The melancholy failure attending the explosion of the mine before Petersburg and the continued reduction of Grant's forces, brought about by Early's diversions, coming on top of the losses since crossing the Rapidan, had brought affairs on the James to a dead-lock. While Grant in this situation was willing to spare the Sixth corps and the Nineteenth and even to strengthen them by two divisions of cavalry from the Army of the Potomac, Lee on his part not only gave up all present thought of recalling Early, as had been the custom in former years, but even sent Anderson with Kershaw's division of infantry, Fitzhugh Lee's division of cavalry, and Cutshaw's battalion of artillery, to strengthen Early, so as to enable him to hold his ground, and thus to cover the gathering of the crops in the valley, and perhaps to encourage still further detachments from the investing forces before Richmond and Petersburg. The first week of August found Anderson on the march and he was now moving down the valley. Therefore Early very properly drew back through Strasburg to wait for Anderson, and on the night of the 12th of August took up a strong position at Fisher's Hill. Its natural advantages he proceeded to increase by entrenchments.
Sheridan, following, encamped in the same order as before on the left bank of Cedar Creek. On the 13th Wright crossed Cedar Creek and occupied Hupp's Hill, and sending his skirmishers into Strasburg, discovered Early in position as described; but at nightfall Sheridan, who now had information that caused him to suspect Anderson's movement, drew back and set the cavalry to guard the Front Royal road. Then Early advanced his outposts to Hupp's Hill, and so for the next three days both armies rested.
On the 14th of August, Sheridan received from Grant authentic, rather than exact, information of Anderson's movement, for this was supposed to include two infantry divisions, instead of one. Coupled with this was Grant's renewed order to be cautious.
With his quick eye for country, Sheridan soon saw that he had but one even tolerable position for defence, and that this was at Halltown. The Confederate defence, on the other hand, rested on Fisher's Hill, and between these two positions the wide plain lay like a chess-board between the players. And now began a series of moves, during which each side watched and waited for the adversary to weaken himself, or to make a mistake, or for some chance encounter to bring about an unlooked-for advantage. Finding his position at Cedar Creek, to use his own words, "a very bad one," Sheridan was about to retire to the extreme limit of the valley at the confluence of the Potomac and the Shenandoah; and this was but to be the beginning of a series of seesaw movements, in which, as often as Sheridan went back to Halltown, Early would advance to Bunker Hill. Early, having taken the offensive, was bound to keep it, or lose his venture. Now, at this time, Early's objective was the Baltimore and Ohio railway; but Sheridan's was Early. Thus, whenever he found Early at Bunker Hill, wreaking his pleasure on the railway and the canal, Sheridan had only to take a step forward to the Clifton-Berryville line in order to force Early to hasten back to Winchester, and to lay hold of the Opequon; and so this alternating play might have continued as long as the war lasted, if other causes and events had not intervened.
At eleven o'clock on the night of the 15th of August, Sheridan's retreat began, Emory moving to Winchester, where he went into bivouac at six o'clock on the morning of the 16th. At eight o'clock on the evening of the 16th, Wright and Crook followed, and on the 17th Early, who had now been joined by Anderson, marched in pursuit. The same evening Sheridan took up the Clifton-Berryville position in the old order; the cavalry, now strengthened by the arrival of Wilson's division, covering the rear and flanks. At Berryville, at midnight, Grover joined Emory, from Washington by Leesburg and Snicker's Gap, with the remainder of the Nineteenth Corps from the James (1); and since the receipt of these reinforcements formed Sheridan's only reason for staying at Berryville, on the 18th he fell back to Charlestown, holding the roads leading thence to Berryville and to Bunker Hill.
On the 19th and 20th of August, Sheridan stood still while Early occupied Bunker Hill and Winchester; but, on the 21st, Early from Bunker Hill and Anderson from Winchester moved together to the attack. Rodes and Ramseur had a sharp fight with Wright, which caused Sheridan to bring up Crook on the left and Emory on the right; but neither came into action, because Merritt and Wilson stood so stiffly that Anderson got no farther than Summit Point. During the night Sheridan fell back to Halltown.
In retreating from Cedar Creek Sheridan began to put in force Grant's new policy of making the valley useless to the Confederate armies by burning all the grain and carrying off all the animals above Winchester. "I have destroyed everything eatable," are Sheridan's words.
On the 25th of August, after three days spent in skirmishing, Early left Anderson to mask Halltown, and sent Fitzhugh Lee by Martinsburg to Williamsport, marching himself to Shepherdstown. A rough fight with Torbert's cavalry resulted near Kearneysville, in which Custer narrowly avoided the loss of his brigade by a rapid flight across the Potomac at Shepherdstown. Sheridan sent two divisions of cavalry under Averell and Wilson over the Potomac to watch the fords and to hold the gaps of the South Mountain. Thus when Fitzhugh Lee got to the Potomac, he found Averell waiting for him, and Anderson being pressed back by Crook on the 26th, Early fell back behind the Opequon to Bunker Hill and Stephenson's Depot. On the 28th of August Sheridan advanced to Charlestown, and waiting there five days while his cavalry was concentrating and feeling the enemy, he again moved forward to the Clifton-Berryville line on the 3d of September, and encamped in the usual order.
Two marked features had now become regularly established: as often as the troops halted, no matter for how short a time, of their own accord they instantly set about protecting their front with the spade and the axe; and, secondly, the depots of the army were fixed behind the strong lines of Halltown with a sufficient force to guard them, and thence, as needed, supplies were sent forward to the troops in the field by strongly guarded trains, and these, as soon as unloaded, were returned to Halltown, thus reducing to a minimum the impedimenta of the army as well as the detachments usually demanded for their care. For the Nineteenth Corps, Currie's brigade of Dwight's division performed this service during the campaign.
The contingency for which Grant and Sheridan were waiting was now close at hand. Anderson had been nearly a month away from Lee, and meanwhile Grant had not only kept Lee on the watch on both banks of the James, as well as for Richmond as for Petersburg, but had taken a fast hold on the Weldon railway. Unable to shake off Grant's clutch either on the James or on the Shenandoah, Lee greatly needed Anderson back with him. Accordingly, on the very day when Sheridan went back to Berryville, Anderson, seeking the shortest way to Richmond, ran into Crook in the act of going into camp, and darkness shortly put an end to a sharp fight that might otherwise have proved a pitched battle. This brought Early in haste from Stephenson's to Anderson's help, but when the next day Early saw how strongly posted Sheridan was, he fell back across the Opequon to cover Winchester, and finally, on the 14th of September, sent off Anderson by Front Royal and Chester Gap, but this time without Fitzhugh Lee.
The interval was occupied in continual skirmishes and reconnoissances. Meanwhile Crook changed over from the left flank to the right at Summit Point, the cavalry covering the front and flanks from Snicker's Gap by way of Smithfield and Martinsburg to the Potomac. On the 16th of September, Grant, pressed by the government in behalf of the business interests disturbed by the enemy's control of the railway and the canal, went to Charlestown to confer with Sheridan. In the breast-pocket of his coat Grant carried a complete plan of the campaign he meant Sheridan to carry out; but when, having asked Sheridan if he could be ready to move on Tuesday, Sheridan promptly answered he should be ready whenever the General should say "Go in"—at daylight on Monday, if necessary,—so delighted was Grant that he said not a word about the plan, but contented himself with echoing the words, "Go in!"
(1) Grover's men made the hard march of 69 miles from Washington in three days; the last 33 miles in 13½ hours, actual time. See Major Tiemann's "History of the 159th New York," pp. 91, 92.
