International Law. A Treatise. Volume 2 (of 2) / War and Neutrality. Second Edition

II PASSPORTS, SAFE-CONDUCTS, SAFEGUARDS

Grotius, III. c. 21, §§ 14-22—Vattel, III. §§ 265-277—Hall, §§ 191 and 195—Lawrence, § 213—Phillimore, III. §§ 98-102—Halleck, II. pp. 323-328—Taylor, § 511—Wheaton, § 408—Moore, VII. §§ 1158-1159—Bluntschli, §§ 675-678—Heffter, § 142—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 525-527—Ullmann, § 185—Bonfils, Nos. 1246-1247—Despagnet, Nos. 558-561—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2884, 2932-2938—Nys, III. pp. 504-505—Calvo, IV. §§ 2413-2418—Fiore, III. No. 1499, and Code, Nos. 1742-1749—Longuet, §§ 142-143—Mérignhac, pp. 239-240—Pillet, pp. 359-360—Kriegsbrauch, p. 41—Holland, War, No. 101—Land Warfare, §§ 326-337.

§ 218. Belligerents on occasions arrange between themselves that passports and safe-conducts shall be given to certain of each other's subjects. Passports are written permissions given by a belligerent to enemy subjects, or others, allowing them to travel within that belligerent's territory or enemy territory occupied by him. Safe-conducts are written permissions given by a belligerent to enemy subjects, or others, allowing them to proceed to a particular place for a defined object, for instance, to a besieged town for conducting certain negotiations; but safe-conducts may also be given for goods, and they then comprise permission to carry such goods without molestation to a certain place. Passports as well as safe-conducts make the grantee inviolable so long and in so far as he complies with the conditions specially imposed upon him or made necessary by the circumstances of the special case. Passports and safe-conducts are not transferable, and they may be granted to enemy subjects for a limited or an unlimited period; in the former case their validity ceases with the expiration of the period. Both may be withdrawn, not only when the grantee abuses the protection, but also for military expediency. It must, however, be specially observed that passports and safe-conducts are only a matter of International Law when the granting of them has been arranged between the belligerents or their responsible commanders, or between belligerents and neutral Powers. If they are granted without such an arrangement, unilaterally on the part of one of the belligerents, they fall outside the scope of International Law.[434]

§ 219. Belligerents on occasions arrange between themselves that they shall grant protection to certain of each other's subjects or property against their own forces in the form of safeguards, of which there are two kinds. One consists in a written order given to an enemy subject or left with enemy property and addressed to the commander of armed forces of the grantor, in which the former is charged with the protection of the respective individual or property, and by which both become inviolable. The other kind of safeguard is given by detailing one or more soldiers to accompany enemy subjects or to guard the spot where certain enemy property is, for the purpose of protection. Soldiers on this duty are inviolable on the part of the other belligerent; they must neither be attacked nor made prisoners, and they must, on falling into the hands of the enemy, be fed, well kept, and eventually safely sent back to their corps. As in the case of passports and safe-conducts, it must be specially observed that safeguards are only a matter of International Law when the granting of them has been arranged by the belligerents, and not otherwise; except in the case of the safeguards mentioned by article 8, No. 2, of the Geneva Convention of 1906, who, according to articles 9 and 12 of that Convention, are inviolable.

III FLAGS OF TRUCE

Hall, § 190—Lawrence, § 211—Westlake, II. p. 81—Moore, VII. § 1157—Phillimore, III. § 115—Halleck, II. pp. 333, 334—Taylor, § 510—Bluntschli, §§ 681-684—Heffter, § 126—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 421-423—Ullmann, § 180—Bonfils, Nos. 1239-1245—Despagnet, Nos. 556-557—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2927-2931—Rivier, II. pp. 279-280—Calvo, IV. §§ 2430-2432—Fiore, III. No. 1378, and Code, Nos. 1495-1500—Martens, II. § 127—Longuet, §§ 136-138—Mérignhac, pp. 220-225—Pillet, pp. 356-358—Zorn, pp. 195-199—Meurer, II. §§ 39-40—Bordwell, p. 293—Spaight, pp. 216-231—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 26-29—Holland, War, Nos. 88-91—Land Warfare, §§ 224-255.

