reports were always exaggerated. They invariably retire when met by a stronger force. If our infantry is a little careful we need have no fear of the Cossacks.
A Russian battery consists of eight guns; they have few mountain guns. In the war of 1877 their artillery was not able to accomplish much.
When at war with the Turks their higher officers were jealous of each other’s success and fame; often they could not agree upon strategic plans, and were accordingly unable to make simultaneous movements of many divisions under one command. Notwithstanding that the Russians had a greater force of cavalry than the Turks they could not prevent the enemy from bringing supplies into Plevna.
Amid the snows of Shipka Pass the infantry suffered terrible hardships and yet made a terrific assault, but this was because the defeat of the Turks was no longer in question.
The Russians sometimes try to carry out the wildest plans; and we must neglect no point however impossible of approach it may appear.
In 1877 the men endured hardships well; the officers did not.
So changeable are the feelings of the Russians that though at one moment they may be in the depths of despair, a trifling success will make them bold again and remove all fear of their enemy.
In the war with the Turks there were many mean-minded Russian officers who placed their personal interest and comfort beyond every other consideration.
The Russians often endeavour to draw their enemy to a short distance, and then open a terrible fire of rifles and artillery. In occupying a position they pay little attention to their communications.”
This estimate of the Russian army, adds General Fujii, is derived “simply from what I have read and heard. It is, of course, essential that we should take advantage of their weak points and avoid their strong points. Their troops are by no means anything to be afraid of, yet it would be a mistake to under-rate them. The execution of our plans must always be after more than sufficient reconnaissance and preparation, but, once begun, the battle, in whatever circumstances, must be carried right through until the enemy is crushed.”
RUSSIAN ESTIMATE OF THE JAPANESE SOLDIER.
From this Russian study of the Japanese army I make the following extracts:—
“The Japanese soldier is short in stature; his physical development is imperfect, but his frame is healthy, and though a trifle slow in action he is ingenious and quick of understanding. Light hearted and ingenious, his chief qualities are perseverance and unselfishness. He can march great distances on very little. His wants are few because of the extreme simplicity of his home life. During the Boxer trouble in 1900 some of the Japanese papers complained that the soldiers were required to do long marches with heavy equipment, and were much exhausted. The Japanese are a military race; they take readily to a soldier’s life and adapt themselves easily to discipline, non-commissioned officers and men observing even the minutest detail of their training and discipline.
The training of the Japanese Army is modelled on the German system of 1880, with some modifications. The infantry, whether in company or in battalion, are clever in manœuvring; their movements are rapid and precise, and they have wonderful capacity for marching. Their non-commissioned officers are soldiers of some years service; they are intelligent and ingenious, and are capable of dealing independently with situations as they arise. Their company commanders are intelligent and skilled in the management of men.
Japanese cavalry horses are very poor, weak, and badly trained, and are not quiet in the ranks. Every man rides after his own fashion, and, generally, his seat is neither well balanced nor easy. Curb and snaffle are used all the time; the speed of the horses is not well regulated, and the horses do not trot. On the march they do not keep together. These defects show that the Japanese have no good cavalry instructors, and are not trained in the management of animals. This is due partly to the physical character of Japan, which has few wide plains, and offers few facilities for horsemanship. The cavalry equipment is not uniform, and is not scientifically made. The saddle is often on the withers of the horses, so that when they move quickly the riders are much shaken, and the animals develop saddle galls and fistulous withers.
The material and equipment of the artillery are fairly good. The horses, however, are small and badly trained, and on the march the batteries—especially those of later invention—are slow. The gunners are clever in handling their weapons, in loading, aiming, and selecting a target. They are wonderfully cool, and handle their guns with the utmost confidence, but in training and discipline they are inferior to the infantry. In shooting, their accuracy is about the same as our own.
