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History of the Zulu war and its origin

Chapter 26: FOOTNOTES:
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About This Book

The book reconstructs the political, social, and diplomatic background that produced a late‑19th‑century conflict between colonial authorities and a powerful indigenous kingdom, examining long-term relations, border incidents, and the sequence of decisions that escalated tensions. It combines narrative chapters describing government proclamations, cross‑border episodes, and the unfolding campaigns with technical military analysis contributed by a professional, and closes with evaluations of strategic conduct and consequences for both societies. Documentary material, firsthand reportage, and critical commentary are interwoven to explain the war’s origins, conduct, and immediate aftermath.

FOOTNOTES:

[1] “Few things struck me more than the evident haste and temporary character of the defensive measures undertaken by the English part of the population”—in the border districts of Natal. (See letter from Sir Bartle Frere to Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, dated March 28th, 1879. P. P. [C. 2318] p. 32.)

[2] Spelt thus to give the nearest proper pronunciation of “Cetywayo.”

[3] Residence of the Bishop of Natal.

[4] These people had refused to leave their homes, or desert their Bishop, as long as he and his family remained at Bishopstowe, although both black and white, for miles around, had sought shelter elsewhere.

[5] A system not unlike the Inquisition in its evil results.

[6] Who, it may be remarked, have always been well treated in Zululand.

[7] Portions of this letter are omitted from the Blue-book. It would be interesting to see the letter as originally received.

[8] One put to death in 1861 was condemned on a charge of high treason.

[9] As he had previously, in the year 1861, visited Zululand for the purpose of fixing the succession upon the house of Cetshwayo.

[10] Since by our desire he refrained from protecting it by force of arms.

[11] He gives as reasons for his objections: first, that such treaties “involve an admission of equality between the contracting parties,” and therefore “encourage presumption” on the part of the inferior, etc.; secondly, that “men who cannot read are apt to forget or distort the words of a treaty.” A third reason, which does not seem to have occurred to Mr. Shepstone, lies in the ease with which a savage may be deceived as to the contents of a written document, which facility we shall soon largely illustrate in the matter of Boer treaties with the natives.

[12] See Lecky’s “Rationalism in Europe”:—7000 at Trèves; 600 by a single Bishop of Bamberg; 800 in one year, in the bishopric of Wurtzburg; 1000 in the province of Como; 400 at once, at Toulouse; 500 in three months, at Geneva; 48 at Constance; 80 at the little town of Valary in Saxony; 70 in Sweden; and one Christian judge boasted that he himself had been the means of putting to death, in sixteen years, 800 witches!

In Scotland, two centuries ago, but after many centuries of Christianity and civilisation, John Brown, the Ayrshire carrier, was shot, and, within a fortnight, an aged widow and a young maid were tied to stakes in the Solway and drowned by the rising tide, for the crime of neglecting episcopal worship, and going aside into the moor to spend the Sabbath day in prayer and praise.

[13] P. P. [C. 1401] p. 30.

[14] Natives of Basutoland, resident for many years in Natal.

[15] See Field Force Order, 1873.

[16] In the Zulu language the word abantwana (children) is a general one, including both women and children.

[17] It is only fair to Major Durnford to state that during the whole of these proceedings he was away over the mountains, in vain pursuit of an enemy to be fought.

[18] 1. The following account of the above transaction was given by one of those concerned, in a letter to The Natal Times of that date: “Twenty of us volunteered yesterday to go up and into a cave about eight miles from here. We found only one native, whom we shot, took a lot of goats (eighty-seven), and any amount of assegais and other weapons. We also searched about the country and killed a few niggers, taking fourteen prisoners. One fellow in a cave loaded his rifle with stones, and slightly wounded Wheelwright and Lieutenant Clarke, R.A. We, however, got him out, and Moodie shot him through the brains. Fifteen of ours have just volunteered to go to a cave supposed to contain niggers. We are gradually wiping out the three poor fellows who were shot, and all our men are determined to have some more.”

2. The Natal Government Gazette, December 9th, 1873, contains the following enactment: “All officers and other persons who have acted under the authority of Sir Benjamin Chillay Campbell Pine, K.C.M.G., as Lieut.-Governor of the colony of Natal, or as Supreme Chief over the native population, or have acted bonâ fide for the purposes and during the time aforesaid, whether such acts were done in any district, county, or division of the colony in which martial law was proclaimed or not, are hereby indemnified in respect of all acts, matters, and things done, in order to suppress the rebellion and prevent the spread thereof; and such acts so done are hereby made and declared to be lawful, and are confirmed.”

[19] It is hard to understand why these people should yet be detained and their harmless old chief still kept prisoner at Capetown. The common saying that they are all content and the chief better off than he ever was before in his life, is an entirely and cruelly false one. Langalibalele is wearying for his freedom and his own people; the few women with him are tired of their loneliness, and longing to be with their children in Natal. The present writer paid the chief a visit in September of this year (1879), and found him very sad. “I am weary; when will they let me go?” was his continual question.

[20] Not including those individual acts of cruelty which no one could defend, although many speak of them as unavoidable.

[21] The Lieut.-Governor of the colony.

[22] Kafir law, under which Langalibalele was tried, because most of the offences with which he was charged were not recognisable by English law.

