Life and Times of Her Majesty Caroline Matilda, Vol. 2 (of 3) / Queen of Denmark and Norway, and Sister of H. M. George III. of England

On the recall of Counts Brandt and Rantzau, no one, as I have stated, of those who took part in it thought of the changes that afterwards took place, or that any of the ministers would be removed. As concerns myself, however, I do not deny that I, without feeling any personal aversion or repugnance to any one of the ministers, was rather disposed against, than in favour of, the administration. Long before I came to court I had been filled with thoughts against it, and I had never found a reason to doubt the trustworthiness, integrity, patriotic will, and disinterestedness of the persons and reports from which I derived them. I was also confirmed in my opinion by what I heard in this respect in Copenhagen, and partly remarked. The following points were the chief ones alleged against the administration of that day.[94]

1. It had grown into a principle, through habit, to keep the king aloof from affairs, and try to deprive him of all inclination for them, by increasing his governmental labours by superfluous mechanical tasks, and by not bringing matters forward simply and distinctly. Every matter of importance was wrapped up in long-winded phrases and declamations, which led the king into unnecessary details; he was rarely left the choice between two opinions, but was led to decide for the one which had been previously adopted by the ministers; and lastly, his attention was drawn to trivial matters, and for this reason more important ones produced less impression upon him.

2. The king had so little personal authority, that he had no will of his own, even in the poorest trifles, and was even ruled in his domestic life. Hence those persons were always ruined who attached themselves to him, and possessed his taste, inclination, and confidence; while, on the other hand, others held their ground for whom he entertained exactly opposite feelings.

3. Favour and intrigue were mixed up in everything. The most important dignities and offices were given to courtiers whose sole merit was having been pages, and the other appointments were bestowed on creatures and lackeys of personages and families who supported each other in power.

4. A perfect anarchy prevailed, as no one would, or dared, to use his authority, for fear of injuring himself. Everybody was striving to acquire influence in other departments beside his own. Subordination was nowhere to be found: everything resolved itself into consultations, giving advice, investigations, modifications, and expedients. The subordinates, instead of carrying out the orders they received, only strove to raise difficulties, objections, and counter-propositions.

5. The finances were ruined—not through the expenses the king incurred (although many of the latter were unnecessary, as, for instance, the colonists, the costly factories, the forced development of the arts, taste, and luxury, far beyond the resources of the country, the disproportionate augmentation of the army, and the support of a commerce which was not adapted to the nature of the country, while its true and natural industry was neglected), but in consequence of the prevalent disorder, the worthless operations, and the manœuvres so often carried on for private objects.

6. The influence of foreign courts and their ministers had been for some time past great and oppressive. As the mainspring in negociations is complaisance, nought but a dependence could result from this, which could not be compensated by any resulting benefit. As a rule, more expense and attention was devoted to this portion of the business of the state than the nature and circumstances of the country required.

7. Lastly, the great and small offices, distinctions, and honorary titles, were too numerous for the size of the state, too oppressive for the country, and, at the same time, valueless. Everybody wished to live and enrich himself at the cost of the king; there was no impulse among the nobility to serve his Majesty with their fortune and strength, and in the other classes no inclination to seek self-support in industry.

I will not decide how far these reproaches are founded, but for my part I was convinced of their truth by everything I afterwards experienced, though without accusing one or the other minister personally of being the cause. In matters of state, success in most cases decides the value of an administration, in the present case it decided against it. When I acquired influence in affairs through the king's confidence, my design merely was to induce his Majesty to examine into them himself, and for this reason I believed it was necessary that the king should have about him other persons holding opinions opposed to those of the then existing ministry. If, afterwards, alterations and resolutions with this object followed more rapidly, this was caused rather by the personal sentiments of the king, and by accidental circumstances, than by any regular resolution or plan—at least, as far as concerned myself. With regard to the king's wishes successive steps were necessary, for his Majesty was more than too willing to undertake such changes. On my joining the king, I found his mind, temper, and inclination full of aversion from the ministry, and this always remained so. If, for my part, I did not try to change his sentiments so far as my conviction admitted, on the other hand, prior to the Holstein progress, I did not strive to imbue the king with any favourable idea of the persons belonging to the opposite party. It is well known that his Majesty, from the beginning of his reign, desired changes in the ministry. In addition to the above-mentioned dislikes, which were more or less impressed on the king's mind, his Majesty had others which he felt personally, as—1. The ministry attracted to themselves the prestige of the government, and nothing was left him but the title and burden of representation. 2. Affairs in Denmark were so confused and damaged, and the want of money was so great, that nothing good or great could be effected. 3. The influence of the foreign ministers was excessive, of which his Majesty had on several occasions obtained personal experience. 4. The Holstein negociation was onerous in the way it was carried on, and it had been employed at various times to divert the king from certain resolutions, when other reasons would probably have been sufficient and better. 5. Nothing could be more embarrassing to the king than to preside at the council twice a week, and I believe the reason for this lay in the fact that his Majesty, from his childhood, had felt a certain respect and sort of fear of it, which, in the course of time, had grown into a habit. As this feeling was not based on his confidence, while his real sentiments and the impressions received contradicted it, such a dislike could be easily aroused. The king would say at times, "When I am of a different opinion from the council, I at once notice a restlessness on all faces; solemn representations ensue, and I am obliged to hold my tongue." 6. The king had been spoken to at times about economy in matters affecting him personally, such as comedies, hunting, &c., and his Majesty believed that such an economy ought to be commenced in other outlays. And 7. The king was excessively displeased with the results of the Algerine expedition.

