History of the Zulu War

CHAPTER X.

LORD CHELMSFORD'S POLICY—PROMPTNESS AND DECISION OF SIR GARNET WOLSELEY—THE HUNT AND CAPTURE OF CETYWAYO—DEPARTURE FROM NATAL—THE LAST OF THE ZULU KINGS A PRISONER IN THE CASTLE OF CAPE TOWN—GREAT MEETING WITH ZULU CHIEFS—SIR GARNET WOLSELEY'S SPEECH—SETTLEMENT OF THE COUNTRY—END OF THE WAR.

Before leaving the shores of South Africa, Lord Chelmsford took occasion at Cape Town to make a public defence of his policy, in which he denied that he had been guilty of hesitation and vacillation. His mind was made up at a very early date, and he went on unswervingly to Ulundi by the route he had originally resolved upon. If the work were to be done over again he would adopt the same plan of campaign. In marching upon Ulundi no calculation was made for assistance from the coast column—only indirect support was reckoned upon. After the crushing defeat at Ulundi no advantage would have been gained by endeavouring to penetrate the difficult country lying north of the king's kraal, even had the state of supplies permitted it. "While, therefore, one portion of the force retraced its steps towards the Blood river, escorting the sick and wounded, and taking with it all the empty waggons, the others moved viâ Kwamagwasa to St. Paul's, and then completed the chain of strongly entrenched posts extending east and west along the centre of Zululand at intervals of about twenty miles. So far one side of the question. On the other hand, men of unquestioned ability and experience, correspondents for several of the leading journals of the world, did not hesitate to blame Lord Chelmsford severely. These men were on the spot, were qualified to form an opinion, and it is absurd and unjust to imagine that political bias of any sort guided their pens.

The Times' correspondent complains of the want of a definite plan, and speaks of orders having been countermanded, and of general uncertainty. "What is wanted is a bolder determination." On the 16th of June he writes, "We are wandering towards Ulundi much as the children of Israel wandered towards Canaan, without plans or even definite notions for the future. Plain, common-sense plans suffice, if backed by energy, decision, and determination." The Telegraph's correspondent tells us that Lord Chelmsford's intelligence department "has been singularly defective throughout." The correspondent of the Daily News, Mr. Archibald Forbes, thoroughly shared these opinions, and expresses them with conspicuous power and ability. Indeed, it is almost impossible for any one to study carefully the proceedings of this protracted campaign, from the arrival of reinforcements in March until the battle of Ulundi, and not come to conclusions by no means complimentary to the general commanding-in-chief. It is urged that carriers, such as those employed by Sir Garnet Wolseley immediately after his arrival,[50] would have immensely facilitated transport, and when we consider that 4000 British troops at Ulundi defeated, in the open field, the concentrated power of Cetywayo—an army of more than 20,000 men—it is hard to believe that a column such as Wood's, properly reinforced and moving quickly, would not have been able to finish the war.

Sir Garnet Wolseley's proceedings were of the most prompt and vigorous character. Disappointed in not being able to land at Port Durnford, he had to return to D'Urban and proceed overland to General Crealock's coast column. When near the coast, he was gratified by receiving news of the battle of Ulundi, but was subsequently disappointed at Lord Chelmsford's neglecting to take full advantage of this victory. That officer almost immediately resigned, and had an interview with Sir Garnet, whom he met at St. Paul's. A Ulundi column was organized under Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke, consisting of the 60th Regiment, Barrow's Mounted Infantry, two troops of Lonsdale's Horse, and two troops of the Native Contingent. This small movable column was ordered to operate towards the upper waters of the White and Black Umvolosi; Oham, with a burgher force, was to move from Luneberg. On the 21st of July Sir Garnet had a satisfactory interview with the principal Zulu chiefs. Dabulamanzi, the king's brother and one of the chief leaders of his army, had surrendered at Fort Chelmsford (Crealock's column) on the 11th of July, and numbers of minor chiefs, with their people, came forward to declare their submission to the British Government. Colonel Baker Russell was directed to operate from Intabankawa, in the direction of the Black Umvolosi, lending assistance to Oham, whose forces were situated in a more northerly direction. Under Colonel Villiers it was arranged that the Swazis should cross the Pongolo, accompanied by Political Agent Macleod. As Sir Garnet considered that there were more troops in the command than were necessary, the first division and cavalry brigade were broken up. Generals Crealock and Marshall went home. The 1-13th, 1-24th, and 17th Lancers were ordered to leave, and several colonial corps were disbanded. Brigadier-General Wood and Colonel Buller required rest, and proceeded to England, while the Marines who arrived by the Jumna, from Plymouth, were sent back before even they reached Natal.

The chase of Cetywayo must always form an interesting episode in British colonial history. No war in Zululand could be said to be thoroughly at an end in which the despot whose will was law throughout the entire country was left uncaptured. The task of securing his person was a very difficult one. The king was looked upon as sacred, and we shall see that the most unbounded loyalty was manifested towards him. The country into which he had retreated was broken and difficult, intersected by forests and unprovided with roads. Above all, the people were thoroughly hostile, and faithful unto death to the monarch who was pursued to death by the hated white man. Nevertheless, the chase was successful, and that it was so reflected immense credit upon those engaged in it.

The force told off for the duty was organized at Ulundi. It was placed under the command of Major Barrow, and comprised the King's Dragoon Guards, the Mounted Infantry, Lonsdale's Horse, Captain Norse's Mounted Contingent, Jantje's Horse under Captain Hayes, together with a corps of Guides under Corporal Acutt. The hunt lasted fourteen days, and commenced on a Tuesday afternoon with a forced march of twenty-one hours, during the whole of which time the men were in the saddle. In this manner Zonyamma's kraal was reached, where it was supposed the king might be. The king had left the day previously with thirty men. Two hours' rest, and away over very hilly country. A terribly steep hill was descended, and a kraal visited where Cetywayo had been that morning. The river Mona was then crossed, and a steep hill ascended in order to reach Umbopa's kraal, where the scent was entirely lost. Of course, the Zulus knew where the king was, but nothing on earth would induce them to tell. Umbopa (whose son was with Cetywayo) was then made prisoner and taken to his son's kraal, at a distance of five miles, where some of the king's slaughter oxen were found. The kraal was deserted. Lord Gifford, second in command, was then ordered to scour the country, and had a very exciting but unsuccessful chase after a naked Zulu, who afterwards turned out to be one of the king's servants, appointed to look out and give warning of the approach of pursuers. Forty Zulus were got together by Major Barrow, but neither promises nor threats had any effect upon them. They were as loyal to their sable ruler as a faithful Highlander to his chief, or a loyal Cavalier to his king. At last it was accidentally mentioned that one of Cetywayo's own servants was present. With great difficulty some information was obtained from him, and a promise to put the British force on the right track. At the dawn of day the dense black forests of the Umvolosi were entered, and as they proceeded pots and calabashes, evidently dropped in flight, were picked up. On—on until the river was reached, but there, alas! the trail was completely wanting. A few "koodoos" quietly grazing was the only sign of life. Lord Gifford was then sent to Funwayo's kraal, eight miles distant, and there information was obtained that some of the king's girls had been seen passing that way. Five miles further on was Shemana's kraal, where the same party were again heard of. Pushing through thick bush and long grass, in which the small band under Lord Gifford—only eleven in number—could very easily have been cut off, they got at length to a kraal, where they again heard of the girls. Thence, taking two men as guides, they proceeded further, taking care to make for the open country, in order to intercept Cetywayo in case he endeavoured to reach the Inkanhla forest. At last they reached Umgitya's kraal, from whence they could overlook the bush in which they supposed the king to be. Disappointment then met them on every side, only relieved by the encounter with the two girls who, in spite of emphatic denials, there was every reason to believe were the property of the king. One of the king's own servants was shortly afterwards captured, and inside his bundle was found a valuable Martini-Henry rifle of excellent workmanship. Subsequently, this prisoner confessed that he had left the king only two or three days previously. A day's rest was then taken, and while encamped, seven girls, a young man, and a boy were caught, who reported that Cetywayo was captured, and that they had fled from his place two days before. It then turned out that when the pursuing party was encamped on the banks of the Black Umvolosi, they were only within 300 yards of the king, some of whose people ran away, thinking that his capture was certain. Next day they commenced to scour the bush. There they had to sleep, while Zulu beef and Zulu beer were their fare. Most of the party at this time thought the game was up, but Lord Gifford was still full of hope. Back they went, beating the bush on the way, to Umbopa's son's place, where the kraal was burned and the cattle captured. The main body was shortly afterwards reached, and there, at last, rather precise information was obtained from a Zulu "by means of proper persuasive measures." This man was to act as guide, but no sooner had they entered the bush than he slipped off and escaped. Two places which had evidently been prepared for the king were seen, and the party had to return again to the kraals, which had now become head-quarters.

