"War Department, Washington, November 23, 1846.
"Sir: The President several days since communicated in person to you his orders to repair to Mexico to take command of the forces there assembled, and particularly to organize and set on foot an expedition to operate on the Gulf coast, if, on arriving at the theater of action, you shall deem it to be practicable. It is not proposed to control your operations by definite and positive instructions, but you are left to prosecute them as your judgment, under a full view of all the circumstances, shall dictate. The work is before you, and the means provided or to be provided for accomplishing it are committed to you, in the full confidence that you will use them to the best advantage.
"The objects which it is desirable to obtain have been indicated, and it is hoped that you will have the requisite force to accomplish them. Of this you must be the judge when preparations are made and the time for action arrived. Very respectfully,
"Your obedient servant,
"W.L. Marcy, Secretary of War.
"General Winfield Scott."
General Scott was impressed with the belief that Mr. Marcy, the Secretary of War, and Hon. Robert J. Walker, of Mississippi, the Secretary of the Treasury, had the fullest confidence in his ability, and favored giving him the substantial direction of the war. He was also impressed with the kindness and confidence extended to him by President Polk, but on his arrival in New Orleans he was shown a letter from Alexander Barrow, then a Senator in Congress from Louisiana and a personal friend of General Scott, informing him that the President had asked that the grade of lieutenant general be established in the army, and that on the passage of such an act by Congress it was the intention of the President to confer this rank, and consequently the command of the army, upon Thomas H. Benton, then a Senator from Missouri. This was a great shock to General Scott, and he attributed it to political motives. He reasoned this way: "Scott is a Whig; therefore the Democracy is not bound to observe good faith with him. His successes may be turned to the prejudice of the Democratic party. We must, however, profit by his military experience, and if successful, by force of patronage and other helps, continue to crown Benton with the victory, and thus triumph both in the field and at the polls."
He reached the Brazos Santiago, near the mouth of the Rio Grande, in Christmas week, and proceeded from there to Camargo, where he expected to meet General Taylor, but, by some mismanagement or delay, his notification to General Taylor did not reach the latter.
A confidential dispatch from General Scott to General Taylor was opened, read, and freely discussed at headquarters at Monterey. A duplicate was sent forward, but the party in charge of it was killed at Villa Gran and the dispatch delivered to General Santa Anna. Taylor had made a movement toward Tampico, and hence did not receive the first dispatch delivered at Tampico. In the later dispatch General Scott had written him that he might have his choice of two armies—either remain as the commander of Northern Mexico, or accompany General Scott in command of a division toward the City of Mexico, with every assurance in either case of confidence and support.
General Scott anticipated the difficulty of timely concentration of forces off the Brazos large enough to give hope of success. He thought it necessary to have fifteen thousand troops, of which five thousand were to be regulars, and to have the co-operation of the navy. The time named for the concentration was the middle of January, so that the army might reach Vera Cruz by February 1st. He had requested the advice of General Taylor on these matters and all others in regard to the proposed campaign. He had intimated, in a letter of November 15th, that it would be necessary to withdraw a large number of troops from General Taylor, and thus reduce him to the defensive, while he thought it absolutely necessary for success that General Taylor should have a force sufficient to act offensively in the direction of San Luis Potosi. In addition to the volunteers and regulars at Tampico and those moving there, he desired that Worth's division of regulars, Duncan and Taylor's field batteries, a thousand mounted men, and all the volunteer infantry that could be spared be sent to General Taylor, only retaining a force sufficient to hold Monterey and protect his communications to Point Isabel. From New Orleans General Scott had written the Secretary of War that he approved of the rendezvous at Pensacola rather than at Brazos for the ordnance and ordnance stores. He also urged that volunteers be forwarded rapidly to Brazos. Subsequently he wrote the Secretary of War asking that ships with troops and supplies be ordered to Lobos Island. He addressed a letter to General George M. Brooke, commanding at New Orleans, giving detailed orders of what he required of him. He also wrote to Commodore Conner, and made suggestions about joint operations.
Failing to meet General Taylor, as he hoped and endeavored to do, with a view of a full and free conference, he felt compelled to issue orders detaching from the army of the Rio Grande such regular troops as were deemed necessary to lead the volunteers for the capture of Vera Cruz and the move on the capital, leaving General Taylor with a force sufficient to maintain himself at Monterey. He intended, had he seen General Taylor, to advise him to contract his line to the Rio Grande. General Taylor, supported by the authorities in Washington, favored the movement on the City of Mexico from Monterey and via San Luis Potosi, but General Scott had already formulated and determined on the movement which he made with such brilliant success. Orders were accordingly issued from Camargo, January 3, 1847, for the movement of troops from Monterey, and General Scott returned to Brazos Santiago. The embarkation for Vera Cruz was delayed by the non-arrival of the troops from Monterey and want of transportation. The Lobos Islands was selected as the place of rendezvous. This point is one hundred and twenty miles from Vera Cruz. When the greater part of the troops had arrived, they sailed past Vera Cruz and anchored, on March 7th, at Anton Lizardo, from which point it was determined to make the necessary reconnoissances.