§ 220. Although the outbreak of war brings all negotiations between belligerents to an end, and although no negotiations are as a rule conducted during war, certain circumstances and conditions make it necessary or convenient for the armed forces of belligerents to enter into negotiations with each other for various purposes. Since time immemorial a white flag has been used as a symbol by an armed force wishing to negotiate with the enemy, and always and everywhere it has been considered a duty of the enemy to respect this symbol. In land warfare the flag of truce is made use of in the following manner.[435] An individual—soldier or civilian—charged by his force with the task of negotiating with the enemy, approaches the latter either carrying the flag himself, or accompanied by a flag-bearer and, often, also by a drummer, a bugler, or a trumpeter, and an interpreter. In sea warfare the individual charged with the task of negotiating approaches the enemy in a boat flying the white flag. The Hague Regulations have now by articles 32 to 34 enacted most of the customary rules of International Law regarding flags of truce without adding any new rule. These rules are the same for land warfare as for sea warfare, although their validity for land warfare is now grounded on the Hague Regulations, whereas their validity for sea warfare is still based on custom only.

§ 221. As a commander of an armed force is not, according to article 33 of the Hague Regulations, compelled to receive a bearer of a flag of truce, a flag-bearer who makes his appearance may at once be signalled to withdraw. Yet even then he is inviolable from the time he displays the flag to the end of the time necessary for withdrawal. During this time he may neither be intentionally attacked nor made prisoner. However, an armed force in battle is not obliged to stop its military operations on account of the approach of an enemy flag-bearer who has been signalled to withdraw. Although the latter may not be fired upon intentionally, should he be wounded or killed accidentally, during the battle, no responsibility or moral blame would rest upon the belligerent concerned. In former times the commander of an armed force could inform the enemy that, within a certain defined or indefinite period, he would under no circumstances or conditions receive a flag-bearer; if, in spite of such notice, a flag-bearer approached, he did not enjoy any privilege, and he could be attacked and made prisoner like any other member of the enemy forces. But this rule is now obsolete, and its place is taken by the rule that a commander must never, except in a case of reprisals, declare beforehand, even only for a specified period, that he will not receive a bearer of a flag of truce.[436]

§ 222. Bearers of flags of truce and their parties, when admitted by the other side, must be granted the privilege of inviolability. They may neither be attacked nor taken prisoners, and they must be allowed to return safely in due time to their own lines. On the other hand, the forces admitting enemy flag-bearers need not allow them to acquire information about the receiving forces and to carry it back to their own corps. Flag-bearers and their parties may, therefore, be blindfolded by the receiving forces, or be conducted by roundabout ways, or be prevented from entering into communication with individuals other than those who confer officially with them, and they may even temporarily be prevented from returning till a certain military operation of which they have obtained information is carried out. Article 33 of the Hague Regulations specifically enacts that a commander to whom a flag of truce is sent "may take all steps necessary to prevent the envoy taking advantage of his mission to obtain information." Bearers of flags of truce are not, however, prevented from reporting to their corps any information they have gained by observation in passing through the enemy lines and in communicating with enemy individuals. But they are not allowed to sketch maps of defences and positions, to gather information secretly and surreptitiously, to provoke or to commit treacherous acts, and the like. If nevertheless they do any of these acts, they may be court-martialed. Articles 33 and 34 of the Hague Regulations specifically enact that a flag-bearer may temporarily be detained in case he abuses his mission for the purpose of obtaining information, and that he loses all privileges of inviolability "if it is proved beyond doubt that he has taken advantage of his privileged position to provoke or commit an act of treachery." Bearers of white flags and their party, who approach the enemy and are received, must carry[437] some authorisation with them to show that they are charged with the task of entering into negotiations (article 32), otherwise they may be detained as prisoners, since it is his mission and not the white flag itself which protects the flag-bearer. This mission protects every one who is charged with it, notwithstanding his position in his corps and his status as a civilian or a soldier, but it does not protect a deserter. The latter may be detained, court-martialed, and punished, notice being given to his principal of the reason of punishment.[438]

§ 223. Abuse of his mission by an authorised flag-bearer must be distinguished from an abuse of the flag of truce itself. Such abuse is possible in two different forms:—

(1) The force which sends an authorised flag-bearer to the enemy has to take up a corresponding attitude; the ranks which the flag-bearer leaves being obliged to halt and to cease fire. Now it constitutes an abuse of the flag of truce if such attitude corresponding with the sending of a flag of truce is intentionally not taken up by the sending force. The case is even worse when a flag-bearer is intentionally sent on a feigned mission in order that military operations may be carried out by the sender under the protection due from the enemy to the flag-bearer and his party.

