"I wish them God-speed with their work. It is the holiest work that men can undertake, to maintain the freedom and the rights and to uphold the peace, the order and safety of their own nation. You ought to be proud—you, the sons and the grandsons of men who were shot down for daring to arm themselves—you ought to be proud that you have lived to see the day when with the good will of the democracy of England you are arming yourselves in the light of heaven."
The note of exultation in this passage rings again and again through his utterances. He saw, or thought he saw, the symbol of achieved liberty in the muster of young men, ready to take up the sword, and no longer branded with the name of felons for so doing. Nor was he alone in his rejoicing. The host at that meeting was a great Irish landlord, Colonel Sir Hutcheson Poe. He, upon reading Redmond's speech of August 4th had written to the Press saying that since he was too old to serve he was taking steps to arm and equip a hundred National Volunteers. Now, in Redmond's presence, addressing a body of the Volunteers, he told them what he thought of Redmond's action.
"That five minutes' speech did more to compose our differences, to unite all Irishmen in a bond of friendship and good will, than could have been accomplished by years of agitation or by a conference, however well-intentioned it might be."
That was a notable tribute from one of the eight men who formed the historic Land Conference of 1902; and Sir Hutcheson Poe was not the man to rest on complimentary expressions. He set to work at once to promote a memorial praying for joint action between Ulster and the Irish Volunteers and for settlement of the political question which alone prevented such action.
Unhappily, this was not easy of accomplishment. When the House reassembled after its adjournment of a fortnight, negotiations were resumed, with the result that on August 31st the Prime Minister asked for a fresh adjournment for ten days, at the end of which time the Government hoped to be able to produce satisfactory proposals as to the Irish and Welsh Bills. Redmond felt himself obliged to enter a protest. It had been agreed that the circumstances of the war should not be allowed to inflict political injury on any party in the House; and he would give the friendliest consideration to any proposal for giving to the Opposition what they might have gained by a discussion on the Amending Bill.
"But we must emphatically say that any proposal which would have the effect of depriving us of the enactment of the Irish measure—and I presume I may say the same with reference to the Welsh measure—an enactment to which we were entitled practically automatically when the circumstances of the war arose, would do infinite mischief, and would be warmly resented by us.
"Just let me say one word more. There has arisen in Ireland the greatest opportunity that has ever arisen in the history of the connection between the two countries for a thorough reconciliation between the people of Ireland and the people of this country. There is to-day, I venture to say, a feeling of friendliness to this country, and a desire to join hands in supporting the interests of this country such as were never to be found in the past; and I do say with all respect, that it would be not only a folly, but a crime, if that opportunity were in any degree marred or wasted by any action which this country might take. I ask this House—and I ask all sections of the House—to take such a course as will enable me to go back to Ireland to translate into vigorous action the spirit of the words I used here a few days ago."
An angry scene followed. Mr. Balfour asked whether "it was possible decently to introduce subjects of acute discussion in present circumstances"—in other words, whether all mention of Home Rule must not be postponed till after the war. This provoked hot debate, checked only by a strong appeal from the Prime Minister. But the general effect was not reassuring to Ireland. The contrast with the Tsar's prompt grant of autonomy to Poland was sharply drawn. Nobody rated high the chances of an amicable agreement. On September 4th Sir Edward Carson outlined his views in Belfast. Home Rule "will never be law in our country." But "in the interests of the State and of the Empire we will postpone active measures." This indicated sufficiently that in his judgment the Bill might become law, and that they would not be encouraged to set up immediate resistance. The Prime Minister, as chief Minister of the nation, must be supported in the war at all costs.
Next day, renewing at Coleraine his appeal for recruits, he said:
"We are not going to abate one jot or tittle of our opposition to Home Rule, and when you come back from serving your country you will be just as determined as you will find us at home."
This was the answer to Redmond's proposal of fraternization. Clearly Sir Edward Carson had made up his mind that he could not prevent the passage of the Bill, and he decided upon the strongest course, which was to advocate unlimited support to the war. Any other course would have been ruinous to his cause, which depended always upon a profession of the extremest loyalty. Yet only a strong man, confident in his leadership, could have taken this line at a moment when Ulstermen were about to feel that all their preparations were wasted and that the game had been won against them by a paralysing chance.
Before the House reassembled there was a meeting at the Carlton Club; a report communicated to the Press attributed these words to Sir Edward Carson—they are typical of the tone of the time:
"We asked for no terms and we got none. We did not object to go under the War Office. We did not make speeches calculated to humbug or deceive while we meant to do nothing."
On September 15th Government announced its intentions. Both Bills were to be placed on the Statute Book, but their operation deferred till the end of twelve months, or, if the war were not then over, till the end of the war. During the suspensory period Government would introduce an Amending Bill. Mr. Asquith made a flattering reference to Sir Edward Carson's action in appealing to his organization for recruits, and admitted that "it might be said that the Ulstermen had been put at a disadvantage by the loyal and patriotic action which they had undertaken."—This meant that their preparations for resistance to Mr. Asquith's Government were disorganized.—He proceeded to promise that they should never have need of such preparations; they should get all the preparations aimed at without having to use them.
"I say, speaking again on behalf of the Government, that in our view, under the conditions which now exist—we must all recognize the atmosphere which this great patriotic spirit has created in the country—the employment of force, any kind of force, for what you call the coercion of Ulster, is an absolutely unthinkable thing. So far as I am concerned, and so far as my colleagues are concerned—I speak for them, for I know their unanimous feeling—that is a thing we would never countenance or consent to."
This utterance has dominated the situation from that day to this. Ulster had organized to rebel, sooner than come under an Irish Parliament; and had refrained from rebellion because the Great War was in progress. For this reason Ulster should never be coerced, no matter what might happen. Sir Edward Carson's line of action had secured an enormous concession: he might have gone back to his people and said, "We have won." But he was strong enough to represent it as a new outrage, which they for the sake of loyalty must in the hour of common danger submit to endure. By this course, risky for himself, he vastly improved their position in all future negotiation.—After a violent speech from Mr. Bonar Law the Tory party walked out of the House in a body.
Redmond rose at once. He denounced the view that Ireland had gained an advantage, or desired to gain one. The Prime Minister had at every stage assured him that the Bill would be put on the Statute Book in that session, and therefore it was unjust to say that his loyalty was only conditional; he had asked for nothing that was not won in advance. Now, instead of an Act to become immediately operative, Ireland received one with at least a year's delay. Yet this moratorium did not seem to him unreasonable.
"When everybody is preoccupied by the war and when everyone is endeavouring—and the endeavour will be made as enthusiastically in Ireland as anywhere else in the United Kingdom—to bring about the creation of an Army, the idea is absurd that under these circumstances a new Government and a new Parliament could be erected in Ireland."
Further, it gave time for healing work. The two things that he cared for most "in this world of politics" were: first, that "not a single sod of Irish soil and not a single citizen of the Irish nation" should be excluded from the operation of Irish self-government; secondly, that no coercion should be applied to any single county in Ireland to force their submission.
The latter of these ideals was cast up to him by many in Ireland, first in private grumblings, afterwards with public iteration. He saw and admitted, what these critics urged, that the one aspiration made the other impossible of fulfilment, for the moment. Would it be so, he asked, after an interval in which Ulstermen and other Irishmen, Nationalist and Unionist, would be found fighting and dying side by side on the battlefield on the Continent, and at home, as he hoped and believed, drilling shoulder to shoulder for the defence of the shores of their own country?
On that hint he renewed his appeal to the Ulster Volunteers for co-operation and regretted that he had got no response from them. More than that, he urged that his appeal to Government had got no response. "If they had done something to arm, equip and drill a certain number at any rate of the National Volunteers the recruiting probably would have been faster than it had been." Alluding to the taunts at Ireland's shirking which had been bandied about in interruptions during the debate, he recalled the stories which already had come back from France of Irish valour; of the Munster Fusiliers who stood by their guns all day and in the end dragged them back to their lines themselves; the story told by wounded French soldiers who had seen the Irish Guards charge three German regiments with the bayonet, singing a strange song that the Frenchmen had never heard before—"something about God saving Ireland."
"I saw these men," said Redmond, "marching through London on their way to the station; they marched here past this building singing 'God save Ireland!'"
But he could not rest his claim, and had no intention of resting it, merely on the prowess of the Irish regulars already in the army.
"Speaking personally for myself, I do not think it is an exaggeration to say that on hundreds of platforms in this country during the last few years I have publicly promised, not only for myself, but in the name of my country, that when the rights of Ireland were admitted by the democracy of England, Ireland would become the strongest arm in the defence of the Empire. The test has come sooner than I, or anyone, expected. I tell the Prime Minister that this test will be honourably met. I say for myself that I would feel myself personally dishonoured if I did not say to my fellow-countrymen as I say to them here to-day, and as I will say from the public platform when I go back to Ireland, that it is their duty, and should be their honour, to take their place in the fighting-line in this contest."
That was a clear pledge. The Home Rule Bill received the Royal Assent on September 18th. But before the seal was affixed Redmond's manifesto to the Irish people was in all the newspapers. It was his call to arms.
FOOTNOTES:
This fact was verified for me oddly enough. When the 16th Division went to France, it was put through the usual period of apprenticeship with trained troops, and our brigade was attached for training to the Scottish Fifteenth Division. Two companies of our battalion of the 6th Connaught Rangers were attached to the 8th and 9th K.O.S.B. I met two officers who had been in Dublin on July 26th, and it was one of these who told me of the cheering. Perhaps I may add that the relations between our Connaught Rangers and the Scots were most friendly, and that we found probably a hundred Irish Catholics in that battalion—Irishmen living in the North of England who had at once rushed to enlist in the nearest corps available.
Bought in Belgium by John O'Connor M.P., and T.M. Kettle, after the Germans had entered Brussels.
CHAPTER VI
THE RAISING OF THE IRISH BRIGADES
I
At the ending of the long session of Parliament in 1914 there was a curious scene in the House of Commons, where members were crowded to assist at the formal passing of the Irish and Welsh Bills. On the adjournment, Mr. Will Crooks, from his seat on the front bench below the gangway, called out, "Mr. Speaker, would it be in order to sing 'God save the King'?" and without more ado uplifted his voice and the House chimed in. There must have been strange thoughts in the minds of Redmond, of Mr. Dillon, and others of the Irish, standing in the places where they had fought so long and bitter a battle, where they had been so often the object of fierce reproaches, whence they had hurled back so many taunts, now to find themselves the centre of congratulation, and joined with English members in singing on the floor of the House that national anthem which in Ireland had been for decades a symbol of ascendancy, rigidly tabooed by every Nationalist.
When the singing ended, Mr. Crooks's genial voice rose again. "God save Ireland!" he shouted.
"And God save England too!" Redmond answered.
That exchange of words outside the period of debate is, contrary to usage but very properly, recorded in Hansard.
From this time forth Redmond was on his trial. He had given pledges; he must make good to Ireland and make good to Great Britain. For the first, since Home Rule could not be brought into operation, he must secure recognition of the National Volunteers, must establish and regularize their status; for the second, he must obtain recruits as Ireland's contribution to the war. The two proposals were in his view—and indeed were in reality—inseparably connected. For both, in order to succeed, he needed to have the cordial support of his fellow-countrymen; for both, he needed whole-hearted co-operation from the British Government. It would be too much to say that Ireland backed him cordially; but for the limitation of Ireland's response the fault lay chiefly and primarily with the Government, which failed him completely. The War Office could not actually and directly oppose his effort to raise troops; what they could do was to hamper him by the adoption of wrong methods and the refusal of right ones. Yet in that part of his task which involved making good to England, laying England and the Empire under a debt of living gratitude, his appeal was made to Ireland, and he succeeded so far that only Ireland herself could have destroyed his work. But on the other point, which involved gaining satisfaction for Ireland, the appeal was made to Government and the refusal was complete. It was worse than absolute, for it was tainted with bad faith. Mr. Asquith as Prime Minister accepted the mutual covenant which Redmond had proposed, and allowed Lord Kitchener to disallow fulfilment of it.
Redmond's view was not limited to Ireland's interest. No man living in these islands felt more keenly for the great underlying principles at issue in the war. His mission, as he conceived it, was to lead Ireland to serve those principles. But it was futile to suppose that he could secure for England all that England expected of Ireland if he could obtain from England nothing of what Ireland asked. Redmond wanted recognition for the Volunteers chiefly as a basis upon which Ireland could feel that she was building an Irish army worthy of her record in arms; and this army would be no mean assistance to the nations allied against Germany's aggression. Considering all the facts which have to be set out, the true cause for wonder is not the limitation but the extent of his success.
There was neither delay nor uncertainty in his exposition of Ireland's duty. Quite literally, he seized the first chance that came to his hand. He left London on the evening when the Act was signed, motored to Holyhead, as he liked to do, in the big car which his friends had presented to him—it was the only material testimonial which he ever received—and crossed by the night boat, driving on in the morning to Aughavanagh. When he reached the Vale of Ovoca he found a muster of the East Wicklow Volunteers. These were the nearest thing to him in all the force—his own friends and neighbours from the Wicklow hills. Aughrim, his post-town at the foot of his own particular valley, had its company, commanded by a friend of his, the local schoolmaster—typical of what was best in the Volunteers, a keen Gaelic Leaguer, tireless in, work for the old language and old history. This man, well on in the forties, but mountain-bred and hardy, had thrown himself into the new movement—little guessing that a few months would see him a private in the British Army, or that he would come with honour to command a company of a famous Irish regiment on the battlefields of a European war.
If it had been only for the sake of Captain MacSweeny (he was then, of course, only a captain of Volunteers), I think Redmond would have stopped. But it was a gathering of many friends, who pressed him to speak at a moment when his heart was full. Grave results followed from what he said that day; but a week sooner or later he was bound to say these things, and the results were bound to follow. Here is the pith of his utterance:
"I know that you will make efficient soldiers. Efficient for what? Wicklow Volunteers, in spite of the peaceful happiness and beauty of the scene in which we stand, remember this country at this moment is in a state of war, and the duty of the manhood of Ireland is twofold. Its duty is at all cost to defend the shores of Ireland from foreign invasion. It has a duty more than that, of taking care that Irish valour proves itself on the field of war as it has always proved itself in the past. The interests of Ireland, of the whole of Ireland, are at stake in this war. This war is undertaken in defence of the highest principles of religion and morality and right, and it would be a disgrace for ever to our country, a reproach to her manhood, and a denial of the lessons of her history, if young Ireland confined their efforts to remaining at home to defend the shores of Ireland from an unlikely invasion, or should shrink from the duty of proving on the field of battle that gallantry and courage which have distinguished their race all through all its history. I say to you, therefore, your duty is twofold. I am glad to see such magnificent material for soldiers around me, and I say to you: go on drilling and make yourselves efficient for the work, and then account for yourselves as men, not only in Ireland itself, but wherever the firing-line extends, in defence of right and freedom and religion in this war."
On the following Thursday Mr. Asquith, as Redmond had publicly urged him to do, came to Dublin and spoke at the Mansion House with the Lord Mayor in the chair. Mr. Dillon and Mr. Devlin, as well as Redmond, were on the same platform and spoke also. The papers of September 25th, which reported the speeches of this notable gathering, contained also a manifesto from twenty members of the original Committee of the Volunteers, definitely breaking with Redmond's policy and taking his speech to the Wicklow Volunteers as their cause of action. Having recited a version of the facts which led up to the inclusion of Redmond's nominees on the Committee, it continued:
"Mr. Redmond, addressing a body of Irish Volunteers on last Sunday, has now announced for the Irish Volunteers a policy and programme fundamentally at variance with their own published and accepted aims and objects, but with which his nominees are, of course, identified. He has declared it to be the duty of the Irish Volunteers to take foreign service under a Government which is not Irish. He has made this announcement without consulting the Provisional Committee, the Volunteers themselves, or the people of Ireland, to whose service alone they are devoted."
The next paragraph announced the expulsion of Redmond's nominees and the reconstitution of the Committee as it existed before their admission. Six resolutions followed. It is noteworthy that the attitude taken up with regard to autonomy was simply "to oppose any diminution of the measure of Irish self-government which now exists as a Statute on paper," and to repudiate any "consent to the legislative dismemberment of Ireland." There was no word of an Irish Republic and no explicit claim beyond immediate operation for the Home Rule Act.
Ireland's attitude towards the war was defined by a resolution:
"To declare that Ireland cannot, with honour or safety, take part in foreign quarrels otherwise than through the free action of a National Government of her own; and to repudiate the claim of any man to offer up the blood and lives of the sons of Irishmen and Irishwomen to the service of the British Empire while no National Government which could speak and act for the people of Ireland is allowed to exist."
Mr. Asquith, when he spoke on Thursday night, must have been informed that this split was imminent, and he spoke with a view to that situation. He said:
"Speaking here in Dublin, I address myself for a moment particularly to the National Volunteers, and I am going to ask them all over Ireland—not only them, but I make the appeal to them particularly—to contribute with promptitude and enthusiasm a large and worthy contingent of recruits to the second new army of half a million which is now growing up, as it were, out of the ground. I should like to see, and we all want to see, an Irish Brigade—or, better still, an Irish Army Corps. Don't let them be afraid that by joining the colours they will lose their identity and become absorbed in some invertebrate mass, or what is perhaps equally repugnant, be artificially redistributed into units which have no national cohesion or character.
"We shall, to the utmost limit that military expediency will allow, see that men who have been already associated in this or that district in training and in common exercises shall be kept together and continue to recognize the corporate bond which now unites them. One thing further. We are in urgent need of competent officers, and when the officers now engaged in training these men prove equal to the test, there is no fear that their services will not be gladly and gratefully retained. But, I repeat, gentlemen, the Empire needs recruits and needs them at once. They may be fully trained and equipped in time to take their part in what may prove to be the decisive field in the greatest struggle of the history of the world. That is our immediate necessity, and no Irishman in responding to it need be afraid he is jeopardizing the future of the Volunteers.
"I do not say, and I cannot say, under what precise form of organization it will be, but I trust and I believe—indeed, I am sure—that the Volunteers will become a permanent, an integral and characteristic part of the defensive forces of the Crown.
"I have only one more word to say. Though our need is great, your opportunity is also great. The call which I am making is backed by the sympathy of your fellow-Irishmen in all parts of the Empire and of the world.... There is no question of compulsion or bribery. What we want, what we ask, what we believe you are ready and eager to give, is the freewill offering of a free people."
This was a double pledge as to Redmond's two objects. It promised, first, that every inducement should be given to join a corps distinctively Irish and having national cohesion and character; secondly, that the Volunteers should obtain recognition as part of the defensive forces of the Crown. Over and above this was an assurance of enormous importance. There was to be no question of compulsion. Nothing was asked, nothing would be asked, but "the freewill offering of a free people."
Lord Meath followed, a representative figure of Unionist Ireland and a most zealous promoter of recruiting. Then Redmond spoke, and as usual dwelt on Ireland's contribution to the forces of the Regular Army so far actually engaged, which was fully adequate in numbers. "As to quality, let Sir John French answer for that, and let my friend and fellow-countryman Admiral Beatty from Wexford speak from Heligoland."—Nothing gave him more pleasure at all times than to dwell on the personal achievement of Irishmen; his voice kindled when he named such names.—He went on to give confident assurance, having in it the note of defiant answer to the revolt which had been raised:
"I tell the Prime Minister he will get here plenty of recruits and of the best material. We will maintain here in Ireland intact and inviolate our Irish National Volunteers, and in my judgment that body of Volunteers will prove to be an inexhaustible source of strength to the new army corps and the new army that is being created."
Then, with disdainful reference to the "little handful of pro-Germans" who had "raised their voices in Ireland," he declared that it would be no less absurd to consider them representative than to take General Beyers and not General Botha as expressing the sentiments of South Africa.
Yet, as we know, the danger in South Africa was serious, and South Africa possessed freedom, not the promise of freedom. General Botha had what Redmond was denied—power to act and act promptly. In Ireland the menace was far less grave at this moment, but it was destined to become overpowering because Redmond lacked the power to deal with the situation in his own way. Already much had been lost. Between the declaration of war and the passage of the Home Rule Bill more than six weeks had been allowed to elapse in which nothing was done in response to Redmond's proposal, except the purely negative decision that Territorials should not be sent to garrison Ireland. This inevitably strengthened the hand of those who never liked the offer he had made. From the first an accent of dissent from the new policy was plainly distinguishable in what came from the Committee of the Volunteers. Mr. Bulmer Hobson says of the famous speech of August 4th:
"This statement amounted to an unconditional offer of the services of the Irish Volunteers to the English Government, and was made without any consultation with the Volunteers themselves. The first that members of the Provisional Committee heard of their being offered to the Government was when they read it in the newspapers, and Mr. Redmond's nominees on the Committee were as much surprised as the older members. At the next meeting of the Standing Committee, held a couple of days later, the nominated members strove hard to induce us to endorse Redmond's offer. The utmost they could get, however, notwithstanding their clear party majority, was a statement of 'the complete readiness of the Irish Volunteers to take joint action with the Ulster Volunteer Force for the defence of Ireland.' Further than that the older members of the Committee declined to go. This statement in reality committed, and was meant to commit, the Volunteers to nothing, though it was interpreted by the Press as a complete endorsement of Mr. Redmond's policy."
At the beginning of the war, there were two strong currents of desire in the Volunteer body and its backers. One sought that the Volunteers should retain complete freedom of action and in no way be brought under the War Office. The other craved to see them trained and armed with the least possible delay. Colonel Moore,[5] who was the chief of their military staff at this time, says Mr. Hobson, saw no way of accomplishing the latter object without the assistance of the military authorities. Other men, who had come in since Redmond's speech, impressed on the public that without legal recognition from the Crown no Volunteer could act against the Germans in case of a landing without exposing himself and others to the penalties which Germany was inflicting in Belgium wherever the civilian population fired a shot. As a result, negotiations were opened in August 1914 with the Irish Command, and Colonel Moore, in concert with General Paget's staff, drew up a scheme for training the Irish and Ulster Volunteers and for using them when trained for a short term of garrison duty in Ireland. The scheme was submitted to the Provisional Committee, who added conditions designed to lead to rejection by the War Office; and in the upshot Colonel Moore's proposals were refused by Lord Kitchener on one side and by the Standing Committee of Volunteers on the other.
Redmond was of course aware of the failure of this scheme, and took up the matter personally. He wrote to the Chief Secretary:
HOUSE OF COMMONS,
September 9, 1914. Private.
MY DEAR MR. BIRRELL,
I am very anxious to put shortly before you on paper my views with reference to the Volunteer question, which we discussed with the Prime Minister to-day. I take so strong a view on the subject that I think I must ask you to show him this letter and to urge upon him the importance of getting the War Office to move. I know the influences that are at work in the War Office throwing cold water on the Volunteers and causing intense dissatisfaction in Ireland by unnecessary delays.
What I suggest should be done is this: There are two separate questions: (1) Recruits; and (2) Volunteers for Home Defence.
The first absolutely depends upon the way in which the second is treated. If the existing Volunteer organization is ignored and sneered at and made little of, recruiting in the country will not go ahead.
On the other hand, if the Volunteers are properly treated, I believe that recruiting will go ahead.
Now, my suggestion is this: that an announcement should be made immediately that the War Office are taking steps to assist in the equipment and arming and instructing of a certain number of the Irish Volunteers for Home Defence, and that this will be done without interfering in any way with the character or organization of the existing Volunteer Force.
Carrying out this programme will really not stand in the way of the preparing of the new Army. All that is required is a few thousand rifles, and there are plenty of them in the military stores in Ireland at this moment which are not being used and will not be used, because they are too old, in the training of the recruits, but which would be quite suitable for making a beginning at any rate in the drilling of the Volunteers. It might be stated that they would be replaced by better weapons gradually, as soon as the rush was over.
A few instructors should be placed at the disposal of the Volunteers.[6]
If this is done, intense satisfaction will be given all through the country, and the pride and sentiment of the Volunteers will be touched, and the appeal for recruits generally through the country, and even in the ranks of the Volunteers themselves, will, I am confident, be responded to.
But, as I have said, if this course is not taken, inevitably recruiting will flag.
I would earnestly beg of you to take this matter vigorously in hand, so that some satisfactory announcement may be made before I return to Ireland next week.
Very truly yours,
RIGHT HON. A. BIRRELL, M.P. J.E. REDMOND.
Mr. Asquith's speech on September 24th was at least an indication that the Prime Minister desired to act in the spirit of Redmond's suggestions. The Chief Secretary was of the same disposition. But neither of them was able to control the imperious colleague who now had taken charge of the Army, and who in the most critical moment thwarted effectually the designs of Liberal statesmanship in Ireland.
After Redmond's death an "Appreciation" published in The Times (with the signature "A.B.,") by Mr. Birrell, contained this passage:
"He felt to the very end, bitterly and intensely, the stupidity of the War Office. Had he been allowed to deflect the routine indifference and suspicion of the War Office from its old ruts into the deep-cut channels of Irish feelings and sentiments, he might have carried his countrymen with him, but he jumped first and tried to make his bargain afterwards and failed accordingly. English people, as their wont is, gushed over him as an Irish patriot and flouted him as an Irish statesman. Had he and his brother been put in charge of the Irish Nationalist contingents, and an Ulster man, or men, been put in a corresponding position over the Irish Protestant contingents, all might have gone well. Lord Kitchener, who was under the delusion that he was an Irishman no less than Redmond, was the main, though not the only obstacle in the path of good sense and good feeling."
Yet it is, to say the least, not clear why Lord Kitchener should have been allowed to be an obstacle. Redmond was not fortunate in his allies. He had set an example of generous courage; it was not followed by British statesmen.
From the very outset of his campaign in Ireland he had two hostilities to meet. The first was that of the section which had always been opposed to him—the Unionist party. Into this block he had already driven a wedge. The Irish Times, its principal organ in the South and West, was now backing him heartily, and, as has been seen, not a few leading Unionists were doing their utmost to assist. But the real opposition, that of Ulster, was in no way conciliated. On September 28th, "Covenant Day," a great meeting was held at which the Ulstermen denounced what they called the Government's treachery, and declared their implacable determination never to submit to Home Rule. Mr. Bonar Law for the British Unionists proclaimed that whereas heretofore his party were willing to be bound by the verdict of a general election, they now withdrew that condition, and without any reservation would support Ulster in whatever course it chose to adopt.
In a purely partisan sense these speeches, and this attitude, did Redmond no harm in his campaign with Nationalists. When a certain section of Home Rulers were clamouring that he had been tricked and betrayed by the Government, had given all and got nothing, it was a good rejoinder to point to the fact that in Ulster's opinion the opportunity had been used to gain an unfair victory for Home Rule. But Redmond from the outbreak of the war had no concern with party or partisan arguments. He wanted a real truce, an end of bitterness, in Ireland.
There was, moreover, a feature of the Ulster propaganda in these days which disturbed him. General Richardson, a retired Indian officer, who had chief command of the Ulster Volunteer Force, in appealing for recruits, urged the Volunteers "to recollect the events of March last and what the Navy and Army did for Ulster. They came to the help of Ulster in the day of trouble, and would come again." He added his assurance to the Volunteers that "when the war was over, and their ranks were reinforced by some 12,000 men, thoroughly well trained and with vast field experience, they would return to the attack and relegate Home Rule to the devil."
It did not assist Redmond in gaining recruits for the Army that a general officer should represent the services as trusty and proven allies of gentlemen whose leading idea in life was to relegate Home Rule to such a destination The average Nationalist civilian did not easily discriminate between what was said by a retired officer out of commission and what was said by officers in uniform. There was a tendency to regard General Richardson as speaking of right for the Army—for which Nationalist recruits were desired.
The Liberal Government could not help Redmond to allay Ulster or Unionist hostility. One thing they could do; they could ensure that whatever concession or privilege was extended to those who followed Sir Edward Carson should be equally accorded to those who followed Redmond. This one thing which they could have done they did not do. They allowed the War Office to increase the arrogance of the Ulstermen and to weaken Redmond's hand, giving Ulster special privileges, which inevitably created jealousy and suspicion in Nationalist Ireland—as shall be shown in detail.
But first it is necessary to indicate the other element of hostility—far more serious than that of Ulster, because it challenged Redmond's leadership. It was that of the extremist group, which rapidly began to welcome German successes, not for any love to Germany but because it could not conceive of any hope for Ireland except in the weakening or Destruction of British power. These men, as been already seen, had acquired an influence in the Volunteer Force out of all proportion to their numbers, owing to the fact that the Irish party had stood aloof from the movement in its early stages. Professor MacNeill said later that but for the Gaelic League and the Gaelic Athletic Association there would have been no Irish Volunteers. The bulk of both these bodies was always antagonistic to the parliamentary movement. When their opposition openly declared itself, in consequence of the East Wicklow speech, Redmond was not sorry to have a clear issue raised, involving a formal breach. In a public letter to Colonel Moore he wrote that he read "this extraordinary manifesto with feelings of great relief," because communications from all parts of the country had forced him to the conclusion that so long as the signatories to this document remained members of the governing body, "no practical work could be done to put the Volunteer organization on a real business basis."
By a real "business basis" he meant that the Volunteers should be made a defensive force to act in concert with the troops engaged in the war. That was the clear issue. You must be for the troops or against them. In these days the official attitude of those who signed the dissenting manifesto was that Ireland should be neutral. But at such a crisis, as Mr. Dillon said in a telling phrase, a man who calls himself a neutral "is either an enemy or a coward."
It became only too clear later that we had to do with a body of men who were enemies and were certainly not cowards. Their number at this moment was difficult to determine. What immediately revealed itself was that the vast majority of the Volunteers, when choice was forced on them, adhered to Redmond.
The case of my own constituency, Galway City, may be given as typical, though rather of the towns than of the country. The country-side was apathetic; the towns were both for and against Redmond's policy. In Galway, Sinn Fein had a strong hold on the college of the National University, but, on the other hand, the depot of the Connaught Rangers was just outside the city at Renmore, and that famous corps had many partisans; while in the fishing village of the Claddagh nearly every man was a naval reservist.
I came to Galway on the day the Home Rule Bill was signed and attended a couple of Volunteer drills, where I noted the activity of some young men going round with a password: "For whom will you serve?" "For Ireland only." After the publication of the dissenting manifesto a Committee was called, and I obtained leave to be present. There was a sharp discussion, and at the finish the vote was a tie, whether to support Redmond or the dissentients. This did not at all please me or my friends, so we determined to have a big general meeting to see on which side public support really lay. Everybody was invited, and a great many people could not get into the hall; this mattered the less because the Sinn Feiners cut the electric wires leading to the building and plunged us in darkness; luckily, it was a fine night, and we took the meeting outside with great success. A couple of interruptions were drastically dealt with, and complete peace then prevailed. Two of the four county members were among the many speakers, and the last man to address the meeting was a wounded Connaught Ranger back from the line. We cheered for the Rangers, and then we cheered for the King; the local band was present, but unable, though quite willing, to assist at this point. "Isn't it a pity," the chief bandsman said to me, "there was three of us knew the tune well, but they've all gone to the front, and not a one of us ever heard it."
But as a net result the original Volunteer organization was killed. The pick of the young and keen who were with us went off to the war; the young and keen who stayed kept up an organization with very different purposes. There was plenty of material in Galway and everywhere else to build up a volunteer corps such as Redmond desired to see; but the organizing spirits were in the opposite camp, and our friends did not interest themselves in what seemed to be a kind of play-acting when such serious business was afoot in the world. Had they been set to duties of coast patrol, under officers who were available on the spot, and given clear recognition as part of the defensive forces, their body would have been alive and active; as it was, it atrophied and grew inert. Broadly speaking, the same was true all over the country. Redmond was willing to make bricks for the War Office to build with; they insisted that he should make them without straw.
Facts directly connected with recruiting ultimately convinced the British public that the War Office had spoilt a great opportunity in Ireland. But the fundamental blunder, the deep-seated cause which undermined the force of Redmond's appeal, was the refusal of recognition to the National Volunteers and the failure to fulfil the promise held out in Mr. Asquith's Dublin speech.
II
The other respects in which the War Office crippled the Nationalist efforts after recruiting were matters of detail, not of principle. The first and best help which Redmond might expect would have come from his colleagues in the party; and all the recruiting authorities in Ireland should have been directed to secure that help locally. No such step was taken. No attempt was made to enlist Nationalists of position as patrons of the recruiting campaign. In Catholic Nationalist districts it was the rule rather than the exception to select gentlemen of the Protestant Church, and of strong Unionist opinions, as recruiting officers. If Catholic Nationalists had been selected as the official agents to assist in raising the Ulster Division, there would have been an outcry, and very rightly; it would have been contrary to common sense. But the War Office, always even obsequiously ready to consider the Ulstermen's point of view, completely lacked sympathy for that of the majority in Ireland. In some cases the choice of a man locally unpopular on public grounds afforded—to speak plainly—an excuse for those leading Nationalists who were loath to depart from all the tradition of their lifetime. Some of Redmond's colleagues held that they had been "extreme men" all their lives, and they thought it too hard that they should be expected to ask Irishmen to join the English Army. Yet these same men would have worked enthusiastically for the Volunteers, and by sympathy for their comrades who went out could have been led into a very different attitude.
Many of them, too, felt an honourable scruple about asking others to do what they could not do themselves. As a parliamentary group we were under a singular disability. In its early days the Irish party had been, what Sinn Fein is now, a party of the young. But so strong was the tie of gratitude that service in its ranks became an inheritance, and in most cases a man once elected stayed on till he died or resigned. By 1914, of all parties in the House we had by far the largest proportion of men over military age. I question whether three out of the seventy could have passed the standard then exacted—for two or three of the younger men were medically unfit. In these circumstances the War Office would have been well advised to waive a regulation or two to facilitate matters; but the rigour of the rules was maintained. One of my colleagues, a man in the early forties, offered to join as a private; he was refused. In my own case a similar refusal was based on Lord Kitchener's personal opinion against that of the Under-secretary for War, to whom, as a personal friend, I had written; it took nearly six months to get the decision altered; and by that time the value of example was much depreciated. The beginning was the chance to give a lead.
Far graver was the intolerable delay in forming a corps which should appeal definitely to Irish national and Nationalist sentiment. The First Army included one Irish Division—the Tenth, destined to a splendid history, under a popular commander, Sir Bryan Mahon; but it had no specially Nationalist colour, so to say, and no connection with the Irish Volunteers. Redmond wanted the counterpart of what had been readily granted to Sir Edward Carson; and this was what Mr. Asquith had outlined in his speech at Dublin. The Sixteenth Division already existed; its commander was appointed on September 17th. But the first step to give it the desired character was not taken without long delay, and much heart-burning and confusion resulted.
Part of the confusion is attributable to the fact that Redmond, in his desire to touch the historic memories connected with the famous corps which attained its crowning glory at Fontenoy, always spoke of "a new Irish Brigade." But at the Mansion House meeting Mr. Asquith spoke of something more than a brigade—an army corps; and Redmond, following him, instantly accepted the idea. "I used the word 'brigade' in my ignorance—I meant an Irish army corps." There was always present to his mind the hope that in some larger formation the Ulster Division might find itself shoulder to shoulder with other Irish troops.
Yet intending recruits were puzzled, and Lord Meath, writing to Redmond on October 10th that he had formed a Recruiting Committee in Dublin "for the purpose of endeavouring to raise the Irish Army Corps for which you spoke," reported that men came in asking to know where was the Irish Brigade, and refused to join anything else. Lord Meath suggested that Redmond should obtain from Lord Kitchener "an official declaration sanctioning the enlistment of Irishmen in an Irish Brigade, or Irish Army Corps, consisting exclusively of Irish officers and men." He wrote again on the 14th, asking that the Prime Minister himself should be approached, and on the 17th, in reply to some communication from Redmond: "I hope you will insist on some official and unmistakable statement that your request has been granted."