"SEC. 7. And be it further enacted, That all other lands bid in by the United States at tax sales, being thirty-eight thousand acres, more or less, and now in the hands of the said tax commissioners as the property of the United States, in the parishes of Saint Helena and Saint Luke, excepting the 'school-farms,' as specified in the preceding section, and so much as may be necessary for military and naval purposes at Hilton Head, Bay Point, and Land's End, and excepting also the city of Port Royal, on Saint Helena island, and the town of Beaufort, shall be disposed of in parcels of twenty acres, at one dollar and fifty cents per acre, to such persons, and to such only, as have acquired and are now occupying lands under and agreeably to the provisions of General Sherman's special field order, dated at Savannah, Georgia, January sixteenth, eighteen hundred and sixty-five; and the remaining lands, if any, shall be disposed of, in like manner, to such persons as had acquired lands agreeably to the said order of General Sherman, but who have been dispossessed by the restoration of the same to former owners: Provided, That the lands sold in compliance with the provisions of this and the preceding section shall not be alienated by their purchasers within six years from and after the passage of this act.
"SEC. 8. And be it further enacted, That the 'school-farms' in the parish of Saint Helena, South Carolina, shall be sold, subject to any leases of the same, by the said tax commissioners, at public auction, on or before the first day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven, at not less than ten dollars per acre; and the lots in the city of Port Royal, as laid down by the said tax commissioners, and the lots and houses in the town of Beaufort, which are still held in like manner, shall be sold at public auction; and the proceeds of said sales, after paying expenses of the surveys and sales, shall be invested in United States bonds, the interest of which shall be appropriated, under the direction of the commissioner, to the support of schools, without distinction of color or race, on the islands in the parishes of Saint Helena and Saint Luke.
"SEC. 9. And be it further enacted, That the assistant commissioners for South Carolina and Georgia are hereby authorized to examine the claims to lands in their respective States which are claimed under the provisions of General Sherman's special field order, and to give each person having a valid claim a warrant upon the direct tax commissioners for South Carolina for twenty acres of land; and the said direct tax commissioners shall issue to every person, or to his or her heirs, but in no case to any assigns, presenting such warrant, a lease of twenty acres of land, as provided for in section seven, for the term of six years; but, at any time thereafter, upon the payment of a sum not exceeding one dollar and fifty cents per acre, the person holding such lease shall be entitled to a certificate of sale of said tract of twenty acres from the direct tax commissioner or such officer as may be authorized to issue the same; but no warrant shall be held valid longer than two years after the issue of the same.
"SEC. 10. And be it further enacted, That the direct tax commissioners for South Carolina are hereby authorized and required, at the earliest day practicable, to survey the lands designated in section seven into lots of twenty acres each, with proper metes and bounds distinctly marked, so that the several tracts shall be convenient in form, and, as near as practicable, have an average of fertility and woodland; and the expense of such surveys shall be paid from the proceeds of sales of said lands, or, if sooner required, out of any moneys received for other lands on these islands, sold by the United States for taxes, and now in the hands of the direct tax commissioners.
"SEC. 11. And be it further enacted, That restoration of the lands now occupied by persons under General Sherman's special field order, dated at Savannah, Georgia, January sixteenth, eighteen hundred and sixty-five, shall not be made until after the crops of the present year shall have been gathered by the occupants of said lands, nor until a fair compensation shall have been made to them by the former owners of said lands, or their legal representatives, for all improvements or betterments erected or constructed thereon, and after due notice of the same being done shall have been given by the assistant commissioner.
"SEC. 12. And be it further enacted, That the commissioner shall have power to seize, hold, use, lease, or sell, all buildings and tenements, and any lands appertaining to the same, or otherwise, held under claim or title by the late so-called Confederate States, and any buildings or lands held in trust for the same by any person or persons, and to use the same or appropriate the proceeds derived therefrom to the education of the freed people; and whenever the bureau shall cease to exist, such of the late so-called Confederate States as shall have made provision for the education of their citizens, without distinction of color, shall receive the sum remaining unexpended of such sales or rentals, which shall be distributed among said States for educational purposes in proportion to their population.
"SEC. 13. And be it further enacted, That the commissioner of this bureau shall at all times coöperate with private benevolent associations of citizens in aid of freedmen, and with agents and teachers, duly accredited and appointed by them, and shall hire or provide by lease buildings for purposes of education whenever such associations shall, without cost to the Government, provide suitable teachers and means of instruction; and he shall furnish protection as may be required for the safe conduct of such schools.
"SEC. 14. And be it further enacted, That in every State or district where the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has been interrupted by the rebellion, and until the same shall be fully restored, and in every State or district whose constitutional relations to the Government have been practically discontinued by the rebellion, and until such State shall have been restored in such relations, and shall be duly represented in the Congress of the United States, the right to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to have full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, personal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and disposition of estate, real and personal, including the constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to and enjoyed by all the citizens of such State or district, without respect to race or color, or previous condition of slavery. And whenever in either of said States or districts the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has been interrupted by the rebellion, and until the same shall be fully restored, and until such State shall have been restored in its constitutional relations to the Government, and shall be duly represented in the Congress of the United States, the President, shall, through the commissioner and the officers of the bureau, and under such rules and regulations as the President, through the Secretary of War, shall prescribe, extend military protection and have military jurisdiction over all cases and questions concerning the free enjoyment of such immunities and rights; and no penalty or punishment for any violation of law shall be imposed or permitted because of race or color, or previous condition of slavery, other or greater than the penalty or punishment to which white persons may be liable by law for the like offense. But the jurisdiction conferred by this section upon the officers of the bureau shall not exist in any State where the ordinary course of judicial proceedings has not been interrupted by the rebellion, and shall cease in every State when the courts of the State and the United States are not disturbed in the peaceable course of justice, and after such State shall be fully restored in its constitutional relations to the Government, and shall be duly represented in the Congress of the United States.
"SEC. 15. And be it further enacted, That the officers, agents, and employees of this bureau, before entering upon the duties of their office, shall take the oath prescribed in the first section of the act to which this is an amendment; and all acts or parts of acts inconsistent with the provisions of this act are hereby repealed.
On the 16th of July the President returned the bill to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, with his "objections thereto" in writing. The following is
THE VETO MESSAGE.
