The defence of her sea-borne commerce, greater in proportion to population, as has been said, than that of any other country in the world, must always be a foremost thought in the Australian mind. On the conditions which will render that defence secure military authorities are practically agreed. Speaking of the great naval stations which command the principal trade routes, Major General Sir Bevan Edwardes said after his late careful study of Australian defence: 'It will thus be seen how mutually dependent the scattered parts of the Empire must necessarily be. The mother-country in maintaining {201} these fortified stations affords direct protection to Australian interests. The Cape Colony, in bearing a share in the defence of the most important of these stations, lends a hand to Australia in the event of war. Hong Kong, Singapore, Ceylon and Mauritius, in the large contributions they have made to defence, and the considerable annual sums applied to military purposes, are not only defending themselves, but the interests of the whole nation, including those of Australia. Canada, by the construction of that grand line of communication, the Canada Pacific Railway—the importance of which will be fully shown in our next great war—and when she has completed the defences of Esquimault, will in the same way aid in the general national defence.' He adds, and I venture to italicize his words: 'Australia, as being the most remote of all portions of the Empire, and having the largest trade routes, would gain more in war from the existence of these stations than any other group of colonies. The idea that local defence will suffice for the needs of a commercial country, and that the interests of Australasia end with her territorial waters, is utterly false. The real defence of the Australasian colonies and their trade will be secured by fleets thousands of miles from their shores[1].'
Once more, China, with its population of 400,000,000, is a close neighbour to Australia with its 4,000,000. Only narrow seas separate them. The decisive objection felt in every part of Australia to the immigration {202} of Chinese, and the steps taken to prevent it, point to relations which might easily lead to serious rupture between the two countries. I have heard sober-minded Australians, including cabinet ministers, affirm that for a long time to come Australia of itself would be absolutely powerless to offer any adequate resistance to an irritated China if she used her considerable fleet for the annoyance of Australian commerce, or if she chose to flood with a Mongolian population the vast unoccupied areas of the North and West coasts of the continent, which are incapable of defence by land forces from the colonies. The idea is sometimes brought forward in Australia that England's desire to keep on good terms with China and Australia's resolution to prevent a large Chinese immigration, bring Imperial and colonial interests into hopeless conflict on a fundamental point of policy. On the other hand it may be fairly questioned whether Australia, without the weight of British influence and the strength of British ironclads behind her, would have escaped serious consequences through her impulsive action in denying international rights to Chinamen. But leaving aside this question, it is still clear that so long as China is a naval power of considerable strength in seas frequented by Australian commerce, so long Australia cannot forget her existence and neighbourhood. An independent Australia would be compelled at once to develop a navy equal at least to that which she meets in those seas, otherwise she would have no means of {203} checking or chastising the insolence of the meanest Chinese junk which interfered with Australian trade or attacked an Australian ship.
It is manifest, then, that Australia's position is far from being one of isolation. Conditions more different from those under which the United States started upon their career of independence it is difficult to imagine. Almost the last act of Britain before the Revolution was to crush the only other European power which had a footing in America, and might prove a menace to the colonies. Wolfe won at Quebec in 1759—and Independence was declared in 1776. From 1789 till 1815 the whole of Europe was plunged, in strife so desperate that the United States were left free to work out their own development as no nation had ever been left to do so before. Nevertheless the short war of 1812 ruined American commerce, paralyzed industry, and closed by far the larger number of American business houses. It showed that isolation and an ability to ward off actual invasion did not give immunity from the calamities of war.
It seems to me that two inferences, most misleading when applied to the present condition of the British world, are constantly drawn from the results of the American Revolution, and the growth of the United States.
In the first place, because Britain's power in the world was not seriously affected by the loss of the American colonies, it is supposed that she would suffer as little from the loss of those which she now {204} possesses. No inference could be more mistaken. When the American colonies were gone, there still remained space in which a new colonial empire could be founded; there was still room to find bases of maritime power and commercial influence on all the great oceans, and in both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres. England at once found it necessary to avail herself of this opportunity. There is no chance left now to found a third colonial empire. The other nations of Europe, finding out too late for themselves the advantage which England had gained, have appropriated what small portions were open for their occupation.
Again, the fact that the United States have in the course of a century grown into a world-power of the first magnitude tends to mislead the imagination in forecasting the future of the colonies. Let Canada and Australia, it is thought, make themselves independent, and the history of the United States will be repeated; their greatness equalled in each case. Many circumstances unite to make such a result impossible.
First, the physical conditions of the countries themselves. A Canadian who has made some study of Australia may perhaps be allowed to express frankly his conviction that neither country can possibly look forward to anything that will for a moment compare with the extraordinary increment of population in the United States. He may add that to him this is a subject for congratulation, rather than regret.
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Delightful as are Canadian homes, and all the surroundings of Canadian life to those who understand and have been brought up among them, or to those who come from a similar climate, there is no doubt that the long winter, the short summer, and the necessity which both impose for strenuous exertion, render the country unattractive to vast masses of those emigrants of less stamina who pass so freely into parts of the United States. We may fairly hope that in the long run the race advantage of the slower growth will be great, and an abundant recompense for the less rapid increase of population.
Climate is, in fact, the controlling element in a persistent process of natural selection. It excludes the negro from being any considerable factor in the population. The Italian organ-grinder and all his kind flee southward at the approach of winter. Only on the Pacific coast does the Chinaman find a congenial home. Cities like New York, St. Louis, Cincinnati, or New Orleans attract even the vagrant population of Italy and other countries of Southern Europe: Canada, to her own ultimate advantage, repels it. Canada will belong to the sturdy races of the North-Saxon and Celt, Scandinavian, Dane and Northern German, fighting their way under conditions sometimes rather more severe than those to which they have been accustomed in their old homes. Selection implies less rapid increment; quality is balanced against quantity.
The obstacles to rapid growth which Canada finds {206} in northern cold Australia meets with in southern heat, in a continental configuration which deprives the country of an adequate river system, and in isolation from European centres of emigration.
The geography of the continent presents features which must be considered in forecasting the future of the country. We often see elaborate calculations, based upon the rate of increase during the last fifty years, which are intended to prove that a rapid increment of population, parallel to that which has taken place in the United States, may be anticipated. I found that more prudent thinkers in Australia reject such estimates as utterly fallacious on merely physical grounds, and facts support this different view. With a circumference of about 8000, and a diameter of more than 2000 miles, it is very doubtful if Australia can ever have a great city more than two or three hundred miles from the sea-shore. If Broken Hill be quoted as an exception, it would seem to confirm rather than weaken this view. A large output of silver, amounting already to many tons per week, has attracted to the spot and supports a population of twenty-five or thirty thousand people. But even the presence of so large a population has not led to the cultivation of the soil, and almost every article of food is brought from a distance, while a supply of water itself is only obtained with difficulty. During a recent period of drought, water was carried to Broken Hill by rail.