CHAPTER XXXII. THE OPEQUON.(1)
Grant's approval of Sheridan's attack was founded on the withdrawal of Kershaw; but on the 18th of September, just as Sheridan was about to move on Newtown, meaning to offer Early the choice of being turned out of Winchester, or being overwhelmed if he should stay, news came from Averell that he had been driven out of Martinsburg by two divisions of infantry. These were the divisions of Rodes and Gordon, with which, enticed at last into a grave error by the temptation of hearing that the railway was being repaired, Early had marched on the 17th to Bunker Hill and Martinsburg. When Sheridan heard of this, and perceived that Early's forces, already diminished, were strung along all the way from Winchester to Martinsburg, he stopped the execution of the orders he had already issued for the movement at four o'clock in the afternoon of that day, the 18th of September, and replaced them by fresh arrangements which led to the battle of the Opequon on the 19th. Since last moving to the Clifton-Berryville line, Sheridan had used his cavalry to preserve in his front an open space fully six miles in depth, extending to the banks of the Opequon, meaning not only to have the first tidings of any offensive movement by the enemy, but also that when himself ready to move he might be able to take the enemy by surprise.
On the evening of the 18th of September, part of Early's cavalry was at Martinsburg, Gordon occupied Bunker Hill, Wharton was at Stephenson's, with Rodes closing back on him, while Ramseur alone covered Winchester in the path of Sheridan's advance. Sheridan naturally supposed that in a quick movement he would have two divisions to deal with after crossing the Opequon.
At two o'clock on the morning of Monday, the 19th of September, on the very day when Sheridan had told Grant he would be ready to move, but just three hours earlier, Sheridan put his army in motion toward the Opequon, covering his flank by directing Merritt and Averell on Stephenson's. He sent Wilson rapidly ahead on the Berryville road to carry the ford and to seize the long and deep defile on the left or east bank through which the main column would have to advance. Wright was to lead the infantry, closely followed by Emory, who, in order to solidify the movement, was instructed to take his orders from Wright after reaching the ford. Crook, coming in from his more distant position, would naturally fall in the rear of the others, and he was to mass his men in reserve, covering the ford. Wright had to move partly across country, and had farther to go than Emory. Although both started punctually at the appointed hour, it happened that, about five o'clock, the head of Wright's column ran into Emory's in march near the crest, whence the road sweeps down to the Opequon. There Emory halted, by Wright's orders, to let the Sixth Corps pass. Unfortunately, minute and thorough as Sheridan's plans and instructions were, he appears to have underrated the double difficulty of crossing the ford and threading the long defile, for to this cause must be attributed the presence of Wright's entire wagon-train in the rear of his corps, as well as the excess of artillery for the work and the field. The head of the column could move but slowly; thus the rear was so long retarded, that, although the crossing began about six o'clock, and the whole movement was urged on by Sheridan, Wright, and Emory, and indeed by every one, it wanted but twenty minutes of noon when the line of battle was finally formed on the rolling ground overlooking the vale of the Opequon to the rear and Winchester to the front. Even as it was, Sheridan's eagerness being great, and the delay seeming interminable, Emory felt obliged to take upon himself the responsibility of departing from the strict order of march, and directed Dwight to move his men to the right of the road and pass the train. Thus it had taken six hours to advance three miles and to form in order of battle, and the immediate effect of this delay was that Sheridan had now to deal, not only with Ramseur, or with the two divisions counted on, but with the whole of Early's army; for between five and six o'clock in the morning Gordon, Rodes, and Wharton were all at Stephenson's, distant only five miles from Winchester or from the field of battle, toward which they all moved rapidly at the sound of the first firing, due to Wilson's advance.
Opequon Creek flows at the foot of a broad and thickly wooded gorge, with high and steep banks. The ravine through which the Berryville road rises to the level of the rolling plain, in the middle of whose western edge stands Winchester, is nearly three miles long. Here and there the high ground is covered with large oaks, pines, and undergrowth, and is intersected by many brooks, called runs. Of these the largest is Red Bud Run, which forms a smaller parallel ravine flanking the defile on the north, while a still larger stream, called Abraham's Creek, after pursuing a nearly parallel course on the south side of the defile, crosses the road not far from the ford, and just below it falls into the Opequon.
Wilson, after crossing the Opequon and completing his task of covering the advance of the infantry through the defile, had turned to the left on the high ground and taken post to cover the flank on the Senseny road, which, after crossing the Opequon about a mile and a quarter above the main ford, reaches the outskirts of Winchester at a point little more than three hundred yards from the Berryville road. The Sixth Corps formed across the Berryville road, Getty on its left, Ricketts on its right. Getty rested his left on Abraham's Creek. Behind him Russell stood in column in support. Emory prolonged the line of battle to the Red Bud on the right by posting Sharpe's and Birge's brigades of Grover, with Molineux and Shunk in the second line, the 9th Connecticut deployed as skirmishers to cover the right flank of Birge. Dwight's two brigades formed on the right and rear of Grover in echelon of regiments on the right, in order not only to support Grover's line, but to cover the flank against any turning movement by the Confederates or an attack by their reinforcements coming straight from Stephenson's. Beal's brigade held the right of Dwight's line, and the brigade line from right to left was formed in order of the 114th New York, 153d New York, 116th New York, 29th Maine, and 30th Massachusetts. Beal covered his right flank by a detail of skirmishers taken from all his regiments and commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Strain, of the 153d New York. McMillan, on the left and rear of Beal, formed in order of the 47th Pennsylvania, 8th Vermont, 160th New York, and 12th Connecticut, with five companies of the 47th Pennsylvania deployed to cover the whole right flank of his brigade and to move forward with it by the flank left in front. Crook had by this time crossed the ford and was massed on the left or west bank.
In climbing the hill the Berryville road follows nearly a northwesterly course, but soon after reaching the high ground bends rather sharply toward the left, crosses the ravine called Ash Hollow forming the head of Berryville Cañon, and runs for nearly a mile almost westerly. Wright was following the road, but as Emory guided upon Wright, the alignment was to be preserved by Sharpe's keeping his left in touch with the right of Ricketts. While the ground in Wright's front was for the most part open, Emory was chiefly in the dense wood, where the heavy leafage and undergrowth prevented him from seeing not only the enemy before him, but also the full extent of his own line. It should be observed with care that Ricketts was between Sharpe and the Berryville road, while the road was between Getty and Ricketts, and formed the guide for both; for these facts, of slight importance though they may seem, were destined presently to exert an influence wellnigh fatal on the fortunes of the day.
During the early hours of the morning Ramseur, on the Berryville road, and the cavalry of Lomax on the Senseny road, had been the only Confederate force between Sheridan and Winchester. But first Gordon came up at nine o'clock, and placed himself opposite Emory's right, his own left resting on the line of the Red Bud; then Rodes, closely following Gordon, formed between him and Ramseur against the right of Emory and the left of Wright.
About a quarter before twelve o'clock, at the sound of Sheridan's bugle, repeated from corps, division, and brigade headquarters, the whole line moved forward with great spirit, and instantly became engaged. Wilson pushed back Lomax, Wright drove in Ramseur, while Emory, advancing his infantry rapidly through the wood, where he was unable to use his artillery, attacked Gordon with great vigor. Birge, charging with bayonets fixed, fell upon the brigade of Evans, forming the extreme left of Gordon, and without a halt drove it in confusion through the wood and across the open ground beyond to the support of Braxton's artillery, posted by Gordon to secure his flank on the Red Bud road. In this brilliant charge, led by Birge in person, his lines naturally became disordered, and Grover, foreseeing the effect of an advance so swift and tumultuous, ordered Birge to halt and re-form in the wood. This order Birge tried to execute; but whether the words of command were not heard or were misunderstood, or in the wild excitement of the moment were wilfully disregarded by the men, certain it is that their officers found it impossible to restrain their ardor until they had followed on the run the broken fragments of Evans quite through the wood and beyond its farther skirt, where Braxton, using his guns with energy and skill, brought them to a stand.