"To the House of Representatives:
"A careful examination of the bill passed by the two houses of Congress, entitled 'An act to continue in force and to amend "An act to establish a bureau for the relief of freedmen and refugees," and for other purposes,' has convinced me that the legislation which it proposes would not be consistent with the welfare of the country, and that it falls clearly within the reasons assigned in my message of the 19th of February last, returning without my signature a similar measure which originated in the Senate. It is not my purpose to repeat the objections which I then urged. They are yet fresh in your recollection, and can be readily examined as a part of the records of one branch of the National Legislature. Adhering to the principles set forth in that message, I now reäffirm them, and the line of policy therein indicated.
"The only ground upon which this kind of legislation can be justified is that of the war-making power. The act of which this bill was intended as amendatory was passed during the existence of the war. By its own provisions, it is to terminate within one year from the cessation of hostilities and the declaration of peace. It is therefore yet in existence, and it is likely that it will continue in force as long as the freedmen may require the benefit of its provisions. It will certainly remain in operation as a law until some months subsequent to the meeting of the next session of Congress, when, if experience shall make evident the necessity of additional legislation, the two houses will have ample time to mature and pass the requisite measures. In the mean time the questions arise, Why should this war measure be continued beyond the period designated in the original act? and why, in time of peace, should military tribunals be created to continue until each 'State shall be fully restored in its constitutional relations to the Government, and shall be duly represented in the Congress of the United States?' It was manifest with respect to the act approved March 3, 1865, that prudence and wisdom alike required that jurisdiction over all cases concerning the free enjoyment of the immunities and rights of citizenship, as well as the protection of person and property, should be conferred upon some tribunal in every State or district where the ordinary course of judicial proceeding was interrupted by the rebellion, and until the same should be fully restored. At that time, therefore, an urgent necessity existed for the passage of some such law. Now, however, war has substantially ceased; the ordinary course of judicial proceedings is no longer interrupted; the courts, both State and Federal, are in full, complete, and successful operation, and through them every person, regardless of race or color, is entitled to and can be heard. The protection granted to the white citizen is already conferred by law upon the freedman; strong and stringent guards, by way of penalties and punishments, are thrown around his person and property, and it is believed that ample protection will be afforded him by due process of law, without resort to the dangerous expedient of 'military tribunals,' now that the war has been brought to a close. The necessity no longer existing for such tribunals, which had their origin in the war, grave objections to their continuance must present themselves to the minds of all reflecting and dispassionate men. Independently of the danger in representative republics of conferring upon the military, in time of peace, extraordinary powers—so carefully guarded against by the patriots and statesmen of the earlier days of the republic, so frequently the ruin of governments founded upon the same free principle, and subversive of the rights and liberties of the citizen—the question of practical economy earnestly commends itself to the consideration of the law-making power. With an immense debt already burdening the incomes of the industrial and laboring classes, a due regard for their interests, so inseparably connected with the welfare of the country, should prompt us to rigid economy and retrenchment, and influence us to abstain from all legislation that would unnecessarily increase the public indebtedness. Tested by this rule of sound political wisdom, I can see no reason for the establishment of the 'military jurisdiction' conferred upon the officials of the bureau by the fourteenth section of the bill.
"By the laws of the United States, and of the different States, competent courts, Federal and State, have been established, and are now in full practical operation. By means of these civil tribunals ample redress is afforded for all private wrongs, whether to the person or to the property of the citizen, without denial or unnecessary delay. They are open to all, without regard to color or race. I feel well assured that it will be better to trust the rights, privileges, and immunities of the citizens to tribunals thus established, and presided over by competent and impartial judges, bound by fixed rules of law and evidence, and where the rights of trial by jury is guaranteed and secured, than to the caprice and judgment of an officer of the bureau, who, it is possible, may be entirely ignorant of the principles that underlie the just administration of the law. There is danger, too, that conflict of jurisdiction will frequently arise between the civil courts and these military tribunals, each having concurrent jurisdiction over the person and the cause of action—the one judicature administered and controlled by civil law, the other by the military. How is the conflict to be settled, and who is to determine between the two tribunals when it arises? In my opinion it is wise to guard against such conflict by leaving to the courts and juries the protection of all civil rights and the redress of all civil grievances.
"The fact can not be denied that since the actual cessation of hostilities many acts of violence—such, perhaps, as had never been witnessed in their previous history—have occurred in the States involved in the recent rebellion. I believe, however, that public sentiment will sustain me in the assertion that such deeds of wrong are not confined to any particular State or section, but are manifested over the entire country—demonstrating that the cause that produced them does not depend upon any particular locality, but is the result of the agitation and derangement incident to a long and bloody civil war. While the prevalence of such disorders must be greatly deplored, their occasional and temporary occurrence would seem to furnish no necessity for the extension of the bureau beyond the period fixed in the original act. Besides the objections which I have thus briefly stated, I may urge upon your consideration the additional reason that recent developments in regard to the practical operations of the bureau, in many of the States, show that in numerous instances it is used by its agents as a means of promoting their individual advantage, and that the freedmen are employed for the advancement of the personal ends of the officers instead of their own improvement and welfare—thus confirming the fears originally entertained by many that the continuation of such a bureau for any unnecessary length of time would inevitably result in fraud, corruption, and oppression.
"It is proper to state that in cases of this character investigations have been promptly ordered, and the offender punished, whenever his guilt has been satisfactorily established. As another reason against the necessity of the legislation contemplated by this measure, reference may be had to the 'Civil Rights Bill,' now a law of the land, and which will be faithfully executed as long as it shall remain unrepealed, and may not be declared unconstitutional by courts of competent jurisdiction. By that act, it is enacted 'that all persons born in the United States, and not subject to any foreign power, excluding Indians not taxed, are hereby declared to be citizens of the United States; and such citizens, of every race and color, without regard to any previous condition of slavery or involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall have the same right in every State and Territory of the United States, to make and enforce contracts, to sue, to be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be subject to like punishment, pains, and penalties, and to none other, any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom to the contrary notwithstanding.'
"By the provisions of the act full protection is afforded, through the district courts of the United States, to all persons injured, and whose privileges, as they are declared, are in any way impaired, and heavy penalties are denounced against the person who willfully violates the law. I need not state that that law did not receive my approval, yet its remedies are far preferable to those proposed in the present bill—the one being civil and the other military.