In America, as soon as the Alleghanies were {207} passed, the flood of immigration poured out upon the great river valleys of the Ohio, Mississippi, and Missouri, and the prairies of the far West, capable of at once absorbing millions of people. Nothing of this kind is possible for Australia. There the want of water in the interior, the partly desert and partly pastoral character of the country, are limiting dense population to the rim of the continent. Even there it is curiously concentrated in the cities. Irrigation, with the intense culture which it makes possible, may cause a considerable change over limited areas, and artesian wells will do much to give steadiness to the pastoral industry, but after all such allowances have been made it seems perfectly clear that the centre of Australia will be conquered but slowly, and will never be densely inhabited. It is hoped that by a united effort among the colonies a railway may be thrown across the continent from North to South; one from East to West would apparently be impracticable, and the connection between the opposite coasts will be chiefly maintained by Sea. Over vast areas from five to ten acres of land must be allowed for each sheep pastured, and it is doubtful if the capacity of much of this land to carry stock can be sensibly increased. The care of sheep and cattle can be carried on with great profit and on an immense scale by an exceedingly limited population, and a large part of Australia must always be chiefly pastoral. I suspect that in the mining industry also the proportion of workers to the volume of production {208} is comparatively small. Three hundred millions of gold taken from the soil since the first discovery of the precious metal less than fifty years ago, and vast public and private borrowings in addition of outside capital have given a great impulse to settlement in the past. But the conditions of the last half century have clearly been abnormal, and can scarcely be taken as an index of the future.
There are, however, other aspects of Australian life which mark this contrast with America even more decisively than do the prevailing industries and physical conditions to which I have referred. The coloured element, which in the United States now numbers about 8,000,000, and forms so large a fraction of the whole population, Australia rejects entirely. Neither Chinaman, Hindoo coolie, nor Kanaka will ever be permitted to become to Australia what the negro is to the United States, a considerable and permanent addition to dense population. Scarcely less strong is the objection to the indiscriminate immigration of cheap competitive labour such as that which has filled up America. The arrival at Melbourne, Sydney or Brisbane of half a dozen steamships with a living freight such as has been discharged at New York from the steerage of Trans-atlantic liners almost every day for the last quarter of a century would today bring New South Wales, Victoria, or Queensland to the edge of revolution. Assisted emigration has come to an end, save in the two younger colonies. For years {209} the great trans-continental Railway companies and Trans-atlantic steamship companies of the United States have acted as the most energetic emigration agencies in every country of Europe, with the one object of pouring a flood of population, without the slightest reference to its quality, over the lands lying along the newly built Railway lines. An Australian Government which tried in this manner to make its State-built Railways productive, would soon find its occupation of governing gone.
That 'pulling in of the latch string' and closing the door which the United States have decided upon reluctantly and late, Australia has begun almost at the commencement of her career. She has determined that her population shall be select. This policy exposes the working man of Australia to the sarcasm that he is quite prepared to repeat in his vast continent that selfishness in respect of land which he is rather fond of denouncing in the landlord of the old world. On the other hand, the United Kingdom has, early and late, sent too many social failures to Australia to justify either surprise or indignation at Australia's aversion to unacceptable immigration. We need not quarrel with Australia's decision in this matter, for it is one which a country has a right to make. It secures more perfect social and political assimilation of new material and avoids the great dangers which flow from placing large political powers in hands unfitted to use them. But if select, then not vast in numbers. Judging from present indications and {210} tendencies Australia is likely to have settled along its seaboard a slowly increasing but singularly wealthy population, whose prosperity will be ministered to by the highly remunerative mining and pastoral industries of the thinly settled interior.
This sea-board of the continent, the rim of which alone is or is likely to be thickly settled is 8000 miles long. A country so situated and populated is manifestly exposed, in an unusual degree, to naval attack. It is this sense of exposure which has in large measure promoted the idea of Federation among the colonies themselves. It has stimulated the work of harbour defence, important for the whole Empire as for Australia itself. It has led to the joint arrangement between the mother-land and the various colonies for an addition to the Australian Squadron. The terms of this arrangement are worthy of note. The various colonies jointly agree to contribute the sum of £126,000 per annum, partly as interest on the capital employed in construction, partly towards the maintenance of a certain number of armed ships to be reserved exclusively for service in Australian waters. To carry out this arrangement the amount invested by the mother-country in the ships, seven in number, already constructed and in active service, has been close upon a million sterling. The skilled officers and trained seamen are also supplied from the Royal Navy. It is specially agreed that any expense incurred beyond £126,000 shall be borne by the Imperial Treasury, that the ordinary strength {211} of the Australian Squadron shall not be reduced on account of this local addition to naval defence, and that during the ten years over which the arrangement extends the seven ships cannot be withdrawn from Australian waters. Surely no young country with an increasing necessity for coast defence due to enlarged wealth and commerce ever secured it on terms to compare with these. No better illustration could be given of the advantage which the colonies may derive from joint action with the mother-land.
The Australasian colonies aspire, and reasonably aspire, to dominance in the Pacific. That manifestly depends on having at command the naval power which can be best secured by co-operation with the Empire. The creation of substantial interests in the heart of the Pacific, such as would be involved in the construction of cable, postal and commercial routes, linking Australia and New Zealand with Canada in one direction, with the West Indies and Great Britain in another (when the Panama route is open), interests which the whole Empire would be concerned in securing, would do more than anything else to give effect to Australian aspirations.
However threatening or annoying the presence of Germany and France in the Southern Seas might be to an independent Australia before she had arisen to a position of great naval strength, I cannot but think that every German and French station in the Pacific, so long as the Empire remains one, is a guarantee of peace. So overwhelming would be the advantage {212} in naval and coaling bases, and in reserves of fighting force, enjoyed by a united British people in those seas, that any European nation could not but expect that a declaration of war against the British Empire would be followed by an immediate attempt on our part to sweep the enemy from the few ports which he might hold in the Pacific; and it cannot be doubted that such an attempt would be made with every probability of success.
There are those who think that Australian Federation will not make for British unity, but will instead prove the prelude to Australian Independence. I believe that this is an entirely mistaken view. But were it true; did the choice for Australians lie between Federation with the Empire and Federation among the colonies themselves, I unhesitatingly say that the true course would be to accept the latter. Until Australia can act and speak as a unit, she is incapable of deciding wisely and conclusively upon her own destiny; she is not in a position to take her right place and exert her due influence in a federation of nations. A number of colonies grouped as are those of Australia, which failed to see the advantage of a common political life, or were unwilling to make the sacrifices necessary to secure it, would remain in a state of political unrest and incomplete development which would render them a weakness rather than a strength in a great national combination. Much as I believe in the advantages which would come to Australia, to the other colonies, to Great Britain and {213} to the world at large from British unity, I yet am convinced that it would be better that Australia should be isolated from the Empire than that she should be divided within her own boundaries. This opinion is entertained, I feel sure, by ninety-nine out of every hundred advocates of a United Empire.
In Canada, however, confederation has not had the effect of weakening attachment to the Empire. By giving the people a larger political judgment it has made them weigh more seriously the responsibilities of national existence and made them value more highly connection with a powerful state.