[23] Ordinance No. 3, 1849.

[24] The italics are the Author’s own in this and following charge.

[25] The other rebel chiefs of the Cape Colony here alluded to, however, were not “banished,” but merely imprisoned in a portion of their own Supreme Chiefs territory, where, at proper times, they could be visited by members of their families and tribes; moreover, they were duly tried and convicted before the ordinary courts of serious crimes committed by themselves individually, and they had actually resisted by force their Supreme Chief within his territory; whereas Langalibalele had made no resistance—he was a runaway, but no rebel; he had not been tried and condemned for any crime in the Colonial Court, and banishment for life to Robben Island, away from all his people, was a fate worse than death in his and their eyes.

[26] The same Magema, the Bishop’s printer, before mentioned.

[27] Although Mawiza’s lies were plainly exposed, he was never punished, but remains to this day in charge of a large tribe, over which he has been placed by the Government.

[28] On June 24th, 1874, the Bishop presented this “Appeal on behalf of Langalibalele” to His Excellency the Lieut.-Governor of Natal and the executive committee of the Colony. The appeal was made in the first instance to Sir B. C. C. Pine, who altogether refused to listen to it. On this the Bishop forwarded a letter through the Lieut.-Governor to the Earl of Carnarvon, enclosing a copy of his correspondence with Sir B. C. C. Pine, and stating his reasons for acting as he had done in the matter. This letter was dated August 6th, 1874, and on August 16th the Bishop left home en route to England.

[29] He was a bright intelligent lad, keenly anxious for self-improvement, and with a great desire, unusual amongst his kind, to go to England, and see a civilised country.

[30] The Zulus and Zulu-Kafirs bathe their persons frequently, but they have not our ideas of cleanliness in respect to dress and habitations, although they are very particular about their food, utensils, and other matters.

[31] This was done at the expense of Government, which likewise allowed certain supplies of meal, salt, and a little meat to the captives.

[32] The boy was one of those who in the meanwhile had learnt at Bishopstowe to read and write, and who therefore could be of some use to his father as scribe, although his usefulness in that respect is much curtailed by the exceeding caution of the Government, which in its absurd and causeless fear of “treasonable correspondence,” will not allow written words of any description to reach or leave the poor old chief without official inspection. This precaution goes so far that in one instance some mats made by the women for Miss Colenso, and sent from Uitvlugt (the place of Langalibalele’s confinement after he was removed from the island), never reached their destination, owing to the paper attached, signifying for whom they were intended, being removed, as coming under the head of prohibited liberties. Another case is that of a lady who visited the family in September, 1879, and asked them to tell her what trifles they would like her to send them from Cape Town, but found that she had no power to send some babies’ socks which the women had chosen, and a comforter for the old man’s neck, except through an official individual and by formal permission.

[33] A woman, wife of one of the fugitives, being taken prisoner during the expedition, found favour, much against her will, in the eyes of one Adam (a follower of the Secretary for Native Affairs), who asked to be allowed to take her as his wife. Permission was granted, but the woman refused, saying that she had a husband already, to whom she was attached. Her wishes were disregarded, and she was conveyed home by Adam, from whom she shortly escaped. Adam applied to the nearest magistrate for an order to take forcible possession of the fugitive, and the woman was thrown into gaol by the magistrate, until she should consent to be Adam’s wife. The man took her home a second time, and she again escaped from him; in fact her determination was so great that the matter was finally given up altogether. Eventually she rejoined her own husband, who received her and her child with the kindness which her constancy deserved.

[34] Reaching home early in October, 1874.

[35] Acts of “defiance” and “resistance,” too vague for any special instance to be given, probably striking his lordship as being of a slightly imaginary character.

[36] Implying plainly that strict justice would demand it.

[37] Author’s italics.

[38] No notice was ever taken of the recommendation.

[39] It is reported that Sir B. Pine has felt the injustice to himself so keenly that he refuses longer to acknowledge his title of K.C.M.G., and styles himself simply Mr. Pine. There can be little doubt that in point of fact Mr. Shepstone was mainly responsible for all that happened; but “the right man to annex the Transvaal” could not well be spared, and a scapegoat was found for him in Sir Benjamin Pine.

[40] Three at last.

[41] It would be an injustice to an association, called into existence and maintained by a true spirit of Christian charity, to pass over in silence the active, if seemingly ineffectual, efforts of the Aborigines Protection Society to obtain justice for the unfortunate people of the Putini tribe.

[42] The annexation of the Transvaal:—so stated by one of his own staff.

[43] It is neither customary nor convenient to speak publicly of a parent, and I desire to let facts speak for themselves as much as possible. I feel, however, bound to remark that of all the mistakes made by a succession of rulers in Natal, perhaps the most foolish and unnecessary has been that jealousy of episcopal “or unofficial” interference, which has blinded them to the fact that the Bishop has always been ready to give any assistance in his power to the local Government in carrying out all just and expedient measures towards the natives, without claiming any credit or taking any apparently prominent position beyond his own; and, so long as justice is done, would greatly prefer its being done by those in office. He has never interfered, except when his duty as a man, and as the servant of a just and merciful Master, has made it imperatively necessary that he should do so; nor does he covet any political power or influence. To a government which intends to carry out a certain line of policy in defiance of justice and honour, he would ever be an opponent; but one which honestly aims at the truth would assuredly meet with his earnest support.

