This was directed mainly at the British under command of Sir John French. There followed a retreat that for sheer heroism and dogged determination has become one of the great battles of all time. The British, outflanked and outnumbered three to one, fought and marched without cessation for six days and nights. Time after time envelopment and disaster threatened them, but with a determination that would not be beaten they fought off the best that Germany could send against them, maintained contact with the French army on their right, and delayed the German advance so effectively that a complete disarrangement of all the German plans ensued. This was the second great disappointment to Germany. It made possible the victory of the Marne and the victorious peace of 1918. The story of that immortal retreat is best told in the words of Sir John French, transmitting the report of this encounter to the British War Office:
"The transport of the troops from England both by sea and by rail was effected in the best order and without a check. Each unit arrived at its destination well within the scheduled time.
"The concentration was practically complete on the evening of Friday, the 21st ultimo, and I was able to make dispositions to move the force during Saturday, the 22d, to positions I considered most favorable from which to commence operations which the French commander-in-chief, General Joffre, requested me to undertake in pursuance of his plans in prosecution of the campaign.
"The line taken up extended along the line of the canal from Conde on the west, through Mons and Binche on the east. This line was taken up as follows:
"From Conde to Mons, inclusive, was assigned to the Second Corps, and to the right of the Second Corps from Mons the First Corps was posted. The Fifth Cavalry Brigade was placed at Binche.
"In the absence of my Third Army Corps I desired to keep the cavalry divisions as much as possible as a reserve to act on my outer flank, or move in support of any threatened part of the line. The forward reconnoissance was intrusted to Brig.-Gen. Sir Philip Chetwode, with the Fifth Cavalry Brigade, but I directed General Allenby to send forward a few squadrons to assist in this work.
"During the 22d and 23d these advanced squadrons did some excellent work, some of them penetrating as far as Soignies, and several encounters took place in which our troops showed to great advantage.
"2. At 6 A. M., on August 23d, I assembled the commanders of the First and Second Corps and cavalry division at a point close to the position and explained the general situation of the Allies, and what I understood to be General Joffre's plan. I discussed with them at some length the immediate situation in front of us.
"From information I received from French headquarters I understood that little more than one, or at most two, of the enemy's army corps, with perhaps one cavalry division, were in front of my position; and I was aware of no attempted outflanking movement by the enemy. I was confirmed in this opinion by the fact that my patrols encountered no undue opposition in their reconnoitering operations. The observations of my airplanes seemed to bear out this estimate.
"About 3 P. M. on Sunday, the 23d, reports began coming in to the effect that the enemy was commencing an attack on the Mons line, apparently in some strength, but that the right of the position from Mons and Bray was being particularly threatened.
"The commander of the First Corps had pushed his flank back to some high ground south of Bray, and the Fifth Cavalry Brigade evacuated Binche, moving slightly south; the enemy thereupon occupied Binche.
"The right of the Third Division, under General Hamilton, was at Mons, which formed a somewhat dangerous salient; and I directed the commander of the Second Corps to be careful not to keep the troops on this salient too long, but, if threatened seriously, to draw back the center behind Mons. This was done before dark. In the meantime, about 5 P. M., I received a most unexpected message from General Joffre by telegraph, telling me that at least three German corps, viz., a reserve corps, the Fourth Corps and the Ninth Corps, were moving on my position in front, and that the Second Corps was engaged in a turning movement from the direction of Tournay. He also informed me that the two reserve French divisions and the Fifth French army on my right were retiring, the Germans having on the previous day gained possession of the passages of the Sambre, between Charleroi and Namur.
"3. In view of the possibility of my being driven from the Mons position, I had previously ordered a position in rear to be reconnoitered. This position rested on the fortress of Maubeuge on the right and extended west to Jenlain, southeast to Valenciennes, on the left. The position was reported difficult to hold, because standing crops and buildings made the placing of trenches very difficult and limited the field of fire in many important localities. It nevertheless afforded a few good artillery positions.
"When the news of the retirement of the French and the heavy German threatening on my front reached me, I endeavored to confirm it by airplane reconnoissance; and as a result of this I determined to effect a retirement to the Maubeuge position at daybreak on the 24th.
"A certain amount of fighting continued along the whole line throughout the night and at daybreak on the 24th the Second Division from the neighborhood of Harmignies made a powerful demonstration as if to retake Binche. This was supported by the artillery of both the First and Second Divisions, while the First Division took up a supporting position in the neighborhood of Peissant. Under cover of this demonstration the Second Corps retired on the line Dour-Quarouble-Frameries. The Third Division on the right of the corps suffered considerable loss in this operation from the enemy, who had retaken Mons.
"The Second Corps halted on this line, where they partially intrenched themselves, enabling Sir Douglas Haig with the First Corps gradually to withdraw to the new position; and he effected this without much further loss, reaching the line Bavai-Maubeuge about 7 P. M. Toward midday the enemy appeared to be directing his principal effort against our left.
"I had previously ordered General Allenby with the cavalry to act vigorously in advance of my left front and endeavor to take the pressure off.
"About 7.30 A. M. General Allenby received a message from Sir Charles Ferguson, commanding the Fifth Division, saying that he was very hard pressed and in urgent need of support. On receipt of this message General Allenby drew in the cavalry and endeavored to bring direct support to the Fifth Division.
"During the course of this operation General De Lisle, of the Second Cavalry Brigade, thought he saw a good opportunity to paralyze the further advance of the enemy's infantry by making a mounted attack on his flank. He formed up and advanced for this purpose, but was held up by wire about five hundred yards from his objective, and the Ninth Lancers and the Eighteenth Hussars suffered severely in the retirement of the brigade.
"The Nineteenth Infantry Brigade, which had been guarding the line of communications, was brought up by rail to Valenciennes on the 22d and 23d. On the morning of the 24th they were moved out to a position south of Quarouble to support the left flank of the Second Corps.
"With the assistance of the cavalry Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien was enabled to effect his retreat to a new position; although, having two corps of the enemy on his front and one threatening his flank, he suffered great losses in doing so.
"At nightfall the position was occupied by the Second Corps to the west of Bavai, the First Corps to the right. The right was protected by the Fortress of Maubeuge, the left by the Nineteenth Brigade in position between Jenlain and Bry, and the cavalry on the outer flank.
"4. The French were still retiring, and I had no support except such as was afforded by the Fortress of Maubeuge; and the determined attempts of the enemy to get round my left flank assured me that it was his intention to hem me against that place and surround me. I felt that not a moment must be lost in retiring to another position.
"I had every reason to believe that the enemy's forces were somewhat exhausted and I knew that they had suffered heavy losses. I hoped, therefore, that his pursuit would not be too vigorous to prevent me effecting my object.
"The operation, however, was full of danger and difficulty, not only owing to the very superior force in my front, but also to the exhaustion of the troops.
"The retirement was recommenced in the early morning of the 25th to a position in the neighborhood of Le Cateau, and rearguards were ordered to be clear of the Maubeuge-Bavai-Eih Road by 5.30 A. M.