Meanwhile the contest going on in Australia is the best of all preparations for the acceptance of the wider idea of national unity, since it leads to the accurate definition of principles, and a careful balancing of the gain and loss involved in large organization.
Canadian experience leads us to think that Australian Federation would lend itself to national union in another way. In Canada before 1867, the date of Confederation, the Colonial Office was continually appearing as a factor in provincial politics. Whatever trouble arose, Downing Street was to blame, and party passion vented all its bitterness upon this official representative of England's policy. It is safe to say that Confederation eliminated the Colonial Office as an active, or at any rate, an irritating factor from Canadian party politics. It was found that by far the larger number of those questions which gave rise {214} to friction with the Colonial Office were transferred to the domain of the Dominion government; that the difficulties were such as were necessarily incident to the management of a large state; that Canadians had to fight out among themselves disputes once fought out with an English minister. It is a striking fact that since Canada attained to a united voice on public questions, since confederation imposed upon her the necessity of dealing with internal difficulties and forming a large judgment on common affairs, not only has no serious difficulty arisen with the Colonial Office, but the deliberately expressed opinion of the Canadian Government has, as a rule, given a general direction to British policy in dealing with external matters which concerned Canada.
In one or two of the Australian colonies the Colonial Office is still heard of occasionally as it was in Canada thirty or forty years ago; the Colonial Secretary of the day is a frequent subject of political lampoon; denunciation of his policy is a part of the stock-in-trade of the party politician. To say that this denunciation is affected rather than real is not enough; it is at times a very real irritant between English and Australian feeling. The federation of Australia will, in my opinion, remove this irritant as federation did in Canada, and by eliminating petty differences enable people to take larger views and have fewer suspicions in national affairs. If the Federal Government of Australia reserve the right, as Canada has done, to appoint the governors of provinces, there will {215} be no opportunity for disputes such as that which arose with Queensland a few years ago. If the right be not reserved, a colony will have little room to complain about the manner of its exercise by the Colonial office.
I have pointed out the interest which it seems to me the Australian colonies have in all matters which affect the rule of the Empire in the East, and especially in the question whether Britain or Russia is in India. Military authorities, on the other hand, are agreed, and the fact is, indeed, manifest to any observer, that in the event of a great struggle for the possession of India, the advantage for the Empire as a whole would be immeasurable in having behind India the colonies of Australia and New Zealand, as a base of supply and support, even if they did not send a man into the field. The suggested creation of a great national arsenal in one of the southern colonies as a safe source of rapid supply of war material in case of any temporary break in the connection of India and the colonies with the United Kingdom is a proposal which recommends itself to the common sense of British people, who will have more at stake in the next great war than any nation ever risked before. In the single matter of equipping cavalry the colonies might well turn the scale in an Eastern war. Already both New Zealand and Australia export horses in considerable numbers to India, and indeed already furnish the bulk of the remounts for our Indian cavalry. The surplus stock {216} to be drawn upon is becoming great enough to stand almost any drain, and with the attention now given in the colonies to horse breeding quality is constantly improving. The command of men which the nation has in India, and of horses in Australia, would counterbalance anything that Russia can draw from the steppes of Tartary.
In the matter of food supplies, too, the colonies might play an important part. Army contracts for tinned meats are now filled by the great meat preserving factories, and the capacity of the vast pastures of Queensland and the farms of New Zealand to furnish food of this kind is practically unlimited. There remains to be noticed one all-important fact. The original acquisition of India, as the highest authorities now admit, depended upon Britain's easy access to its coasts by sea. With the Australian colonies and South Africa under the national flag that access could be easily maintained in the face of all comers. The permanence of the British position in India may be considered as resting very largely on this issue.
Whether in a critical contest for the possession of India Australia would contribute men, as well as supplies, may be left to conjecture. But looking at all that would be at stake for the colonies of the South, the failure to respond to a real call of need against Russia would indicate some falling off in that 'saving common sense' which has hitherto inclined British people to challenge enemies on the furthest {217} frontier rather than await them at their own doors. An Australian opinion has already been given upon this subject. A contingent of Australian troops sent to the Soudan may be put to the credit of impulsive national enthusiasm; a contingent one day on the frontier of Afghanistan might well be the outcome of deliberate and far-sighted Australian policy.
I attach very little importance to the opinion, sometimes expressed, that in view of the rapid increase of a native-born population in Australia, any measures looking towards national unity should be hurried forward before the generation born in the United Kingdom had passed away or lost its controlling influence. Other reasons there are for early movement, but not this one. The idea of national unity must win on its own merits. The growth of a native-born population may or may not make for consolidation, but it is on the judgment and sentiment of such a population that the strength of any union must ultimately depend. Meanwhile we may remember that four-fifths of the population of Canada is native-born; the fact has not weakened in the slightest degree the closeness of sympathy with Great Britain and the Empire.
Of the many ardent advocates of national unity, everywhere scattered throughout the Dominion, by far the larger proportion consists of native Canadians. So I believe it will ultimately be in Australia. The longer history of Canada, the more severe conditions of that history, seem to me to have given a greater {218} maturity and definiteness of political thought in Canada than in Australia.
It was often pointed out to me in Australia, by the older inhabitants, and particularly the older politicians, that among the un-travelled younger people of the colonies there was at present an extraordinarily exaggerated opinion of the absolute and relative importance of Australia in the world. A stranger naturally hesitates to generalize on the truth of such a criticism, though marking individual illustrations. I had the privilege of addressing a gathering of young men of the Sydney University. In a debate which followed one of the students asked: 'What single thing have people in England better than we Australians have here?' The manifest sincerity with which the question was asked made the remark deeply interesting—almost touching. The attitude of mind is accounted for by the lack of some standard of comparison close at hand. England has measured her strength with too many rivals to overrate her place in the world. Canada has had a great neighbour to force upon her a sense of proportion. The United States themselves emerged from the great war of Secession with a temper curiously modest and moderate as compared with the spread-eagleism which prevailed in the years when the country had known little but continuous prosperity, when its strength had not been tested by trial, and when a republican form of government was supposed to be a guarantee against all the ills from which monarchies were wont to suffer. {219} The remarkable conditions under which Australia has been developed, with no strong native races against which to struggle—with external enemies kept at a distance by British ironclads, or by fear of the British name, and with suddenly gained wealth almost without precedent in history—sufficiently account for any over-confident attitude on the part of very young Australians. This, time is sure to rectify. Political experience gives political perspective. Out-side of this it would be difficult to discover anything in the mass of Australians to indicate that they were likely to be different from Englishmen or Canadians in loyalty to a large nationality. I say the mass of Australians, for it would be idle to ignore the fact that another current of thought exists.