[44] “The recollection of past events”—that is to say, of the slaughter of many men, women, and children, the destruction of homes, and the sufferings of the living;—this can hardly with reason be said to be kept alive by attempts to ameliorate the condition of those that remained, and to show them some small kindness and pity. How “a good feeling” was to be restored between the victims and their conquerors by other means, Sir Garnet does not suggest.

[45] In common only with the rest of the tribe.

[46] Three women and two children only have been allowed to join him.

[47] Which did not prevent their being of the utmost importance in considering the case of the chief under trial at the time the statements were made.

[48] Sir B. Pine complains in his despatch, December 31st, 1874, of the “intolerable injustice” of charges being made against Mr. J. Shepstone, upon evidence taken by the Bishop ex parte, without the safety of publicity and the opportunity of cross-examination. Yet Sir Garnet Wolseley refused to allow publicity or searching cross-examination by experienced advocates.

[49] One of the original four.

[50] Mr. Shepstone says in his second report that a day or two previous to the meeting with Matshana, he had received information to the effect that the chief’s intentions were to put him and his people to death at the expected interview, and all the efforts made by Mr. Shepstone and his witnesses were to prove, first, the murderous intentions of Matshana; and, secondly, that nevertheless Mr. Shepstone had no counter-plans for violence, and did not fire upon the people.

[51] Author’s italics.

[52] Rather by the determination of their rulers to preserve their land from Boer encroachments.

[53] Sand River Treaty.—“Evidence was adduced that the Transvaal Boers, who, by the Sand River Convention, and in consideration of the independence which that convention assured to them, had solemnly pledged themselves to this country (England) not to reintroduce slavery into their Republic, had been in the habit of capturing, buying, selling, and holding in forced servitude, African children, called by the cant name of ‘black ivory,’ murdering the fathers, and driving off the mothers; that this slave trade was carried on with the sanction of the subordinate Transvaal authorities, and that the President did actually imprison and threaten to ruin by State prosecution a fellow-countryman who brought it to the notice of the English authority—an authority which, if it had not the power to prevent, had at any rate a treaty right to denounce it. This and more was done, sometimes in a barbarous way, under an assumed divine authority to exterminate those who resisted them. So much was established by Dutch and German evidence. But it was supplemented and carried farther by the evidence of natives as to their own sufferings, and of English officers as to that general notoriety which used to be called publica fama.”—From an article by Lord Blachford in The Nineteenth Century Review, August 1879, p. 265.

[54] A native chief.

[55] Written in October, 1879.

[56] Lord Blachford says in the article already quoted from: “The citizens of these Republics have gone out from among us into a hostile wilderness, because they could not endure a humanitarianism which not only runs counter to their habits and interest, but blasphemes that combination of gain with godliness which is part of their religion. While that humanitarianism forms a leading principle of our government they will not submit to it. Why should we bribe or force them to do so? It is no doubt right and wise to remain, if possible, on good terms with them. It is wise and generous to save them, if possible, in their day of calamity—as, with our own opposite policy, we have been able to save them—by a wave of the hand—twice from the Basutos, and once from the Zulus. (Once for all rather, through the course of many years, during which we have restrained the Zulus from asserting their own rights to the disputed territory, by promises that we would see justice done.—Author.) But it is neither wise nor necessary to embroil ourselves in their quarrels until they call for help, until they have had occasion to feel the evil effects of their own methods, and the measure of their weakness, and are ready, not in whispers or innuendos and confidential corners, but outspokenly in public meetings, or through their constituted authorities, to accept with gratitude our intervention on our own terms, until they are, if they ever can be, thus taught by adversity. I do not myself believe that we could enter into any political union with them except at the sacrifice of that character for justice to which, I persist in saying, we owe so much of our power and security in South Africa. Nor so long as we observe the rules of justice to them shall we do any good by disguising our substantial differences, or refraining from indignant remonstrances against proceedings which are not only repugnant to humanity, but violate their engagements with us and endanger our security.”

[57] Colonel Durnford, R.E., who paid a flying visit to Pretoria at the time.

[58] Mr. John Dunn is said to have stated to the Special Correspondent of The Cape Argus, and to have since reaffirmed his statement, that Sir T. Shepstone “sent word to Cetshwayo that he was being hemmed in, and the king was to hold himself in readiness to come to his assistance.” This assertion has also been denied by Sir T. Shepstone’s supporters.

[59] P. P. [C. 1776] p. 88.

[60] It may be interesting to compare the above with the wording of Sir T. Shepstone’s “Commission”—P. P. [C. 1776] p. 111.

[61] The chief repeatedly refused to sign any paper presented to him by the Boers, on the grounds that he could not tell what it might contain, beyond the points explained to him, to which he might afterwards be said to have agreed; showing plainly to what the natives were accustomed in their dealings with the Transvaal.

[62] That claimed by the Boers.

[63] P. P. (2079, pp. 51-54).

[64] The conclusion arrived at, after a careful consideration of all producible evidence, by the Rorke’s Drift Commission, in 1878.