"Two cavalry brigades, with the divisional cavalry of the Second Corps, covered the movement of the Second Corps. The remainder of the cavalry division, with the Nineteenth Brigade, the whole under the command of General Allenby, covered the west flank.
"The Fourth Division commenced its detrainment at Le Cateau on Sunday, the 23d, and by the morning of the 25th eleven battalions and a brigade of artillery with divisional staff were available for service.
"I ordered General Snow to move out to take up a position with his right south of Solesmes, his left resting on the Cambrai-LeCateau Road south of La Chaprie. In this position the division tendered great help to the effective retirement of the Second and First Corps to the new position.
"Although the troops had been ordered to occupy the Cambrai-Le Cateau-Landrecies position, and the ground had, during the 25th, been partially prepared and intrenched, I had grave doubts, owing to the information I had received as to the accumulating strength of the enemy against me—as to the wisdom of standing there to fight.
"Having regard to the continued retirement of the French on my right, my exposed left flank, the tendency of the enemy's western corps (II) to envelop me, and, more than all, the exhausted condition of the troops, I determined to make a great effort to continue the retreat until I could put some substantial obstacle, such as the Somme or the Oise, between my troops and the enemy, and afford the former some opportunity of rest and reorganization. Orders were, therefore, sent to the corps commanders to continue their retreat as soon as they possibly could toward the general line Vermand-St. Quentin-Ribemont.
"The cavalry under General Allenby, were ordered to cover the retirement.
"Throughout the 25th and far into the evening, the First Corps continued its march on Landrecies, following the road along the eastern border of the Foret de Mormal, and arrived at Landrecies about 10 o'clock. I had intended that the corps should come further west so as to fill up the gap between Le Cateau and Landrecies, but the men were exhausted and could not get further in without rest.
"The enemy, however, would not allow them this rest, and about 9.30 P. M. a report was received that the Fourth Guards Brigade in Landrecies was heavily attacked by troops of the Ninth German Army Corps, who were coming through the forest on the north of the town. This brigade fought most gallantly, and caused the enemy to suffer tremendous loss in issuing from the forest into the narrow streets of the town. This loss has been estimated from reliable sources at from 700 to 1,000. At the same time information reached me from Sir Douglas Haig that his First Division was also heavily engaged south and east of Maroilles. I sent urgent messages to the commander of the two French reserve divisions on my right to come up to the assistance of the First Corps, which they eventually did. Partly owing to this assistance, but mainly to the skilful manner in which Sir Douglas Haig extricated his corps from an exceptionally difficult position in the darkness of the night, they were able at dawn to resume their march south toward Wassigny on Guise.
"By about 6 P. M. the Second Corps had got into position with their right on Le Cateau, their left in the neighborhood of Caudry, and the line of defense was continued thence by the Fourth Division toward Seranvillers, the left being thrown back.
"During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the cavalry became a good deal scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th, General Allenby had succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai.
"The Fourth Division was placed under the orders of the general officer commanding the Second Army Corps.
"On the 24th the French Cavalry Corps, consisting of three divisions under General Sordet, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my way back from Bavai, which was my 'Poste de Commandement' during the fighting of the 23d and 24th, I visited General Sordet, and earnestly requested his co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction from his army commander to act on my left flank, but said that his horses were too tired to move before the next day. Although he rendered me valuable assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was unable, for the reasons given, to afford me any support on the most critical day of all, viz., the 26th.
"At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second Corps and the Fourth Division.
"At this time the guns of four German army corps were in position against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face of such an attack.
"I sent him orders to use his utmost endeavors to break off the action and retire at the earliest possible moment, as it was impossible for me to send him any support, the First Corps being at the moment incapable of movement.
"The French Cavalry Corps, under General Sordet, was coming up on our left rear early in the morning, and I sent an urgent message to him to do his utmost to come up and support the retirement of my left flank; but owing to the fatigue of his horses he found himself unable to intervene in any way.
"There had been no time to intrench the position properly, but the troops showed a magnificent front to the terrible fire which confronted them.
"The artillery, although outmatched by at least four to one, made a splendid fight, and inflicted heavy losses on their opponents.
"At length it became apparent that, if complete annihilation was to be avoided, a retirement must be attempted; and the order was given to commence it about 3.30 P. M. The movement was covered with the most devoted intrepidity and determination by the artillery, which had itself suffered heavily, and the fine work done by the cavalry in the further retreat from the position assisted materially in the final completion of this most difficult and dangerous operation.
"Fortunately the enemy had himself suffered too heavily to engage in an energetic pursuit.
"I cannot close the brief account of this glorious stand of the British troops without putting on record my deep appreciation of the valuable services rendered by Gen. Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien.
"I say without hesitation that the saving of the left wing of the army under my command on the morning of the 26th of August, could never have been accomplished unless a commander of rare and unusual coolness, intrepidity, and determination had been present to personally conduct the operation.
"The retreat was continued far into the night of the 26th and through the 27th and 28th, on which date the troops halted on the line Noyon-Chauny-LaFere, having then thrown off the weight of the enemy's pursuit.
"On the 27th and 28th I was much indebted to General Sordet and the French Cavalry Division which he commands for materially assisting my retirement and successfully driving back some of the enemy on Cambrai.
"This closes the period covering the heavy fighting which commenced at Mons on Sunday afternoon, 23d August, and which really constituted a four days' battle.
"It is impossible for me to speak too highly of the skill evinced by the two general officers commanding army corps; the self-sacrificing and devoted exertions of their staffs; the direction of the troops by divisional, brigade, and regimental leaders; the command of the smaller units by their officers; and the magnificent fighting spirit displayed by non-commissioned officers and men.
"I wish particularly to bring to your Lordship's notice the admirable work done by the Royal Flying Corps under Sir David Henderson. Their skill, energy, and perseverance have been beyond all praise. They have furnished me with the most complete and accurate information, which has been of incalculable value in the conduct of the operations. Fired at constantly both by friend and foe, and not hesitating to fly in every kind of weather, they have remained undaunted throughout.
"Further, by actually fighting in the air, they have succeeded in destroying five of the enemy's machines."
The combined French and British armies, including the forces that had retreated from Alsace and Lorraine, gave way with increasing stubbornness before von Kluck. That German general disregarding the fortresses surrounding Paris, swung southward to make a junction with the Army of the Crown Prince of Germany advancing through the Vosges Mountains. General Manoury's army opposed the German advance on the entrenched line of Paris. General Gallieni commanding the garrison of Paris, was ready with a novel mobile transport consisting of taxicabs and fast trucks. The total number of soldiers in the French and British armies now outnumbered those in the German armies opposed to them.
General Joffre, in supreme command of the French, had chosen the battleground. He had set the trap with consummate skill. The word was given; the trap was sprung; and the first battle of the Marne came as a crashing surprise to Germany.
CHAPTER VI
THE TRAIL OF THE BEAST IN BELGIUM
Germany's onrush into heroic Belgium speedily resolved itself into a saturnalia that drenched the land with blood and roused the civilized world into resentful horror. As the tide of barbarity swept forward into Northern France, stories of the horrors filtered through the close web of German censorship. There were denials at first by German propagandists. In the face of truth furnished by thousands of witnesses, the denials faded away.