(2) The second form of a possible abuse appears in the case in which a white flag is made use of for the purpose of making the enemy believe that a flag of truce is about to be sent, although it is not sent, and of carrying out operations under the protection granted by the enemy to this pretended flag of truce.

It need hardly be specially mentioned that both forms of abuse are gross perfidy and may be met with reprisals, or with punishment of the offenders in case they fall into the hands of the enemy. The following case of abuse is related by Sir Sherston Baker in Halleck (II. p. 315):—"On July 12, 1882, while the British fleet was lying off Alexandria, in support of the authority of the Khedive of Egypt, and the rebels under Arabi Pasha were being driven to great straits, a rebel boat, carrying a white flag of truce, was observed approaching H.M.S. Invincible from the harbour, whereupon H.M. ships Temeraire and Inflexible, which had just commenced firing, were ordered to suspend fire. So soon as the firing ceased, the boat, instead of going to the Invincible, returned to the harbour. A flag of truce was simultaneously hoisted by the rebels on the Ras-el-Tin fort. These deceits gave the rebels time to leave the works and to retire through the town, abandoning the forts, and withdrawing the whole of their garrison under the flag of truce."

IV CARTELS

Grotius, III. c. 21, §§ 23-30—Vattel, III. §§ 278-286—Hall, § 193—Lawrence, § 212—Westlake, II. p. 139—Phillimore, III. §§ 111-112—Halleck, II. pp. 326-329—Taylor, § 599—Bluntschli, §§ 679-680—Heffter, § 142—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 525-529—Ullmann, § 185—Bonfils, Nos. 827 and 1280—Despagnet, No. 658—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2832-2837, 2888—Rivier, II. p. 360—Nys, III. pp. 521-525—Calvo, IV. §§ 2419-2429—Longuet, §§ 140, 141—Pillet, p. 359—Kriegsbrauch, p. 38—Holland, War, No. 100, and Prize Law, §§ 32-35—Land Warfare, §§ 338-339.

§ 224. Cartels are conventions between belligerents concluded for the purpose of permitting certain kinds of non-hostile intercourse between one another such as would otherwise be prevented by the condition of war. Cartels may be concluded during peace in anticipation of war, or during the time of war, and they may provide for numerous purposes. Thus, communication by post, telegraph, telephone, and railway, which would otherwise not take place, can be arranged by cartels, as can also the exchange of prisoners, or a certain treatment of wounded, and the like. Thus, further, intercourse between each other's subjects through trade[439] can, either with or without limits, be agreed upon by belligerents. All rights and duties originating from cartels must be complied with in the same manner and good faith as rights and duties arising from other treaties.

§ 225. Cartel ships[440] are vessels of belligerents which are commissioned for the carriage by sea of exchanged prisoners from the enemy country to their own country, or for the carriage of official communications to and from the enemy. Custom has sanctioned the following rules regarding these cartel ships for the purpose of securing protection for them on the one hand, and, on the other, their exclusive employment as a means for the exchange of prisoners: Cartel ships must not do any trade or carry any cargo or despatches;[441] they are especially not allowed to carry ammunition or instruments of war, except one gun for firing signals. They have to be furnished with a document from an official belonging to the home State of the prisoners and stationed in the country of the enemy declaring that they are commissioned as cartel ships. They are under the protection of both belligerents and may neither be seized nor appropriated. They enjoy this protection not only when actually carrying exchanged prisoners or official communications, but also on their way home after such carriage and on their way to fetch prisoners or official communications.[442] They lose the protection at once, and may consequently be seized and eventually be appropriated, in case they do not comply, either with the general rules regarding cartel ships, or with the special conditions imposed upon them.