"By the sixth section of the bill herewith returned, certain proceedings by which the lands in the 'parishes of St. Helena and St. Luke, South Carolina,' were sold and bid in, and afterward disposed of by the tax commissioners, are ratified and confirmed. By the seventh, eighth, ninth, tenth, and eleventh sections, provisions by law are made for the disposal of the lands thus acquired to a particular class of citizens. While the quieting of titles is deemed very important and desirable, the discrimination made in the bill seems objectionable, as does also the attempt to confer upon the commissioners judicial powers, by which citizens of the United States are to be deprived of their property in a mode contrary to that provision of the Constitution which declares that no person 'shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.' As a general principle, such legislation is unsafe, unwise, partial, and unconstitutional. It may deprive persons of their property who are equally deserving objects of the nation's bounty, as those whom, by this legislation, Congress seeks to benefit. The title to the land thus to be proportioned out to a favored class of citizens must depend upon the regularity of the tax sale under the law as it existed at the time of the sale, and no subsequent legislation can give validity to the rights thus acquired against the original claimants. The attention of Congress is therefore invited to a more mature consideration of the measures proposed in these sections of the bill.
"In conclusion, I again urge upon Congress the danger of class legislation, so well calculated to keep the public mind in a state of uncertain expectation, disquiet, and restlessness, and to encourage interested hopes and fears that the National Government will continue to furnish to classes of citizens, in the several States, means for support and maintenance, regardless of whether they pursue a life of indolence or labor, and regardless, also, of the constitutional limitations of the national authority in times of peace and tranquillity.
"The bill is herewith returned to the House of Representatives, in which it originated, for its final action.
"ANDREW JOHNSON.
"WASHINGTON, D. C., July 16, 1866."
As soon as the reading of this document had been completed, a motion was passed that it should be laid on the table and printed. Notice was given that it would be called up for the action of the House on the following day. Mr. Le Blond, a Democrat, suggested that it would be too long to wait until to-morrow to pass it over the veto, and without debate. The sooner action was taken, the more apparent would be the bad animus.
"I have no objection," said Mr. Eliot, taking him at his word. Others said, "There is no objection," whereupon the vote was reconsidered by which the matter was postponed.
The motion to reconsider the postponement was carried, and the previous question called, "Shall this bill become a law, the objections of the President to the contrary notwithstanding?"
"I do not see why we need be in such a hurry," said Mr. Rogers.
"One of your own side suggested that the vote better be taken now," replied Mr. Ashley.
"Well, he was not in earnest, of course," said Mr. Rogers, creating some mirth by the remark.
"I hope the gentleman will make no objection," said Mr. Le Blond, addressing his remark to Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Ward suggested that "the Democrats should choose their leader, and not confuse us in this way."
Without further parley, the vote was one hundred and four in the affirmative, thirty-three in the negative, and forty-five "not voting." The Speaker then announced, "Two-thirds having voted in the affirmative, the bill has, notwithstanding the objections of the President, again passed."
The Clerk of the House of Representatives immediately announced the action of that body to the Senate. Other business was at once laid aside, and the Veto Message was read in the Senate.
Mr. Hendricks and Mr. Saulsbury then addressed the Senate in support of the position of the President. The question being taken, thirty-three voted for and twelve against the bill. Thereupon the President pro tempore announced, "Two-thirds of this body have passed the bill, and it having been certified that two-thirds of the House of Representatives have voted for this bill, I now pronounce that this bill has become a law."
[Illustration: Hon. Eben C. Ingersoll, Representative from Illinois.]
CHAPTER XIII.
FIRST WORDS ON RECONSTRUCTION.
Responsibility of the Republican Party — Its Power and
Position — Initiatory Step — Mr. Stevens steaks for
Himself — Condition of the Rebel States — Constitutional
Authority under which Congress should act — Estoppel —
What constitutes Congress — The First Duty — Basis of
Representation — Duty on Exports — Two important
Principles — Mr. Raymond's Theory — Rebel States still in
the Union — Consequences of the Radical Theory —
Conditions to be Required — State Sovereignty — Rebel Debt
— Prohibition of Slavery — Two Policies contrasted —
Reply of Mr. Jenckes — Difference in Terms, not in
Substance — Logic of the Conservatives leads to the Results
of the Radicals.
Having traced the progress through Congress of the great measures relating to civil rights and protection of the freedmen, it is now proper to go back to an earlier period in this legislative history, and trace what was said and done upon a subject which, more than any other, awakened the interest and solicitude of the American people—the subject of Reconstruction.
The Republican party had a majority of more than one hundred in the House, and after all its losses, retained more than two thirds of the Senate. As a consequence of this great preponderance of power, the party possessing it was justly held responsible for the manner in which the country should pass the important political crisis consequent upon the termination of the war in the overthrow of the rebellion.
It became an important question for members of the Republican party in Congress to determine among themselves what line of policy they should pursue.
The appointment of the Joint Committee of Fifteen on Reconstruction, was every-where regarded by the constituents of the majority as a most happy initiatory step. The whole country listened with eagerness to hear what words would be spoken in Congress to give some clue to the course the committee would recommend. Words of no uncertain significance and weight were uttered at an early period in the session.
On the 18th of December, a fortnight after the opening of the session, Mr. Stevens announced his opinions on reconstruction with great boldness and distinctness. At the same time, seeing himself much in advance of many of his party, and fearing lest his opinions might alarm the less resolute, he declared: "I do not profess to speak their sentiments, nor must they be held responsible for them."
Mr. Stevens opened his speech with remarks on the condition of the rebel States. He said: "The President assumes, what no one doubts, that the late rebel States have lost their constitutional relations to the Union, and are incapable of representation in Congress, except by permission of the Government. It matters but little, with this admission, whether you call them States out of the Union, and now conquered territories, or assert that because the Constitution forbids them to do what they did do, that they are, therefore, only dead as to all national and political action, and will remain so until the Government shall breathe into them the breath of life anew and permit them to occupy their former position. In other words, that they are not out of the Union, but are only dead carcasses lying within the Union. In either case, it is very plain that it requires the action of Congress to enable them to form a State government and send Representatives to Congress. Nobody, I believe, pretends that with their old constitutions and frames of government they can be permitted to claim their old rights under the Constitution. They have torn their constitutional States into atoms, and built on their foundations fabrics of a totally different character. Dead men can not raise themselves. Dead States can not restore their own existence 'as it was.' Whose especial duty is it to do it? In whom does the Constitution place the power? Not in the judicial branch of Government, for it only adjudicates and does not prescribe laws. Not in the Executive, for he only executes and can not make laws. Not in the commander-in-chief of the armies, for he can only hold them under military rule until the sovereign legislative power of the conqueror shall give them law.