General Scott was at this time ignorant of the movement of General Santa Anna toward Monterey, and expected, on landing or attempting to land, to be met by a formidable force of the enemy. On March 9th, the weather proving good, the fleet, consisting of some eighty vessels, including transports, moved up the coast with the naval steamers and five gunboats. General Scott was on board of the Massachusetts, and as she moved up, the troops from the decks of the vessels cheered him with great enthusiasm. The anchorage was made outside the range of the enemy's guns. General Scott had provided sixty-seven surf boats, and in these and some cutters fifty-five hundred men—the boats being steered by sailors furnished by Commodore David Conner—passed the Massachusetts and repeated their cheers to the commanding general. The whole force was landed at half past five in the afternoon, without the loss of a man or a boat and without serious opposition from the enemy. The remainder of the force was soon landed, amounting in all to something less than twelve thousand men.
The following appeared in the New Orleans Bulletin of March 27, 1847: "The landing of the American army at Vera Cruz has been accomplished in a manner that reflects the highest credit on all concerned; and the regularity, precision, and promptness with which it was effected has probably never been surpassed, if it has been equaled, in modern warfare. The removal of a large body of troops from numerous transports into boats in an open sea, their subsequent disembarkation on the sea beach, on an enemy's coast, through a surf, with all their arms and accouterments, without a single error or accident, requires great exertion, skill, and sound judgment.
"The French expedition against Algiers in 1830 was said to be the most complete armament in every respect that ever left Europe; it had been prepared with labor, attention, experience, and nothing had been omitted to insure success, and particularly in the means and facilities for landing the troops. This disembarkation took place in a wide bay, which was more favorable than an open beach directly on the ocean, and (as in the present instance) without any resistance on the part of the enemy; yet only nine thousand men were landed the first day, and from thirty to forty lives were lost by accidents or upsetting of boats; whereas on the present occasion twelve thousand men were landed in one day, without, so far as we have heard, the slightest accident or loss of life."
Both the city and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa were strongly garrisoned and well provisioned. It was General Santa Anna's opinion that the garrison at Vera Cruz and the castle could successfully resist a siege until the annual breaking out of the yellow fever, upon which he depended to cause the withdrawal of the American troops; hence he devoted himself to the collection of troops to advance on General Taylor. General Scott says: "The walls and forts of Vera Cruz in 1847 were in good condition. Subsequent to its capture by the French, under Admiral Baudin and the Prince de Joinville, in 1838, the castle had been greatly extended, almost rebuilt, and its armament about doubled. Besides, the French were allowed to reconnoiter the city and castle and choose their positions of attack without the least resistance, the Mexicans deprecating the war with that nation, and hence ordered not to fire the first gun. Of that injunction the French were aware. When we approached, in 1847, the castle had the capacity to sink the entire American navy." Soon after the landing was effected, General Scott, accompanied by Colonel Joseph G. Totten and other officers of his staff, reconnoitered the land side of the city, the reconnoissance of the water front having been previously made.
The city was now completely invested, and all communication with the interior cut off. A complete blockade had been established by Commodore Conner. Several officers applied to General Scott for the privilege of leading storming parties. They were thanked, but no orders were given. In a meeting with his staff—Colonel Totten, chief engineer; Lieutenant-Colonel Ethan A. Hitchcock, acting inspector general; Captain Robert E. Lee, engineer; and Lieutenant Henry L. Scott, acting adjutant general—General Scott spoke as follows: "We, of course, gentlemen, must take the city and castle before the return of the vomito—if not by head-work, by the slow scientific process of storming, and then escape by pushing the conquest into the healthy interior. I am strongly inclined to attempt the former, unless you can convince me that the other is preferable. Since our thorough reconnaissance, I think the suggestion practicable with a very moderate loss on our part. The second method would no doubt be equally successful, but with the cost of an immense slaughter to both sides, including noncombatants, Mexican men, women, and children, because assaults must be made in the dark, and the assailants dare not lose time in taking and guarding prisoners without incurring the certainty of becoming captives themselves, till all the strongholds of the place are occupied. The horrors of such slaughter as that, with the usual terrible accompaniment, are most revolting. Besides these objections, it is necessary to take into account the probable loss of some two thousand, perhaps three thousand, of our best men in an assault, and I have received but half the number promised me. How, then, could we hope to penetrate in the interior?... For these reasons," I added, quoting literally, "although I know our countrymen will hardly acknowledge a victory unaccompanied by a long butcher's bill (report of dead and wounded), I am strongly inclined—policy concurring with humanity—to forego their loud applause and 'aves vehement' and take the city with the least possible loss of life...."
General Scott's views were fully concurred in by Colonel Totten and others of his staff, and orders were issued for digging the trenches and the establishment of batteries. Very soon all outposts and sentries of the enemy were driven in. General Scott had warned the foreign consuls in the city of his proposed attack and had furnished them safe conducts out of the city, but they had not taken advantage of it. The marines of Commodore Conner's squadron, at his request, were now allowed to join the army, and, under command of Captain Alvin Edson, they were attached to the Third Artillery.
On the morning of the 10th the guns from the castle opened fire, but did very little damage. General Robert Patterson now joined Worth on his left, and extended the line of investment. Small parties of Mexicans were in sight in a valley, and a detachment under command of Colonel Cenovio approached the American camp and opened fire. The only damage done was the wounding of one soldier. General Gideon J. Pillow, with a part of his command and a six-pounder, opened fire on a large stone building occupied by the enemy and known as the magazine. They were soon driven off, and General Pillow advanced and attacked a small force in his front, driving them and occupying the magazine.