Sharpe, advancing simultaneously on Birge's left, tried in vain to keep the alignment with Ricketts and with Birge; for now the peculiar feature of the long alignment across the swerving road began to work, yet, by reason of the screen of timber, without the cause being immediately observed by any one. At first the order of battle formed a right angle with the road, but the bend once reached, in the effort to keep closed upon it, at every step Ricketts was taking ground more and more to the left, while the point of direction for Birge, and equally for Sharpe, was the enemy in their front, standing almost in the exact prolongation of the defile, from which line, still plainly marked by Ash Hollow, the road, as we have seen, was steadily diverging. In short, to continue the march parallel with the road compelled a left half-wheel, while the battle was with the enemy straight in front, so that even had it been possible for Emory to execute his orders literally he must have offered his wheeling flank fairly to Rodes and to Gordon.
Sharpe, seeing that the gap between himself and Ricketts was growing every moment wider, in vain tried to cover it by more than one oblique movement to the left, and Keifer, whose brigade formed the right of Ricketts, being also among the first to perceive the fault, tried to make it good by deploying three of his regiments across the interval.
Birge's advance had borne him far to the right, and as Sharpe, in the vain attempt to keep his alignment with Ricketts, was always drifting to the left, there came a second and smaller gap between the two leading brigades of Grover. Into this Molineux was quickly thrust, and, deploying in parade order, under a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, at once began firing in return with great effect on the advancing columns of the enemy. But, shortly before this happened, the interval between Ricketts and Sharpe had grown to be nearly four hundred yards wide, and Birge's advance being stayed at nearly the same instant, Early saw his opportunity and seized it by throwing against the diverging flanks of Sharpe and Ricketts the fresh brigade that Battle had that moment brought up from Stephenson's. This new impulse once more carried forward the rest of Rodes's division; Ramseur rallied; Early restored his formation; and the whole Confederate line swept forward with renewed impetuosity, broke in the whole right of Ricketts and the left of Sharpe, surged around both flanks of Molineux, and swept back Birge. Sharpe's line, thus taken fairly in flank, was quickly rolled up. By this, the left regiment of Molineux, the gallant 22d Iowa, being in quite open ground, was greatly exposed, so that it, too, was presently swept back. The 159th New York and the 13th Connecticut, after holding on stiffly for a time under the partial cover of a sort of gully, were in like manner swept away, and on the right Birge's men paid the penalty of their own impetuosity. The left of Ricketts, less exposed to the shock, stood firm, and the right of Molineux, isolated as it was, held its ground; but otherwise the whole front of the battle, from the road to the Red Bud, was gone. As the Confederates charged down upon a section of Bradbury's 1st Maine Battery, posted about the centre of the division, Day, who under many drawbacks had brought up his regiment, the 131st New York, to a high standard of discipline and efficiency, took prompt and full advantage of the slight cover afforded by the little wooded ravine in which he happened to be. With equal coolness and readiness he changed front forward on his tenth company, yet held his fire until he could see the shoulders and almost the backs of the enemy; then, pouring in a hot fire, and being immediately supported by the 11th Indiana, part of the 3d Massachusetts, and the 176th New York, which had quickly rallied from Sharpe's reverse, the attacking force was driven back in disorder; but unfortunately, in retiring it swept across the remains of Molineux's left centre, which had been cut off in the gully, and took many prisoners, especially from among the officers who had stood to their posts through everything.
Just as when victory had seemed about to alight on the standard of the Union, the very perch itself had been suddenly and rudely shaken by the tread of Early's charging columns; so now, at the precise moment when defeat—bitter, perhaps disastrous defeat—seemed inevitable, the fortunes of the battle were once more reversed, and the day was suddenly saved by the prompt and orderly advance of Russell into the fatal gap. As he changed front from the wood to the right and swept on in splendid array, it happened that the charging line of Early, already disarranged by its own success, offered its right flank to Russell's front. Russell himself, bravely leading his division, fell, yet not until he had struck the blow that gave the victory to the defenders of his country,—a noble sacrifice in a noble cause.
But on the right a danger almost equally serious menaced the flank of Emory, for when Birge's men came streaming back, Shunk, who had been supporting Birge without having men enough to cover the whole ground, found his left uncovered to Gordon by the giving way of Sharpe, while at the same time his line was nearly enfiladed from the right by a section or battery of Fitzhugh Lee's horse artillery on the north bank of the Red Bud. Seeing all this, Emory instantly ordered his own old division to deploy at the top of its speed, and to make good the broken line. "Have this thing stopped at once," were the terse words of his command to Dwight. Once more, as at the Sabine Cross-Roads, the 1st brigade was called upon the yield up its leading regiment for a sacrifice, and again the lot fell to New York, yet this time upon the 114th, and upon not one of all the good veteran battalions that held the field on that 19th of September—if indeed upon any in all the armies of the Union—could the choice have rested more securely. To the left and front, far into the open field, through the wreck of Grover's right, into the teeth of the pursuing lines of Gordon, Per Lee led his regiment. No sooner had his men emerged from the cover of the wood than they came under the fire of Gordon's infantry and artillery, crossed with the fire of Fitzhugh Lee's guns beyond the Red Bud; yet they were not able to fire a musket in return until their own defeated comrades had passed to the rear. Cruel as the situation was, the 114th marched steadily forward nearly two hundred yards in front of the forest; then, finding itself quite alone and unsupported, confronted by the line of battle of the enemy at the skirt of the timber opposite, Per Lee made his men lie down without other cover than the high grass, and there, loading on their backs and at every moment losing heavily, without yielding an inch, they held off the enemy until support came. That this was longer than usual in coming was no fault of their comrades, but a mere accident of the situation; for Dwight's division being formed in echelon of battalions on the right, just as it had in the first instance been necessary to bring the 114th into action obliquely to the left, so now Beal was forced to form the line of battle of his brigade by inversion, and this, moreover, in the woods, with the steep bank of the Red Bud hampering his right. Slow though it must have seemed to Per Lee, standing out there alone, this difficult movement was in reality executed by Beal with great promptness and rapidity and in admirable order. As regiment after regiment, beginning with the 153d, came into the new line at the double-quick by the shortest path, each advanced with a shout to the rail fence on Per Lee's right and somewhat toward his rear, and, throwing down the rails, opened a rapid fire. This checked the enemy. Finding Beal unable to cover all the ground he was now trying to hold, Emory made Dwight take the 160th New York from McMillan's brigade and posted it on the right of Beal's.
McMillan had been ordered to move forward at the same time as Beal, and to form on his left. The five companies of the 47th Pennsylvania that had been detached to form a skirmish line on Red Bud Run, to cover McMillan's right flank, had somehow lost their way on the broken ground among the thickets, and, not finding them in place, McMillan had been obliged to send the remaining companies of the regiment to do the same duty. This detail and the employment of the 160th New York in Beal's line left McMillan but two of his battalions, the 8th Vermont and the 12th Connecticut; but although McMillan, holding the left of the formation in echelon, had farther to go to reach his position, it was only necessary for him to move straight to the front, and thus the 8th Vermont formed the right of his line and the 12th Connecticut the left. Not a moment too soon did Thomas and Peck bring their good regiments to the support of Molineux's diminished and almost exhausted brigade, and thus complete the restoration of Emory's line of battle. Almost at the first fire Lieutenant-Colonel Peck, the brave, accomplished, and spirited soldier who had led the 12th Connecticut in every action, fell mortally wounded by the fragment of a shell.
The shaken regiments of Grover quickly rallied and re-formed in good order behind the lines of Dwight, and all pressing forward once more, took part in the countercharge begun by Russell, by which the whole Confederate line was driven back in confusion quite beyond the positions from which they had advanced to the attack. To this line, substantially, Wright and Emory followed, and, correcting their position and alignment, waited for events or for orders. By one o'clock the morning's fight was over. Fierce and eventful as it had been, it had lasted barely an hour.