What caused these atrocities? Were they the spontaneous expression of dormant brutishness in German soldiers? Were they a sudden reversion of an entire nation to bestiality?
The answer is that the private soldier as an individual was not responsible. The carnage, the rapine, the wholesale desolation was an integral part of the German policy of schrecklichkeit or frightfulness. This policy was laid down by Germany as part of its imperial war code. In 1902 Germany issued a new war manual entitled "Kriegsbrauch im Landkriege." In it is written this cold-blooded declaration:
All measures which conduce to the attainment of the object of war are permissible and these may be summarized in the two ideas of violence and cunning. What is permissible includes every means of war without which the object of the war cannot be attained. All means which modern invention affords, including the fullest, most dangerous, and most massive means of destruction, may be utilized.
Brand Whitlock, United States Minister to Belgium, in a formal report to the State Department, made this statement concerning Germany's policy in permitting these outrages:
"All these deliberate organized massacres of civilians, all these murders and outrages, the violation of women, the killing of children, wanton destruction, burning, looting and pillage, and whole towns destroyed, were acts for which no possible military necessity can be pleaded. They were wilfully committed as part of a deliberately prepared and scientifically organized policy of terrorism."
[Illustration: Painting]
From a Painting by F. Gueldry to illustrate an official report.
GERMAN ATROCITIES
At Senlis, Department of Oise, on September 2,1914, French captives
were made to walk in the open so as to be hit by French bullets. Many
were killed and wounded. The townsman on the left was struck in the
knee. A German officer asked to see the wound and shot him through the
shoulder. On the right a German officer is seen torturing a wounded
French soldier by beating him in the face with a stick.
[Illustration: Photographs] Copyright Underwood and Underwood, N. Y. THE SUPREME EXPONENTS OF GERMAN FRIGHTFULNESS On the left, General van Bossing, military commander of Belgium. On the right, Grand Admiral van Tirpitz, who inspired the German submarine campaign.
THE TRAIL OF THE BEAST IN BELGIUM 91
And now, having considered these outrages as part of the German policy of terrorism, let us turn to the facts presented by those who made investigations at first hand in devastated Belgium and Northern France.
Let us first turn to the tragic story of the destruction of Louvain. The first document comes in the form of a cable sent from the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs under date of August 8,1914:
"On Tuesday evening a body of German troops who had been driven back retired in disorder upon the town of Louvain. Germans who were guarding the town thought that the retiring troops were Belgians and fired upon them. In order to excuse this mistake the Germans, in spite of the most energetic denials on the part of the authorities, pretended that Belgians had fired on the Germans, although all the inhabitants, including policemen, had been disarmed for more than a week. Without any examination and without listening to any protest the commanding officer announced that the town would be immediately destroyed. All inhabitants had to leave their homes at once; some were made prisoners; women and children were put into a train of which the destination was unknown; soldiers with fire bombs set fire to the different quarters of the town; the splendid Church of St. Pierre, the markets, the university and its scientific establishments, were given to the flames, and it is probable that the Hotel de Ville, this celebrated jewel of Gothic art, will also have disappeared in the disaster. Several notabilities were shot at sight. Thus a town of 40,000 inhabitants, which, since the fifteenth century, has been the intellectual and scientific capital of the Low Countries is a heap of ashes. Americans, many of whom have followed the course at this illustrious alma mater and have there received such cordial hospitality, cannot remain insensible to this outrage on the rights of humanity and civilization which is unprecedented in history."
Minister Whitlock made the following report on the same outrage:
"A violent fusillade broke out simultaneously at various points in the city (Louvain), notably at the Porte de Bruxelles, Porte de Tirlemont, Rue Leopold, Rue Marie-Therese, Rue des Joyeuses Entrees. German soldiers were firing at random in every street and in every direction. Later fires broke out everywhere, notably in the University building, the Library, in the old Church of St. Peter, in the Place du Peuple, in the Rue de la Station, in the Boulevard de Tirlemont, and in the Chaussee de Tirlemont. On the orders of their chiefs, the German soldiers would break open the houses and set fire to them, shooting on the inhabitants who tried to leave their dwellings. Many persons who took refuge in their cellars were burned to death. The German soldiers were equipped with apparatus for the purpose of firing dwellings, incendiary pastils, machines for spraying petroleum, etc. . . .
"Major von Manteuffel (of the German forces) sent for Alderman Schmidt. Upon the latter's arrival, the major declared that hostages were to be held, as sedition had just broken out. He asked Father Parijs, Mr. Schmidt, and Mgr. Coenraedts, First Vice-Rector of the University, who was being held as a hostage, to make proclamations to the inhabitants exhorting them to be calm and menacing them with a fine of twenty million francs, the destruction of the city and the hanging of the hostages, if they created disturbance. Surrounded by about thirty soldiers and a few officers, Major Manteuffel, Father Parijs, Mr. Schmidt and Mgr. Coenraedts left in the direction of the station, and the alderman, in French, and the priest, in Flemish, made proclamations at the street corners.. . .
"Near the statue of Juste-Lipse, a Dr. Berghausen, a German surgeon, in a highly excited condition, ran to meet the delegation. He shouted that a German soldier had just been killed by a shot fired from the house of Mr. David Fishbach. Addressing the soldiers, Dr. Berghausen said: 'The blood of the entire population of Louvain is not worth a drop of the blood of a German soldier!' Then one of the soldiers threw into the interior of the house of Mr. Fishbach one of the pastils which the German soldiers carried and immediately the house flared up. It contained paintings of a high value. The old coachman, Joseph Vandermosten, who had re-entered the house to try to save the life of his master, did not return. His body was found the next day amidst the ruins. . . .
"The Germans made the usual claim that the civil population had fired upon them and that it was necessary to take these measures, i. e., burn the churches, the library and other public monuments, burn and pillage houses, driving out and murdering the inhabitants, sacking the city in order to punish and to spread terror among the people, and General von Luttwitz had told me that it was reported that the son of the burgomaster had shot one of their generals. But the burgomaster of Louvain had no son and no officer was shot at Louvain. The story of a general shot by the son of a burgomaster was a repetition of a tragedy that had occurred at Aerschot, on the 19th, where the fifteen-year-old son of the burgomaster had been killed by a firing squad, not because he had shot a general, but because an officer had been shot, probably by Belgian soldiers retreating through the town. The story of this tragedy is told by the boy's mother, under oath, before the Belgian Commission, and is so simple, so touching, so convincing in its verisimilitude, that I attach a copy of it in extenso to this report. It seems to afford an altogether typical example of what went on all over the stricken land during those days of terror. (In other places it was the daughter of the burgomaster who was said to have shot a general.)
"The following facts may be noted: From the avowal of Prussian officers themselves, there was not one single victim, among their men at the barracks of St. Martin, Louvain, where it was claimed that the first shot had been fired from a house situated in front of the Caserne. This would appear to be impossible had the civilians fired upon them point blank from across the street. It was said that when certain houses near the barracks were burning, numerous explosions occurred, revealing the presence of cartridges; but these houses were drinking houses much frequented by German soldiers. It was said that Spanish students shot from the schools in the Rue de la Station, but Father Catala, rector of the school, affirms that the schools were empty. . . .