"There is fortunately no difficulty in solving the question. There are two provisions in the Constitution, under one of which the case must fall. The fourth article says: 'New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union.' In my judgment, this is the controlling provision in this case. Unless the law of nations is a dead letter, the late war between two acknowledged belligerents severed their original compacts, and broke all the ties that bound them together. The future condition of the conquered power depends on the will of the conqueror. They must come in as new States or remain as conquered provinces. Congress—the Senate and House of Representatives, with the concurrence of the President—is the only power that can act in the matter. But suppose, as some dreaming theorists imagine, that these States have never been out of the Union, but have only destroyed their State governments so as to be incapable of political action, then the fourth section of the fourth article applies, which says, 'The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government.' Who is the United States? Not the judiciary; not the President; but the sovereign power of the people, exercised through their Representatives in Congress, with the concurrence of the Executive. It means the political Government—the concurrent action of both branches of Congress and the Executive. The separate action of each amounts to nothing either in admitting new States or guaranteeing republican governments to lapsed or outlawed States. Whence springs the preposterous idea that either the President, or the Senate, or the House of Representatives, acting separately, can determine the right of States to send members or Senators to the Congress of the Union?"
Mr. Stevens then cited authorities to prove that "if the so-called Confederate States of America were an independent belligerent, and were so acknowledged by the United States and by Europe, or had assumed and maintained an attitude which entitled them to be considered and treated as a belligerent, then, during such time, they were precisely in the condition of a foreign nation with whom we were at war; nor need their independence as a nation be acknowledged by us to produce that effect."
Having read from a number of authorities to support his position, Mr. Stevens continued: "After such clear and repeated decisions, it is something worse than ridiculous to hear men of respectable standing attempting to nullify the law of nations, and declare the Supreme Court of the United States in error, because, as the Constitution forbids it, the States could not go out of the Union in fact. A respectable gentleman was lately reciting this argument, when he suddenly stopped and said: 'Did you hear of that atrocious murder committed in our town? A rebel deliberately murdered a Government official.' The person addressed said, 'I think you are mistaken.' 'How so? I saw it myself.' 'You are wrong; no murder was or could be committed, for the law forbids it.'
"The theory that the rebel States, for four years a separate power and without representation in Congress, were all the time here in the Union, is a good deal less ingenious and respectable than the metaphysics of Berkeley, which proved that neither the world nor any human being was in existence. If this theory were simply ridiculous it could be forgiven; but its effect is deeply injurious to the stability of the nation. I can not doubt that the late Confederate States are out of the Union to all intents and purposes for which the conqueror may choose so to consider them."
Mr. Stevens further maintained that the rebel States should be adjudged out of the Union on the ground of estoppel. "They are estopped," said he, "both by matter of record and matter in pais. One of the first resolutions passed by seceded South Carolina in January, 1861, is as follows:
"Resolved, unanimously, That the separation of South Carolina from the Federal Union is final, and she has no further interest in the Constitution of the United States; and that the only appropriate negotiations between her and the Federal Government are as to their mutual relations as foreign States."
"Similar resolutions appear upon all their State and Confederate Government records. The speeches of their members of Congress, their generals and executive officers, and the answers of their Government to our shameful suings for peace, went upon the defiant ground that no terms would be offered or received except upon the prior acknowledgment of the entire and permanent independence of the Confederate States. After this, to deny that we have a right to treat them as a conquered belligerent, severed from the Union in fact, is not argument but mockery. Whether it be our interest to do so is the only question hereafter and more deliberately to be considered.
"But suppose these powerful but now subdued belligerents, instead of being out of the Union, are merely destroyed, and are now lying about, a dead corpse, or with animation so suspended as to be incapable of action, and wholly unable to heal themselves by any unaided movements of their own. Then they may fall under the provision of the Constitution which says, "the United States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a republican form of government." Under that power, can the judiciary, or the President, or the commander-in-chief of the army, or the Senate or House of Representatives, acting separately, restore them to life and reädmit them into the Union? I insist that if each acted separately, though the action of each was identical with all the others, it would amount to nothing. Nothing but the joint action of the two houses of Congress and the concurrence of the President could do it. If the Senate admitted their Senators, and the House their members, it would have no effect on the future action of Congress. The Fortieth Congress might reject both. Such is the ragged record of Congress for the last four years."
He cited a decision of the Supreme Court to show that "it rests with Congress to decide what government is the established one in a State," and then remarked: "But Congress does not mean the Senate, or the House of Representatives, and President, all acting severally. Their joint action constitutes Congress. Hence a law of Congress must be passed before any new State can be admitted or any dead ones revived. Until then, no member can be lawfully admitted into either house. Hence, it appears with how little knowledge of constitutional law each branch is urged to admit members separately from these destroyed States. The provision that "each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members," has not the most distant bearing on this question. Congress must create States and declare when they are entitled to be represented. Then each house must judge whether the members presenting themselves from a recognized State possesses the requisite qualifications of age, residence, and citizenship, and whether the election and returns are according to law. The houses separately can judge of nothing else.
"It is obvious from all this, that the first duty of Congress is to pass a law declaring the condition of these outside or defunct States, and providing proper civil government for them. Since the conquest, they have been governed by martial law. Military rule is necessarily despotic, and ought not to exist longer than is absolutely necessary. As there are no symptoms that the people of these provinces will be prepared to participate in constitutional government for some years, I know of no arrangement so proper for them as territorial government. There they can learn the principles of freedom and eat the fruit of foul rebellion. Under such governments, while electing members to the territorial legislatures, they will necessarily mingle with those to whom Congress shall extend the right of suffrage. In territories Congress fixes the qualifications of electors, and I know of no better place nor better occasion for the conquered rebels and the conqueror to practice justice to all men and accustom themselves to make and obey equal laws."
Mr. Stevens proceeded to specify amendments to the Constitution which should be made before the late rebel States "would be capable of acting in the Union." The first of those amendments would be to change the basis of representation among the States from federal numbers to actual voters. After explaining the operation of this amendment, he depicted the consequences of reädmitting the Southern States without this guarantee. "With the basis unchanged," said he, "the eighty-three Southern members, with the Democrats that will in the best of times be elected from the North, will always give them the majority in Congress and in the Electoral College. They will, at the very first election, take possession of the White House and the halls of Congress. I need not depict the ruin that would follow. Assumption of the rebel debt or repudiation of the Federal debt would be sure to follow; the oppression of the freedmen, the reämendment of their State constitutions, and the reëstablishment of slavery would be the inevitable result."
