Japan and the California Problem

The only alternative which remains and which is the most feasible proposition to absorb the energies of her crowded population is found in her commercial and industrial expansion. Here again, however, she is terribly handicapped, as we shall see in the next chapter, by the conspicuous absence and scarcity of raw materials indispensable for industrial development. Fortunately, in the territories of her neighbors—China and East Siberia—there are vast stores of these materials untouched and unused, the unfolding of which will not only meet her wants, but will equally benefit her neighbors. The supreme importance of winning their good will thereby becomes accentuated a thousandfold, for without their willing coöperation nothing can be accomplished. In the participation of the benefits accruing from the development of her neighbors’ natural resources Japan need not ask for special privileges. The faithful and effective execution of the “open door” policy is all she requires. Here she stands on common ground with Occidental Powers. She entertains no fear of the outcome of the “open door” policy, for she is in a position to secure every advantage accruing from its operation.

Japan’s Proper Sphere of Activity.

As Colonel Roosevelt pointed out, “Japan’s proper sphere is in Asia,” and it is but proper that her activities therein develop in intensity and vigor. She is entitled to use every peaceful and legitimate means that is open to her for the extension of her influence in the Far East, for it is there that she can assure herself of her right to live. America and Great Britain, while reserving to themselves the right of opening or closing their own doors to the Japanese, will not be playing a fair and even game if they grudge to recognize this fact. In the strict adherence on the part of Japan to the spirit which gave birth to the “Gentlemen’s Agreement,” and in the just appreciation on the part of America of Japan’s difficulties at home and abroad, lies one of the fundamentals of an equitable solution of the Japanese-California problem.

CHAPTER IV

Diverse as are the causes that induce emigration and invite immigration, the most fundamental of all, with the exception of a few extraordinary cases, such as that of the Pilgrim Fathers, is economic pressure. There is a close relationship—a mutual give and take—between the immigrants and those who receive them. Generally speaking, human activities have their main-spring in man’s desire to improve his conditions of living. The motive which induces the people of one country to go out and settle in another country is the same as the motive which induces another people to invite immigrants from other countries. True, in the former case, the direct reason for the move is generally the overcrowding and poor natural environment at home. In the latter case, it is the lack of man-power and the presence of great unexploited natural resources. But in both cases the real motive is the pursuit of interest, which may be reciprocally promoted by the transaction. It is well to keep this point clearly in mind at the outset, because much of the confusion in discussing the Japanese problem in California arises from forgetting the real cause which brought Japanese immigrants to America and which induced America to invite them.

During the early colonial period the American colonies invited refugees from political and religious oppression to come and settle in the new world of freedom and democracy. The remnant of this early spirit still remains embodied in the present immigration laws of the United States. Nevertheless, it is almost a dead letter, with great historic interest but with no practical significance. The real motive for welcoming immigrants has been the acquisition of man-power for the exploitation of vast natural resources and for the development of industry. This is a fact which may be observed in almost all “new worlds,” including the South American republics, Canada, and Australia, where the dearth of human energy is the capital reason of slow economic development. With settlers, however, the economic motive is not the only one, though it is predominant. Here the motives are diverse and complicated. With the Japanese there are particular causes which have been driving them to seek opportunities in new worlds.

Japan’s Land Area.

The first and foremost cause is Japan’s limited and unresourceful land. The land area of Japan Proper is 147,655 square miles, which is about 8,000 square miles less than that of California. The terrain of Japan is mountainous and volcanic, being traversed by two chains of mountains. One runs down from Saghalien towards the center of Honshu and the other from China via Formosa headed towards the north, both meeting at the middle of Honshu, thereby producing rugged upheavals popularly known as “the Japanese Alps.” Being thus rocky and mountainous, the area contains a very small portion of plain land. Hokkaido, the extreme northern island, has seven plains. Honshu, the main island, has between the mountains five small plains, and Kyushu, the large southern island, has one. The total area of plains forms about one fourth of the entire area of Japan. The consequence of this geological formation is that about 16 per cent. of the total area is fit for cultivation, while over 70 per cent. of it is made up of mountains and forests.

Agriculture.

The Japanese having always been primarily farmers, agriculture still remains the principal occupation of the people. More than half the population is earning a livelihood wholly or partially by agricultural pursuits. The large number of farmers and the small amount of agricultural land allotted to them has given rise to the most intensive cultivation, which probably has no parallel in the world. Nearly five and a half million families, or thirty million people, cultivate fifteen million acres, which means less than three acres per family, and half an acre per individual farmer. It is little wonder that the law of diminishing return has long been operating, rendering the agricultural pursuit less and less remunerative, driving farm hands to industry and other work. The average daily wage of the farm laborer was 56 sen in 1917, while that of the industrial laborer was 1 yen.[4]

In recent years the Government undertook a thorough examination of the tillable land in the country and reported as a result that there is yet a possibility of reclaiming about five million acres. By way of experiment, the Government began, with the approval of the 41st Session of the Diet (1918-19), to undertake the work of partial reclamation of seven hundred thousand acres on a nine-year program, with an outlay of some four million yen. It is yet uncertain how the enterprise will turn out; but it is fairly doubtful, in view of the fact that already the land is utilized almost to the limit of cultivation, including narrow back yards and rugged hillsides, as well as sandy beach, whether the program can materially increase the present amount of farm acreage.