Such was the disposition of the king on his return from Holstein, and it may be easily supposed that those persons who had his ear did nothing to alter it. Their attention was principally directed to the effects and measures which the presence of Count von Rantzau would produce. Count von Bernstorff had handed in a memorial to the king on this subject at Traventhal. Count von Rantzau answered it, and declared that he would not interfere in the Holstein negociations, or attempt to oppose them; while, on the other hand, the former (Count Bernstorff) would seek to remove disagreeable impressions at the Russian court. Unfortunately, Count von Bernstorff alluded in his speeches, and on other occasions, to the enemies of the Russian alliance. This occasioned his dismissal, and the changes ensuing from it. I cannot remember that any special steps were taken to bring the latter about. With the king, as I have remarked, there were no difficulties to overcome: those persons to whom he listened at that time were prepared for the changes, and agreed in them. Nor can I state how far the remarks of those who were for the measure had an effect on the king's mind, especially with reference to Count von Rantzau. This I know, that at the time I read to his Majesty several letters and memorials about the general position of affairs; that I received considerable encouragement and support in the matter, and employed it in accordance with my convictions; that no one was formally consulted on the subject, and that the king prepared its execution and the arrangements himself in my presence. The king drew up all the measures in his own hand. At times I previously prepared rough drafts on the principal heads of an affair, which his Majesty altered or retained as he thought proper. More frequently, however, his Majesty wrote them out of his own head. The cabinet secretary corrected, and the king read, the document through once again ere it was copied and completed. I sealed the letters in the presence of the king in the cabinet. I rarely showed the rough drafts to any one beforehand, and if it took place, it was to Counts Rantzau and Brandt. People now entertained the best hopes that everything would go on well. The king worked with pleasure, and read everything connected with the affairs of state. In order to keep his Majesty to this, and to arrange the mode of his occupation in accordance with his taste, the following principles were adopted, and I always strove to act in accordance with them so far as it depended on myself:—

1. The king would retain the final decision in affairs.

2. All reports were to be made in writing, and the king's resolutions made known in the same way.

3. The officials would try to render their reports distinct, short, and free from divergences, in order that they might contain the material points alone, so that the different matters in which the king was to decide might be distinctly expressed and explained in the extract.

4. In cases where the king found it necessary to ask the advice of others, his Majesty would either take the opinion of the colleges, or appoint a commission for the purpose, but everything, as far as possible, was to be done by the ordinary departments.

5. The colleges would try, so far as the nature of the matter allowed, to discuss and report affairs in a similar form.

6. As the king did not wish to interfere in the details of carrying out affairs, but expected this to be done by the colleges, the latter were invited to follow the same style in business, to urge their subordinates to do the same, and to make the latter responsible.

7. Everything would be decided upon settled principles.

8. Finally, the business of the departments would be kept distinct, so that each would manage its own affairs for itself, and one department have no influence over the other, save through the king alone. Their number would also be reduced, so that there should be only one department for each branch of business.

As regards the affairs, the king laid down the following general rules:—

1.—The Foreign Department.

(a) The king would seek no further influence at foreign courts than the position of his kingdoms and their commerce required.

(b) He would save all the expense which the ostentation of numerous ministers at foreign courts entailed; and

(c) Tolerate no influence over the internal affairs of his kingdoms or elsewhere.

(d) He would adhere faithfully to the Russian alliance, but did not wish the latter court to found its security on accidental circumstances, but trust to the integrity of his conduct, of which the king had given the empress very evident proofs recently.

(e) His Majesty would not expend more money on the Swedish affair than was stipulated by treaty, and not interfere in the private quarrels in that country.

With regard to the last two points, the king himself read everything that could be urged for and against them, and afterwards decided himself, as his Majesty previously possessed no settled opinion or conviction.