The Confederates, greatly outnumbered from the first, were now, after their losses and the rough handling they had received, no longer in condition for the offensive, and from the defensive they had, as things stood, little to hope. Sheridan, on his part, with some reluctance, made up his mind that it would be better to give up his original plan of putting in Crook to the left to cut off Early's retreat by moving against the valley turnpike near Newtown, and instead of this to use Crook and the cavalry on the Red Bud line against Early's left. The time needed for this movement caused a comparative lull in the battle of about two hours' duration. It was not so much that the battle died away, for the fire of artillery and even of musketry was still kept up, as that neither side moved in force against the other. While waiting for Crook to come into position on the right, Emory's restored line was formed by Beal on the right, prolonged toward the left by Shunk, Birge supported by Molineux, Day with the 131st New York, Allen with the battalion of the 38th Massachusetts, the 8th Vermont, and the 12th Connecticut of McMillan supported by the 160th New York, now withdrawn from the right, and finally Neafie, leading Grover's 3d brigade in place of Sharpe, who had been carried off the field severely wounded.
From his position in reserve, covering the Opequon ford, Crook moved up the right bank of the Red Bud to the rear of Dwight's first position, and then, dividing his command, posted Thoburn on the right of Dwight, and sent Duval across the Red Bud to his point of attack. Then Thoburn, at Emory's request, relieved Beal's front line of battle, while Emory drew out the 114th, the 116th, and the 153d New York and placed them under Davis to strengthen the centre. Beal himself was looking to his flank, held by the 47th Pennsylvania and the 30th Massachusetts.
Meanwhile Wharton had gone back from the desperate task of covering the flank at Stephenson's against Merritt's advance and had taken position in the rear of Rodes.
As soon as Crook was fairly across the Red Bud, his movement silenced the battery on the left bank that had been enfilading Emory's line, and this served to tell Emory that Crook was in place and at work. Averell and Merritt could be plainly seen surging up the valley road far in Gordon's left and rear, furiously driving before them the main body of Fitzhugh Lee's cavalry. About four o'clock the cheers of Duval's men beyond the Red Bud served as the signal for Thoburn, and now as Crook moved forward, sweeping everything before him, from right to left the whole army responded to the impulse. To meet Thoburn, Breckinridge placed Wharton in position at right angles with Gordon and with the valley road. Duval, having easily driven before him everything on the left bank of the Red Bud, waded through the marsh on his left, crossed the run, and united with Thoburn. Then Crook, with a sudden and irregular but curiously effective half-wheel to the left, fell vigorously upon Gordon, and Torbert coming on with great impetuosity at the same instant, the weight was heavier than the attenuated lines of Breckinridge and Gordon could bear. Early saw his whole left wing give back in disorder, and as Emory and Wright pressed hard, Rodes and Ramseur gave way, and the battle was over.
All that remained to Early was to make good his retreat, now seriously compromised by the steady progress of Wilson toward and at last upon the Millwood road. Early vainly endeavored to reunite his shattered fragments behind the lines constructed in the former campaigns for the defence of Winchester on the east. About five o'clock Torbert and Crook, fairly at right angles to the first line of battle, covered Winchester on the north from the rocky ledges that lie to the eastward of the town nearly to the first position of Braxton's guns. Thence Wright extended the line at right angles with Crook and parallel with the valley road, while Sheridan drew out Emory, who was naturally displaced by these converging movement, and sent him to extend Wright's line toward the south.
The disorderly retreat of Early's men once begun, there was no staying it. Torbert pursued the fugitives to Kernstown, where Ramseur faced about, but Sheridan, mindful that his men had been on their feet since two o'clock in the morning, many of them since one, and had in the meantime fought with varying success a long and hard fight ending in a great victory, made no attempt to send his infantry after the flying enemy.
For what was probably the first time in their lives, his men had seen every musket, every cannon, and every sabre put in use, and to good use, by their young and vigorous commander. They had looked upon a decisive victory ending with the rout of their enemy. Sheridan himself openly rejoiced, and catching the enthusiasm of their leader, his men went wild with excitement when, accompanied by his corps commanders, Wright and Emory and Crook, Sheridan rode down the front of his lines. Then went up a mighty cheer that gave new life to the wounded and consoled the last moments of the dying, for in every breast was firmly implanted the conviction that now at last the end was in sight, and that deep-toned shout that shook the hills and the heavens was not the brutal roar of a rude and barbarous soldiery, coarsely exulting over the distress and slaughter of the vanquished, but the glad voice of the American people (2) rejoicing from the hill-top at the first sure glimpse of the final victory that meant to them peace, home, and a nation saved.
When the President heard the news his first act was to write with his own hand a warm message of congratulation, and this he followed up by making Sheridan a brigadier-general in the regular army, and assigning him permanently to the high command he had been exercising under temporary orders.
The losses of the Army of the Shenandoah, according to the revised statements compiled in the War Department were 5,018, including 697 killed, 3,983 wounded, 338 missing. Of the three infantry corps, the Nineteenth, though in numbers smaller than the Sixth, suffered the heaviest loss, the aggregate being 2,074, while the total casualties of the Sixth Corps were 1,699, and those of the West Virginia forces, 794. The total loss of the cavalry was 451. The loss of the Nineteenth Corps was divided into 314 killed, 1,554 wounded, 206 missing. Of this, far the heaviest share fell upon Grover's division, which reported 1,527 against 542 in Dwight's division. Dwight reports 80 killed, 460 wounded, 2 missing; Grover, 234 killed, 1,089 wounded, 204 missing; but Grover had four brigades in the action while Dwight had two, and this nearly represents the relative strength of the two divisions. Of the brigades, Birge's suffered the most, having 107 killed, 349 wounded, 69 missing—together, 525; while Molineux, who came next, had 58 killed, 362 wounded, 87 missing—together, 507; yet in proportion Sharpe fared the worst, for his brigade, though but half as strong as Birge's, lost 39 killed, 222 wounded, 17 missing—together, 278. The 114th New York heads the fatal record for the day with 44 killed and mortally wounded, and 141 wounded—together, 185 out of about 270 in action—nearly sixty-five per cent.
Dwight's report having been sent back to him by Emory for correction, and not again presented, no report is to be found from the First division or any portion of it, except McMillan's brigade and the 12th Connecticut. The most useful detailed accounts of the part taken by the division are to be found in the admirable histories of the "First-Tenth-Twenty-Ninth Maine" by Major John M. Gould, and of the 114th New York by Assistant-Surgeon Harris H. Beecher.
Prominent among the slain of the Nineteenth Corps, besides Lieutenant-Colonel Peck, already spoke of, were Colonel Alexander Gardiner, 14th New Hampshire, Lieutenant-Colonel Willoughby Babcock, 75th New York, Major William Knowlton, 29th Maine and Major Eusebius S. Clark, 26th Massachusetts. These were fine officers, and their loss was deeply deplored.
Early lost nearly 4,000 in all, including about 200 prisoners. Rodes was killed, Fitzhugh Lee severely wounded. Early was forced to leave his dead and most of his wounded to be cared for by the victors, into whose hands also fell five guns and nine battle-flags.
Severe military critics have sometimes been disposed to find fault with Early, not merely for scattering his army—which, though certainly a fault, was handsomely made good by the rapid concentration, —but even for fighting his battle at Winchester at all. Weakened by the loss of Kershaw, Early should, these critics think, have fallen back to Fisher's Hill at the first sign of Sheridan's advance; yet upon a broad view it is difficult to concede this. The odds against Early were the same that the Confederates had necessarily assumed from the beginning. They were desperate; they could not possibly be otherwise than desperate; they called for desperate campaigns, and these for desperate battles. Standing on the defensive at Fisher's Hill, Early would not only have given up the main object of his campaign and of his presence in the valley, but would have exposed himself to the risk of being cut off by a turning column gaining his rear by way of the Luray valley. Indeed, this would have been more than a risk; sooner or later it would have been a certainty.
(1) Also spelled "Opequan." Pronounced O-peck'-an.
(2) "Hear that! That's the voice of the American people!" Thomas is said to have exclaimed on hearing the tremendous cheers of his men for their decisive victory of Nashville.