Parallel with the effort to extend the tillable land, everything has been done to increase the productivity of the soil under cultivation. Thanks to the application of scientific methods in agriculture and the use of fertilizer, the average yield of all crops per acre has increased since 1894 by about 35 per cent. But experts assert that owing to the excessive employment of land the soil now indicates signs of exhaustion, and that accordingly any further increase of productivity cannot be hoped for. On the contrary, the tendency will be toward a gradual decrease of productivity in the future. This is a grave forecast for Japan, and makes that country dependent more and more upon the food supply from abroad. The average yield of staple crops in Japan during the past few years comprises: barley, nine million koku (a koku is approximately five bushels); rye, seven million koku; wheat, five million koku; millet, four million koku, and rice, the most important crop, fifty-two million koku. The crops are far from being sufficient to feed a population of fifty-five millions, and Japan buys annually millions of koku of staple food from abroad. Taking rice, for instance, the average annual consumption is fifty-eight million koku, which exceeds by six million koku the average annual yield of Japan, so that the deficiency is made up by imports from Korea, China, and India.

Naturally, the Japanese, being very good farmers and fond of agriculture, and yet having so small a prospect of success at home, look with eager eyes for an opportunity to cultivate land abroad. In the north there are the vast plains of Manchuria; towards the south the fertile soil of Australia; in the east, California and Hawaii appear to offer golden opportunities for industrious farmers. Manchuria, however, turned out to be too cold, and competition there with cheap Chinese labor proved unprofitable. Australia, from the beginning, never welcomed the yellow races. Only Hawaii and California seemed in all respects satisfactory for Japanese emigration. Hence, large numbers of Japanese farmers migrated to these places during the years between 1891 and 1907.

Population.

Another big factor of Japanese emigration is the overcrowded status of the home population. Strangely, during the three centuries of national isolation, Japan’s population remained fairly static, varying only slightly around twenty-six millions. A reasonable explanation of this peculiar phenomenon may be found in the rigid social structure of feudalism, which allowed no swelling of population beyond a certain number. Malthusian factors, such as pestilence and famine, as well as artificial means of control, operated in effectively thwarting the increasing forces of population.

When, however, feudalism was at last destroyed and in its place were established new forms of political and social systems which were much more liberal and advanced, the population suddenly began to swell at a tremendous rate. The advent of Occidental enlightenment which went far to improve the economic conditions of the country, and hence the conditions of living among the people, greatly encouraged the rapid multiplication of the number of people. Within the last fifty years the population of Japan has nearly doubled, increasing from thirty millions to fifty-five millions. At the present time the population is increasing at the rate of 650,000 to 700,000 per annum within Japan proper alone. The census taken on October 1, 1920, shows the total population of the Mikado’s Empire as totalling 77,005,510, of which that of Japan proper is 55,961,140.

The significance of Japan’s population cannot be appreciated unless it is considered in connection with her land. The total area of Japan proper we have seen to be 147,655 square miles and the population close to 56,000,000. That is to say, the number of inhabitants per square mile is 380. This is rather a high figure when compared with that of other countries. Germany with her dense population counted, in 1915, 319 per square mile; France had 191, America 31 (1910), India and China, famous for density, had populations enumerated respectively at 158 and 100. Great Britain has rather a dense population (370 per square mile), but she has vast colonies, the population of which is extremely thin. This comparison of the number of people per square mile does not tell the true story until the quality and resources of each square mile are also compared. It has already been made clear that only 16 per cent., or fifteen million acres, of the land of Japan proper is tillable. This gives only one quarter of an acre of agricultural land per capita of population. In Great Britain agricultural land occupies 77 per cent. of the total area; in Italy, 76 per cent.; in France, 70 per cent. and in Germany 65 per cent.

Industry.

Handicapped as she is in agriculture, and holding on the other hand a vast and ever-increasing population, the best, in fact the only, policy for Japan to follow has been to utilize her vast man-power for the development of industry. Firmly convinced that the future of Japan depends solely on her ability to stand in the world as an industrial nation, the far-sighted statesmen of Japan long ago formulated plans for a steady industrial expansion. These plans were furthered by Government subsidy and have been faithfully carried out step by step by the authorities. The creation of a vast merchant marine; the building of railroads throughout the country, closely knitting all parts of the empire together; the enactment of a carefully drafted protective tariff; the national and municipal monopolization of public utilities and important industries; the establishment of a stable financial system with facilities for financing healthy enterprises; the establishment of technical schools throughout the empire for the training of experts and skilled workmen, and thousands of other remarkable undertakings were accomplished within a very short time by the direct and indirect efforts of the State.

The people, too, were not behind in their devotion to the cause of making Japan an industrial power. They toiled most willingly under all kinds of disadvantages and hardships; they shouldered extortionate taxes with smiling faces; they worked in unison, disregarding for the time being petty private interests; they calmly and bravely met all privations and adversities. There is little wonder indeed that Japan established herself within only a few decades as an industrial nation of the first rank.

In order to get a general idea of Japan’s industrial strides, a few figures will perhaps suffice. Take, for instance, the number of factories. There was not one factory, properly so-called, in the country at the time of the Restoration in 1868; as late as 1885 there were but 496 industrial companies, joint stock or partnership, with a total capital of seven million yen. In the year 1900, however, there were 7000 typically modern factories, and this number rapidly multiplied, subsequently reaching over 25,000, with billions of paid-up capital. The number of factory operatives, too, correspondingly multiplied during that period. Less than 500,000 twenty years ago, they now total 1,500,000. The increase in the output of production and multiplication of various kinds of industries has been particularly phenomenal. In the textile industry the production has increased more than 300 per cent. during the past twenty years, cotton yarn having increased from 30,000,000 kan (one kan is approximately equal to 8.27 pounds avoirdupois) in 1900 to 100,000,000 kan; and in the silk textiles from 2,500,000 kan to 7,500,000 kan. In cloth fabrics, similarly the value turned out in silk weaving increased from $42,000,000 to $100,000,000; in cotton weaving from $30,000,000 to $200,000,000 between the years mentioned. The corresponding increase of output has been realized in almost all established industries, and the same ratio obtains in the many new industries which have sprung up in recent years. Generally speaking, the industry of Japan, which was established on a firm footing by the year 1900, has trebled during the last twenty years.

