Notes by Lieut.-Colonel Charles Rosenthal,[17] Commanding 3rd Australian Field Artillery Brigade, 1st Australian Division, relating to Artillery at Anzac, from 25th April to 25th August, 1915. (Compiled from personal diary.)
During the early hours of 25th April, 1915, the 3rd Australian Infantry Brigade landed on Gallipoli Peninsula, close to Gaba Tepe, at a point now known as Anzac Beach, followed by other troops of 1st Australian Division and Australian and New Zealand Division.
Arrangements had been made for artillery to land about 10 a.m. on the same morning, but owing to delays in disembarkation of Infantry, and enemy shelling of transports necessitating ships temporarily leaving their allotted anchorage, it was after mid-day before the vessels carrying guns were actually in correct position for disembarkation.
I did not wait for the naval boats to come alongside, but after issuing necessary instructions to Battery Commanders concerning the landing of the guns, I disembarked in a ship's boat manned by a volunteer crew from my Brigade Ammunition Column, accompanied by two officers and sixteen men of my Headquarters' Staff.
Immediately on landing I reported to my C.R.A., and was by him informed that the Divisional Commander had decided no artillery should land during the day. This decision absolutely nonplussed me, and on asking the reason I was informed the position was not considered sufficiently secure to ensure the safety of guns, if emplaced. With this decision I did not agree and urged, without result, that the safety of guns was surely secondary to the proper supporting of the troops already committed.
In view of the above decision instructions were at once sent off to the ships ordering Colonel Johnstone, Commanding 2nd A.F.A. Brigade, and Major Hughes, acting for me in command of 3rd A.F.A. Brigade, to defer disembarkation of guns. Colonel Johnstone, however, by this time had one 18-pr. gun well on the way to the shore. Permission was given for it to be landed and it was brought into action close to the beach against guns at Gaba Tepe, undoubtedly temporarily silencing them.
In the meantime the Indian Mountain Battery attached to 1st Australian Division, which had landed early in the day, was in action doing splendid work though suffering severe casualties.
By the order of Colonel White, G.S.O. (1), 1st Australian Division, I spent the afternoon in collecting Infantry stragglers and getting them forward again to the firing line. At 5 p.m. I reported completion of this task and then proceeded to thoroughly reconnoitre the right flank, overlooking Gaba Tepe, which had seemed to me, from observations made from the ship, to be a suitable area for emplacing of guns.
I returned to Divisional Headquarters just before dark, and informed the C.R.A. and Divisional Commander that I had found suitable places for batteries and could use them effectively.
I had in my reconnaissance conferred with three Battalion Commanders (one of whom was killed a couple of days later), who were delighted to hear that the artillery they were so anxiously waiting for was to come up in support.
After much discussion and persuasion the Divisional Commander agreed to allow me to land two of my three 18-pr. batteries. This approval was shortly afterwards altered to permission to land two guns only, and finally all approval was cancelled, though no information of these decisions officially reached me.
During the night, in anticipation of early arrival of guns, my Headquarters personnel worked untiringly in preparing a track from the beach to the selected sites for guns, and it was not till 5.30 a.m. on 26th that I learned approval to land guns had been cancelled overnight.
During the morning of 26th April one gun of 1st Battery, 1st Brigade, and one gun of 4th Battery, 2nd Brigade, were landed, hauled up the steep hill to their positions, and came into action on the extreme right of ridge overlooking Gaba Tepe.
Later in the day the 7th Battery of my Brigade came into action on the same ridge and the single guns of 1st and 4th Batteries were withdrawn for return to their respective Brigades.
During the afternoon there also came ashore, apparently without order, two guns of 3rd Battery, 1st Brigade, and 8th Battery, 3rd Brigade, but were returned to their respective ships by the C.R.A.
