Arnold was ordered to bring up the siege train, manned by the 1st Indiana heavy artillery, and Houston to provide entrenching tools and siege materials. When all the siege artillery was in position there were forty pieces, of which six were 8-inch sea-coast howitzers on siege carriages, eight 24-pounders, seven 30-pounder Parrotts, four 6-inch rifles, four 9-inch Dahlgren guns, four 8-inch mortars, three 10-inch mortars, and four 13-inch mortars. To these were added twelve light batteries of sixty pieces, namely, six 6-pounder Sawyer rifles, two 10-pounder Parrotts, twenty-six 12-pounder Napoleons, two 12-pounder howitzers, twelve 3-inch rifles, and twelve 20-pounder Parrotts. The Dahlgren guns were served by a detachment of fifty-one men from the Richmond and seventeen from the Essex, under Lieutenant-Commander Edward Terry, with Ensign Robert P. Swann, Ensign E. M. Shepard, and Master's Mates William R. Cox and Edmund L. Bourne for chiefs of the gun divisions.
In the course of the next few days the eight regiments that had been left on the Teche and the Atchafalaya rejoined the army before Port Hudson, coming by way of Brashear, Algiers, and the river. This gave to the cavalry under Grierson one more regiment, the 41st Massachusetts, now mounted, and henceforth known as the 3d Massachusetts cavalry, the three troops of the old 2d battalion being merged in it; Weitzel got back the 114th New York; Paine recovered the 4th Massachusetts and the 16th New Hampshire of Ingraham's brigade, now practically broken up; and Grover the 22d Maine and 90th New York of Dwight's brigade, the 52d Massachusetts of Kimball's, and the 26th Maine of Birge's, while losing the 41st Massachusetts by its conversion into a mounted regiment. The 16th New Hampshire, however, had suffered so severely during its six week's confinement in the heart of the pestilential swamp that it was reduced to a mere skeleton, without strength either numerical or physical. It was easy to see that officers and men alike were suffering from some aggravated form of hepatic disorder, due to malarial poison. Many were added to the sick-report every day. Few that went to the regimental or general hospital returned to duty, while of the men called well all were yellow, emaciated, and restless, or so drowsy that the sentries were found asleep on their posts at noonday. This unfortunate regiment was therefore taken from the front and set to guard the general ammunition depot, near headquarters. Without being once engaged in battle, so that it had not a single gunshot wound to report, the 16th New Hampshire suffered a loss by disease during its seven months' service in Louisiana of 5 officers and 216 men—in all, 221; and nearly the whole of this occurred in the last two months. This regiment was replaced in Paine's division by the 28th Connecticut, from Pensacola.
Dwight was now given the command of Sherman's division, relieving Nickerson, who had assumed command the morning after the assault of the 27th. Dow being disabled by his wounds, his brigade fell to Clark. The 2d Louisiana was transferred from Dudley's brigade to Chapin's, bringing Charles J. Paine in command. Halbert E. Paine's division was withdrawn from the earlier formation of the right wing under Weitzel, and was established in position on Grover's left, covering the Jackson road and the second position of Duryea's battery at No. 12. Grover was placed in command, from the afternoon of the 27th, of the whole right wing, but Dwight's brigade, under Morgan, remained with Weitzel as part of a temporary division under his command, Thomas retaining the command of Weitzel's brigade. Finally, the 162d New York and the 175th New York were temporarily taken from Paine and lent to Dwight, who, directly after the 14th of June, united them with the 28th Maine of Sherman's division to form a temporary 2d brigade. At the same time he transferred the 6th Michigan to Nickerson's brigade, evidently meaning to take the command of the 1st brigade from Clark; but these arrangements were promptly set aside by orders from headquarters. The left wing, comprising Augur's division and Sherman's, now Dwight's, was placed under the command of Augur.
Along the whole front the troops now held substantially the advanced positions they had gained on the 27th of May. This shortened the line, and, as it was on the whole better arranged and the connections and communications better, Augur took ground a little to the left and held, with Charles J. Paine's brigade, a part of the field that had been in Sherman's front on the 27th; while Dwight, in closing up and drawing in his left flank, moved nearer to the river and covered the road leading in a southerly direction from the Confederate works around the eastern slope of Mount Pleasant and past Troth's house.
The cavalry, being of no further use to the divisions, but rather an encumbrance upon them, was massed, under Grierson, behind the centre, and assigned to the duty of guarding the rear, the depots, and the communications against the incursions of the Confederate cavalry, under Logan, known to be hovering between Port Hudson and Clinton, and supposed to be from 1,500 to 2,000 strong. Logan's actual force at this time was about 1,200 effective. Grierson had about 1,700, including his own regiment, the 6th Illinois, the 7th Illinois, Colonel Edward Prince, a detachment of the 1st Louisiana, the 3d Massachusetts cavalry, and the 14th New York.
As fast as the engineers were able to survey the ground and the working parties to open the roads, Arnold and Houston chose with great care the positions for the siege batteries, and heavy details were soon at work upon them, as well as upon the long line of rifle-pits, connecting the batteries and practically forming the first parallel of the siege works. The positions of some of these batteries, especially on the left, were afterward changed; but as finally constructed and mounted, they began at the north, near the position of the colored regiments on the right bank of Foster's Creek, and extended, at a distance from the Confederate works varying from six hundred to twelve hundred yards, to the Mount Pleasant road, across which was planted siege battery No. 21. The first position of siege battery No. 20 is marked "old 20," and the three formidable batteries on the extreme left, Nos. 22, 23, and 24, were not established till later, the attack of the Confederate works in their front being at first left to the guns of the fleet. Two epaulements for field artillery were thrown up on either side of the road at Foster's Creek to command the passage of the stream, but no siege guns were mounted there. The extreme right of the siege batteries was at No. 2.
While all eyes were turned upon the siege works and every nerve strained for their completion, Logan's presence in the rear, though at no time so hurtful as might fairly have been expected, was a continual source of anxiety and annoyance. To find out just what force he had and what he was about, Grierson moved toward Clinton on the morning of the 3d of June with the 6th and 7th Illinois, the old 2d Massachusetts battalion, now merged in the 3d, a squadron of the 1st Louisiana, two companies of the 4th Wisconsin, mounted, and one section of Nims's battery. Grierson took the road by Jackson, and, when within three miles of that place, sent Godfrey, with 200 men of the Massachusetts and Louisiana cavalry, to ride through the town, while the main column went direct to Clinton. Godfrey pushing on briskly through Jackson, captured and paroled, after the useless fashion of the time, a number of prisoners, and rejoined the column two miles beyond. When eight miles west of Clinton, Grierson heard a report that Logan had gone that morning toward Port Hudson, but pushing on toward Clinton, after crossing the Comite Grierson found Logan's advance and drove it back on the main body, strongly posted on Pretty Creek. A three hours' engagement followed, resulting in Grierson's retirement to Port Hudson, with a loss of 8 killed, 28 wounded, and 15 missing; 3 of the dead and 7 of the wounded falling into the hands of the enemy. Logan reports his loss as 20 killed and wounded, and claims 40 prisoners. Among the killed, unfortunately, was the young cavalry officer, Lieutenant Solon A. Perkins, of the 3d Massachusetts, whose skill and daring had commended itself to the notice of Weitzel during the early operations in La Fourche, and whose long service without proper rank had drawn out the remark: "This Perkins is a splendid officer, and he deserves promotion as much as any officer I ever saw."