"If it was necessary, for whatever reason, to do what was done at Vise, at Dinant, at Aerschot, at Louvain, and in a hundred other towns that were sacked, pillaged and burned, where masses were shot down because civilians had fired on German troops, and if it was necessary to do this on a scale never before witnessed in history, one might not unreasonably assume that the alleged firing by civilians was done on a scale, if not so thoroughly organized, at least somewhat in proportion to the rage of destruction that punished it. And hence it would seem to be a simple matter to produce at least convincing evidence that civilians had fired on the soldiers; but there is no testimony to that effect beyond that of the soldiers who merely assert it: Man hat geschossen. If there were no more firing on soldiers by civilians in Belgium than is proved by the German testimony, it was not enough to justify the burning of the smallest of the towns that was overtaken by that fate. And there is not a scintilla of evidence of organized bands of francs-tireurs, such as were found in the war of 1870."
Under date of September 12, 1917, Minister Whitlock, in a report to the State Department of the United States, made the following summary: "As one studies the evidence at hand, one is struck at the outset by the fact so general that it must exclude the hypothesis of coincidence, and that is that these wholesale massacres followed immediately upon some check, some reverse, that the German army had sustained. The German army was checked by the guns of the forts to the east of Liege, and the horrors of Vise, Verviers, Bligny, Battice, Hervy and twenty villages follow. When they entered Liege, they burned the houses along two streets and killed many persons, five or six Spaniards among them. Checked before Namur they sacked Andenne, Bouvignies, and Champignon, and when they took Namur they burned one hundred and fifty houses. Compelled to give battle to the French army in the Belgian Ardennes they ravaged the beautiful valley of the Semois; the complete destruction of the village of Rossignlo and the extermination of its entire male population took place there. Checked again by the French on the Meuse, the awful carnage of Dinant results. Held on the Sambre by the French, they burn one hundred houses at Charleroi and enact the appalling tragedy of Tamines. At Mons, the English hold them, and after that all over the Borinage there is a systematic destruction, pillage and murder. The Belgian army drive them back from Malines and Louvain is doomed. The Belgian army failing back and fighting in retreat took refuge in the forts of Antwerp, and the burning and sack of Hougaerde, Wavre, Ottignies, Grimde, Neerlinter, Weert, St. George, Shaffen and Aerschot follow.
[Illustration: Painting: Three soldiers in a bombed out shack, one on a
telephone.]
AN OBSERVATION POST
Watching the effect of gun fire from a sand-bagged ruin near the
German lines.
[Illustration: Photograph of King and soldiers parading on horses.] Photo by Trans-Atlantic News Service KING ALBERT AT THE HEAD OF THE HEROIC SOLDIERS OF BELGIUM It is universally agreed that the Belgian monarch was no figurehead general but a real leader of his troops. It was these men, facing annihilation, who astonished the world by opposing the German military machine successfully enough to allow France to get her armies into shape and prevent the immediate taking of Paris that was planned by Germany.
[Illustration: Painting of soldiers dragging large guns through mud;
shells are exploding in the background; in the foreground a dead
soldier lies face down in the mud.]
THE TERRIBLE FLANDERS MUD
A German battery endeavoring to escape from a British advance sinks in
the mud. The gunners are endeavoring to pull the gun out with ropes.
"The Belgian troops inflicted serious losses on the Germans in the South of the Province of Limbourg, and the towns of Lummen, Bilsen, and Lanaeken are partially destroyed. Antwerp held out for two months, and all about its outer line of fortifications there was blood and fire, numerous villages were sacked and burned and the whole town of Termonde was destroyed. During the battles of September the village of Boortmeerbeek near Malines, occupied by the Germans, was retaken by the Belgians, and when the Germans entered it again they burned forty houses. Three times occupied by the Belgians and retaken by the Germans Boortmeerbeek was three times punished in the same way. That is to say, everywhere the German army met with a defeat it took it out, as we say in America, on the civil population. And that is the explanation of the German atrocities in Belgium."
A committee of the highest honor and responsibility was appointed by the
British Government to investigate the whole subject of atrocities in
Belgium and Northern France. Its chairman was the Rt. Hon. Viscount
James Bryce, formerly British Ambassador to the United States. Its other
members were the Rt. Hon. Sir Frederick Pollock, the Rt. Hon. Sir Edward
Clark, Sir Alfred Hopkinson, Mr. H. A. L. Fisher, Vice-Chancellor of the
University of Sheffield, Mr. Harold Cox and Sir Kenelm E. Digby.
The report of the commission bears upon its face the stamp of painstaking search for truth, substantiates every statement made by Minister Whitlock and makes known many horrible instances of cruelty and barbarity. It makes the following deductions as having been proved beyond question:
1. That there were in many parts of Belgium deliberate and systematically organized massacres of the civil population, accompanied by many isolated murders and other outrages.
2. That in the conduct of the war generally innocent civilians, both men and women, were murdered in large numbers, women violated, and children murdered.
3. That looting, house burning, and the wanton destruction of property were ordered and countenanced by the officers of the German army, that elaborate provision had been made for systematic incendiarism at the very outbreak of the war, and that the burnings and destruction were frequent where no military necessity could be alleged, being, indeed, part of a system of general terrorization.
4. That the rules and usages of war were frequently broken, particularly by the using of civilians, including women and children, as a shield for advancing forces exposed to fire, to a less degree by killing the wounded and prisoners and in the frequent abuse of the Red Cross and the white flag.
The Bryce Commission's report on the destruction of Dinant is an example of testimony laid before them. It follows:
"A clear statement of the outrages at Dinant, which many travelers will recall as a singularly picturesque town on the Meuse, is given by one witness, who says that the Germans began burning houses in the Rue St. Jacques on the 21st of August, and that every house in the street was burned. On the following day an engagement took place between the French and the Germans, and the witness spent the whole day in the cellar of a bank with his wife and children. On the morning of the 23d, about 5 o'clock, firing ceased, and almost immediately afterward a party of Germans came to the house. They rang the bell and began to batter at the door and windows. The witness' wife went to the door and two or three Germans came in. The family were ordered out into the street. There they found another family, and the two families were driven with their hands above their heads along the Rue Grande. All the houses in the street were burning.
"The party was eventually put into a forge where there were a number of other prisoners, about a hundred in all, and were kept there from 11 A. M. till 2 P. M. They were then taken to the prison. There they were assembled in a courtyard and searched. No arms were found. They were then passed through into the prison itself and put into cells. The witness and his wife were separated from each other. During the next hour the witness heard rifle shots continually and noticed in the corner of a courtyard leading off the row of cells the body of a young man with a mantle thrown over it. He recognized the mantle as having belonged to his wife. The witness' daughter was allowed to go out to see what had happened to her mother, and the witness himself was allowed to go across the courtyard half an hour afterward for the same purpose. He found his wife lying on the floor in a room. She had bullet wounds in four places but was alive and told her husband to return to the children and he did so.