CHAPTER XXXIII. FISHER'S HILL.
The frowning heights of Fisher's Hill had long been the bugbear of the valley. The position was, in truth, a purely defensive one, its chief value being that there was no other. Except for defence it was worthless, because it was as hard to get out of as to get at; and even for defence it was subject to the drawback that it could be easily and secretly turned upon either flank. In a word, its strength resided mainly in the fact that between the peaks of Massanutten and the North Mountain the jaws of the valley were contracted to a width of not more than four miles. The right flank of the shortened front rests securely upon the north fork of the Shenandoah, where it winds about the base of Three Top Mountain before bending widely toward the east to join the south fork and form the Shenandoah River. Across the front, among rocks, between steep and broken cliffs, winds the brawling brook called Tumbling Run, and above it, from its southern edge, rises the rugged crag called Fisher's Hill. Here, behind his old entrenchments, Early gathered the remnants of his army for another stand, and began to strengthen himself by fresh works. The danger of a turning movement through the twin valley of Luray was in his mind, and to guard against it he sent his cavalry to Milford, while Sheridan, who was thinking of the same thing, ordered Torbert to ride up the Luray valley from Front Royal.
On the morning of the 20th of September Sheridan set out to follow Early, and in the afternoon took up a position before Strasburg, the Sixth Corps on the right, Emory on the left, and Crook behind Cedar Creek in support. The next morning, the 21st, Sheridan pushed and followed Early's skirmishers over the high hill that stands between Strasburg and Fisher's Hill, overlooking both, drove them behind the defences of Fisher's Hill, and took up a position covering the front from the banks of the North Fork on the left, where Emory's left rested lightly, to the crown of the hill just mentioned, which commanded the approach by what is called the back road, or Cedar Creek grade, and was but slightly commanded by Fisher's Hill itself. This strong vantage-ground Wright wrested from the enemy after a struggle, and felling the trees for protection and for range, planted his batteries there. The ground was very difficult, broken and rocky, and to hold it the Sixth corps had to be drawn toward the right, while Emory, following the movement, in the dark hours of the early morning of the 22d of September, extended his front so as to cover the ground thus given up by Wright.
Sheridan now thought of nothing short of the capture of Early's army. Torbert was to drive the Confederate cavalry through Luray, and thence, crossing the Massanutten range, was to lay hold of the valley pike at New Market, and plant himself firmly in Early's rear on his only line of retreat. Crook, by a wide sweep to the right, his march hidden by the hills and woods, was to gain the back road, so as to come up secretly on Early's left flank and rear, and the first sounds of battle that were certain to follow the discovery of his unexpected approach in this quarter were to serve as a signal for Wright and Emory to fall on with everything they had.
During the forenoon of the 22d, Grover held the left of the position of the Nineteenth Corps, his division formed in two lines in the order of Macauley,(1) Birge; Shunk, Molineux. Dwight, in the order of Beal, McMillan, held the right, and connected with Wheaton. In taking ground towards the right, as already described, this line had become too extended, and, as it was necessary that the left of the skirmishers, at least, should rest upon the river, Grover shortened his front by moving forward Foster with the 128th and Lewis with the 176th New York to drive in the enemy's skirmishers opposite, and to occupy the ground that they had been holding. This was handsomely done under cover of a brisk shelling from Taft's and Bradbury's guns. As on the rest of the line, the whole front of the corps was covered as usual by hasty entrenchments. In the afternoon Ricketts moved far to the right, and seized a wooded knoll commanding Ramseur's position on Fisher's Hill. In preparation for the attack Sheridan gave Emory the ground on the left of the railway, and Wright that beyond it, and Molineux moved forward to lead the advance of Grover. The sun was low when the noise of battle was heard far away on the right. This was Crook, sweeping everything before him as he charged suddenly out of the forest full upon the left flank and rear of Lomax and Ramseur, taking the whole Confederate line completely in reverse. The surprise was absolute. Instantly Wright and Emory took up the movement, and, inspired by the presence and the impetuous commands of Sheridan, descended rapidly the steep and broken sides of the ravine, at the bottom of which lies Tumbling Run, and then rather scrambling than charging up the rocky and almost inaccessible sides of Fisher's Hill, swarmed over the strong entrenchments, line after line, and planting their colors upon the parapets, saw the whole army of Early in disorderly flight. Foremost to mount the parapet was Entwistle with his company of the 176th New York. To them the good fortune fell of being the first to lay hands on four pieces of artillery in battery, abandoned in the panic caused by the appearance of Crook, but almost at the same instant Wilson, gallantly leading the 28th Iowa, planted the colors of his regiment on the works. That nothing might be wanting to the completeness of the victory, the Confederates, who, until that moment had felt their position so secure that they had even taken the ammunition boxes from the caissons, abandoned sixteen pieces of artillery where they stood. Early was unable to arrest the retreat of his army until he found himself near Edenburg, four miles beyond Woodstock.
Sheridan's loss in this battle was 52 killed, 457 wounded, 19 missing, in all, 528. Of this the Sixth Corps suffered nearly half, namely, 27 killed, 208 wounded, 3 missing, in all, 238. Crook's loss was 8 killed, 152 wounded, 2 missing, total 162, and Emory accounts for 15 killed, 86 wounded, 13 missing, together 114. All the casualties of the cavalry numbered but 14. Early reports his loss in the infantry and artillery alone as 30 killed, 210 wounded, 995 missing, total 1,235; but Sheridan claims 1,100 prisoners.
Now came Torbert's opportunity, but unfortunately, after suffering a check from the two brigades of Fitzhugh Lee under Wickham, Torbert had on the 22d fallen back down the Luray valley toward his starting-point, and when on the afternoon of the 23d word came to him of what had happened at Fisher's Hill, although he again advanced, he was then too late. Thus for once the cavalry column completely failed. Sheridan, from the tenor of his despatches to Torbert, must have felt that this result was probable, but he did not let it disturb his own movements, and without a halt he pushed forward his whole force in pursuit, with slight regard to organization, each regiment or brigade nearly in the order in which it chanced to file into the road. Devin's cavalry brigade trod closely on the heels of what was left of Lomax, and Emory, whose line had crossed the valley road, pushed up it as fast as the men could move over the ground. Wright moved in close support of Emory and personally directed the operations of both corps, the Nineteenth as well as the Sixth. So fast did the infantry march that it was ten o'clock at night before Devin, from his place in line on the right of the Sixth Corps, was able to take the road abreast with the Nineteenth, and broad daylight before his or any other horsemen passed the hardy yet toil-worn soldiers of Molineux, who were left all night to lead the swift pursuit. Molineux caused Day to deploy the 131st New York as skirmishers on the right of the road, while the 11th Indiana, led by Macauley, performed the same service on the left. About half-past eight the head of the column first came in contact with the rear-guard of the enemy, but this was soon driven in, and no further resistance was offered until about an hour later, at the crossing of a creek near Woodstock, a brisk fire of musketry, aided by two guns in the road, was opened on Molineux's front, but was quickly silenced. At dawn on the 23d of September Sheridan went into bivouac covering Woodstock, and let the infantry rest until early in the afternoon, when he again took up the pursuit with Wright and Emory, leaving Crook to care for the dead and wounded. Early fell back to Mount Jackson, and was preparing to make a stand when Averell coming up, he and Devin made so vigorous a demonstration with the cavalry alone that Early thought it best to continue his retreat beyond the North Fork to Rude's Hill, which stands between Mount Jackson and New Market.
Sheridan advanced to Mount Jackson on the morning of the 24th of September, and before nightfall had concentrated his whole army there. He was moving his cavalry to envelop both of Early's flanks and the infantry, Wright leading, to attack in front. However, Early did not wait for this, but retreated rapidly in order of battle, pursued by Sheridan in the same order, that is by the right of regiments with an attempt at deploying intervals, through New Market and six miles beyond to a point where a country road diverges through Keezeltown and Cross Keys to Port Republic, at the head of the South Fork. Here both armies halted face to face, Sheridan for the night; but Early, as soon as it was fairly dark, fell back about five miles on the Port Republic road, and again halted at a point about fourteen miles short of that town.