Banks determined to chastise Logan for this; accordingly, at daylight on the morning of the 5th of June, Paine took his old brigade under Fearing, with the 52d Massachusetts, the 91st New York, and two sections of Duryea's battery, and preceded by Grierson's cavalry, marched on Clinton by way of Olive Branch and the plank road. That night Paine encamped at Redwood creek; on the 6th he made a short march to the Comite, distant nine miles from his objective, and there halted till midnight. Then, after a night march, the whole force entered Clinton at daylight on the morning of the 7th, only to find that Logan, forewarned, had gone toward Jackson. Then Paine countermarched to the Comite, and, remaining till sunset, marched that evening to Redwood, and, there going into bivouac, at two o'clock on the following morning, the 8th of June, returned to the lines before Port Hudson. On this fruitless expedition the men and horses suffered severely from the heat, and there were many cases of sunstroke.
By the 1st of June the artillery and the sharp-shooters of the besieged had obtained so complete a mastery over the guns of the defenders, that on the whole line these were practically silent, if not silenced. In part, no doubt, this is to be ascribed to a desire on the part of the Confederate artillerists to reserve their ammunition for the emergency, yet something was also due to the effect of the Union fire, by which, in the first week, twelve heavy guns were disabled. The 10-inch columbiad in water battery 4 was dismounted at long range. This gun was known to the Union soldiers, and perhaps to the Confederates first, as the "Lady Davis," and great was the dread awakened by the deep bass roar and the wail of the big shells as they came rolling down the narrow pathway, or searched the ravines where the men lay massed. The fire of the navy also did great damage among the heavy batteries along the river front. When the siege batteries were nearly ready, on the evening of the 10th of June, Banks ordered a feigned attack at midnight by skirmishers along the whole front, for the purpose, as stated in the orders, "of harassing the enemy, of inducing him to bring forward and expose his artillery, acquiring a knowledge of the ground before the enemy's front, and of favoring the operations of pioneers who may be sent forward to remove obstructions if necessary." None of these objects can be said to have been accomplished, nor was any advantage gained beyond a slight advance of the lines, at a single point on Weitzel's front, by the 131st New York. The full loss in this night's reconnoissance is not known; in Weitzel's own brigade, there were 2 killed, 41 wounded, 6 missing—in all, 49; in Morgan's, a partial report accounts for 12 wounded and 59 missing, including two companies of the 22d Maine that became entangled and for the moment lost in the ravines.
On the evening of the 12th of June, all arrangements being nearly complete, Banks ordered a vigorous bombardment to be begun the next morning. Punctually at a quarter past eleven on the morning of the 13th, every gun and mortar of the army and navy that could be brought to bear upon the defences of Port Hudson opened fire, and for a full hour kept up a furious cannonade, limited only by the endurance of the Union guns and gunners, for the Confederates hardly ventured to reply, save at first feebly. When the bombardment was at its fiercest, more than one shell in a second could be seen to fall and explode within the narrow circuit of the defences visible from the headquarters on the field. The defenders had three heavy guns dismounted during the day, yet suffered little loss in men, for long before this nearly the whole garrison had accustomed themselves to take refuge in their caves and "gopher-holes" at the first sound of Union cannon, and to await its cessation as a signal to return to their posts at the parapet. They were not always so fortunate, however, for more than once it happened that three or four men were killed by the bursting of a single shell.
When the hour was up the cannonade ended as suddenly as it began, and profound silence followed close on the intolerable din. Then Banks sent a flag of truce summoning the garrison to surrender in these words: "Respect for the usages of war and a desire to avoid unnecessary sacrifice of life, impose on me the necessity of formally demanding the surrender of the garrison at Port Hudson. I am not unconscious, in making this demand, that the garrison is capable of continuing a vigorous and gallant defence. The events that have transpired during the pending investment exhibit in the commander and garrison a spirit of constancy and courage that, in a different cause, would be universally regarded as heroism. But I know the extremities to which they are reduced. . . . I desire to avoid unnecessary slaughter, and I therefore demand the immediate surrender of the garrison, subject to such conditions only as are imposed by the usages of civilized warfare." To this Gardner replied: "My duty requires me to defend this position, and therefore I decline to surrender."
In the evening the generals of division met in council at headquarters. In anticipation of what was to come, Dudley had already been ordered to send the 50th Massachusetts, and Charles J. Paine the 48th Massachusetts, to Dwight; and Dudley himself, with the 161st and 174th New York, was to report to Grover. This left under Augur's immediate command only five regiments of his division, namely, one, the 30th Massachusetts, of Dudley's brigade, and four of C. J. Paine's. Shortly before midnight a general assault was ordered for the following morning. At a quarter before three Augur was to open a heavy fire of artillery on his front, following it up half and hour later by a feigned attack of skirmishers. Dwight was to take two regiments, and, with a pair of suborned deserters for guides, was to try and find an entrance on the extreme left of the works near the river. But the main attack was to be made by Grover on the priest-cap. Its position is shown on the map at XV. and XVI., and the approach was to be from the cover of the winding ravine, near the second position of Duryea's battery, at No. 12. The artillery cross-fire at this point was to begin at three o'clock, and was to cease at a signal from Grover. At half-past three the skirmishers were to attack. The general formation of each of the two columns of attack had been settled in orders issued from headquarters on the morning of the 11th. Each column, assumed to consist of about 2,000 men, was to be preceded and covered by 300 skirmishers; immediately behind the skirmishers were to be seventy pioneers, carrying thirty-five axes, eighteen shovels, ten pickaxes, two handsaws, and two hatchets; next was to come the forlorn hope, or storming party, of 300 men, each carrying a bag stuffed with cotton; following the stormers, thirty-four men were to carry the balks and chesses to form a bridge over the ditch, in order to facilitate the passage of the artillery, as well as of the men. The main assaulting column was to follow, marching in lines-of-battle, as far as the nature of the ground would permit, which, as it happened, was not far. The field-artillery was to go with the assaulting column, each battery having its own pioneers. To the cavalry, meanwhile, was assigned the work of picketing and protecting the rear, as well as of holding the telegraph road leading out of Port Hudson toward Bayou Sara, by which it was thought the garrison might attempt to escape, on finding their lines broken through, or even to avoid the blow.
As was the uniform custom during the siege, all watches at division and brigade headquarters were set at nine o'clock, by a telegraphic signal, to agree with the adjutant-general's watch.
These final orders for the assault bear the hour of 11.30 P.M. This was in fact the moment at which the earliest copies were sent out by the aides-de-camp, held in readiness to carry them. There were seven hundred and fifty words to be written, and eleven o'clock had already passed when the council listened to the reading of the drafts and broke up. From the lateness of the hour, as well as from the distance and the darkness of the night, it resulted that one o'clock came before the last orders were in the hands of the troops that were to execute them. Many arrangements had still to be carried out and many of the detachments had still to be moved over long distances and by obscure ways to the positions assigned to them. In some instances all that was left of the night was thus occupied, and it was broad daylight before every thing was ready.
A dense fog prevailed in the early morning of Sunday, the 14th of June, strangely veiling, while it lasted, even the sound of the big guns, so that in places it was unheard a hundred yards in the rear. Punctually at the hour fixed the cannonade opened. It was an hour later, that is to say, about four o'clock, when the first attack was launched.