"About 5 o'clock in the evening, he saw the Germans bringing out all the young and middle-aged men from the cells, and ranging their prisoners, to the number of forty, in three rows in the middle of the courtyard. About twenty Germans were drawn up opposite, but before anything was done there was a tremendous fusillade from some point near the prison and the civilians were hurried back to their cells. Half an hour later the same forty men were brought back into the courtyard. Almost immediately there was a second fusillade and they were driven back to the cells again.
"About 7 o'clock the witness and other prisoners were brought out of their cells and marched out of the prison. They went between two lines of troops to Roche Bayard, about a kilometer away. An hour later the women and children were separated and the prisoners were brought back to Dinant passing the prison on their way. Just outside the prison, the witness saw three lines of bodies which he recognized as being those of his neighbors. They were nearly all dead, but he noticed movement in some of them. There were about one hundred and twenty bodies. The prisoners were then taken up to the top of a hill outside Dinant and compelled to stay there till 8 o'clock in the morning. On the following day they were put into cattle trucks and taken thence to Coblenz. For three months they remained prisoners in Germany.
"Unarmed civilians were killed in masses at other places near the prison. About ninety bodies were seen lying on the top of one another in a grass square opposite the convent. A witness asked a German officer why her husband had been shot, and he told her that it was because two of her sons had been in the civil guard and had shot at the Germans. As a matter of fact, one of her sons was at that time in Liege and the other in Brussels. It is stated that besides the ninety corpses referred to above, sixty corpses of civilians were recovered from a hole in the brewery yard and that forty-eight bodies of women and children were found in a garden. The town was systematically set on fire by hand grenades. Another witness saw a little girl of seven, one of whose legs was broken and the other injured by a bayonet. We have no reason to believe that the civilian population of Dinant gave any provocation, or that any other defense can be put forward to justify the treatment inflicted upon its citizens."
The Bryce Commission reports the outrages in a number of Belgian villages in this terse fashion:
"In Hofstade a number of houses had been set on fire and many corpses were seen, some in houses, some in back yards, and some in the streets. Two witnesses speak of having seen the body of a young man pierced by bayonet thrusts with the wrists cut also. On a side road the corpse of a civilian was seen on his doorstep with a bayonet wound in his stomach and by his side the dead body of a boy of five or six with his hands nearly severed. The corpses of a woman and boy were seen at the blacksmith's. They had been killed with the bayonet. In a cafe, a young man, also killed with the bayonet, was holding his hands together as if in the attitude of supplication.
"In the garden of a house in the main street, bodies of two women were observed, and in another house, the body of a boy of sixteen with two bayonet wounds in the chest. In Sempst a similar condition of affairs existed. Houses were burning and in some of them were the charred remains of civilians. In a bicycle shop a witness saw the burned corpse of a man. Other witnesses speak of this incident. Another civilian, unarmed, was shot as he was running away. As will be remembered, all the arms had been given up some time before by the order of the burgomaster.
"At Weerde four corpses of civilians were lying in the road. It was said that these men had fired upon the German soldiers; but this is denied. The arms had been given up long before. Two children were killed in the village of Weerde, quite wantonly as they were standing in the road with their mother. They were three or four years old and were killed with the bayonet. A small barn burning close by formed a convenient means of getting rid of bodies. They were thrown into the flames from the bayonets. It is right to add that no commissioned officer was present at the time. At Eppeghem, on August 25th, a pregnant woman who had been wounded with a bayonet was discovered in the convent. She was dying. On the road six dead bodies of laborers were seen.
"At Boortmeerbeek a German soldier was seen to fire three times at a little girl five years old. Having failed to hit her, he subsequently bayoneted her. He was killed with the butt end of a rifle by a Belgian soldier who had seen him commit this murder from a distance. At Herent the charred body of a civilian was found in a butcher's shop, and in a handcart twenty yards away was the dead body of a laborer. Two eye witnesses relate that a German soldier shot a civilian and stabbed him with a bayonet as he lay. He then made one of these witnesses, a civilian prisoner, smell the blood on the bayonet. At Haecht the bodies of ten civilians were seen lying in a row by a brewery wall. In a laborer's house, which had been broken up, the mutilated corpse of a woman of thirty to thirty-five was discovered."
Concerning the treatment of women and children in general, the report continues: "The evidence shows that the German authorities, when carrying out a policy of systematic arson and plunder in selected districts, usually drew some distinction between the adult male population on the one hand and the women and children on the other. It was a frequent practice to set apart the adult males of the condemned district with a view to the execution of a suitable number—preferably of the younger and more vigorous—and to reserve the women and children for milder treatment. The depositions, however, present many instances of calculated cruelty, often going the length of murder, toward the women and children of the condemned area.
"At Dinant sixty women and children were confined in the cellar of a convent from Sunday morning till the following Friday, August 28th, sleeping on the ground, for there were no beds, with nothing to drink during the whole period, and given no food until Wednesday, when somebody threw into the cellar two sticks of macaroni and a carrot for each prisoner. In other cases the women and children were marched for long distances along roads, as, for instance, the march of the women from Louvain to Tirlemont, August 28th, the laggards pricked on by the attendant Uhlans. A lady complains of having been brutally kicked by privates. Others were struck at with the butt end of rifles. At Louvain, at Liege, at Aerschot, at Malines, at Montigny, at Andenne, and elsewhere, there is evidence that the troops were not restrained from drunkenness, and drunken soldiers cannot be trusted to observe the rules or decencies of war, least of all when they are called upon to execute a preordained plan of arson and pillage. From the very first women were not safe. At Liege women and children were chased about the streets by soldiers.
"Witnesses recount how a great crowd of men, women and children from Aerschot were marched to Louvain, and then suddenly exposed to a fire from a mitrailleuse and rifles. 'We were all placed,' recounts a sufferer, 'in Station Street, Louvain, and the German soldiers fired on us. I saw the corpses of some women in the street. I fell down, and a woman who had been shot fell on top of me.' Women and children suddenly turned out into the streets, and, compelled to witness the destruction of their homes by fire, provided a sad spectacle to such as were sober enough to see.
"A humane German officer, witnessing the ruin of Aerschot, exclaimed in disgust: 'I am a father myself, and I cannot bear this. It is not war but butchery.' Officers as well as men succumbed to the temptation of drink, with results which may be illustrated by an incident which occurred at Campenhout. In this village there was a certain well-to-do merchant (name given) who had a cellar of good champagne. On the afternoon of the 14th or 15th of August three German cavalry officers entered the house and demanded champagne. Having drunk ten bottles and invited five or six officers and three or four private soldiers to join them, they continued their carouse, and then called for the master and mistress of the house.
"'Immediately my mistress came in,' says the valet de chambre, 'one of the officers who was sitting on the floor got up, and, putting a revolver to my mistress' temple, shot her dead. The officer was obviously drunk. The other officers continued to drink and sing, and they did not pay any great attention to the killing of my mistress. The officer who shot my mistress then told my master to dig a grave and bury my mistress. My master and the officer went into the garden, the officer threatening my master with a pistol. My master was then forced to dig the grave and to bury my mistress in it. I cannot say for what reason they killed my mistress. The officer who did it was singing all the time.'