In two of the Australian colonies, New South Wales and Queensland, some journals are found which make it their business to cultivate an anti-British and separatist feeling, and it must be admitted that they give themselves to their task with great and unflagging energy. It is very difficult to estimate accurately the range of their influence. I found the most divergent opinions held upon the point by well-informed Australians themselves, some looking upon them, and the idea which they represented, as forces that would have to be reckoned with in the future: others regarding them as unworthy of notice, and without any permanent influence. Certainly in strength of language they have no parallel in any other part of the British world, or in the United States. British people {220} outside of Australia may be interested in knowing something of their tone and aim. I select a comparatively moderate passage. 'What does it [British Federation] offer us in exchange for our ideals and our aspirations, and our sympathies and our interests? … It offers us only an unwieldy Empire, crusted over with fungi, rotting with inequalities, governed by a class which is blown out with Privilege and Pride, that ignores the Spirit of the Age and clings to the brutal Past. In this Empire our Australia will be swamped, under it she would be buried; in it our inspiration to lift again the torch of Liberty would be smothered and drowned. We do not want it and we will not have it. Our Australia shall be as free from foreign control as is the sunshine that the Australian loves; as is the billowing sea that surges eternally around her shores. She shall in herself be complete, in sympathy with all, in dependence upon none. … We have no interest in British Trade and still less in the maintenance of the Empire. We do not care who owns India; we hope that if any more opium wars come about the white ensign will be blown out of Chinese waters; nothing would please us better than to hear that the Spaniards had retaken Gibraltar and the Germans Heligoland and that the huge facade of commercial aggression and oligarchic robbery had come down with a crash.'
This passage fairly represents a kind of political pabulum which is dealt out very freely and finds an audience in Sydney and Brisbane. For the most {221} part it is furnished, not by native Australians, but by imported talent. In Sydney a higher grade of newspaper freely discusses the question of separation from the Empire, with a distinct inclination towards independence as the true Australian ideal.
At a public meeting which I addressed in Sydney the statement of the arguments for British unity met with what seemed to me a distinctly unfriendly reception. The case stands quite alone in my experience of the British world. I was, however, to my surprise assured by leading men who were present that the hearing given me was, for Sydney, a very good one. If so, the lot of a public man in New South Wales is not an enviable one.
At this meeting Mr. Buchanan of the Legislative Council moved, and Mr. Traill of the Legislative Assembly seconded, a resolution, affirming that 'the natural and inevitable tendency of the Australian colonies is to unite and form among themselves one free and independent nation.' I give the names of the mover and seconder that the weight or weakness of their support of such a resolution may be justly estimated by those competent to judge. In comment upon the occurrence the leading Sydney journal, while repudiating any sympathy with the display of Separatist feeling, said, 'the fact is patent that within the last few years the opponents of closer union, even the advocates of separation, have gathered courage, spoken more boldly, and taken an aggressive attitude.' Australians therefore know what they have to deal {222} with. Mr. Dibbs, the present premier of New South Wales, has used expressions that indicate a wish for or an expectation of Australian independence. On the other hand, among the great majority of leading men in the colony, including native Australians of prominence and conspicuous ability, such as Mr. Barton and Mr. Reid, the opinion appeared general that separation from the Empire would mean for Australia 'all loss and no gain.' At the Sydney conference of 1891 the voice of Sir Henry Parkes was as decisive for permanent unity with the Empire as was that of Sir John Macdonald at Quebec in 1864.
Making all allowance, however, for division of opinion in Sydney, it must be remembered that New South Wales by no means represents all Australia.
If large and enthusiastic meetings, the hearty support of an influential and exceptionally able press, and the cordial approval of the clearest thinkers form a sufficient index to popular opinion, then one is justified in saying that the idea of national unity appeals strongly to the sentiment and to the reasoned conviction of the people of the next great colony, Victoria. The dominating energy of Victoria has extended its interests to every corner of the Australian continent. Its business connection with the mother-land is more important and intimate than that of any other colony. Hence the outlook on national questions is wide, and Victoria would steadily resist any tendency to separation from the Empire. The same may be said, I think, of South Australia, where the press is conspicuous {223} for its able and temperate discussion of national questions and where the prominent leaders of opinion are sincere believers in the permanent unity of the Empire.
In Queensland, as is well known, there has been in past years much talk of separation, chiefly arising from friction with the Colonial office being made a factor in local party conflicts. For some time Queensland refused to share in the expense for naval defence undertaken by the other colonies, the contribution for that purpose being denounced as 'tribute.' Later and wiser thought has reversed this decision. From its long coast-line and the immediate proximity of settlements formed by other nations, Queensland has more interest than any other colony in naval defence.
The consciousness of exposure to attack prompted the attempted annexation of the whole of New Guinea, and explains the intense annoyance felt in Queensland at the refusal of the Colonial office to sanction that annexation. The necessity for naval protection is a permanent condition, and will probably dominate the political thought of Queensland even more than of the rest of Australia. In Rockhampton I had the opportunity of discussing, the question with a large and sympathetic audience, and in other parts of Queensland as well as there with leading politicians and journalists. Despite the superficial talk about separation, I doubt if in any colony of the Empire is the value of a great national connection more thoroughly understood by those who really dominate the policy of the colony.
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Taking the Australian continent as a whole I think it is a fair estimate to say that in every one of the colonies there is an overwhelming majority who would favour permanent connection with the Empire. On the other hand it is quite certain that in some of the colonies there is an active and aggressive minority energetically working for ultimate separation. It is for Australians and Australians alone to decide between these conflicting ideas.
TASMANIA.
The colony of Tasmania is comparatively small, but its insular position makes it one of the critical points in Australian defence. Up to the present time owing to the small population and revenue, its principal harbours have been less strongly fortified than those of Australia, and military authorities have constantly urged greater attention to its defences upon the ground that by seizing positions here an enemy might find means of coal supply and a base from which to attack Australia. Upon this point the report of General Edwards was most emphatic. The island is within three days' steaming distance from Adelaide, one from Melbourne, two and a half from Sydney and four from New Zealand. With several fine harbours, a soil and climate equal to any in the world, a considerable coal supply, and as yet only a limited population to resist attack, Tasmania {225} would present to any hostile power not merely an opportunity but almost a temptation to establish a Gibraltar in the Southern seas. Tasmania has strong commercial reasons for wishing to federate with Australia. On the other hand in an Australian federation she would have the strongest reasons for opposing separation from the mother-country. Like New Zealand, she depends for safety upon naval defence, a defence she could not receive from the colonies of the continent.
So far as it is possible to judge from external indications the opinion of this small but strategically most important colony is almost entirely in favour of close and permanent connection with the Empire. During discussion on the subject carried on in the principal centres of population, and extending over some weeks, I found that the idea of British unity was heartily supported by everyone of the leading newspapers, and by most of the principal public men, including the leaders of the Government and Opposition. Opposing ideas have their representatives in a small group of sincere republicans, headed by the present Attorney-General, the Hon. A. Inglis Clark. The republicanism of this small party was the more interesting, as it seemed to me quite unconnected with and superior to the irrational and bitter anti-British feeling which occasionally finds expression in one or two of the Australian colonies.