Mr. Stevens thus set forth the importance of a proposed amendment to allow Congress to lay a duty on exports: "Its importance can not well be overstated. It is very obvious that for many years the South will not pay much under our internal revenue laws. The only article on which we can raise any considerable amount is cotton. It will be grown largely at once. With ten cents a pound export duty, it would be furnished cheaper to foreign markets than they could obtain it from any other part of the world. The late war has shown that. Two million bales exported, at five hundred pounds to the bale, would yield $100,000,000. This seems to be the chief revenue we shall ever derive from the South. Besides, it would be a protection to that amount to our domestic manufactures. Other proposed amendments—to make all laws uniform, to prohibit the assumption of the rebel debt—are of vital importance, and the only thing that can prevent the combined forces of copper-heads and secessionists from legislating against the interests of the Union whenever they may obtain an accidental majority.
"But this is not all that we ought to do before these inveterate rebels are invited to participate in our legislation. We have turned, or are about to turn, loose four million slaves, without a hut to shelter them or a cent in their pockets. The infernal laws of slavery have prevented them from acquiring an education, understanding the commonest laws of contract, or of managing the ordinary business of life. This Congress is bound to provide for them until they can take care of themselves. If we do not furnish them with homesteads, and hedge them around with protective laws; if we leave them to the legislation of their late masters, we had better have left them in bondage. Their condition would be worse than that of our prisoners at Andersonville. If we fail in this great duty now, when we have the power, we shall deserve and receive the execration of history and of all future ages.
"Two things are of vital importance: 1. So to establish a principle that none of the rebel States shall be counted in any of the amendments of the Constitution until they are duly admitted into the family of States by the law-making power of their conqueror. For more than six months the amendment of the Constitution abolishing slavery has been ratified by the Legislatures of three-fourths of the States that acted on its passage by Congress, and which had Legislatures, or which were States capable of acting, or required to act, on the question.
"I take no account of the aggregation of whitewashed rebels, who, without any legal authority, have assembled in the capitals of the late rebel States and simulated legislative bodies. Nor do I regard with any respect the cunning by-play into which they deluded the Secretary of State by frequent telegraphic announcements that 'South Carolina had adopted the amendment,' 'Alabama has adopted the amendment, being the twenty-seventh State,' etc. This was intended to delude the people and accustom Congress to hear repeated the names of these extinct States as if they were alive, when, in truth, they have now no more existence than the revolted cities of Latium, two-thirds of whose people were colonized, and their property confiscated, and their rights of citizenship withdrawn by conquering and avenging Rome."
A second thing of vital importance to the stability of this republic, Mr. Stevens asserted to be "that it should now be solemnly decided what power can revive, recreate, and reinstate these provinces into the family of States, and invest them with the rights of American citizens. It is time that Congress should assert its sovereignty, and assume something of the dignity of a Roman senate. It is fortunate that the President invites Congress to take this manly attitude. After stating, with great frankness, in his able message, his theory—which, however, is found to be impracticable, and which, I believe, very few now consider tenable—he refers the whole matter to the judgment of Congress. If Congress should fail firmly and wisely to discharge that high duty, it is not the fault of the President."
Mr. Stevens closed his speech by setting the seal of reprobation upon a doctrine which is becoming too fashionable, that "this is a white man's Government." He uttered a severe rebuke to those who thus "mislead and miseducate the public mind."
There were some Republicans in Congress who disagreed with Mr. Stevens in his theory of the condition of the late rebel States, yet no one ventured immediately, to use a contemporary expression, "to take the Radical bull by the horns."
At length, three days afterward, Mr. Raymond, as a representative of the "Conservatives," ventured a reply. He thus set forth his theory as in opposition to that of Mr. Stevens: "I can not believe that these States have ever been out of the Union, or that they are now out of the Union. I can not believe that they ever have been, or are now, in any sense a separate power. If they were, sir, how and when did they become so? They were once States of this Union—that every one concedes; bound to the Union and made members of the Union by the Constitution of the United States. If they ever went out of the Union, it was at some specific time and by some specific act. Was it by the ordinance of secession? I think we all agree that an ordinance of secession passed by any State of this Union is simply a nullity, because it encounters in its practical operation the Constitution of the United States, which is the supreme law of the land. It could have no legal, actual force or validity. It could not operate to effect any actual change in the relations of the States adopting it to the National Government, still less to accomplish the removal of that State from the sovereign jurisdiction of the Constitution of the United States.
"Well, sir, did the resolutions of these States, the declarations of their officials, the speeches of members of their Legislatures, or the utterances of their press accomplish the result? Certainly not. They could not possibly work any change whatever in the relations of these States to the General Government. All their ordinances and all their resolutions were simply declarations of a purpose to secede. Their secession, if it ever took place, certainly could not date from the time when their intention to secede was first announced. After declaring that intention, they proceeded to carry it into effect. How? By war. By sustaining their purpose by arms against the force which the United States brought to bear against it. Did they sustain it? Were their arms victorious? If they were, then their secession was an accomplished fact; if not, it was nothing more than an abortive attempt, a purpose unfulfilled. This, then, is simply a question of fact, and we all know what the fact is. They did not succeed. They failed to maintain their ground by force of arms; in other words, they failed to secede.
"But the gentleman from Pennsylvania [Mr. Stevens] insists that they did secede, and that this fact is not in the least affected by the other fact that the Constitution forbids secession. He says that the law forbids murder, but that murders are, nevertheless, committed. But there is no analogy between the two cases. If secession had been accomplished; if these States had gone out, and overcome the armies that tried to prevent their going out, then the prohibition of the Constitution could not have altered the fact. In the case of murder the man is killed, and murder is thus committed in spite of the law. The fact of killing is essential to the committal of the crime, and the fact of going out is essential to secession. But in this case there was no such fact. I think I need not argue any further the position that the rebel States have never for one moment, by any ordinances of secession, or by any successful war, carried themselves beyond the rightful jurisdiction of the Constitution of the United States. They have interrupted for a time the practical enforcement and exercise of that jurisdiction; they rendered it impossible for a time for this Government to enforce obedience to its laws; but there has never been an hour when this Government, or this Congress, or this House, or the gentleman from Pennsylvania himself, ever conceded that those States were beyond the jurisdiction of the Constitution and laws of the United States."
Referring to the citation of authorities made by Mr. Stevens, Mr. Raymond maintained that they did not lend the "slightest countenance to the inference which was drawn from them."