2.—The Finances.

(a) There was to be only one college, which would expedite all the business connected with the department.

(b) Order and economy were the sole means of restoring the finances, to the exclusion of all projects which were not based on those principles.

(c) All the royal resources would flow into the general treasury, and thence be distributed to the other departments, so that the king might more easily survey the state of his revenues.

(d) Efforts would be made to simplify the collection of the taxes for the relief of the subjects.

(e) The usual payments in kind would be converted into pecuniary payments, in order to encourage the industry of the countrymen, and remove the existing abuses.

(f) The expenses of the state would be kept entirely distinct from the private outlay for the king and the royal family.

(g) Those factories which, owing to the nature of the country, were not self-supporting, would not be maintained at the expense of the king, and the support of others would merely be reduced to bounties, so that the king might not have any share in them; which was also regulated with reference to commerce.

(h) The crown domains would be farmed out.

(i) At the beginning of each year the budget expenses would be settled, and not exceeded during the year.

(k) The pensions, which were quite disproportionate in comparison with the amount of the king's revenue, would undergo a certain reduction.

If in this branch reforms and reductions have taken place or are intended, it will be easily discovered how greatly the nature of the finances requires such.

3.—Justice.

(a) The king would not decide in any cause until it had been properly tried by the courts of law.

(b) The number of law courts would be reduced, as every man, no matter his rank, must be regarded as a citizen in the sight of the law.

(c) The judges would receive no fees, and the forms of proceeding would be abridged.

4. Concerning the army, I refer to the memorial found among my papers, which alludes to it.

5. As regards the navy, it was arranged:—

(a) That the strength of the fleet was not to be sought in an increase of the number of vessels, but in those existing being kept in a good state and thoroughly equipped.

(b) That the storing up of everything required for a bombardment is correct in principle.

6.—The Court.

(a) Everything superfluous and only belonging to ostentation was to be cut down, and only that retained which served for amusement.

(b) The amusements and parties would be arranged after the taste and opinion of the king and queen, without regard to other considerations.

In addition to these there are many other principles which I repeated to the king, and strove to impress on his mind. I will mention some of them, as they will serve to clear up several points.

1. It is injurious to occasion a great affluence of persons to court through the hope of making their fortunes, for it ruins private individuals, renders the provinces poor, and the royal treasury in the end has to bear the loss.

2. It is better for the nobility to live on their estates if they wish to be idlers, and if they seek government appointments they must pass through the lower stages. Only valid reasons could produce an exception, but not favour or several years' residence at court.

3. The king, in filling up posts, ought to trust to the proposals of the departments, but pay no heed to supplications and recommendations at court.

4. His Majesty would grant no reversions, survivor-ships, exclusive privileges, or other liberties, which encroach on the rights of the subjects; and

5. At least for the first year grant no "characters" and distinctions which were not really connected with the office held.

6. No pensions should be granted except in extraordinary cases, and no alms bestowed at court; but instead of it, the poor should be liberally remembered.

7. Copenhagen could not be made great and prosperous by luxury and an increase of the number of consumers to the detriment of the provinces, but by real industry and promotion of the foreign trade. Rich people must be attracted to the capital by the agreeable mode of life there.

8. Morals cannot be improved by police laws, and such are opposed to the liberty of men, as their moral actions, in so far as they have no immediate influence on the peace and security of society, should be left to education and the lessons and exhortations of the clergy; for the secret vices produced by coercion are frequently the worst, and create hypocrites.

These principles can be employed in forming an opinion how far it was useful or injurious to the king's affairs that his Majesty granted me his confidence. I readily acknowledge that after the time when the council was abolished affairs were not conducted in the proper form. But this was the very thing which some of those who gave advice desired; for it was hoped thus to give the king a prestige if a great many orders were issued from the cabinet, and cabinet orders passed without consulting the colleges. Others, on the contrary (Lieutenant General von Gähler,) were of an opposite opinion, and disapproved of it. The former advisers pleased the king; but I found that the latter were in the right, and hence I tried to draw his Majesty's attention more especially to the regulation of the departments. Equally little could I give my approval to the proposition (especially of Count Rantzau) that the affairs prepared by the heads of departments should be forwarded to the cabinet, and issued thence without making the author's name known. On this head countless insinuations, memoirs, and propositions, were sent in. I tried, as far as I could, to prevent this mode of conducting business, and only those orders emanated from the cabinet which concerned the form of the colleges, or established great general rules. In some cases it was also done in order to please the king's taste, and, as I willingly acknowledge, to give a prestige to the cabinet. Of such a nature were the instructions of Baron von Gyldencrone and Falckenskjold's mission, of which no one knew anything but the cabinet before they were determined on, except that I spoke with the latter officer generally about the affair. If afterwards so many decrees were issued from the cabinet, this had its origin in the ordinary course of business, and the representations of the colleges, or they concerned matters about which a report was requested in the cabinet. It was my wish to regulate the cabinet business after a certain form and rule, and to reduce it. Hence I calculated that no one ought to have any influence over it, except in so far as his office gave him a right, and that this should be effected by the representation of his department, or a direct report to the king. I understood to what confusion it would give rise if I listened to all the insinuations and suggestions laid before the king, and carried them out through the cabinet. I was therefore induced to take great care not to speak with any one about affairs unconnected with his department, and I directed my attention solely to information that reached the cabinet through ordinary channels. This conduct injured me personally, though it might be advantageous to the affairs, for it drew on me a suspicion that I was distrustful and reserved, and unwilling to accept any good advice. By degrees several persons were suspected of exerting an influence over me, but I can declare that no one ever possessed such an ascendancy, and that the only person to whom I gave unlimited confidence was Count Brandt. Still, I can assert that I said but little, even to Count Brandt, about the affairs, and the rest shared my confidence only in isolated instances. In the affairs I had no secrets affecting myself, and the other matters I could not and would not confide to any one but Count Brandt. I wished that persons in business matters should act according to their convictions, and not look to me. For this reason, I believed it requisite for the king formally to declare that his Majesty had entrusted the cabinet business to me, so that it might not appear as if I had usurped it. This occasioned the cabinet decree of July 14, 1771, which is so greatly brought against me, and is said to be opposed to the Lex Regia. I will honestly declare my intentions and principles.

1. I am free to confess that I tried to concentrate the royal authority in the cabinet, in accordance with the above-mentioned form and principles.

2. I had frequently remarked that royal orders were given by persons who had an opportunity to approach his Majesty, without having any other justification for doing so, than the fact that they had spoken with the king on the matter. This might give rise to many abuses, which I tried to prevent by having every direct order copied in a register. The persons who executed them were thus rendered secure, and the king knew who was answerable for the execution.

3. Instead of such orders not being brought under the king's notice, as was formerly the case, his Majesty saw them three or four times.

4. The king signed them in the extract, which was kept in the cabinet, or on the representations of the department, which reported receipt of the order.

5. No department could have any influence over another, except through the king, and there was a copy of it in the cabinet.

6. The king found no difficulty in carrying out what he pleased, and I was ever of opinion, and had always heard, that in a sovereign state the form should be kept as simple as possible: that good principles, and the desire to act well, were the best means to keep a king from abusing his power: and that other difficulties impeded the execution of great and useful plans, without preventing the results of a bad appliance of the authority.

7. All the time I was minister, the cabinet orders were sent to the colleges and heads of departments. The latter could then raise objections especially in cases where such regulations were contrary to the laws and earlier royal resolutions.

8. I thus acquired no personal authority, except in so far as the king granted me his confidence.

9. I thus deprived myself of the means of mis-applying the king's confidence to designs opposed to his interests, and if I had any such designs, of which I am not conscious, however, they can be very easily detected in the copies preserved in the cabinet.

10. As regards the king's signature, several persons, especially Councillor of Conference Schumacher, know what his Majesty thought of it, and that this was the reason why all the cabinet orders were not signed by the king.

Although I have thus declared with the greatest truthfulness the sentiments with which I employed the king's confidence, I do not venture to decide how far, on the whole, the changes that resulted were advantageous or injurious. The result must prove this, and for this the time during which they have existed is too short.

So much, however, I believe I may assert, that the economic arrangements at court, as well as the management of the royal privy treasury, were advantageous, and will produce considerable savings: and further, that the financial system is established on a sound basis, as the price of corn in Copenhagen this winter will prove, how far correct measures were taken in that matter;—that all the expenses of the last year have been paid, and the resources which the extraordinary ones required, were not oppressive for the country;—that the arrangement of the Chanceries and Colleges of Justice is advantageous;—that the persons whom I proposed as officials, three or four excepted, as I might be mistaken about them, possessed the requisite ability for what they were employed in;—and lastly, that there has been no delay in the settlement of business. It was unavoidable that defects should have crept in here and there, which I certainly felt, but could not possibly prevent. If private persons have suffered, the intention always was to employ such persons again, and give them compensation.

If the undertaking has failed through incorrect measures, or want of support, I will confess that I deserve all the reproaches that may be made me in consequence, as it is sufficient that it has not been carried out. The king alone can decide how far my advice has had an influence on his personal comfort, and the examination will prove how far the results have been injurious on the whole. At the beginning I was encouraged by my friends: but when it had grown too late to draw back, I lost them. If it be possible in such a situation as mine was, for a man to act without personal motives and impartially, I tried to do so, and so much the less did I believe that I should deserve the general hatred. On this account I was indifferent to all the menaces that were spread against me in public. I suspected even less, that I should be seriously accused of wishing to sustain myself against the opinion and will of the king, and of entertaining dangerous designs against his Majesty's person. As concerns the first charge, I do not know whether the king ever had the wish, or formed a resolution of discharging me. Everything I could employ to sustain myself in the king's favour was that I strove to be agreeable to his Majesty. Besides this, the influence of the queen was the only thing on which I could calculate. During the last half year, Count Brandt lost the king's confidence. Etats-rath Reverdil had no personal liaisons with me, and would assuredly not have allowed me to support myself in an improper manner. I did not know page Schack personally, before he was attached to the king: the king said but little about Berger, and, besides, all the valets were still attached to his Majesty whom I found there, and they were under very slight or no obligations to me. These persons will know whether I asked of them information as to what the king said, or services to my advantage. If I had wished to prevent his Majesty from forming a speedy decision (about my dismissal) in consequence of insinuations made to him, I could only trust to the repugnance which such a thing would meet with in his mind, because there were countless opportunities, which I could neither prevent, nor attempted to prevent, and at least I ought to have made more certain of the sentiments of the persons who were about the king. Besides, the king had formerly dismissed several persons who were about him, and it would have been very easy for him to find means for doing the same with me, if he had wished it, and how could I have opposed it?

Equally improbable is the other charge that I entertained designs against the king's person. With every one prejudiced against me, without a party, even hated by the public, how could I have formed the idea of undertaking such a thing? and if I had formed it, how could I take such bad measures? All my security consisted in the person of the king and his authority. Whose authority could have been substituted for that of the king? The regulations which aroused suspicion were hardly sufficient to check the disturbances and a revolt of the populace if such had broken out; and it would have been quite impossible to carry out a plan which must displease the people. At least, there is no political probability in all this that such an idea existed. And what moral reason could arouse suspicion against those persons, who must necessarily have been acquainted with it, that they would have been capable of forming such a detestable resolution? A careful investigation, on the contrary, will prove the excellent sentiments all my friends entertained for the king's person. I do not deny that measures were taken to check any violent attacks of the people; and I do not believe that a government would be justified in allowing changes in its administration to be effected by such means.

If everything which I have said conscientiously and in accordance with the truth about the intentions and motives of my actions be carefully examined, more political faults and moral errors will be found in my conduct than crimes worthy of punishment. Those persons who knew me, and watched me closely, can judge and bear witness how far I have spoken the truth. If I had sought money and personal distinctions, my situation afforded much easier ways of acquiring them than the one I selected. The desire of making my fortune was a more remote impulse, and I merely wished to owe it to the services I rendered the king. My readiness to carry out whatever the king desired, and his Majesty's willingness to accept my advice, cannot justify me, but they serve as my excuse, even if, through my error, evil results for the king's interest were produced by them.

I appeal to the memory and feeling of the king whether the changes I carried out or occasioned produced an unpleasant impression on his Majesty, and I know of no disorders which originated from them. For the dissatisfaction of individuals is of no effect in this matter. It was ever my opinion that I owed the king alone an account of my actions, and it was easy to explain them to the king as the affairs came so repeatedly before him. Not a trace will be found that I wished to exercise an influence over the representations of the departments, or give a false appearance to affairs, as in my time every deputy of a college was allowed to give his vote. The first changes occurred in the vicinity of the king, and it would certainly not have been wise to begin with the council and the court, if his Majesty's conviction, will, and assent, had not agreed with it. No one was prevented from attending court but Count Laurvig; nor was any one sent from Copenhagen with orders not to return; or any dismissed minister prevented from having an audience of the king.

All those persons whom I knew to have lost their liberty through their employment about the king's person, or who were forbidden to reside in Copenhagen, were liberated on my representations. No private cause was ever decided or protected by the cabinet. Count Rantzau's affair with the agent Bodenhoff will prove how little influence friendship had. If, in custom-house disputes, in royal contracts, and in cases which were clear, the royal resolution was carried out on the representation of a college, any man who considered himself injured by it was at liberty to seek justice in the ordinary course. I do not believe that in this any inclination to despotism will be found. Despotism, in my opinion, consists in the king deciding about the rights, liberties, fortunes, and lives of his subjects arbitrarily, without examination, and without regard to established forms. Those royal officials who were dismissed through the changes received pensions, and would have the first claim to vacancies. If any one was dismissed from a college for proved negligence, unfaithfulness, or other offences, I did not believe that a judicial process was requisite, which could only take place if he deserved further punishment; and every man was at liberty to defend himself legally, if injustice had been dealt to him by the college.

I have the following remarks to make about the education of the crown prince. I derived the principles on which it was established from the king's wishes, and the queen desired and herself carried them out. The crown prince, when the system was commenced, had a weak constitution, a tendency to rickets, a great deal of obstinacy, continually cried, would not walk alone, but must always be carried, attached himself to certain persons, would not play by himself, but must have people to sing and dance to him, and had been taught a certain fear of the queen, as his nurses used to threaten that his mamma would come if he were not good. In order to prevent all this, the following means were employed:—his royal highness only had simple food given him, gruel, bread, water, rice, milk, and afterwards potatoes, but all cold. At first, he was bathed twice or thrice a day in cold water, and at last went daily into his bath of his own accord. Last winter, he remained in a cold room when he was not with the queen, was only lightly clad, and went nearly the whole of the previous winter without shoes or stockings. He was allowed to do everything that he could effect with his own strength, but when he cried or obstinately desired anything which was not absolutely necessary, it was not given him, but he did not, on that account, receive any punishment, scolding, or threats; on the other hand, he was never pacified by soothing. He played alone with his companion, and no distinction was made between them, and they helped one another at meals and in undressing. They climbed, broke, and did what they pleased, but everything with which they might hurt themselves was kept from them. They generally remained alone, even in the dark. If they hurt themselves they were not pitied, and if they quarrelled, they made it up between themselves, for the lackeys were forbidden speaking or playing with them. The prince's education was to begin in his sixth or seventh year. Up to that time it was considered sufficient to allow his ideas and abilities to be developed by habit and experience. The result has been, that the crown prince's constitution is now as strong and good as might be naturally expected. His royal highness has never been ill, except in a few trifling cases; he got over the inoculation for the small-pox with the greatest ease; he knows the use and employment of his limbs, as is suited to his age; he dresses and undresses himself, can go up and down stairs without assistance, and knows how to guard himself from injury. He has none of that timidity which arises from repeated warnings, is not shy in society, obstinate, or capricious. If mental knowledge, or a morality which is based on assumed customs, is left out of the question, little will be missed in the prince royal, which can be demanded from a child of five years of age. If it is advantageous that a prince should have his first education in common with that of all other men, that he should acquire the strength which such a ripe training produces, that he should know how to do little matters for himself, without growing accustomed to be dependent on others; that he should not at too early an age learn the external insignia of his rank, which might render him lax in his duties, or imbue him with a vanity which would have eventually to be checked by moral principles; and if, lastly, that mode of education is the best in early years which is nearest to the natural one, I believe that the one applied to the crown prince will not be considered absurd. The only punishment inflicted on him was that he had no breakfast, or was left by himself in a room if he was naughty.

As regards the alleged forgery of the document to prove the receipt of the 60,000 dollars from the king, I declare most sacredly that I intended no fraud in drawing it up, and was not guilty of forgery; that, before his Majesty signed the document, I wrote the whole account in his presence, and that I expressly asked the king for 50,000 dollars for Count Brandt and for myself, and his Majesty granted them; and that I could not notice at this time, nor when he signed the document, the slightest disinclination on the part of the king to our receiving such a sum. With the same certainty I can declare that everything which this memoir contains relating to the motives and inducements of my actions, and the occurrences in which I took part, has been most conscientiously recorded by me, as well as my memory enabled me to recall it. This was not the place to speak about morality, hence I shall not be suspected of having wished to bring forward anything in my excuse in this respect.

Postscript.

Perhaps it will not be superfluous to add an accurate and definite explanation of my sentiments with regard to the Russian alliance. I was ever of opinion that the king ought to maintain it, and although I was not at first so convinced as I afterwards was of the advantage of the Holstein negociation, still my advice was not to listen to any other propositions in this matter, and to carefully avoid arousing any suspicion of the sort at the Russian court. The insinuations and opinions of others, especially of Count Rantzau, produced but slight impression on me, and much less did I follow them. They were to the effect that we ought not to trust solely to the Russian court, but draw nearer to others, especially the Swedish.

I never noticed any inclination of the sort in Lieutenant-General von Gähler. Since Easter of last year I have never spoken on the subject with any one but the minister of foreign affairs. As regards the Swedish alliance, I believed that it was advantageous, if the king only took that part which the treaty with Russia obliged him to do, but not seek any other influence, especially the influence of money.

These are the true principles on which I acted, although I at times thought and said that the Russian alliance is not the only resource for Denmark, and that it was not well to sacrifice all other considerations to it.

Struensee.

April 14, 1772.

This apology, though obscure in some parts, is decidedly clever and modest. In any ordinary court of justice it ought to have produced its effect, and the minister who could not be condemned for mere errors of judgment, ought to have been acquitted. But it was the old story of the wolf and the lamb, and the bought judges were of opinion that any rope was good enough to hang a dog.

END OF VOL. II.

INDEX TO VOL. II.,
HISTORICAL AND BIOGRAPHICAL.

• Administration, the new one, and its members, 129.
• Adeler, major von, 56.
• Adultery, on the law of, 237, 250.
• Ahrenfeld, major von, a favourite of the guards, 74.
• Army, changes in the, 55.
• "Atticus," his libellous attacks on the British ministry, 172;
• his condemnation of Caroline Matilda and Struensee, 172, 173;
• his scandalous charges, 175.

B.

• Bang, lawyer in the exchequer court, engaged against the queen, 213;
• his indictment and recapitulation of charges, 214-229;
• selected for defending Brandt, 255.
• Berger, professor, his attendance on the king, 59;
• his arrest, 112;
• his treatment in prison, and his examination before the privy council, 201.
• Bering, Magnus (see Beringskjold).
• Beringskjold, von, joins in a conspiracy against Struensee, 84-102;
• his position and character, 90;
• his baptismal name, ib.;
• his rewards, 125;
• his punishment, 142.
• Bernstorff, count von, his opposition to count Rantzau, 345.
• Biälke, von, marshal of the court, 16, 139.
• Body guard, its dismissal justified, 307.
• Braëm, Conferenz-rath, sends anonymous admonitory letters to Brandt, 3, 17;
• one of the judges for the trial of Struensee, 179;
• his threats and abuse, ib.
• Brandt, count, anonymous warning letter sent to, 3;
• his levities, 15, 16;
• receives a second anonymous letter, 17;
• his letter of complaint to Struensee, 27;
• Struensee's letter to, 34;
• his treacherous proposals for arresting Struensee, 47-49;
• his duty to find the king amusement, 60;
• exposed to his Majesty's mad freaks, 61;
• his personal conflict with the king, 62;
• appointed master of the wardrobe, 63;
• his arrest, 109;
• his wretched cell, 110;
• cruelly treated in prison, 148;
• his conduct, 150;
• his curiosity about matters of gallantry, 182, note;
• his examination before the privy council of state, 184;
• his character, 185;
• his apparent conversion, ib.;
• was he a hypocrite? 186;
• Dr. Hee's character of him, 187;
• the Fiscal General's statements respecting, 261, 262;
• account of his fight with the king, 278.
• Bruhn, the queen's maid, 218, 219.
• Budget, the, 349.
• Bülow, baron von, 15, 53, 97, 123;
• expelled the kingdom, 143;
• his opinion of Struensee's confession, 181.
• Bute, earl of, libellous attack on, 173, 174.

C.

• Cabinet, business of the departments under the king's supervision, according to Struensee's statement, 346 et seq.;
• plan of conducting the business, 353;
• its orders emanated from the king, 355.
• Caroline Matilda, the ladies of her court, and her court amusements, 64, 65;
• conspiracy against, 84-104; her arrest, 113;
• her firmness and desperate courage, 114, 115;
• variations in the accounts of her arrest, and the different authorities, 116, note;
• committed to the fortress of Kronborg, 117;
• her profound grief and despair, 117, 118;
• her harsh treatment, 118;
• her miserable apartments at Kronborg, 119 et note;
• persecution and arrests of her friends and adherents, 141 et seq.;
• her two maids of honour expatriated, 143;
• sensation caused in England by her arrest, 158 et seq.;
• her defence, 162;
• vigorous appeal by Junius on behalf of, 171;
• attacks on, and defence of, 175;
• her treatment fiendish and cruel, 177;
• her trial, 203 et seq.;
• her suite composed of spies and gaolers, 203;
• her letters to Sir R. Keith, 205;
• letter to the king, 206;
• commission appointed to examine her, 207;
• her fatal confession, 211;
• Lawyer Bang's indictment of, 213 et seq.;
• his recapitulation of charges and accusations against her, and prayer for a divorce, 214-229;
• her advocate Uldall, 231;
• and his defence, 233-250;
• appeal to the king in her favour, 251;
• the sentence passed upon her, 254.
• Carstenskjold, major von, 56;
• his rewards, 126.
• Charles, prince of Hesse, his account of Caroline Matilda's arrest, 116 note.
• Chemnitz, the preacher, insults the imprisoned queen, 203, 204.
• Christian VII., his insane amusement, 59, 60;
• his pugnacious propensities, 60-62;
• surprised by the conspirators, who compel him to
• sign orders for the arrest of Struensee and others, 103, 104;
• the conspiracy having succeeded, he makes his appearance in state, drawn by eight white horses, 120;
• a helpless tool in the hands of the new government, 128;
• his pretended indictment of the queen, and suit for a divorce, 213-229;
• had no idea of the value of money, 319;
• his cabinet regulations, and the general rules laid down by him, 346 et seq.
• Christiansborg palace, commission of inquisition sit daily for the trial of state prisoners, 152.
• Christianity, beneficial effects of, 199.
• Clergy, their bitterness against the fallen ministry, 130.
• Coffee-house scandal, 161.
• Commission of Inquisition, appointed to try the state prisoners, 151, 152.
• Commission, general, appointed as a supreme court to try the cause of the king against the queen, and pass sentence, 212;
• members of the court, ib.;
• appoint lawyer Bang to undertake the king's cause, and Uldall, of the supreme council, the cause of the queen, 213.
• Conspiracy, secretly brooding, 81;
• leaders found in the higher circles, 84;
• their names, ib.;
• forged document employed, 85;
• preparations of the conspirators, 98 et seq.;
• the conspirators surprise the king in his bed, 102;
• compel him to sign orders for arresting Struensee and others, 103, 104;
• completely successful, the principal officers of state having been arrested and imprisoned, 119.
• Copenhagen, dissatisfaction of the people at, 8 et seq. (see Denmark, and Struensee).
• Council of State, Struensee's abolition of the, 282.
• Court, amusements of the, 64, 65, 83, 136, 137;
• great changes at, 138;
• rules to be observed at, 350, 351.
• Court parties, Struensee's notices of, 333.
• Crown Prince, Struensee's treatment of the, 279.

D.

• D'Alembert's admiration of Voltaire, 200.
• De Flaux's account of Caroline Matilda's apartments at Kronborg, 119.
• Denmark, alarming preparations against insurrection, 67;
• public dissatisfaction, 68;
• meeting of the royal guards, 73;
• behaviour of the citizens, 75;
• a formidable conspiracy against Struensee and his government, which terminates with the arrest and imprisonment of the queen, 84, 107, 120;
• tumultuous proceedings, 121, 122;
• the new administration, 129;
• public thanks offered in all the churches, 130;
• police regulations for preventing mobs and street riots, 140;
• violent persecutions and punishments, 148;
• the Lex Regia, 155, 156;
• state trials of the queen, Struensee, and others, 178 et seq.;
• sentence passed upon the queen, 254;
• state of the kingdom, 257;
• and of parties, 341, 342;
• general dissatisfaction in, 344.
• Dieden, baron, the Danish envoy at St. James's, 168.
• Dockyard men, of Copenhagen, their complaints, 11, 12.
• Doctrinaire school, Struensee's state paper on the, 34-47.
• Düval, captain C., 141.

E.

• Eickstedt, colonel von., joins in a conspiracy against Struensee, 84-102;
• his position and character, 89;
• appointed commandant of the city, 104;
• arrests his brother officers, colonels Falckenskjold and Hesselberg, 110;
• arrests Justiz-rath Struensee and Professor Berger, 112;
• his promotions, 125.
• England, sensation caused in, by the arrest of Queen Caroline Matilda, 158 et seq.
• Eyben, Fräulein von, the queen's lady in waiting, 220, 221, 243.

F.

• Falckenskjold, colonel von, his advice
• to Struensee, 13, 14, 51, 52;
• his conversation with Brandt, 17;
• arrested, 110;
• transferred to the navy prison, 111;
• his treatment in prison, and his examination before the privy council, 201;
• his opinion of Struensee's trial, 318.
• Falckenskjold, Captain von, his rewards, 125.
• Fanatical preachers, 204.
• Finances, Struensee's alleged malversation of the, 289, 308;
• his brother appointed deputy of the, 290;
• the forgery, 291, 308, 309, 319;
• general rules for conducting the, 348.
• Flying corps, disbandment of the, 55.
• Foot guards, disbandment of the, 69;
• mutiny of the, 71.
• Foreign affairs, Struensee's view of, 365.
• Foreign department, rules for conducting the, 347.
• Forgery, attributed to Struensee, 291, 308, 309;
• Reverdil's evidence on, 319;
• Struensee's explanation, 364.
• Frederick, prince, joins in a conspiracy against Struensee, 84-102;
• incident connected with, 95.
• Frederick III., of Denmark, 325.
• Frederiksberg, residence of the Danish court, 66;
• march of the mutinous guards to, 73.