Colonels William T. Haskell's and Francis M. Wynkoop's regiments of Tennessee and Pennsylvania volunteers were moved on a small force on the road to Medelin, which retired, and two companies—one of artillery under command of Captain John R. Vinton, and one of infantry under command of Lieutenant A.P. Rogers—seized a point known as the limekiln, where it was proposed to plant a battery. General Twiggs moved on the 11th to extend the line of investment, which was now complete. General Scott then addressed a letter to the commanding officer of the city as follows:
"Headquarters of the Army of the United States of America, Camp Washington, before Vera Cruz,
"March, 23, 1847.
"The undersigned, Major-General Scott, general in chief of the armies of the United States of America, in addition to the close blockade of the coast and port of Vera Cruz previously established by the squadrons under Commodore Conner, of the navy of said States, having more fully invested the said city with an overwhelming army, so as to render it impossible that it should receive from without succor or re-enforcements of any kind, and having caused to be established batteries competent to the speedy destruction of said city, he, the undersigned, deems it due to the courtesies of war in like cases, as well as to the rights of humanity, to summon his Excellency the governor or commander in chief of the city of Vera Cruz to surrender the same to the army of the United States of America, present before the place. The undersigned, anxious to spare the beautiful city of Vera Cruz from the imminent hazard of demolition, its gallant defenders from a useless effusion of blood, and its peaceful inhabitants—women and children inclusive—from the inevitable horrors of a triumphant assault, addresses this summons to the intelligence, the gallantry, the patriotism, no less than the humanity, of his Excellency the governor and commander in chief of Vera Cruz. The undersigned is not accurately informed whether both the city and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa be under the command of his Excellency, or whether each place has its own independent commander; but the undersigned, moved by the considerations adverted to above, may be willing to stipulate that if the city should by capitulation be garrisoned by a part of his troops no missile shall be fired from within the city or from its bastions or walls upon the castle, unless the castle should previously fire upon the city. The undersigned has the honor to tender his distinguished opponent, his Excellency the general and commander in chief of Vera Cruz, the assurance of the high respect and consideration of the undersigned,
Winfield Scott."
To which he received the following reply:
"God and Liberty!"
"Vera Cruz, March 22, 1847.
"To Major-General Scott: The undersigned, commanding general of the free and sovereign State of Vera Cruz, has informed himself of the contents of the note which Major-General Scott, general in chief of the forces of the United States, has addressed to him under date of to-day, demanding the surrender of this place and castle of San Juan de Ulloa, and in answer has to say that the above-named fortress as well as the city depends on his authority; and it being his principal duty, in order to prove worthy of the confidence placed in him by the Government of the nation, to defend both points at all cost, to which he counts upon necessary elements, and will make it good to the last, therefore his Excellency can commence his operations of war in a manner which he may consider most advantageous. The undersigned has the honor to return to the general in chief of the forces of the United States the demonstrations of esteem he may be pleased to honor him with.
"Juan Morales."
The city was garrisoned by a force of three thousand three hundred and sixty officers and men, and the castle had a force of one thousand and thirty, making a total of four thousand three hundred and ninety. It was certainly a brave determination of the Mexicans with this force to resist the formidable foe who had invested them and were ready to attack.
On March 22d, at 4.15 p.m., the mortar batteries opened fire, and from that time the firing was continued without ceasing until the 23d, when it was suspended for a few hours. The fire was returned from the batteries. Fire was also opened on the city from the vessels. Heavy guns having arrived, preparations were made for getting them ashore, but it was prevented by a heavy norther. The norther having subsided on the 23d, six heavy guns and a detachment from the navy were landed. On Commodore Matthew C. Perry's request a place in the trenches was assigned to the navy. On the 24th, Colonel Persifor F. Smith moved out to a small stream called the San Pedro and attacked and drove off a force of the enemy.
On the night of the 24th General Scott received a communication, signed by the British, French, Spanish, and Prussian consuls in Vera Cruz, asking time to permit the neutrals and women and children to withdraw from the city; to which he replied that up to the 23d the communication between the neutrals in Vera Cruz and the neutral ships of war lying off Sacrificios was left open to allow them an exit, and that he had given notice to the consuls. He therefore declined to grant the request unless it was made by the governor and commander in chief of Vera Cruz, accompanied with a proposition to surrender. On the 25th, the six heavy guns, the navy battery, and all the mortars opened fire. General Scott had determined that, if no proposition for surrender was made by the 26th, he would assault the works.
The command of the city having been turned over by General Morales to General Landero, the latter, on the 26th, addressed General Scott as follows:
"I have the honor of transmitting to your Excellency the exposition which has this moment been made to me by the señores consuls of England, France, Spain, and Prussia, in which they solicit that hostilities may be suspended while the innocent families in this place who are suffering the ravages of war be enabled to leave the city, which solicitude claims my support; and considering it in accordance with the rights of afflicted humanity, I have not hesitated to invite your Excellency to enter into an honorable accommodation with the garrison, in which case you will please name three commissioners who may meet at some intermediate point to treat with those of this place upon the terms of the accommodation. With this motive I renew to your Excellency my attentive consideration.
"God reward your Excellency, etc., etc., etc. (on account of the sickness of the commanding general).