In reply to the theory maintained by Mr. Stevens, that States forfeited their State existence by the fact of rebellion, Mr. Raymond said: "I do not see how there can be any such forfeiture involved or implied. The individual citizens of those States went into the rebellion. They thereby incurred certain penalties under the laws and Constitution of the United States. What the States did was to endeavor to interpose their State authority between the individuals in rebellion and the Government of the United States, which assumed, and which would carry out the assumption, to declare those individuals traitors for their acts. The individuals in the States who were in rebellion, it seems to me, were the only parties who, under the Constitution and laws of the United States, could incur the penalties of treason. I know of no law, I know of nothing in the Constitution of the United States, I know of nothing in any recognized or established code of international law, which can punish a State as a State for any act it may perform. It is certain that our Constitution assumes nothing of the kind. It does not deal with States, except in one or two instances, such as elections of members of Congress and the election of electors of President and Vice-President.
"Indeed, the main feature which distinguishes the Union under the Constitution from the old Confederation is this: that whereas the old Confederation did deal with States directly, making requisitions upon them for supplies and relying upon them for the execution of its laws, the Constitution of the United States, in order to form a more perfect Union, made its laws binding on the individual citizens of the several States, whether living in one State or in another. Congress, as the legislative branch of this Government, enacts a law which shall be operative upon every individual within its jurisdiction. It is binding upon each individual citizen, and if he resists it by force, he is guilty of a crime, and is punished accordingly, any thing in the constitution or laws of his State to the contrary notwithstanding. But the States themselves are not touched by the laws of the United States or by the Constitution of the United States. A State can not be indicted; a State can not be tried; a State can not be hung for treason. The individuals in a State may be so tried and hung, but the State as an organization, as an organic member of the Union, still exists, whether its individual citizens commit treason or not."
Mr. Raymond subsequently cited some of the consequences which he thought must follow the acceptance of the position assumed by Mr. Stevens. "If," said Mr. Raymond, "as he asserts, we have been waging war with an independent Power, with a separate nation, I can not see how we can talk of treason in connection with our recent conflict, or demand the execution of Davis or any body else as a traitor. Certainly if we were at war with any other foreign Power, we should not talk of the treason of those who were opposed to us in the field. If we were engaged in a war with France, and should take as prisoner the Emperor Napoleon, certainly we could not talk of him as a traitor or as liable to execution. I think that by adopting any such assumption as that of the honorable gentleman, we surrender the whole idea of treason and the punishment of traitors. I think, moreover, that we accept, virtually and practically, the doctrine of State sovereignty, the right of a State to withdraw from the Union, and to break up the Union at its own will and pleasure.
"Another of the consequences of this doctrine, as it seems to me, would be our inability to talk of loyal men in the South. Loyal to what? Loyal to a foreign, independent Power, as the United States would become under those circumstances? Certainly not. Simply disloyal to their own Government, and deserters, or whatever you may choose to call them, from that to which they would owe allegiance, to a foreign and independent State.
"Now, there is another consequence of the doctrine which I shall not dwell upon, but simply suggest. If that confederacy was an independent Power, a separate nation, it had the right to contract debts; and we, having overthrown and conquered that independent Power, according to the theory of the gentleman from Pennsylvania, would become the successors, the inheritors, of its debts and assets, and we must pay them."
Mr. Raymond set forth his theory of the conditions and relations of the late rebel States in the following language: "I certainly do not think these States are to be dealt with by us as provinces—as simply so much territory—held to us by no other ties than those of conquest. I think we are to deal with them as States having State governments, still subject to the jurisdiction of the Constitution and laws of the United States, still under the constitutional control of the National Government; and that in our dealings with them we are to be guided and governed, not simply by our sovereign will and pleasure as conquerors, but by the restrictions and limitations of the Constitution of the United States, precisely as we are restrained and limited in our dealings with all other States of the American Union."
In answer to the question how we are to deal with the late rebel States, Mr. Raymond remarked: "I think we have a full and perfect right to require certain conditions in the nature of guarantees for the future, and that right rests, primarily and technically, on the surrender we may and must require at their hands. The rebellion has been defeated. A defeat always implies a surrender, and, in a political sense, a surrender implies more than the transfer of the arms used on the field of battle. It implies, in the case of civil war, a surrender of the principles and doctrines, of all the weapons and agencies, by which the war has been carried on. The military surrender was made on the field of battle, to our generals, as the agents and representatives of the Commander-in-chief of the armies of the United States.
"Now, there must be at the end of the war, a similar surrender on the political field of controversy. That surrender is due as an act of justice from the defeated party to the victorious party. It is due, also, and we have a right to exact it, as a guarantee for the future. Why do we demand the surrender of their arms by the vanquished in every battle? We do it that they may not renew the contest. Why do we seek, in this and all similar cases, a surrender of the principles for which they fought? It is that they may never again be made the basis of controversy and rebellion against the Government of the United States.
"Now, what are those principles which should be thus surrendered? The principle of State sovereignty is one of them. It was the corner-stone of the rebellion—at once its animating spirit and its fundamental basis. Deeply ingrained as it was in the Southern heart, it must be surrendered. The ordinances in which it was embodied must not only be repealed, the principle itself must be abandoned, and the ordinances, so far as this war is concerned, be declared null and void, and that declaration must be embodied in their fundamental constitutions."
The speech was here interrupted by Mr. Bingham, who insisted that the adoption of the principle in the State constitutions would not be sufficient guarantee. Adoption in the Constitution of the United States was essential to its permanent effective force.
Mr. Raymond thought the Constitution of the United States as plain as possible in its declaration against the doctrine of State sovereignty. If any more explicit denial could be got into the Constitution, he would favor it.
"Another thing," said Mr. Raymond, "to be surrendered by the defeated rebellion is the obligation to pay the rebel war debt. We have the right to require this repudiation of their debt, because the money represented by that debt was one of the weapons with which they carried on the war against the Government of the United States.
"There is another thing which we have the right to require, and that is the prohibition of slavery. We have the right to require them to do this, not only in their State constitutions, but in the Constitution of the United States. And we have required it, and it has been conceded. They have also conceded that Congress may make such laws as may be requisite to carry that prohibition into effect, which includes such legislation as may be required to secure for them protection of their civil and personal rights—their 'right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.'"
Mr. Spalding having inquired whether there was any limit to the right to make these requisitions, except the good judgment of Congress, Mr. Raymond answered:
"My impression is that these requisitions are made as a part of the terms of surrender which we have a right to demand at the hands of the defeated insurgents, and that it belongs, therefore, to the President, as Commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, to make them, and to fix the limit, as to what they shall embrace."