For the chief assault Grover had selected Paine's division and had placed the main body of his own division with Weitzel's brigade, in close support. Paine determined to lead the attack himself. Across his front as skirmishers he deployed the 4th Wisconsin, now again dismounted, and the 8th New Hampshire. The 4th Massachusetts was told off to follow the skirmishers with improvised hand-grenades made of 6-pounder shells. Next the 38th Massachusetts and the 53d Massachusetts were formed into line of battle. At the head of the infantry column the 31st Massachusetts, likewise deployed, carried cotton bags, to fill the ditch. The rest of Gooding's brigade followed, next came Fearing's, then Ingraham's under Ferris. In rear of the column was posted the artillery under Nims. At a point on the crest of the ridge, ninety yards distant from the left face of the priest-cap, Paine's advance was checked. Then Paine, who had previously gone along the front of every regiment, addressing to each a few words of encouragement and of preparation for the work, passed afoot from the head of the column to the front of the skirmish line, and exerting to the full his sonorous voice, gave the order to the column to go in. At the word the men sprang forward, but almost as they did so, the Confederates behind the parapet in their front, with fairly level aim and at point-blank range, poured upon the head of the column a deadly volley. Many fell at this first discharge; among them, unfortunately, the gallant Paine himself, his thigh crushed by a rifle-ball. Some of the men of the 4th Wisconsin, of the 8th New Hampshire, and of the 38th Massachusetts gained the ditch, and a few even climbed the parapet, but of these nearly all were made prisoners. The rear of the column fell back to the cover of the hill, while all those who had gained the crest were forced to lie there, exposed to a pitiless fire of sharp-shooters and the scarcely more endurable rays of the burning sun of Louisiana, until night came and brought relief. In this unfortunate situation the sufferings of the wounded became so unbearable, and appealed so powerfully to the sympathy of their comrades, that many lives were risked and some lost in the attempt to alleviate the thirst, at least, of these unfortunates. Two men, quite of their own accord, took a stretcher and tried to reach the point where Paine lay, but the attempt was unsuccessful, and cost both of them their lives. These heroes were E. P. Woods, of Company E of the 8th New Hampshire, and John Williams, of Company D, 31st Massachusetts. Not less nobly, Patrick H. Cohen, a private soldier of the 133d New York, himself lying wounded on the crest, cut a canteen from the body of a dead comrade and by lengthening the strap succeeded in tossing it within reach of his commander; this probably preserved Paine's life, for unquestionably many of the more seriously hurt perished from the heat and from thirst on that fatal day.
It was about seven o'clock, and the fog had lifted, when Weitzel advanced to the attack on the right face of the priest-cap. The 12th Connecticut and the 75th New York of his own brigade were deployed to the left and right as skirmishers to cover the head of the column. Two regiments of Morgan's brigade, loosely deployed, followed the skirmishers; in front the 91st New York, with hand-grenades, and next the 24th Connecticut, every man carrying two cotton bags weighing thirty pounds each. In immediate support came the remainder of Weitzel's brigade in column of regiments, in the order of the 8th Vermont, 114th New York, and 160th New York, followed by the main body of Morgan's brigade. Birge was in close support and Kimball in reserve. Finally, in the rear, as in Paine's formation, was massed the artillery of the division.
Toward the north face of the priest-cap the only approach was by the irregular, but for some distance nearly parallel, gorges cut out from the soft clay of the bluffs by Sandy Creek and one of its many arms. The course of these streams being toward the Confederate works, the hollows grew deeper and the banks steeper at every step. At most the creeks were but two hundred yards apart, and the ridge that separated them gave barely standing room. Within a few feet of the breastworks the smaller stream and its ravine turned sharply toward the north and served as a formidable ditch until they united with the main stream and ravine below the bastion. This larger ravine near its outlet and the natural ditch throughout its length were mercilessly swept by the fire of the bastion on the right, the breastworks in front, and the priest-cap on the left. The smaller ravine led toward the south to the crest from which Paine's men had recoiled, where their wounded and their dead lay thick, and behind which the survivors were striving to restore the broken formations.
Weitzel therefore chose the main ravine. Bearing to the right from the Jackson road, the men moved by the flank and cautiously, availing themselves of every advantage afforded by the timber or the irregularities of the ground, until they gained the crest of the ridge at points varying from twenty to fifty yards from the works near the north face of the priest-cap. In advancing to this position the column came under fire immediately on filing out of the ravine and the wood in front of the position of battery No. 9. Then, in such order as they happened to be, they went forward with a rush and a cheer, but beyond the crest indicated few men ever got. From this position it was impossible either to advance or retire until night came.
At the appointed hour Dwight sent the 6th Michigan, under Lieutenant-Colonel Bacon, and the 14th Maine, to the extreme left to make an attempt in that quarter, the arrangements for which have been already described; but either Dwight gave his orders too late, or the column mistook the path, or else the difficulties were really greater than they had been thought beforehand or than they afterward seemed, for nothing came of it. Then recalling this detachment to the Mount Pleasant road, Dwight tried to advance in that direction. The 14th Maine was sent back to its brigade and Clark deployed his own regiment, the 6th Michigan, as skirmishers, supported by the 128th New York, now commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel James Smith. The 15th New Hampshire followed and the 26th Connecticut, under Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Selden, brought up the rear. These two regiments went forward in column of companies on the main road, but as the Confederates immediately opened a heavy artillery fire upon the head of the column, they had to be deployed. However, the ground, becoming rapidly narrower, did not long permit of an advance in this order, so that it soon became necessary to ploy once more into column. About 350 yards from the outer works the Mount Pleasant road enters and crosses a deep ravine by a bridge, then destroyed. The hollow was completely choked with felled timber, through which, under the heavy fire of musketry and artillery, it was impossible to pass; so here the brigade stayed till night enabled it to retire. Nickerson's brigade supported the movement of Clark's, but without becoming seriously engaged. Thus ended Dwight's movement. It can hardly be described as an assault, as an attack, or even as a serious attempt to accomplish any valuable result; yet indirectly it was the means of gaining, and at a small cost, the greatest, if not the only real, advantage achieved that day, for it gave Dwight possession of the rough hill, the true value of which was then for the first time perceived, and on the commanding position of its northern slope was presently mounted the powerful array of siege artillery that overlooked and controlled the land and water batteries on the lower flank of the Confederate defences.
Of Augur's operations in the centre, it is enough to say that the feigned attack assigned to this portion of the line was made briskly and in good order at the appointed time, without great loss.
The result of the day may be summed up as a bloody repulse; beholding the death and maiming of so many of the bravest and best of the officers and men, the repulse may be even termed a disaster. In the whole service of the Nineteenth Army Corps darkness never shut in upon a gloomier field. Men went about their work in a silence stronger than words.
On this day 21 officers and 182 men were killed, 72 officers and 1,245 men were wounded, 6 officers and 180 men missing; besides these, 13 were reported as killed, 84 as wounded, and 2 as missing without distinguishing between officers and men, thus making a total of 216 killed, 1,401 wounded, 188 missing—in all, 1,805. Among the wounded many had received mortal hurts, while of the missing, as in the first assault, many must now be set down as killed.
Paine, as we have seen, fell seriously hurt while in the very act of leading his division to the assault. Nine days earlier he had received his well-earned commission as brigadier-general. He was taken to New Orleans, and there nine days later, at the Hôtel de Dieu Hospital, after vain efforts to save the limb, the surgeons performed amputation of the thigh. A few days after the surrender, in order to avoid the increasing dangers of the climate, Paine was sent to his home in Wisconsin on the captured steamer Starlight, the first boat that ascended the river. Thus the Nineteenth Corps lost one of its bravest and most promising commanders, one who had earned the affection of his men, not less through respect for his character than by his unfailing sympathy and care in all situations, and who was commended to the confidence and esteem of his associates and superiors by talent and devotion of the first order joined to every quality that stamps a man among men.
The fiery Holcomb, wounded in the assault of the 27th, yet refusing to leave his duty to another, fell early on this fatal morning at the head of his regiment and brigade, in the first moment of the final charge of Weitzel's men. This was another serious loss, for Holcomb had that disposition that may, for want of a better term, be described as the fighting character. All soldiers know it and respect it, and every wise general, seeing it anywhere among his officers, shuts his eyes to many a blemish and pardons many a fault that would be severely visited in another; yet in Holcomb there was nothing to overlook or forgive. As he was the most prominent and the most earnest of the few officers of the line that to the last remained eager for the fatal assault, so he was among the earliest and noblest of its victims.