V CAPITULATIONS

Grotius, III. c. 22, § 9—Vattel, III. §§ 261-264—Hall, § 194—Lawrence, § 215—Westlake, II. p. 81—Phillimore, III. §§ 122-127—Halleck, II. pp. 319-322—Taylor, §§ 514-516—Wheaton, § 405—Moore, VII. § 1160—Bluntschli, §§ 697-699—Heffter, § 142—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. p. 527—Ullmann, § 185—Bonfils, Nos. 1259-1267—Despagnet, No. 562—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2917-2926—Rivier, II. pp. 361-362—Nys, III. pp. 514-517—Calvo, IV. §§ 2450-2452—Fiore, III. Nos. 1495-1497, and Code, Nos. 1733-1740—Martens, II. § 127—Longuet, §§ 151-154—Mérignhac, pp. 225-230—Pillet, pp. 361-364—Bordwell, p. 294—Meurer, II. §§ 41-42—Spaight, pp. 249-259—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 38-41—Holland, War, No. 92—Land Warfare, §§ 301-325.

§ 226. Capitulations are conventions between armed forces of belligerents stipulating the terms of surrender of fortresses and other defended places, or of men-of-war, or of troops. It is, therefore, necessary to distinguish between a simple and a stipulated surrender. If one or more soldiers lay down their arms and surrender, or if a fortress or a man-of-war surrenders without making any terms whatever, there is no capitulation, for capitulation is a convention stipulating the terms of surrender.

Capitulations are military conventions only and exclusively; they must not, therefore, contain arrangements other than those of a local and military character concerning the surrendering forces, places, or ships. If they do contain such arrangements, the latter are not valid, unless they are ratified by the political authorities of both belligerents.[443] The surrender of a certain place or force may, of course, be arranged by some convention containing other than military stipulations, but then such surrender would not originate from a capitulation. And just as is their character, so the purpose of capitulations is merely military—namely, the abandonment of a hopeless struggle and resistance which would only involve useless loss of life on the part of a hopelessly beset force. Therefore, whatever may be the indirect consequences of a certain capitulation, its direct consequences have nothing to do with the war at large, but are local only and concern the surrendering force exclusively.

§ 227. If special conditions are not agreed upon in a capitulation, it is concluded under the obvious condition that the surrendering force become prisoners of war, and that all war material and other public property in their possession or within the surrendering place or ship are surrendered in the condition they were at the time when the signature was given to the capitulation. Nothing prevents a force fearing surrender from destroying their provisions, munitions, their arms and other instruments of war which, when falling into the hands of the enemy, would be useful to him. Again, nothing prevents a commander, even after negotiations regarding surrender have begun, from destroying such articles. But when once a capitulation has been signed,[444] such destruction is no longer lawful, and, if carried out, constitutes perfidy which may be punished by the other party as a war crime.

But special conditions may be agreed upon between the forces concerned, and they must then be faithfully adhered to by both parties. The only rule which article 35 of the Hague Regulations enacts regarding capitulations is that the latter must be in accordance with the demands of military honour, and that, when once settled, they must be scrupulously observed. It is instructive to give some instances of possible conditions:—A condition of a capitulation may be the provision that the convention shall be valid only if within a certain period relief troops are not approaching. Provision may, further, be made that the surrendering forces shall not in every detail be treated like ordinary prisoners of war. Thus it may be stipulated that the officers or even the soldiers shall be released on parole, that officers remaining prisoners shall retain their swords. Whether or not a belligerent will grant or even offer such specially favourable conditions depends upon the importance of the force, place, or ship to be surrendered, and upon the bravery of the surrendering force. There are even instances of capitulations which stipulated that the surrendering forces should leave the place with full honours, carrying their arms and baggage away and joining their own army unmolested by the enemy through whose lines they had to march.[445]

§ 228. No rule of International Law exists regarding the form of capitulations, which may, therefore, be concluded either orally or in writing. But they are usually concluded in writing. Negotiations for surrender, from whichever side they emanate, are usually sent under a flag of truce, but a force which is ready to surrender without special conditions can indicate their intention by hoisting a white flag as a signal that they abandon all and every resistance. The question whether the enemy must at once cease firing and accept the surrender, is to be answered in the affirmative, provided he is certain that the white flag was hoisted by order or with the authority of the commander of the respective force. As, however, such hoisting may well have taken place without the authority of the commander and may, therefore, be disowned by the latter, no duty exists for the enemy to cease his attack until he is convinced that the white flag really indicates the intention of the commander to surrender.