The infantry march in column of fours; the cavalry in column of threes, and the artillery in single column. The average speed of a detachment of these arms is from four-and-a-half to five Russian miles an hour. Twenty-five paces separate battalions; forty paces separate regiments. They march in large bodies, their columns extending over a great distance, a halt of from one-and-a-half to two hours being made in each march. In war, the Japanese send in front an independent body of horsemen, usually the whole of the cavalry attached to the column. The advance guard consists of about one-quarter of the infantry, from one-seventh to one-third of the artillery, a company of sappers, and a troop of cavalry. From this is drawn the vanguard—a small detachment of infantry and cavalry. The “point” is composed of specially selected cavalry, and sends out patrols to the front. They have neither flank guards, nor fixed patrols. Occasionally they send patrols to examine the locality and to report upon the character and topography of the district. As in the Russian army, the duties of the advance guard vary with the force that follows, with the distance marched, and the physical features of the country. When the advance guard of a division is in hilly country, it always sets out one hour earlier than the main body. The component parts and order of a column are as follows:—As point, a small body of cavalry—about half a squadron—followed by a large body of infantry, all the artillery, the rest of the infantry, the engineers, and the bridging sections, followed by a small rearguard. One or more divisions advance along several roads, and the advance guard is sent from one column—generally the central. Connection among columns marching in the same direction is very weak. When retiring, the formation is the same as when advancing, though the retirement is covered by a rear guard, whose strength and distance from the main body are the same as those of an advance guard in an advance.
Five or six military cyclists are attached to each regiment, and do the work of orderlies and patrols. Sometimes cyclists are with the advance guard or with the point. In a country like Japan, where roads are good and horses few, there is room for military cyclists to compete with mounted orderlies. The first baggage follows the regiment; the second baggage is two miles behind the rear guard. A divisional train is divided into two lines, the first line of wagons being a day’s march from its main body, and the second line two days’ march behind the main body.
In choosing quarters the Japanese are nearly always indifferent to their distance from the enemy, and to any other circumstance. The infantry are placed in front, then the artillery, and after these the cavalry and transport trains. The advance guard is stationed about one mile from the main force, and goes into quarters. The soldiers, when in quarter, never undress.
In the service of security, from one to several companies of infantry are used. Each company sends out a small number of sentries, who are posted at a distance of two miles from the main body. About half a mile behind these is a larger number of sentries. Each post has three men, one of whom patrols a short distance in front of the post. From the picquets patrols are sent along the line of sentries. Picquets and patrols—large and small—go into quarters, but are ready for battle at any moment. When the post of an advance guard reaches the line of sentries, the men engaged in the service of security rejoin the main body.
The duties of reconnaissance and cavalry patrols are the same as in the Russian army. Their reports are usually very detailed, accurate, and trustworthy. When a cavalry patrol meets an enemy it takes up a defensive position, but retires if threatened by a small body of infantry. Japanese infantry patrols are clever in reconnaissance.
The method of fighting, as observed in manœuvres, is after this manner. The fighting body of skirmishers, firing line and supports. There is no separate support attached to these. Each company sends out skirmishers to the number of two sections, and as they are not in extended order they are practically in close order of one line with a short space between the sections. In the firing line the men usually lie down and take advantage of any cover. Non-commissioned officers and commanders of sections kneel on one knee three paces behind the firing line. The supports take their place from forty to fifty paces behind the firing line, and when the skirmishers are stationary for some time the supports kneel on one knee with the rifle close to the leg. Before the firing line extends for an advance the officers go forward to reconnoitre the ground and conditions, thereby exposing themselves and offering a good target.
When a company of infantry is ordered to take a position it advances in close order, and on reaching the position sends out skirmishers, but has no flank guards. Infantry fire is independent or by volleys. Volley firing is adopted at long range, independent fire within a thousand paces. Fire discipline is regulated by company and section commanders, who point out the target and give the range. Their estimate of distances is often wrong. Independent firing is ordered by whistle of the company commander repeated by non-commissioned officers. In sighting and loading their rifles the men are quick and accurate. To reinforce the firing line the supports are added. The supports form in extended order and fill up the spaces between the sections. If additional reinforcements are needed the supports extend and move forward between the companies which are already in extended order. When still further help is required a part of the supports form a second extended firing line behind the first line. In this case the first line lies down, while the second stands or kneels. The reinforcement of the firing line is very quick after the fight has begun. In short, within a few minutes after the firing has commenced the skirmishing line can be strengthened, and the firing line consists of many extended lines; and all the supports are in action within twenty or twenty-five minutes. In executing this manœuvre the fighting force must move in front of the enemy, quite exposed, to extend its flanks.