The World War, too, by absorbing for military purposes all the energies of the belligerent Powers in Europe and America, was greatly instrumental in stimulating the industrial growth of Japan, who, after accomplishing her allotted task at the initial stage of the great conflict, was thereafter called upon by her Allies to do her utmost in supplying their urgent needs in ships and industrial products.

The development of industry naturally accompanies a similar expansion in commerce. The total amount of foreign trade, which started with the meager sum of $13,000,000 in 1868, jumped to about $250,000,000 in 1900, and in 1920 reached $2,124,000,000. That is, within the past twenty years only, Japan’s foreign trade increased roughly ten times, and during the past fifty years 163 times.

Yet, with all this remarkable development, the future of Japanese manufactures does not allow unqualified optimism. In several important respects the foundation of Japan’s industrialism is seriously hampered. In the first place, the supply of raw material is pitifully meager. With the exception of silk, Japan has in store hardly any raw material worthy of mention. She produces no wool or cotton and has only a limited store of iron. With the exception of coal, in which alone she is fairly independent—at least for the present—Japan depends for these indispensable factors of modern industry mostly on foreign supply. Scarcity of iron, in particular, is a notable weakness of Japan as an industrial nation.

The many mistakes Japan made in her labor policy, which were the inevitable outcome of the extreme difficulty she confronted in adjusting the sudden transition from the Feudal régime to the modern industrial stage, must also be counted as a cause in retarding the progress of her industry. Due to exceedingly low wages, long working hours, and lack of adequate protection of labor from exploitation, the man-power of Japan has been greatly lavished and wasted. The paternal social systems inherited from the feudal days long refused to allow the voice of the working classes to be heard and to give them freedom to improve their status. Strikes and labor unions, whatever their motive and character, have always been frowned upon in Japan. It is by no means too much to say that the present development of Japan’s industry has been achieved largely by the costly sacrifice of health and the rights of millions of laboring men and women. Considering how costly was the present achievement of industry, there remains some doubt as to how far Japan can carry on its progress in the future.

It may seem that the development of industry must have brought a marked improvement in the standard of living of the masses. Such, however, is not the case. It has indeed immensely swelled the pockets of plutocrats, but has not much benefited the rank and file. While the income of the lower classes has not increased to any large extent, the cost of living has gone up by leaps and bounds, aggravating the severity of their struggle.

When both farming and manufacturing failed successfully to cope with the ever-increasing population, the only alternative for the Japanese was emigration. Among the students, the talk of another alternative, namely birth-control, is becoming a fad.

Social Factors.

Besides the economic reasons so far discussed there are social reasons which induce Japanese youths to go abroad. Socially an old country like Japan contains a vast accumulated crust of custom and tradition which refuses to adapt itself to the changing conditions and ideals of the age, and which, therefore, is objectionable to the younger generation who know something of the value of freedom and democracy. Again, the national conscription for military service is becoming increasingly distasteful to the youths of individualistic inclination. It is but natural, in the face of such powerful and numerous fetters which obstruct the free development of lives and personalities, that the young people of Nippon should seek opportunities abroad.

All these factors above described would not have constituted the effective motive forces for Japanese emigration had it not been for the assumed external advantages. Attractive narratives in which some of the new countries, more especially America, were represented as places where economic opportunities are really boundless and where an ideal state of freedom and democracy prevails, took an exaggerated form in the imagination. The glaring contrast which the visualized America presents with the actual Japan stimulates the desire of young men to turn to America and try their fortunes.

CHAPTER V

Because of the geographical proximity and alluring temptations that the vast uncultivated lands and rich natural resources presented, Australia was the place which early attracted the Japanese. A few hundreds of them began to migrate to several colonies, chiefly to Queensland, New South Wales, and Victoria. But they soon found the conditions exceedingly uncomfortable, owing to the hostile feeling already prevalent there against the Asiatics. The Australian fear of an influx of Asiatic races was early aroused by Chinese immigrants, who, as early as 1848, attained a sufficient number to cause agitation and race riots in several colonies. These colonies subsequently enacted rigorous anti-Asiatic immigration laws restricting the number of immigrants admitted per annum to a few hundred. Since then, filled with the fear, real or imaginary, of a menace of Asiatic inundation from across the equator, where one-half of the planet’s population live congested on one-tenth of the total area of the earth, the great task of Australia during the last sixty years has been to keep the country clear of Asiatics.

The immigration policy of the Commonwealth of Australia presents perhaps the most clear-cut and radical example of racial discrimination. While, on the one side, she spares neither effort nor money to attract and welcome white settlers, on the other side she leaves no stone unturned to exclude all Asiatic immigrants. With an immensely large area—about 50,000 square miles more extensive than that of the United States—yet almost untouched, and a population less than that of the City of New York, Australia really needs farmers, artisans, and all other classes of people. It is the function of the Commonwealth Department of Home and Territories to advertise in Europe, through lectures, films, exhibitions, and posters, for the purpose of inviting laborers and settlers to Australia. Each State of the Commonwealth has extended assistance in money and privilege to hundreds of thousands of European immigrants. The cause for lamentation by the government is that with all this effort and sacrifice she has not been successful in getting any considerable number of people as settlers.