§ 229. The competence to conclude capitulations is vested in the commanders of the forces opposing each other. Capitulations entered into by unauthorised subordinate officers may, therefore, be disowned by the commander concerned without breach of faith. As regards special conditions of capitulations, it must be particularly noted that the competence of a commander to grant them is limited[446] to those the fulfilment of which depends entirely upon the forces under his command. If he grants conditions against his instructions, his superiors may disown such conditions. And the same is valid if he grants conditions the fulfilment of which depends upon forces other than his own and upon superior officers. The capitulation in El Arish[447] on January 24, 1800, arranged between the French General Kléber and the Turkish Grand Vizier, and approved by the British Admiral, Sir Sidney Smith, presents an illustrative example of this rule. As General Kléber, who was commanding the French army in Egypt, thought that he could not remain in Egypt, he proposed surrender under the condition that his army should be safely transported to France, carrying away their arms and baggage. The Grand Vizier accepted these conditions. The British Admiral, Sir Sidney Smith, who approved of these conditions, was the local commander on the coast of Egypt, but was an officer inferior to Lord Keith, the commander of the British Mediterranean fleet. The latter had, on January 8, 1800, received secret orders, dated December 15, 1799, from the British Government instructing him not to agree to any capitulation which stipulated the free return of Kléber's army to France. Sir Sidney Smith did not, however, receive instructions based on these orders until February 22, 1800, and, therefore, when he approved of the capitulation of El Arish in January, was not aware that he acted against orders of the British Government.[448] Lord Keith, after having received the above orders on January 8, 1800, wrote at once to General Kléber, pointing out that he was not allowed to grant the return of the French army to France.[449] On the other hand, the British Government, after having been informed that Sir Sidney Smith had approved of the return of the French army, sent, on March 28, 1800, fresh orders[450] to Lord Keith, received by him at the end of April, advising him, although Sir Sidney Smith had exceeded his competence, to allow the capitulation to be carried out and the French army to be safely transported to France. Meanwhile, however, circumstances had entirely changed. When General Kléber had on March 17, 1800, received Lord Keith's letter of January 8, he addressed a proclamation,[451] in which Lord Keith's letter was embodied, to his troops asking them to prepare themselves for battle and actually began hostilities again on March 20. He was assassinated on June 14, and General Menou took over the command, and it was the latter who received, on June 20, 1800, information of the changed attitude of the British Government regarding the capitulation of El Arish. Hostilities having been renewed as far back as March, General Menou refused,[452] on his part, to consent to the carrying out of the capitulation, and continued hostilities.

It is obvious that Sir Sidney Smith, in approving the capitulation, granted a condition which did not depend entirely upon himself and the forces under him, but which depended upon Lord Keith and his fleet. Lord Keith as well as the British Government could have lawfully disowned this condition. That the British Government did not do so, but was ready to ratify Sir Sidney Smith's approval, was due to the fact that it did not want to disavow the promises of Sir Sidney Smith, who was not at the time aware of the orders of his Government to Lord Keith. On the other hand, the French Generals were not wrong in resuming hostilities after having received Lord Keith's first information, as thereby the capitulation fell to the ground.

§ 230. That capitulations must be scrupulously adhered to is an old customary rule, now enacted by article 35 of the Hague Regulations. Any act contrary to a capitulation would constitute an international delinquency if ordered by the belligerent Government concerned, and a war crime if committed without such order. Such violation may be met with reprisals or punishment of the offenders as war criminals.

VI ARMISTICES

Grotius, III. c. 21, §§ 1-13, c. 22, § 8—Pufendorf, VIII. c. 7, §§ 3-12—Vattel, III. §§ 233-260—Hall, § 192—Lawrence, § 216—Westlake, p. 82—Phillimore, III. §§ 116-121—Halleck, II. pp. 311-319—Moore, VII. § 1162—Taylor, §§ 513 and 516—Wheaton, §§ 400-404—Bluntschli, §§ 688-699—Heffter, § 142—Lueder in Holtzendorff, IV. pp. 531-544—Ullmann, § 186—Bonfils, Nos. 1248-1258—Despagnet, Nos. 563-566—Pradier-Fodéré, VII. Nos. 2889-2918—Rivier, II. pp. 362-368—Nys, III. pp. 518-520—Calvo, IV. §§ 2433-2449—Fiore, III. Nos. 1484-1494, and Code, Nos. 1750-1763—Martens, II. § 127—Longuet, §§ 145-149—Mérignhac, pp. 230-239—Pillet, pp. 364-370—Zorn. pp. 201-206—Bordwell, p. 291—Meurer, II. §§ 43-44—Spaight, pp. 232-248—Kriegsbrauch, pp. 41-44—Holland, War, Nos. 93-99—Land Warfare, §§ 256-300.