We have observed that when on the defensive there is great confusion if the flanks are threatened by a turning movement. In advancing, the firing line moves at the ordinary pace until near the enemy, when the advance is at the double. Rushes are made forty or fifty paces from the enemy. Sometimes each body rushes forward independently. All the supports double after the firing line, and the advance is usually confused. The men crowd together and move forward obliquely, exposing their flank. They seldom fire when advancing; the retirement of the firing line is always disorderly and too quick; they do not fire until they have returned to their original position.
To defend a position the infantry form a long firing line in extended order, and the supports are quickly extended. When there is time they dig trenches deep enough to enable them to fire kneeling. If there is no time to make trenches they take cover behind the line of defence, and each section sends out one man to a distance of twenty or twenty-five paces to watch the enemy. The man remains kneeling until the firing begins and then rejoins the line.
Japanese infantry never attack with the bayonet. They believe that against the modern rifle, bayonet attacks are impracticable, and that the issue must be decided by powder and shot. Accordingly they employ rapid fire. The rapidity of the fire varies with physical features of the country, and at distances of from three hundred to eight hundred paces. The fire tactics in defence are as follows: When the enemy approaches within eight hundred or three hundred paces, a special signal is given and the firing line leaves the trenches, shouting, “Yah!” fixed bayonets, advances forty or fifty paces. At the same moment the supports draw near to the firing line, forming a second line and open fire standing. Leaving cover the defensive force is exposed in the open—an easy target for rifle and artillery.
The cavalry take little part in actual fighting, and rarely keep watch on the flanks. They are always anxious to seek shelter behind the fighting line, and do not take advantage of any opening to attack the enemy. Even when they see an excellent opportunity they do not ride rapidly forward, being more anxious not to fall off their horses than to quicken their pace.
The artillery take up an independent position, and in defence of the guns—about one third—are held in support. Generally speaking the choice of positions is very bad, and the field of fire is very narrow and limited. In the open field the artillery constructs empalements. When advancing to a fighting position the order is not good; the speed is slow and the guns are exposed to the enemy’s fire. After reaching a position from three to seven minutes elapse before they open fire. Though the firing is regular and orderly, though the gunners are brave and the handling of the guns is cool and collected, the practice is slow. The artillery does not change position during a fight, so that it cannot give proper assistance to the infantry in attack. On the defensive the artillery does not open fire immediately, even though it may see an effective target, but waits for the enemy’s fire. The ammunition wagons are placed near the guns, and the rapidity of the fire increases more or less as the battle proceeds. In the fight at Peichilii in 1900 the Japanese papers complained that the artillery was generally unsatisfactory.
The engineers belong to the advance guard. They repair the roads and lay the telegraph and telephone wires between the advance and rear guards. The telegraph and telephone communications are quickly made. The engineers do active work, taking the chief part in constructing cover and empalements for the gunners. The work is done quickly and looks substantial, though not always suited to the local conditions.
The chief characteristics of the different arms are summed up in these sentences.
In defence they like to take a position with a wide range of front.
In offensive movements the order and position of the different arms are the same whatever the conditions.
In marching, as well as in fighting, the flank guard is imperfect.
On the march the main body is separated by a long distance from the advance guard, which, unaided, must engage the enemy for some time.
The objective in attack is not definitely pointed out.
They use their supports too quickly, and exhaust their strength to repel the enemy when the latter attempts a flanking movement.
They do not recognise the necessity of continuing a fight until within reach of the bayonet.
They avoid covered places, especially in mountainous country.
They make frontal attacks without attempting turning movements.
In defence they are at little pains to avail themselves of natural cover, and are content with trenches and empalements.
When a retreat is ordered the main body of the infantry is first to retire, then all the guns, and finally the remainder of the infantry.
They do not like night attacks or night marches.
In an army of more than two divisions each division has a commander, so that there is no connection among the divisions, and the action of each is independent.”
FINIS.
A. C. Fowler, Printer, Tenter Street, Moorfields, E.C.
Transcriber’s Notes:
1. Obvious printers’, punctuation and spelling errors have been
corrected silently.
2. Where hyphenation is in doubt, it has been retained as in the
original.
3. Some hyphenated and non-hyphenated versions of the same words have
been retained as in the original.
4. Where appropriate, the original spelling has been retained.