Unsuccessful in attracting white settlers, she has been most successful in repelling the yellow race. She has an immigration law which requires immigrants to pass a dictation test—a test in writing of not less than fifty words of a European language—which is dictated to them by an officer. Examination in a European language for the Asiatics! And what is more, the Europeans are exempt from it. The law provides, furthermore, that Asiatic immigrants may be required to pass a test at any time within two years after they have entered the Commonwealth. Even for the reception of those Asiatics who have been lawfully admitted, some of the States, New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, and Tasmania in particular, do not allow them the right of owning or leasing land, under the pretext that they are not eligible to citizenship. The Commonwealth of Australia does not extend the right of naturalization to Asiatics. No wonder, then, that there is only a handful of Orientals in that vast country—35,000 Chinese and some 5000 Japanese.

Canada.

Until recent years, no record was kept of the number of Japanese immigrants arriving in Canada and consequently the development of the movement cannot be accurately traced. The Canadian census of 1901 shows that 4674 persons born in Japan were in the Dominion at that time; 4415 were in the Province of British Columbia, the rest being scattered in the Provinces of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta. After that year the number of Japanese immigrants coming to Canada gradually increased, and when the United States placed restrictions on the influx of Japanese from Hawaii, and the latter began to seek entrance into Canada, the number grew considerably and soon caused serious concern to the people of Western Canada. It was estimated that in 1907 the Japanese domiciled in Canada had reached eight thousand. Determined opposition soon arose among the western provinces, and protests were sent by the Canadian Government to Hawaii and Tokyo requesting them to control the sudden immigration tide. An agreement was reached in 1908 between Japan and Canada by which the number of passports to be granted in any one year to Japanese emigrating to Canada was limited to four hundred. In this way the question was satisfactorily settled.

Canada’s treatment of the Asiatic races lawfully admitted has been marked by leniency. She has extended to the Orientals the privilege of naturalization and of securing homesteads. Even in British Columbia, the center of anti-Oriental agitation, the Japanese and Chinese are permitted to conduct business and cultivate land on an equal basis with British subjects in Canada. They may own land, both urban and rural, and in provinces other than British Columbia they are entitled to voting privileges when naturalized; only in that province the Orientals are not allowed to cast ballots, though free to become citizens. It is reported that there are 13,823 Japanese residing in Canada to-day, engaged in fishing and logging and sawmill industries, as well as in agriculture.

South America.

For some years past a number (about six thousand) of Japanese immigrants has been sent every year to Brazil in compliance with the request of the Republic. They have been mostly engaged on coffee plantations in Sao Paulo. The colonization is still in an experimental stage, and it is a little premature to forecast its future at this time. Altogether about twenty thousand Japanese immigrants have gone to the South American Republic.

The United States.

Perhaps attracted by the wonderful stories of the discovery of gold in the Sacramento Valley, or possibly cast ashore in boats on the Pacific Coast of America, there seem to have lived in the early sixties in California about a hundred Japanese. Early California papers record the story of quaint-looking Japanese settlers, who were received with great favor. Although accurate records are lacking, it would seem that the number of Japanese did not begin to increase until the late eighties, when a few hundred began to come in every year. The census of 1890 reported the number of Japanese residents as 2039. From that time on the number of immigrants steadily increased, reaching the highest mark in 1907, when about ten thousand of them entered continental America in one year.[5]

The direct incentive for Japanese emigration was furnished by a few large emigration companies,[6] which were formed with a view to supplying contract labor to Hawaii and America, where the demand for labor was insatiable. In the former case, the rapid growth of the sugar plantations demanded a large supply of cheap labor. In the latter case, the need for cheap labor was urgent, due to the enactment of the Chinese Exclusion Law in 1882, which soon began to effect a decrease in the number of Chinese laborers, resulting in a dearth of labor on the farms and in railroad work. It was in response to the urgent demand of capitalists and landowners in Hawaii and America for Japanese labor that the emigration companies sprang into existence with the object of facilitating the complex process of immigration.

The Japanese coolies so brought in were welcomed and prosperous—at least for a while. Their industry and frugality won them the confidence of their employers. In agriculture, in railroad-building, in mining and fishing, they proved useful hands. They saved money and remitted to their native country a considerable portion of it. Some of them returned home with a fortune and a degree of refinement which a superior environment could bestow upon a laborer. These incidents stimulated the desire of ambitious Japanese to leave for and work in California and Hawaii, and the number of applicants for emigration greatly multiplied.

In the meantime, between 1895 and 1900, changes had taken place in the attitude of the people of California toward the Japanese. For various reasons the friendly feeling of the Californians was gradually replaced by a more or less hostile sentiment. It so happened that just about this time California was the stage for a struggle between organized labor and capital. It was with a great deal of effort and sacrifice that the organized labor of California succeeded in excluding the Chinese coolies. But their hard-won victory was shattered to pieces by the advent of Japanese laborers, whom capital, taking advantage of their ignorance of American customs and language, wisely utilized as a powerful weapon to defeat the unions. To the union men it made no difference whether the strike-breakers were Chinese or Japanese; whether strike-breaking was voluntarily or unwittingly performed; they were enemies just the same. The cry for exclusion was a natural consequence.