Mortally wounded at the head of Weitzel's brigade fell Colonel Elisha B. Smith, of the 114th New York. Barely recovered from a serious illness, his spirit could not longer brook the restraint of the hospital at New Orleans with the knowledge that his men were engaged with the enemy. Thomas was ill and had received a slight wound of the scalp; this brought Smith to the head of the brigade; his fall devolved the command upon Lieutenant-Colonel Van Petten, for though Thomas, unable to bear the torture inflicted upon him by the sounds of battle, rose from his sick-bed and resumed the command, his weakness again overcame him when the day's work was done.
No regiment at Port Hudson approached the 8th New Hampshire in the number and severity of its losses, no brigade suffered so much as Paine's, to which this regiment belonged, and no division so much as Emory's, under the command of Paine. On this day, Fearing commanded the brigade, and later the division, and Lull having fallen in the previous assault, the regiment went into action 217 strong, led by Captain William M. Barrett; of this number, 122, or 56 per cent., were killed or wounded. On the 27th of May, out of 298 engaged, the regiment lost 124, or 41 per cent.
Next to the 8th New Hampshire on the fatal roll stands the 4th Wisconsin. This noble regiment, at all times an honor to the service and to its State, whence came so many splendid battalions, was a shining monument to the virtue of steady, conscientious work and strict discipline applied to good material. Bean had been instantly killed by a sharp-shooter on the 29th of May; the regiment went into action on the 14th of June 220 strong, commanded by Captain Webster P. Moore; of these, 140 fell, or 63 per cent. In the first assault, however, it had fared better, its losses numbering but 60.
The eccentric Currie, who came to the service from the British army, with the lustre of the Crimea still about him, rather brightened than dimmed by time and distance, fell severely wounded on the same fatal crest. He was struck down at the head of his regiment, boldly leading his men and urging them forward with the quaint cry of "Get on, lads!" so well known to English soldiers, yet so unfamiliar to all Americans as to draw many a smile, even in that grim moment, from those who heard it.
To the cannonade that preceded the assault and announced it to the enemy must be attributed not only the failure but a great part of the loss. The wearied Confederates were asleep behind the breastworks when the roar of the Union artillery broke the stillness of the morning, and gave them time to make ready. Such was their extremity that in Grover's front they burned their last caps in repelling the final assault, and, for the time, were able to replenish only from the pouches of the fallen.
Under cover of night all the wounded that were able to walk or crawl made their way to places of safety in the rear; while, disregarding the incessant fire of the sharp-shooters, heavy details and volunteer parties of stretcher-bearers, plying their melancholy trade, carried the wounded with gentle care to the hospitals and the dead swiftly to the long trenches. The proportion of killed and mortally wounded, already unusually heavy, was increased by the exposure and privations of the long day, while many, whom it was impossible to find or reach during the night, succumbed sooner or later during the next forty-eight hours. For although when, on the morning of the 15th, Banks sent a flag of truce asking leave to send in medical and hospital supplies for the comfort of the wounded of both armies, Gardner promptly assented, and in his reply called attention to the condition of the dead and wounded before the breastworks, yet it was not until the evening of the 16th that Banks could bring himself to ask for a suspension of hostilities for the relief of the suffering and the burial of the slain. But three days and two nights had already passed; most of the hurt, and these the most grievously, were already beyond the need of succor. The same thing had already occurred at Vicksburg.
The operations at Vicksburg and Port Hudson were so far alike in their character and objects that no just estimate of the events at either place can well be formed without considering what happened at the other. In this view it is instructive to observe that Grant assaulted the Confederate position at Vicksburg within a few hours after the arrival of his troops in front of the place, on the afternoon of the 19th of May, when two determined attacks were easily thrown off by the defenders, with a loss to their assailants of 942 men. On the 22d of May Grant delivered the second assault, in which about three fourths of his whole effective force of 43,000 of all arms were engaged. The full corps of Sherman and McPherson, comprising six divisions, were repulsed by four brigades of the garrison, numbering probably 13,000 effectives. In this second assault Grant's loss was 3,199. These are the reasons he gives for his decision to attack:
"Johnston was in my rear, only fifty miles away, with an army not much in inferior in numbers to the one I had with me, and I knew he was being reinforced. There was danger of his coming to the assistance of Pemberton, and, after all, he might defeat my anticipations of capturing the garrison, if, indeed, he did not prevent the capture of the city. The immediate capture of Vicksburg would save sending me the reinforcements which were so much wanted elsewhere, and would set free the army under me to drive Johnston from the State. But the first consideration of all was—the troops believed they could carry the works in their front, and they would not have worked so patiently in their trenches if they had not been allowed to try."
Having tried, he now "determined upon a regular siege—to 'outcamp the enemy,' as it were, and to incur no more losses. The experience of the 22d convinced officers and men that this was best, and they went to work on the defences and approaches with a will."(1)
It has also to be remembered, in any fair and candid consideration of the subject, that at this comparatively early period of the war even such bloody lessons as Fredericksburg had not sufficed to teach either the commanders or their followers on either side, Federal or Confederate, the full value, computed in time, of even a simple line of breastworks of low relief, or the cost in blood of any attempt to eliminate this value of time by carrying the works at a rush. Indeed, it may be doubted whether, from the beginning of the war to the end, this reasoning, in spite of all castigations that resulted from disregarding it, was ever fully impressed upon the generals of either army, although at last there came, it is true, a time when, as at Cold Harbor, the men had an opinion of their own, and chose to act upon it. It is also very questionable whether earthworks manned by so much as a line of skirmishers, prepared and determined to defend them, have ever been successfully assaulted save as the result of a surprise. Sedgwick's captures of the Rappanhannock redoubts and of Marye's Heights have indeed been cited as instances to the contrary, yet on closer consideration it is apparent that although in the former case the Confederates had been looking for an attack, they had given up all expectation of being called on to meet it that day, when, just at sunset, Russell fell suddenly upon them and finished the affair handsomely before they had time to recover. Marye's Heights, again, may be described as a moral surprise, for no Confederate officer or man that had witnessed the bloody repulse of Burnside's great army on the very same ground, but a few weeks before, could have expected to be called on so soon to meet the swift and triumphant onset of a single corps of that army. Moreover, Sedgwick's tactical arrangements were perfect.
The truth is, the insignificant appearance of a line of simple breastworks has almost always caused those general and staff-officers especially that viewed them through their field-glasses, with the diminishing power of a long perspective, to forget that an assault upon an enemy behind entrenchments is not so much a battle as a battue, where one side stands to shoot and the other goes out to be shot, or if he stops to shoot it is in plain sight of an almost invisible foe. European examples, as usual misapplied or misunderstood, have contributed largely to the persistency of this fatal illusion, and Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajos have served but as incantations to confuse many a mind to which these sounding syllables were no more than names; ignorant, therefore, of the stern necessities that drove Wellington to these victories, forgetful of their fearful cost, and above all ignoring or forgetting the axiom, on which rests the whole art and science of military engineering—that the highest and stoutest of stone walls must yield at last to the smallest trench through which a man may creep unseen. Vast, indeed, is the difference between an assault upon a walled town, delivered as a last resort after crowning the glacis and opening wide the breach, and any conceivable movement, though bearing the same name, made as the first resort, against earthworks of the very kind whereby walled towns are taken, approached over ground unknown and perhaps obstructed.
Even so, in the storm of Rodrigo the defenders struck down more than a third of their own numbers; Badajos was taken by a happy chance after the main assault had miserably failed; at both places the losses of the assailants were in proportion less, and in number but little greater, than at Port Hudson; yet, in the contemplation of the awful slaughter of Badajos, even the iron firmness of Wellington broke down in a passion of tears.