My guns were placed absolutely in the Infantry front trenches, on the sky line, no troops of any kind being in advance of them. It would have been quite useless to take up positions behind the Infantry line in the normal way, owing to the configuration of the ground, for in such cases the lowest range at which the crest could be cleared was 3,000 yards, while our targets were from 500 to 1,000 yards distant. Indeed at night, shrapnel shell with fuse set at zero was frequently used.
Each gun fired during the 26th about 400 rounds, over open sights, and caused very heavy casualties to the enemy.
The whole battery covered a front of 187°, necessitating each gun being personally controlled by an officer and each with its own particular arc of fire.
The supply of ammunition was very difficult. It had to be delivered by hand to the guns over a bullet-swept area, the distance from the beach to the guns being about half a mile, while in this distance the hills rose 400 feet.
By the afternoon of the 3rd May, two guns of 8th Battery, 3rd Brigade, were in action, and 2nd Brigade also had guns in position on the left flank of 1st Australian Divisional Front.
The Australian and New Zealand Division also had 18-prs. in action together with two 4.5-inch Howitzer Batteries, the latter being the only howitzers available up to this time at Anzac.
I was wounded on 5th May, evacuated to Cairo, and did not rejoin my command at Anzac till 26th May. During this interval gun positions, as well as Infantry trenches, had been much improved, and the enemy country in our immediate front which, when I left on 5th May, gave no signs of life, was now well traversed by trenches.
I found in my sector that the guns of my Brigade were now all in action, and the remainder of the artillery of the Division was also emplaced.
About this time 6-inch howitzers were made available and later emplaced, one for left sector, one for the centre, and one for the right, but with very limited quantities of ammunition. Another 6-inch howitzer was landed on 17th June.
I had made continual urgent representations for two 4.7-inch guns for right flank to deal with innumerable targets beyond the range of 18-prs., but it was not till 11th July that one very old and much worn gun arrived, and was placed in position on right flank, firing its first round on 26th July.
On 24th June a Scottish Territorial Howitzer Battery (the 5th Battery, City of Glasgow Lowland Howitzer Brigade) arrived and came under my command.
On 14th July a heavy battery was organized for right flank, consisting of the two 6-inch howitzers and the 4.7-inch gun before mentioned, but ammunition was still very scarce.
On 15th July a 5-inch Howitzer Brigade under Colonel Hope Johnstone commenced to arrive and was complete in position by 18th July.
On 28th July the 4th Battery of Lowland Brigade arrived.
About this time some alterations were made in artillery dispositions and grouping in preparation for impending battle at Suvla Bay and Lone Pine, commencing on 6th August, and on 30th July the artillery of right sector under my command was as follows:—
3rd A.F.A. Brigade (18-prs.).
Heavy Battery (two 6-inch howitzers and one 4.7-inch gun).
2 Mountain Guns.
Two 5-inch Howitzer Batteries, Lowland Brigade.
One 5-inch Howitzer Battery, 69th Brigade.
When leaving Australia in 1914 I had urged that a battery of 5-inch howitzers (which I commanded prior to the outbreak of war), together with stocks of ammunition held by Australia, should accompany 1st Australian Division. This was not approved. On arrival at Gallipoli Peninsula, when the need for howitzers was at once apparent, I again re-opened the question, particularly on the 29th May, when the C.R.A. agreed to press for them to be sent forward. The Divisional Commander, on 25th June, cabled Australia definitely asking for this battery, which was at once forwarded, but arrived at the Peninsula too late to be of any service.
Two Australian Field Batteries (together with a Brigade of Infantry) were transferred to Cape Helles on 5th May and did not rejoin the Australian Division at Anzac till 18th August.
With the limited number of guns available it was exceedingly important that transfers might be made very rapidly from one part of our front to another, and on 2nd June I put forward a proposal which was approved immediately to make a road along the entire front just behind the crest on which infantry trenches were sited. This road was completed in about two weeks and was a great boon alike to gunners and Infantry.