Two of Oham's men came in professing their loyalty, and were appointed spies, but a little boy revealed the fact that one of them had been with the king down in the bush, and then, before all the people, they were told that their double-dealing and humbug were perfectly understood. Trails were followed, people were examined, but all to no purpose; fealty to the king was paramount. Neither the loss of their cattle, which were carried off, the fear of death, nor the offer of bribes, immense in value to them, were of any avail. Returning from one of their long exploring expeditions, a woman was suddenly met in the bush, whose fright at the sight of the white men and the guns was so great as to make her confess the place where the king had slept two nights previously. A party went off at dusk to this place, and captured three brothers, who being questioned, under fear of death, declared that they knew nothing, and that if killed they would die innocently. In the dark forest, lit up by the moon and the bright glare of the bivouac fire, the three men stood before their captors. It was a subject worthy of the pencil of Salvator Rosa. Interrogatories, threats, promises, all were useless, until at last the plan was adopted of leading one of the brothers away blindfolded behind a bush, and causing a rifle to be fired off in such a way as to induce the others to believe that he was shot. At last, overcome by fear, one of them told where the king had slept the night before, and where he had seen him that morning. The other brother, being informed that everything was known, confirmed the intelligence. Away went Lord Gifford and his party, with these two men as guides, and at daybreak the kraal was reached and found deserted. The direction that Cetywayo had taken was then pointed out, and having been followed to one of Umnyamna's kraals, it was then discovered that the king was only five miles distant, and had halted for the day. It was then absolutely necessary to surround the place without being seen, particularly as his refuge was close by the side of a forest, into which, upon the slightest alarm, he would immediately escape. As it was known that the Dragoons had gone some distance beyond this place, a note was sent by Lord Gifford to Major Marter, telling him to watch the passes. The latter officer, upon questioning the Zulu, ascertained where the king was, and immediately made such dispositions as to render escape impossible. The kraal was surrounded before Cetywayo had the slightest idea that his pursuers were upon him. The men of the Natal Native Contingent called upon him to surrender, but no notice was taken of this summons. Upon Major Marter repeating it, the king came out. The natives stretched out their hands towards him, but with dignity the monarch of the Zulus waved them back, and surrendered to Major Marter, accompanying his submission with a request that he might be immediately shot. He was informed, in reply, that if no resistance were made his person was perfectly safe. Then there was mounting in hot haste, and, under the escort of Major Marter's party, the king, with four of his women, were hurried away towards Ulundi. From that place an ambulance with eight mules was sent out, on the morning of the 29th of August, to proceed to the Black Umvolosi river and convey him thence. The king complained of the jolting, and walked a good deal of the way.

The authority for the preceding account is Mr. Lysight, interpreter with Lord Gifford's party. The following is the interesting narrative of the capture given by Major Marter. That officer left Colonel Clarke's column at the Black Umvolosi at daylight on Wednesday the 27th, in consequence of news coming in from General Colley that the king was making for the Ignome forest. He had with him his squadron King's Dragoon Guards, one company of Barton's natives under Captain Plesh, ten Mounted Irregulars under Lieutenant Wingh, and young Oftenbro as interpreter, with four scouts or guides. He sent his men on to threaten the inhabitants of the kraals that unless they gave him information about the king and helped to catch him, he had orders to burn their kraals, take prisoners, capture cattle, and not allow them to cultivate any land until he was caught. At last he got an indirect hint, after sleeping out one night, from a Zulu whom he met, named Uzililo, who stated that he had come from Umbopa's kraal, and had heard that the "wind blew that way," pointing to where the king was afterwards taken, but that the troops had better go "that way," pointing further to the north-east, so as to get there well. This was enough for the major, and having also met Gifford's messenger with the note to Captain Maurice, who was not near, and opened it, in which it spoke of his being on the track again, and that he expected to capture the king that night, he felt sure he was also on the track and would try and assist at the capture. He went on carefully up the hill, until near the top he came to a kraal, when, in answer to a question for guides, two men started off without speaking or answering any questions, and took their guests to the top of the Ignome forest, at a place with precipitous edges looking down nearly 1500 feet. They came to a small open space with long grass, and here the guides put up their hands, and the party was halted. From this point only Major Marter and his interpreter proceeded on hands, knees, and stomach, imitating their guides, until fifty yards further on they could look down and see a small kraal of about twenty huts strongly stockaded, standing on a slight rise in the centre, surrounded by forest-covered steep slopes on three sides, and only open towards the south-west. This was the place where the king was then, and a plan was quickly arranged to surround it. The natives were stripped of all their clothes to the skin, and taking only their rifles, assegais, and cartridges, were to proceed down the left slope, and get round quietly in front and across the opening, so as to be in time to co-operate with the Dragoons, who were to dismount and lead their horses down, as best they could, any place which was found at all accessible. The men were all dismounted, and after a little search a place was found where they could get into a little ravine and so work them very carefully to the bottom. The major led, and left the top at 1.45, reaching the bottom at 3 p.m., with the loss of two horses and several men injured. They all say it was most horrible work, all thick forest, with rocky boulders to jump down sometimes several feet. However, "all's well that ends well," and the end was worth the means; so, luckily, as there was a slight rise hiding them from the kraal, which was only 600 yards distant, they managed to mount again en masse, and then, directing Captain Gibbing's troops to file off to the right, and Godsden's to the left, they charged at the kraal full gallop, and surrounded it before the people inside knew they were there. Fortunately, also, the natives first got across the open, but at the same time others completely hemmed them in. It was seen that all the men inside were armed; but they were at once warned that if a shot was fired they would be fired into all round, and the kraal burnt, so they unwillingly submitted. Major Marter dismounted, and, followed by his interpreter and some Dragoons, went in and demanded where the king was. Umkozana, the last chief who remained with the king, pointed to a hut at the other end, and they went there at once and told Cetywayo to come out. He refused, asked them to come in to him, wanted to know the rank of the officer in charge, and then requested them to shoot him. After some useless parleying, and as it was foolish to lose time, he was threatened that unless he came out they would burn the kraal, and not until then did he come out. The first thing he said was that they would never have caught him if they had not come down the mountains, as he had spies on the flats, and thought it quite impossible for any troops but Zulus to come down the precipices at the back. He was told his life would be spared, but that he must go along with them as a prisoner to the white chief at Ulundi. They captured, besides the king and Umkozana, the headman of the kraal, six men-servants and one boy, and five women and one girl; also four Martini-Henry's, lots of cartridges, fourteen other guns, and many relics of the 24th Regiment, with a lot of the king's cooking and sleeping things. The king caused much intentional delay by walking as slowly as he could.