"José Juan de Landero."
General Scott notified General Landero that he had appointed Brevet Major-General Worth, of the regular army, Major-General Pillow, of the volunteers, and Colonel Totten, chief of the engineer corps of the army, commissioners on his part to meet a like number to be appointed by General Landero. The latter announced the appointment on his part of Colonels Herrera, Gutierrez de Villa Nueva, and Lieutenant-Colonel Robles. The commissioners met at the Punta de Hornos, and on the 27th agreed upon terms.
The terms of capitulation were in substance that the Mexican troops should march out of the city with the honors of war, should stack their arms and be paroled; that their colors, when lowered, should be saluted. Absolute protection was guaranteed to persons and property in the city. No private building was to be taken or used by the United States forces without previous arrangement and fair compensation. A Mexican historian says: "The sacrifice was consummated, but the soldiers of Vera Cruz received the honor due to their valor and misfortunes—the respect of the conqueror. Not even a look was given them by the enemy's soldiers which could be interpreted into an insult." Five thousand prisoners and four hundred guns were captured, and with a loss of only sixty-seven killed and wounded.
There is scarcely anything in history equal to this achievement of General Scott. Throughout the siege he shared all the dangers and hardships of his troops. He examined in person, aided by his very able staff officers, every detail of works of defense, and gave orders for the firing of the batteries.
One day during the siege General Scott was walking the trenches where a heavy fire of the enemy was directed. Seeing some of the soldiers standing up, General Scott ordered them not to expose themselves. "But, General," said one, "you are exposing yourself." "Oh!" said he, "generals nowadays can be made out of anybody, but men can not be had." The point of this reply is easy to understand. General Worth was appointed commandant and governor of Vera Cruz, with instructions to establish and enforce police regulations, but not to interfere with the functions of the civil magistrates in affairs between Mexicans.
He was authorized and instructed, after conferring with Commodore Perry, to establish a tariff of duties on articles imported, to be applied to the necessities of the sick and wounded of the army and navy and indigent inhabitants of the city of Vera Cruz; this to continue in force until instructions were received from Washington. General Worth, on assuming command, immediately issued an order to the alcalde as follows:
"Arms in possession of citizens to be given into the alcalde's possession and to be reported to headquarters. Drinking saloons to be closed, and not to be reopened hereafter except under special permission. Mexican laws as between Mexicans to be enforced, and justice administered by regular Mexican tribunals. Cases arising between American citizens of the army, or authorized followers of the same, will be investigated by military commissions."
To cover all cases arising by the military occupation of the country, General Scott had issued at Tampico his Martial-Law Order No. 40, and republished it at Vera Cruz. General Worth gave permission to the residents of the city to leave and enter the city freely between daylight and sunset. No duties were imposed on any of the necessaries of life.
On March 30th a combined military and naval expedition was organized to move to Alvarado, Commodore Perry in command of the naval contingent. The army detachment, under General John A. Quitman, consisted of the Georgia, Alabama, and South Carolina infantry, and a squadron of the Second Dragoons under command of Major Benjamin Lloyd Beall, and a section of the Third Artillery under Lieutenant Henry Bethel Judd.
The object of this expedition was to conciliate the inhabitants, and for the purchase of horses, mules, and cattle. Commodore Perry landed there on the 1st of April, followed by the arrival of General Quitman very soon afterward. Many citizens fled on the approach of the troops, and the town was surrendered to the American forces. Twenty-two cannon and some ammunition were captured, and five hundred horses secured by purchase. The troops returned to Vera Cruz, April 6th. A similar expedition for like purposes was undertaken by General Harvey, April 2d, for Antigua. A lieutenant and eight soldiers were captured, and some horses and cattle purchased. On April 3d, Brevet Colonel Henry Wilson, with the First United States Infantry and two companies of volunteers, was assigned to the command of Vera Cruz and the castle of San Juan de Ulloa.
Orders were now issued for an advance of the army on Jalapa, General David E. Twiggs, with the Second Division of regulars, to lead the movement on the 8th, two brigades of volunteers to follow. On the 9th Patterson's division moved, but, for want of transportation, Quitman's brigade, Colonel James H. Thomas, Tennessee mounted regiment, Worth's division, and the siege train were left at Vera Cruz. General Twiggs was notified by General Scott that he had information that General Santa Anna had arrived at Jalapa with six thousand troops, though he [General Scott] regarded the numbers as exaggerated. General Twiggs, on receipt of General Scott's notice, replied that the Mexicans would doubtless endeavor to hold the pass of Cerro Gordo between the National Bridge and Jalapa. Through Mexican sources he had information rating Santa Anna's force at from two thousand to thirteen thousand, and that he expected to arrive on the evening of the 11th at Plan del Rio, the point where the Mexican advance was posted.
General Scott had received information that Generals Patterson and Twiggs had met a strong force of the enemy at Plan del Rio. Worth's division was ordered forward, and Quitman directed to follow in twenty-four hours. General Scott himself now moved out under a cavalry escort.
CHAPTER IX.
General Santa Anna arrives at Cerro Gordo—Engagement at Atalay—General Orders No. 111—Reports from Jalapa—Report of engagement at Cerro Gordo—Occupation of Perote—Account of a Mexican historian—General Santa Anna's letter to General Arroya—Delay of the Government in sending re-enforcements—Danger of communications with Vera Cruz—Troops intended for Scott ordered to General Taylor—Colonel Childs appointed governor of Jalapa—Occupation of Puebla—Arrival of re-enforcements—Number of Scott's force.