[65] A liability transferred to the Zulu king by Sir Bartle Frere in his correspondence with the Bishop of Natal.

[66] That is to say, that they may be bribed by substantial benefits to acquiesce in the loss of their liberties.

[67] Was it by inadvertence that Sir T. Shepstone speaks of “us” and “we,” thus producing a sentence so strangely and unhappily applicable?

[68] Italics not Sir B. Frere’s.

[69] Author’s italics throughout.

[70] Author’s italics.

[71]Ama-Swazi” for the plural correctly, as also “Ama-Zulu.”

[72] Sir Henry Bulwer, speaking of the disputed territory generally, writes as follows: “The Zulu king had always, in deference very much to the wishes and advice of this Government (Natal), forborne from doing anything in respect of the question that might produce a collision, trusting to the good offices of this Government to arrange the difficulty by other means. But no such arrangement had ever been made; and thus the question had drifted on until the formal annexation of the disputed territory by the Government of the Republic last year, and their subsequent attempt to give a practical effect to their proclamation of annexation by levying taxes upon the Zulus residing in the territory, provoked a resistance and a feeling of resentment which threatened to precipitate a general collision at any moment.”—Sir H. Bulwer, June 29th, 1876 (C. 1961, p. 1).

[73] Umtonga escaped again, and is now living in the Transvaal. His brother was still living in Zululand, as head of Umtonga’s kraal, at the beginning of the war, and no injury appears to have been done to any of the four.

[74] Thereby pointing the truth of his own remark at a previous date—March 30th, 1876 (1748, p. 24): “But messages from the Zulu king are becoming more frequent and urgent, and the replies he receives seem to him to be both temporising and evasive.” (Author’s italics).

[75] Immediately after they had signed the instrument of appointment the two Zulu messengers were sent in to the Government by Messrs. Smith and Colenso, and took with them a letter (C. 2000) which mentioned them as its bearers, and announced what they had done.

[76] ’Mfunzi and ’Nkisimane were sent down again to ’Maritzburg by Cetshwayo, at the request of Sir H. Bulwer, and denied the whole transaction, though it was attested by the signatures of the notary and two white witnesses. It was afterwards discovered that they had been frightened into this denial by a Natal Government messenger, who told them that they had made the Governor very angry with them and their king by making this appointment; and John Dunn also, after receiving letters from ’Maritzburg, told them that they had committed a great fault, and that he saw that they would never all come home again.

[77] Messrs. Smith and Colenso’s explanatory letter to Sir M. Hicks-Beach, dated June 9th, 1878, concludes as follows:

“This business, as far as we are concerned, is, therefore, ended. We had hoped to be instrumental in embodying in a contract a proposal which we knew was advantageous to both parties. To do so only required the intervention of European lawyers trusted by Cetewayo. We knew that he trusted us, and would trust no others. The task of acting for the king was, therefore, imposed on us as lawyers and as gentlemen. Of pecuniary reward, or its equivalent, our labours have brought us nothing. We do not require it. Honour we did not desire, nor had a savage prince any means of conferring it. The duty thus undertaken we give up only in despair, and we have nothing to regret.

“Such information, however, as we have gleaned in the course of our agency you are entitled to hear from us, as we are British subjects.

“The Zulus are hostile to the Boers of the Transvaal, and would fight with them but for fear of being involved in a quarrel with the English. But neither Cetewayo himself, who is wise and peaceful, nor the most hot-blooded of his young warriors have any desire to fight with England, i.e. Natal.

“If they wished to do so there is nothing to prevent them, and never has been. As they march, they could march from their border to this city or to Durban in a little more than twenty-four hours. Their only fear is, that the English will come with an army ‘to make them pay taxes.’ They say they will rather die than do so. The king says the same. Almost every man has a gun. Guns and ammunition are cheaper at any military kraal in Zululand than at Port Natal. These goods are imported by Tonga men, who come in large gangs from Delagoa Bay, for white merchants. An Enfield rifle may be had for a sheep of a Tonga man; many have breech-loaders. The missionaries, whose principal occupation was trading, deal in ammunition. The missionaries have recently lost most of their converts, who have gone trading on their own account. Without these converts the missionaries cannot do business, and they have left the country, except Bishop Schreuder, who has gone back, that it may not be said that a white man is not safe there. Cetewayo says that he has asked the missionaries to stop. They have certainly not been turned out or threatened. Their going makes the Zulus think that we are about to invade the country.

“Nothing but gross mismanagement will bring about a quarrel between England and the Zulus.”—(P. P. [C. 2144] pp. 215, 216).

[78] This is apparently a figure of speech, since Luneburg, near which the kraal was being built, would seem by the map not to lie “to the rear”—as seen from Zululand—of Utrecht, where Sir T. Shepstone was staying.

[79] Compare the account of the delay on the part of the Boer Government when Mr. Keate proposed to arbitrate. See last chapter, p. 182.

[80] 2144, p. 191.

[81] The Zulus, of course, would not have appreciated the convenience of a table and chairs; they had no “documents” to lay upon the former; and their opinion of the comfort of the latter is best expressed by the well-known Zulu saying that, “Only Englishmen and chickens sit upon perches.” The mats provided for them were, therefore, a proper equivalent to the tables and seats placed for the other delegates.