In entering Ulundi six of the Dragoon Guards rode in front, followed by Natal Native Contingent men and one company of the 60th Regiment; then two Dragoon Guards, between whom walked Cetywayo, with another Dragoon close behind him. Natal Native Contingent, eight men of Lonsdale's Horse, and another company of the 60th Regiment followed. Sir Garnet Wolseley did not go out to meet the last of the Zulu kings, as the prisoner had rejected and despised every overture. He was treated, not as a captured king, but as a mere fugitive from law and order. After a very short delay, the party again started, ostensibly for Pietermaritzburg viâ Rorke's Drift; but the march had not proceeded long, when an express messenger galloped up from the general with an order to proceed with all speed to Fort Durnford. When Cetywayo arrived at Kwamagwaza, he said, "This is not the way to the Tugela," and knew at once that he would have to cross the sea. He became melancholy and abstracted. During the entire journey, he retained the quiet dignity for which he is remarkable. At Port Durnford a surf-boat was ready, into which the king and his party were placed and taken to the steamer Natal, which was waiting.[51] The sea was rough, and Cetywayo had to crawl on his hands and knees on board, while one of his people, overcome by the terrors of the ocean, lay on his back in the surf-boat, and made signs that he desired to be killed. The gunboat Forester escorted the Natal to Simon's Bay, and thence to Table Bay, where Cetywayo and his wives were landed, and were lodged in the castle of Cape Town. Thus ended in a prison in the metropolis of the Cape Colony the career of the last of the Zulu kings and the autonomy of the nation. The greatest and most powerful ruler of South Africa had defied Great Britain, and in his defeat fell once and for ever all the hopes of domination so long cherished among the native tribes of Southern Africa.

In spite of his large proportions, Cetywayo is a handsome man, of much dignity of aspect. His limbs are large, but symmetrical; very broad chest, large and lustrous eyes, intelligent and not unamiable countenance. With plenty of food and perfect safety, he lost all inclination to be shot. Speaking of the war, he took all the responsibility for the battle of Kambula, but declared that Ulundi was fought against his wish, and in consequence of the determination of his young men once more to try the arbitration of the sword. Now that his power is broken, he laughs to scorn the idea of any more fighting being possible against British rule.

A great meeting was called by the white "inkosi" (Sir Garnet) for the 1st of September—the same day, six years ago, on which Cetywayo was crowned. It was fitting that the anniversary of the day of promises never fulfilled should be also a day of atonement. Two hundred Zulus were seated a few paces from Sir Garnet's tent, and although naturally great talkers, the silence of death prevailed. Ranged in rows four deep, with the principal chiefs in front, they listened with perfect attention to the words which decided the fate of their country and of themselves. Two of the king's brothers and the prime minister of the king were present. At half-past four, Sir Garnet Wolseley left his tent, and, as he walked towards the assembly, was greeted with uplifted hands and shouts of "Inkose." Leaning upon the hilt of his sword, he calmly gazed for a few moments upon the representatives of a conquered nation assembled to hear its doom. Mr. Shepstone interpreted into Zulu sentence by sentence as Sir Garnet Wolseley spoke, as follows:—

"It is six years ago on this very day, the 1st of September, that Cetywayo was crowned King of the Zulus, and only yesterday you yourselves have seen him carried away a prisoner, never to return again to Zululand. On the occasion of his coronation Cetywayo made certain promises regarding laws to be observed in the future, which promises he never fulfilled, and his country is now about to be divided into different chieftainships, and I hope his fate will be a warning to all of the chiefs not to follow in his footsteps, but to act according to the commands and terms given by the English Queen, who will most certainly punish any who do not do so. The interests and welfare of the South African races are very dear to the Queen, and she is anxious that the natives of this country should thrive, as those in Natal have done up to the present time. She will be lenient to faults arising from ignorance; but although inclined, as I have said, to deal leniently when ignorance causes them to commit faults, those who persistently go contrary to good government and peace will assuredly be punished as Cetywayo has been. As they are aware, she lives far away; but her power is very great, and she is quite able to, and will, punish those who take life or make wars contrary to her orders. Cetywayo took the lives of his people for trivial offences, without giving them a chance of defending themselves, or allowing them a fair trial. This must cease. In future, trivial offences will be punishable by fines. Cetywayo kept on foot a large and powerful army, and did not allow his men to marry without his permission; in future, the young men will be allowed to marry when and whom they like, provided always they have sufficient for the support of a wife, and the consent of the girl's parents. Disobedience of this law is to be punishable by a fine inflicted by the headmen of the kraal. As Zululand is almost entirely surrounded by country under the Queen of England's rule, and not threatened in any way, there is no need of a larger army; and in future no guns or ammunition will be allowed to be imported, or to be in the hands of any Zulu. Nor will any stores be permitted to be landed on the Zulu coast, in case, under the guise of merchandise, arms should be brought into the country. The young men are to be encouraged to labour, and are to be allowed to come and leave when they like; for only by work can they become rich and prosperous. Cetywayo encouraged witchcraft, and what is known as 'smelling out.' That I look to the chiefs to put down, and an end to such ridiculous and foolish practices arrived at. Cetywayo, by this practice of witchcraft, caused many lives to be taken, and neither life nor property was safe. And each chief must clearly understand, before he signs his name to the treaty, that none of his people must be taken without a fair trial before the chief being granted, and the accused being allowed to call his witnesses. In what I have said there is nothing new, though the young men may have forgotten; but these laws and customs held good before Chaka's ancient laws and usages introduced what is known as the military system. I intend leaving an English officer here as Resident, to be the eyes and ears of England, to watch over the people, to see the laws observed, and that the chiefs rule with justice and equity. I am aware there are still a considerable number of rifles and guns of ours, as well as cattle scattered about the country, and those chiefs who wish to stand well with the English Queen will lose no time in bringing them in and delivering them up to the British Resident.

"As they are well aware by their own rules of war and conquest, Zululand now belongs to the Queen of England. She has, however, already enough land in Africa, and so she has, through me as her representative, appointed certain chiefs to rule over districts which I shall presently name. The chiefs elected must remember that this is an act of grace, and that what I am now doing in partitioning the country to various chiefs is only what Cetywayo has himself done in former times. They are well aware our laws, religion, and customs are very different to theirs, and the Queen has no wish to force ours upon them. As regards the laws and customs they are to be ruled by, they are to be those good and ancient ones in use before Chaka's time; but life and property is to be protected, and no life to be forfeited without a fair trial. As regards religion, there is no wish to force ours upon them, and missionary enterprise will not be encouraged contrary to the wish of the chief and people he proposes to reside amongst. The British Government is very anxious to prevent white people settling in the country, and no sale, transfer, or alienation of land will be permitted or recognized. I consider this a very important point, as in many instances land has been said by white people to have been purchased by them from the Zulus, and given rise to very serious complications. If, therefore, missionaries do come and wish to reside among the people, all that can be permitted them to hold in land must be a small patch for their house and garden, but none whatever must be alienated from the Zulu people, to whom it really belongs. Some of those I have intended to make chiefs, I am sorry to see, are not here to-day; but some who are here to-day will now sign a document, the purport of which I have now told you all; and a duplicate of the treaty will be given to each chief to keep, and a similar one retained by me. The boundaries of the various chieftainships will be told them, and will be clearly defined hereafter by officers sent round for that purpose."

The first division, or coast column, under General Crealock, had not been opposed by the Zulus in the field. It established a series of fortified posts along the south coast of Zululand, opened a new base of supplies at Port Durnford, from which to feed a force operating against Ulundi, destroyed the military kraal of Emangwene and the king's old military kraal at Ondini, besides clearing the coast district. By the 6th of July, all the great Zulu chiefs, with their people, from the Tugela river to St. Lucia Bay, had given in their submission. It was the coast column, under Pearson, which gained the battle of Inyezane, and had gallantly held Ekowe for three months; and it was the coast column, more than any other, which had suffered from disease. Among General Crealock's valedictory remarks are the following:—

"July 17, 1879.

"In notifying to the army in South Africa that Brigadier-General Wood, V.C., C.B., and Lieutenant-Colonel Buller are about to leave Zululand for England, Sir Garnet Wolseley desires to place on record his high appreciation of the services they have rendered, and that their military abilities and untiring energy have materially tended to bring the war to an end. The success which has attended the operations of the flying column is largely due to General Wood's genius for war, to the admirable system which he has established in his command, and to the zeal and energy with which his ably conceived plans have been carried out by Colonel Buller."

Brigadier-General Wood's Orders.

"The Brigadier-General proposes, weather permitting, to leave for Pietermaritzburg to-morrow. In saying good-bye to the soldiers of all ranks, he wishes to express his warm gratitude for the support he has invariably received. The Brigadier-General has gained the commendation of his superiors for the successful operations of the flying column; he feels that the credit he has so obtained has been gained by the courage and untiring devotion to duty of his fellow-soldiers, and he will never forget his comrades of the flying column."