General Santa Anna had arrived at Cerro Gordo on April 9th. General Scott, on his arrival, ordered (on the morning of the 11th) reconnoissances to be made on the Mexican left by Captain Robert E. Lee, which were resumed on the 16th. These reconnoissances determined the order of attack, which was to make a demonstration with the commands of Generals Pillow and Shields on the Mexican right, and press the mass of the army on their right. This movement being successful, the enemy's communications would be cut off. In the meantime the Mexicans were busily engaged in greatly strengthening their positions.
General Scott had not intended to attack the enemy in the absence of Worth's division, which had not yet arrived. A movement of Lieutenant Franklin Gardner, re-enforced later by the mounted rifles under Major Edwin Vose Sumner and a battalion of the First Artillery under Lieutenant-Colonel Childs, to occupy a position near the base of the Atalaya, provoked a sharp conflict. General Santa Anna, being at the front, ordered re-enforcements. Colonel Thomas Childs withdrew, having advanced under a misapprehension. The American loss was ninety-seven, killed and wounded. General Scott returned to Plan del Rio and issued the following order:
"Headquarters of the Army,
"Plan del Rio, April 17, 1847.
"General Orders No. 111.
"The enemy's whole line of intrenchments and batteries will be attacked in front, and at the same time turned, early in the day to-morrow, probably before ten o'clock A.M. The second (Twiggs's) division of regulars is already advanced within easy turning distance toward the enemy's line. That division has instructions to move forward before daylight to-morrow and take up position across the national road, in the enemy's rear, so as to cut off a retreat toward Jalapa. It may be re-enforced to-day, if unexpectedly attacked in force, by regiments—one or two—taken from Shields's brigade of volunteers. If not, the two volunteer regiments will march for that purpose at daylight to-morrow morning under Brigadier-General Shields, who will report to Brigadier-General Twiggs in getting up with him, or to the general in chief if he be in advance. The remaining regiments of that volunteer brigade will receive instructions in the course of this day. The first division of regulars (Worth's) will follow the movement against the enemy's left at sunrise to-morrow morning. As already arranged, Brigadier-General Pillow's brigade will march at six o'clock to-morrow morning along the route he has carefully reconnoitered, and stand ready, as soon as he hears the report of arms on our right, or sooner, if circumstances should favor him, to pierce the enemy's line of batteries at such point—the nearer the river the better—as he may select. Once in the rear of that line, he will turn to the right or left, or both, and attack the batteries in reverse; or, if abandoned, he will pursue the enemy with vigor until further orders. Wall's field battery and cavalry will be held in reserve on the national road, a little out of view and range of the enemy's batteries. They will take up that position at nine o'clock in the morning. The enemy's batteries being carried or abandoned, all our divisions and corps will pursue with vigor. This pursuit may be continued many miles toward Jalapa until stopped by darkness or fortified positions; consequently the body of the army will not return to this encampment, but be followed to-morrow afternoon, or early the next morning, by the baggage trains of the several corps. For this purpose the feeble men of each corps will be left to guard its camp and effects, and to load up the latter in the wagons of the corps. A commander of the present encampment will be designated in the course of this day.
"As soon as it shall be known that the enemy's works have been carried, or that the general pursuit has been commenced, one wagon for each regiment and battery and one for the cavalry will follow the movement, to receive, under the direction of medical officers, the wounded and disabled, who will be brought back to this place for treatment in general hospital. The surgeon general will organize this important service, and designate that hospital, as well as the medical officers to be left at it.
"Every man who marches out to attack or pursue the enemy will take the usual allowance of ammunition and subsistence for at least two days.
"By command of Major-General Scott.
"H.L. Scott, Acting Adjutant General."
The engineer train and troops under Lieutenant George Brinton McClellan having arrived, additional batteries were placed in position. General Santa Anna, believing that the Americans would attack his right, made his dispositions accordingly. Following are General Scott's reports of the battle made to the Secretary of War:
"Headquarters of the Army, Plan del Rio,
"Fifty Miles from Vera Cruz, April 19, 1847.
"Sir: The plan of the attack, sketched in General Orders No. 111 herewith, was finely executed by this gallant army before two o'clock p.m. yesterday. We are quite embarrassed with the results of victory—prisoners of war, heavy ordnance, field batteries, small arms, and accouterments. About three thousand men laid down their arms, with the usual proportion of field and company officers, besides five generals, several of them of great distinction—Pinson Jarrero, La Vega, Noryuga, and Obando. A sixth general, Vasque, was killed in defending the battery (tower) in the rear of the line of defense, the capture of which gave us those glorious results.