(1) "Personal Memoirs of U. S. Grant," pp. 530, 532.
CHAPTER XVIII. UNVEXED TO THE SEA.
With that quick appreciation of facts that forms so large a part of the character of the American soldier, even to the extent of exercising upon the fate of battles and campaigns an influence not always reserved for considerations derived from a study of the principles of the art of war, the men of the Army of the Gulf had now made up their minds that the end sought was to be attained by hard work on their part and by starvation on the part of the garrison. Criticism and denunciation, by no means confined to those officers whose knowledge of the art of war is drawn from books, have been freely passed upon this peculiarity, yet both alike have been wasted, since no proposition can be clearer than that a nation, justly proud of the superior intelligence of its soldiers, cannot expect to reap the full advantage of that intelligence and at the same time escape every disadvantage attending its exercise. Among these drawbacks, largely overbalanced by the obvious gains, not the least is the peculiar quality that has been aptly described in the homely saying, "They know too much." When, therefore, the American volunteer has become a veteran, and has reached his highest point of discipline, endurance, and the simple sagacity of the soldier, it is often his way to stay his hand from exertions that he deems needless and from sacrifices that he considers useless or worse than useless, although the same exertions and the same sacrifices would, but a few months earlier in the days of his inexperience, have been met by him with the same alacrity that the ignorant peasant of Europe displays in obeying the orders of his hereditary chief in the service of the king.
After the 14th of June the siege progressed steadily without farther attempt at an assault. This was now deferred to the last resort. At four points a system of comparatively regular approaches was begun, and upon these labor was carried on incessantly, night and day; indeed, as is usual with works of this character, the greatest progress was made in the short hours of the June nights. The main approach led from Duryea's battery No. 12 toward the priest-cap, following the winding of the ravines and the contour of the hill. When at last the sap had, with great toil and danger, been carried to the crest facing the priest-cap, and only a few yards distant, the trench was rapidly and with comparative ease extended toward the left, in a line parallel with the general direction of the defences. The least distance from this third parallel, as it was called by an easy stretch of the language, to the enemy's parapet was about twenty yards, the greatest about forty-five.
About two hundred yards farther to the right of the elbow of the main sap, a zigzag ran out of the ravine on the left flank of Bainbridge's battery, No. 8, toward the bastion. Upon this approach, because of its directness, the use of the sap-roller, or some equivalent for it, could never be given up until the ditch was gained.
From the extreme left, after the northern slope of Mount Pleasant had been gained, a main approach was extended from the flank of Roy's battery of 20-pounder Parrotts, No. 20, almost directly toward the river, until the trench cut the edge of the bluff, forming meanwhile a covered way that connected all the batteries looking north from the left flank. Of these No. 24 was the seventeen-gun battery, including two 9-inch Dahlgrens removed from the naval battery of the right wing, and commanded by Ensign Swann. On the 2d of July, Lieutenant-Commander Terry took command of the Richmond and turned over the command of the right naval battery to Ensign Shepard. These "blue-jacket" batteries, with their trim and alert gun crews, were always bright spots in the sombre line. From the river bank the sap ran with five stretches of fifty or sixty yards, forming four sharp elbows, to the foot and well up the slope of the steep hill on the opposite side of the ravine, where the Confederates had constructed the strong work known to both combatants as the Citadel. From the head of the sap to the nearest point of the Confederate works the distance was about ninety-five yards.
From the ravine in front of the mortar battery of the left wing, No. 18, a secondary approach was carried to a parallel facing the advanced lunette, No. XXVII., and distant from it 375 yards. The object of this approach was partly to amuse the enemy, partly to prevent his breaking through the line, now drawn out very thin, and partly also to serve as a foothold for a column of attack in case of need.
From the ravine near Slaughter's house a zigzag, constructed by the men of the 21st Maine, under the immediate direction of Colonel Johnson, led to the position of battery No. 16, where were posted the ten guns of Rails and Baines. The distance from this battery to the defences was four hundred yards.
On the 15th of June, on the heels of the bloody repulse of the previous day, Banks issued a general order congratulating his troops upon the steady advance made upon the enemy's works, and expressed his confidence in an immediate and triumphant issue of the contest:
"We are at all points on the threshold of his fortifications," the order continues. "Only one more advance, and they are ours!
"For the last duty that victory imposes, the Commanding General summons the bold men of the corps to the organization of a storming column of a thousand men, to vindicate the flag of the Union, and the memory of its defenders who have fallen! Let them come forward!
"Officers who lead the column of victory in this last assault may be assured of the just recognition of their services by promotion; and every officer and soldier who shares its perils and its glory shall receive a medal to commemorate the first great success of the campaign of 1863 for the freedom of the Mississippi. His name will be placed in General Orders upon the Roll of Honor."
Colonel Henry W. Birge, of the 13th Connecticut, at once volunteered to lead the stormers, and although the whole project was disapproved by many of the best officers and men in the corps, partly as unnecessary and partly because they conceived that it implied some reflection upon the conduct of the brave men that had fought and suffered and failed on the 27th and the 14th, yet so general was the feeling of confidence in Birge that within a few days the ranks of the stormers were more than filled. As nearly as can now be ascertained, the whole number of officers who volunteered was at least 80; of enlisted men at least 956. Of these, 17 officers and 226 men belonged to the 13th Connecticut. As the different parties offered and were accepted, they were sent into camp in a retired and pleasant spot, in a grove behind the naval battery on the right. On the 15th of June Birge was ordered to divide his column into two battalions, and to drill it for its work. On the 28th this organization was complete. The battalions were then composed of eight companies, but two companies were afterwards added to the first battalion. To Lieutenant-Colonel Van Petter, of the 160th New York, Birge gave the command of the first battalion, and to Lieutenant-Colonel Bickmore, of the 14th Maine, that of the second battalion. On that day, 67 of the officers and 826 men—in all, 893, were present for duty in the camp of the stormers. Among those that volunteered for the forlorn hope but were not accepted were 54 non-commissioned officers and privates of the 1st Louisiana Native Guards, and 37 of the 3d. From among the officers of the general staff and staff departments that were eager to go, two were selected to accompany the column and keep up the communication with headquarters and with the other troops; these were Captain Duncan S. Walker, assistant adjutant-general, and Lieutenant Edmund H. Russell, of the 9th Pennsylvania Reserves, acting signal officer.
Then the officers and men quietly prepared themselves for the serious work expected of them. Those that had any thing to leave made their wills in the manner sanctioned by the custom of armies, and all confided to the hands of comrades the last words for their families or their friends.
Meanwhile an event took place, trifling in itself, yet accenting sharply some of the more serious reasons that had, in the first instance, led Banks to resist the repeated urging to join Grant with his whole force, and afterward had formed powerful factors in determining him to deliver and to renew the assault. Early on the morning of the 18th of June a detachment of Confederate cavalry rode into the village of Plaquemine, surprised the provost guard, captured Lieutenant C. H. Witham and twenty-two men of the 28th Maine, and burned the three steamers lying the bayou, the Sykes, Anglo-American, and Belfast. Captain Albert Stearns, of the 131st New York, who was stationed at Plaquemine as provost marshal of the parish, made his escape with thirteen men of his guard. The Confederates were fired upon by the guard and lost one man killed and two wounded. In their turn they fired upon the steamboats, and wounded two of the crew. Three hours later the gunboat Winona, Captain Weaver, came down from Baton Rouge, and, shelling the enemy, hastened their departure. In the tension of greater events, little notice was taken at the moment of this incident; yet it was not long before it was discovered that the raiders were the advance guard of the little army with which Taylor was about to invade La Fourche, intent upon the bold design of raising the siege of Port Hudson by blockading the river and threatening New Orleans.