It is right to quote the following orders respecting two distinguished officers of the war:—

"The troops and Naval Brigade forming the first division must be content with the conviction that their gallantry in the earlier part of this war has probably diminished the opposition of the Zulus in this country.

"You must be content with the honest conviction that your hard work and energy, under very great difficulties, and with your ranks thinned day by day with sickness and fever, has successfully carried out the task set you by Lord Chelmsford to perform; and, thanks to the valuable assistance and co-operation of Commodore Richards and the Naval Brigade, you have established the landing-place opened at Port Durnford, which will enable further operations towards the capital to be carried out with facility should they become necessary.

"Soldiers and sailors of the first division, I thank you all for your good conduct, your hard works; and sympathize with you in the loss of so many comrades whose lives have been sacrificed to this climate, so deadly to man and beast. We have all had great difficulties to overcome.

"I wish you all a hearty 'good-bye;' I wish you success and prosperity wherever your duty to her Majesty may lead you."[52]

It would be uninteresting to go into details with respect to the movements of the columns under Colonels Villiers and Baker Russell. Mahabolin and other Magulisin chiefs surrendered, Manyonyoba asked terms of the commanding officer at Luneberg, and the various scattered embers left after the great war conflagration were soon extinguished in the north. In September Zululand was most thoroughly conquered. On the 1st of September, John Dunn, Umgayna, Usibilo, Umcitsobu, Somkelu, and Gonzi signed the terms upon which they accepted chieftainship; Oham and others were proclaimed at a later date. The principal undertakings and conditions were that the chiefs should respect the boundaries assigned; abolish the military system; allow all men to marry and work as they will; prohibit importation of arms; take no life without fair trial; discontinue witchcraft; surrender fugitive criminals from British territory; make no war without the sanction of Government; prevent sale or alienation of land; arbitration to be appealed to in case of disputes with British subjects. The succession to chieftainships to be dependent on approval of our Government.

The following is an exact summary of the terms and conditions signed in duplicate by all the newly appointed chiefs in Zululand at Ulundi, September 1, 1879. The prelude and ending are verbatim; terms and conditions summarized:—

I recognize the victory of British arms over the Zulu nation and the full right and title of her Majesty Queen Victoria, Queen of England and Empress of India, to deal as she may think fit with the Zulu chiefs and the people, and with the Zulu country; and I agree and hereby signify my agreement to accept from General Sir Garnet Joseph Wolseley, G.C.M.G. and K.C.B., as the representative of her Majesty Queen Victoria, the chieftainship of a territory of Zululand, to be known hereafter as——, subject to the following terms, conditions, and limitations:—

Terms, conditions, and limitations laid down by General Sir Garnet Joseph Wolseley, G.C.M.G., K.C.B., and assented to by me——, as the terms, conditions, and limitations subject to which I agree to accept the chieftainship of the aforesaid territory.

1. To observe and respect whatever boundaries shall be assigned to my territory by the British Government through the Resident of the division in which his territory is situated.

2. Not to permit the existence of the Zulu military system or the existence of any military system or organisation whatsoever within my territory; to proclaim and make it a rule that all men shall be allowed to marry when they choose and as they choose, according to the good and ancient customs of his people known and followed in the days preceding the establishment by Chaka of the military system, and to allow and encourage all men living within his territory to go and come freely for peaceful purposes, and to work in Natal or in the Transvaal or elsewhere for themselves or for hire.

3. Not to import or allow to be imported into his territory by any person, for any object whatsoever, firearms, or other goods of any description, and ammunition from any port, inland or sea-coast, and to confiscate all such goods or arms, etc., as come in, fining the owners or possessors of them with heavy fine or such other punishment as may be allowed.

4. Not to allow life to be taken on any pretence without trial before the council of chiefsmen, allowing fair and impartial examination of witnesses in the chiefs presence, and further not to permit of witchcraft or witch-doctors, or "smelling out."

5. To surrender all fugitives demanded by British Government flying from the laws, and to prevent their coming into Zululand, and if in, to exert himself and his people to catch them.

6. Not to make war on any other chiefs without the sanction of the British Government through the Resident of the district.

7. The succession to the chieftainship to be decided by ancient laws and customs, and nominations of successors to be submitted for approval of Government.

8. Not to sell or alienate the land.

9. To permit all people now in the district to remain upon recognition of his power, and any wishing to leave to be allowed to do so.

10. In all cases of dispute in which British subjects are concerned, to appeal and decide by decision of British Resident, and in other cases not to punish until approved of by Resident.

11. In all cases not included in the above, or in any doubt or uncertainty, to govern and decide in accordance with ancient laws.

These terms, conditions, and limitations I engage, and I hereby solemnly pledge my faith, to abide by and respect in letter or in spirit without qualification or reserve.

Signed at Ulundi on the 1st day of September, 1879.

Chief——his X mark.
Induna——Do.

General commanding her Majesty's forces in South Africa, and High Commissioner for South-Eastern Africa.

Signed by John Shepstone as witness of the correct interpretation by him and thorough knowledge of the contents of the document the chief has signed.

On the 12th of September Major-General Clifford was able to notify that Colonels Villiers' and Russell's columns were in course of being broken up, after they had thoroughly patrolled the Makulusi district and found all quiet. Oham had returned to his own territory, accompanied by Wheelwright, who was appointed to act as Resident in Zululand. Mongodhla had been driven from his caves and his cattle captured, while his brother had surrendered at Luneburg. Two companies of the 24th Regiment, ordered to encamp at Isandhlwana, removed the last vestiges of the camp, buried any bodies remaining above ground, and erected cairns of stones over the graves of the troops who fell there. More than 5000 guns had been taken, or surrendered by Zulus. Sir Garnet Wolseley did his work thoroughly. Troops were despatched against Sekukuni, and Sir Garnet himself proceeded to the Transvaal, in order to subdue discontent among the inhabitants, and establish a settled system of government. It is not necessary to follow him there.

With the conclusion of the Zulu war this book must terminate. As regards the political adjustment of affairs in Zululand, the directions of the Home Government, were no doubt, implicitly obeyed. The country was made self-supporting in a military point of view, and the chiefs, with their tribes, were so disposed as to form a barrier against hostile aggression. John Dunn, who was a Christian renegade, living as a Zulu in polygamic life, but whose influence was supreme throughout the country, was placed as chief over South-Eastern Zululand. One of his first steps was the prohibition of all missionaries in the country in which he holds sway. Over Sirayo's country near the border, extending to the foot of the Drakenberg, the chief Hlubi was appointed, about whose tried fidelity and loyalty there can be no question. Oham occupies the region between the Pongolo and the Black Umvolosi. Mnyame, the late king's prime minister, is established near him, and, it is to be hoped, will not hatch plots for the establishment of Oham on the throne of his brother. "Zululand for the Zulus" has been the motto for this arrangement, but hopeless heathenism has been riveted as chains upon the people. Missionary enterprise is discouraged and even forbidden, while all the evils of tribal rule are virtually perpetuated. It has been said with some fancy, but great exactitude, that the new dispensation realizes the description of the country given by Tennyson in "Locksley Hall"—

"Never comes the trader, never floats an European flag,

Slides the bird o'er lustrous woodland, swings the trailer from the crag.

There methinks would be enjoyment more than in this march of mind.

The passions cramped no longer shall have scope and breathing-space."

Savage women shall be taken to rear dusky races. Polygamy receives approval. Missionaries are forbidden; and, strange to say, all this is really done in consequence of the efforts of the Exeter Hall zealots, who have denounced Sir Bartle Frere and the colonists from the beginning, lauded the heathens, and strenuously objected to any assumption of their territory. The toleration of heathenism is both a blunder and a crime, which, if not stopped in time, must result in disastrous consequences.

APPENDIX.

CAPE COLONISTS VERSUS NATIVES.

(Articles published in the P.E. Telegraph.)

I.