"Our loss, though comparatively small in number, has been serious. Brigadier-General Shields, a commander of activity, zeal, and talent, is, I fear, if not dead, mortally wounded. He is some five miles from me at this moment. The field of operations covers many miles, broken by mountains and deep chasms, and I have not a report as yet from any division or brigade. Twiggs's division, followed by Shields's (now Colonel Baker's) brigade, are now near Jalapa, and Worth's division is en route thither, all pursuing with good results, as I learn, that part of the Mexican army—perhaps six or seven thousand men—that fled before our right had carried the tower, and gained the Jalapa road. Pillow's brigade alone is near me at this depot of wounded, sick, and prisoners, and I have time only to give from him the names of First-Lieutenant F.B. Nelson and Second-Lieutenant C.G. Gill, both of the Second Tennessee Foot (Haskell's regiment), among the killed, and in the brigade one hundred and six of all ranks killed or wounded. Among the latter the gallant brigadier general himself has a smart wound in his arm, but not disabled; and Major R. Farqueson, Second Tennessee, H.F. Murray, second lieutenant, G.T. Southerland, first lieutenant, W.P. Hale, adjutant, all of the same regiment, severely, and First-Lieutenant W. Yearwood mortally wounded. And I know, from personal observation on the ground, that First-Lieutenant Ewell, of the Rifles, if not now dead, was mortally wounded in entering, sword in hand, the intrenchments around the captured tower. Second-Lieutenant Derby, Topographical Engineers, I saw also at the same place, severely wounded, and Captain Patten, Second United States Infantry, lost his right hand. Major Sumner, Second United States Dragoons, was slightly wounded the day before, and Captain Johnson, Topographical Engineers (now lieutenant colonel of infantry), was very severely wounded in reconnoitering some days earlier. I must not omit to add that Captain Mason and Second-Lieutenant Davis, both of the Rifles, were among the very severely wounded in storming the same tower. I estimate our total loss in killed and wounded may be about two hundred and fifty, and that of the enemy three hundred and fifty. In the pursuit toward Jalapa (twenty-five miles hence) I learn we have added much to the enemy's loss in prisoners, killed, and wounded. In fact, I suppose this retreating army to be nearly disorganized, and hence my haste to follow in an hour or two to profit by events. In this hurried and imperfect report I must not omit to say that Brigadier-General Twiggs, in passing the mountain range beyond Cerro Gordo crowned with the tower, detached from his division, as I suggested the day before, a strong force to carry that height which commanded the Jalapa road at the foot, and could not fail, if carried, to cut off the whole or any part of the enemy's forces from a retreat in any direction. A portion of the First Artillery under the often-distinguished Brevet-Colonel Childs, the Third Infantry under Captain Alexander, the Seventh Infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Plympton, and the Rifles under Major Loring, all under the temporary command of Colonel Harvey, Second Dragoons, during the confinement to his bed of Brevet Brigadier-General P.F. Smith, composed that detachment. The style of execution, which I had the pleasure to witness, was most brilliant and decisive. The brigade ascended the long and difficult slope of Cerro Gordo, without shelter and under the tremendous fire of artillery and musketry, with the utmost steadiness, reached the breastworks, drove the enemy from them, planted the colors of the First Artillery, Third and Seventh Infantry, the enemy's flag still flying, and after some minutes of sharp firing finished the conquest with the bayonet. It is a most pleasing duty to say that the highest praise is due to Harvey, Childs, Plympton, Loring, Alexander, their gallant officers and men, for this brilliant service, independent of the great results which soon followed.
"Worth's division of regulars coming up at this time, he detached Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel C.F. Smith with his light battalion to support the assault, but not in time. The general, reaching the tower a few minutes before me and observing a white flag displayed from the nearest portion of the enemy's lines toward the batteries below, sent out Colonels Harvey and Childs to hold a parley. The surrender followed in an hour or two.
"Major-General Patterson left a sick-bed to share in the dangers and fatigues of the day, and after the surrender went forward to command the advanced forces toward Jalapa. Brigadier-General Pillow and his brigade twice assaulted with great daring the enemy's lines of batteries on our left; and, though without success, they contributed much to distract and dismay their immediate opponents.
"President Santa Anna, with Generals Canalizo and Ampudia, and some six or eight thousand men, escaped toward Jalapa just before Cerro Gordo was carried and before Twiggs's division could reach the national road above. I have determined to parole the prisoners—officers and men—as I have not the means of feeding them here beyond to-day, and can not afford to detach a heavy body of horse and foot, with wagons, to accompany them to Vera Cruz. Our baggage train, though increasing, is not yet half large enough to give an assured progress to this army. Besides, a greater number of prisoners would probably escape from the escort in the long and deep sandy road, with subsistence, ten to one, than we shall find again out of the same body of men in ranks opposed to us. Not one of the Vera Cruz prisoners is believed to have been in the lines at Cerro Gordo. Some six of the officers highest in rank refused to give their paroles, except to go to Vera Cruz, and hence, perhaps, to the United States.
"The small arms and their accouterments being of no value to our army here or at home, I have ordered them to be destroyed, for we have not the means of transporting them. I am also somewhat embarrassed with the many pieces of artillery—all bronze—which we have captured. It would take a brigade and half the mules of this army to transport them fifty miles. A field battery I shall take for service for the army, but the heavy metal must be collected and left here for the present. We have our own siege train and the proper carriages with us.
"Being occupied with the prisoners and all the details of a forward movement, besides looking to the supplies which are to follow from Vera Cruz, I have time to add no more, intending to be at Jalapa early to-morrow. We shall not probably meet with serious opposition this side of Perote, certainly not unless delayed by the want of the means of transportation.
"I have the honor to remain, sir, with high respect, your most obedient servant,
"Winfield Scott.