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NEW ZEALAND
In New Zealand I found among politicians, journalists, and the public generally, a remarkable consensus of opinion that the circumstances of that colony would always compel it to regard questions of national defence and consolidation from its own point of view, and in a large measure independently of Australia. Facts justify this attitude. New Zealand is 1000 miles long and nowhere more than 150 broad. Cut in two by a broad strait and penetrated by numerous bays and inlets, it has 3000 miles of coast line, and is therefore more exposed from a naval point of view than any other equally fertile, wealthy, and thinly settled country in the world. That it is an outlying part of Australia is an illusion left on many minds from a casual glance at small maps of the Southern Hemisphere, but the illusion vanishes the moment we visit the country or consider the facts. Twelve hundred miles of open sea separate it from Australia. The trade between the two is growing, but it is insignificant compared with the flood of commerce which pours from each towards Britain. The similarity of production will probably make this a permanent condition, save when drought compels Australia to look to New Zealand for food supplies. Britain is New Zealand's one great market, and it has become a more steady and reliable market from the means which have been devised to transfer the perishable produce of New Zealand farms to the {227} British consumer. Meanwhile, in her isolated position only naval power can give the colony adequate defence. The states of Australia can give effective support to each other—they cannot give it to New Zealand until they possess a fleet sufficient to command the Southern seas, and such a fleet they will not possess at any time within the range of present political calculation. Among reflective men in New Zealand one finds no readiness to believe that geographical isolation could be relied upon for giving military security, an idea which has considerable vogue in parts of Australia. 'I see that the tendency of enterprize and science is every year more to annihilate space, and space will be annihilated for purposes of war as well as peace, and the distance of the colonies from those who may attack them every year becomes less and less of a protection to them.' These words of Lord Salisbury express not inaccurately, I think, the prevailing thought of all serious politicans in New Zealand in regard to their country. The feeling is strengthened by a further consideration. New Zealand has already a good deal of trade with the scattered islands of the Pacific. This trade is likely to have a large development as time goes on. At any rate New Zealanders have formed a very definite ambition to acquire a large commercial connection and powerful influence in the Pacific, an ambition which can scarcely be realized unless its commercial interests have adequate naval support.
Considerations of the kind I have mentioned explain {228} the comparative indifference of the colony to Australian federation, which would never satisfy her necessities except as subsidiary to the larger national union. They explain the fairly unanimous support which her ablest public men have given to the general principle of national Federation. Mr. Ballance, the Liberal Premier of New Zealand, said in the House of Representatives, in a discussion which took place prior to the Australasian Federal Convention at Sydney, that 'Imperial Federation, with a free management of its own affairs as at present, was the only future he would look to for the colony.' Equally strong expressions could be gathered from the speeches or writings of most of the leading men of New Zealand. The fear lest Australian Federation might ultimately lead to separation from the Empire was publicly and expressly assigned as a reason why New Zealand should not be a part of the Australian commonwealth. Inside an Australasian Federation New Zealand's influence would be steadily thrown in favour of British national unity. On the other hand, should Australia ever move towards separation—an improbable contingency, but one often suggested by a few of her journalists and public men—the advantage in prestige and more practical ways which New Zealand would derive from retaining the wide national connection, and becoming the centre of the Empire's naval strength in the Southern seas, would infinitely outweigh anything Australia could possibly offer, and would decide the course to which {229} self-interest even now points. The individual interest which New Zealand thus holds towards the question is very significant, and worthy of careful attention. Placed in the centre of the water hemisphere of the globe this 'Britain of the South' seems the precise complement of the mother-country at the centre of the land hemisphere, while a conjunction of circumstances,—the possession of excellent harbours, already very fairly defended, and easily made impregnable, a plentiful supply of coal, timber, and metals, a climate which never fails to favour abundant crops, and nourishes a sturdy race,—fits the country to be the opposite pole of the Oceanic Empire which Britain has created. Distance might be supposed to have lessened commercial intercourse with the mother-land; as a matter of fact it is greater in proportion to wealth and population than that of any other country. Roughly putting the exports of New Zealand at £10,000,000 per annum, £7,000,000 go to Great Britain, £2,250,000 to other parts of the Empire, and only the small remaining balance to other countries. The proportion of imports is not widely different. Community of interest could scarcely be greater than this. The safety of this trade, too, is of the very essence of the prosperity, one might almost say of the commercial life of the country. Its stoppage would mean financial and industrial paralysis. We have therefore some measure of what the security guaranteed by the greatest naval power in the world means to New Zealand.
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On the other hand, it would be difficult to exaggerate the advantage which such a power would derive in war from the exclusive use of this halfway place in the voyage around the world. Auckland, Lyttleton, Wellington and Dunedin all have excellent harbours. The fortifications which protect them, constructed and equipped at the expense of the colony itself, are, says General Edwards in his report 'well planned, and the armaments are sufficient to repel the attack of several cruisers, provided the defence is properly organized and competent officers appointed to command.' Thus they furnish a comparatively secure retreat for ships of commerce or of war. Auckland and Lyttleton have docks, that at Auckland being capacious enough to receive for repair the largest ship of war afloat. Even now the vessels of France, Germany and other nations call here to coal, victual, or repair, finding such stations as Samoa or Noumea but poor bases from which to operate. The advantage to a nation holding these ports in time of war would be overwhelming. It would scarcely be diminished even if Australia should become independent. Other powers, if they respected Australia's independence, could not use her ports as a base of attack, and at the utmost could only demand the rights of neutrals which would be of little use in a serious conflict with Britain while retaining the exclusive possession of New Zealand. The defection of one or two of the Australian colonies, or even of the whole continent, would weaken {231} the chain of the Empire's maritime position, but would not create in it a fatal flaw, so long as New Zealand remains faithful to the national allegiance. The practically undivided sentiment of her people and her own supreme interests alike incline her in this direction.
[1] Address before Royal Colonial Institute—March, 1891.
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CHAPTER IX.
SOUTH AFRICA.
THOSE who claim that the separation from the Empire of any one of our three groups of great colonies would inflict a serious if not a fatal blow on our national greatness and the prosperity of British people—point with no slight interest to the illustration of their argument which is furnished by South Africa. Here, again, we have under the British flag a country of vast extent and favourable for European occupation. The institutions of self-government are already established over a wide area, and are being gradually extended. A confederation of all the South African provinces is already in the thought of practical statesmen. We have here, then, the probability of the formation of another power, so large that a merely colonial position cannot be expected to satisfy its ultimate political necessities. Though at present far inferior to Canada and Australia in population, and behind them in fulness of constitutional development, it is moving along the same lines of political growth, and circumstances may at any time lead to a rapid increase of population. Most of the arguments, therefore, which are used, in, {233} favour of Canadian or Australian separation apply to South Africa as well. If an independent government, a separate foreign policy, a distinct system of defence, an individual diplomatic relation to the rest of the world, is a political necessity for Australia, New Zealand, or Canada, it is clearly an equal necessity for South Africa. The internal impulse towards independence might even be expected to be exceptionally strong, since a considerable fraction of the white population is not British by descent, and has been led by circumstances to feel a peculiar sensitiveness in regard to political rights.