§ 231. Armistices or truces, in the wider sense of the term, are all agreements between belligerent forces for a temporary cessation of hostilities. They are in no wise to be compared with peace, and ought not to be called temporary peace, because the condition of war remains between the belligerents themselves, and between the belligerents and neutrals on all points beyond the mere cessation of hostilities. In spite of such cessation the right of visit and search over neutral merchantmen therefore remains intact, as does likewise the right to capture neutral vessels attempting to break a blockade, and the right to seize contraband of war. However, although all armistices are essentially alike in so far as they consist of cessation of hostilities, three different kinds must be distinguished—namely, (1) suspensions of arms, (2) general armistices, and (3) partial armistices.[453] It must be emphasised that the Hague Regulations deal with armistices in articles 36 to 41 very incompletely, so that the gaps need filling up from old customary rules.

§ 232. Suspensions of arms, in contradistinction to armistices in the narrower sense of the term, are such cessations of hostilities as are agreed upon between large or small military or naval forces for a very short time and regarding momentary and local military purposes only. Such purposes may be—collection of the wounded; burial of the dead; negotiation regarding surrender or evacuation of a defended place, or regarding an armistice in the narrower sense of the term; but may also be the creation of a possibility for a commander to ask for and receive instructions from a superior authority,[454] and the like. Suspensions of arms have nothing to do with political purposes, or with the war generally, since they are of momentary and local importance only. They concern exclusively those forces and that spot which are the object of the suspension of arms. The Hague Regulations do not specially mention suspensions of arms, since article 37 speaks of local armistices only, apparently comprising suspensions of arms among local armistices.

§ 233. A general armistice is such a cessation of hostilities as, in contradistinction to suspensions of arms with their momentary and local military purposes, is agreed upon between belligerents for the whole of their forces and the whole region of war. General armistices are always conventions of vital political importance affecting the whole of the war. They are as a rule, although not necessarily, concluded for a political purpose. It may be that negotiations of peace have ripened so far that the end of the war is in sight and that, therefore, military operations appear superfluous; or that the forces of either belligerent are exhausted and need rest; or that the belligerents have to face domestic difficulties, the settlement of which is more pressing than the continuation of the war; or any other political purpose. Thus article 2 of the general armistice agreed upon at the end of the Franco-German War on January 28, 1871,[455] expressly declared the purpose of the armistice to be the creation of the possibility for the French Government to convoke a Parliamentary Assembly which could determine whether or not the war was to be continued or what conditions of peace should be accepted.

It is of importance to note that, for particular reasons, small parts of the belligerent forces and small parts of the theatre of war may be specially excluded without detracting from the general character of the armistice, provided the bulk of the forces and the greater part of the region of war are included. Thus, article 1 of the above-mentioned general armistice at the end of the Franco-German war specially excluded all military operations in the Départements du Doubs, du Jura, de la Côte d'Or, and likewise the siege of Belfort. It should also be mentioned that in the practice of belligerents the terms "suspension of arms" and "general armistice" are sometimes not sufficiently distinguished, but are interchangeable. Thus, for instance, the above-mentioned general armistice between France and Germany is entitled "Convention entre l'Allemagne et la France pour la suspension des hostilités, ..." whereas the different articles of the Convention always speak correctly of an armistice, and whereas, further, an annexe to the Convention signed on January 29 is entitled[456] "Annexe à la Convention d'armistice."

§ 234. Partial armistices are agreements for cessations of hostilities which are not concluded by belligerents for their whole forces and the whole region of war, but do not merely serve, like suspensions of arms, momentary and local military purposes. They are armistices concluded by belligerents for a considerable part of their forces and front; they are always of political importance affecting the war in general; and they are very often, although they need not be, agreed upon for political purposes. Article 37 of the Hague Regulations apparently includes partial armistices together with suspensions of arms under the term "local" armistices. A partial armistice may be concluded for the military or the naval forces only; for cessation of hostilities in the colonies only; for cessation of hostilities between two of the belligerents in case more than two are parties to the war, and the like. But it is always a condition that a considerable part of the forces and region of war must be included, and that the purpose is not only a momentary one.