It is an axiom that history repeats itself, and historical studies, therefore, become particularly useful in a political crisis like the present, when the policy of Sir Bartle Frere towards the native tribes of South Africa has been condemned by the Home Government. In all parts of the world a tragedy is enacted when barbarism and civilization come into contact. It was so with the Puritans, whose pioneers landed in North America from the Mayflower; it is so with the Dutch and the natives of Java, with the British and the Maoris, with the French and the people of New Caledonia. Wherever, throughout the world, colonization takes place among savages there must be war, or there can be no safety or progress. When the Dutch formed a settlement on the shores of Table Bay in 1652, it was neither their interest nor their wish to fight, but it was perfectly impossible to avoid it. Although a mere place of call for outward and homeward-bound ships was required, yet it soon became apparent that not merely as a sequence of successful defence, but as a means of protection, it was requisite to annex conquered territory. The Hottentots were the first enemies of Europeans in South Africa, and the Kafirs—themselves aggressors—were the second. The latter people were robbers by profession, and an organized system of plunder continually harassed the border farmers of the colony.

The first act of the present tragedy of Kafir war waged against Great Britain took place in 1811, when constant depredations on the part of the Kafirs made it necessary either to repel the enemy or to abandon the country. The latter system of tactics was not then in vogue among the countrymen of Nelson and Wellington, therefore a large force under Colonel Graham was despatched to the front. Landdrost Stockenstrom, who accompanied this force, rode up to a party of the natives and urgently endeavoured to secure peace. In reply he was stabbed to death, and fourteen of the men who accompanied him were likewise murdered. Of course the Kafirs were chastised, but the snake was only scotched, not killed, and in 1816 the colonial frontier farmers were so plundered by the natives that they were forced to state to Government that they would have to abandon their farms unless effectively protected. As a result, Lord Charles Somerset held a solemn conference with Gaika and other great chiefs in April, 1817, which was followed by a solemn treaty of peace. Those solemn farces must have been sources of immense amusement to the savages. Gaika gave pledges with the utmost readiness—there was no difficulty whatever. Honesty and justice were in future to prevail; the people of the kraal to which stolen cattle were traced should always be held responsible, and reparation was always to be made instanter. Presents were lavished upon the "Paramount" Chief, and then (in the words of the Rev. Mr. Williams) "Gaika fled instantly to the other side of the Kat river like a thief," plundering was soon vigorously recommenced, and the idea of restitution became almost as great a joke as the treaty of peace. In 1818 the chief T'Slambie positively refused to restore cattle traced to his kraal. Afterwards, to gain time, he promised, and then, of course, broke his promise. War was once more forced upon the authorities, and this time the contest was a serious one. While military operations were going on in Kafirland, the confederate chiefs got behind our forces, drove in the small military posts, and ravaged the frontier districts. Incited to fanaticism by the witch-doctor Mokanna, or Lynx, 9000 savages impetuously attacked the head-quarters of the military at Graham's Town, and it was only by means of desperate fighting that the town was saved. Soon afterwards another solemn treaty was made, in which it was agreed that all Kafirs should evacuate the country between the Great Fish and Keiskamma rivers, and that this territory should remain neutral and unoccupied. The usual sequence occurred, the treaty was laughed at and violated by our enemies at the earliest possible moment. Downing Street invariably looked upon the Kafirs in the light of honourable belligerents, and the unfortunate colonists as grasping, unscrupulous men. An outrageous divorce was constituted between truth and justice on the one side, and so-called philanthropy on the other, and the people of the Cape Colony had to suffer the heavy and bitter penalties of this extraordinary ignorance and fatuity. The course of events from first to last has been very simple. It must be borne in mind that the South African Kafir wars constitute one tragedy in various acts, with intervals of unequal duration. The war with Cetywayo is identical in principle with those waged with Gaika, T'Slambie, Dingaan, Kreli, and Sandilli. By immense exertions the tide of savagery has been periodically rolled back, and if wise counsel had been followed, the war of 1835 would have been final; but Downing Street intervened, and it is to the disastrous fatuous policy then adopted that we owe the wars of 1846 and 1852. It is to this intervention, and to this policy, that we desire in this article, and in others that are to follow, specially to draw attention, because the part taken by Sir Benjamin D'Urban in 1836 is now filled by Sir Bartle Frere in 1879; and the character of Lord Glenelg, who declared that "the Kafirs had ample justification in the late war," seems likely to be attempted by the gentleman who is at present her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the Colonies.—April 22, 1879.

II.

The Kafir war of 1835 was exceedingly disastrous to the colonists. Shortly after it had commenced Colonel Smith (afterwards Sir Harry Smith) wrote: "Already are 7000 persons dependent upon the Government for the necessaries of life. The land is filled with the lamentations of the widows and the fatherless. The indelible impressions already made upon myself by the horrors of an irruption of savages upon a scattered population, almost exclusively engaged in the peaceful occupation of husbandry, are such as make me look on those I have witnessed in a service of thirty years as trifles to what I have now witnessed." The Kafirs were on this occasion, as on every other, the aggressors, and plunder was the principal motive of the war. Fifteen years previously Great Britain had taken the responsibility of settling 5000 of her subjects in the frontier districts of the Cape Colony, and then defence and protection became both the duty and the interest of the home country. With great exertions and after immense loss the war was brought to a close. As a glorious trophy of the war no fewer than 15,000 Fingoes were literally saved from cruel captivity. The Moses who led them out of their house of bondage was Sir Benjamin D'Urban, and it was this wise and enlightened Governor who annexed the province of Queen Adelaide, and determined that the liberated people should be placed in this territory, so as to form "the best barrier against the entrance of the Kafirs into the great Fish River jungle." This extensive bush was the "quadrilateral" of the Kafirs, and it was only acquired by the best blood of the British and colonial troops.

During the whole period of the war of 1835 a very small section of colonists had endeavoured to poison the minds of our Downing Street rulers. Their arguments were based on several fictions, including affirmations about violence on the part of colonists having begot violence on the part of Kafirs, and that the great body of Kafirs had never offended us. They even went so far as to make use of glaring untruths respecting Hintza not having been engaged in the war, and misled Lord Glenelg so much respecting the particulars of that chief's death as to induce his lordship to make use of expressions which he was afterwards compelled to retract. A steady fire of prejudice, fed by pre-conceived ideas, constantly existed at home in favour of the Kafir tribes—and indeed all savages—which required very little effort to turn into a consuming fire of anger and indignation. These little efforts were sedulously made and constantly continued in South Africa with the most disastrous results. A number of well-meaning and prejudiced men, who can be styled the Exeter Hall party, declaimed with virulence against the colonists, and unfortunately Lord Glenelg was enrolled among their number. This nobleman evidently considered that humanitarian efforts were due to savages only, not to colonists, and through his contemptible folly became the means of inflicting the most severe injuries upon both. Sir Benjamin D'Urban, who was completely master of the situation, and had proved himself an honest and wise administrator, was entirely ignored, his policy was stigmatized in the most insulting manner, and the sentimental ideas of theorists made to take its place. In a despatch, dated 28th December, 1835, the Secretary of State entirely exculpates the Kafirs and censures both Sir Benjamin D'Urban and the colonists. He says: "In the conduct which was pursued towards the Kafir nation by the colonists, and the public authorities of the colony, through a long series of years, the Kafirs had ample justification of the late war; they had a perfect right to hazard the experiment, however hopeless, of extorting by force that redress which they could not expect otherwise to obtain; and the claim of sovereignty over the new province, bounded by the Keiskamma and the Kei, must be renounced. It rests upon a conquest resulting from a war in which, as far as I am at present able to judge, the original justice is on the side of the conquered, not of the conquering party." The governor is severely reproved for styling the Kafirs "irreclaimable savages," and the Wesleyan missionaries are also censured. As a sequence the whole country between the Fish and Buffalo rivers had to be handed over to the Kafirs, although that portion of this territory which extended between the Fish and Keiskamma rivers had been ceded by Gaika to the colony so far back as the year 1819, and was therefore not conquered in the recent war. The extraordinary fatuity of this course, judged from a military point of view, is evident from the description of the boundary furnished by Major Charters, military secretary to Sir George Napier. This able officer says: "The line of frontier is all in favour of the Kafirs; a dense jungle—the medium breadth is about five miles—torn and intersected by deep ravines, a great part impenetrable except to Kafirs and wild beasts, occupies about one hundred miles of frontier, following the sinuosities of the Great Fish river. The whole British army would be insufficient to guard it." In fact, this country comprised what, by analogy, may be styled the Kafir quadrilateral, or combination of almost impregnable fortresses. British and colonial blood had to be poured out as water in the wars of 1845 and 1852 to recapture this country; but fanaticism and prejudice are always impervious to argument. "Their blood be upon us and upon our children" is a sentence often repeated in history, so when the Waterloo veteran and gallant British soldier, Sir Benjamin D'Urban, was dismissed for doing his duty, Lord Glenelg defiantly wrote, "You announce to me the abandonment of the province of Adelaide and cast on me the responsibility of all the consequent disasters you predict. I am perfectly ready to take upon myself the sole and exclusive responsibility on this occasion."

