Historical materialism and the economics of Karl Marx

[93] Comment se pose le problème de l'economie pure. Paper read in December 1898 to the Societé Stella.

[94] Giornale degli economisti, March 1900, pp. 216-235.

[95] Rivista di sociologia, III. no. vi., pp. 746-8, see Materialismo Storico, pp. 193-208.

[96] Dr Christian v. Ehrenfels (Professor at Prague University): System der Werttheorie, vol. I, Allgemeine Werttheorie, Psychologie des Begehrens, Leipzig, Reisland, 1897; vol. II, Grundzüge einer Ethik, the same, 1898.

[97] Pareto answered this letter in the same journal, Giornale degli economisti, August, 1900, pp. 139-162.

[98] I have before me Professor A. Graziadei's article Intorno alla teoria edonistica del valore. (In Riforma Sociale, September 15th, 1900); in which A. fails to see how the purist theory of value dovetails in with the doctrines of Psychophysics and Psychology. I can well believe it! Psychophysics and Psychology are natural sciences and cannot throw light on economic fact which is mental and of value. I may be allowed to point out, that, even three years ago, I gave a warning against the confusion of economics with psychology. (See in this volume pp. 72-75.) He who appeals to psychology (naturalistic) in order to understand economic fact, will always meet with the delusion, opportunely shown up by Graziadei. I have stated the reasons owing to which economics cannot dwell where the psychologists and hedonists say; now Graziedei has questioned the door-keepers (Fechner, Wundt, etc.), and has learnt that it does not dwell there. Well and good!

[99] Camillo Trivero, La teoria dei bisogni, Turin, Bocca, 1900, pp. 198. Trivero means by need 'the condition of a being, either conscious or unconscious (man, animal, plant, thing), in which it cannot remain': so that it can be said 'that all needs are ultimately condensed into the supreme need or end of being or becoming.' Need for him is hence actual reality itself. But since, on the other hand, he declares that he does not wish to solve nor even to consider the philosophical problem, it is hard to understand what a theory of needs (i.e. of reality) can be, and for what reason he goes back to such generalities.

It is true that Trivero believes that, by going back to the general concept of need, he can establish the parent theory on which rest the particular doctrines of needs; and amongst them economics, which concerns itself with economic needs. If there are species—he says—we ought to determine of what genus they are species. But he will allow me to remark that the genus to look for is, as logic teaches, the proximate genus. To jump to such a great distance as to reality or to fact, would only lead to the noble discovery: that economic needs are part of reality, are a group of facts.

And what he does is to make an equally valuable discovery: that the true theory of history is the theory of needs, which, granted his definition of needs, is as much as to say that history is history of reality and the theory of it is—the theory.

I have then no objection to make to the meaning which Trivero wishes to give to the word need; but I must assert that, having given it this meaning, he has not afterwards constructed the theory of anything, nor thrown light on any special group of facts.

For real economic theory his book is quite useless. Economists do not recognise the needs of things and plants and animals, but only human needs, or those of man in so far as he is homo oeconomicus and hence a conscious being. I too believe that it is right to work out philosophically the principle of economics; but in order to do this, Trivero should have studied economic science. He declares that 'he does not want to hold fast to anyone's petticoats.' This statement is superfluous if it means that each individual ought to base his own scientific convictions on reason and not on authority. It is dangerous if it signifies, on the contrary, an intention to spare himself the trouble of studying other people's books, and of reconstructing everything from the beginning by his own personal efforts and by the aid of general culture alone. The result obtained—being far from satisfactory—should deter the author (who will not grumble at my plain speaking), from returning to this unfruitful method in the future.

[100] Pareto answers this second letter in the Giornale degli economisti, February, 1901, pp. 131-138.