"In the evidence before us there are cases tending to show that aggravated crimes against women were sometimes severely punished. One witness reports that a young girl who was being pursued by a drunken soldier at Louvain appealed to a German officer, and that the offender was then and there shot. Another describes how an officer of the Thirty-second Regiment of the Line was led out to execution for the violation of two young girls, but reprieved at the request or with the consent of the girls' mother. These instances are sufficient to show that the maltreatment of women was no part of the military scheme of the invaders, however much it may appear to have been the inevitable result of the system of terror deliberately adopted in certain regions. Indeed, so much is avowed. 'I asked the commander why we had been spared,' says a lady in Louvain, who deposes to having suffered much brutal treatment during the sack. He said: 'We will not hurt you any more. Stay in Louvain. All is finished.' It was Saturday, August 29th, and the reign of terror was over.
"The Germans used men, women and children of Belgium as screens for advancing infantry, as is shown in the following: Outside Fort Fleron, near Liege, men and children were marched in front of the Germans to prevent the Belgian soldiers from firing. The progress of the Germans through Mons was marked by many incidents of this character. Thus, on August 22d, half a dozen Belgian colliers returning from work were marching in front of some German troops who were pursuing the English, and in the opinion of the witnesses, they must have been placed there intentionally. An English officer describes how he caused a barricade to be erected in a main thoroughfare leading out of Mons, when the Germans, in order to reach a crossroad in the rear, fetched civilians out of the houses on each side of the main road and compelled them to hold up white flags and act as cover.
"Another British officer who saw this incident is convinced that the Germans were acting deliberately for the purpose of protecting themselves from the fire of the British troops. Apart from this protection, the Germans could not have advanced, as the street was straight and commanded by the British rifle fire at a range of 700 or 800 yards. Several British soldiers also speak of this incident, and their story is confirmed by a Flemish witness in a side street."
The French Government also appointed a commission, headed by M. Georges Payelle. This body made an investigation of outrages committed by German officers and soldiers in Northern France. Its report showed conditions that outstripped in horror the war tactics of savages. It makes the following accusations:
"In Rebais, two English cavalrymen who were surprised and wounded in this commune were finished off with gunshots by the Germans when they were dismounted and when one of them had thrown up his hands, showing thus that he was unarmed.
"In the department of the Marne, as everywhere else, the German troops gave themselves up to general pillage, which was carried out always under similar conditions and with the complicity of their leaders. The Communes of Heiltz-le-Maurupt, Suippes, Marfaux, Fromentieres and Esternay suffered especially in this way. Everything which the invader could carry off from the houses was placed on motor lorries and vehicles. At Suippes, in particular, they carried off in this way a quantity of different objects, among these sewing machines and toys. A great many villages, as well as important country towns, were burned without any reason whatever. Without doubt, these crimes were committed by order, as German detachments arrived in the neighborhood with their torches, their grenades, and their usual outfit for arson.
"At Marfaux nineteen private houses were burned. Of the Commune of Glannes practically nothing remains. At Somme-Tourbe the entire village has been destroyed, with the exception of the Mairie, the church and two private buildings. At Auve nearly the whole town has been destroyed. At Etrepy sixty-three families out of seventy are homeless. At Huiron all of the houses, with the exception of five have been burned. At Sermaize-les-Bains only about forty houses out of 900 remain. At Bignicourt-sur-Saultz thirty houses out of thirty-three are in ruins.
"At Suippes, the big market town which has been practically burned out, German soldiers carrying straw and cans of petrol have been seen in the streets. While the mayor's house was burning, six sentinels with fixed bayonets were under orders to forbid anyone to approach and to prevent any help being given.
"All this destruction by arson, which only represents a small proportion of the acts of the same kind in the Department of Seine-et-Marne, was accomplished without the least tendency to rebellion or the smallest act of resistance being recorded against the inhabitants of the localities which are today more or less completely destroyed. In some villages the Germans, before setting fire to them made one of their soldiers fire a shot from his rifle so as to be able to pretend afterward that the civilian population had attacked them, an allegation which is all the more absurd since at the time when the enemy arrived, the only inhabitants left were old men, sick persons, or people absolutely without any means of aggression.
[Illustration: Painting]
THE HORRORS OF GERMAN RULE IN FRANCE
Forcibly removing French civilians from Lille to German labor
colonies. Families were ruthlessly separated and led away into slavery
often worse than death.
[Illustration: Hand to hand combat with bayonets.]
Copyright Underwood and Underwood, N. Y.
A FIGHT IN A CLOUD OF GAS
The Germans had sent over gas and in this spot it lingered. Then the
infantry advanced and here, amid the British wire entanglements, the
foes meet. Both sides in gas masks, they struggle amid the "poisonous
vapor, and when the bayonet fails they fight, like the pair in the
foreground, to bring death by tearing away their opponent's mask.
"Numerous crimes against the person have also been committed. In the majority of the communes hostages have been taken away; many of them have not returned. At Sermaize-les-Bains, the Germans carried off about one hundred and fifty people, some of whom were decked out with helmets and coats and compelled, thus equipped, to mount guard over the bridges.
"At Bignicourt-sur-Saultz thirty men and forty-five women and children were obliged to leave with a detachment. One of the men—a certain Emile Pierre—has not returned nor sent any news of himself. At Corfelix, M. Jacqet, who was carried off on the 7th of September with eleven of his fellow-citizens, was found five hundred meters from the village with a bullet in his head.
"At Champuis, the cure, his maid-servant, and four other inhabitants who were taken away on the same day as the hostages of Corfelix had not returned at the time of our visit to the place.
"At the same place an old man of seventy, named Jacquemin, was tied down in his bed by an officer and left in this state without food for three days. He died a little time after. At Vert-la-Gravelle a farm hand was killed. He was struck on the head with a bottle and his chest was run through with a lance. The garde champetre Brulefer of le Gault-la-Foret was murdered at Maclaunay, where he had been taken by the Germans. His body was found with his head shattered and a wound on his chest.
"At Champguyon, a commune which has been fired, a certain Verdier was killed in his father-in-law's house. The latter was not present at the execution, but he heard a shot and next day an officer said to him, 'Son shot. He is under the ruins.' In spite of the search made the body has not been found among them. It must have been consumed in the fire.
"At Sermaize, the roadmaker, Brocard, was placed among a number of hostages. Just at the moment when he was being arrested with his son, his wife and his daughter-in-law in a state of panic rushed to throw themselves into the Saulx. The old man was able to free himself for a moment and ran in all haste after them and made several attempts to save them, but the Germans dragged him away pitilessly, leaving the two wretched women struggling in the river. When Brocard and his son were restored to liberty, four days afterward, and found the bodies, they discovered that their wives had both received bullet wounds in the head.