Thus Banks was brought face to face with the condition described in his letter of the 4th of June to Halleck:
"The course to be pursued here gives me great anxiety. If I abandon Port Hudson, I leave its garrison, some 6,000 or 7,000 men, the force under Mouton and Sibley, now threatening Brashear City and the Army of Mobile, large or small, to threaten or attack New Orleans. If I detach from my command in the field a sufficient force to defend that city, which ought not to be less than 8,000 or 10,000, my assistance to General Grant is unimportant, and I leave an equal or larger number of the enemy to reinforce Johnston. If I defend New Orleans and its adjacent territory, the enemy will go against Grant. If I go with a force sufficient to aid him, my rear will be seriously threatened. My force is not large enough to do both. Under these circumstances, my only course seems to be to carry this post as soon as possible, and then to join General Grant. If I abandon it I cannot materially aid him."
Taylor's incursion caused Banks some anxiety and appreciable inconvenience, without, however, exercising a material influence on the fortunes of the siege; accordingly, it will be better to reserve for another chapter the story of this adventure.
About the same time, Logan again became troublesome. At first he seems to have thought of retiring on Jackson, Mississippi; but this Johnston forbade, telling him to stay where he was, to observe and annoy the besiegers, and if pressed by too strong a force, to fall back only so far as necessary, hindering and retarding the advance of his assailants. By daylight, on the morning of the 15th of June, Logan dashed down the Clinton road, surprised the camp of the 14th New York cavalry, who made little resistance, and the guard of the hospital at the Carter House, who made none. In this raid Logan took nearly one hundred disabled prisoners, including six officers, and carried off a number of wagons. However, finding Grierson instantly on his heels, Logan promptly "fell back as far as necessary." On the evening of the 30th of June, while hovering in the rear of Dwight, Logan captured and carried off Brigadier-General Dow, who, while waiting for his wound to heal, had taken up his headquarters in a house some distance behind the lines. At daylight, on the morning of the 2d of July, Logan surprised the depot at Springfield Landing, guarded by the 162d New York, Lieutenant-Colonel Blanchard, and a small detachment of the 16th New Hampshire, under Captain Henry. Careless picket duty was the cause, and a great stampede the consequence, but Logan hardly stayed long enough to find out exactly what he had accomplished, since he reports that, besides burning the commissary and quartermasters' stores, he killed and wounded 140 of his enemy, captured 35 prisoners, fought an entire brigade, and destroyed 100 wagons, with a loss on his part of 4 killed and 10 wounded; whereas, in fact, the entire loss of the Union army was 1 killed, 11 wounded, 21 captured or missing, while the stores burned consisted of a full supply of clothing and camp and garrison equipment for about 1,000 men. The wagons mentioned by Logan were part of a train met in the road, cut out, and carried off as he rapidly rode away, and the number may be correct.
The end of June was now drawing near, and already the losses of the besiegers in the month of constant fighting exceeded 4,000. At least as many more were sick in the hospitals, while the reinforcements from every quarter barely numbered 3,000. There were no longer any reserves to draw from; the last man was up. The effective strength of all arms had at no time exceeded 17,000.(1) Of these less than 12,000 can be regarded as available for any duty directly connected with the siege, and now every day saw the command growing smaller in numbers, as the men fell under the fire of the sharp-shooter, or succumbed to the deadly climate, or gave out exhausted by incessant labor and privation. The heat became almost insupportable, even to those who from time to time found themselves so fortunate as to be able to snatch a few hours' rest in the dense shade of the splendid forest, until their tour of duty should come again in the trenches, where, under the June sun beating upon and baking all three surfaces, the parched clay became like a reverberating furnace. The still air was stifling, but the steam from the almost tropical showers was far worse. Merely in attempting to traverse a few yards of this burning zone many of the strongest men were sunstruck daily. The labor of the siege, extending over so wide a front, pressed so severely upon the numbers of the besieging army, always far too weak for such an undertaking in any climate at any season, above all in Louisiana in June, that the men were almost incessantly on duty, either in digging, as guards of the trenches, as sharp-shooters, or on outpost service; and as the number available for duty grew smaller, and the physical strength of all that remained in the ranks daily wasted, the work fell the more heavily. When the end came at last the effective force, outside of the cavalry, hardly exceeded 8,000, while even of this small number nearly every officer and man might well have gone on the sick-report had not pride and duty held him to his post.
This will seem the less remarkable when it is remembered that the garrison during the same period suffered in the same proportion, while from like causes less than a year before Breckinridge had, in a much shorter time, lost the use of half his division. Butler's experience had been nearly as severe.
To the suffering and labors that are inseparable from any operation in the nature of a siege were added insupportable torments, the least of which were vermin. As the summer days drew out and the heat grew more intense, the brooks dried up; the creek lost itself in the pestilential swamp; the wells and springs gave out; the river fell, exposing to the almost tropical sun a wide margin of festering ooze. The mortality and the sickness were enormous.
The animals suffered in their turn, the battery horses from want of exercise, the train horses and mules from over-work, and all from the excessive heat and insufficiency of proper forage. There was never enough hay; the deficiency was partly eked out by making fodder of the standing corn, but this resource was quickly exhausted, and after the 3d of July, when Taylor sealed the river by planting his guns below Donaldsonville, all the animals went upon half or quarter rations of grain, with little hay or none. At length, for two or three days, the forage depots fairly gave out; the poor beasts were literally starving when the place fell, nor was it for nearly a week after that event that, by the raising of Taylor's blockade below and the arrival of supplies from Grant above, the stress was wholly relieved.
The two colored regiments, the 1st and 3d Louisiana Native Guards, besides strongly picketing their front, were mainly occupied, after the 27th of May, in fatigue duty in the trenches on the right. While the army was in the Teche country, Brigadier-General Daniel Ullmann had arrived at New Orleans from New York, bringing with him authority to raise a brigade of colored troops. With him came a full complement of officers. A few days later, on the 1st of May, Banks issued, at Opelousas, an order, which he had for some time held in contemplation, for organizing a corps of eighteen regiments of colored infantry, to consist, at first, of five hundred men each. These troops were to form a distinct command, to which he gave the name of the Corps d'Afrique, and in it he incorporated Ullmann's brigade. By the end of May Ullmann had enrolled about 1,400 men for five regiments, the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, and 10th. These recruits, as yet unarmed and undrilled, were now brought to Port Hudson, organized, and set to work in the trenches and upon the various siege operations.
About the same time the formation of a regiment of engineer troops was undertaken, composed of picked men of color, formed in three battalions of four companies each, under white officers carefully chosen from among the veterans. The ranks of this regiment, known as the 1st Louisiana engineers, were soon recruited to above a thousand; the strength for duty was about eight hundred. Under the skilful handling of Colonel Justin Hodge it rendered valuable service throughout the siege.
Company K of the 42d Massachusetts, commanded by Lieutenant Henry A. Harding, had for some months been serving as pontoniers, in charge of the bridge train. During the siege it did good and hard work in all branches of field engineering under the immediate direction of the Chief Engineer.
