CHAPTER V
INTO THE INTERIOR OF MEXICO
In after-years Lee’s admirers claimed that much of Scott’s glory on the fields of Mexico was due to Lee’s military ability. Scott gave him great praise.
When it was learned that two divisions of Taylor’s army had been ordered to the coast, there was much speculation at the front as to the meaning of the movement. The younger contingent immediately jumped to the conclusion that the war was over, and that Twiggs’s and Patterson’s troops were ordered home. This proved not to be the case, but the army was not much disappointed to learn that another campaign farther south was projected. There was some friction between Taylor and Scott over the withdrawal of the regulars. Some of Scott’s letters to Taylor miscarried, and Scott, pressed for time, was compelled to order the troops he wanted down to the coast without Taylor’s knowledge, the latter at times being far in the interior. When Taylor learned that his best troops had been ordered away without an hour’s previous notice, the old general was naturally very much incensed. He was afterwards somewhat mollified when he received Scott’s delayed correspondence, and saw that his chief had endeavored to reach him in the proper spirit. Scott was the senior, and of course it was for him to order; besides, Scott himself had orders from the President to withdraw the troops. Taylor, however, made, both to Scott and the Secretary of War, a sharp protest against the manner of carrying out the design. Doubtless Taylor felt sore upon learning that the administration intended leaving him upon the defensive, without means to continue his victorious advance. Buena Vista, a few weeks later, probably melted the old fellow’s rancor into sardonic satisfaction.
Once started, the troops rapidly retrograded to the Rio Grande. The weather was fairly cool, and the marches made from twenty to twenty-eight miles per day. One rather warm day, while the troops were on this move, a burnt district was passed over, and the heat and flying smoke and ashes choked the tired men and officers. When the column camped, it was upon a beautiful mountain stream, into which all rushed for a bath. First Lieutenant Sydney Smith, of the Fourth, one of the first to start for the water, while passing through the timber which fringed the stream, was attacked by peccaries, a species of wild pig common in Mexico. They are not very large, but travel in droves, and are very fierce. They treed Smith upon a low-hanging limb barely out of reach of his excited pursuers. The limb was very slender for his weight, and as he swung to the ground, the maddened peccaries reared upon their hind feet and snapped savagely at Smith’s pendent feet and legs. The woods were now full of the officers and men going to the stream, and a party soon relieved Smith from his precarious perch. Smith was a brave fellow. He was the next year wounded at Molino del Rey, and within a week after killed at the attack on Belen Gate.
There was a considerable delay at the mouth of the river, awaiting transports. The point of assemblage of the troops from New Orleans, Mobile, and Taylor’s army was Lobos Island, some three hundred miles south of the Rio Grande’s mouth. The march began January 9, 1847, but it was not until about February 12 that the first of the regulars sailed from the Rio Grande to Lobos Island. Scott had expected the concentration at Lobos to have been completed three weeks earlier. The fault was in the transport service.
The fleet did not leave Lobos Island until March 2. A week later a landing was effected near Vera Cruz, and on the 10th the first guns of the new campaign were heard,—shots from the castle of San Juan de Ulloa at Worth’s troops encamped upon the sand-hills. The investment of the city was speedily completed and siege operations begun. The army heard of Taylor’s remarkable victory at Buena Vista on the 15th of March. It took away their breath to learn that Santa Anna had marched a great army against Taylor after they had left, and had been defeated. It explained why there had been so little opposition to the landing of the American forces. Vera Cruz surrendered on the 29th.
Then the march into the interior of Mexico began, led by Twiggs’s division. The first objective point was Jalapa. Scott’s design was to get upon the mountain plateau before the yellow-fever season approached on the coast. It was deadly in that region. The precision with which Scott’s plans were carried forward, and their uniform success, made a profound impression upon the army. His reputation was very high before he had struck the first blow, but after Vera Cruz no one of that army doubted that he would soon enter the Mexican capital. The army’s morale was high from the outset; it was small, consequently but little bothered with the impedimenta which make the movements of a large army so slow and oftentimes tortuous. It marched rapidly, and Scott sent it square at the mark every time occasion offered.
Nevertheless there was great delay in the advance to the valley of Mexico. Operations were very energetic in the beginning. The battle of Cerro Gordo occurred on the 18th of April, where a complete and technically brilliant victory was won. It was here Santa Anna, already returned from his ill-fated movement against Taylor, undertook to defend the passage of the mountains against Scott’s advance. After careful reconnoissances, the American general turned his position, attacked his flank, and after a short fight broke up his army in utter rout, very nearly cutting off and capturing the whole. As it was, the Americans captured about four thousand prisoners, forty-three cannon, and three thousand five hundred small-arms. All this was done with a force of less than nine thousand Americans against some twelve thousand Mexicans strongly fortified.
This extraordinary victory opened the road to the valley. Thus within twenty days Scott had effected a landing, captured Vera Cruz, signally defeated the enemy in pitched battle, and taken the road into the heart of Mexico. Jalapa was entered on the 20th. At Jalapa seven regiments of volunteers were discharged, and the American force was too greatly reduced to attack the capital. The enforcements promised did not arrive. The advance, however, was pushed on to Puebla, a city then of some seventy thousand inhabitants, which was occupied by Worth on the 15th of May; Lieutenant Longstreet was with the division occupying Puebla. Here there was a long wait of weeks for the required forces to attack the capital, now less than three marches away. From Jalapa Scott set out for the front on May 23, arriving at Puebla on the 28th. Many of the higher officers rode out to meet and give the General a proper reception, and he entered the city in considerable state. “El Generalissimo! El Generalissimo!” was shouted by the citizens as the general-in-chief rode through the streets to his head-quarters. The army welcomed him with enthusiasm.
It was at the siege of Vera Cruz and the operations at Cerro Gordo that the engineer officers, R. E. Lee, G. B. McClellan, I. I. Stevens, G. T. Beauregard, and others, began to attract the notice of the line. Taylor had made little use of engineers in northern Mexico. He largely depended upon his own practised military eye to determine positions, either for the offensive or defensive. Scott’s methods were entirely different. He depended more upon reconnoissances led by his staff engineers, and their reports of situations, approaches, etc. He saw largely through the eyes of these officers, and his fine strategy was based on their information. Hence under Scott the engineer officers soon began to fill a large space in the eyes of the army. They became familiar figures.
Longstreet’s personal acquaintanceship with Lee began in this campaign. He was graduated from the Academy, No. 2 of the class of 1829, nine years before Longstreet entered it. Lee was already a captain of engineers when Longstreet entered as a cadet in 1838. He was past forty when the American forces landed before Vera Cruz. So in years he was much older, as in rank and prestige he was away above the line subalterns of that campaign, many of whom subsequently served under him and against him in 1861–65. He evinced great admiration, even reverence, for Scott’s generalship. In after-years his admirers claimed that much of Scott’s glory was due to Lee’s military ability. Scott gave him great praise. But while Lee was much respected in the army, it is due to say that nobody then ascribed the victories of American arms to him. Besides which, Colonel Joseph G. Totten was Scott’s chief-engineer, and Lee had another superior present in the person of Major J. L. Smith. The army thought General Scott entitled to the full credit of leadership in the campaign of 1847.
About August 14 sufficient reinforcements had arrived to warrant another forward movement. Scott had now about ten thousand men, with more coming on from the coast. His army was composed of four divisions, commanded by Generals Twiggs, Worth, Pillow, and Quitman, the two latter volunteer major-generals. The army began its final advance on the 8th of August, 1847. It had been idle nearly three months, awaiting the action of the government. It was General Longstreet’s opinion that with five thousand more men Scott could have followed Santa Anna straight into Mexico from Cerro Gordo. Owing to dilatoriness in raising troops at home, his active force at Puebla was at one time reduced to five thousand men. The three months’ halt gave the demoralized enemy time to recover courage and recruit their numbers.
The American advance from Puebla to the valley of Mexico was over the Rio Frio Mountain. The pass is over eleven thousand feet above the ocean. It was easily susceptible of successful defence, but the experience of the Mexicans at Cerro Gordo probably led their generals to conclude that Scott’s strategy was irresistible in a mountain region. At any rate there was no resistance, and after a toilsome climb of three days in the mountains, the Americans debouched into the beautiful valley without firing a shot.
This valley is one of the most singular of natural features. It is simply a basin in the mountains without any visible outlet. In seasons of heavy rainfall and snowfall on the stupendous mountains which surround it, the small lakes in this basin overflow, and sometimes inundate the capital itself. It is only in recent years that a channel, or tunnel, has been cut to drain off the superfluous water in time of need. At some time in the past the basin was probably a lake. There must have been some unknown subterranean outlet which originally drained it down and afterwards prevented it refilling. Before the artificial drain was made, however, there were indubitable signs that the lakes were much smaller than in the beginning of the sixteenth century when Cortés conquered the Aztec capital. The bed of this valley is seven thousand feet above the sea level. There are five shallow lakes in the basin. The capital is located on the west side of Lake Tezcuco. It contained about two hundred thousand people in 1847.
The army entered the valley from the east, at first aiming to pass between Lakes Chalco and Tezcuco, but the fortified hill of El Penyon and other obstructions made that approach very difficult, if not impossible, and after the engineers had examined the ground, Scott concluded to pass around to the southward of Lake Chalco and Xochimilco. The movement was inaugurated on the 15th of August, four days after entering the valley. On the 17th, the border of Lake Xochimilco was skirted, and that night Worth bivouacked in San Augustin, the Tlalpan of Cortés, on the road approaching the capital from the south and west of the lakes. It became for the time the depot and base of the army. These preliminary movements consumed a week’s time.
CHAPTER VI
FROM CONTRERAS TO CHAPULTEPEC
While rushing up the heights of Chapultepec with the regimental flag in his hands, Longstreet was severely wounded by a musket-ball through the thigh. After Longstreet fell, George E. Pickett carried the old Eighth’s flag to the works on the hill and to the top of the castle.
On the 18th the brilliant action of Contreras was fought. Here Scott outmanœuvred the enemy completely, employing again the Cerro Gordo tactics, and striking him in flank and rear. The routed Mexicans fled back to the fortified lines about Churubusco. Many prisoners were captured at Contreras. The attack was pressed against the position of Churubusco on the 19th and 20th, resulting in the severest battle of the war, except perhaps Buena Vista. Longstreet’s regiment, the Eighth Infantry, of which he was adjutant, here distinguished itself, aiding in the capture of many prisoners and some guns. At one crucial point Longstreet had the proud honor to carry forward the regimental colors mentioned in Worth’s despatches. After the surrender some of the prisoners attempted to escape by a rush, and many of them did get away. Others were shot down and some were recaptured. A company of Americans who had deserted the year before from Taylor’s army and joined the Mexicans were here captured in a body. Their resistance had caused severe loss to the American army. They were tried for desertion, found guilty and a score or so of them shot to death.
Scott won Churubusco with less than nine thousand men. The routed enemy fled into the city and to the fortified hill of Chapultepec, and were followed pell mell by the American cavalry. It was in this charge that Phil Kearny lost his arm. He was afterwards killed at Chantilly, in Pope’s campaign of 1862, a Union major-general. The Americans could certainly have entered the city that day on the heels of the flying foe, but Scott thought it wisest to hold back and not disperse the Mexican government, to give the American peace commissioner, Mr. Trist, an opportunity to propose terms. An armistice followed, but the Mexican government declined the basis of peace proposed.
The Americans were in possession of the whole country practically; at least there was nothing left to successfully oppose their occupation of its territory to the farthest limits. Yet after these victories, they proposed to take only Texas, New Mexico, and California, and to pay for them a large sum of money. Texas was counted our own before the war began. The terms of our government were so liberal that the Mexicans probably suspected that there was alarm for the result of future operations. Perhaps they judged the terms would be no worse after another trial of arms. And they were not.
Molino del Rey and Chapultepec followed on September 8 and 13 respectively. At the first affair the Americans lost seven hundred and eighty-seven men in the two hours of severe fighting, but won a complete victory, as usual. The fight was made by Worth’s division, and Longstreet’s regiment was engaged, of course. Thus far he had got through without a scratch.
Scott’s army, at the outset not over-large for the contract he had undertaken, was now very much reduced, but its morale was still fine. It was a critical question to determine the point of attack on the city. On the 11th there was a council of nearly all the generals and engineer officers at Piedad. Major Smith, Captain Lee, and Lieutenants Tower and Stevens, of the engineers, reported in favor of attacking the San Antonio or southern gate. Generals Quitman, Shields, Pierce, and Cadwalader concurred. General Scott, on the contrary, favored the Chapultepec route, and General Twiggs supported the general-in-chief. Alone of the engineers, Lieutenant Beauregard favored the Chapultepec route. After hearing Beauregard’s reasons, General Pierce changed his opinion. At the conclusion of the conference General Scott said, “We will attack Chapultepec and then the western gate.”
“The Hill of the Grasshopper,” Chapultepec, is an isolated mound rising one hundred and fifty to two hundred feet above the valley. Nearly precipitous in some parts, it slopes off gradually to the westward. Heavy batteries frowned from its salient positions, sweeping the approaches from all directions. To the southward the ground was marshy. The position was regarded by both belligerents as the key to the capital.
The American batteries opened fire upon Chapultepec on the 12th, causing great destruction and killing and wounding many of its defenders. The Mexican leader, Santa Anna, a very brave fellow with only one leg, was under this heavy fire for a time, taking observations of its effect. On the 13th this fire was resumed, followed by an assault of infantry. The volunteers of Quitman and Pillow, led by picked storming parties, made the assault on two fronts. The hill was carried with a rush after Scott gave the signal of attack. Pillow calling for reinforcements, Longstreet’s brigade was ordered forward by General Worth, and he went into the enemy’s works on the hill with the others.
Longstreet did not quite reach the works, for while rushing up the hill with the regimental flag in his hands he was severely wounded by a musket-ball through the thigh. The castle, all the enemy’s guns, and many prisoners were captured. General Scott rode to the summit soon after and surveyed the work of his gallant army. It was well done. General Worth chased the fleeing enemy to the city’s gates. After Longstreet fell George E. Pickett carried the flag to the works on the hill, and to the top of the castle. The old Eighth’s flag was hoisted from the staff which but a month before flaunted the Mexican banner.
This was the last action in the valley. There was some fighting at the gates, and desultory firing from the houses as the American troops pushed in, but the city fell without much loss after Chapultepec. The Mexicans evacuated the capital that night, and General Scott entered the next day. The Mexican War was practically over. In a few months a treaty was made giving the United States about what was demanded by Mr. Trist after Churubusco in August, the United States salving up Mexico’s wounded pride with fifteen million dollars.
CHAPTER VII
LONGSTREET’S HONEYMOON
After reaching home from Mexico, Longstreet soon regained his strength. He then wrote to Colonel John Garland, of Virginia, his old brigade commander, asking for his youngest daughter. Colonel Garland promptly replied, “Yes, with all my heart.”
With several wounded comrades Longstreet was assigned quarters with the Escandons, a kind-hearted, refined Mexican family. They could not conceal their deep chagrin at the defeat of their army, and were doubtless mortified by the enforced presence of the wounded Americans. Nevertheless they insisted that those officers confined to their beds should be supplied from their own table. Delicacies without stint were sent. The days of confinement were greatly brightened by their delicate attentions. On the 1st of December the accomplished surgeons, Satterlee and DeLeon, thought that Longstreet was strong enough to travel, and announced that he was to be ordered out of the country on sick-leave.
With others he left Mexico on December 9. A few days later he sailed from Vera Cruz with a large number of sick and wounded, among whom was Brigadier-General Pierce, who was very popular in the army. After reaching home Longstreet soon regained his strength. He then wrote to Colonel John Garland, of Virginia, his late brigade commander, asking for his youngest daughter. Colonel Garland promptly replied, “Yes, with all my heart.” He had won fame in Mexico and returned home on leave a month before Longstreet was well enough to travel, and was then with his family. The young lady and her soldier sweetheart already had a pretty good understanding on the subject, and her answer was equally flattering. On the 8th of March, 1848, the marriage occurred at Lynchburg. After a brief honeymoon orders were received from the War Department detailing Longstreet for recruiting service, with station at Poughkeepsie, New York. Before autumn of that year nearly all the troops in Mexico were withdrawn, and the Eighth, Longstreet’s old regiment, was ordered to Jefferson Barracks, St. Louis, where he had been stationed before the war, then a brevet second lieutenant in the Fourth.
After fifty years General Longstreet found that many of the physical details of the battle terrain in the valley of Mexico differed quite materially from the memory conveyed by his younger eyes in the heat of action. There was no real change in fixed landmarks, but the depressions were not so deep, nor the impregnable hills the Americans attacked so high, as they appeared when the Mexicans were defending them with sword, musket, and cannon. In instants of supreme danger it is very difficult for the soldier or subordinate officer to see things exactly as they are on a battle-field. His eye and mind are inevitably and anxiously concentrated on the enemy or the battery that is dealing death and destruction round about.
GREAT BATTLES BEFORE AND AFTER GETTYSBURGG
THE FIRST MANASSAS
The armies that prepared for the first grand conflict of the Civil War were commanded by West Point graduates, both of the Class of 1838,—Beauregard and McDowell. The latter had been assigned to the command of the Federal forces at Washington, south of the Potomac, in the latter part of May, 1861. The former had assumed command of the Confederates at Manassas Junction about the 1st of June. To him, Brigadier-General Longstreet reported for duty.
McDowell marched on the afternoon of the 16th of July at the head of an army of five divisions of infantry, supplemented by nine batteries of the regular service, one of volunteers, besides two guns operating separately, and seven companies of regular cavalry. In his infantry columns were eight companies of regulars and a battalion of marines,—an aggregate of thirty-five thousand men.
Beauregard stood behind Bull Run with seven brigades, including Holmes, who joined on the 19th, twenty-nine guns, and fourteen hundred cavalry,—an aggregate of twenty-one thousand nine hundred men, all volunteers. To this should be added, for the battle of the 21st, reinforcements aggregating eight thousand five hundred men, under General Johnston, making the sum of the aggregate thirty thousand four hundred men.
The line behind Bull Run was the best between Washington and the Rapidan for strategy, tactics, and army supplies.
General Longstreet always believed that by vigorous and concentrated work the Confederates, after the battle of the first Manassas, might have followed McDowell’s fleeing columns into Washington, and held the capital. But this is not a part of my story.
On the eve of the battle the Confederates had occasional glimpses behind the lines about Washington, through parties who managed to evade the eyes of guards and sentinels, which told of McDowell’s work since May, and heard on the 10th of July that he was ready to march. Most of the Confederates knew him and of his attainments, as well as those of Beauregard, to the credit of the latter, and on that point they were satisfied. But the backing of an organized government, and an army led by the foremost American war-chief,—that consummate strategist, tactician, and organizer, General Scott,—together with the splendid equipment of the field batteries and the presence of the force of regulars of infantry, gave serious apprehension.
A gentleman who was a boy in Washington during the Civil War, said not long ago, in speaking of the first Manassas, that he would never forget the impression made upon his youthful mind by McDowell’s army in moving towards Manassas Junction. Their arms glistened in the sunshine; the new uniforms added to the splendid bearing of the ranks; the horses were garlanded with flowers; the silken folds of regimental flags, lifted caressingly by the breezes of mid-summer, made an ocean of color above the noble columns. It was an inspiring sight; every flag in the capital was a beckoning call to arms in the nation’s defence. McDowell’s army seemed setting out for some festal occasion, and gayly moved to the sound of music and song. But oh, what a different sight after Manassas, when his weary and routed columns straggled back to Washington, before the victorious Confederates. Their gala day had been of short duration.
On the 16th of July the Confederates learned that the advance of McDowell’s army was under definite orders for next day. Longstreet’s brigade was at once ordered into position at Blackburn’s Ford, and all others were ordered on the alert.
At eight o’clock A.M. on the 18th McDowell’s army concentrated about Centerville, his immediate objective being Manassas Junction. His orders to General Tyler, commanding the advance division, were to look well to the roads on the direct route to Manassas Junction and via the Stone Bridge, to impress an advance upon the former, but to have care not to bring on a general engagement.
Under the instructions, as General Tyler construed them, he followed the Confederates to the heights of Centerville, overlooking the valley of Bull Run, with a squadron of cavalry and two companies of infantry. From the heights to the Run, a mile away, the field was open, and partially disclosed the Confederate position on his right. On the left the view was limited by a sparse growth of spreading pines.
The enemy was far beyond the range of Confederate guns, his position commanding as well as his metal, so Longstreet ordered the guns withdrawn to a place of safety, till a fair opportunity was offered them. The guns were limbered and off before a shot reached them. Artillery practice of thirty minutes was followed by an advance of infantry. The march was quite up to the bluff overlooking the ford, when both sides opened fire.
The first pouring-down volleys were most startling to the new troops. Part of Longstreet’s line broke and started at a run. To stop the alarm he rode with sabre in hand for the leading files, determined to give them all that was in the sword and his horse’s heels, or stop the break. They seemed to see as much danger in their rear as in front, and soon turned and marched back to their places, to the evident surprise of the enemy. Heavy firing was renewed in ten or fifteen minutes, when the Federals retired. After about twenty minutes a second advance was made to the top of the bluff, when another rousing fusilade followed, and continued about as long as the first, with like result. Longstreet reinforced the front line with part of his reserve, and, thinking to follow up his next success, called for one of the regiments of the reserve brigade.
The combat lasted about an hour, when the Federals withdrew to their ground about Centerville, to the delight of the Confederates, who felt themselves christened veterans; their artillery being particularly proud of the combat against the famed batteries of the United States regulars.
General McDowell’s order for the battle on the 21st of July was issued on the afternoon of the 20th.
Beauregard’s order for battle, approved by General Johnston, was issued at five A.M. on the 21st.
The orders for marching were only preliminary, coupled with the condition that the troops were to be held ready to move, but to wait for special order for action. The brigade at Blackburn’s Ford had been reinforced by the Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiments, under Lieutenant Jones and Colonel Kemper. Longstreet crossed the Run under the five o’clock order, adjusted the regiments to position for favorable action, and gave instructions for their movements on the opening of the battle.
This first clash of arms tested the fighting qualities of the Confederates; but the soil was Virginia, and for them it was to be death or victory.
The close of the battle of the 21st found the Federals beaten and fleeing towards the shelter of their capital. They had fought stubbornly. McDowell made a gallant effort to recover his lost power, riding with his troops and urging them to brave effort. Although his renewed efforts were heroic, his men seemed to have given confidence over to despair when fight was abandoned and flight ensued. Over the contested field of the first battle of the war, Longstreet had borne the victorious banners of the South.
WILLIAMSBURG
“General Longstreet’s clear head and brave heart left no apology for interference at Williamsburg.”—Joseph E. Johnston.
This battle was fairly fought and dearly won by the Confederacy, May 5, 1862. General Joseph E. Johnston was chief in command and General Longstreet had the active direction of the battle.
In his official report upon the battle, General Johnston said,—
“The action gradually increased in magnitude until about three o’clock, when General Longstreet, commanding the rear, requested that a part of Major-General Hill’s troops might be sent to his aid. Upon this I rode upon the field, but found myself compelled to be a spectator, for General Longstreet’s clear head and brave heart left no apology for interference.”
The battle was fought by Sickles’s Federal Third Corps, that heroically contested every inch of the ground.
It was at the close of the battle that General Hancock distinguished himself by holding his position in and about the forts with five regiments and two batteries against the assault of the Fifth North Carolina and Twenty-fourth Virginia Regiments, and it was on this field that he won the title of “The Superb,” given to him by McClellan in his report.
The object of the battle on the part of the Confederates was to gain time to haul their trains to places of safety. The effect besides was to call two of the Federal divisions from their flanking move to support the battle, thereby greatly crippling their expedition.
General McClellan was at Yorktown during most of the day to see several of the divisions of his army aboard the transports for his proposed flanking and rear move up York River. Upon receiving advice that the Williamsburg engagement was serious and unsatisfactory, he hastened to the battle with the divisions of Sedgwick and Richardson, which he had expected to send up the river.
There were about nine thousand Confederates and twelve thousand Union troops engaged. The Confederate casualties were 1565; the Federal casualties, 2288. Johnston had anticipated McClellan’s move up the York River, and considered it very important to cripple or break it up. Therein he used the divisions of Longstreet, Magruder, D. R. Jones, McLaws, G. W. Smith, and D. H. Hill.
There was a tremendous downpour of rain the night before the battle, flooding thoroughfares, by-ways, woodlands, and fields so that many of the Confederate trains were unable next day to move out of the bogs that were developed during the night.
General Hooker’s division of the Third Corps, on the Federal side, came to the open on the Hampton road, and engaged by regiments,—the First Massachusetts on the left, the Second New Hampshire on the right. After the advance of his infantry in the slashes, General Hooker, with the Eleventh Massachusetts and Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania, cleared the way for communication with the troops on the Yorktown road and ordered Webber’s six-gun battery into action. As it burst from the woods through which it had come, the Confederate infantry and every gun in reach opened upon it a fire so destructive that it was unmanned before it came into practice. New Federal troops immediately came to the rescue, and the guns reopened fire. Osborn’s and Bramhall’s batteries joined in, and the two poured an unceasing fire into the Confederate troops about the fort and redoubts. The Fifth New Jersey Regiment was added to the battery guard, and the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth were deployed on the left in the woodland. The brigades of R. H. Anderson, Wilcox, Pryor, A. P. Hill, and Pickett were taking care of the Confederate side.
General Longstreet, hearing the swelling noise of battle, rode to the front and ordered Colston’s brigade and the batteries of Deering and Stribling to follow, as well as Stuart’s horse artillery under Pelham.
It soon became evident that the fight was for the day. D. H. Hill was asked to return with the balance of his division. Hooker was bracing the fight on his left. He directed Emory to reconnoitre on his extreme left. Grover was called to reinforce the fighting in the edge of the woods. Several New York regiments came into the action, but the Confederates nevertheless continued to gain ground until they got short of ammunition. While holding their line, some of the regiments retired a little to fill their cartridge-boxes from those of the fallen enemy and their fallen comrades. This move was misconstrued into an order to withdraw, and the Confederate line fell back, but the mistake was soon discovered and the lost ground regained. The Eleventh Massachusetts, Twenty-sixth Pennsylvania, and Second New Hampshire came into the action. On the Confederate side, Colston’s brigade, the Florida regiment, and the Mississippi battalion came to the rescue, and General Anderson, who was in immediate charge, grouped his forces, made a concentrated move upon the Federal batteries, cleared them of the gunners, and captured four of Webber’s guns and forty horses. General Stuart rode up about this time, decided that the Federals were in retreat, and insisted upon a charge and pursuit. He was, however, convinced that Federal reinforcements were coming up and that the break was only of their front line. About three o’clock Kearny’s division came to the Federal aid.
Before the reinforcements arrived for Hooker’s relief, Anderson had established his advanced line of skirmishers so as to cover with their fire Webber’s guns that were abandoned. The Federal reinforcing column drove back his advance lines; then he reinforced and recovered his ground. Then he met General Peck, the leader of the last reinforcing brigade, who put in his last regiment, the Ninety-eighth Pennsylvania; but the night was approaching, both armies were exhausted, and little further aggressive work was done.
FRAYSER’S FARM
Stonewall Jackson was in the Shenandoah Valley and the rest of the Confederate troops were east and north of Richmond. In front General McClellan’s army was encamped, a hundred thousand strong, about the Chickahominy River preparing for a regular siege of the Confederate capital. His army was unassailable from the front, and he had a small force at Mechanicsville and a much larger force farther back at Beaver Dam Creek.
A Confederate conference was called. Longstreet suggested that Jackson be called down from the Valley to the rear of the Federal right, in order to turn the position behind Beaver Dam, and that the rest of the Confederate forces who were to engage in the attack cross the Chickahominy and get ready for action. General Lee then sent General J. E. B. Stuart on his famous ride around McClellan. He made a favorable report of the situation. Upon further conference, the 26th was selected as the day for moving upon the Federal position at Beaver Dam. There was some spirited fighting between the two armies, but the advance of Jackson, which had been some time delayed, made the Federals abandon their position at Beaver Dam. They were closely followed, and were again encountered at Gaines Mill, where battle followed.
Longstreet came up with reserve forces, and was preparing to support Hill, when he was ordered by General Lee to make a demonstration against the Federal left. He threw in three brigades, and for a time the battle raged with great fierceness. General Jackson could not reach the point of attack, and General Lee ordered Longstreet to throw in all the force he could. The position in front of him was very strong. An open field led to a difficult ravine beyond Powhite Creek. From there the ground made a steep ascent, and was covered with trees, slashed timber, and hastily made rifle-trenches. General Whiting came up with two brigades of Jackson’s men. Longstreet’s column of attack then was the brigades of R. H. Anderson and Pickett and the divisions of Law, Hood, and Whiting. They attacked and defeated the Federals on their left and captured many thousand stands of arms, fifty-two pieces of artillery, a large quantity of supplies, and many prisoners, among them General Reynolds, who afterwards fell at Gettysburg.