[82] Sir Bartle Frere gives a very unfair account of this matter-of-course fact when he transmits to the Secretary of State the above despatch, “informing me of the incomplete result, in consequence of the attitude of Cetshwayo’s representatives at the Commission of Inquiry.”

[83] The king’s kraal at that time.

[84] The homestead specially spoken of in this case does not appear to have been destroyed or injured till March, 1879, in the midst of the war, nor was any human being, white or black, belonging to these farms, killed by this “savage, unbridled, revengeful nation,” before the war began.

[85] Apparently by Sir T. Shepstone’s orders, as the following phrase appears in one of the Boer protests against arbitration, April 25th, 1873: “The majority of the people have, by order of your Excellency, trekked into laager on December 14th last, and after having remained in laager for nearly five months, we are to go and live on our farms again.”

[86] The married women work in the mealie-gardens, etc., and the little girls carry the babies; but the marriageable young women seem to have an interval of happy freedom from all labour and care.

[87] This was comprehensible during the attempt, which proved so signal a failure, on the part of Sir T. Shepstone, to impose a marriage tax upon the natives. The tax was so extremely unpopular that it was thought advisable to relinquish it, and to make the desired increase in the revenue of the colony by doubling the hut-tax.

[88] Sir T. Shepstone, when he says (1137, p. 18) “Natal gives up the cattle of Zulu refugees.... The refugees themselves are not given up,” plainly includes women amongst the cattle or “property” of the Zulus.

[89] And later, Nov. 18, 1878 (2222, p. 173), he says: “I do not hold the King responsible for the commission of the act, because there is nothing to show that it had his previous concurrence or even cognizance. But he becomes responsible for the act after its commission, and for such reparation as we may consider is due for it.”

[90] Since rifled by our troops, and the bones of the old king brought over to England.

[91] No “demand” was made until it appeared in Sir B. Frere’s ultimatum.

[92] On perusing the above italicised words, one learns for the first time that the ultimatum, which Sir Bartle Frere sent to the Zulu king a few months later, was actually sent for the express purpose of putting “an end to pacific relations with our neighbours.” This is hardly the light in which the British public has been taught to look upon the matter.

[93] Mr. H. Shepstone (Secretary for Native Affairs in the Transvaal) acknowledges that this fine was paid (2222, p. 99).

[94] Manyonyoba owed allegiance to Cetshwayo (as did Umbilini). He lived north of the Pongolo, in a part of the country over which Sir Bartle Frere and Sir Henry Bulwer altogether deny Cetshwayo’s supremacy, and was claimed as a subject of the Transvaal Government.

[95] Sir H. Bulwer says “they have suspected, quite wrongly, that we had some design against them in making it” (the new road to the drift). It is to be questioned how far their suspicion was a wrongful one, seeing that it was understood from the first that the drift was intended especially for military purposes, and was undoubtedly inspected by Mr. Smith for the same.

[96] Quotations from Mr. Deighton’s report to Mr. Wheelwright.

[97] Words applied to him by Mr. Brownlee, late Secretary for Native Affairs of the Cape Government.

[98] Author’s italics.

[99] On one of these visits a missionary is reported to have said to the king coarsely in Zulu, “You are a liar!” (unamanga!) upon which Cetshwayo turned his back to him, and spoke with him no more.

[100] Or rather he was angry with them for the rudeness which they committed in going without taking leave. He said they had never received anything but kindness from him, and might as well have paid him the compliment of a farewell salutation.

[101] Author’s italics.

[102] “Our Correspondent” of The Daily News speaks, in to-day’s issue (November 17th, 1879), of the “tranquillising fear” of Cetshwayo having been removed from “our own native population.”

[103] A mere assertion, often made, but never supported by the slightest proof.

[104] And so the Rev. Mr. Glockner, speaking of the late war, says that they (the missionaries) had often warned the native chiefs of what would befall them, if they refused to become Christians.—Vide The Scotsman, February 5th, 1880.

[105] Story of Maqamsela, from The Natal Colonist of May 4th, 1877: “Another case referred to in our previous article was that of a man named Maqamsela, particulars of which, derived from eye-witnesses, we have received from different sources. On Friday, March 9th, he attended morning service at Etshowe mission station as usual, went home to his kraal, and at noon started to go over to the kraal of Minyegana, but was seized on the road and killed because he was a Christian!

“For many years he had wished to become a Christian, and this at his own desire was reported to Gaozi, his immediate chief, who scolded him, saying, ‘it would occasion him (Gaozi) trouble.’ The earnest and repeated solicitation of Maqamsela was that the missionary (Mr. Oftebro) would take him to the king to obtain his permission to profess Christianity. Last winter the missionary consented to mention it to the king; but, failing to see Gaozi first, deemed it imprudent to do so at that time. Maqamsela was greatly grieved at this, saying, ‘I am not afraid of death; it will be well if I am killed for being a Christian.’ When an opportunity occurred of speaking to Gaozi about Maqamsela’s wish to be baptized, he would give no direct answer, but complained of his bad conduct. Maqamsela, however, persisted in his entreaties that his case should be reported to the king. ‘If they kill me because I believe, they may do so; the Lord will receive me. Has not Christ died for me? Why should I fear?’ A favourable opportunity of naming the matter to the king presented itself some time after. Cetshwayo appeared very friendly, and proposed that the Christians should pay a tax, but said that their service should be building houses for him when called; otherwise they might remain in peace. Maqamsela was then mentioned as being desirous to become a Christian. He was an old man, who could not leave his kraal, and could not come up to serve. He had therefore been eaten up, and had not now a single head of cattle. On his name being mentioned, the king replied that he would say nothing, Gaozi, Minyegana, and Xubane not being there. Maqamsela was glad when he heard what had been done, and said, ‘If they kill me now, it is all right.’