While at Opelousas, Banks had applied to Halleck to order Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone to duty in the Department of the Gulf. Stone had been without assignment since his release, in the preceding August, from his long and lonely imprisonment in the casemates of the harbor forts of New York, and, up to this moment, every suggestion looking to his employment had met the stern disapproval of the Secretary of War. Even when in the first flush of finding himself at last at the top notch of his career, Hooker, in firm possession, as he believed, of the post he had long coveted, as commander of the Army of the Potomac, had asked for Stone as his Chief of Staff, the request had been met by a flat refusal. A different fate awaited Banks's application. On the 7th of May Halleck issued the orders asked for, and in the last days of the month Stone reported for duty before Port Hudson. At first Banks was rather embarrassed by the gift he had solicited, for he saw that he himself was falling into disfavor at Washington; the moment was critical; and it was easy to perceive how disaster, or even the slightest check, might be magnified in the shadows of Ball's Bluff and Fort Lafayette. Moreover, Stone was equally unknown to and unknown by the troops of the Nineteenth Army Corps. Instead, therefore, of giving him the command of Sherman's division, for which his rank indicated him, Banks kept Stone at headquarters without special assignment, and made every use of his activity, as well as of his special knowledge and ready skill in all matters relating to ordnance and gunnery.
On the evening of the 26th of June a strange thing happened. While it was yet broad daylight Colonel Provence of the 16th Arkansas, posted in rear of the position of battery XXIV, discovering and annoyed by the progress made on battery 16 in his front, sent out, one at a time, two bold men, named Mieres and Parker, to see what was going on. After nightfall, on their report, he despatched thirty volunteers, under Lieutenant McKennon, to drive off the guard and the working party and destroy the works. The position was held by the advance guard of the 21st Maine, under Lieutenant Bartlett, who, for some reason hard to understand, ordered his men not to fire. The Arkansas party, therefore, accomplished its purpose, without further casualty than having one man knocked down, as he was leaping the parapet of the trench, by a soldier who happened to consider his orders as inapplicable to this method of defence. Then Major Merry, with the reserves of the 21st, coming promptly to the rescue, easily drove out the enterprising assailants, with whom went as prisoners Lieutenant Bartlett and five of his men, with fourteen muskets that had not been fired.(2)
As the saps in front of Bainbridge's and Duryea's batteries drew every day nearer to the bastion and the priest-cap, the working parties were harassed and began to be greatly delayed by the unceasing fire of the Confederate sharp-shooters. Moreover, in spite of the vigilance of the sharp-shooters in the trenches, their adversaries had so much the advantage of ground that they were able to render the passage of certain exposed points of the approaches slow and hazardous. At first, cotton bales were used to protect the head of the sap, but these the adventurous enemy set alight with blazing arrows or by sallies of small parties under cover of darkness. In the short night it was impossible to raise a pile of sand-bags high enough to overlook the breastworks. Toward the end of June this was changed in a single night by the skill and ingenuity of Colonel Edward Prince, of the 7th Illinois cavalry.
Happening to be at headquarters when the trouble was being talked about, he heard an officer suggest making use of the empty hogsheads at the sugar-house; how to get them to the trenches was the next question. This he promptly offered to solve if simply ordered to do it and left to himself. Cavalry had never been of any use in a siege, he said; it was time for a change. The order was instantly given. Prince swung himself into the saddle and rode away. Before daylight his men had carried through the woods and over the hills to the mouth of the sap, opposite the southern angle of the priest-cap, enough sugar hogsheads to make two tiers. The heads had been knocked in, a long pole thrust through each hogshead, and thus slung, it was easy for two mounted troopers to carry it between them. Quietly rolled into position by the working parties and rapidly filled with earth, a rude platform erected behind for the sharp-shooter to mount upon, with a few sand-bags thrown on top to protect his head,—this was the beginning of the great trench cavalier, whose frowning crest the astonished Confederates awoke the next morning to find towering high above their heads. Afterwards enlarged and strengthened, it finally dominated the whole line of defence not only in its immediate front, but for a long distance on either side.
Not less ingenious was the device almost instinctively resorted to by the artillerists for the safety of the gunners when, after the siege batteries opened, the Confederate sharp-shooters began picking off every head that came in sight. The first day saw a number of gunners stricken in the act of taking aim, an incident not conducive to deliberation or accuracy on the part of their successors at the guns. The next sunrise saw every exposed battery, from right to left, protected by a hinged shutter made of flat iron chiefly taken from the sugar troughs, covered with strips of rawhide from the commissary's, the space stuffed tight with loose cotton, and a hole made through all, big enough for the gunner's eye, but too small for the sharp-shooter's bullet. Such was substantially the plan simultaneously adopted at three or four different points and afterwards followed everywhere. The remedy was perfect.
On the 3d of July arrangements were made for the daily detail of a brigade commander to act as General of the Trenches during a tour of twenty-four hours, from noon to noon. His duties were to superintend the siege operations, to post the guards of the trenches, to repulse sorties, and to protect the works. The works to be constructed were indicated and laid out by the Chief Engineer, whose duties, after the 17th of June, when Major Houston fell seriously ill, were performed by Captain John C. Palfrey, aided and overlooked by General Andrews, the Chief of Staff. Daily, at nine o'clock in the morning, the General of the Trenches and the Chief Engineer made separate reports to headquarters of everything that had happened during the previous day. Each of these officers made five reports, yet of the ten but two are to be found printed among the Official Records. These are the engineer's reports of work done on the 5th and 6th of July. They contain almost the only details of the siege to be gathered from the record, notwithstanding the fact that every paper, however small, or irregular in size or form, or apparently unimportant in substance, that related in any way to the military operations of the Army of the Gulf was carefully preserved on the files of its Adjutant-General's office, where, for safety as well as convenience, documents of this character were kept separate from the ordinary files covering matters of routine and requiring to be handled every day or hour. The proof is strong that these important records were in due time delivered into the custody of the War Office, where, for a considerable period after the close of the war, little or no care seems to have been taken of the documents thus turned in by the several Corps and Departments, as these were discontinued; and although the care and management of the War Records division of the Adjutant-General's Office at Washington has, from its earliest organization, been such as to deserve the highest admiration, yet many of these papers are not to be found there. The probability is that they were either mislaid or else swept away and destroyed before this office was organized.
Palfrey's report for the 5th of July shows the left cavalier finished and occupied, and the right cavalier nearly finished, but constantly injured by a 24-pounder gun that had so far escaped destruction by the artillery of the besiegers. The sap in front of Bainbridge's battery, No. 8, was advanced about twenty yards during this day, and the parallel in front of the priest-cap extended to the left eleven yards; work was greatly retarded by a heavy rain in the night. The mine was so far advanced that a shaft was begun to run obliquely under the salient, this course being chosen instead of the usual plan of a vertical shaft with enveloping galleries, as shorter in time and distance, although more dangerous.
On the 6th the sap was pushed forward forty-two feet, and the parallel carried to the left sixty-nine feet. The mine shaft, begun the day before, was carried about twenty-seven feet underground, directly toward the salient. The cavaliers were finished.
During the 7th, although there is no report for that day, the shaft for the mine under the priest-cap was finished, the chamber itself excavated and charged with about twelve hundred pounds of powder, and the mine tamped with sand-bags. The mine on the left had been ready for some days; it was now charged with fifteen hundred pounds of powder and tamped.
Heavy thunder-storms, accompanied by warm rain, had been frequent of late, and the night dews had been at times heavy. Accordingly it was thought best not to trust so delicate an operation as the explosion of the mines to the chance of a damp fuse. Daybreak on the 9th of July having been set as the hour for the simultaneous explosion of the mines, to be instantly followed by one last rush through the gaps, Captain Walker was sent on the evening of the 7th, to the Richmond to ask for dry fuses from the magazines of the Navy.
Meanwhile events were moving rapidly to an end. In the early morning of Tuesday, the 7th, the gunboat General Price came down the river bringing the great news that Vicksburg had surrendered to Grant on the 4th of July. Commodore Palmer, on board the Hartford, was the first to receive the news, but for some reason it happened that signal communication was obstructed or suspended between the Hartford and headquarters, so that it was not until a quarter before eleven that Colonel Kilby Smith, of Grant's staff, delivered to Banks the welcome message of which he was the bearer.
