History of the Scottish expedition to Norway in 1612

VIII.

THE COMBAT AT KRINGELEN.

We have seen that the historical facts are as follows:—A detachment of about three hundred Scots, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Alexander Ramsay and five other Scottish officers, marched safely, and without committing any acts of murder, pillage, or incendiarism, through Romsdalen and Gudbrandsdalen, as far as Kringelen, where it had opposed to it four hundred and five Bönder and peasants, under the leadership of two civil, not military, officers. Further, that one hundred and thirty-four of the Scots were taken prisoners, and were all killed the next day,[52] except eighteen, who reached Aggershuus, now the fort of Christiania,—the loss of the victorious Norwegians being only six killed and ten or twelve wounded.

Such a remarkable result could certainly only have been attained under very advantageous circumstances, and as existing documents give only the barest outline of the fight at Kringelen, we can only form an hypothesis upon them.

The following conjecture is deduced from an attentive study of all that is so far known or established on the subject.

It must be acknowledged that four hundred Bönder, only partly or imperfectly armed, could not have been an equal match, even in the early part of the seventeenth century, for the smallest admissible number of Scots—namely, three hundred—that documentary evidence will allow us to admit, and especially if they had been well-armed, trained soldiers. Some of those Scots, those raised by Sinclair, were apparently Caithness men, whose principal occupation had no doubt been warfare.[53] Many of them were in all probability descendants of Norsemen who had conquered and held a great part of their country. They were, to say the least, as brave and as ready to defend their lives as the Bönder and peasants of Gudbrandsdal, a province which had moreover been to some extent drained of its younger and more able-bodied men for the purposes of the war of Denmark against Sweden. We have also seen that the attempts made to destroy Mönnichhofen's force of about one thousand men by a levy of one thousand five hundred peasants, mounted and on foot, supported by some soldiers and commanded by three military officers, were quite unsuccessful.

What then were the exceptional circumstances that rendered possible the easy and utter defeat of the Scots at Kringelen?

In traditional accounts of the affair, reproduced by almost every historian, much stress is laid on the deadly effect of the hurling down of rocks, or of what is known in Norway as a "tömmervælte," on the heads of the invaders while they were passing unsuspectingly through a ravine, pass, or defile at Kringelen. To those who have not visited the locality in question such an explanation would perhaps be quite satisfactory; for there have been instances, both in ancient and modern history, of troops being destroyed by such means in mountain passes by an enemy inferior in number and untrained in skilled warfare.

But an inspection of Kringelen, or a study of the accompanying plan prepared for this work from actual survey by Lieutenant Arneberg of the Norwegian army, renders impossible the acceptance of such an explanation. The present road, on which stands the stone pillar that marks the vicinity of the spot where the fighting occurred, dates from the beginning of this century. It is about forty feet below the old road, where it sinks into the "Sinclair Dokka" or hollow, in which the Scots are popularly believed to have been overwhelmed by huge masses of rock, and where human bones, supposed to be those of the Scots, have been dug up.

In an account[54] of a journey from Christiania to Trondhjem in 1733 by King Christian VI. and Queen Sophia the road through Gudbrandsdalen is described as follows:—"Froen Præstegaard (vicarage). About here the road begins to show the difficulties travellers in Norway have to encounter." After passing Zell "is a road called Kringelen, on the side of a fjeld, and so narrow that every precaution is necessary on the part of travellers and drivers." Dr. Yngvar Nielsen states in his interesting work on the "Development of Roads in Norway,"[55] that "in 1766 Kringelen was the worst bit of road in Gudbrandsdalen, as it was so narrow that a carriole could scarcely pass." In fact, it was only a bridle-path on the edge of a precipice fifty to one hundred feet above the Laugen river. This track, which was all that the condition of the country required when produce was transported chiefly in winter on sledges, was quite open and exposed; while above it the almost precipitous cliffs, averaging seven hundred feet in height, left at their base a sloping ledge of about one hundred and fifty feet in breadth. It was neither a pass nor a ravine, and has sometimes been described as a "defile," probably because not more than two men could have walked abreast along it, and certainly only a single file of men could have used it with convenience.

The Bönder concealed themselves on the sloping ledge between the precipitous cliff and the path. The ledge was somewhat thickly covered with wood, which is said to have been washed away by a memorable rainstorm in 1789. At the same time there must have been a clear space in front both of the "tömmervælte" and of the intrenchments which tradition says the Bönder erected there, although Envold Kruse makes no mention of them.

The military officer who carefully surveyed the ground in the autumn of 1884 has shown on the plan the probable position of the celebrated "tömmervælte." It is supposed to have been an accumulation of rocks piled on round beams or trunks of trees, arranged in such a manner as to roll down in a mass as soon as the ropes which held the structure in position were cut.