Up to 24th August no anti-aircraft guns had been provided, but specially constructed emplacements had been made for 18-prs. to be used against aircraft, and though never successful in bringing down an enemy 'plane they certainly made good enough shooting to cause enemy aviators to treat them with respect. About 20th August three 3-pr. Hotchkiss arrived for anti-aircraft purposes. They were of obsolete pattern and had been manufactured for the Japanese Government many years before. In fact the only range tables provided were printed in Japanese, but thanks to the fact that one of my Sergeants (who was a Master Mariner) spoke Japanese, we succeeded in preparing serviceable range tables.
Two Japanese trench mortars were also used from Infantry trenches with excellent effect, but owing to ammunition supply becoming soon exhausted and no fresh supplies being available they had to be discarded. A good supply of these weapons, together with full supplies of ammunition, would have been invaluable in bombarding enemy front line trenches.
The ammunition supply at all times up to the operation of 6th August was a difficult problem. Frequently we had to be rationed to a very small allowance per battery per day, and the guns of the heavy battery were for some time not permitted to fire more than two rounds per day and then only by special permission of the C.R.A.
On 20th June I was first informed that H.E. for 18-pr. was to be supplied, and shortly afterwards a small supply for experiment was landed at Anzac. I think I am right in saying my share was 15 rounds per battery.
On 2nd August our first supply of H.E. arrived, but only 150 rounds per battery.
During the first few months of the campaign, when our stocks of ammunition were desperately low, our guns and gunners had to suffer considerable casualties without being able to effectively reply.
Our batteries were of necessity in many cases under direct observation of the enemy, and only the splendid work of the detachments in building earthworks for their protection made it possible to carry on.
Under the protection of the banks of a small ravine near the beach, our artificers established a workshop, and the extraordinary ingenuity and skill displayed in the repairing and replacing of damaged guns earned for the artificers our most grateful appreciation and thanks.
On 25th August I was evacuated suffering from enteric.
These notes only apply to the right sector, which I commanded.
APPENDIX III
The Dispatch of a Commander-in-Chief is not a technical document. In it the situation should be set forth, as briefly and clearly as may be, together with a few words indicative of the plan of G.H.Q. for coping with it. After that comes a narrative which ends with thanks to those individuals and units who have earned them. A Dispatch should be so written that civilians can follow the facts stated without trouble: it should not be too technical. But when the Military Colleges and Academies at Camberley, Duntroon, Kingston, West Point and in the European and Japanese capitals set to work in a scientific spirit to apportion praise or blame they are more influenced by the actual instructions and orders issued by the Commander-in-Chief before and during the battle, than by any after-the-event stories of what happened. They are glad to know the intentions of the Commander, but his instructions i.e., the actual steps he took to give practical effect to those intentions, are what really interest them.
When I came to write my Dispatch of the 11th December, so much about the actual course of events at Suvla was still obscure, that it had become desirable either to write the narrative in a more technical form than was customary or else to publish my actual instructions simultaneously with the Dispatch. I chose the latter course. The authorities had raised objections to several passages in the Dispatch, and in every case but one, where they had wished me to add something which was not, in my opinion, correct, I had met them. No objection had been raised to the inclusion of my instructions. At 9 p.m. on the night of the 6th January (the Dispatch being due to appear next morning) I received a letter by Special Messenger from the War Office telling me the Press Bureau were wiring to all those to whom the Dispatch had been issued to suppress the instructions!
Whatever the reason of this action may have been, its result was clear enough: my Dispatch was eviscerated at the very moment it was stepping on to the platform. Had I known that these instructions, now given, were to have been cut out, my Dispatch would have been differently written.
SIR IAN HAMILTON'S INSTRUCTIONS.
To Vice-Admiral, Commanding
Eastern Mediterranean Squadron,
Sir,—I have the honour to forward a series of tables drawn up to show in detail the men, animals, vehicles, stores, etc., which it will be required to land in connection with the forthcoming operations. I shall be grateful if you will let me know as early as possible if you consider that any part of the programme indicated presents especially serious difficulties or is likely to require modification.