Early's object in quitting the main valley road, which would have conducted him to Harrisonburg, covering Staunton, was to receive once more the reinforcements that Lee, at the first tidings from Winchester, had again hurried forward under Kershaw. On the 25th of September, therefore, Early retreated through Port Republic towards Brown's Gap, where Kershaw, marching from Culpeper through Swift Run Gap, joined him on the 26th. Here also Early's cavalry rejoined him, Wickham from the Luray valley, and Lomax, pressed by Powell, from Harrisonburg.
Sheridan, keeping to the main road, advanced to Harrisonburg with Wright and Emory, leaving Crook to hold the fork of the roads where Early had turned off. At Harrisonburg Torbert rejoined with Merritt and Wilson. Then Sheridan sent Torbert with Wilson and Lowell by Staunton to Waynesboro', where, before quitting the valley by Rockfish Gap, the major road, as well as the railway to Charlottesville, crossed the affluent of the Shenandoah known as the South River. To divert attention from this raid Sheridan reinforced Devin, who, in the absence of Torbert's main body, had been following and observing Early near Port Republic without other cavalry support, and thus Merritt presently ran into Kershaw marching to join Early at Brown's Gap. Early, having gone as far as he wished, turned upon Merritt and drove him across the South Fork, but just then getting the first inkling of Torbert's movements, divined their purpose, and, to check them, marched with all speed, in compact order and with the greatest watchfulness in every direction, on Rockfish Gap. But Torbert, having a good start, won the race, and had accomplished his object when the advance of Early's column came up, and caused him to draw off.
Sheridan, on his part, had gone nearly as far as he intended, but as he meant presently to begin with his cavalry above Staunton the work of destroying the value of the whole valley to the Confederate army, on the 29th he ordered Wright and Emory to Mount Crawford to support Torbert in this work.
Grant, who, ever since he reached the James, had cast longing eyes upon the Virginia Central railway, as well as upon the great junction at Gordonsville, now strongly desired Sheridan to go to Staunton or Charlottesville, but Sheridan set himself firmly against the plan on account of the daily increasing difficulty of supplying his army and the great force that must be wasted in any attempt to keep open a line of communication longer or more exposed than that he already had to maintain. As an alternative, Sheridan, who seems to have thought Early had quitted the valley for good, proposed to bring the Valley campaign to an end with the destruction of the crops, and then to move with his main force to join Grant on the James. Grant, at once agreeing to this, directed Sheridan to keep Crook in the valley and to transfer the rest of his force to the armies before Richmond.
On the morning of the 6th of October Sheridan faced about and began moving down the valley, the infantry leading in the inverse order of its advance, and the cavalry bringing up the rear in one long line that reached from mountain to mountain, busied in burning as it marched the mills, the barns, and everything edible by man or beast. From the Blue Ridge to the Shenandoah Mountains, nothing was spared that might be of use to the Confederates in prolonging the war.
When Early discovered this he followed on the morning of the 7th of October, with his whole force, including Kershaw, as well as the cavalry brigade of Rosser, sent by Lee from Petersburg. The command of all the cavalry being given to Rosser, he at once began treading on the heels of Torbert. On the 9th, at Tom's Brook, Torbert, under the energetic orders of Sheridan to whip the Confederate cavalry or get whipped himself, turned on Rosser, and, after a sharp fight, completely overwhelmed him and hotly pursued his flying columns more than twenty miles up the valley. Several hundred prisoners, eleven guns with their caissons, and many wagons —tersely described by Sheridan "as almost everything on wheels"—fell into the hands of the captors. But more important even than these trophies, confidence in Rosser's cavalry was destroyed at a blow, and its early prestige wiped out forever.
On the 10th of October Sheridan once more crossed Cedar Creek and went into camp, Emory holding the right or west of the valley road, Crook on the left or east of the road, and the cavalry covering the flanks. Wright took up the line of march by Front Royal on Washington.
The first intention of the government was that he should take advantage of the Manassas Gap railway, which was again being restored under the protection of Augur's troops; but this work was not yet completed, and while Wright waited at Front Royal, Grant once more fell back on his first and favorite plan of a movement on Charlottesville and Gordonsville. To effect this he wished Sheridan to take up an advanced position toward the head of the valley, and to this the government added its favorite notion of rebuilding the railways in the rear. Halleck even went so far as to instruct Sheridan to fortify and provision heavily the position Grant had directed him to occupy. All these ideas Sheridan combated with such earnestness that he was summoned to Washington for consultation. Grant at the same time reduced his call on Sheridan for troops for service on the James to the Sixth Corps, and Sheridan, having on his own motion stopped the work on the Manassas Gap railway, ordered Wright to march on Alexandria by Ashby's Gap. Wright set out on the 12th.
Sheridan having lost touch with the main body of the Confederates in returning down the valley, he, in common with Grant and with the government, now thought that Early had quitted the region for good. Sheridan's information placed Early variously at Gordonsville, Charlottesville, and in the neighborhood of Brown's Gap; but in truth, though nothing had been seen of Early's troops for some days, they had never gone out of the valley, but had slowly and at a long and safe interval been following Sheridan's footsteps, so that on the 13th, while Wright was well on his way towards Alexandria, and Sheridan himself was getting ready to go to Washington, Early once more took post at Fisher's Hill, and sent his advance guard directly on to Hupp's Hill to look down into the Union camps on the farther bank of Cedar Creek and see what was going on there. The first news of Early's presence, within two miles of the Union camp, at the very moment when he was thought to be sixty miles away on the line of the Virginia Central railway, was brought by the shells his artillery suddenly dropped among the tents of Crook. Thoburn at once moved out to capture the battery whose missiles had presented themselves as uninvited guests at his dinner-table, but was met by Kershaw and driven back after a sharp fight. Custer, who was covering the right flank of the army, was assailed at the same time by the Confederate cavalry, but easily threw off the attack. At the first sound Torbert sent Merritt from the left to the support of Custer, and afterward Sheridan kept him there.
When on the 12th of October Sheridan received Grant's definite instructions for the movement on Gordonsville and Charlottesville, he ceased to offer any further opposition, yet, realizing that he would need his whole force, he withdrew the order for Wright's movement to Alexandria and sent him word to come back to Cedar Creek. The head of Wright's column was wading the Shenandoah when these orders overtook it. Wright at once faced about, and on the next day, the 14th of October, went into camp behind the lines of Cedar Creek on the right and rear of Emory. No change was made in the positions of the other troops, because, until Sheridan's return from Washington, the policy and plan of the campaign must remain unsettled, and Wright might at any moment be called upon to resume his march.
On the 15th of October Sheridan received formal instructions from Grant, limiting the proposed movement on Charlottesville and Gordonsville to a serious menace, instead of an occupation, and again reducing the call for troops to a single division of cavalry. Sheridan at once sent Merritt in motion toward Chester Gap, directing Powell to follow, and he himself rode with Merritt to Front Royal, meaning to pay his postponed visit to the Secretary of War at Washington; but on the 16th, before quitting Front Royal, he was overtaken by an officer from Wright bringing the words of the strange message read off by our signal officers from the waving flags of the Confederates in plain sight on the crest of Three Top Mountain.(2) This message purported to have been sent by Longstreet to Early. "Be ready," it said, "to move as soon as my forces join you, and we will crush Sheridan." The true story of this despatch has not until now been made public,(3) and many are the surmises, clever or stupid, that have been wasted upon the mystery. In fact, the message was, as both Sheridan and Wright naturally inferred, a trick intended to deceive them; Early thought to induce them to move back without waiting for the attack which, with his reduced strength, he wished to avoid. The effect was to put the Union commanders on their guard against what was actually about to happen. Therefore Sheridan instantly turned back all the cavalry save one regiment, which he kept for an escort, and rode on to Rectortown, and so went by rail to Washington—first, however, taking the precaution to warn Wright to strengthen his position, to close in Powell from Front Royal, to look well to the ground, and to be prepared. In his official report of the campaign, Sheridan, speaking of the events now to be related, said:
"This surprise was owing probably to not closing in Powell or that the cavalry divisions of Merritt and Custer were placed at the right of our line, where it had always occurred to me there was but little danger of attack."