“A week later his time came. An induna, named Jubane, sent for him, and on his return from Jubane’s, an impi came to him, saying they had orders to kill him. He asked for what reason, and being told it was because he was a Christian and for nothing else, he said again, ‘Well, I rejoice to die for the word of the Lord.’ He begged leave to kneel down and pray, which he was allowed to do. After praying, he said, ‘Kill me now.’ They had never seen any man act in this manner before, when about to be killed, and seemed afraid to touch him. After a long pause, however, a young lad took a gun and shot him, and they all ran away.”

[106] This indiscriminate killing is disproved and denied by Cetshwayo himself and his principal chiefs (vide “A Visit to King Ketshwayo,” “Macmillan’s Magazine,” March, 1878).

[107] Author’s italics throughout.

[108] Two Zulu prisoners, captured while on a peaceful errand, just before the commencement of hostilities, and who were permitted to reside at Bishopstowe when released from gaol, until they could safely return home, were questioned concerning these regulations, and said that they applied only to those who voluntarily joined the regiments, concerning which there was no compulsion at all, beyond the moral effect produced by the fact that it was looked upon, by the young people themselves, as rather a poor thing to do to decline joining. Once joined, however, they were obliged to obey orders unhesitatingly. These young men said that in the coast, and outlying districts, there were large numbers of people who had retained their liberty and married as they pleased, but that strict loyalty was the fashion nearer the court. It was in these very coast districts that the Zulus surrendered during the late war, the loyal inhabitants proving their loyalty to the bitter end.

[109] “We are equal,” said the interpreter; but the expression used is more correctly translated as above.

[110] The natives of Natal, “peaceful subjects of Her Majesty,” were living in perfect security on one side of the border, and the Zulus on the other, the two populations intermarrying and mingling in the most friendly manner, without the smallest apprehension of injury to life or property, when Sir B. Frere landed at Durban.

[111] Compare with 9 and 10 the distinct instructions on this point given by Lord Carnarvon during the previous year (1961, p. 60): “I request, therefore, that you will cause the missionaries to understand distinctly that Her Majesty’s Government cannot undertake to compel the king to permit the maintenance of the mission stations in Zululand.” Yet here the clause is made one of the conditions of an ultimatum, the alternative of which is war.

[112] Sir T. Shepstone’s incontrovertible, overwhelming, and clear evidence, sifted and proved worthless by the Commissioners.

[113] Sir Bartle Frere declares (Correspondence, p. 57) that Cetshwayo “could have known nothing of the memorandum,” although (ibid. p. 6) he himself asserts that “it was intended to explain for Cetshwayo’s benefit what was the nature of the cession to him,” and it was plainly very generally known, and therefore naturally by the king.

[114] Correspondence, p. 3.

[115] Ibid. p. 6.

[116] Compare with Sir Bartle Frere’s suggestion to Sir Henry Bulwer that the latter should persuade the Zulu king that the Active and her fellows were mostly merchant vessels, but that the English war-vessels would be sufficient to protect his coast!

[117] Our own troops’ experience showed that this was no idle excuse.

[118] One of Colonel Durnford’s officers writes, January 26th, “that he (the Colonel) had worked so hard at equipping this Native Contingent, against much opposition, and took special pride in his mounted men, three hundred men, that he called ‘The Natal Native Horse.’”

[119] These words deserve special remark.

[120] After-events proved the fallacy of these “reports.” Even when the Zulus could have swept Natal with fatal effect, they refrained.

[121] Lord Chelmsford, January 16th, 1879. (P. P. [C. 2252] p. 63.)

[122] Captain N. Newman.

[123] Some Zulus (a chief named Gandama, and others) came into the camp on the 21st, saw the General, and were allowed to depart.—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 182).

[124] P. P. (C. 2260) p. 81.

[125] Major Clery.

[126] “There were no high words,” Lieutenant Cochrane says, of any kind between the colonels, as some would lead the public to suppose. The above remarks are taken from Lieutenant Cochrane’s account of what passed; and he says: “I think no one lives who was present during the conversation but myself; so that anything said contradictory to my statement is invented.”

[127] Captain Essex, 75th Regiment.

[128] Lieutenant Raw, Natal Native Horse.

[129] Lieutenant Cochrane, 32nd Regiment.

[130] Mr. Brickhill.

[131] Having disengaged his men, Captain G. Shepstone said: “I must go and see where my Chief is,” and rode in again. His devotion cost him his life.

[132] Captain Gardner.

[133] Captain Essex.

[134] Lieutenant Curling, R.A.

[135] Captain Essex.