Then there also seems to be some truth in the report[7] made in 1908 by W. L. Mackenzie King, the Deputy Minister of the Government of Canada, which states that it is suspected that much of the anti-Japanese agitation in California was deliberately fermented by the interests of the Planters’ Association of Honolulu, who, alarmed by the tendency of Japanese laborers engaged on the sugar plantations to seek work on the Pacific Coast of America, where wages were much better, started a campaign to check the exodus by causing ill feeling toward the Japanese along the Pacific Coast. The report states in part:

It is believed ... that the members of the Asiatic Exclusion League in San Francisco were not without contributions from the Association’s incidental expense fund, to assist them in an agitation which by excluding Japanese from the mainland would confine that class of labor to the islands, to the greater economic advantage of the members of the Association.[8]

For these two chief reasons, and perhaps for many other minor ones, there arose the persistent social movement for Japanese exclusion in California, which first took definite shape in 1900, when a mass-meeting held at San Francisco for the express purpose of more rigidly excluding the Chinese, adopted a resolution urging Congress to take measures for the total exclusion of Japanese other than members of the Diplomatic Staff. Following this came the first of the anti-Japanese messages delivered by the Governor of California, and of the resolutions voted on by the State Legislature calling upon Congress to extend the Chinese Exclusion Law to other Asiatics. The climax of the movement was reached when, immediately after the earthquake, the Board of Education of San Francisco passed the “separate school order,” and Japan protested. A series of diplomatic negotiations followed, which finally resulted in the repeal of the school discriminatory order and the conclusion of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement,” whereby Japan pledged herself to restrict the number of immigrants to the United States.

Leaving to a later chapter the detailed discussion of the result which the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” has brought about in the status of Japanese immigration, it will suffice to mention here that the agreement has faithfully and loyally been carried out by Japan, and that since then the Japanese problem has in fact ceased to be an immigration issue.

Results.

Twenty years of emigration attempts, chief of which we reviewed in this chapter, have resulted in failure in every case, and Japan’s effort to plant her race in other lands has proved futile. There are many causes for this failure, for which Japan is partially, but not wholly, responsible. But this is a matter which we shall more fully discuss in the next chapter. Excluded and maltreated wherever they went, the Japanese returned home with shattered hopes and wounded feelings, and the mooted question of population once more confronted them with intensified severity. Giving up as entirely hopeless the attempt at settling in places where the white races held supremacy, they now appear to have made up their minds to migrate towards the north, where climatic and economic disadvantages, together with political revolution in Eastern Europe, have freed the land temporarily from the strong white grip, offering the line of least resistance for Japanese.

CHAPTER VI

Clearly, such a conflict is one of the by-products of the complex international relations brought about by modern science, which, simply because of the lack of experience and regulation due to their short history, remain deplorably defective. This suggests the point already brought out in our introduction, that the principle of the solution of the California problem lies not in an attempt at separating Japan and the United States, which time and destiny brought together, but in a yet closer, more regulated relationship, and in the promotion of a better mutual understanding.

Various Attitudes Towards Japanese.

With reference to the attitude toward the Japanese, it is possible to discern four classes of critics in California. There are the veteran exclusionists, whose only hope in this world seems to be the realization of the slogan, “All Japs must go!” There is the majority of people which is too preoccupied with its own affairs to investigate the facts and is ready to accept anything said or asserted by the exclusionists. Then there are those, intellectually more critical, who hold independent opinions as to why the Japanese must be excluded. There are also others who stoutly oppose, rationally or irrationally, any attempt at excluding the Japanese.

The reasons offered for justifying the exclusion of the Japanese widely vary according to the class of people, and they are often mutually contradictory and conflicting. To those agitators whose motive is purely self-interest, agitation is a profession, and hence it transcends the consideration of justice or international courtesy. They have no scruples about lying or resorting to any means which they think would serve their purpose. The masses, generally speaking, accept what is given to them by the agitators, unthinkingly echo their voices, and so play directly into their hands. Only fair, rational exclusionists study the facts of the case, consider the significance involved therein, and present arguments supporting their conviction. It is in this class of people, and not in professional agitators or whimsical populace, or irrational friends of the Japanese, that the hope of the solution of the problem may be found.

From the fact that so much agitation is going on in California, some may think—especially those in Japan—that all Californians are unkind or hostile to the Japanese. This, however, is far from being the case. It is precisely in California that the most earnest, devoted friends of the island people are found—found in great numbers.[9] These sympathizers are wholly unable to share the opinions of the exclusionists, and are simply at a loss to comprehend the reason why so much fuss should be made because of a handful of Japanese who compare favorably with European immigrants.

Psychological Nature of the Cause.

The fact that right in the midst of the hotbed of the Japanese exclusion movement there are goodly numbers of unqualified friends of the Japanese suggests that the motives of exclusion as well as inclusion are primarily personal; that is, psychological. We are all human and are prone to pass judgment from personal incidents or experience. A single disagreeable experience with a Japanese may drive a level-headed politician to a frenzy of Japanese exclusion, just as the memory of one Japanese friend may make another individual a consistent advocate of a friendly attitude toward all Japanese. Inevitably limited in the scope of experience, we can only generalize from a few particulars. This is why there are such contradictory attitudes to be found among Californians toward the same problem. In generalizing from particular experience we are more apt to arrive at a conclusion which suits our desires and emotions. We reach our conclusions in ways which we think promote our interests and please our feeling. Gain or loss, like or dislike, are two pivots determining our judgment. Those who think they gain from the presence of Japanese and those who like the Japanese, from whatever reason, naturally tend to welcome them; those who feel the contrary, incline to advocate their exclusion. At bottom, therefore, the effort of discrimination arises from a direct or indirect personal experience with Japanese which resulted in some sort of an unfavorable impression.