On the 29th General Lee ascertained that McClellan was marching towards the James, and decided to intercept his forces in the neighborhood of Charles City Cross-Roads. Longstreet was to march to a point below Frayser’s Farm with General A. P. Hill. Holmes was to take up position below on the New Market road; Jackson was to pursue the Federal rear; Huger to attend to the Federal right flank. Thus the Federal rear was to be enveloped and a part of McClellan’s army destroyed. Longstreet found himself in due time in front of General McCall with a division of ten thousand Federals near Frayser’s Farm. Finally artillery firing was heard, which was taken for the expected signal for the beginning of battle, and Longstreet’s batteries replied as the signal that he was ready. While the order was going around to the batteries, President Davis and General Lee, with their staff and followers, were with Longstreet in a little open field near the firing lines, but not in sight of the Federals.
The Federal batteries opened up spitefully. They did not know of the distinguished Confederates near by, yet a battery had by chance their exact range and distance, and poured a terrific fire in their midst. The second or third shell killed two or three horses and wounded several men. The little party speedily retired to safer quarters. Longstreet sent Colonel Micah Jenkins to silence the Federal battery with his long-range rifles. He charged the battery, and that brought on a general fight between Longstreet’s division and the troops in front. The Federal lines were broken and a number of batteries taken. At points during the day McCall several times regained his lost position. He was finally pushed back. At length McCall’s division was driven off and fresh troops came to the Federal relief. Ten thousand men of A. P. Hill’s division, held in reserve, were now brought into action.
About dark General McCall, while looking up a fragment of his division, ran into Longstreet’s arms and was taken prisoner. General Lee was there at the time. Longstreet had served with McCall in the old Fourth Infantry, and offered his hand as McCall dismounted. The Federal general did not regard this as an occasion for renewing old friendships, and he was promptly offered an escort of Longstreet’s staff to take him to Richmond.
MARCH AGAINST POPE AND THE SECOND MANASSAS
Even as early as 1862 the Union army had been using balloons to examine the position of the Confederates, and even that early, the scanty resources of the Confederates made the use of balloons a luxury that could not be afforded. While gazing enviously upon the handsome balloons of the Federals floating serenely at a distance that their guns could not reach, a Confederate genius suggested that all the silk dresses in the Confederacy be got together and made into balloons. This was done, and soon a great patch-work ship of many and varied hues was ready for use. There was no gas except in Richmond, and so the silk-dress balloon had to be inflated there, tied to an engine, and carried to where it was to be sent up. One day it was on a steamer down the James River, when the tide went out and left the vessel and balloon on a sand-bar. The Federals gathered it in, and with it the last silk dress in the Confederacy. General Longstreet used to say, laughingly, that this was the meanest trick of the war.
When General Pope came down into Virginia as Federal commander-in-chief, with the double purpose of drawing McClellan away from Westover and checking the advance of the new enemy approaching from Washington, General Lee sent Stonewall Jackson to Gordonsville and ordered General Longstreet to remain near Richmond to engage McClellan if he should attempt an advance on that city. On the 9th of August, 1862, Jackson encountered the Federals near Cedar Mountain and repulsed them at what is known as the battle of Cedar Run. About five o’clock in the afternoon of this fight the Federals, by a well-executed move, were pressing the Confederates back, when the opportune approach of two brigades converted seeming defeat into victory. The Federals were more numerous than the Confederates, and Jackson deemed it unwise to follow in pursuit, so the Confederates retired behind the Rapidan to await the arrival of General Lee with other forces.
General Lee then began preparations for a vigorous campaign against General Pope. On the 13th of August Longstreet’s corps was ordered to Gordonsville, and General Lee accompanied it there. General Jackson’s troops were near by. The Rapidan River was to the north. Farther on at Culpeper Court-House was the army of Pope, and the Rappahannock River was beyond them. Clark’s Mountain, rising several hundred feet above the surrounding hills, was a little in advance of Longstreet’s position. The Federal situation was observed from the summit of this mountain.
The flags of Pope’s army were in full view above the tops of the trees around Culpeper Court-House. General Lee was very anxious to give battle as soon as possible, but operations were in some way delayed until General Pope captured a despatch from Lee to Stewart containing information of the contemplated advance. Pope then withdrew to a stronger position behind the Rappahannock River. Longstreet approached the Rappahannock at Kelly’s Ford, and Jackson approached higher up at Beverly Ford, near the Orange and Alexandria bridge. They found Pope in an almost unassailable position, with heavy reinforcements summoned to his aid.
The Confederate idea was to force a passage and make the attack before reinforcements could reach Pope. Some sharp marching to this end was done by Longstreet and Jackson. On the 23d Longstreet had a spirited artillery combat at Beverly Ford with a Federal force. The Federals had the superior position, the better guns; the Confederates had more guns, and fought with accustomed persistence. Before night the Federals withdrew. Incidentally, they set fire to a number of farm-houses in the locality. Henry W. Grady, afterwards a distinguished Georgian, who was a small boy during the war, frequently said that one of the worst things about the Union forces was the carelessness with which they handled fire.
Pope was meanwhile on the alert, and Lee found it impracticable to attack him in his stronghold behind the Rappahannock. Lee then decided to change his plan of operations by sending Jackson off on a long march to the rear of the Federal army while keeping Longstreet with thirty thousand men in front to receive any attack that might be made. Jackson crossed the Rappahannock at Hinson’s Hill, four miles above Waterloo Bridge, and that night encamped at Salem. The next day he passed through Thoroughfare Gap, moved on by Gainesville, and when the sun next set he was in the rear of Pope’s army and between it and Washington. The sudden appearance of his army gave much terror to the Federals in the vicinity; when he arrived at Bristoe Station just before night the Federal guard at that point sought safer quarters, and two trains of cars coming from towards Warrenton were captured. Jackson sent a force forward seven miles and captured Manassas Junction. He left a force at Bristoe Station and proceeded himself to the Junction. During the afternoon the Federals attacked the Confederates at Bristoe Station in such force as to make it appear that Pope had discovered the situation and was moving upon Jackson with his entire army. The Confederates then hastened away from Bristoe Station and the Federals halted there. Jackson’s forces then moved over to a position north of the turnpike leading from Warrenton to Alexandria, and there awaited results.
On the evening of the 28th King’s division attacked Jackson, but was repulsed. That same evening Longstreet arrived at Thoroughfare Gap. During the time of Jackson’s march he had been engaging Pope’s army at different points along the Rappahannock, to impress them with the idea that he was attempting to force a passage in front and with the hope of preventing his discovery of Jackson’s movement. Pope was not deceived, however, but turned his army to meet Jackson’s daring and unexpected move. Longstreet decided to follow at once. To force a passage of the river, much swollen by recent rains, seemed impossible, and so he took the route by which Jackson had gone. Finding that Thoroughfare Gap was unoccupied, he went into bivouac on the west side of the mountain and sent a brigade under Anderson to occupy the pass.
As the Confederates approached from one side, Ricketts’s division of Federals approached from the other and took possession of the east side. Thoroughfare Gap is a rough pass in the Bull Run Mountains, in some places not more than a hundred yards wide. A swift stream rushes through it, and the mountains rise on both sides several hundred feet above. On the north the face of the Gap is almost perpendicular; the south face is less precipitous, but is covered with tangled mountain ivy and projecting boulders; the position, occupied by a small force, was unassailable. The interposition of Ricketts’s division at this mountain pass showed a disposition to hold Longstreet back while overwhelming Jackson. This necessitated prompt and vigorous measures by Longstreet. Three miles north was Hopewell Gap, and it was necessary to get possession of this in advance of the Federals to provide for a flank movement while forcing the way by foot-paths over the mountain heights of Thoroughfare Gap. During the night Longstreet sent Wilcox with three brigades to Hopewell Gap, while he sent Hood and his forces by a trail over the mountain at Thoroughfare.
To the great delight of the Confederates, in the morning it was discovered that Ricketts had given up the east side of the Gap and was going towards Manassas Junction. Longstreet’s corps then went along unimpeded. Hearing the artillery combat around Gainesville, they quickened their steps. As the fire became more spirited their movements became more rapid. Passing through Gainesville, they filed to the left down the turnpike, and soon came in sight of the Federal troops held at bay by Jackson. They were on the left and rear of the Federals; the artillery was ordered up for action, but the advance was discovered, and the Federals withdrew from attack and retired behind Groveton on defensive ground. The battalion of Washington Artillery was thrown forward to a favorable position on Jackson’s right, and Longstreet’s general line was deployed so as to extend it to the right some distance beyond the Manassas Gap Railroad.
The two great armies were now face to face, both in good positions, each anxious to find a point for an entering wedge into the stronghold of the adversary. What troubled the Confederates was the unknown number of Federals at Manassas Junction. Each side watched the movements of the other until the day was far spent. Orders were given for a Confederate advance under the cover of night until the main position of the enemy could be more carefully examined by the earliest light of the next day. It so happened that a similar order was issued at the same time by the Federals, and the result was a spirited engagement, which was a surprise to both sides. Longstreet’s corps was, however, successful, so far, at least, as to capture a piece of artillery and make reconnoissance before midnight. The next day Longstreet did not deem an attack wise, and the Confederate forces were ordered back to their original positions. Then each side was apprehensive that the other was going to get away.
Pope telegraphed to Washington that Longstreet was in full retreat and he was preparing to follow; while Longstreet, thinking Pope was trying to escape, was arranging to move to the left across Bull Run, so as to get over on the Little River pike and between Pope and Washington. Just before nine o’clock that day (the 30th) Pope’s artillery began to play a little, and some of his infantry was seen in motion. Longstreet construed this as a display to cover his movements to the rear. Later a large division of Pope’s army began an attack on the left along the whole of Jackson’s line. Pope evidently supposed that Longstreet was gone, and intended to crush Jackson with a terrific onslaught. Longstreet was meanwhile looking for a place to get in. Riding along the front of his line, he could plainly see the Federals as they rushed in heavy masses against Jackson’s obstinate ranks. It was a splendidly organized attack.