In informing me of the results of your consideration, I shall be obliged if you will let me know what craft you intend to use in carrying out the disembarkations referred to in tables B, C, D and E, so that detailed arrangements with regard to embarkation and to the allocation of troops, etc., to boats may be prepared.
2. Immediately after the disembarkation of the details referred to in the attached tables it will be necessary, if the operations are successful, to land 5,000 to 7,000 horses in order to render the force sufficiently mobile to carry the operations to a conclusion. Details as to disembarkation of these horses will be forwarded to you later. In the meantime the horses will be collected at Alexandria, and should subsequently be brought up to Mudros or Imbros, to begin arriving on August 6th.
It will also be necessary to land the remaining portions of the units referred to in the tables (first line transport, etc.), and, further, the remaining units of the formations to which they belong. In this latter category will be included three batteries of heavy artillery with mechanical transport. It will not be required to land any of the above until after August 7th, and details as to numbers, order of disembarkation, etc., will be forwarded to you later.
I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) Ian Hamilton,
General, Commanding
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
TABLE A.
Table showing Units and Details which it is required to Land gradually at Anzac Cove before the Morning of the 3rd of August. It will be necessary to carry out these Disembarkations by Night, and the Movements can begin as soon as it is convenient to the Naval Transport Authorities.
| Unit. | From | To | Personnel. | Vehicles. | Animals. | Stores. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 69th Howitzer Bde. R.F.A. | Mudros | Anzac Cove |
312 | 16 guns, 16 wagons, 4 water carts |
Nil | ||
| ⅓rd City of Glasgow 5" Howitzer Battery |
Helles | Anzac Cove |
78 | 4 guns, 4 wagons, 1 water cart |
Nil | ||
| 10th Heavy Battery R.G.A. | On board ship at Mudros | Anzac Cove |
11 | 4 guns, 4 wagons, 1 water cart 2 G.S. wagons | Nil | I.G.C. has already been instructed to arrange for this move. | |
| One F.A. Bde. (11th division "A" Bde.) | On board ship at Mudros | Anzac Cove |
33 | 16 guns, 32 wagons, telegraph cart 4 water carts | Nil | I.G.C. has already been instructed to arrange for this move. | |
| Reinforcements for Units of A.N.Z.A.C. | Alexandria | Anzac Cove |
7,000 to 8,000 | Nil | Nil | ||
| Mule Corps | Helles | Anzac Cove |
50 | Nil | 200 | By August 1st. | |
| Ammunition Park | Mudros | Anzac Cove |
65 | Nil | Nil | S.A. Ammn. 5,500,000 rounds Mk. VII (a) (225 tons), 760,000 rounds Mk. VI (30 tons) Gun Ammunition (b) 10 pr. 2,700 (19 tons), 18 pr. 5,500 (70 tons), 4.5" How. 1,600 (45 tons), 5" How. 10,000 (330 tons), 6" How. 1,200 (70 tons), 60 pr. 1,000 (30 tons) |
(a) If possible, an additional 3,000,000 S.A.A. should be landed, so that half the reserve for the whole Northern Force may be ashore before operations begin (see Table "C" Remarks).
(b) If possible, the following additional gun ammunition should also be landed, so that the full reserve for the whole Northern Force may be ashore before operations begin:—
| 10 pr. | 3,000 rounds} | |
| 18 pr. | 10,000 rounds} | See Table "C" Remarks. |
| 6" Howitzer | 1,000 rounds} |
TABLE B.