Chinese Agitation Inherited.

With this preliminary we shall see what are the more obvious factors which give rise to anti-Japanese sentiment on the Pacific Coast. It is perhaps beyond doubt, as most authorities insist, that the Japanese inherited the ill-feeling that early prevailed against the Chinese, and this for no other reason than that the Japanese are similar to the Chinese in many respects and were placed under the same conditions which caused hostility to the Chinese. We have already discussed how the Japanese coolies were used by capital as weapons to pit against the ascendency of organized labor. Under the general term “Asiatics” the Japanese shared at first, and later inherited, the painful experience of the Chinese.

Local Politics.

That the Japanese issue was frequently made the football of minor political games in California is an undeniable truth. Wholly apart from the consideration of right and wrong, we cite a case of political activity which illustrates such a situation. Writing in the January (1921) issue of the North American Review, Mr. R. W. Ryder observes:

All during the late war—while the Japanese fleet was protecting our commerce and other interests by patrolling the Pacific—the most cordial relationship existed between the two peoples. But the Armistice had hardly been signed before agitation against the Japanese again manifested itself; however, not until it had been resuscitated and energized by one of California’s United States Senators who was soon to be a candidate for reëlection. This Senator, Mr. Phelan, appeared in California early in 1919, and at once made a visit to the Immigration Station at San Francisco and Los Angeles; whereupon he issued a statement characterizing the Japanese situation as a menace. Next, he addressed the State Legislature on the Japanese question. Prior to his address, although the Legislature had been in session for almost two months, it had done nothing regarding the Japanese. But a few days afterward several anti-Japanese measures were introduced....

The particular susceptibility of the Japanese issue to political agitation in California may be attributed to the safety and advantage with which it may be manipulated. The Japanese in California having practically no vote are safe toys for play. The possibility of magnifying the “menace” of the Asiatic “influx” is immensely tempting in this case, rendering it a most effective smoke screen for the tactics of private interests.

The San Francisco Chronicle stated, in its editorial on October 22, 1920, under the heading, “It Would Probably Have Been Settled without Trouble but for Politicians,” as follows:

“Yellow Peril.”

The imaginary fear of an Asiatic influx, cleverly fermented by agitators, is certainly a strong cause of Japanophobia. Somehow we have a historical fear of foreign invasion. This fear is inculcated and whetted among the Californians by a hideous picture of a Japanese Empire, that, like medieval Mongolia, would send a storming army of invasion. One might gather from the reports of the Hearst papers in California that the Pacific Coast of North America was invaded by a Japanese army on an average of once a month. Whether misled by jingo journalism or aroused by the exaggeration of agitators—whatever the cause—it is simply amazing how large a portion of the California people honestly fear the utterly impossible eventuality of a Japanese invasion.

Quite recently another form of menace was suggested, which, because of its more plausible nature, has been widely circulated. It is the fear based upon conjecture that the Japanese will soon control the entire agricultural industry of California and that they will ere long overwhelm the white population in that State. This apprehension was by far the most effective force in deciding in the affirmative the initiative bill voted on by the California electorate on November 2, 1920.

Propaganda.

Propaganda is autocratic power in a democratic state; it is a subtle attempt at controlling social sentiment by influencing the people’s mind through its unconscious entrance. Freud teaches us that each of us is in a sense a complex of boundless wishes. We wish vastly more than our environment offers us; hence, most of our wishes have to be suppressed, thwarted. Now, propaganda appeals to this weakest part of man; it promises us an opportunity to satisfy our arrested wishes. “You are badly off, my friends,” a propagandist would say to honest laborers, “because the Japs are here to bid your wages down. We are trying to get rid of them for you, and for this we want your help.” A similar appeal can be made with immediate good results to almost all classes of people who have some unsatisfied wish—and all men do have such wishes.

Racial Difference.

It is clearly untenable, however, to argue that the Japanese agitation in California is wholly due to imaginary fear and aversion created in the minds of people by politicians and propagandists. The Japanese themselves are responsible for conditions which often justify some of the accusations, and which prompt exaggeration and misrepresentation. In the first place, the Japanese are a wholly different race, with different customs, manners, sentiment, language, traditions, and—not of least importance—of different physical appearance. Were these differences merely in kind, they would not be very repugnant, but when such differences involve qualitative difference they are particularly repulsive. It is, of course, impossible to pass judgment upon the relative superiority in all respects of things Occidental and Oriental; but western civilization naturally seems incomparably superior to American eyes. Mere difference of race alone gives no unpleasant feeling. When it is also a difference of quality, at least in appearance—and in this all must agree—it arouses our æsthetic repulsion.

Even if a man be of different race and as ugly as a Veddah from Ceylon, if he remains a solitary example, or one of a very limited number of his kind, he would not only not arouse our antipathy but would even stimulate our curiosity, and many of us would spend money to see his quaint customs and manners. But when his followers increase in number and establish themselves in our midst, and carry on the struggle for existence until they are in the way of fairly matching ourselves, we begin to be alarmed and unconsciously learn to hate them. This is an exaggerated illustration, but it is precisely the process which has been taking place in California relative to the Japanese. The fact that the Japanese are looked upon rather favorably in the East is because there they are comparatively few in number and are not competitors of the Americans in the struggle for existence.

Japanese Nationality.