It is difficult to find language sufficiently strong to stigmatize the base perfidy and fatuous incompetency of the Glenelg policy. A colony is acquired and its people exchange allegiance for protection; later on 5000 British emigrants are placed in its frontier districts. The savages in and beyond the borders of this country are numerically far superior to our own subjects, and systematically send in plundering bands who devastate the country and impoverish the farmers. It is these savages who make war, and in defence it is at last absolutely necessary either to repel the invaders or to abandon the country. The case, let it be remembered, is not one of emigrants seizing a country and then applying for protection. It is the British Government which established its sovereignty first and sent its emigrants afterwards. With immense exertion, and at the cost of much blood and treasure, the savage tide is pushed back—and then Lord Glenelg deliberately makes it flow again over the conquered country, perfidiously becomes the ally and friend of the savages and creates a cruel necessity—no other than that of doing the work over again in the bloody wars of 1845 and 1852. There is scarcely anything in history to form a parallel to this gross injustice and perfidy. Yet at the present moment a large party of fanatical "philanthropists" in England are crying out for a repetition of the same policy in Natal. The tide will be pushed back to Cetywayo's kraal, but we must abandon the country after we conquer it. The Zulu King made the war, and it is as purely one of righteous self-defence as any ever waged in the world; yet we are told that the colonists provoked it and are responsible for it! Sir Bartle Frere is to be converted into Sir Benjamin D'Urban! and a new edition of the Glenelg policy must be adopted by her Majesty's Government!—April 25, 1879.

III.

Lord Glenelg emphatically stated that the Kafirs had perfect justification for the war of 1835, and this affirmation was the foundation of his entire policy. He identified himself with the pseudo-philanthropists who looked upon the white inhabitants of the Eastern districts as usurpers and persecutors. The ideas of 1836 remain substantially the ideas of 1879, the only difference being that the venue is changed and that the tide of savagery has been pushed further eastward. The settlers of 1820 were placed by the British Government on the frontier of the Cape Colony, and on their part and that of their descendants there was certainly no usurpation, while it positively seems to be the result of monomania to speak of their having persecuted the Kafirs. The incontestable facts of history prove exactly the opposite: it was the Kafirs that harassed and persecuted them. A comparatively small, struggling, and sparsely settled community was persistently tormented and impoverished by most cruel thefts and constant aggressions, which at last culminated in wars of defence most disastrous to the farmers and the principal portion of the settlers. The stock, dwellings, etc., of the poor border population destroyed in the war of 1835 alone were valued at upwards of £280,000! This was a cruel, terrible infliction on those poor settlers, but it was not considered enough by the Exeter Hall party. Christianity was blasphemed by a policy of the grossest injustice adopted in its name. Those who were bound by every tie of justice—putting aside charity—to defend their own countrymen turned against them most virulently, and did everything in their power to cause the re-enactment of the bloody scenes in which British settlers in this distant land had suffered so much.

In Mr. Godlonton's "Case for the Colonists" there is abundant proof of the facts already adduced. The Kafirs were the aggressors and the colonists the sufferers. Gross injustice, faithlessness, rapine, and fraud—or in other words, savagery—had to be grappled with, repelled, and conquered in the Cape Colony, and the pseudo-philanthropists of England, headed by Lord Glenelg, did everything in their power to aid and assist the latter cause. Perhaps the most clear proof of the error of the British policy on which we are now animadverting may be found in the evidence of one of Lord Glenelg's chosen men and champions. Sir George Napier was sent out specially to reverse the policy of Sir Benjamin D'Urban. In answer to a Port Elizabeth address, he said, "I decidedly tell you that I accepted the government of this colony in the conviction that the former system, as regarded our Kafir neighbours, was erroneous; and I am come out here, agreeing in, and determined to support, the system of policy pursued by the Lieutenant-Governor of these districts (Captain Stockenstrom) in accordance with the instructions which his Honour and myself have received from her Majesty's Secretary of State (Lord Glenelg)." Nothing can be clearer than this, or more decided; but when Sir George Napier learnt the facts of the case, the mist of prejudice dropped from his eyes. Most fortunately, this officer was an honest man, and dared to give his testimony in favour of the truth in spite of his employers in England. He found that the policy he had been directed to carry out "shocked one's natural sense of justice" (these are his own words), and that he had been completely duped and deceived. Referring to the aggressions of the Kafirs, Sir George Napier says, "It would not be just to pass over the fact that while much loss has been sustained by the colonists, as stated in the official returns, I am not aware, except in one instance—and that one of no importance—that any aggression has been committed by the border colonists against the persons or property of the neighbouring tribes." It was at Port Elizabeth, and in the month of October, 1840, that Sir George Napier forcibly admitted that the Glenelg treaties "seem to shock our sense of natural justice, and to be unsupported by any considerations of sound policy." Speaking subsequently to a gathering of the Slambie and Congo tribes of Kafirs at Fort Peddie, his Excellency said, "You have sustained no bad treatment on the part of the colonists, and I now appeal to you whether the colonists have not kept their part of the treaties ever since they were made? I ask if there has been a single act of injustice of which you have any reason to complain on the part of the Government and the colonists? You will answer, None. I therefore appeal to you for justice towards the colonists." In fact, Sir George Napier was forced to thoroughly change his opinions, and it is unnecessary to multiply proofs of this well-known fact. Would to God that Sir Michael Hicks-Beach, or even Sir Charles Dilke, could come out to South Africa and report to the Home Government so as to avert the awful catastrophe of surrendering conquered Zululand to Cetywayo! This would be a suicide greater in extent and more terrible even in its consequences than the surrender of the province of Queen Adelaide by Lord Glenelg. But surely if the world had been searched no more reliable man than Sir Bartle Frere could have been chosen. He is a most upright, wise, and experienced administrator; the friend of her Majesty the Queen, and himself distinguished for all the qualities which make men respected and trusted. He belongs to the "Aborigines' Protection Society," and is in all respects above suspicion, yet his most positive assurances weigh lightly in the balance against the monomania existing among certain classes in Europe, that savages must be right and colonists invariably wrong. It is a bitter reflection that Zulu savagery finds its best allies among the very people from whom we spring, and that the most deadly enemies of the white people of South Africa are literally "those of their own household."

One of the most able newspapers in South Africa echoes the sentiments of Lord Glenelg, Dr. Philip, and Bishop Colenso. It declares against annexation, and also against interference with the usages of the native chiefs. It is said that to rule the Zulus through their chiefs is the policy of her Majesty's Ministers. The extraordinary admission is added that "order will be found better than caprice and the law better than individual notions of right." Surely we must admit that the rule of chiefs is purely a rule of absolute caprice, and that the history of Cetywayo's government specially proves it. The will of the monarch is the law of the land, and bloody sacrifices constantly connected with witchcraft are purely the effects of cruel and avaricious caprice. The entire history of South Africa shows the folly and cruelty of the policy advocated by the enemies of Sir Bartle Frere. No careful student of Cape history can fail to see that the Glenelg plan of non-annexation was most disastrous, while it was only when the power of the Gaika and Gcaleka chiefs had been finally taken from them—and not till then—that the people of this country, whites as well as blacks, could hope to be finally released from the fearful curse of recurring thefts, bloodshed, and wars. In fact history teaches plainly that to secure peace, prosperity, and happiness to all the people of Southern Africa it is absolutely necessary: (1.) To secure territorial guarantees, such as those justly acquired in a war of defence by Sir Benjamin D'Urban. (2.) To create a firmly knit and strong confederation of colonies and states in which the Queen and just laws shall be supreme, to the exclusion of witchcraft and the caprice of chiefs.