Is then the retention of South Africa under the national flag, and within the national system, a matter of indifference to British people either at home or abroad? Is the separation of South Africa, its freedom to associate itself with any power it pleases, or even its being placed in a position where British people could only enjoy or be granted neutral rights in its harbours, a condition of things which can be discussed with equanimity by Australians, New Zealanders, East Indians, nay, even by Canadians with their great ocean interests, to say nothing of the people of the United Kingdom itself? The test which South Africa applies to separatist theories seems to me a crucial one.
Once more I cannot do better than quote from the 'Problems of
Greater Britain.'
The author says: 'Considered from the Imperial, from the Indian, and from the Australian point {234} of view, as an aid to our maritime power, no spot on earth is more important to us than the Cape with its twin harbours Table Bay and Simon's Bay.' And again: 'While a general hostility to our rule would be sufficient to make us part with almost any other colony, it is impossible for us to give up the military station which we occupy at the extremity of the African continent and which itself cannot be held unless we hold at all events a portion of the country round it.'
No one who considers the geographical position of the Cape, and its relation to the greatest trade route of the Empire, can regard these utterances as exaggerated. The Cape is, and must always be, one of the greatest turning places of the world's commerce. Between St. Helena and Mauritius for the Indian bound ships, between St. Helena and King George's Sound for those going towards the Southern seas, the Cape is the only sufficient resting-place that European ships can find.
'As a vessel steaming from British ports for India, or China, or Australia, in time of war begins to approach the point of exhaustion of its coal supply it finds itself in a region of storms, far from any shelter except that at the Cape of Good Hope. The position of that refuge, and the certainty of being able to deny it to an enemy, combined with the command of the Red Sea route, even if only for the purpose of stopping it, draws therefore, on behalf of England, an almost impassable line on this side of the globe {235} between the Eastern and the Western Hemispheres. The difficulty which our ownership of the Cape places in the way of possible opponents, even more than the refuge afforded to our ships, constitutes in war the supreme advantage of the possession of the Cape of Good Hope as a naval station[1].'
Such being the relation of South Africa to the Empire, such the importance of its remaining under the British flag, we may well ask, with some anxiety, whether the feelings of its people and the interests of the colony point in the same direction.
The attitude of the leading men of South Africa towards the idea of national unity is clearly defined. Mr. Hofmeyer, the leader of the Dutch or Afrikander party, at the colonial conference of 1887, brought forward, and earnestly pressed upon the assembled delegates, a scheme for 'promoting a closer union between the various parts of the British Empire by means of an imperial tariff of customs.' His words indicate the temper of mind in which he addresses himself to the question: 'I have taken this matter in hand with two objects: to promote the union of the Empire, and at the same time to obtain revenue for the purpose of general defence.'
Sir Gordon Sprigg, for many years Premier of Cape Colony, speaking in London in 1891, strongly advocated a similar policy, and was urgent, to quote his own words, 'that an invitation should be addressed to the governments of the various colonies and dependencies {236} to send representatives to this country to consider, in a conference, the practicability of forming a commercial union between the different parts of the Empire,' regarding this as the most effectual way of accomplishing what he considered should be the aim of national statesmanship, viz. the unification of national interests.
The present Premier of Cape Colony, and the most influential man in South Africa, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, has stated that he looks upon the consolidation of the different colonies of South Africa as the main aim of his political life, but at the same time his utterances, from the beginning of his political career to the present moment, indicate conclusively that he only thinks of a united South Africa as an integral part of a united Empire, so constituted as to give adequate expression to the aims of its various members. It is interesting to find that these three men, who may be taken as representing the different sides of South African feeling, all eminently practical, and all above a suspicion of subjecting the interest of the colony to the interest of the nation at large, are agreed in the belief that the best future for their country is close association with the mother-land, and the Empire. And looking at the facts of the situation, from a South African point of view, who can doubt that they are justified? Pressing upon British South Africa on all sides are the nations of Europe. France is in Madagascar. Bordering on British territories are those of Germany and Portugal. {237} The Dutch Republics, as yet only half won to friendliness and sympathy, are close at hand. Large native populations—which do not fade away, as in America, New Zealand, or Australia at the approach of the white man, but rather multiply under influences which make for peace—are all around. The development of a great continent overflowing with stores of wealth depends not only on the energy of the men who have the work directly in hand, but on the confidence they feel that behind them is the diplomacy of a powerful nation to maintain their rights, the wealth of a rich nation to furnish them with capital, the strength of a great people to secure them, in emergency, from disaster.
If the British connection seems of such significance to South African statesmen, in working out the future of their vast country, quite as much does the Empire require the constant advice of those statesmen in directing the difficult diplomacy and making the critical decisions which the control of so much of the continent necessitates. The lack of such advice, directly and consistently sought, is probably at the root of much of the difficulty of the past. In the long run South African opinion must dominate national policy in South Africa. That it should be expressed in an authoritative form, and under a due sense of national responsibility, are the conditions which will make it most helpful, and most reliable.
Sir Gordon Sprigg and other public men from the Cape have pointed out to me how peculiar are the {238} problems which arise in South African politics, how much they stand apart from Anglo-Saxon experience in other parts of the world, how impossible it is for anyone who has not to deal with these problems on the spot to understand them. Here, if anywhere, the maxim is true to which I have alluded in another place, that 'only those who know a country are fitted to rule it.' It is only by utilizing the knowledge and experience of the best minds of the country that adequate direction can be given to its external relations as to its internal government.
The actual and contingent stake which Great Britain, Australia and other parts of the Empire have in the exclusive use of the Cape as a naval station in time of war may be roughly outlined in figures. Lord Brassey, dwelling upon the importance to the nation of completing the fortification and equipment of the neighbouring harbours, mentions in the Naval Annual for 1890, that at present about £90,000,000 worth of commerce centres at or passes this point every year, including £20,000,000 of outward trade to Australia, £13,000,000 to the Cape itself, and portions of the Indian, Chinese and other Eastern trade which make up the whole. This is under normal conditions. But should the Suez Canal be closed, and it is difficult to see how in a great European war this could be prevented, unless England could obtain and maintain absolute naval control of the Mediterranean, and military control of Egypt, then at least £150,000,000, and possibly £200,000,000 of {239} British trade would be forced to go round the Cape. I have mentioned elsewhere Lord Dufferin's statement, to the London Chamber of Commerce, that if anything ever occurred to take away our control of the Indian markets there is not a cottage in the manufacturing districts of England which would not feel the blow at once. If this be true of the Indian trade alone, the argument becomes much more impressive when applied to the risks which would be incurred, alike by Britain, India, and Australia if they were compelled to depend for the security of the whole vast volume of Eastern and Australian commerce upon such neutral rights as could be granted by an independent South Africa, or if they left the Cape in such a position that it could be seized by a hostile power. We have an interesting historical illustration of what security on this great trade route means in the fact, stated on apparently reliable authority, that between the years 1793 and 1797, when the French held the Isle of France and Bourbon, no less than 2266 British merchantmen were seized by French ships or expeditions sallying out from those stations. So intolerable did the situation become for British commerce that the conquest of the French stations became an absolute necessity, and this was effected in 1810 when a new outbreak of war had made like disaster imminent. Yet this was before the vast trade of Australasia had come into existence, and when our trade with the East was but a trifle compared with its present great proportions.