To a certain extent, the anti-Japanese sentiment in California as well as elsewhere is accentuated by the national principles of the Japanese Empire. It has a system of government which for various good reasons is unique. It embraces many points that are considered, from the standpoint of the Anglo-Saxon, undemocratic. The smooth operation of democracy has been hindered by some inherent defect in the national system, by lack of experience in representative government, and by the influence exerted through an unconstitutional power represented by the elder statesmen. To make the situation worse, by means of unscrupulous journalism, the American mind is duly impressed with the assumed bellicose and Prussian character of the Japanese Empire, the hatred of which becomes anti-Japanese sentiment in general.

The Japanese Government, again, adheres to a policy of extreme paternalism with regard to her colonists abroad. It seems true that in case of an aggressive and military government it is from necessity the devotee of a pure race and a solidified population, as Mr. Walter Lippman stated.[10] At any rate, Japan does not wish her subjects to be naturalized nor does she encourage them to lose their racial or national consciousness. This is clearly seen in her policy of dual nationality (which we shall have occasion to discuss later), which aims to retain the descendants of the Japanese who are born in America, and hence are citizens thereof, as subjects also of the Mikado. It is likewise observable in the spirit of Japanese education, which is fundamentally nationalistic, as it was referred to in the second chapter. Such a policy of nationalism inevitably incites the suspicion of countries to which Japanese immigrants go, and discourages the people from making an attempt at assimilating the Japanese. This, together with their nationalistic training and education, renders the assimilation of the Japanese exceedingly difficult.

Modern Nationalism.

What accentuates the difficulty in the situation is that the countries which receive such Japanese immigrants also uphold a policy of nationalism, which runs full tilt against the “influx” of immigrants who do not readily become amalgamated or assimilated. The inflow of such a population, they claim, threatens and endangers the unity of the nation, and therefore it must be stopped or resisted. This is the capital reason which is being ascribed for the discriminatory effort against the Japanese in California by the leaders of the movement.

Congestion in California.

The Japanese, moreover, manifest a strong tendency to congregate in a locality where they realize a social condition which is a poor hybrid of Japanese and American ways. The tendency to group together is not a phenomenon peculiar to Japanese immigrants alone. Such a tendency is manifested by almost all immigrants in America in different degrees. In the case of the Japanese, however, several additional factors operate to necessitate their huddling together—they are ethnologically different; English is an entirely different language from theirs; their customs are wholly different from those of Americans; their segregation offers advantages and facilities to some Americans who deal with them. The external hostile pressure naturally compresses them into small groups. Whatever the cause, it is true that this habit of collective living among themselves retards the process of assimilation, and, moreover, makes the Japanese problem loom large in the eyes of the white population living in adjoining places.

Fear and Envy Incited by Japanese Progress.

In addition to this, a point to be noted is the increase in number of Japanese and their rapid economic development within the State of California. The question of immigration becomes inextricably mixed up in the minds of the populace with the problem of the treatment of those who are already admitted. They act and react as causes and effects of the agitation. The apprehension of a Japanese “influx” expresses itself in a hostile attitude toward the Japanese already domiciled there. Conversely, the conflict arising from the presence of Japanese in California naturally prompts opposition against Japanese immigration. Now, it so happened that recently, and especially since the war, the number of Japanese coming to the United States through the California port has decidedly increased. This is due to the increased arrival of travelers, business men, officials, and students, as a consequence of the closer relationship between America and Japan, as we shall see in the next chapter. Nevertheless, it incites the fear of the Californians and induces them to adopt more stringent measures against the Japanese living in that State.

On the other hand, the economic status of the Japanese in California has been steadily developing. They are entering in some directions into serious competition with the white race. Thus, in agriculture, their steady expansion through industry and thrift has caused alarm among small white farmers. Added to this is the high birth rate among the Japanese, which, because of their racial and cultural distinction, forms a problem touching the fundamental questions of the American commonwealth.

Summary.

By the foregoing analysis of the situation, we see that although the problem of the Japanese in California has been made the subject of political and private exploitation, and thereby rendered unnecessarily complicated and acute, it is, nevertheless, a grave problem which contains germs that are bound to develop many evils unless it is properly solved.

In the following chapters we shall study the status of the Japanese in California in respect to population and birth rate, their agricultural condition, their living and culture, and their economic attainments, with a view to elucidating just wherein lie the precise causes of the difficulties.

CHAPTER VII

A knowledge of the facts regarding the Japanese population in California is important, because it has been a point of sharp dispute between those who insist on exclusion and those who oppose it, the former arguing that the Japanese are increasing at an amazing rate through immigration, smuggling, and birth, threatening to overwhelm the white population in the State, the latter contending that they are not multiplying in a way menacing to the State of California. The fact that such a dispute prevails in the matter of the number of Japanese suggests that it is, at least, one of the crucial points on which the whole problem rests. This is true in the sense that, if the Japanese in California were decreasing in number as the American Indians are, it would be totally useless to waste energy in an attempt to quicken the final extinction. If, on the other hand, they were to multiply in a progressively higher rate so as to overwhelm the white population, it would certainly be serious both for California and for the United States.

Number of Japanese in California.