By way of setting forth the opinions of the "Radicals" in as strong a light as possible, Mr. Raymond said: "It may be for the welfare of this nation that we shall cherish toward the millions of our people lately in rebellion feelings of hatred and distrust; that we shall nurse the bitterness their infamous treason has naturally and justly engendered, and make that the basis of our future dealings with them. Possibly we may best teach them the lessons of liberty, by visiting upon them the worst excesses of despotism. Possibly they may best learn to practice justice toward others, to admire and emulate our republican institutions, by suffering at our hands the absolute rule we denounce in others. It may be best for us and for them that we discard, in all our dealings with them, all the obligations and requirements of the Constitution, and assert as the only law for them the unrestrained will of conquerors and masters."
In contrast with this, he placed what he supposed to be a different policy: "I would exact from them, or impose upon them through the constitutional legislation of Congress, and by enlarging and extending, if necessary, the scope and powers of the Freedmen's Bureau, proper care and protection for the helpless and friendless freedmen, so lately their slaves. I would exercise a rigid scrutiny into the character and loyalty of the men whom they may send to Congress, before I allowed them to participate in the high prerogative of legislating for the nation. But I would seek to allay rather than stimulate the animosities and hatred, however just they may be, to which the war has given rise. But for our own sake as well as for theirs, I would not visit upon them a policy of confiscation which has been discarded in the policy and practical conduct of every civilized nation on the face of the globe."
Mr. Raymond having closed his speech, it was moved that the Committee of the Whole should rise, but the motion was withdrawn to allow Mr. Jenckes, of Rhode Island, five minutes for reply. He said: "The gentleman states, and properly, that every act or ordinance of secession was a nullity. Undoubtedly it was. Upon that question of law we do not disagree. But he seems to me to overlook entirely what was the state of facts from the time of the passage of the ordinances of secession until the time of the surrender of Lee's army. During that period what were the relations which all that territory—I will not use the term States, but all that territory—between the Potomac and the Rio Grande sustained to the Government of the United States? Who could see States there for any purpose for which legislation was required by the Constitution of the United States?
"At the time of the passage of the ordinance of secession, States were organized there, in existence, in action, known to the Constitution and the constitutional authorities under it. But were they loyal? Did they obey the Constitution of the United States? This is a question that needs no answer other than that which is conveyed to every mind by the recollection of the last four years of war, with their expenditure of treasure and blood. Those States were not destroyed, in the technical language of the law—they simply died out. As their Governors passed out of office, as the terms of their legislatures expired, who knew those facts? None but themselves. And yet, behind this grand cordon of armies, stretching from here to the Rio Grande, there were States in existence, organized as States, but States in rebellion, occupying the territory belonging to the people of the United States. They were not acting in concert with this Government, but against it. That, Mr. Chairman, is a matter of fact. My eyes are not dimmed or blinded by the parchment upon which constitutions or laws are written. I, like the men who carried the bayonets and planted the cannon, recognize the fact that was before us during all this time. There was a state of rebellion. There were in that part of our territory no States known to our Constitution or the laws that we enact, or the officers whose duty it is to enforce those laws.
"I recognize, too, the next fact. Bear in mind, I am simply stating now what I conceive to be the facts. The question as to what may be the law can be reserved for discussion on another occasion. I recognize fully the duties of the Executive. And it was the duty of the President of the United States, as the head of the civil and military power of this great republic—not 'empire;' God forbid that this country should ever be so designated with applause or even with toleration—to beat down armed opposition to it, whether it came from a foreign power or from domestic insurrection. That was the duty of the President, and he recognized it; and it was not the duty of any one in this Congress to gainsay it. It was written on the face of the Constitution that the President was to see that the laws should be faithfully executed, and the power of this republic maintained, and he did so.
"The next fact—the fact which seems to me to be the one most pertinent for consideration now—is that the military power which was opposed to this Government has been destroyed. It was the duty of the Executive to see that this was done, and to report to the Congress of the United States that it has been done. But what then? Then there comes the third question of fact, intimately connected with the last, and hardly separable from it, because it requires the immediate action of the Executive and of Congress. All the power that existed in the shape of Confederated States behind rebel bayonets and fortifications has fallen to the earth. The territory which these States in rebellion occupied was the property of the people of the United States, and never could be taken from us. I hold it to be a question of public law, worthy of consideration by the representatives of the American people, by the President and the Administration generally, to ascertain what existed in the shape of civil constitutions and laws behind the military government that has been overthrown. I hesitate not to say, here or elsewhere, that the Executive of this Government has done his duty in this matter. All conquering nations, when they overcome a rebellious people by overthrowing their military power, look, as did the Government of Great Britain when it had overcome the mutiny in India, to see what government of a civil kind has existed or may exist from custom among the people who are conquered. I see no reason in this view to discriminate between the argument of the gentleman from Pennsylvania and the argument of the gentleman from New York. It seems to me, that if they will look at the particular questions which are now before us, and which require our action, the differences would be in terms and not in substance."
The people of the predominant party generally acquiesced in the opinion of Mr. Jenckes, as expressed in the conclusion of his remarks as above presented. They conceived that the difference between the various views of the whole question was "one of details and not of essence." The question of reconstruction was purely practical. All shades of opinion in the Republican party blended in this: that the States in question were not to be restored until satisfactory pledges were given to the United States. All speculation or attempt at argument in reference to their abstract condition was consequently superfluous—"a pernicious abstraction," in the language of Mr. Lincoln.
If some were not prepared to accept the deductions of Mr. Stevens, yet accepting the logic of Mr. Raymond, they would be carried almost as far. The latter held that the citizens of those States were defeated insurgents who must submit to any conditions of surrender imposed by the victorious commander. Certain concessions could be rightfully demanded as parts of their surrender and conditions of their restoration. Their acquiescence had been required in a constitutional amendment affecting the great social and industrial interests of Southern society. After this none could deny the right, whatever might be the expediency, of requiring their assent to other amendments bearing upon the political structure of the Southern States.
Some of the predominant party were willing to stop short in their demands upon the rebel States with requiring acceptance of the emancipation amendment, repudiation of the rebel debt, legal protection of freedmen, and revocation of the ordinances of secession. The majority, however, were disposed to go still further, and demand other conditions and guarantees which should become a part of the fundamental law of the land. This was the practical work of reconstruction for which the Joint Committee of Fifteen was preparing the way, and upon which Congress was soon to enter.
CHAPTER XIV.
THE BASIS OF REPRESENTATION—IN THE HOUSE.