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In the case of South Africa, however, the argument for national unity is so strong that few undertake to question it. Not long since, in the Manchester Reform Club, I met a sincere disciple of the old school of thinkers on colonial policy. He had studied the question under Mr. Goldwin Smith, at Toronto, and was at first concisely and comprehensively dogmatic in his assertion that the only plan for England was not only to permit, but to encourage, each of the great colonies to become independent as soon as possible. He was an honest thinker, and one could with him afford to stake the argument on a candid answer to a single question. 'Could Great Britain, with any regard to the safety of her national position, afford to give up South Africa'? The emphatic negative which, after a moment's thought, he gave, was the only reply possible for one who acknowledged the force of facts when presented to his mind.
THE WEST INDIES.
The present and contingent relation of the British West Indies to the problem of national defence, and therefore of national unity, is more direct than at first sight may appear. No portion of the Empire was won at greater expense of prolonged conflict than the West Indian Islands, but their relative commercial importance was temporarily diminished by the occupation of other tropical countries, and the substitution of the {241} beet-root sugar of temperate climates for that of the cane. West Indian trade, which has found out many new directions, is still, however, important, and not for the United Kingdom alone, but for the Canadian Dominion as well. Canada and the West Indies are the complement of each other in natural production, and a very large trade is sure to grow up between them as they develop in wealth and population. The Dominion has, therefore, a deep interest in the power of the Empire to protect commerce such as is given by stations like Bermuda, St. Lucia and Kingston. Halifax has already been connected with Bermuda by a telegraph cable. The West Indian islands and Naval Stations at present depend for communication upon lines passing through the United States. The continuation of the Halifax-Bermuda cable to the West Indies would give an independent electric connection between all the British possessions in America. This might become a very distinct addition to the resources of our naval system.
The completion of any means of ship communication across the Isthmus of Panama would increase indefinitely the importance to the Empire of the West Indies. Australia would have at once the same kind of interest in the strength of the national position there which she now has in our possession of the Cape, or in our control of Aden and Malta. Through this new channel would probably flow the main flood of British commerce with the western coasts of North and South America. It would furnish the easiest line of {242} naval communication between the Eastern and Western coasts of Canada.
Thus for the needs of the present and the contingencies of the future the retention of the British West Indies under the national flag gives strength to our general system of defence.
The completion of telegraphic and steam communication between the principal islands has brought the question of local federation within the range of serious discussion, but the obstacles, social as well as physical, are naturally much greater than in the case of Canada and Australia, and the accomplishment of union may be for some time delayed. The islands could not well be independent in any case, and there is probably no part of the Empire which would lend itself more readily than the West Indies to national consolidation.
[1] Problems of Greater Britain, vol. ii. p. 521.
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CHAPTER X.
INDIA.
'As time passes it rather appears that we are in the hands of a Providence which is greater than all statesmanship, that this fabric so blindly piled up has a chance of becoming a part of the permanent edifice of civilization, and that the Indian achievement of England, as it is the strangest, may after all turn out to be the greatest; of all her achievements.'—Prof. J. R. Seeley.
'BUT above all, what is to be done with India'? With this question Mr. Goldwin Smith makes the relation of India to the Empire the crux of the Federation problem. To him the difficulty presented seems insoluble, chiefly because he believes that it would be impossible for a federation of democratic communities scattered over the globe to hold India, about which they know little, as a dependency. He even doubts, in his customary vein of pessimism, whether the fate of the Indian Empire is not already 'sealed by the progress of democracy in Britain.' So far from this last being the case it looks as if the English working man, who has annually more than £60,000,000 of trade staked on our hold on India, will be the last to weaken by his vote our position in the country or our grip on the waterways which lead to the East. Every second or third day's work of the Lancashire cotton-spinner is done for the Indian market, or for other Eastern {244} markets which we control on account of our position in India. In some large districts, such as that of Oldham, the proportion is three days' work out of four. And the Lancashire spinner is a keen political thinker, especially where his bread and butter are concerned.
The industry of the city of Dundee depends almost entirely upon the supply of a single fibre from the valley of the Ganges. The Dundee jute-worker is a Radical, but he is not likely for that reason to forget that his daily wage depends on the hold which the Empire keeps upon Bengal. The purely trade relation of India to the United Kingdom was clearly put by Lord Dufferin in his address to the London Chamber of Commerce three years ago. He said:—
'During the past year our trade with our Indian Empire was larger than our trade with any other country in the world, with the exception of the United States, amounting to no less a sum than £64,000,000. If, again, we merely confine our attention to a comparison of our exports to India with our exports to other countries, we shall find that the same statement holds good, namely, that the exports of Great Britain to India are greater than those to any other country in the world except the United States, amounting as they do to £34,000,000, whereas our exports to France do not exceed £24,000,000, and to Germany £27,000,000. In fact, India's trade with the United Kingdom is nearly one-tenth of the value of the total British trade with the whole world. … In 1888 she took £21,250,000 worth of our cotton goods {245} and yarns, out of a total of £72,000,000 worth exported to all countries, whereas China only took £6,500,000 worth, Germany £2,500,000 worth and the United States £2,000,000 worth. Again, if we take another great section of British exports, such as hardware, machinery and metals, we find that out of a total export of £36,000,000 to all countries India in 1888 took £5,750,000 worth, whereas we only sent £3,000,000 worth to France, £1,750,000 worth to Russia, and £750,000 worth to China.
'These figures, I think, should be enough to convince the least receptive understanding what a fatal blow it would be to our commercial prosperity were circumstances ever to close, either completely or partially, the Indian ports to the trade of Great Britain, and how deeply the manufacturing population of Lancashire, and not only of Lancashire, but of every centre of industry in Great Britain and Ireland, is interested in the well-being and expanding prosperity of our Indian fellow-subjects. Indeed it would not be too much to say that if any serious disaster ever overtook our Indian Empire, or if our political relations with the Peninsula of Hindostan were to be even partially disturbed, there is not a cottage in Great Britain, at all events in the manufacturing districts, which would not be made to feel the disastrous consequences of such an intolerable calamity.'
There is another point to consider. The rapid growth of our vast Indian commerce has been largely due to the application on an immense scale of British capital {246} for the opening up of the country by railways and canals, and for the conservation and distribution of water by systems of irrigation. It is estimated that £350,000,000 are thus invested, to which must be added other large sums employed in various forms of industrial enterprise; the profits and interest of all this capital flowing back steadily to the United Kingdom, and evidently secured only by British dominance.
When to all this we connect the fact that from 75,000 to 100,000 British people find well paid employment in carrying on the government, defence and industrial development of the country we begin to understand the vast range of national interests involved in our retaining possession of India. The estimate that the people of the United Kingdom draw from India sixty or seventy millions sterling every year in direct income is probably a moderate one. Directly then Britain's stake in India is enormous. Indirectly our possession of the country would probably determine the drift of the commerce of the vast regions still further East.