[136] Lieutenant Cochrane.

[137] Mr. Brickhill.

[138] Lieutenant Curling.

[139] Three mounted Zulu scouts were seen on the hills on the right from the rear guard, by an officer, who pointed them out to one of the staff.

[140] Some remarks made by Lieutenant Milne, R.N. (aide-de-camp), are worthy of notice: “January 21st.—We then rode up to the high land to the left of our camp, the ascent very steep, but possible for horses. On reaching the summit of the highest hill, I counted fourteen Zulu horsemen watching us at the distance of about four miles; they ultimately disappeared over a slight rise. Two vedettes were stationed at the spot from where I saw these horsemen; they said they had seen these men several times during the day, and had reported the fact.... We then returned to camp, the General having determined to send out a patrol in this direction the next day.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 183).

January 22nd.—Lieutenant Milne was sent to the top of a hill to see what was doing in camp, and says: “On reaching the summit I could see the camp; all the cattle had been driven in close around the tents. I could see nothing of the enemy on the left” (ibid. p. 184).

“We are not quite certain about the time. But it is just possible that what I took to be the cattle having been driven into camp may possibly have been the Zulu ‘impi’” (ibid. p. 187).

[141] One message only is mentioned by the General or his military secretary as having been received from the camp. But an officer (of rank) who had seen them, says that five or six messages were received from the camp during the day by the General or his staff; and he says distinctly that the messages were in the possession of Lieut.-Colonel Crealock.

[142] About this hour the tents in camp suddenly disappeared.

[143] No spare ammunition was taken by the force with the General.

[144] The reserve ammunition is said to have been packed in waggons, which were then filled up with stores.

[145] The first official mention of this appears in a Blue-book of August, 1879, where Lieutenant Milne, R.N. (aide-de-camp), says: “In the meantime, news came that Colonel Harness had heard the firing, and was proceeding with his guns and companies of infantry escorting them to camp. Orders were immediately sent to him to return and rejoin Colonel Glyn.”—(P. P. [C. 2454] p. 184).

[146] By the General’s directions this statement was to be “of the facts which came under his cognizance on the day in question.”—(P. P. [C. 2260] p. 80).

[147] “The panic and confusion were fearful,” says one of themselves.

[148] The number of prisoners thus killed is said to have been about twenty.

[149] Yet Sir B. Frere, on the 30th June, writes: “The position of Wood’s and Pearson’s columns effectually checked the execution of an attempt at invasion.” These two columns, being some ninety miles apart and secure in their own positions only, would have been of little avail had the Zulu king desired to make “an attempt at invasion.” It needed no better strategists than Cetshwayo and his chiefs to have masked each of the posts at Kambula and Etshowe with some 5000 men, and then “the Zulus might march at will through the country.”

[150] Some officers who were with the advance column, and who afterwards visited Isandhlwana, say that they appear to have “tried to get the waggons together to form a laager,” but there was not time.

[151] With respect to this, Lord Chelmsford lays down a principle (relative to the border raids, but even more strongly applicable here) that if a force remains “on the passive defensive, without endeavouring by means of scouting in small bodies or by raiding in large ones, to discover what the enemy is doing in its immediate front, it deserves to be surprised and overpowered.”—(P. P. [C. 2318] p. 80).

[152] It is stated that on the previous evening there was no intention on the part of the Zulus to attack the camp upon the 22nd, which was not thought by them a propitious day, being that of the new moon. It is also said that the Zulu army came with pacific intentions, in order to give up Sihayo’s sons, and the cattle for the fine. In all probability they left the king with such orders—that is to say, to make terms if possible, but to fight if forced to it, and if the English intentions were plainly hostile. This hostility was thoroughly proved before the morning of the 22nd, when the departure of Lord Chelmsford’s force from the camp must have been a strong temptation to the Zulus to attack the latter.

Warning of the Zulu army moving against Nos. 1 and 3 Columns was received on the border, and communicated to Mr. Fannin, Border Agent, on January 20th. The warning stated that the whole Zulu army, over 35,000 strong (except about 4000 who remained with the king), was marched in two columns, the strongest against Colonel Glyn’s column, the other against Colonel Pearson; this was to take up its position on the 20th or 21st January at the royal kraal near Inyezane, and the first to approach Rorke’s Drift. The writer complains of the little and inadequate use made of the information, which might have been communicated from Fort Pearson to Rorke’s Drift in time to have averted the fearful disaster of the 22nd January.—(P. P. [C. 2308] pp. 69, 70).

[153] P. P. (C. 2318) p. 12.

[154] Had Lord Chelmsford been acquainted with this peculiarity of the Zulus, he might not have thought it necessary to hurry away from Isandhlwana on the 23rd. There was no fear of the same force attacking again for some days to come.

[155] P. P. (C. 2318) pp. 11-17.

[156] Who, it is said, insisted upon the animals being fine and in good condition, returning some which were sent in below the required mark.

[157] Captain Clarke’s report (C. 2144), p. 37.

[158] Sir T. Shepstone to Sir H. Bulwer, April 16th, 1878 (C. 2144).

[159] Upon the Zulu border.

[160] C. 2367, p. 90.

[161] Sondolosi, deceased brother of Seketwayo.