First work of the Joint Committee — The joint resolution proposing a constitutional amendment — Mr. Stevens' reasons for speedy action — Protracted discussion commenced — Objections to the bill by Mr. Rogers — Defense by Mr. Conkling — Two other modes — How States might evade the Law — Not a finality — Wisconsin and South Carolina — Amendment for Female Suffrage proposed — Orth on Indiana and Massachusetts — Obscuration of the sun — More Radical remedy desired — A Kentuckian gratified — Citations from the Census — Premium for Treason — White Slaves — Power to amend well-nigh exhausted — Objections to the Suffrage Basis — "Race" and "Color" ambiguous — Condition of the Question — Recommitted — Final passage.
Although the Joint Committee of Fifteen were assiduous in their attention to the work assigned them, it was not until the 22d of January, 1866, that they were ready to make a partial report and recommend a practical measure for the consideration of Congress.
On that day Mr. Fessenden, of the Senate, and Mr. Stevens, of the House of Representatives, brought before those bodies respectively a partial report from the committee, recommending the passage of the following joint resolution:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, (two-thirds of both houses concurring,) That the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the several States as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when ratified by three-fourths of the said Legislatures, shall be valid as part of said Constitution, namely:
ARTICLE—. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed: Provided, That whenever the elective franchise shall be denied or abridged in any State on account of race or color, all persons of such race or color shall be excluded from the basis of representation.
In the Senate this subject was laid over, and was not reached for several days, as the Freedmen's Bureau Bill was then under discussion.
The subject was pressed upon the attention of the House for immediate action. Mr. Stevens had no intention to make a speech, since the question had been under consideration by every member for the last six weeks. He remarked, however: "There are twenty-two States whose Legislatures are now in session, some of which will adjourn within two or three weeks. It is very desirable, if this amendment is to be adopted, that it should go forth to be acted upon by the Legislatures now in session. It proposes to change the present basis of representation to a representation upon all persons, with the proviso that wherever any State excludes a particular class of persons from the elective franchise, that State to that extent shall not be entitled to be represented in Congress. It does not deny to the States the right to regulate the elective franchise as they please; but it does say to a State, 'If you exclude from the right of suffrage Frenchmen, Irishmen, or any particular class of people, none of that class of persons shall be counted in fixing your representation in this House. You may allow them to vote or not, as you please; but if you do allow them to vote, they will be counted and represented here; while if you do not allow them to vote, no one shall be authorized to represent them here; they shall be excluded from the basis of representation.'"
As indicative of the apparent harmony of sentiments prevailing on the question, Mr. Wilson said that the Committee on the Judiciary had determined to report a proposition substantially identical with that offered by Mr. Stevens.
It was deemed important to have the joint resolution passed as soon as possible, that it might go before the State Legislatures then in session for their ratification before their adjournment. The member who had the measure in charge desired, after one or two speeches on either side, to have the question put to vote, and have the resolution passed before the sun went down. Such action, however, seemed to the House too hasty, and a discussion of the measure was entered upon, which ran through many days.
Mr. Rogers, a member of the committee, offered a minority report, and addressed the House in opposition to the proposed amendment of the Constitution. He thus presented his view of the object of the measure proposed: "It appears to have in its body, in its soul, and in its life only one great object and aim; that is, to debase and degrade the white race, and to place upon a higher footing than the white men are placed, under the Constitution, this African race. It is a proposition to change the organic law of the land with regard to one of the fundamental principles which was laid down by our fathers at the formation of the Constitution as an axiom of civil and political liberty, that taxation and representation should always go together. If gentlemen will examine this proposed amendment of the Constitution, they will see that it is in violation of that great doctrine which was proclaimed by the fathers of the republic when they enunciated the Declaration of Independence, and protested against the tyranny and despotism of England, because she attempted to tax the people of the colonies without allowing them representation in the councils of the kingdom. The amendment now under consideration proposes the very same identical thing that the Parliament of England proposed when it attempted to inflict upon the American colonies taxation without allowing the people of the colonies to have representatives in the Parliament of England to represent them upon the question whether they should be taxed by the mother country or not.
"The first objection I have to the passage of this joint resolution is, that it is violative of the main principle upon which the Revolutionary War was conducted, and which induced our fathers to enter the harbors of Boston and New York and throw the tea into the water. Because the British people attempted to inflict taxation upon them with regard to that tea, and refused to allow them representation in the Parliament of England, our fathers rebelled against their mother country. What has come over the fortunes and happiness of the people of this country that the great principle of the Constitution should now be violated, that principle for which our fathers spilt their blood to sustain, the great axiom of American liberty, that taxation never should be imposed upon a people unless that people have a corresponding representation? If this amendment to the Constitution should be carried into effect, it will prevent any State, North or South, from allowing qualified suffrage to its colored population, except upon forfeiture of representation; and if qualified suffrage should be allowed to the colored population of any State in this Union, on account of race of color, and but one single negro should be deprived of his vote by failure to meet the requirements of the qualification imposed, that State would be denied representation for the whole of that colored population—men, women, and children.
"More than that: this bill attempts, in an indirect manner, to have passed upon, by the Legislatures of the different States, a question which the party in power dare not boldly and openly meet before the people of this country, because there can be but one object lying at the foundation of this bill—an object which has been explained and expatiated upon in this House—and that object, as I have said, is, through the Federal power, to force the States to adopt unqualified negro suffrage, by holding over them the penalty of being deprived of representation according to population.
"But I object to this joint resolution upon another ground—upon the same ground that I objected to the passage of the Negro Suffrage Bill for the District of Columbia—without consulting the people. It has been said in this country that all power emanates from the people. And I say that to submit this grave question to the consideration and decision of partisan Legislatures in the different States—Legislatures which were elected without any regard to this question—is violative of the great principles which lie at the foundations of the liberties of this country; that no organic law, affecting the whole people, should be passed before submitting it to the people for their ratification or rejection. Now this joint resolution proposes simply to submit this amendment for ratification to the Legislatures of the different States. The Legislatures are not the States; the Legislatures are not the people in their sovereign capacity; Legislatures are not the source from which all power emanates. But the people, the sacred people, in the exercise of their sovereign power, either at the ballot-box or in conventions, are the only true and proper forum to which such grave and serious questions should be submitted.
"I maintain that the Constitution of the United States, as it now exists, is not as liberal toward the Southern States, now that slavery has been abolished, as it was before the abolition of slavery. Why, sir, in the days of the past, under our Constitution, the Southern States have been allowed a representation for a population that was not classed as citizens or people; they were allowed a representation for people who had no political status in the State; persons who were not entitled even to exercise the right of coming into a court of civil justice as a plaintiff or defendant in the prosecution or defense of a suit.