"At Triaucourt the Germans gave themselves up to the worst excesses. Angered doubtless by the remark which an officer had addressed to a soldier, against whom a young girl of nineteen, Mlle. Helene Proces, had made complaint of on account of the indecent treatment to which she had been subjected, they burned the village and made a systematic massacre of the inhabitants. They began by setting fire to the house of an inoffensive householder, M. Jules Gand, and by shooting this unfortunate man as he was leaving his house to escape the flames. Then they dispersed among the houses in the streets, firing off their rifles on every side. A young man, seventeen years, Georges Lecourtier, who tried to escape, was shot. M. Alfred Lallemand suffered the same fate. He was pursued into the kitchen of his fellow-citizen Tautelier, and murdered there, while Tautelier received three bullets in his hand.
"Fearing, not without reason, for their lives, Mlle. Proces, her mother and her grandmother of seventy-one and her old aunt of eighty-one, tried to cross the trellis which separates their garden from a neighboring property with the help of a ladder. The young girl alone was able to reach the other side and to avoid death by hiding in the cabbages. As for the other women, they were struck down by rifle shots. The village cure collected the brains of the aunt on the ground on which they were strewn and had the bodies carried into Proces' house. During the following night, the Germans played the piano near the bodies.
"While the carnage raged, the fire rapidly spread and devoured thirty-five houses. An old man of seventy and a child of two months perished in the flames. M. Igier, who was trying to save his cattle, was pursued for 300 meters by soldiers, who fired at him ceaselessly. By a miracle this man had the good fortune not to be wounded, but five bullets went through his clothing."
This summary merely hints at the atrocities that were perpetrated. And these are the crimes that France and Belgium will remember after indemnities have been paid, after borders have been re-established and after generations shall have past. The horrors of blazing villages, of violated womanhood, of mutilated childhood, of stark and senseless butcheries, will flash before the minds of French and Belgian men and women when Germany's name shall be mentioned long after the declaration of peace.
Schrecklichkeit had its day. It took its bloody toll of the fairest and bravest of two gallant nations. It ravaged Poland as well and wreaked its fiendish will on wounded soldiers on the battle-fields.
But Schrecklichkeit is dead. Belgium and France have shown that murder and rape and arson can not destroy liberty nor check the indomitable ambitions of the free peoples of earth.
The lesson to Germany was taught at a terrible cost to humanity, but it was taught in a fashion that nations hereafter who shall dream of emulating the Hun will know in advance that frightfulness serves no end except to feed the lust for destruction that exists only in the most debased and brutish of men.
CHAPTER VII
THE FIRST BATTLE OF THE MARNE
France and civilization were saved by Joffre and Foch at the first battle of the Marne, in September, 1914. Autocracy was destroyed by Foch at the second battle of the Marne, in July, 1918.
This in a nutshell embraces the dramatic opening and closing episodes of the World War on the soil of France. Bracketed between these two glorious victories were the agonies of martyred France, the deaths and life-long cripplings of millions of men, the up-rooting of arrogant militarism, the liberation of captive nations.
The first battle of the Marne was wholly a French operation. The British were close at hand, but had no share in the victory. Generals Gallieni and Manoury, acting under instructions from Marshal Joffre, were driven by automobile to the headquarters of the British commander, Sir John French, in the village of Melun. They explained in detail General Joffre's plan of attack upon the advancing German army. An urgent request was made that the British army halt its retreat, face about, and attack the two corps of von Kluck's army then confronting the British. Simultaneously with this attack General Manoury's forces were to fall upon the flank and the rear guard of von Kluck along the River Ourcq. This operation was planned for the next day, September 5th. Sir John French replied that he could not get his tired army in readiness for battle within forty-eight hours. This would delay the British attack in all probability until September 7th.
Joffre's plan of battle, however, would admit of no delay. The case was urgent; there was grave danger of a union between the great forces headed by the Crown Prince and those under von Kluck. He resolved to go ahead without the British, and ordered Manoury to strike as had been planned.
He fixed as an extreme limit for the movement of retreat, which was still going on, the line of Bray-sur-Seine, Nogent-sur-Seine, Arcis-sur-Aube, Vitry-le-Francois, and the region to the north of Bar-le-Duc. This line might be reached if the troops were compelled to go back so far. They would attack before reaching it, as soon as there was a possibility of bringing about an offensive disposition, permitting the co-operation of the whole of the French forces. On September 5 it appeared that this desired situation existed.
[Illustration: Photograph] Copyright Underwood and Underwood, N.Y. GENERAL PERSHING AND MARSHAL JOFFRE The Commander-in-Chief of the American Expeditionary Forces chatting with the veteran Marshal of France, the hero of the first battle of the Marne.
[Illustration: Photograph]
MARSHAL FERDINAND FOCH, GENERALISSIMO OF THE ALLIED ARMIES
No leader could command greater confidence than the brilliant
strategist to whom was mainly due the great victory of the Marne in
the first autumn of the war. He also directed the French offensive on
the Somme in 1916 and in November, 1917, he was chosen as the French
representative and subsequently chairman of the Central Military
Committee appointed to assist the Supreme Allied War Council. Marshal
Foch was formerly for five years lecturer on strategy and tactics at
the Ecole de Guerre. At the close of the war he said to the Allied
armies: "You have won the greatest battle in history and saved the
most sacred cause—the liberty of the world,"
[Illustration: Map; Paris in the lower left corner, showing various battle lines Eastward to Luxumburg.] THE FIRST GERMAN DASH FOR PARIS
The First German army, carrying audacity to temerity, had continued its endeavor to envelop the French left, had crossed the Grand Morin, and reached the region of Chauffry, to the south of Rebais and of Esternay. It aimed then at cutting Joffre off from Paris, in order to begin the investment of the capital.
The Second army had its head on the line Champaubert, Etoges, Bergeres, and Vertus.
The Third and Fourth armies reached to Chalons-sur-Marne and
Bussy-le-Repos. The Fifth army was advancing on one side and the other
from the Argonne as far as Triacourt-les-Islettes and Juivecourt. The
Sixth and Seventh armies were attacking more to the east.
The French left army had been able to occupy the line Sezanne, Villers-St. Georges and Courchamps. This was precisely the disposition which the General-in-Chief had wished to see achieved. On the 4th he decided to take advantage of it, and ordered all the armies to hold themselves ready. He had taken from his right two new army corps, two divisions of infantry, and two divisions of cavalry, which were distributed between his left and his center.
On the evening of the 5th he addressed to all the commanders of armies a message ordering them to attack.
"The hour has come," he wrote, "to advance at all costs, and to die where you stand rather than give way."
If one examines the map, it will be seen that by his inflection toward Meaux and Coulommiers General von Kluck was exposing his right to the offensive action of the French left. This is the starting point of the victory of the Marne.