This being the case, it is but natural that the enemies of the Japanese should exaggerate the number of Japanese living in California. The leaders of the movement for excluding Japanese estimate their number as no less than one hundred thousand. The report of the State Board of Control of California, prepared for the specific purpose of emphasizing the gravity of the Japanese problem in California, enumerated the population of Japanese in that State at the end of December, 1919, as 87,279. This number turned out to be 13,355 higher than the number reported by the Foreign Office of Japan,[11] which was based on the Consular registrations (including American-born offspring of the Japanese) and the count made by the Japanese Association of America. Most fortunately, the preliminary publication of a part of the United States Census for 1920 removed the uncertainty arising from the discrepancy by stating the exact number of the Japanese in California to be 70,196. The possible cause of the over-estimation by the Board of Control is to be found in its method of computation. Instead of counting the actual number of residents, it simply added the number of net gain from immigration and the excess in birth over death statistics to the returns of the census of 1910, overlooking the fact that in the meantime a great number of Japanese were leaving California for Japan as well as other States of the Union.

The present number of Japanese is a minor matter compared with its dynamic tendency. The rate of increase of the Japanese population in California in the past may be easily obtained by comparing the returns of the United States Census.

The following table indicates the number and rate of decennial increase:

Number of Japanese in California According to the United States Census.

We see from the above table that after half a century of Japanese immigration to the United States, California’s net gain amounts to a little over 70,000, the number having increased at an average rate of 14,025 per decade, or 1603 per annum. We also observe that the percentage of decennial increase gradually decreased from 1234 per cent. to 69.7 per cent.

It is useful to compare this development of the Japanese population with that of California in general, because it gives an idea of the relative importance of the Japanese increase. This is shown in the following table, in which the decennial rates of increase between them are compared:

Comparison of Population Increase of California and of Japanese in California.

Thus we see that while the percentage of decennial increase of Japanese has been fast decreasing since the census of 1890, descending from 1234 per cent. to 785 per cent. in the next census, and to 307.3 per cent. in 1910, and 69.7 per cent. in 1920, that of California is headed, on the whole, towards an increase. We also notice that the percentage of the Japanese population to the total population of California also shows a tendency to slow growth, increasing only three tenths of one per cent. during the last decade. As a general conclusion, therefore, we may say that the rate of increase of Japanese in California is slowly declining while that of the total population of California is steadily increasing.

In the next place, how does the status of the Japanese population in California compare with that in the continental United States? In the following table, we compare the rate of increase in California and the United States, and enumerate the percentage of the number of Japanese in California to the total number of Japanese in the United States:

Japanese Population in the United States and California.

The table indicates that the percentage of Japanese in California to the total number of Japanese in the United States is rather high, justifying the complaint of the Governor of California that during ten years, between 1910 and 1920, “the Japanese population in California increased 25,592, but in all of the other States of the United States it decreased 10,873. Perhaps, in this last-named fact may be found the reason that makes Oriental immigration a live subject of continued consideration in California.”[12]

The truth of this statement, which in other words means that the cause of anti-Japanese agitation in California is due to congestion in that one State, becomes almost indisputable. It is doubly apparent when we consider the reason why the Chinese no longer constitute the objects of exclusion in California while the Japanese do. The Chinese have shown, ever since the launching of the agitation against them in the early ’80’s, a wise tendency to disperse into other States, thus avoiding conflict with the Californians. The Japanese, on the other hand, appear to cling tenaciously to California, and the more they are maltreated and slandered the more steadfastly they remain in that State. This is apparently due largely to the recognition of the desirability of California, even with its handicaps, over other States, but it is also due to their helplessness to extricate themselves from the situation in fear of a great financial loss involved in the change.

The Report of the State Board of Control of California uses the fact of the decreasing number of Chinese and the increasing number of Japanese in California as evidence of the success of the Chinese Exclusion Act in accomplishing its purpose, and of the failure of the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” in restricting Japanese immigration.[13] But, in so doing, it fails to take into consideration the very fact which it points out elsewhere, which we have just quoted; namely, that the number of Japanese has decreased in all of the other States combined while it has increased in California. It also fails to take into account the fact that the number of Chinese, contrary to the Japanese tendency, has shown a marked tendency to grow in eastern and middle western States and to decrease in California. Thus, for example, the number of Chinese in New England, the Middle Atlantic, and Eastern and North Central States increased from 401, 1227, and 390 respectively in 1880 to 3499, 8189, and 3415, respectively, in 1910, while it decreased in the Pacific division from 87,828 to 46,320 in the corresponding period.[14]

The foregoing examination establishes the fact that much of the anti-Japanese agitation in California is due to the congestion of Japanese in that one State, as pointed out by the authorities of California, and as confirmed by the extinction of anti-Chinese sentiment in California, consequent upon the exodus of large numbers of Chinese from that State.

We have seen that the Japanese population in California increased from 86 in 1880 to 70,196 in 1920 at the annual rate of 1403. We shall now see how each of the three factors—lawful entrance of Japanese into the United States, smuggling, and birth—has contributed to this increase.

Immigration.

Without question, the coming of the Japanese who are legally permitted to enter the United States has been the largest factor contributing to their increase in California. Of the total Japanese entering the continental United States since its beginning up to the end of 1920, estimated at 180,000,[15] California claims to have received about two thirds,[16] or approximately 125,000. Since California’s present Japanese population is 70,196, of which about 25,000[17] are American-born children, it means that out of the total number of Japanese immigrants (125,000) who entered California, only 45,196 survive now in that State, the rest having either migrated to other States, or died out, or returned home.

One reason why the Japanese immigration is viewed with so much apprehension is because the facts of the situation are not rightly understood. The number of Japanese coming to the United States has decidedly increased in recent years, especially since the war, the annual number reaching the ten thousand mark. This would certainly be alarming were it not for the correspondingly large number of Japanese who returned every year. The following table shows the percentage of those who returned out of the total arrivals: