John Brown, Soldier of Fortune: A Critique

In answer to a letter from Brown, Holmes replied August 16th:

The "Little Hornet" did not recommend, as profitable, the business that might be had on election-day—October 5th; that opportunity foreshadowed the possibility of real resistance against pro-slavery aggressions; but other profitable employments could be had, by the act of undertaking them, at any time. These thieves understood each other. The "profitable employments" meant stealing horses.

With his arrival at Tabor, August 7th, Brown reached the limit of his possibilities. The next day he thus reported his arrival to Mr. Stearns:[252]

He now had at Tabor and at Nebraska City, five wagon loads of stuff[254] which was wholly useless for any purpose relating to Kansas. He had been posing, for nearly a year, as a hero charged with the responsibility of saving Kansas to freedom, and had finally come to the end of his rope. To Mr. Sanborn he wrote, August 13th:[255]

Four days later he wrote to his wife these significant words:

To Mr. Adair he wrote:

There was nothing more that Brown could do. The failure of his pretensions was almost complete. Only his vocabulary had survived the general wreck. It was still intact and in working order. Drawing upon that inexhaustible resource of the charlatan, he wrote to Mr. Sanborn, October 1st:

A comparison of Brown's correspondence at this time, with what his eulogists have put forth concerning it, discloses a wide divergence between the facts therein stated, and the biographical fiction relating thereto. Referring to Brown's irrelevant reference to the tears and blood of his children, Mr. Villard says:

Only editorial fiction mystifies the cause of his delay at Tabor. The "grim, self-willed, resolute chieftain" had a clear and unalterable purpose in view, when he was delaying there. It was to attempt the conquest of the Southern States. If he entered Kansas, it would be merely an incident in the promotion of that scheme. His attitude was pivotal but not enigmatic; if a "disturbance" occurred in Kansas, he intended to proceed thither, and under cover of it, execute such purposes as he had in view; otherwise, he would "work back eastward."

One, at least, of his Eastern admirers, Mr. Thomas Wentworth Higginson, became impatient because of this delaying. After nursing his disappointment a few months, he protested Brown's procrastination, which evoked the following instructive reply from Mr. Sanborn:[260]

On August 13th, the "Cromwellian Trooper" wrote Mr. Sanborn a long letter,[261] which he intended "as a kind of report of my progress and success, as much for your committee or my friend Stearns as yourself." The letter has no public significance. It is a prolonged whine because he had not received all the money that had been promised him; also it incidentally but artistically put Mr. Stearns and Mr. Lawrence in a position that practically compelled them to make good the thousand dollars which he had theretofore pressed Mr. Lawrence for.[262] He said:

Brown's hope for a "disturbance" in Kansas was nourished by the reports that he received from General Lane, which, doubtless, encouraged him to prolong his stay at Tabor. Concerning this, Mr. Villard says:[263]

Lane wrote Brown, confidentially, September 7th, as follows:[264]

To this letter Brown replied September 16th:

Lane, hoping to make his proposition more attractive, appointed Brown Brigadier-General, Second Brigade, First Division. But not until the 29th, did he send his Quartermaster-General, Mr. Jamison, to Brown, for the arms. In a letter addressed to "General John Brown" Lane said that it was "all important to Kansas, that your things should be in at the earliest possible moment, and that you should be much nearer than you are." He also enclosed fifty dollars, "all the money I have," but said that Jamison "had some more." Naturally Lane's proposal failed to interest Brown. He replied that he could not go to Lawrence on such short notice and returned the fifty dollars.[265] The election, however, passed off quietly and resulted in a complete victory for the Free-State men. They elected their delegate to Congress, and thirty-three of the fifty-two members of the Legislature.

Another of Lane's schemes served to keep Brown at Tabor a month longer: a project for "the wholesale assassination of pro-slavery men through a secret order" called Danites. This time Mr. Whitman ably seconded Lane's efforts to interest Brown. He borrowed one hundred and fifty dollars which he enclosed with a letter to him and sent it by Mr. Charles P. Tidd, saying: "General Lane will send teams from Falls City so that you may get your goods all in. Leave none behind. Come direct to this place, and see me before you make any disposition of your plunder.... Make the money I send answer to get here, and I hope by that time to have more for you. Mr. Tidd will explain all."[266] That this messenger gave Brown inside information concerning the prospective assassinations, there can be little doubt.

October 25th, Mr. Whitman reported to Mr. Stearns[267] that Brown would be at Lawrence November 3d, "at a very important council: Free-State Central Com., Executive Com., Vigilance Committee of 52, Generals and Capts. of the entire organization." Such a "disturbance" as this promised to be, could not otherwise than interest Brown. Regarding the money he received from Whitman as money due him from the National Kansas Committee, he kept it; and disregarding the instructions concerning the arms, he proceeded personally to Kansas, arriving at Mr. Whitman's home about November 5th: too late, it will be observed, for him to participate in the important council meeting of the 3d; but not too late to take advantage of any public disturbance that might arise as a result of the proceedings of the council. By messenger Tidd, Brown received one hundred dollars from Mr. Adair, and upon his arrival at Lawrence, he received from Mr. Whitman five hundred dollars for account of the Massachusetts Kansas Committee.

All the prospects for "trouble" in Kansas having vanished, Brown promptly decided to "move eastward." Mr. Villard states that he "remained two days with Mr. Whitman, obtaining tents and bedding." From Topeka, when en route to the East, on the 16th, he wrote to Mr. Stearns that he had "been in Kansas for more than a week;" that he had "found matters quite unsettled;" but was "decidedly of the opinion that there will be no use for arms or ammunition before another Spring;" that he had them all safe and meant "to keep them so." Also that he meant "to be busily; but very quietly engaged in perfecting his arrangements during the Winter." He further said: "Before getting your letter saying to me not to draw on you for the $7,000 (by Mr. Whitman) I had fully determined not to do so unless driven to the last extremity." In a postscript he said: "If I do not use the arms and ammunition in actual service; I intend to restore them unharmed; but you must not flatter yourself on that score too soon."

It will be observed that Brown did not call upon Governor Robinson, or make any recommendations concerning Territorial affairs. To Mr. Adair he wrote on the 17th: "I have been for some days in the territory but keeping very quiet and looking about to see how the land lies ... I do not wish to have any noise about me at present; as I do not mean to 'trouble Israel.' I may find it best to go back to Iowa."[268]

The "failure" of Brown's plans to "trouble Israel," or the failure of his hope for another opportunity to plunder Kansas settlers on a large scale, lay in the simple fact that at the time he arrived at Tabor, August 7, 1857, the Free-State leaders had worked out the Free-State problem, and were then in position to make official declaration of the fact at the polls; and to take over, into their own hands, by right of the law of Squatter Sovereignty, the control of the Territorial government. They had almost accomplished their mighty undertaking. Also, they had established conditions of order, and security from violence, that afforded neither encouragement nor opportunity for organized bands of thieves, of the Brown type, to prey upon the settlements. The activities of the marauder and his "Little Hornet" were barred.

CHAPTER IX

A SOLDIER OF FORTUNE

He was the mildest manner'd man that ever scuttled ship
or cut a throat.

—Don Juan

At Collinsville, Connecticut, about March 1, 1857, John Brown gave out the first evidence that he contemplated inciting an insurrection in the Southern States. He was there making his usual appeal for money. To a group of citizens, among whom was a Mr. Charles Blair, he told the story of Black Jack; and, as was his custom in such recitals, he drew from his boot a trophy of the fight—a two-edged dirk-knife with a blade about eight inches long—which he had taken from Captain Pate; and said, that if he "had a lot of those things to attach to poles about six feet long, they would be a capital weapon of defense for the settlers of Kansas to keep in their log cabins to defend themselves against any sudden attack that might be made upon them." And then turning to Blair, whom he knew to be an edge-tool maker, asked him what it would "cost to make five hundred or a thousand of those things" as he described them. To this Blair replied that he would make "five hundred for a dollar and a quarter apiece; or if he wanted a thousand, they might be made for a dollar apiece." To this Brown replied that he would want them made. March 30th, a contract for the thousand spears was signed. Brown agreeing to pay five hundred dollars within ten days. At the time agreed upon he paid three hundred dollars; but April 25th, he remitted two hundred and fifty dollars more. This amount Blair expended in purchasing material, and in making a part of the order; after which he suspended work on it until such time as Brown would advance additional funds. There was some correspondence between the parties in February and March, 1858, but nothing further was done in the matter until June 3, 1859, when Brown again called upon Blair and made satisfactory arrangements for payment of the remaining four hundred and fifty dollars; whereupon Blair renewed work upon the order, and, on September 17th, delivered the spears complete, at Chambersburg, Pennsylvania.[269]

In New York City, Brown made the acquaintance of an Englishman who entered into his life more largely, and gave greater direction to his actions, than his biographers have acknowledged. This man was "Colonel" Hugh Forbes. Brown called upon him, it is said, with a letter of introduction from the Rev. Joshua Leavitt. The date of their meeting is not given; but, since Brown is not reported as being in that city during 1857, after his visit there, January 23d-26th,[270] it may be assumed that they met upon that occasion, and together planned to precipitate a revolution in the South, through an insurrection of the slave population. Forbes was a practical as well as a professional revolutionist. He had served with Garibaldi. Mr. Villard refers to him as "a suave adventurer of considerable ability." To Mr. Horace Greeley he was "fanatical and mercenary and wholly wanting in common sense." Gerrit Smith described him as a "handsome, soldierly-looking man, skillful in the sword-exercise, and with some military experience picked up under Garibaldi." Before entering the latter's service he had been a "silk merchant at Sienna." In Mr. Sanborn's opinion he was a "brave, vainglorious, undisciplined person, with little discretion, and quite wanting in qualities that would fit him to be a leader of American soldiers. Yet he was ambitious, eager to head a crusade against slavery." In New York he taught fencing, and did some work on the Tribune as reporter and translator.

It was not unnatural that these two adventurers should meet and unite their fortunes in a revolutionary venture. Also, there was some similarity in their lives. Both were "typical of the human flotsam and jetsam washed up by every revolutionary movement." Forbes had been washed up by Garibaldi's "revolution" in Italy, and Brown had been washed up by Robinson's revolution in Kansas. Forbes was looking for an adventure, and Brown had a make-believe one on hand, which, if prudently handled, might be made to serve the purposes of their mutual ambitions. The suave adventurer was the stronger character. He impressed Brown with his knowledge of military science, and with the value his services would be in their undertaking, and so fascinated the "grim, self-willed, resolute chieftain" that he engaged his services at one hundred dollars per month, and paid him six months' salary in advance. Mr. Villard says:[271]

In relation to this Mr. Sanborn says:[272]

Both of these major transactions—the placing of the order for the spears, and the employment of Forbes, as stated—are so discreditable to ordinary intelligence, that they impeach Brown's sanity, except upon the sole hypothesis, that these two men had, at that time, so matured their plans for attempting a revolution, through an insurrection of the slaves, that Brown felt justified in placing the order for the spears, and in engaging the services of a man capable of directing large military operations. It is impossible to believe that Brown contemplated giving up a thousand dollars for a purpose so tame and absurd as the distribution of a thousand spears among the Free-State settlers of Kansas. They were already well armed with modern weapons—fire-arms—and knew how to use them; while the proposal to employ a "drill-master" at such a salary, in view of the state of his treasury, to drill such a lot of nightriders as he could use in Kansas, is quite as preposterous. If Brown needed the services of a drill-master, he knew where one could be had for less money. There were plenty of men available who had served in the volunteer army in Mexico, or had been discharged, or had deserted from the regular army—men of the Aaron D. Stevens class—who were competent to command as well as to drill. He also knew that many such men were ready and anxious to engage in adventures in the Kansas field, who would serve without compensation, other than a share of the prospective plunder.

From the time of his alliance with Forbes, Brown pressed forward steadily, with a single definite ultimate purpose. The conquest of the Southern States was on; and the Osawatomie Guerrilla had become the Soldier of Fortune.

Brown and Forbes moved upon the theory that the slaves were the rightful owners of their masters' property. They believed that every slave regarded his master as an enemy, who denied him a right to his family, and appropriated to himself the fruits of his labor; that freedom was the hope and the dream of every slave; that each lived in a state of expectancy, awaiting the coming of a "Liberator" who would lead them in a crusade for liberty. Also, they believed that every slave would fight for his freedom. Self-constituting themselves "Liberators," they regarded each slave as already enrolled in their service. The problems before them were how to arouse these units of energy; how to incite the slaves to simultaneous activity, and how to organize and direct them as an operating force. The man who had killed his friendly neighbors with nonchalance, and had taken their horses, could not understand why another man, a slave, should hesitate to kill an enemy, such as has been described, and take his horses and lands, and be further rewarded by the benefaction of liberty.

As results of their plotting, and planning, and scheming, they seem to have figured out to their entire satisfaction, how they could destroy the slave-holding population of the Southern States and confiscate their property; and then, with the aid of their negro allies, thus liberated from slavery, and with the assistance of the non-slave-holding whites in the South and the ambitious and daring in the North, who would be lured to join them, they could create an army; invade the South; take possession of the several State governments, and reorganize them under the jurisdiction of a Provisional Government.

Brown was a disunionist,[273] and believed his revolution would result in a dissolution of the Union. His friends—Redpath, Sanborn, Higginson, Smith et al., were disunionists, and he lived in an atmosphere saturated with the toxin of disunion sentiment. Also, he was an optimist, and believed that while he ravaged the South with his bloody scourge, the disunion propaganda in the North would assert itself to his advantage, and create such a diversion in his favor, as would leave him and Forbes free to deal with the South and its problems in their own way. Only under such conditions could he hope to seize the property of slave-holders, "personal and real, wherever and whenever it may be found in either Free or Slave States." From their point of view, or as they hoped to make it appear, their revolution was to be an affair between the citizens of a block of sovereign States, in the result of which the Federal Government would not be especially concerned. They would act within the limits of the States involved for revolutionary purposes, and not in unnecessarily aggressive hostility toward the United States. At the same time, these adventurers well understood that no matter how successful they might be in starting their revolution, there would probably come a time when the Federal army would have to be reckoned with; that the General Government would attempt to intervene in behalf of local order, at least, and might seriously embarrass their operations or wholly defeat them. This visible menace they not only planned to overcome, or eliminate from the problem, but actually to turn it into a valuable asset, by transposing it bodily to their side of the military equation. They planned, in apparent sincerity of purpose, to accomplish what appears to be the most colossal of all imaginable absurdities: to have the men of the United States army abandon their colors and accept service in their army; or, as Brown expressed it, to make an "actual exchange of service from that of Satan to the service of God."

To poison the minds of the soldiery of the Union and to ripen them for revolt against their colors, they planned to begin a campaign of education; to publish and distribute in the army, a series of tracts, for the instruction of the officers and enlisted men in public morals and in patriotism. In the division of their labors, to Forbes was assigned the Department of Literature. In pursuance of his duties, he proceeded to prepare a "Manual of the Patriotic Volunteer," and a tract, which was the first of what was to be a series of tracts, entitled "The Duty of the Soldier."[274] The tract was headed in small type: "Presented with respectful and kind feelings, to the Officers and Soldiers of the United States Army in Kansas." Mr. Villard says[275] the object of the tract was to win them from their allegiance to their colors. That it does this indirectly by asking whether the "Soldiers of the Republic" should be "vile living machines and thus sustain Wrong against Right." That it contained "three printed pages of rambling and discursive discussion of the soldiery of the ancient Republics and of the princes of Antiquity, and a consideration of Authority, legitimate and illegitimate—as ill-fitted as possible an appeal to the regular soldier of 1857." Appended to the copy in his possession is a closing remark in Brown's handwriting as follows:

To one person at least, this literary performance was a serious matter. In the promotion of it, John Brown was deeply, deadly in earnest. The statement that "Forbes and not Brown, was the author of the tract"[276] is not correct, and to characterize the paper as Forbes's attempt to seduce the soldiery of the Union,[277] is equally misleading. The scheme originated with Brown; he furnished the subject. To Forbes he assigned the duty of preparing the text for publication. Writing to Rev. Theodore Parker, from Boston, March 7, 1858, he said:

There can be no doubt that Brown placed a high estimate upon the value of this tract, but we know from the postscript thereto, that, although the tract was dedicated to the "Officers and Soldiers" of the army, it was the "common soldier" that he hoped to arouse and incite. His effort to convert the army to his service, by means of a tract, may be called madness, but it may also be said there was "method" in the madness. If he had been criticised in relation to this matter, he would probably have said in reply what he said to Mr. Sanborn, defending his action in ordering the thousand spears: "Wise men may ridicule the idea; but I take the whole responsibility of that job;" which was equivalent to saying: "You do not comprehend the scope of my scheme, or the use which I intend to make of these spears. When they have accomplished their silent but deadly work, the wisdom of my conduct concerning them will appear." The trouble in this case was how to obtain an opportunity to inject the virus of revolt into the ranks of the army—how to start the contagion—how to get his proposition before the troops, and to explain what he intended to do; and what he would have at his disposal to offer in the way of rewards for services in his army, without putting himself and his plans in peril. How he intended to use the tract can only be surmised. But the fact remains that he had to begin this all important move somehow or somewhere, and the tract was, probably, evolved from his inner consciousness to meet that necessity. It may therefore be assumed that, under cover of discussing the generalities contained in the tract, Brown hoped to make acquaintances among the enlisted men of the army in whom he could confide, and who would serve his purpose by fomenting the revolt.

In projecting his campaign, Brown was a law unto himself, untrammelled by the accepted usages of war. The excess of his ardor and enthusiasm led him to believe that he could corrupt the rank and file of the army. In his philosophy, the daring, dangerous, adventurous men who largely composed the enlisted men of the army at that time, having no hope of promotion in the service, would become eager listeners to his proposal. Before them, he would throw open the storehouses of his prospective empire, that they might behold the volume of his treasures, and select that which they desired. His army was to be created; he had the men in view—the slaves whom he would set free—but not the officers to command them. If the enlisted men would desert from their service singly or en masse, and thus temporarily paralyze the United States forces, and join him, they could immediately become commissioned officers in his army and share with him the honors, the booty, and the beauty of the rich country he intended to ravage. By means of these "mighty and soul satisfying rewards" he hoped to "seduce the soldiery of the Union." The campaign of education was a stratagem.

It is not apparent that Forbes, at any time, showed a desire to quit Brown's service, or any disinclination to follow him westward. It is true that he was in arrears at one time with his literary work, but that was due to an incidental diversion of his activities in other directions—soliciting contributions and collecting money from various benevolent persons, including Mr. Greeley and Mr. Gerrit Smith. Forbes also had been making necessary arrangements for the comfort of his family—a wife and a daughter. The former being in Paris, and the latter in New York, he wisely decided, in view of the character of the pending military operations, to have the latter return to the care of her mother. Brown, who was paying the price, required results rather than explanations. It appears that Forbes had not prepared the "Manual" within the time in which he had led his impetuous chief to believe it would be forthcoming; and this had aroused an unwarranted suspicion in his mind that his subordinate was lagging. It is also true that Forbes had been indiscreet from a "military" point of view. He had talked, as one having authority, or knowingly, about the situation in Kansas, and had committed the very serious mistake of expressing a doubt that their services would be needed there before winter, which would have a tendency to discourage contributions to the "cause of freedom." In addition to all this, Brown became suspicious that the "Colonel" was ambitious, and aspired to supersede him in command; or, it may be that he became jealous because of his subordinate's brilliant accomplishments—his "military bearing" and qualifications. Mr. Sanborn confirmed Brown's distrust of him. He says that "Forbes was ambitious and apparently desirous of taking Brown's place in command." It may, however, be nearer the truth to assume that the depleted condition of the exchequer had much to do with Brown's "dissatisfaction" with Forbes.

There is no apparent reason why Forbes should have preceded Brown into Kansas, and the fact that he arrived at Tabor August 9th, two days after the arrival of his chief, is proof of commendable alacrity on his part to take up and continue his duties. Besides, Forbes brought with him copies of the "Manual," and copies of Brown's specialty: "The Duty of the Soldier." With these evidences of his ability, fidelity, and loyalty, the shadows of distrust were all dispelled, and Forbes's restoration to Brown's confidence and favor resulted immediately. The next day Brown was in a hopeful mood, and wrote very encouragingly to Mr. Stearns, sending him copies of the tracts and, incidentally, impressing upon his attention the important fact that he was "in immediate want of Five Hundred to One Thousand Dollars for secret service and no questions asked."

There can be no doubt that in their poverty, but dreaming of the splendors of war, of marching armies, and the possibilities of empire, these two bankrupt but hopeful speculators in destiny gazed wistfully upon the order for the seven thousand dollars that Stearns had given to Brown after his "Farewell to the Plymouth Rocks" effort. The question was, how to get some of it. Unfortunately for their purpose, Mars was not doing a thing for them; they were unable to detect even so much as a trace of a war-cloud upon the Kansas sky; and the $7,000 could only be used for the subsistence of the make-believe troopers when in "active service." Under these circumstances they did the best they could; they made as much as possible out of nothing. They wrote Mr. Stearns what he already knew; that there was no fighting in Kansas "just then"; and, that while "Rather interesting times were expected, no great excitement is reported." But "Our next advices may entirely change the aspect of things." From this, Mr. Stearns was to be led to infer that imminent danger to the Free-State cause was lurking somewhere, and that the sagacious leader was already upon the trail of it. Also, the hope that Brown earnestly expressed that the "Friends of Freedom" would respond to his call and "prove me now herewith," was intended to move Mr. Stearns to authorize Brown to draw upon him for a part of the seven thousand dollars for their immediate necessities. But, although the request was wisely framed and neatly but urgently pressed, it failed to raise any money. To Theodore Parker Brown wrote September 11th:[279]

Stranded at Tabor, without means to go anywhere, or with which to do anything, the two leaders of the revolution had abundant leisure to compare their respective plans of operation, and their views upon methods of procedure, as well as to formulate and agree upon final plans for the invasion and conquest. Forbes, later, disclaimed any intention to participate in "Brown's" purpose to overthrow the State Governments, and establish a provisional government; but that disclaimer came as an incident in his effort to supersede Brown, after his name had been dropped from the muster and pay-roll. November 1st, the financial embargo was raised by the receipt of two hundred and fifty dollars: one hundred and fifty from Lane, and one hundred from Mr. Adair. It was not a large sum of money, when compared with the expenses usually incurred in "mobilizing" even a small army, or, as compared with the magnitude of the operations they intended to inaugurate; but it was large enough to enable the filibusters to start doing something.

In their dreams of the Provisional Government and in their planning for the Provisional army, they decided to open a school for instruction in the science of war and in the science of civil government, at some point convenient to the scene of the prospective conflict; whereat the persons whom Brown had in view for his subordinate commanders—general officers, division and military district commanders—could be swiftly educated and fitted for their respective duties and responsibilities. Forbes, whose position was that of a chief of staff, was to have charge of the school. November 2d, he took passage from Nebraska City for the East to find a suitable location, in Ashtabula County, Ohio, for the War College which was to be improvised; and Brown, as we have seen, proceeded to Kansas to further finance their venture if local conditions—"disturbances"—became favorable for fiscal operations; and to matriculate the tyros.

He had been in correspondence with Holmes—the "Little Hornet"—and other adventurers whom he thought would engage in his enterprises. Cook agreed to join him and recommended others—Richard Realf, Luke F. Parsons, and Richard J. Hinton.[280] On Sunday, November 8th, Brown met Cook and Parsons, near Lawrence, and came to an understanding with them for organizing a party to steal some horses; or, as Mr. Villard puts it: "To organize a company for the purpose of putting a stop to the aggressions of the pro-slavery forces." A few days later he notified the members of the party to meet at the appointed rendezvous. Cook met him on the 16th, at Mrs. Sheridan's, near Topeka. The next day Aaron D. Stevens, Charles W. Moffet, and John H. Kagi joined them, and the party set out on the contemplated expedition.

In their camp north of Topeka that evening. Brown took the men into his confidence, and disclosed to them his intention to attempt the conquest of the Southern States.[281] "Here," says Cook in his confession, "for the first time I learned that we were to leave Kansas to attend a military school during the winter." It is for the reader to decide for himself whether or not the party stole any horses that night, or what other steps they took, if any, to put "a stop to the aggressions of the pro-slavery forces." Their destination was Tabor, Iowa; they were horse thieves, and were in a secret camp, north of Topeka. Continuing his narrative Cook says: "Next morning I was sent back to Lawrence to get a draft of $80 cashed, and to get Parsons, Realf and Hinton, to go back with me." He relates how he with Realf and Parsons, made the trip to Tabor; but the route traveled by Brown, Stevens, Moffet, and Kagi, and the incidents of their journey, if any, are not given.

December 2d, there were assembled at Tabor, John Brown, Owen Brown, A. D. Stevens, Charles W. Moffett, C. P. Tidd, John H. Kagi, Richard Realf, Luke F. Parsons, John E. Cook, and W. M. Leeman; also Richard Richardson, a runaway slave whom Brown had picked up at Tabor. "Here," Cook says, "we found that Captain Brown's ultimate destination was the State of Virginia"; and these were the men he had selected for his commanders in the Army of the Invasion. They were not a coterie of humanitarians or sentimentalists whom he had picked up, mooning about in Kansas; but a lot of care-free, reckless, ambitious young men who had parted their moorings to an orderly life. Of them Senator Doolittle, speaking for the minority of the Mason Committee said: "It was from such elements [lawless] that John Brown concocted his conspiracy consisting of young men and boys over whom he had entire control, many of them foreigners and none of substance or position in the country."[282] It is not in the "dominating spirit of John Brown himself must be found the true reason for their readiness to join in so desperate a venture as Brown outlined to them or because of their readiness to go any lengths to undermine slavery."[283] Cook knew Brown's career from the Pottawatomie to Osawatomie, and approved of his system for undermining things. Parsons was with him in the Osawatomie cattle raid. Stevens had graduated from a volunteer in the Mexican War, to a private in the First Dragoons, United States army. He was insubordinate, and had been tried for mutiny and for assaulting an officer—Major George A. H. Blake, First Dragoons—and sentenced to death. The sentence had been commuted to confinement, for three years at hard labor, in the military prison at Fort Leavenworth, from which he escaped and joined the Free-State forces in Kansas. He became colonel of the Second Regiment in the Free-State army under the name of Charles Whipple. It was not Brown and his magnetism or any insipid nonsense about "philanthropy or love for the slave" that appealed to these adventurers, but the scheme which he unfolded before them. It was the charm of the glittering expanse of opportunity which he pressed upon their mental conceptions, that won, and enlisted them in the venture.

On December 4th, with their plunder, ordnance stores and camp and garrison equipment, Brown and his staff set out from Tabor for Ashtabula. There had been argument, disagreement, and some wrangling at Tabor about the practicability of the undertaking; but yielding to the force of Brown's exposition of it, opposition was silenced and confidence of success supplanted doubt in the minds of all. Of the march across Iowa to Iowa City and Springdale, Mr. Villard, quoting from fragments of Owen Brown's diary, that survived the wreck at Harper's Ferry, says: "Progress was slow, for all of the men walked and the weather was bitter cold. On December 8, the entry reads: 'Cold, wet and snowy; hot discussion about the Bible and war—warm argument about the effects of the abolition of slavery upon the Southern States, Northern States Commerce and manufactures, also upon the British provinces and the civilized world; whence came our civilization and origin? Talk about prejudices against color; question proposed for debate,—greatest general, Washington or Napoleon.'" The party arrived at Springdale, Iowa, on the 28th or 29th of December. Early in January, 1858, Brown changed his plans about going to Ashtabula County, and for opening there the School of Instruction. On January 11th, he located his men for the winter at the home of Mr. William Maxson, the latter agreeing to take the wagons and horses from Brown on account for boarding. The War College was then opened at Springdale, instead of in Ashtabula County; and with Stevens in charge instead of Forbes. Continuing his narrative about the doings of the school, Mr. Villard says:[284] "On the 12th (February) there was 'talk about our adventures and plans.' In the main, discussion ranged from theology and spiritualism to caloric engines, and covered every imaginable subject between them. Much talk of war and fighting there was, and drilling with wooden swords. Stevens, by reason of his service in the Mexican War, and subsequently in the United States Dragoons, was drill-master in default of Forbes. Sometimes they went into the woods to look for natural fortifications; again they discussed dislodging the enemy from a hill-top by means of zig-zag trenches. Forbes manual was diligently perused." Also they organized a "moot legislature and beguiled the long winter evenings, drafting laws for an ideal 'State of Topeka.' It followed the regulation procedure with its bills and debates." The curriculum in this school is evidence of the character of the duties the students therein were being fitted to perform; they were being instructed in the higher strategy of war, in the command of troops and in the science of government. Writing to Mr. Sanborn from Brooklyn, February 26th, Brown said:[285]