Table showing Units and Details which it is required to Land at Anzac Cove on the Nights of August 3rd/4th, August 4th/5th and August 5th/6th.
| Unit. | From | Date | Personnel. | Vehicles. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 6 Battalions (a), 13th Division | Mudros | Night, August 3rd/4th |
4,650 | Nil | Machine guns and other equipment carried by hand. |
| Bearer Sub-Division, personnel Anzac | Mudros | Night, August 4th/5th |
100 | Nil | Machine guns and other equipment carried by hand. |
| 7 Battalions (a), 13th Division | Mudros | Night, August 4th/5th |
5,425 | Nil | |
| Bearer Sub-Division, I Field Ambulance, 13th Division | Mudros | Night, August 4th/5th |
125 | Nil | |
| 4 Battalions, 10th Division. | Mudros | Night, August 5th/6th |
3,100 | Nil | Machine guns and other equipment carried by hand |
| 29th Indian Brigade and Field Ambulance | Mudros | Night, August 5th/6th |
2,000 | Nil | Ditto |
| Bearer Sub-Divisions, 2 Field Ambulance, 13th Division | Mudros | Night, August 5th/6th |
255 | Nil | |
| 3 Field Companies R.E. (a), 13th Division | Mudros | Night, August 5th/6th |
525 | Nil | Machine guns and other equipment carried by hand |
(a) These units to move from Helles to Mudros as follows:—
| 1 Brigade 1 Field Company | Night, 28th/29th July. |
| 1 Brigade 1 Field Company | Night, 29th/30th July. |
| 1 Brigade 1 Field Company | Night, 30th/31th July. |
TABLE C.
Table showing Units and Details which it is required to Land at New Beach during the Night of August 6th/7th, beginning one Hour after Dark (9.30 p.m.). All Troops will come from Imbros, but Horses will come direct except where otherwise stated.
TABLE D.
Table showing Units and Details which it is required to Land at Anzac Cove beginning at dawn August 7th. Order of Landing as shown. All these Troops will come from Mudros.
| Unit. | Personnel. | Horses. | Vehicles. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Medical personnel, tent sub-divisions A. and N.Z.A.C. Field Ambulance | 900 | Nil | Nil | spare stretchers to be carried by hand. |
| Bearer Sub-Divisions of 1 Field Ambulance, 10th Division. | 125 | Nil | Nil | |
| One 18-pr. Battery and H.Q. F.A. Bde. ("A" Bde.) | 120 | 92 | Nil | |
| 10th Heavy Battery R.G.A. | 110 | 70 | Nil | |
| Three 18-pr. Batteries ("A" Brigade) | 300 | 246 | Nil | Guns and personnel already ashore. (See Tables A and B.) |
| Mules of Mule Corps | * | 400 | Nil | Sufficient personnel to look after mules. |
TABLE E.
Table showing Units to be ready to Land immediately after those shown in Tables A, B, C and D. Units will probably be required in the Order shown either at New Beach or Anzac Cove as circumstances may dictate.
| Unit. | From | Personnel. | Animals | Vehicles. | Remarks. |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Divl. H.Q. 10th Divn. | Mudros | 125 | 28 | 2 limbered R.E. wagons, 1 water cart, 2 cable wagons | |
| 3 Battalions 10th Divn. | Mudros | 2,325 | 40 | 6 water carts | S.A.A. 2,600,000 rounds besides that carrried on the men. |
| 6 Battalions 10th Divn. | Port Iero | 4,650 | 76 | 12 water carts | |
| 3 Field Cos. R.E. 10th Division | — | — | — | — | |
| Bearer Sub-Divisions of 2 Field Amulances, 10th Divn. | Mudros | 250 | — | — | |
| 15th Heavy Battery R.G.A. | On board ship—Mudros | 121 | 70 | 4 guns, 4 wagons, 1 water cart, 2 G.S. wagons | |
| Tent Sub-Division of 10th Divn. | Mudros | 350 | 300 | 150 carts | |
| Mule Corps | Mudros | 150 | 54 horses or 84 mules | 15 ambulance wagons, 12 carts |
General Officer Commanding,
Australian and New Zealand Army Corps.
With reference to your G.288 of 15th July, the Navy is being asked to provide transport for the following ammunition to be landed at Anzac by the 3rd August:—
For A. and N.Z.A.C.—Sufficient S.A.A. to bring the amount on shore up to 500 rounds per rifle and 27,500 per machine-gun.
For other Troops.—300 rounds per rifle and 24,000 rounds per machine-gun (in addition to what the troops will carry on landing).
These will come to 10,000,000 rounds in all, and arrangements are being made to begin landing this ammunition as soon as possible.
2. The following artillery ammunition will also have to be gradually landed and stored, and should all be ashore, if possible, by August 3rd:—
| 10 pr. | 5,700 | rounds |
| 18 pr. (probably 15 per cent. H.E.) | 15,500 | " |
| 4.5-in. Howitzer probably half H.E. | 1,600 | " |
| 5-in. Howitzer majority H.E. | 10,000 | " |
| 6-in. Howitzer majority H.E. | 1,200 | " |
| 60 pr. probably two-thirds H.E. | 1,000 | " |
All of this ammunition is not yet arrived, and the proportion of H.E. shell is not yet ascertainable from England. The arrangements suggested in your paragraph 2 (iii.) of your letter are noted, and will be followed as far as possible.
3. With regard to the marking of ammunition-boxes, the necessary arrangements are being prepared. You will be informed of the arrangements and of the system of marking in due course.
Consignments of Mark VI. and Mark VII. will be sent separately as you suggest.
4. The above figures do not include the periodical replenishment referred to in paragraph 2 (iv.) of your letter. Dispatch of consignments on this account and consignments for the reserve will be notified to you separately.
Enclosed a copy of tables forwarded to Vice-Admiral, showing troops, animals, stores, etc., which the Navy is being asked to land at Anzac.
General Offices Commanding,
9th Corps.
The General Commanding wishes me to send you the following outline of his plans for the next general attack, for the exclusive information of yourself, your Divisional Generals, and such Officers of your Corps Headquarters and Divisional Headquarters as you may consider it necessary to take into your confidence. I am to add that it is Sir Ian's wish that as few officers as possible should be made acquainted with it.
2. The general plan is, while holding as many of the enemy as possible in the southern theatre, to throw the weight of our attack on the Turkish forces now opposite the Australian and New Zealand Army Corps. It is hoped, by means of an attack on the front and right flank of these forces, to deal them a crushing blow, and to drive the remnants south towards Kilid Bahr. It will then be the object of the General Commanding to seize a position across the peninsula from Gaba Tepe to Maidos with a protected line of supply from Suvla Bay.
3. The strength of the enemy north of Kilid Bahr at the present time is about 30,000 men. Of these some 12,000 are permanently maintained in the trenches opposite the Anzac position, and the majority of the remainder are held in reserve at Boghali, Kojadere and Eski-Keui. It is believed that there are about three battalions in the Anafarta villages, a battalion at Ismail Oglu Tepe (New map 1/20,000), a battalion near Yilghin Burnu, and small parties of outposts at Lala Baba (Sq. 104.L.) and Ghazi Baba (Sq. 106.N.). The hills due east of Suvla Bay towards Aji Liman are believed to be held only by a few Gendarmerie, but information on this point is at present not precise. The hills near Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe are known to contain one 4.7-in. gun, one 9.2-in. gun, and three field guns, protected by wire entanglements and infantry trenches, but it is believed that the main defences are against attack from the south or west, and that there is no wire on the northern slopes of the hills; also that the guns can only be fired in a southerly direction.
4. The success of the plan outlined in paragraph 2 will depend on two main factors:—
(a) The capture of Hill 305 (Sq. 93.W.).
(b) The capture and retention of Suvla Bay as a base of operations for the northern army.
5. The operations from within the present Anzac position against the enemy on Hill 305 will be carried out by the Australian and New Zealand Corps, temporarily reinforced by the following units of the 9th Army Corps:—
13th Division (less 66th, 67th and 68th Brigades, R.F.A.).
29th Infantry Brigade (10th Division).
29th Indian Brigade.
69th Howitzer Brigade, R.F.A.
6. The landing near Suvla will be entrusted to you, and you will have at your disposal:—
11th Division.
10th Division (less 29th Brigade).
Highland Mountain Artillery Brigade.
1st/4th Lowland Howitzer Brigade.