[162] Trooper Grandier’s story of ill-treatment has since been contradicted by this Dutchman.

[163] C. 2374, p. 109.

[164] Nevertheless, during the end of March and beginning of April communications took place between the Lieut.-Governor and the General commanding, on this subject (C. 2318, p. 45); therefore both the military and civil authorities were aware of it.

[165] John Dunn is understood to have come back from his interview with the last peace messengers, and to have reported that the message was bonâ fide, and that Cetshwayo “means to have peace if possible.”

[166] This company of Native Pioneers (one of those organised by Colonel Durnford, R.E., before the war) was raised from the employés of the Colonial Engineer Department, and commanded by Captain Beddoes of the same department; this officer being highly commended by his chief. The company worked under the supervision of Lieutenant Main, R.E., and rendered excellent service. Colonel Pearson remarked: “The men worked cheerfully. They had eyes like hawks, and they did their scouting to perfection.”

[167] One of the hardest workers in this department was Commissary J. W. Elmes, who distinguished himself by his untiring zeal and energy.

[168] P. P. (C. 2260) p. 104.

[169] P. P. (C. 2374) p. 115.

[170] Mr. Mansel, the officer commanding this troop of Natal Mounted Police, says: “When we went out the morning before the fight we left thirty-one men behind, men whose horses had sore backs, etc. These men were in charge of only a corporal. Seven men escaped, and we buried all of the twenty-four that were killed. Twenty were killed just around Colonel Durnford. Three about two hundred yards away, and one at the Fugitives’ Drift.”

[171] Properly Uzulu—the Zulu nation.

[172] The above is corroborated on all main points by Mehlokazulu, son of Sihayo, who states that he was sent with three other indunas (mounted), on the morning of the 22nd, to see what the English were doing. On reporting to Tshingwayo, he said, “All right, we will see what they are going to do.” “Presently,” says Mehlokazulu, “I heard Tshingwayo give orders for the Tulwana and Ngyaza regiments to assemble. When they had done so, he gave orders for the others to assemble and advance in the direction of the English camp. We were fired on first by the mounted men, who checked our advance for some little time.” He says the soldiers were at first “in loose order,” but afterwards he saw them “massing together,” when “they fired at a fearful rate.” When the Zulus broke the infantry and closed in, they “came on to a mixed party of mounted men and infantry men,” about one hundred, who “made a desperate resistance, some firing with pistols and others using swords, and I repeatedly heard the word ‘Fire!’ given by someone. But we proved too many for them, and killed them all where they stood. When all was over I had a look at these men, and saw a dead officer, with his arm in a sling and a big moustache (Colonel Durnford, R.E.), surrounded by dead carbineers, soldiers, and other men whom I did not know.”—Vide R. E. Journal, Feb. 1880.

[173] Written for him by a Dutch trader, residing with him.

[174] This information he obtained through his messengers ’Mfunzi and ’Nkisimane, who were in Pietermaritzburg in June. The message (sent by Mr. Colenso) being, that the young officer killed at the Styotyozi river was a Prince; that his sword would be desired by his family, and that if Cetshwayo wanted to make peace he had better return it. The result was that, as soon as the king received the message, he sent the sword on to Lord Chelmsford.

[175] Amongst the wild natives of South Africa it is thought that the carrying of burdens is not a manly task. In a family of travelling Zulus the women and lads perform the duties of carriers, while the man of the party marches ahead, unencumbered except by his weapons, ready if necessary to defend his flock against the attack of man or beast. An officer, travelling in the eastern province some years ago, met and questioned a party proceeding in this fashion. “Why,” he asked the leader of the little band, “do you allow these women and girls to carry heavy loads, while you, a strong able-bodied man, have nothing but your assegais and knob-kerries in your hand?” Such questions are not seldom resented when they touch on native customs, and are asked in an overbearing manner. This officer was uniformly kind and courteous to the natives, and the man smilingly replied, “It is our custom, and the women prefer it;” referring his questioner to the women themselves for their opinion. The chief of these latter thereupon replied, with much grace and dignity: “Does the white chief think we would let our man do woman’s work? It is our work to carry, and we should not like to see him do it.”

[176] The appearance of the native carrier on the march was very ludicrous. Picture a stalwart Kafir carrying his sleeping mats, provisions, cooking-pot, drinking-gourd, shield, bundle of assegais and knob-kerries, and perched on top of all, on his head, a fifty-pound mealie-bag; the result was likened to a Christmas-tree.

[177] A splendid elephant’s tusk (the Zulu emblem of international good-will and sincerity) had been sent by Cetshwayo, with one of his messages, to General Crealock; this Sir Garnet Wolseley sent home to the Queen, who thus has received a valuable present from her dusky antagonist.

[178] Mr. Colenso was acquainted with him, having, as already related, paid him a visit in 1877.

[179] At the same time many residents in Cape Town obtained, from mere motives of curiosity, that interview which, to those who had desired it for humanity’s sake, had been refused, while all who know his language, or are likely to sympathise, are rigidly excluded. Orders were given afterwards that the name of the Bishop of Natal should not be mentioned to Cetshwayo, “because it excited the prisoner.”

[180] We think this statement is hardly correct.

[181] The Daily News, 30th October, 1879.