The depression in the old road known as the "Sinclair Dokka" has a length of about two hundred and seventy English feet between the highest points at its two extremities. It is reasonable to suppose that the object of the Bönder was to hurl down the rocks at the deepest or centre part of the depression, which would be about one hundred feet in length at the utmost, and that the length of the "tömmervælte" was in proportion with the size of the hollow into which it was destined to descend. It could not possibly have been even half as long as the deepest part of the hollow itself; for an artificial structure a hundred feet in length, with a clear space in front of it, would certainly have been observed by the Scots, however unsuspecting they may have been, and however lax their military precautions. Moreover, it would have been strategically unwise on the part of the Bönder to have attacked the invaders until a good part of them had descended into the hollow and were passing through it. It has therefore been assumed on the plan that the "tömmervælte" could not have been more than thirty feet in length, whilst its height above the deepest part of the "Sinclair Dokka" has been fixed at about one hundred and twenty feet, partly as a result of a thorough examination of the configuration of the slope on which it stood, and partly on the conjecture that the structure required elevation in order to attain a sufficient impetus on being let loose, and in order also that it should be as much concealed as possible from the Scots proceeding along the road.

A mathematical question here presents itself. If we assume that the Scots on whom the "tömmervælte" descended occupied the path in the "Sinclair Dokka" along an approximate length of even one hundred feet, how many could possibly have stood there? Giving only three feet to each man, the number could not have been more than thirty-three men if they marched in single file, or about sixty-seven if two abreast, along a path so rugged, narrow, and dangerous. But considering that the rocks must have taken several seconds to roll down the declivity, which could not have had a steeper gradient than forty to forty-five degrees, the men at the extremities of the threatened group must have had time to rush back at one end and forward at the other; and allowing for further chances of escape, we cannot possibly account for the destruction of more than twenty-five or thirty men (even if they walked two abreast) by the sudden descent of an avalanche of rocks and timbers.

How then were the remainder disposed of?

As soon as the "tömmervælte" had been cast loose, it may be taken for granted that the concealed Bönder rushed down on the startled foe, and that a hand-to-hand fight ensued. In fact, we know there was a combat of an hour and a half, in which Sinclair fell, and that six of the Bönder were killed and ten or twelve wounded. A few of the muskets alleged to have been carried by the Scots have been preserved, the arsenal at Christiania possessing five,[56] Horton arsenal one, the descendants of Dean Krag parts of two or three more, and Consul Heftye of Christiania a lock. The earliest English travellers in Norway mention having seen only a few remnants of those arms in Gudbrandsdalen. From the smallness of the number of such muskets that have been preserved or heard of, it must be supposed that the Scots had not many such weapons. Nor could those few have been of much use at close quarters on a sudden emergency such as that at Kringelen, since from the great length of their barrels (about seventy inches) they had to be fired from a rest.

The traditional or popular account of the mode of attack bears on its face a considerable amount of probability. It is to the effect that the "tömmervælte" was not cast loose until the "vanguard" of the Scots had passed.

On the strength of all these facts and considerations we arrive, in all humility, at the conjecture that the three hundred Scots were not all armed, and that the body of men described in the Sagas as the "vanguard" was most likely the contingent of "honest men's bairns and servants," and some of the men out of jails, forcibly pressed by Lieutenant-Colonel Ramsay, and who were being driven captive into Sweden by Caithness men under Sinclair and Hay, armed, it may be conjectured, principally with swords, the officers perhaps wearing armour and carrying pistols as well as swords.[57]

It has been already shown that Mönnichhofen was to have supplied arms for the Scottish levies, with which he failed to combine. Moreover, the Swedish agent at Amsterdam reported that he feared the projects of General Halkett (one of Ramsay's confederates) would fail, "because of the lateness of the season, and because the men had no weapons, while everywhere in Norway the people were up in arms."[58] The deposition, taken at Copenhagen, of Alexander Ramsay, the leader of the expedition, also shows that Mönnichhofen was to have supplied the Scots with arms from Holland. We have moreover seen that in its acts and proclamations against the proceedings of the Ramsays and others, the Scottish Privy Council made no mention of disarming the men who were to be sent home under precautions that were in other respects so careful. Nor is it likely that the men who had been forcibly seized and kept on board the ships would at once have been supplied with arms by their oppressors. The remarkable fact that the Scots committed no depredations in the valleys through which they passed—a forbearance out of keeping with the custom of that age, either in Scotland or in Scandinavia—suggests that the troops under Ramsay were subject to strict discipline on so daring and dangerous a march. This task probably devolved more especially on Captain Sinclair and Captain Hay, who, while in command of the armed men employed in guarding and driving before them the captive "honest men's bairns and servants," were the only officers killed;[59] and this may account for the popular belief that Sinclair was the chief of the expedition.

If therefore the conjecture be correct, that none but the Caithness men were armed at all, and they chiefly with swords, the almost entire annihilation of the three hundred men by four hundred Bönder is seen to have been easy enough under the circumstances that have been described.

Such is the conclusion that results from the premises here submitted; and remembering how important it is that national history should be correctly known, it is to be hoped that the researches already made will lead to the lifting of the cloud confessedly hanging over this episode of the distant past, and that some historian in time to come may be helped by them, however slightly, in directing the light of truth upon the mists that still remain to be dispelled on the subject of the disastrous expedition of the Scots to Norway in 1612.

Part II.

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Tradition.