The disembarkation of your command, which may be expected to be opposed, though not in great strength, will be after dark at a point immediately south of Lala Baba. The first troops to disembark will be the 11th Division, which will have been concentrated at Imbros previously to the attack, and will be brought across under cover of darkness in destroyers and motor-lighters. It is expected that approximately 4,000 men will be disembarked simultaneously, and that three infantry brigades and the mountain artillery brigade will be ashore before daylight.
Your first objectives will be the high ground at Lala Baba and Ghazi Baba, and the hills near Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe. It will also be necessary to send a small force to secure a footing on the hills due east of Suvla Bay. It is of first importance that Yilghin Burnu and Ismail Oglu Tepe should be captured by a coup-de-main before daylight in order to prevent the guns which they contain being used against our troops on Hill 305 and to safeguard our hold on Suvla Bay. It is hoped that one division will be sufficient for the attainment of these objectives.
Your subsequent moves will depend on circumstances which cannot at present be gauged, but it is hoped that the remainder of your force will be available on the morning of the 7th August to advance on Biyuk Anafarta with the object of moving up the eastern spurs of Hill 305 so as to assist General Birdwood's attack.
7. The operations from within the present Anzac position will begin during the day immediately preceding your disembarkation (the reinforcements for General Birdwood's force having been dribbled ashore in detachments at Anzac Cove on the three previous nights). The operations will begin with a determined attack on the Turkish left centre, Lonesome Pine and Johnston's Jolly (see enlarged map of Anzac position), with the object of attracting the enemy's reserves to this portion of the line. The Turks have for long been apprehensive of our landing in the neighbourhood of Gaba Tepe, and it is hoped that an attack in force in this quarter will confirm their apprehensions. At nightfall the Turkish outposts on the extreme right of the enemy's line will be rushed, and a force of 20,000 men will advance in three or more columns up the ravines running down from Chunuk Bair. This advance, which will begin about the same time as your first troops reach the shore, will be so timed as to reach the summit of the main ridge near Chunuk Bair about 2.30 a.m. (soon after moon-rise).
Latest photographs show that the Turkish trenches on this ridge do not extend further north than Chunuk Bair, and it is unlikely that the higher portions of the ridge are held in great strength.
As soon as a lodgement has been effected on this ridge a portion of the attacking force will be left to consolidate the position gained and the remainder will advance south-west against the enemy's trenches near Baby 700, which will be attacked simultaneously by a special detachment from within the Anzac position.
An advance by your force from the east will, as already indicated in paragraph 6, be of great assistance in the event of this attack being checked.
8. The landing of sufficient transport to secure the mobility of your force will be a matter of considerable difficulty. No animals or vehicles of any kind will be able to land in the first instance, and machine-guns, tools and necessary medical and signalling equipment must be carried by hand. All men will land with two iron rations (one day's meat ration only is advised); infantry will carry 200 rounds S.A.A. and machine-gun sections 3,500 rounds in belt boxes. Packs and greatcoats will not be taken ashore. Before dawn it is hoped to land enough horses to secure the mobility of the mountain artillery brigade and one battery R.F.A., and it is hoped that within the first 24 hours the disembarkation of all the personnel, horses and vehicles enumerated in the attached table will be complete.
One brigade R.F.A. 11th Division, 1/4th Lowland 5th Howitzer Brigade (two batteries) and the 10th Heavy Battery, will be landed at Anzac before the operations commence, and their personnel and horses will disembark on the morning following your disembarkation, and will then be directed along the beach to join your command.
Water is plentiful throughout the Anafarta Valley, but pending the disembarkation of water carts a number of mules with special 8-gallon water bags will be attached to the units of your command.
(Signed) W. P. Braithwaite,
Major-General, C.G.S.,
Mediterranean Expeditionary Force.
P.S.—This letter is never to be out of an officer's possession, and if, as is probable, you require to send it to your Brig.-Gen. G.S., it must be sent to Mudros in charge of an officer.