In less time than it takes to tell, an aide-de-camp was on his way to the General of the Trenches bearing the brief announcement, "Vicksburg surrendered on the 4th of July." This note, written upon the thin manifold paper of the field order-books, the General of the Trenches was directed to wrap securely around a clod of clay —the closest approach to a stone to be found in all the lowlands of Louisiana—and toss it over into the enemy's works. At the same time the good news was sped by wire and by staff officers to the commanders of divisions. At noon a national salute was to be fired and all the bands were to play the national airs; but the men could not wait for these slow formalities. No sooner was the first loud shout of rejoicing heard from the trenches, where for so many weary nights and days there had been little to rejoice at, than by a sort of instinct the men of both armies seem to have divined what had happened. From man to man, from company to company, from regiment to regiment, the word passed, and as it passed, once more the cheers of the soldiers of the Union rang out, and again the forest echoed with the strains of "The Star-Spangled Banner" from the long-silent bands. Many a rough cheek, unused to tears, was wet that morning, and the sound of laughter was heard from many lips that had long been set in silence; but when the first thrill was spent, it gave way to a deep-drawn sigh of relief. The work was done; all the toil and suffering was over. Nor was this feeling restricted to the outside of the parapet; the defenders felt it even more strongly. At first they received the news with real or affected incredulity. An officer of an Arkansas regiment, to whom was first handed the little scrap of tissue paper on which the whole chapter of history was told in seven words, acknowledged the complement by calling back, "This is another damned Yankee lie!" Yet before many minutes were over the firing had died away, save here and there a scattering exception, although peremptory orders were even given to secure its renewal. In spite of everything the men began to mingle and to exchange story for story, gibe for gibe, coffee for corn-beer, and when night fell there can have been few men in either army but believed the fighting was over.
That evening Gardner summoned his commanders to meet him in council.
Among them all there was but one thought—the end had come.
Shortly after half-past twelve the notes of a bugle were heard on the Plains Store road sounding the signal, "Cease firing." A few seconds later an officer with a small escort approached, bearing a lantern swung upon a long pole, with a white handkerchief tied beneath it, to serve as a flag of truce. At the outpost of Charles J. Paine's brigade the flag was halted and its purpose ascertained. This was announced to be the delivery of an important despatch from Gardner to Banks. Thus it was that a few minutes after one o'clock the hoofs of two horses were heard at the same instant at headquarters, yet each with a sound of its own that seemed in keeping with its story. One, a slow and measured trot, told of duty done and stables near; the other, quick and nervous, spoke of pressing news. Two officers dismounted; the clang of their sabres was heard together; together they made their way to the tent where the writer of these lines lay awake and listening. One was Captain Walker, with the fuse, the other was Lieutenant Orton S. Clark, of the 116th New York, then attached to the staff of Charles J. Paine. The long envelope he handed in felt rough to the touch; the light of a match showed its color a dull gray; every inch of it said, "Surrender."
When opened it was found to contain a request for an official assurance as to the truth of the report that Vicksburg had surrendered. If true, Gardner asked for a cessation of hostilities with a view to consider terms. At a quarter-past one Banks replied, conveying an exact copy of so much of Grant's despatch as related the capitulation of Vicksburg. He told when and how the despatch had come, and wound up by regretting that he could not consent to a truce for the purpose indicated. In order to avoid all chance of needless excitement or disturbance, as well as of the premature publication of the news, the Adjutant-General carried this despatch himself, and, accompanied by Lieutenant Clark, as well as, at his own request, by General Stone, rode first to Augur's headquarters to acquaint him with the news and to borrow a bugler, and then to the outposts to meet the Confederate flag of truce. A blast upon the bugle brought back the little party of horsemen, with the lantern swaying from the pole; but it was nearly daylight before they again returned with Gardner's reply. Meanwhile, right and left word had been quietly passed to the pickets to cease firing.
In his second letter Gardner said:
"Having defended this position so long as I deem my duty requires, I am willing to surrender to you, and will appoint a commission of three officers to meet a similar commission, appointed by yourself, at nine o'clock this morning, for the purpose of agreeing upon and drawing up the terms of surrender, and for that purpose I ask a cessation of hostilities. Will you please designate a point outside of my breastworks where a meeting shall be held for this purpose?"
To this Banks answered at 4:30 A.M.:
"I have designated Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone, Colonel Henry W. Birge, and Lieutenant-Colonel Richard B. Irwin as the officers to meet the commission appointed by you. They will meet your officers at the hour designated at a point near where the flag of truce was received this morning. I will direct that all active hostilities shall entirely cease on my part until further notice for the purpose stated."
The division commanders, as well as the commanders of the upper and lower fleets, were at once notified, and at six o'clock Captain Walker was sent to find Admiral Farragut, wherever he might be, and to deliver to him despatches conveying the news of the surrender, outlining Banks's plans for moving against Taylor in La Fourche, and urging the Admiral to send all the light-draught gunboats at once to Berwick Bay.
Banks meant to march Weitzel directly to the nearest landing, which was within the lines of Port Hudson, as soon as the formal capitulation should be accomplished, and to send Grover after him as fast as steamboats could be found. This called for many arrangements; the occupying force had also to be seen to; and finally, it was necessary that the starving garrison should be fed. Colonel Irwin was therefore relieved, at his own request, from duty as one of the commissioners, and Brigadier-General Dwight was named in his stead. This drew an objection from Weitzel, who naturally felt that there were claims of service as well as of rank that might have been considered before those of the temporary commander of the second division; however, it was too late to make any further change, and when Banks offered to name Weitzel, whose protest had been not for himself but for his brigades, as the officer to receive Gardner's sword, the offer was declined. Among the officers of the navy, too, especially those of higher grades, great cause of offense was felt that, after all their services in the siege, they were left unrepresented in the honors of the surrender. This feeling was natural enough; yet before determining how far the complaints based on it were just, it is necessary to consider how important was every hour, almost every moment, with reference to the operations against Taylor, while three and a half hours were required to make the journey between headquarters and the upper fleet, and four and a half hours to reach the lower fleet. Moreover, the Admiral had gone to New Orleans the evening before.
At nine the commissioners met under the shade of the beautiful trees, nearly on the spot where O'Brien had rested among his men while waiting for the word on the 27th of May. On the Confederate side the commissioners were Colonel William R. Miles, commanding the right wing of the garrison, Colonel I. G. W. Steedman, of the 1st Alabama, commanding the left wing, and Lieutenant-Colonel Marshall J. Smith, Chief of Heavy Artillery.
Among those thus brought together there was more than one gentleman of marked conversational talent; the day was pleasant, the shade grateful, and, to one side at least, the refreshment not less so; and thus the time passed pleasantly until two o'clock, when the commissioners signed, with but a single change, the articles that had been drawn up for them and in readiness since six in the morning. The alteration was occasioned by the great and unexpected length to which the conference had been protracted. Five o'clock in the afternoon had been named as the time when the besiegers were to occupy the works; this had to be changed to seven o'clock on the morning of the 9th. The terms, which will be found in full in the Appendix, were those of an unconditional surrender. Gardner, who was in waiting conveniently near, at once approved the articles, and at half-past two they were completed by the signature of Banks. A few minutes later the long wagon-train, loaded with provisions, that had been standing for hours in the Plains Store road, was signalled to go forward. The cheers that welcomed the train, as it wound its way up the long-untravelled road and through the disused sally-port, were perhaps not so loud as those with which the besiegers had greeted the news from Vicksburg, yet they were not less enthusiastic. From this moment the men of the two armies, and to some extent the officers, mingled freely.