"P.S.—I invite attention to the accompanying letters to President Santa Anna, taken in his carriage yesterday; also to his proclamation issued on hearing that we had captured Vera Cruz, etc., in which he says: 'If the enemy advance one step more, the national independence will be buried in the abyss of the past.' We have taken that step.
"W.S.
"I make a second postscript, to say that there is some hope, I am happy to learn, that General Shields may survive his wounds. One of the principal motives for paroling the prisoners of war is to diminish the resistance of other garrisons in our march.
"Headquarters of the Army, Jalapa, April 23, 1847.
"Sir: In forwarding the reports of commanders which detail the operations of their several corps against the Mexican lines at Cerro Gordo, I shall present, in continuation of my former report, but an outline of the affair; and while adopting heartily their commendations of the ardor and efficiency of individuals, I shall mention by name only those who figure prominently, or, from position, could not be included in those subreports. The field sketch herewith indicates the position of the two armies. The tierra caliente, or low level, terminates at Plan del Rio, the site of the American camp, from which the road ascends immediately in a long circle among the lofty hills, whose commanding points had all been fortified and garrisoned by the enemy. His right, intrenched, rested on a precipice overhanging an impassable ravine that forms the bed of the stream; and his intrenchments extended continuously to the road, in which was placed a formidable battery. On the other side the lofty and difficult heights of Cerro Gordo commanded the approaches in all directions. The main body of the Mexican army was encamped on level ground, with a battery of five pieces, half a mile in rear of that height toward Jalapa. Resolving, if possible, to turn the enemy's left and attack in rear while menacing or engaging his front, I caused daily reconnoissances to be pushed, with the view of finding a route for a force to debouch on the Jalapa road and cut off retreat. The reconnoissance, begun by Lieutenant Beauregard, was continued by Captain Lee, engineers, and a road made along difficult slopes and over chasms out of the enemy's view; though reached by his fire when discovered, until, arriving at the Mexican lines, further reconnoissance became impossible without action. The desired point of debouchure, the Jalapa road, was not therefore reached, though believed to be within easy distance; and to gain that point it now became necessary to carry the heights of Cerro Gordo. The disposition in my plan of battle—General Orders No. 111, heretofore inclosed—were accordingly made. Twiggs's division, re-enforced by Shields's brigade of volunteers, was thrown into position on the 17th, and was of necessity drawn into action in taking up the ground for its bivouac, and the opposing height for our heavy battery. It will be seen that many of our officers and men were killed or wounded in this sharp combat, handsomely commenced by a company of the Seventh Infantry under Brevet First-Lieutenant Gardner, who is highly praised by all his commanders for signal services. Colonel Harvey, coming up with the Rifle Regiment and First Artillery (also parts of his brigade), brushed away the enemy and occupied the height, on which, in the night, was placed a battery of one twenty-four pounder and two twenty-four-pound howitzers, under the supervision of Captain Lee, engineers, and Lieutenant Hagner, ordnance. These guns opened next morning, and were served with effect by Captain Steptoe and Lieutenant Brown, Third Artillery, Lieutenant Hagner (ordnance), and Lieutenant Seymore, First Artillery. The same night, with extreme toil and difficulty, under the superintendence of Lieutenant Tower, engineer, and Lieutenant Laidley, ordnance, an eight-inch howitzer was put in position across the river and opposite to the enemy's right battery. A detachment of four companies under Major Burnham, New York volunteers, performed this creditable service, which enabled Lieutenant Ripley, Second Artillery, in charge of the piece, to open a timely fire in that quarter.
"Early on the 18th the columns moved to the general attack, and our success was speedy and decisive. Pillow's brigade assaulting the right of the intrenchments, although compelled to retire, had the effect I have heretofore stated. Twiggs's division, storming the strong and vital point of Cerro Gordo, pierced the center, gained command of all the intrenchments, and cut them off from support. As our infantry (Colonel Riley's brigade) pushed on against the main body of the enemy, the guns of their own fort were rapidly turned to play on that force (under the immediate command of General Santa Anna), who fled in confusion. Shields's brigade, bravely assaulting the left, carried the rear battery (five guns) on the Jalapa road and aided materially in completing the rout of the enemy. The part taken by the remainder of our forces held in reserve to support and pursue has already been noticed. The moment the fate of the day was decided, the cavalry and Taylor's and Wall's field batteries were pushed on toward Jalapa in advance of the pursuing columns of infantry. Twiggs's division and the brigade of Shields (now under Colonel Baker) and Major-General Patterson were sent to take command of them. In the hot pursuit many Mexicans were captured or slain before our men and horses were exhausted by the heat and distance.
"The rout proved to have been complete, the retreating army, except a small body of cavalry, being dispersed and utterly disorganized. The immediate consequences have been our possession of this important city, the abandonment of the works and artillery at La Hoya, the next formidable pass between Vera Cruz and the capital, and the prompt occupation by Worth's division of the fortress of Perote (second only to San Juan de Ulloa), with its extensive armament of sixty-six guns and mortars and its large supply of material. To General Worth's report, annexed, I refer for details.