But it is important to observe and remember that although Wright, in sending Longstreet's message, had remarked—
"If the enemy should be strongly reinforced in cavalry he might, by turning my right, give us a great deal of trouble. . . . I shall only fear an attack on my right,"
yet Sheridan in his reply made no allusion to any difference of opinion on his part as to the place of danger. His instructions to close in Powell, Torbert, under Wright's direction, executed by calling in Moore's brigade to cover Buckton's Ford, on the left and rear of Crook. Powell, with the rest of his division, was left at Front Royal to hold off Lomax.
Sheridan went on to Washington. Arriving there on the morning of the 17th, he at once asked for a special train to take him to Martinsburg at noon, and having, between a late breakfast and an early luncheon, transacted all his business at the War Office, including the conversion of the government to his views, set out to rejoin his command. With him went two engineer officers, Alexander and Thom, with whom he was to consult as to the best point, if any, in the lower valley to be fortified and held; for this venerable error was not dead, merely sleeping.
Torbert rejoined the army at Cedar Creek on the 16th, and Merritt took up his old position on the right. On the same night Rosser took one of his brigades with a brigade of infantry mounted behind the horsemen, and, supported by the whole of Early's army, set out to capture the outlying brigade of Custer's division, but found instead a single troop on picket duty. This he took, but it was a rather mortifying issue to his heavy preparations and great expectations, and a long price to pay for putting Torbert on the alert.
For the next two days nothing was seen of Early, although the cavalry and both of the infantry corps of the main line kept a good watch toward the front. There was some probability that Early would attack, especially if he should have heard of Wright's departure and not of his return. That Early must either attack soon or withdraw to the head of the valley was certain, for Sheridan had stripped the country of the supplies on which the Confederates had been accustomed to rely, and Early had now to feed his men and animals by the long haul of seventy-five miles from Staunton. It was thus that Wright viewed the situation, and in fact the same things were passing through the mind of Early. On the 18th of October, Crook, by Wright's orders, sent Harris with his brigade of Thoburn's division, to find out where Early really was and what he was doing. How far Harris went is not certainly known, but when he returned at nightfall he reported that he had been to Early's old camps and found them evacuated. In reality Early was at Fisher's Hill with his whole force, engaged in his last preparations for the surprise of the morrow, but the report brought back by Harris soon spread as a camp rumor among the officers and men of Crook, so that they may have slept that night without thought of danger near, and even the vigilance of their picket line, as well as that of the cavalry to whom they largely looked for protection against a surprise, may or may not have been inopportunely relaxed.
For Early, warned of the strength of Sheridan's right, by the failure of Rosser's adventure, had since been studying the chances of an attack on the opposite flank. To this indeed the very difficulty of the approach invited, for in all wars enterprises apparently impracticable have been carelessly guarded against and positions apparently impregnable have been loosely watched and lightly defended, so that it might not be too much to say that every insurmountable difficulty has been surmounted and every impregnable stronghold taken. Such apprehensions as the commander of the Union army may be supposed to have entertained were directed toward his right, where Torbert was, and where the back road to Winchester gave easy access to his rear.
While Early was engaged in considering this plan, he sent Gordon, accompanied by Major Hotchkiss of the engineers, to the signal station on the crest of Three Top Mountain to examine the position of the Union army and to study the details of the proposed movement. From this height these officers looked down upon the country about Cedar Creek as upon an amphitheatre and saw the Union camps as in a panorama. Every feature was in plain view; they counted the tents; they noted the dispositions for attack; they made out the exact situation of the various headquarters; and casting careful glances into the shadowy depths of the Shenandoah, winding about the foot of the mountain far below them, they perceived that the flank of Three Top afforded a footing for the passage of the infantry at least. Upon this information Early was not long in deciding upon his course. Under cover of the night he would send the divisions of Gordon, Ramseur, and Pegram,(4) all under the command of Gordon, over the Shenandoah near Fisher's Hill, across the ox-bow, to the foot of Three Top. Thence picking his way over the foot of the mountain, Gordon in two columns was to cross the river a second time at McInturff's Ford, just below the mouth of Cedar Creek and at Bowman's Ford, several hundred yards below. There he would find himself on the flank and in easy reach of the rear of Crook, and indeed of the whole Union army, with nothing but a thin line of pickets to hinder the rush. While Gordon was thus stealthily creeping into position for his spring, Early meant to take Kershaw and Wharton upon the valley road and quietly to gain a good position for assailing Crook and Emory in front, as soon as the rifles of Gordon should be heard toward the rear. Rosser was to drive in the cavalry on the right of the Union army, while Lomax, from the Luray, was expected to gain the valley road somewhere near Newtown, so as to cut off the retreat. Everything that could jingle or rattle was to be left behind, and the march was to be made in dead silence, while, as the rumble of the guns would be sure to reveal the movement, the whole of the artillery was massed at Strasburg, all ready to gallop to the front as soon as the battle should begin.
A closer study of the trail showed Gordon that it would be possible, however difficult and risky, for dismounted troopers to lead their horses over the path already marked out for his infantry. Accordingly the cavalry brigade of Payne was added to Gordon's column, and after surprising and making good the passage of the fords, the first duty of these horsemen was to ride straight to Belle Grove House and capture Sheridan. Early supposed Sheridan to be still present in command.
Bold as was Early's design of surprising and attacking the vastly superior forces of Sheridan, under conditions that must inevitably stake everything upon the hazard of complete success, it may well be doubted whether in the whole history of war an instance can be found of any similar plan so carefully and successfully arranged and so completely carried out in every detail, up to the moment that must be looked for in the execution of every operation of war, when the shock of battle comes and puts even the wisest prevision in suspense.
(1) As the wounding of Sharpe left no officer present with his brigade of higher rank than lieutenant-colonel, Emory took Colonel Daniel Macauley, 11th Indiana, from the 4th brigade and placed him in command of the 3d.
(2) According to Sheridan, agreeing with the general recollection of the survivors; but Wright and Early both say Round Top, which is behind Fisher's Hill. Might not the message sent from Round Top have been repeated from Three Top?
(3) To the courtesy and kindness of General Early, the author is greatly indebted for the key to the riddle. Under date of Lynchburg, Virginia, November 6, 1890, he writes: "The signal message . . . was altogether fictitious. As Sheridan's troops occupied the north bank of Cedar Creek in such a strong position as to render it impracticable for me to attack them in front, I went to the signal station just in my rear for the purpose of examining the position, and I found the officer in charge of the station reading some signals that were being sent by the Federal signal agents. I then asked him if the other side could read his signals and he told me that they had discovered the key to the signals formerly used, but that a change had been made. I then wrote the message purporting to be from Longstreet and had it signalled in full view of the Federal signal men whom we saw on the hill in front of my position, so that it might be read by them. My object was to induce Sheridan to move back his troops from the position they then occupied, and I am inclined to think that if he had then been present with his command he would have done so. However, the movement was not made, and I then determined to make the attack which was made on the 19th of October. The object of that attack was to prevent any troops from being returned to Grant's army."
(4) Observe that Ramseur was now commanding the division that had been Rodes's; Pegram having succeeded to Ramseur's old division.
CHAPTER XXXIV. CEDAR CREEK.
The ground whereon the Army of the Shenandoah now found itself was the same on which Sheridan had left it, the troops were the same, and the formations were in all important particulars the same as when he had been present in command, strengthened, however, by additional entrenchments. Twice before the army had occupied the same line, and on both occasions Sheridan had emphatically condemned it as a very bad one. Briefly, the position was formed by the last great outward bend of Cedar Creek before its waters mingle with those of the Shenandoah, the left flank resting lightly on the river, the centre strongly across the valley road, and the extreme right on the creek near the end of the bow.
Crook held a high and partly wooded height or range of heights on the left or east (1) of the valley road, and nearly parallel with it. Thoburn occupied the most advanced spur overlooking the mouth of the creek, while on his left and rear Hayes and Kitching faced toward the Shenandoah with their backs to the road. As the road descended to cross Cedar Creek by the bridge (2) and ford, it followed the course of a rivulet on its left, and three quarters of a mile from Crook, on the opposite side of this ravine and of the road, Emory was posted on a hill whose crest rose steeply a hundred and fifty feet above the bed of the creek. Here Emory planted nearly the whole of his artillery to command the bridge and the neighboring ford and the approaches on the opposite bank, but the slope and crest of this hill were completely and easily commanded from the higher ground held by Thoburn and by Hayes. From the valley road on the left, Emory's line stretched crescent-wise, until its right rested upon a natural bastion formed by the highest part of the hill, whence the descent is precipitous, not only to the creek in front, but on the flank to the gorge of Meadow Brook. This little stream rising some miles farther north near Newtown, and flowing now between high banks and again through marshy borders in a general direction nearly parallel to the road, empties into Cedar Creek about three quarters of a mile above the bridge. Just below the mouth of the brook Cedar Creek can be crossed by a ford lying nearly in a direct prolongation of the line of the valley road from the point where in descending it swerves to the east to pass the bridge, and midway between the bridge and the Meadow Brook ford is still another ford overlooked by Emory's right wing and commanded by the guns of his artillery. Dwight's division formed the right of Emory's line and Grover's the left. From right to left the front line was composed of the brigades of Thomas, Molineux, Birge, and Macauley, with Davis in reserve supporting Thomas, and Shunk, likewise in reserve, supporting Macauley and Birge.(3)
The fronts of Emory and Crook overlooking the creek were strongly entrenched, and Crook was engaged in extending his line of works toward the left and rear of Thoburn to cover the front of Hayes, but this fresh line was as yet unoccupied. Wright's corps, commanded by Ricketts during the absence of Sheridan, while Wright himself commanded the army, was held in reserve on the high ground known as Red Hill overlooking Meadow Brook from the eastward, the divisions encamped for convenience in a sort of irregular echelon, with Ricketts's, under Keifer, in front, Upton's, commanded by Wheaton, on the right and rear in close support, and Getty's on the left and rear of both, and thus nearer to the valley road than either. Behind the Sixth Corps, opposite Middletown, on the high ground on both sides of Marsh Run, was Merritt, and far away on his right, watching the approaches and the crossing by the back road, stood Custer.
As the Sixth Corps held no part of the front, but formed a general reserve, its position was not entrenched. Torbert, Emory, and Crook each picketed and watched his own front, and there was not a horseman between the infantry and the supposed position of the enemy at or beyond Fisher's Hill.
Emory had for some days been distrustful of the excessive tranquillity, and on the previous evening his uneasiness had rather been augmented by a report that came to him from Thomas of a little group of men in citizens' dress that had been seen during the day moving about on the edge of Hupp's Hill, as if engaged in noting with more intentness than is usual among civilians the arrangement of the Union camps. This incident Emory reported to Wright for what it might be worth, and Wright, on his part, being already doubtful of the exactness of the information brought in by Harris, ordered Emory and Torbert each to send out a strong reconnoitring party in the early morning, to move in parallel columns on the valley road and on the back road, with the significant caution that they were to go far enough to find out whether Early was still at Fisher's Hill or not.
After crossing the Shenandoah and reaching the foot of Three Top, Gordon halted his men for a few hours' rest before the hard work awaiting them. At one o'clock he silently took up the line of march over the rugged trail toward McInturff's and Bowman's fords, and at five o'clock seized both crossings, with the merest show of resistance from Moore's outlying brigade, and pressed on to Cooley's house, the white house he had noted from Three Top. This landmark, as he knew, was barely thirteen hundred yards from the nearest flank of his enemy. He passed nearly half that distance beyond the house and, as pre-arranged, silently formed his three divisions for the attack. Within five minutes he could be in Kitching's camp.
At the last moment, hearing that Crook was strengthening his entrenchments, Early so far changed his plan as to part company with Wharton at Strasburg, and then, bearing off to the right, to conduct Kershaw to the banks of Cedar Creek at the ford that now bears the name of Roberts. This is about twelve hundred yards above the mouth of the creek; and there, at half-past three in the morning, in the long shadows of the full moon,(4) Early stood with Kershaw at his back and the sleeping ranks of Thoburn directly in his front, and waited only for the appointed hour. At half-past four, Early again set Kershaw in motion. The crossing of Cedar Creek was unobserved and unopposed. Once on the north bank, Kershaw deployed to the right and left, and stood to arms listening for Gordon.
Wharton, who had already formed under cover of the tress, on the edge of Hupp's Hill, crept down the slope to the front of the wood, and there, likewise in shadow, hardly a thousand feet from the bridge and the middle ford, he too watched for the signal.
To crown all, as the dawn drew near a light fog descended upon the river bottom and covered all objects as with a veil.
Almost from the beginning it had been the custom of the Nineteenth Army Corps, at all times when in the presence of the enemy, to stand to arms at daybreak. Moreover as Molineux was to go out on a reconnoissance by half-past five, his men had breakfasted and were lying on their arms waiting for the order to march. Birge and Macauley were to be ready to follow in support after a proper interval, and Shunk was to cover the front of all three during their absence. McMillan had also been notified to support the movement of Grover's brigades. Emory himself was up and dressed, the horses of his staff were saddled, and his own horses were being saddled, when from the left a startling sound broke the stillness of the morning air.
This was the roar of the one tremendous volley by which Kershaw made known his presence before the sleeping camp of Thoburn. In an instant, before a single shot could be fired in return, before the muskets could be taken from the stacks, before the cannoneers could reach their pieces, Kershaw's men, with loud and continuous yells, swarmed over the parapet in Thoburn's front, seized the guns, and sent his half-clad soldiers flying to the rear. Thus Kershaw, who a moment before had been without artillery, suddenly found himself in possession of the seven guns that had been planted to secure Thoburn's ground. Then upon Emory and upon Hayes, as well as against the flying fugitives, he turned the cannon thus snatched from their own comrades.
At the first sound Molineux moved his men back into the rifle-pits they had left an hour before, and Emory, ordering his corps to stand to arms, rode at once to the left of his line at the valley road to find out the meaning of this strange outbreak. Knowing that Molineux was near and ready, Emory drew from him two regiments, the 22d Iowa and the 3d Massachusetts, to support the artillery planted on the left to command the bridge. Hardly had this been done when the shells began to fall among the guns and to enfilade the lines of the infantry. What could this mean but the thing that had actually happened to Thoburn? Grover joined Emory, Crook came from Belle Grove, and Wright from his camp beyond Meadow Brook. The fugitives from Thoburn's unfortunate division went streaming by.
Then suddenly from the left and rear came the startling rattle of the rifles that told of Gordon's attack on the exposed flank of Hayes and Kitching. While all eyes were directed toward Kershaw, Gordon, still further favored by the fog, the outcry, and the noise of the cannonade, was not perceived by the troops of Hayes and Kitching until the instant when his solid lines of battle, unheralded by a single skirmisher of his own, and unannounced by those set to watch against him, fell upon the ranks of Crook. He tried in vain to form on the road. Startled from their sleep by the surprise of their comrades on their right, and naturally shaken by the disordered rush of the fugitives through their ranks, his men, old soldiers and good soldiers as they were, gave way at the first onset, before the fire of Gordon had become heavy and almost without stopping to return it.