Nor is it the United Kingdom alone which is concerned.
The present and prospective interest of the Australasian colonies in India are also great, not only for the military reasons which have been mentioned, but in view of the growing trade relations. India reduced to anarchy by the withdrawal of British rule, or India governed by Russia, would mean a serious blow {247} to Australasian trade, present and prospective. It might easily mean exclusion from all the markets of the East.
South Africa, which owed its earliest development to the fact that it was the stopping place on the road to India, still owes much of its importance to the same cause. The interest of Canada in India is more remote, but now that Canadian steamship lines are on the Pacific, with their terminus at Hong Kong, Britain's position in the East has a new interest for the Dominion.
But every British colony great and small is directly and deeply interested in the maintenance of the power of the Empire, and if the continued power of the Empire involves, as it seems to do, the retention and government of India, the colonies should not shrink from sharing that responsibility.
Professor Seeley has proved with conclusive clearness that the government of India has had very little effect upon the domestic politics of England; there is no reason to think that it would have more upon the domestic politics of the Empire.
The political difficulty about India's relation to a united Empire is, however, felt very widely. It is one of the first which occurs to the minds of most men when they turn their attention to the question, as I have found during public discussion in many parts of the Empire. Nor is this to be wondered at. That a country enjoying popular representative institutions should rule as an imperial power over some hundreds {248} of millions of people without representation in their own government is an extraordinary anomaly. Men's minds have, however, become accustomed to it by long usage, and the fact is accepted almost without remark. But when a proposal is made to re-construct the national organism on what is claimed to be a logical basis, the incompatibility between our popular system of government, and the system which we apply to India at once re-appears.
The anomaly, however, would be no greater under federation than without it, and it is one with which the British mind in all parts of the Empire is familiar. Most of the great colonies have had on a small scale the experience which the United Kingdom has had on a large scale of ruling weaker races without giving them representation.
Unquestionably confusion of thought is caused by the careless use of the term Empire into which English people have fallen. Applied to India and the crown colonies it is admissible, though with the qualification that in practice the Empress of India acts as much under advice as the Queen of England. As a name for the 'slowly grown and crowned Republic' of which the mother-land is the type and the great self-governing colonies copies, the term Empire is a misnomer, and has none of the meaning which it has when applied to Russia, Austria, or the France of the Napoleons. If immediate reflection of the popular will in public policy be taken as the test, England, Canada, and Australia are more republican than the modern {249} republics; as democratic as is well possible under a representative system of government. But the people of this 'crowned republic,' proud of their capacity for self-government, and impatient of any illegitimate control over themselves, have assumed the task of governing a real Empire—one which contains a population of some hundreds of millions of various races. The legitimacy of this assumed task we need not stay to discuss. The actual relation of Britain to India as to several other countries without self-government is a fact; and one which has passed beyond the range of discussion.
This government of India the United Kingdom, upon which the work now devolves, finds it possible to carry on, and on the whole efficiently. That it is done to the good of the people ruled is scarcely open to question. British rule in India may be far from ideally perfect, but that it is superior to anything India ever had before is freely admitted even by foreigners. Is there anything in the nature of the case which would prevent the representatives of a united British race from carrying forward the government of India as do now the representatives of the United Kingdom alone?
Let us consider the system of government. To the Indians themselves no representation, as we understand the term, is given. While largely employed for executive functions they take no part in legislation. An English statesman of proved capacity, assisted by a council of experienced specialists, is placed as {250} Viceroy at the head of affairs. Under him is a trained body of civil servants, selected by a rigid system of examination. To these the general administration of the country is committed. It is a system of government by experts.
The fiscal system of India, its revenue and expenditure, are kept entirely separate from those of the United Kingdom. It has its separate and clearly defined code of laws suited to its circumstances. It has a practically independent military organization. The government of the great dependency is not only essentially different in form from that of the self-governing portions of the Empire, but revolves in a sphere of its own. The general lines of Indian policy come under the review of Parliament; the pressure of public opinion is kept upon those who rule India through the channel of Parliamentary criticism; beyond this the rule of the country is left to the specialists to whom it has been committed. It has been long since any question of Indian policy made or unmade a government.
I have met everywhere, in Britain and in the colonies, people who think that India makes a heavy drain upon the revenues of the United Kingdom, and would do so upon the revenues of a united Empire. This is an example of that ignorance which, it has been truly said, is the most probable dissolvent of the Empire. It is therefore not unnecessary to say that India pays exclusively for its own defence and government. Every soldier, white or native, from the {251} Commander-in-Chief down to the humblest sepoy; every civil servant, from the Governor-General to the lately appointed clerk, is paid from Indian revenues alone. India does even more, it pays the whole expense of the India Office in London, and for the maintenance of Aden and other ports near the mouth of the Red Sea, with their garrisons, although these give protection to other Eastern commerce and to that of the Australasian colonies as well as Indian. India contributes also to the maintenance of consular establishments in China and of the British Embassy in Persia. The resources and the fighting power of India stand today as a barrier to guard from danger the enormous British commerce in the Eastern seas, to keep back the most dangerous military power of Europe and Asia from nearer approach to the English communities of the South.
The question whether any degree of representation could be given to the Indian population would remain for a federated Empire, just as it now exists for the United Kingdom. The problem would be no greater and no less. Any step taken in that direction would no doubt be exceedingly cautious and tentative. But for dealing with this, as with all other Indian problems, a united Empire, with its consolidated strength, would be vastly more efficient than a nation going through various stages of disintegration.
The answer which appears to me sufficient to those whom claim that Britain's control of India interposes {252} an insuperable obstacle to a Federal system for the Empire is this:—
India is practically a crown colony, and as yet the United Kingdom has shown no inclination to govern it otherwise than as a crown colony. The same duty may be rightly accepted and duly fulfilled by British people as a whole under any system of common government. To accept it would create no new national burden or risk, would react no more upon the ordinary political development of the various states than it has upon that of the United Kingdom.
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CHAPTER XI.
AN AMERICAN VIEW.
FOR the sake of studying the various angles from which the idea of federating the Empire is criticized it seems worth while to refer briefly to some of the views expressed in a paper, lately contributed to a leading magazine[1], on the subject, by Mr. Andrew Carnegie, under the title of 'An American View' of Imperial Federation. Among thinking native Americans I have found, as a rule, a genuine sympathy with the advocates of unity for British people, a sympathy perfectly natural in a nation which has suffered and sacrificed so much as the people of the United States have for a similar object. Besides, their familiarity not only with the idea of large political organization, but with its actual working out has taken away from them that fear of its difficulties which seems to haunt many weak-kneed Englishmen who conceive that human political capacity had achieved its utmost when it evolved the existing Imperial system. One of the distinguished thinkers of the United States, after a tour made around the world a few years ago, expressed {254} to me, with characteristic American energy and emphasis, the opinion he brought home with him upon the subject of British consolidation. 'The citizen of the British Empire,' said he, 'who is not an enthusiast on the question of Imperial Federation, is a Philistine of the very first magnitude.'