Incidentally, we may be permitted to illustrate what is really meant by this "rule of chiefs." Every one knows that diabolical and wholesale slaughter is a characteristic of the rule of all Zulu potentates. Dingaan, Panda, Cetywayo, are all alike in this particular. It is the system as much as the men that we have to blame. Perhaps there is no more distinguishing proof of constant cold-blooded and revolting cruelty arising directly and constantly from the rule of chiefs than in the administration of the laws of witchcraft. One example out of hundreds is sufficient. Missionaries from time to time publish most revolting cases, but they are all of the same type, and merely as a sample we refer our readers to the one alluded to by Mr. Godlonton, at page 99 of his "Case for the Colonists." The son of a chief was sick, and a man of property was immediately selected for torture and death, simply because the witch-doctor said that it was under his evil influence that the sick man was suffering. He begged and prayed for instant death, but of course that boon is never granted. First of all the victim was held to the ground, and several men pierced his body all over with Kafir needles, two or three inches deep. The victim bore this with extraordinary resolution, and his tormentors became tired, complaining of the pain it gave their hands, and of the needles or skewers bending. By this time a fire was kindled, into which large square stones were placed to heat. His wife having first been cruelly beaten and ill-treated, the victim was brought to the fire, laid on his back, with his feet and hands tied to pegs driven into the ground. When the stones became as hot as possible, they were placed upon his groin, stomach, and chest. Then the scorching and broiling of the body went on, the stones occasionally slipping off, and being immediately replaced and held on by sticks. These awful tortures lasted from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m., when the unfortunate victim of the benefit of the rule of the chiefs in South Africa breathed his last. We are asked to perpetuate this system, and to surrender any conquered country in Zululand, so that savagery may still continue without interruption, and we may reap in Zululand from the policy of 1879 the fruits obtained in 1845 and 1852 from the Glenelg policy of 1836.—April 29, 1879.

IV.

The great question of Sir Bartle Frere's native and Zulu policy is easily narrowed. His Excellency believes in abolishing the power of chiefs, and in obtaining after defensive war adequate territorial guarantees. The opposite policy has, undoubtedly, caused the wars of 1845, 1852, and 1877. The relinquishment of the province of Queen Adelaide by Lord Glenelg necessitated its reconquest, and the system of endeavouring to rule through the medium of chiefs has resulted in disastrous failure. A chief is necessarily antagonistic to civilization: all his power, influence, and means are obtained from savagery, and it is this latter system it is his interest to foster and to continue. But for the astuteness and ability of Sir George Grey Kreli would undoubtedly have thrown us into a serious war in 1857. This great chief ordered cattle to be slaughtered in such a manner as to prove that he had even determined to "burn his ships." Emissaries were despatched to Moshesh, to Taku, and to the Tambookies. A witch-doctor was used as a tool in the usual manner, so as to stir up the people by means of superstition, and the system, whose continuance is advocated by a party, only failed because of the checkmate movements of the Governor. Subsequently, it was purely the continuance of the system of the chiefs that led us into the war of 1877. If their power had been abolished, as it should have been, great calamities would have been averted from their own people and from the Cape Colony. A careful honest study of colonial history is all that is necessary to prove to demonstration that weak half-measures with Kafirs are as irrational and absurd as they are cruel. When we conquer we are bound to take away entirely the pernicious powers of the chiefs, as well as to retain such land guarantees as are really necessary for future safety. Those who advocate this sound, wise policy are real philanthropists, substituting justice and sound ideas for theoretical ideas, founded for the most part upon that worst description of ignorance which is founded upon prejudice and pre-conceived ideas.

One argument brought forward against Confederation is based upon the lowest possible motives. It is the pockets, not the heads or hearts, to which this earnest appeal is made. One great Government in South Africa with provincial administrations will really be too expensive! Besides, an objection is taken to the removal of the liability under which the British Government labours at present. Let the Home country continue to lose its best blood and treasure rather than we should lose our money. A great strong Confederation would put an end to Kafir wars by putting an end to the possibility of their success, but lest we should have to pay a few more taxes the British ratepayers' purses and the British soldiers' bodies must continue to bleed. This infamous policy is not worthy of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope. We have attained our majority as children of the Empire, and we must be prepared to resume our own responsibilities. These, unquestionably, include self-defence, and to make that efficient the fable of the bundle of sticks must be exemplified in the close union of all our states and colonies. Nothing is more clear than the fact that all South Africa is like a draughtboard—the blacks are on one side, the whites on the other. There is no separating the interests of either combatants, so that when Cetywayo fights against Natal, he fights against this colony as well as against the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. But real economy is always attended by a sound and statesmanlike system of Government. There would be no recurrence of native wars under Confederation, and this alone would be a source of great economy and great prosperity. South Africa, not Downing Street, would conduct its own native policy, and there would be then no fear of the recurrence of such a policy as that of Lord Glenelg. At present we are not safe, and the sooner such a period of incertitude and danger is terminated the better for the taxpayers here and in England. Are the people of this country not able to govern themselves in a Confederation? The history of the separate states and colonies proves the contrary. If we are able we ought to be willing, as such a union means against the natives invincible strength, and consequently both peace and economy. Above all things we ought to relieve ourselves from the curse of being perpetually exposed to the meddling and muddling of our native policy. Fatuous incompetency, such as that of Lord Glenelg, is quite enough to ruin half a dozen colonies, and we really can never be quite sure that it will not be renewed.

A reference to Sir Bartle Frere's instructions proves very clearly that his Excellency had incomparably more power than any previous Governor-General or High Commissioner, and in acting as he did under carte blanche authority, in no way exceeded his powers. He had to choose between allowing the Zulu despot to make war when he wished and in what manner he chose, or in checkmating him by early action. The latter policy has been adopted with Cetywayo as it was with Kreli, and in spite of a temporary check will be the means of effectively protecting the interests both of the British colonists and the British crown. England never had a more faithful or conscientious officer than Sir Bartle Frere, and a time will come when on the page of history his name, with those of Sir Benjamin D'Urban and Sir George Grey, will be blazoned as the greatest and most enlightened statesmen who ever ruled in Southern Africa. "After me, the Deluge," would have been a convenient and very safe motto for each of these men, but they scorned the wretched time-serving policy of shunting off the evil day from themselves so as to allow its calamities to accumulate into terrible magnitude and burst with awful force upon their successors. But the principal defence of Sir Bartle Frere's action and policy is to be found in his despatches, and to them we earnestly beg careful and impartial attention.

The people of the Cape Colony and Natal are composed of many races and of many creeds, but with the most insignificant exceptions they all declare in the most emphatic manner in favour of the policy of Sir Bartle Frere.

"Saxon and Celt and Dane are we,
But all of us Danes in our welcome of thee."

From Capetown to the Tugela river and from L'Agulhas to the Orange river one universal shout of sympathy and approval goes forth to England. Resolutions, earnestly and emphatically declaring that the High Commissioner is right, are sent to the foot of the Queen's throne from Capetown, Port Elizabeth, Grahamstown, Graaff-Reinet, Pietermaritzburg, D'Urban, and hosts of smaller places. The newspaper press, with very few exceptions, constantly and vigorously declares aloud the public sentiments. Surely all this is a powerful argument. The people of South Africa, whose lives, property, and character are at stake, may be trusted to take such a lively interest in the entire subject as to understand it thoroughly. Their interests and those of the United Kingdom are thoroughly identical in this matter, and the sky does not so change the mind even in this portion of the British Empire as to pervert entirely the moral nature of so many of her Majesty's loyal subjects.

Political events connected with the Zulu war form incomparably the most powerful argument that has yet been adduced in favour of South African Confederation. We really cannot afford any further Glenelg experiments, and so soon as we can knit ourselves together in a powerful dominion we are by no means apprehensive of the expense of fighting our own battles. In the first place we would take care that there would be no chiefs to fight with, and that witchcraft, tyranny, and other abominations should finally cease. The natives would have to learn the habits of industry and peace, and would be induced to substitute spades and ploughs for guns and ammunition. A just, firm policy of this character, would form a basis for Christianity, peace, and civilization, whereas the senseless and fatuous plans of so-called philanthropists are as destructive to the natives as they are injurious to the colonists and to the British Empire of which they form a part.

It would be fortunate for South Africa if fair play were as much the practice as it is the boast of Englishmen. There are many men at home full of the same sentiments of righteous indignation as those which animated Sir George Napier previous to his arrival in South Africa. How few are there like that Governor, who will consider it their duty to make themselves conversant with the subject, and then be guided by their conscientious convictions. The cause at issue is simply savagery versus civilization, and before a verdict is given the entire evidence and arguments ought to be attentively heard and carefully considered. Colonists do not desire war, but an end of all war. They are most anxious to save, not to destroy, the savages, and the wise statesmanship of such men as Sir Benjamin D'Urban, Sir George Grey, and Sir Bartle Frere is absolutely necessary for this purpose.—May 2, 1879.

IMPORTANT DESPATCH FROM SIR BARTLE FRERE.

The following despatch from Sir Bartle Frere, dated Pietermaritzburg, February 12, has been issued as a parliamentary paper:—

"Sir,—In my despatch of January 24th last, I only partially answered your despatch of December 18th. I was, in fact, interrupted while writing by the intelligence of our disaster at the headquarter camp on the 22nd, and was obliged to close my unfinished despatch to be in time for the mail. The very serious check which we received on the 22nd does not, however, seem to me to call for any modification in the opinions I had already ventured to lay before her Majesty's Government; on the contrary, it seems to confirm most strongly the arguments I had already advanced in my despatch of the 24th, to show that it was impossible, with any regard to the safety of these colonies, to defer placing in the hands of the general commanding her Majesty's forces the enforcement of the demands made on Cetywayo. Deeply as, in common with every subject of her Majesty, I deplore the disastrous check we have received, it is impossible to shut one's eyes to the fact that it was, in all human probability, mainly due to disregard of the general's orders that so great a disaster occurred; whilst every circumstance accompanying or following the events of that day proves what an insecure position we occupied both here and in the Transvaal with such a neighbour along so many hundred miles of undefended frontier. As a consequence of the crippling of Colonel Glyn's and Colonel Durnford's columns, and the shock which has been given to the colonial forces, Europeans as well as natives, the columns of Colonel Pearson and Colonel Wood have been obliged to suspend their advance and await reinforcements, which can only be looked for to the extent required from more distant parts of South Africa and from England. It has become painfully evident that the Zulu king has an army at his command, which could almost any day unexpectedly invade Natal, and, owing to the great extent of frontier and utter helplessness of the undisciplined hordes of Natal natives to offer effectual resistance, the Zulus might march at will through the country, devastating and murdering, without a chance of being checked, so long as they abstained from attacking the entrenched posts of her Majesty's troops, which are from fifty to a hundred miles apart. The capital and all the principal towns are at this moment in 'laager,' prepared for attack, which, even if successfully resisted, would leave two-thirds of them in ashes, and the country around thoroughly desolated. From every part of South Africa outside the colony, where the native races predominate, come the same reports of uneasiness and of intended rising of the native race against the white man; whilst the majority of the Transvaal European population is in a state of avowed readiness to take any opportunity of shaking off the yoke of the English Government. It may be said that these are only the stronger reasons why hostilities should not have been commenced with the Zulu king. But I submit that every circumstance which has lately occurred shows how impossible it is to defer hostilities for more than a few weeks at the utmost, possibly till the harvest now ripening was gathered, and till the Tugela was fordable. The feeling which has just burst out, both among native tribes and in the Transvaal, was there already, and in the Transvaal, at all events, its expression could not have been deferred by any postponement of hostilities with the Zulus. But what possible chance was there that Cetywayo himself would for any length of time have remained quiescent within his own borders? He had not acknowledged officially, and in the usual form, the award of the disputed territory in his favour, nor had he condescended even to discuss the terms of the High Commissioner's messages to him. Had Lord Chelmsford's large force been kept permanently on his frontier, he might possibly have refrained from action as long as this force remained. But its permanent retention was not, as Cetywayo knew, probable, and the removal of the force would assuredly have led to a renewal of the encroachments and the violations of the territory which he had directed or acquiesced in during the preceding year and a half; the slightest accident might have led to a collision taking us at a disadvantage, and what he had the power to do in a colony so little prepared for self-defence may be judged from what he has done since her Majesty's troops crossed the border. It seems to me vain, I had almost said criminal, to shut our eyes to the fact that there has grown up, by our sufferance, alongside this colony, a very powerful military organization, directed by an irresponsible, bloodthirsty, and treacherous despot, and that as long as this organization exists and is so directed it is impossible for peaceful subjects of her Majesty to feel security of life or property within fifty miles of his border. The existence of this military organization makes that of a peaceful English community in his neighbourhood impossible, and unless Cetywayo's power of murder and plunder be restrained, this colony can only continue to exist as an armed camp. Again, it may be said that before attempting to coerce Cetywayo the presence of a large force in the field should have been secured. To this I can only answer that though a larger force might undoubtedly have lessened the chance of successful opposition, there was no reason whatever at the time to suppose that the force at our disposal was too small for the task attempted. I will not dwell on what might have been the case had orders been obeyed, and had things happened otherwise than they did happen. I stand on the broad fact that I sought information in every possible quarter, and had, and have, no reason whatever to suppose that there was anything rash in the undertaking. I know of no one who is supposed to know the Zulus whose advice had not been as fully heard as I could obtain it. Of the three persons who, among unofficial as well as official authorities, are supposed best to know the Zulus, their feelings and probable intentions, one expressed to me his own belief in the ultimate acceptance of the terms offered without fighting; another considered we had, in our military calculations, greatly over-estimated the Zulu power; and a third, who had perhaps better means of judging than any one else, whilst agreeing that the Zulu power had been much overrated, was convinced that the Zulu people themselves would bring their tyrant to reason, and that, after a single action or two, the military system of the Zulus would collapse. It is a singular coincidence that the latter opinion was expressed to me on the 22nd, at the very time that our camp at Isandala was in possession of the Zulus. Looking back on the past in the light of what has happened, I cannot think the work was rashly undertaken. But even if I could have hoped that further reinforcements could be expected within a reasonable time in answer to a call for them, there was no time to wait. No one who had carefully studied the events of the last two years, and knew the ways of these barbarians, could reasonably have expected the Zulus to remain quiet, and it was clear that, even if they deferred action, there were elements of strife elsewhere which could not be evaded or delayed. As I have said before, and in other communications, the die for peace or for war had been cast more than two years ago. It was a simple question whether we should steadily bring our differences to an issue on a clear and unmistakable demand for our right to live at peace with our neighbours, or whether we should await the convenience of the Zulu king, and be taken at disadvantage when he saw his opportunity. It seems to me that this same principle of self-preservation and self-defence should be steadfastly adhered to in all our future proceedings. It may be quite possible to patch up a peace with this or that tribe, which shall for the time be more or less satisfactory to some of the interests in this or in a neighbouring colony. But I submit that her Majesty's Government should not permit peace to be made till her Majesty's unquestioned supremacy has been established and recognized by all Zulu tribes who now acknowledge Cetywayo between this and the Portuguese territory around Delagoa Bay. This I firmly believe to be the only guarantee for peace, security, good government, and progressive civilization throughout her Majesty's possessions and all neighbouring territories in South Africa; and without such security I feel assured that this colony of Natal can never be a safe residence for peace-loving and civilized men of European descent.

"H. B. E. Frere,
Governor and High Commissioner."

LONDON: PRINTED BY WILLIAM CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CROSS.