On the evening of September 5th the French left army had reached the front Penchard-Saint-Souflet-Ver. On the 6th and 7th it continued its attacks vigorously with the Ourcq as objective. On the evening of the 7th it was some kilometers from the Ourcq, on the front Chambry-Marcilly-Lisieux-Acy-en-Multien. On the 8th, the Germans, who had in great haste reinforced their right by bringing their Second and Fourth army corps back to the north, obtained some successes by attacks of extreme violence. But in spite of this pressure the French held their ground. In a brilliant action they took three standards, and being reinforced prepared a new attack for the 10th. At the moment that this attack was about to begin the enemy was already in retreat toward the north. The attack became a pursuit, and on the 12th the French established themselves on the Aisne.
Why did the German forces which were confronting the French, and on the evening before attacking so furiously, retreat on the morning of the 10th? Because in bringing back on the 6th several army corps from the south to the north to face the French left, the enemy had exposed his left to the attacks of the now rested British, who had immediately faced around toward the north, and to those of the French armies which were prolonging the English lines to the right. This is what the French command had sought to bring about. This is what happened on September 8th and allowed the development and rehabilitation which it was to effect.
On the 6th the British army set out from the line Rozcy-Lagny and that evening reached the southward bank of the Grand Morin. On the 7th and 8th it continued its march, and on the 9th had debouched to the north of the Marne below Chauteau-Thierry—the town that was to become famous for the American stand in 1918—taking in flank the German forces which on that day were opposing, on the Ourcq, the French left army. Then it was that these forces began to retreat, while the British army, going in pursuit and capturing seven guns and many prisoners, reached the Aisne between Soissons and Longueval.
The role of the French army, which was operating to the right of the British army, was threefold. It had to support the British attacking on its left. It had on its right to support the center, which, from September 7th, had been subjected to a German attack of great violence. Finally, its mission was to throw back the three active army corps and the reserve corps which faced it.
On the 7th, it made a leap forward, and on the following days reached and crossed the Marne, seizing, after desperate fighting, guns, howitzers, mitrailleuses, and a million cartridges. On the 12th it established itself on the north edge of the Montagne-de-Reime in contact with the French center, which for its part had just forced the enemy to retreat in haste.
The French center consisted of a new army created on August 29th and of one of those which at the beginning of the campaign had been engaged in Belgian Luxemburg. The first had retreated, on August 29th to September 5th, from the Aisne to the north of the Marne and occupied the general front Sezanne-Mailly.
The second, more to the east, had drawn back to the south of the line
Humbauville-Chateau-Beauchamp-Bignicourt-Blesmes-Maurupt-le-Montoy.
The enemy, in view of his right being arrested and the defeat of his enveloping movement, made a desperate effort from the 7th to the 19th to pierce the French center to the west and to the east of Fere-Champenoise. On the 8th he succeeded in forcing back the right of the new French army, which retired as far as Gouragancon. On the 9th, at 6 o'clock in the morning, there was a further retreat to the south of that village, while on the left the other army corps also had to go back to the line Allemant-Connantre.
Despite this retreat General Foch, commanding the army of the center, ordered a general offensive for the same day. With the Morocco division, whose behavior was heroic, he met a furious assault of the Germans on his left toward the marshes of Saint Gond. Then, with the divisions which had just victoriously overcome the attacks of the enemy to the north of Sezanne, and with the whole of his left army corps, he made a flanking attack in the evening of the 9th upon the German forces, and notably the guard, which had thrown back his right army corps. The enemy, taken by surprise by this bold maneuver, did not resist, and beat a hasty retreat. This marked Foch as the most daring and brilliant strategist of the war.
On the 11th the French crossed the Marne between Tours-sur-Marne and Sarry, driving the Germans in front of them in disorder. On the 12th they were in contact with the enemy to the north of the Camp de Chalons. The reserve army of the center, acting on the right of the one just referred to, had been intrusted with the mission during the 7th, 8th, and 9th of disengaging its neighbor, and it was only on the 10th that being reinforced by an army corps from the east, it was able to make its action effectively felt. On the 11th the Germans retired. But, perceiving their danger, they fought desperately, with enormous expenditure of projectiles, behind strong intrenchments. On the 12th the result had none the less been attained, and the two French center armies were solidly established on the ground gained.
To the right of these two armies were three others. They had orders to cover themselves to the north and to debouch toward the west on the flank of the enemy, which was operating to the west of the Argonne. But a wide interval in which the Germans were in force separated them from the French center. The attack took place, nevertheless, with very brilliant success for the French artillery, which destroyed eleven batteries of the Sixteenth German army corps.
On the 10th inst., the Eighth and Fifteenth German army corps counter-attacked, but were repulsed. On the 11th French progress continued with new successes, and on the 12th the French were able to face round toward the north in expectation of the near and inevitable retreat of the enemy, which, in fact, took place from the 13th.
The withdrawal of the mass of the German force involved also that of the left. From the 12th onward the forces of the enemy operating between Nancy and the Vosges retreated in a hurry before the two French armies of the East, which immediately occupied the positions that the enemy had evacuated. The offensive of the French right had thus prepared and consolidated in the most useful way the result secured by the left and center.
Such was this seven days' battle, in which more than two millions of men were engaged. Each army gained ground step by step, opening the road to its neighbor, supported at once by it, taking in flank the adversary which the day before it had attacked in front, the efforts of one articulating closely with those of the other, a perfect unity of intention and method animating the supreme command.
To give this victory all its meaning it is necessary to add that it was gained by troops which for two weeks had been retreating, and which, when the order for the offensive was given, were found to be as ardent as on the first day. It has also to be said that these troops had to meet the whole Germany army. Under their pressure the German retreat at certain times had the appearance of a rout.
In spite of the fatigue of the poilus, in spite of the power of the German heavy artillery, the French took colors, guns, mitrailleuses, shells, and thousands of prisoners. One German corps lost almost the whole of its artillery.
In that great battle the spectacular rush of General Gallieni's army defending Paris, was one of the dramatic surprises that decided the issue. In that stroke Gallieni sent his entire force forty miles to attack the right wing of the German army. In this gigantic maneuver every motor car in Paris was utilized, and the flying force of Gallieni became the "Army in Taxicabs," a name that will live as long as France exists.
General Clergerie, Chief of Staff to Gallieni told the story for posterity. He said:
"From August 26, 1914, the German armies had been descending upon Paris by forced marches. On September 1st they were only three days' march from the advanced line of the intrenched camp, which the garrison were laboring desperately to put into condition for defense. It was necessary to cover with trenches a circuit of 110 miles, install siege guns, assure the coming of supplies for them over narrow-gauge railways, assemble the food and provisions of all kinds necessary for a city of 4,000,000 inhabitants.
"But on September 3d, the intelligence service, which was working perfectly, stated, about the middle of the day, that the German columns, after heading straight for Paris, were swerving toward the southeast and seemed to wish to avoid the fortified camp.
"General Gallieni and I then had one of those long conferences which denoted grave events; they usually lasted from two to five minutes at most. The fact is that the military government of Paris did little talking—it acted. The conference reached this conclusion: 'If they do not come to us, we will go to them with all the force we can muster.' Nothing remained but to make the necessary preparations. The first thing to do was not to give the alarm to the enemy. General Manoury's army immediately received orders to lie low and avoid any engagement that was not absolutely necessary." Then care was taken to reinforce it by every means. All was ready at the designated time.