"I have heretofore endeavored to do justice to the skill and courage with which the heights of Cerro Gordo were attacked, naming the regiments most distinguished, and their-commanders, under the lead of Colonel Harney. Lieutenant G.W. Smith led the engineer company as part of the storming force, and is noticed with distinction. The reports of this assault make favorable mention of many in which I can well concur, having, witnessed the daring advance and perfect steadiness of the whole. Besides those already named, Lieutenant Brooks, Third Infantry, Lieutenant Macdonald, Second Dragoons, Lieutenant Vandorn, Seventh Infantry (all acting staff officers), Captain Magruder, First Artillery, and Lieutenant Gardner, Seventh Infantry, seem to have won special praise. Colonel Riley's brigade and Talcott's rocket and howitzer battery were engaged in and about the heights and bore an active part. The brigade so gallantly led by General Shields, and after his fall by Colonel Baker, deserves high commendation for its fine behavior and success. Colonels Foreman, Burnett, and Major Harris commanded the regiments. Lieutenant Hammond, Third Artillery, and Lieutenant Davis, Illinois volunteers, constituted the brigade staff. These operations, hid from my view by intervening hills, were not fully known when my first report was hastily written. Brigadier-General Twiggs, who was in immediate command of all advanced forces, has earned high credit by his judgment, skill, and energy. The conduct of Colonels Campbell, Haskell, and Wynkoop, commanding the regiments of Pillow's brigade, is reported in terms of strong approbation by Major-General Patterson. I recommend for a commission Quartermaster-Sergeant Henry, of the Seventh Infantry (already known to the army for intrepidity on former occasions), who hauled down the national standard of the Mexican fort. In expressing my indebtedness for able assistance—to Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcock, acting inspector general; to Majors Smith and Turnbull, and respective chiefs of engineers and topographical engineers; to their assistant lieutenants, Lieutenants Mason, Beauregard, Stevens, Tower, G.W. Smith, McClellan, engineers, and Lieutenants Derby and Hardcastle, topographical engineers; to Captain Allen, chief quartermaster, and Lieutenant Blair, chief commissary, and to Lieutenants Hagner and Laidley, ordnance, all actively employed—I am compelled to make special mention of the services of Captain R.E. Lee, engineers. This officer greatly distinguished himself at the siege of Vera Cruz, was again indefatigable during these operations, in reconnoissance as daring as laborious, and of the utmost value. Nor was he less conspicuous in planting batteries and in conducting columns to their stations under the heavy fire of the enemy. My personal staff—Lieutenants Scott, Williams, and Lay, and Major Van Buren, who volunteered for the occasion—gave me zealous and efficient assistance. Our whole force present in action and in reserve was eight thousand five hundred. The enemy is estimated at twelve thousand or more. About three thousand prisoners, four or five thousand stands of arms, and forty-three pieces of artillery are taken. By the accompanying return I regret to find our loss more severe than at first supposed, amounting in the two days to thirty-three officers and three hundred and ninety-eight men—in all, four hundred and thirty-one, of whom sixty-three were killed. The enemy's loss is computed to be from one thousand to one thousand two hundred. I am happy in communicating strong hopes of the recovery of the gallant General Shields, who is so much improved as to have been brought to this place.
"Appended to this report are the following papers:
"(A) General return by name of killed and wounded.
"(B) Copies of report of Lieutenant-Colonel Hitchcock, acting inspector general (of prisoners taken), and accompanying papers.
"(C) Report of Brigadier-General Twiggs, and subreports.
"(D) Report of Major-General Patterson and report of brigade commanders.
"(E) Copy of report of Brigadier-General Worth announcing the occupation by his division of the castle and town of Perote without opposition, with an inventory of ordnance there found.
"I have the honor to remain, sir, with high respect, your most obedient servant,
"Winfield Scott."
A Mexican historian gives the following account of the close of the battle: "General Santa Anna, accompanied by some of his adjutants, was passing along the road to the left of the battery, when the enemy's column, now out of the woods, appeared on his line of retreat and fired upon him, forcing him back. The carriage in which he had left Jalapa was riddled with shot, the mules killed and taken by the enemy, as well as a wagon containing sixteen thousand dollars received the day before for the pay of the soldiers. Every tie of command and obedience now being broken among our troops, safety alone being the object, and all being involved in a frightful whirl, they rushed desperately to the narrow pass of the defile that descended to the Plan del Rio, where the general in chief had preceded, with the chiefs and officers accompanying him. Horrid indeed was the descent by that narrow and rocky path, where thousands rushed, disputing the passage, with desperation, and leaving a track of blood upon the road. All classes being confounded, military distinction and respect were lost; and badges of rank became marks of sarcasm that were only meted out according to their grade and humiliation. The enemy, now masters of our camp, turned their guns upon the fugitives, thus augmenting the terror of the multitude that crowded through the defile and pressed forward every instant by a new impulse, which increased the confusion and disgrace of the ill-fated day."
General Scott reports the strength of his army at Cerro Gordo at eight thousand five hundred, the killed and wounded four hundred and thirty-one, of which thirty-three were officers and three hundred and ninety-eight enlisted men. His estimate of the Mexican force was twelve thousand. The prisoners captured were about three thousand, and the killed and wounded between one thousand and twelve hundred. Forty-three cannon and three thousand five hundred small arms were captured. On the morning of the 22d the army moved to and occupied the town and castle of Perote without resistance.
General Santa Anna now retired to Orizaba, where he was met by many distinguished citizens. He addressed a letter to the ad interim President, General Arroya, as follows: