CHAPTER XVI.
1841–1842.
DEATH OF PRESIDENT HARRISON—BREACH BETWEEN PRESIDENT TYLER AND THE WHIGS—TYLER’S VETOES—BUCHANAN’S REPLY TO CLAY ON THE VETO POWER—HIS OPPOSITION TO THE BANKRUPT ACT OF 1841.
Rarely has a party in a constitutional government come into power with apparently a better prospect of doing good to their country, and retaining their hold upon it, than did the Whigs under President Harrison. This worthy man, who was by no means a statesman of the first or even of the second order, was a person of fair intelligence, of entire honesty of character, and was moderately well taught in the principles of the Constitution. Almost his first act, after his election, was to tender the chief place in his cabinet to Mr. Webster. This was done with the concurrence of Mr. Clay, whom it suited to remain in the Senate, as its leader, and who expected to carry a new national bank, as a remedy for the existing disordered condition of the currency.
But General Harrison died on the day which completed the first month of his official term.[64] His successor, John Tyler, of Virginia, had been chosen as Vice President, with very little attention to his political opinions on the part of those who selected him for that position, or of those who voted for him. When he assumed the duties of the Presidency, he requested the members of General Harrison’s cabinet to remain in office. They were all of that political school which regarded a national bank of some kind as a necessity, and held it to be an instrument of Government which Congress might constitutionally create.[65] President Harrison and his official advisers had deemed it necessary to convene an extra session of Congress; and his proclamation had summoned it for the 31st of May. When that day arrived, it began to be remembered that Mr. Tyler had theretofore been among those who denied the power of Congress to establish a national bank, and that as a Senator he had voted against one. Here, then, the long-cherished policy of the leading Whigs, which they claimed had been affirmed by the people in the late election, was in peril of encountering the opposition of the President. In July, a bill for a bank, with power to establish offices of discount and deposit in the several States, either with or without their consent, was passed by both Houses and sent to the President. He returned it on the 16th of August, with his objections, from which it appeared that he held such a bank to be unconstitutional. In the Senate, Mr. Clay made a bitter attack upon the President; the Whigs in the House of Representatives burst into a fury of indignation. But the Whig majority was not large enough to pass the bill over the President’s “veto.” A new bill to create a “Fiscal Corporation of the United States” was brought in. In the mean time the President was denounced in the press by persons who stood in close relations with Mr. Clay, as a man faithless to the party which had made him Vice President. In the debate on the new bill, Mr. Clay again assailed the President with great violence, expecting by that means to prevent a second “veto.” Mr. Tyler remained firm to his own convictions; the second “veto” came; an irreparable breach between the Whigs and the President ensued; four of the members of the cabinet appointed by President Harrison resigned their places, without previous conference with Mr. Webster, who remained in office.[66] Thus within six months after the death of General Harrison, the Whigs lost the power of shaping the financial legislation of the country, which their triumphant success in the late election appeared to have given them.
Mr. Buchanan, if not now the leader of the opposition in the Senate, was one of its most prominent debaters. It has already been said that he was not an orator, in the highest sense of that term. But in all the polemics of debate he was exceedingly efficient. He could mingle logic with humor; and although in discussions which were largely occupied with party topics and with grave constitutional questions, he was not sparing in his thrusts, there was a gentleman-like manner in his wielding of the rapier, as well as force in handling the weightier weapon of argument. On both of the bills which were prepared with a good deal of design to encounter the anticipated opposition of Mr. Tyler, and the last of which was almost avowedly gotten up as a means of “heading him off” from a union with the democratic opposition, Mr. Buchanan spoke at the extra session with remarkable energy and effect. His most elaborate speech on the first bill was delivered on the 7th of July. It related partly to the old question of the constitutional power of Congress to create a national bank of any kind; and in the course of this discussion he treated the topic of the binding authority of the Supreme Court of the United States, in reference to the legislative department, with new and forcible illustrations, contending that upon any new bank, Senators were bound to follow their conscientious convictions. The residue of the speech was a severe criticism upon the details of the bill, which he contended would establish a dangerous connection between a moneyed institution and the executive of the United States, far worse than that which had existed in the case of either of the former banks. Such a speech was well calculated to produce a strong impression at once upon the mind of the President before whom the bill was likely to come, and upon the country. Mr. Buchanan looked forward to the time when all question about a national bank, as a fiscal agent of the Government in the collection and disbursement of its revenues, would be at an end, and the “Independent Treasury” system would be resorted to as the substitute.[67]
Upon the second bill he spoke on the 2d of September, in reply to Mr. Clay. This scheme of a “Fiscal Corporation of the United States,” which was to have the power of dealing in bills of exchange drawn between different States, or on foreign countries, but was not to be allowed to discount promissory notes, was assailed by Mr. Buchanan with great vigor. His speech placed the advocates of the bill in a somewhat ridiculous position, for it did not appear whether they concurred in founding it on the power to regulate commerce, or on the power to collect and disburse the public revenue: and in the practical operation of the scheme, he made it very plain that it would become a mere “kite-flying” machine. Mr. Clay thought that Mr. Buchanan did not succeed in “attempts at wit.” Buchanan retorted that this was true, and that his opponent as rarely succeeded in argument. An impartial reader would now say that Buchanan had the argument on his side, and a very respectable share of what was certainly a telling species of humor, if it was not wit. His description of the heterogeneous political materials that made up the famous “Harrisburg Convention,”—the body which nominated Harrison and Tyler, with such an entire disregard of the opinions of the candidates that it became afterwards a disputed question whether they were “bank” or “anti-bank” men,—was not an unhappy hit.[68]
Under the advice of Mr. Webster, the Whigs postponed the subject of a bank to the next regular session of Congress. But some important measures were passed at the extra session, and approved by the President, among which was a Bankrupt Act. Mr. Buchanan opposed it in the following speech, delivered on the 24th of July, 1841:
The question being on the passage of the bill—
Mr. Buchanan said, that when he entered the Senate chamber this morning, he had not intended to say one word on the subject of the bankrupt bill. He was content that the question should have been taken silently on its final passage, and decided in its favor, as all knew it would be, from the vote yesterday upon its engrossment. The able remarks of the Senator from New York (Mr. Tallmadge) had induced him to change his purpose, and endeavor to place himself in a proper position before the public in relation to this important measure.
He trusted that he felt as much sympathy for the unfortunate as any Senator on this floor. It would, therefore, have afforded him heartfelt pleasure to be able to vote for this bill. He was sorry, very sorry, that from a deep sense of public duty, he should be compelled to vote against it. Would to Heaven that this were not the case!
It had been asserted over and over again, that there were five hundred thousand bankrupts in the United States anxiously awaiting relief from the passage of this bill. Now, from the very nature of the case, this must be a monstrous exaggeration of the number of these unfortunate men. Less than two millions and a half of votes had been given at the late Presidential election; and, if you add to this number five hundred thousand, the aggregate of three millions would exceed the number of all the male inhabitants of the United States who could by possibility become bankrupts. Could any man believe that half a million of this number were in a state of bankruptcy? That every sixth man in the United States was in this wretched condition? The experience of us all must demonstrate that this was impossible. There were several States in the Union where this bill would be almost a dead letter for want of subjects on which it could operate. Although we had suffered much from the spirit of wild speculation, which had been excited to madness by our unrestricted banking system, yet he did not believe there were more than one hundred thousand bankrupts in the United States who would apply for relief under this bill.bill.
Now, sir, what was the nature of this bill? Whom did it embrace in its provisions? He would answer, every individual in the United States who was an insolvent debtor. There was no limitation, no restriction whatever. It would discharge all the insolvent debtors now in existence throughout the Union, from all the debts which they had ever contracted, on the easiest terms possible. It was said that the bill contained provisions both for voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy; and so it did nominally: but in truth and in fact, it would prove to be almost exclusively a voluntary bankrupt bill.
The involuntary clause would scarcely ever be resorted to, unless it might be by a severe and vindictive creditor, for the purpose of unjustly oppressing his unfortunate debtor. And why would this prove in practice to be a voluntary bankrupt bill, and that alone? The compulsory clause applied only to merchants—wholesale and retail, to bankers, factors, brokers, underwriters, and marine insurers. These were objects of compulsory bankruptcy, provided they owed debts to the amount of two thousand dollars. In order to enable their creditors to prosecute petitions against them, for the purpose of having them declared bankrupt, they must have committed one of the acts of bankruptcy specified by the bill. What were they? The debtor must either have departed from the State of his residence, with intent to defraud his creditors;—or concealed himself to avoid being arrested;—or fraudulently procured himself to be arrested or his goods or lands to be attached, distrained, sequestered, or taken in execution;—or removed and concealed his goods and chattels to prevent them from being levied upon or taken in execution;—or made a fraudulent conveyance or assignment of his lands, goods, or credits. These were the five acts of bankruptcy specified in the bill; and could it be supposed that any merchant or man of business, in insolvent circumstances, would wait and subject himself to this compulsory process by committing any of these acts; whilst the bill threw the door wide open to him, in common with all other persons, to become a voluntary bankrupt, at any time he might think proper? He would select the most convenient time for himself to be discharged from his debts; and would cautiously avoid any one of these acts of bankruptcy, which might restrain the freedom of his own will, and place him in some degree within the power of his creditors. He would “swear out” when it suited him best, and would not subject himself to their pleasure. This bill, then, although in name compulsory as well as voluntary, was in fact, from the beginning to end, neither more nor less than a voluntary bankrupt law.
Now it might be wise, on a subject of such great importance, to consult the experience of the past. In 1817, the British Parliament had appointed a commission on the subject of their bankrupt laws. The testimony taken by the commissioners was decidedly against these laws; and the Lord Chancellor declared that the abuses under them were a disgrace to the country; that it would be better to repeal them at once than to submit to such abuses; and that there was no mercy to the bankrupt’s estate nor to the creditors. Mr. B. spoke from memory; but he felt confident he was substantially correct in the facts stated. This was the experience of England, and that, too, notwithstanding their bankrupt laws had interposed many more guards against fraud than the present bill contained, and were executed with an arbitrary severity, wholly unsuited to the genius of our institutions. In that country, however, these laws had existed for so long a period of time, and were so interwoven with the business habits of the people, that it was found impossible to abolish them altogether.
We have had some experience on this subject in our own country. Congress passed a bankrupt law in April, 1800. It was confined to traders, and was exclusively compulsory in its character. The period of its existence was limited to five years and until the end of the next session of Congress thereafter. It so entirely failed to accomplish the objects for which it was created, and was the source of so many frauds, that it was permitted to live out but little more than half its appointed days. It was repealed in December, 1803; and a previous resolution, declaring that it ought to be repealed, passed the House of Representatives by a vote of 77 to 12.
The State of Pennsylvania had furnished another important lesson on this subject. In March, 1812, the legislature of that State passed a bankrupt or insolvent law absolving all those who chose to take advantage of it from the payment of their debts. It was confined to the city and county of Philadelphia; but within these limits, like the present bill, it offered relief to everybody who desired to be relieved. This act was repealed, almost by acclamation, at the commencement of the very next session after its passage. Its baneful effects were so fully demonstrated during this short intervening period, that the representatives from the city and county who had, but a few months before, strained every nerve to procure its passage, were the most active and zealous in urging its repeal.
During the first session of his service in the House of Representatives (that of 1821–2), powerful efforts were made to pass a bankrupt law. There was then a greater and more general necessity for such a measure than had ever existed since. The extravagant expansion of the Bank of the United States in 1816, ’17 and ’18 had reduced it to the very brink of insolvency. In order to save itself from ruin, it was compelled to contract its loans and issues with a rapidity beyond all former example. The consequence was, that the years 1819, ’20 and ’21 were the most disastrous which the country had ever experienced since the adoption of the federal Constitution. Not only merchants and speculators were then involved in ruin; but the rage for speculation had extended to the farmers and mechanics throughout the country, and had rendered vast numbers of them insolvent. The cry for relief, by the passage of a bankrupt bill, therefore, came to Congress from all classes of society, and from almost every portion of the Union.
The best speech which he (Mr. B.) had ever made in Congress was in opposition to that bill. The reason was, that he had derived much assistance from conversations with Mr. Lowndes upon the subject. That great and good statesman was then suffering under the disease which proved fatal to him soon after. He attempted to make a speech against the bill, but was compelled to desist by physical exhaustion before he had fairly entered on his subject. It was his decided conviction, that no bankrupt law, of which the English system was the model, could ever be adopted by Congress without great injury to the country. He (Mr. B.) had attempted to demonstrate this proposition, at that period, and he should now again, after the lapse of nearly twenty years, make a very few observations on the same subject.
And in the first place, it would be physically impossible for the district courts of the United States to carry this law into execution; and if it were even possible, it would be extremely burdensome and oppressive to the people generally.
The bill prescribes that all applicants for its benefit shall file their petitions in the district court of the district in which they reside. Twenty days’ notice only is required, and that not to be served personally on the creditors, but merely by newspaper publication. At the time and place appointed, the creditors of the applicant may appear and show cause why the prayer of his petition should not be granted. If there be no appearance on the part of the creditors, or sufficient cause be not shown to the contrary, then the court decree the applicant to be a bankrupt; and thus ends the first stage of the proceedings, so far as he is personally concerned.
After such applicant has been thus declared a bankrupt, and has complied with all the provisions of the act, he may then file another petition to be discharged from his debts, which may be granted at any time after ninety days from the date of the decree declaring him a bankrupt. Seventy days’ notice is to be given to his creditors to appear in court, and oppose his discharge, if they think proper.
It thus appeared that there might be two formal hearings in each case before the district court upon every application; and that there would be, in many of the cases, was beyond a doubt. Besides, from the very nature of the proceedings in bankruptcy, and from the provisions of the bill, the interlocutory applications, and the examinations of the bankrupt before the court, must be very numerous. At every stage of the proceedings a large portion of the time of the court must necessarily be devoted to the subject.
Should the district court decide that the bankrupt shall not be discharged, he might then demand a trial by jury, or appeal from this decision to the circuit court. This would be another prolific fountain of business for the district and circuit courts of the United States.
Thus far the proceeding was confined to the bankrupt personally. But before what court was his estate to be settled? By the terms of the bill, the demands of all creditors of the bankrupt, if disputed, must be tried in the district court; the controversies which might arise between the creditors and the assignees of the bankrupt, and also between the bankrupt himself and his assignees, must be settled in the district court; and, to use the comprehensive terms of the bill, the jurisdiction of that court was extended “to all acts, matters, and things to be done under and in virtue of the bankruptcy, until the final distribution and settlement of the estate of the bankrupt, and the close of the proceedings in bankruptcy.”
There were also several criminal offences created by the bill; all of which must be tried in the district courts of the United States.
From the nature of the federal Constitution, all the business which he had enumerated must necessarily be transacted in the courts of the United States. It could not be transferred to the State courts.
Now, sir, said Mr. B., this bill will prove to be a felo de se. It can never be carried into effect, for want of the necessary judicial machinery. Another midnight judiciary must be established, to aid bankruptcy. The number of these midnight judges which were added to the federal judiciary in February, 1801, was eighteen; and if these were necessary at that time, three times the number would not be sufficient at present.
He had just examined McCullough’s Commercial Dictionary, under the title Bankruptcy. He there found that the annual number of commissions of bankruptcy opened in England on an average of nine years, ending with the year 1830, was a little below seventeen hundred. The average annual number of all the commissions which issued during the same period, was about two thousand one hundred. One-half of these seventeen hundred cases were what are called town cases, and the other half country cases. To transact the town business alone, consisting of eight hundred and fifty cases annually, it had been found necessary to establish a new court of bankruptcy, similar to the ancient courts at Westminster Hall, consisting of one chief judge, and three puisne judges. To this court there were attached six commissioners, two principal registrars, and eight deputy registrars. Such was the judicial force found necessary in England to examine and decide upon the cases of seven hundred and fifty bankrupts in each year.
Then what provision had the present bill made to discharge half a million of bankrupts, the number which its friends assert exist at present in the United States? None whatever, except to cast this burden upon the district courts of the United States, which, in the large commercial cities, where the cases of bankruptcy must chiefly be heard, had already as much business as they could conveniently transact. The courts could not transact all this business, if there were half a million of bankrupts to be discharged, within the next twenty years. Sir, unless you establish new courts, and increase your judicial force at least ten fold, it is vain for you to pass the present bill. Without this, the law can never be carried into effect. The moment it goes into operation, these unfortunate bankrupts will rush eagerly to the district courts in such numbers as to arrest all other judicial business. This bill provides that these courts shall be considered open every day in the year, for the purpose of hearing bankrupt cases.
The district courts of the United States were scattered over the Union at great distances from each other. For example, there were in the State of New York, he believed, but two of these courts. In Pennsylvania, one was held in Philadelphia, another in Pittsburg, and a third in Williamsport. Pittsburg and Philadelphia were three hundred miles apart; and parties, jurors, and witnesses must constantly be in attendance from great distances at these two places, on the hearing of the different bankrupts, and on the trial of all the causes which might arise out of the settlement of their estates. By the operation of this bill, all these causes would and must be transferred from the State to the Federal courts. This would be an intolerable oppression to the people.
Without entering into any detail of the frauds to which this bill would give birth, he must be permitted to advert to the effect which it would have upon the rights of creditors in States distant from the court where the debtor might make his application. It would speedily sponge away all the indebtedness, now very great, of the Southwestern portion of the Union to the Eastern cities. Our merchants in those cities, should the bill pass, would have no difficulty in balancing their books. This would be done for them by the bill in the easiest possible manner.
Under all other bankrupt laws which had ever existed, or ever been proposed, either in this country or in England, or anywhere else, as he believed, the debtor could not obtain his certificate of discharge without the express written assent of a certain proportion of his creditors in number and value. This rule had never been found to operate severely in practice on honest debtors, whilst it afforded some security to the creditors. Under the present bankrupt laws of England, the certificate of discharge must be signed by four-fifths in number and value of the creditors of the bankrupt; and under our old bankrupt law of 1800, two-thirds in number and value of the creditors were required to sign. Without this express assent, no bankrupt could receive his certificate of discharge. But the present bill had completely reversed this rule. Under it the debtor must be discharged, “unless a majority in number and value of his creditors, who have proved their debts, shall file their written dissent thereto.” Now he should put a case; and many such would occur under the present bill. A merchant in Philadelphia had a debtor in Mississippi, who owed him $20,000. This debtor applies to the district court of that State for the benefit of the act. The merchant believes he has been guilty of fraud, and determines to oppose his discharge. He goes or sends to Mississippi for this purpose. I ask you, sir, what chance he would have to obtain the necessary proof, in a country where thousands were at the same time applying for the benefit of the bankrupt law. The task would be hopeless; and consequently the attempt would be made in very few cases. Had the law required the express assent of two-thirds or even a majority in number and value of the bankrupt’s creditors, the merchant would have had one security left. The debtor must have satisfied him that he had acted honestly before he could have obtained his assent. Now the debtor would be discharged unless a majority expressly dissent. The ancient rule had been reversed; and instead of an express assent being required to produce his discharge, there must now be an express dissent to prevent it. And if the majority did dissent, what would be the consequence? Was this conclusive, and would the debtor still remain liable? No, sir, no. The Philadelphia merchant would then have to enter upon a new law suit. Notwithstanding this express dissent, the question would, under the bill, be referred to a jury, and if they decided in the bankrupt’s favor, he was discharged from his debts forever, even against the dissent of all his creditors. This jury would necessarily be composed of his own neighbors, all having a sympathetic feeling with him, and looking upon the distant Philadelphia creditor as an unjust and an unfeeling man. This was a natural feeling, and common to almost all men in similar circumstances. It implied no imputations upon their honesty. Truly this bill was a measure to relieve all debtors who might desire to cut loose from their debts, without any adequate provision for the security of creditors.
But all these evils were nothing when compared with the baneful effects which the bill would have upon the morals of the people of this country. Our people were already too much addicted to speculation, and too anxious to become suddenly rich. As a nation, we required the rein and the bit much more than the spur. The present bill would stimulate the spirit of speculation almost to madness. Men would be tempted by the hope of realizing rapid fortunes, and living in affluence the remainder of their days, to embark in every wild undertaking, knowing that they had everything to gain and nothing to lose. This bill proclaimed not merely to merchants and insurers, whose business was from its nature hazardous; but to every citizen of the United States, “you may be as wild and extravagant in your speculations as you please—you may attempt to seize the golden prize in any manner you choose: if you succeed you will then possess what your heart most desires; if not, your debts shall be blotted out in the easiest manner possible, and you may begin the world again.” This was in effect the language of the bill. The consequence must be that the faith of contracts would soon become an idle word. Our former bankrupt law was wholly compulsory in its character, and was confined to traders. The present English bankrupt law expressly excludes farmers and graziers from its provisions. We went a long distance in advance of both. The present bill would be in effect wholly voluntary, and it embraced everybody under the sun, and all debts which had been, or might be, contracted.
He would venture to predict, that when this bill should go into operation the people of the United States would soon become astonished and alarmed at its consequence: and it would be blotted out of existence in less time than had elapsed between the passage and repeal of the act of 1800.
He might be asked if he were opposed to a bankrupt law in any form. He could answer that he was not. He would most cheerfully vote for any safe measure of this nature which could be carried into execution by the courts of the United States, and he did not believe that it would be very difficult to frame such a measure. The judicial system of the Federal Government was of such a character, that it could never execute a bankrupt law, modelled after the English system, without producing great fraud, delay, and injustice. If you changed this system, and increased the number of courts and judges, so as to enable them to transact the business under this bill, with proper deliberation and within a reasonable time, you would go far towards producing a judicial consolidation of the Union. It was the opinion of Mr. Lowndes, that we should be compelled to abandon the idea of framing a bill upon the English model, and adopt the system which prevailed in countries subject to the civil law. For example, he (Mr. B.) would permit a debtor in failing circumstances to make any composition he could obtain from a majority or two-thirds in number and value of his creditors. In that event, he would discharge him from his debts as against the remainder, unless they could prove that he had been guilty of fraud. He would never place any unfortunate, but honest debtor, in the power of a few vindictive creditors against the will of the majority. Such a law would, in a great degree, execute itself, and dispense with nearly all the machinery of this bill. The composition between the debtor and his creditors, and his assignment of his property for the benefit of them all, which he should consider indispensable, might be filed in the district court, and receive its sanction. He would not take time at present to do more than hint at the nature of the bankrupt law, which he thought would be applicable to this country. It would very much resemble the cessio bonorum which now prevailed in Louisiana, where the civil and not the common law governed the proceedings of the courts.
But what great and overruling necessity existed for Congress to pass any bankrupt law? Each State could now pass bankrupt laws, which would relieve their citizens from the obligation of debts contracted with other citizens of the same State subsequent to the passage of such laws. This point had been solemnly adjudged by the Supreme Court of the United States, in the case of Ogden vs. Saunders, reported in 12th Wheaton, 213; and its authority was confirmed in the case of Boyle vs. Zacharie, reported in 6 Peters, 635.
This discharge, however, would be confined to debts contracted between citizens of the same State where the discharge was granted. The decision rested on the principle, that the State law under which the discharge would take place, had become a part of the original contract, in the contemplation of the parties. But if a citizen of Pennsylvania had loaned money to a citizen of New York, who should afterwards take the benefit of a bankrupt law existing in the latter State, this would not discharge the debt; but the Pennsylvanian might, notwithstanding, recover the amount due from the New Yorker, in either the federal or State courts. But, even in such a case, if the Pennsylvania creditor should accept his dividend of the estate of the New York debtor, he would then be bound for ever, and the debt would be discharged. [Vide the case of Clay vs. Smith, 3 Peters, 411.] Foreign creditors would, in almost every instance, accept such dividends, if they amounted to anything considerable; and this would be an encouragement for debtors, in failing circumstances, not to struggle on till all their property was gone, but to surrender it while something remained for the general creditors. Thus, then, it was clear that the States could provide for all prospective cases, and could enact bankrupt laws which would have the same force and effect between their own citizens as though they had been passed by Congress. Besides, the State courts, established in every county, could carry those laws into effect with promptitude, and without inconvenience to the people.
A thought had struck him at the moment. Why might not Congress declare by law that a discharge under all State bankrupt laws should be as effectual against citizens of other States as they could be against citizens of the same State? This would render the system complete in regard to future debts, without any further interposition of Congress. He would not say that we possessed the power, under the Constitution, to pass such a law, because he had never considered the subject; but, if we did, it would be the best mode in which we could exercise our power over bankruptcy. Every State would then be left at liberty to adopt the policy in relation to bankrupts required by its own peculiar circumstances, and to execute the laws which operated chiefly upon the domestic concerns of its own citizens according to its own discretion.
Mr. B. said, as he had referred to the speech which he had made in the House of Representatives on this subject, nearly twenty years ago, he felt bound to acknowledge that, upon one point, he had fallen into a then prevailing error. Of this he had been fully convinced by the debate in the Senate at the last session. In 1822, it was his opinion that the constitutional power of Congress was confined to traders, or that class of persons which were embraced by the bankrupt laws of England at the time of the adoption of the Federal Constitution. This he now believed was too narrow a construction. The Constitution declared that “Congress shall have power to establish uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies, throughout the United States.” The subject of bankruptcies was thus placed generally under our control; and wherever bankruptcy existed, no matter what might have been the pursuits of the bankrupt, whether he had been a trader or not, our power extended over him. It also, in his opinion, embraced artificial as well as natural persons. Was it not absurd to say, that an individual manufacturer on one side of the street at Lowell might be subjected to the compulsory operation of a bankrupt law; whilst two or three individual manufacturers on the other side of the same street, who had obtained a charter of incorporation from the legislature of Massachusetts, could thus withdraw themselves in their corporate capacity from the power conferred upon Congress over bankruptcies? He, therefore, entertained no doubt of the power of Congress to pass a compulsory bankrupt law against banks. If it could not pass such a law, a firm of individual bankers would be embraced by our power; but if these very individuals obtained a charter of incorporation, they might then place that power at defiance. He entertained as little doubt of the policy of such a law as applied to banks. The knowledge of its existence would of itself, in almost every instance, prevent the necessity of its application. Banks, then, in order to save themselves from destruction, would take care to conduct their business in such a manner as always to be able to pay their liabilities in specie. He indulged no hope of a permanently sound convertible paper currency except what arose from the power of Congress to subject banks to a bankrupt law. This was the only practicable method which could be devised of securing to the people this great blessing.
Mr. B. thought it might be shown that this bill was deficient in its details. He would now only refer to one particular. It dispensed with the use of commissioners of bankruptcy altogether. In this respect it was a departure from the English statute of bankruptcy, and from our own act of 1800. Now whilst he admitted that compulsory bankruptcy would rarely occur under this bill, unless it might be to gratify the malignity of a severe creditor; yet he asked the chairman of the committee (Mr. Berrien) to say what would become of the debtor’s property between the time which would intervene between filing the petition against him by the creditor, and the final decree of the court declaring him a bankrupt. The debtor might require a trial by jury before the court to ascertain the fact whether or not he had committed an act of bankruptcy. This trial might, and probably would, often be delayed for years, whilst it ought to proceed immediately. What was to become of the debtor’s property in the mean time, without commissioners? Was he to be left to squander it at pleasure? On the other hand, if the petitioning creditor should proceed without sufficient cause, the act of 1800 gave the debtor a remedy against him. He was bound, before the commission was sued out, to give bond, with such surety as the court might direct, conditioned that the obligor should prove the debtor to be a bankrupt. In case of failure, the debtor had his remedy on the bond to the amount of the injury he might have sustained, in case the condition of it had been violated. Surely this was no more than justice. After the debtor had been arrested in the pursuit of his business by a charge of bankruptcy—after his prospects in life had been blasted—after his credit had been destroyed—and after he had been pursued for years in a course of litigation which eventually terminated in his favor, justice required that he should have some remedy. He asked, therefore, why these provisions of the act of 1800 had been left out of the present bill?
It had been contended that as the Constitution had conferred upon Congress the power to pass a bankrupt law, it was therefore their duty to exercise this power. But power was one thing and duty another. The language of power was that you may—of duty that you must. The Constitution had also conferred upon Congress the power of declaring war, of imposing taxes, and of raising and supporting armies; but would any Senator contend that it was our duty to give life and energy to these powers by calling them into action, unless the interest or honor of the country demanded it at our hands? These sovereign powers were to be exercised or not, according to the dictates of a sound discretion; and we were under no obligation whatever to pass a bankrupt law, unless we believed that under all the circumstances of the country, such a law would promote the best interests of the people.
Upon the whole, he could declare that such was his sympathy for these unfortunate debtors, that he had never given a vote in his life more disagreeable to his feelings than the vote which he should be compelled to give upon the present occasion. He was convinced, however, that the bill, in its effects, would prove disastrous to the people; and, therefore, although reluctantly, he should record his vote against its passage.
At the session which commenced in December, 1841, a measure in which President Tyler and his cabinet had united was recommended to Congress. It proposed the establishment of an “Exchequer Board,” to consist of certain Government officers and other commissioners, with branch agencies in the different States. As it never took effect, it is only needful to refer to Mr. Buchanan’s description of it in a speech made on the 29th of December, from which it appears that he regarded it as only another form of a Government bank. He professed his readiness to concur with the President in any unobjectionable measure confined to the collection, safe-keeping, and disbursement of the public money, “in the hope that, after all experiments should have been tried, and reason should have time to prevail, the people and the Government would at length return to and re-establish the Independent Treasury.”[69] But as the Senate continued to be occupied through the winter of 1841–2 with the discussion of these subjects of finance, Mr. Clay kept on in his bitter criticisms of the President’s “vetoes” of bills which had been passed by those who had, as he claimed, bestowed on Mr. Tyler the office that had made him the successor of General Harrison. Mr. Clay went so far as to propose a joint resolution for an amendment of the Constitution, so as to require but a bare majority of all the members of each house to pass any bill into a law, notwithstanding the objections of the President. That he really expected to bring about such a change in the fundamental rule which had alone made the President’s negative of any practical value, may be doubtful. He was then looking for a nomination to the Presidency by the next national convention of the Whigs, and this proposal to curtail the “veto” power would probably be, under the circumstances of the times, a popular topic on which to make his canvass against the Democratic party. It is, perhaps, to be regretted that Mr. Webster was not in the Senate at this time; but as he was not, it is fortunate that Mr. Buchanan was.[70] Notwithstanding the many differences of opinion between these two statesmen, on the scope of the legislative powers of Congress, I regard it as certain that they would not have differed in their views of the fundamental purpose of the Constitution in requiring two-thirds of each House to pass a bill over the President’s objections. Great and eminent as were Mr. Webster’s powers of understanding and enforcing the principles of the Constitution, and commanding as was his reputation, Mr. Buchanan was an equally conscientious and careful student of that instrument, and equally faithful to its great purposes. His speech on the veto power, in reply to Mr. Clay, delivered on the 2d of February, 1842, may be ranked very high as an exposition of one of the most important parts of our political system. There is a good deal in it of the temporary and party controversies of that period; and there is also a great deal of sound and comprehensive reasoning, valuable now and hereafter.
Mr. President: I am now sorry that I ever committed myself to make a speech upon this subject. I assure you that it has become extremely cold; and I think I never shall again pledge myself to address the Senate at the end of a week or ten days, to be occupied in the discussion of an intervening and different question. Cold as the subject had become, it is now still colder, after having waited for an hour to hear a debate on the mere reference of a memorial to the Committee on Commerce. But although the subject may have lost its freshness to my mind, and I may not be able to reply to the Senator from Kentucky (Mr. Clay) with as much effect as if the discussion on the bankrupt bill had not intervened, yet it has lost none of its intrinsic importance.
Before I commence the discussion, however, let me clearly and distinctly state the question to be decided by the Senate.
Under the Constitution of the United States, as it now exists—
“Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his objections, to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the objections at large on their journal and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration two-thirds of that House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of that House, it shall become a law. But, in all such cases, the votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill, shall be entered on the journal of each House respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law, in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress, by their adjournment, prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.”
The same constitutional rule is applicable to “every order, resolution or vote to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary, except on a question of adjournment.”
The joint resolution offered by the Senator, proposes to change the existing Constitution, so as to require but a bare majority of all the members belonging to each House to pass any bill into a law, notwithstanding the President’s objections.
The question then is, whether the Constitution ought to be so amended as to require but a bare majority of all the members of each House, instead of two-thirds of each House, to overrule the President’s veto; and, in my opinion, there never was a more important question presented to the Senate. Is it wise, or is it republican, to make this fundamental change in our institutions?
The great Whig party of the country have identified themselves, in the most solemn manner, with this proposed amendment. Feeling sensibly, by sad experience, that they had suffered since the late Presidential election, from not having previously presented a clear exposition of their principles “to the public eye,” they determined no longer to suffer from this cause. Accordingly, the conscript fathers of the church assembled in convention at the city of Washington, on the 13th September last—at the close of the ever memorable extra session—and adopted an address to the people of the United States. This manifesto contains a distinct avowal of the articles of their creed; and, first and foremost among them all, is a denunciation of the veto power. I shall refer very briefly to this address; although to use the language of my friend, the present Governor of Kentucky, it contains much good reading. So exasperated were the feelings of the party then, and so deeply were they pledged to the abolition of the veto power, that they solemnly and formally read John Tyler out of the Whig church, because he had exercised it against the bills to establish “a fiscal agent” and a “fiscal corporation” of the United States. The form of excommunication bears a resemblance to the Declaration of Independence which severed this country forever from Great Britain. I shall give it in their own emphatic language. They declare that John Tyler—
“By the course he has adopted in respect to the application of the veto power to two successive bank charters, each of which there was just reason to believe would meet his approbation; by the withdrawal of confidence from his real friends in Congress and from the members of his Cabinet; by the bestowal of it upon others notwithstanding their notorious opposition to leading measures of his administration, has voluntarily separated himself from those by whose exertions and suffrages he was elevated to that office through which he reached his present exalted station,” etc.
After a long preamble, they proceed to specify the duties which the Whig party are bound to perform to the country, and at the head of these duties, the destruction of the veto power contained in the Constitution stands prominently conspicuous. The following is the language which they have employed:
“First. A reduction of the executive power, by a further limitation of the veto, so as to secure obedience to the public will, as that shall be expressed by the immediate Representatives of the people and the States, with no other control than that which is indispensable to avert hasty or unconstitutional legislation.”
Mark me, sir, the object is not to secure obedience to the public will as expressed by the people themselves, the source of all political power; but as expounded by their Senators and Representatives in Congress.
After enumerating other duties, they declare that “to the effectuation of these objects ought the exertions of the Whigs to be hereafter directed.” And they make a direct appeal to the people by announcing that “those only should be chosen members of Congress who are willing cordially to co-operate in the accomplishment of them.” Twenty thousand copies of this manifesto were ordered to be printed and circulated among the people of the United States.
This appeal to the people, sir, was a vain one. The avowal of their principles destroyed them. The people did not come to the rescue. Never was there a more disastrous defeat than theirs, at the last fall elections, so immediately after their triumphant victory. Thank Heaven! the people have not thus far responded to this appeal, and I trust they may never consent to abolish the veto power. Sir, the Democratic party, in regard to this power, in the language of the doughty barons of England, centuries ago, are not willing that the charter of their liberties shall be changed. We shall hold on to this veto power as one of the most effectual safeguards of the Union, and one of the surest means of carrying into effect the will of the people.
In my humble judgment, the wise statesman ought equally to avoid a foolish veneration for ancient institutions on the one hand, and a restless desire for change on the other. In this respect, the middle is the safer course. Too great a veneration for antiquity would have kept mankind in bondage; and the plea of despots and tyrants, in every age, has been that the wisdom of past generations has established institutions which the people ought not to touch with a sacrilegious hand. Our ancestors were great innovators; and had they not been so, the darkness and despotism which existed a thousand years ago would have continued until the present moment. For my own part, I believe that the human race, from generation to generation, has in the main been advancing, and will continue to advance, in wisdom and knowledge; and whenever experience shall demonstrate that a change, even in the Federal Constitution, will promote the happiness and prosperity of the people, I shall not hesitate to vote in favor of such a change. Still, there are circumstances which surround this instrument with peculiar sanctity. It was framed by as wise men and as pure patriots as the sun of heaven ever shone upon. We have every reason to believe that Providence smiled upon their labors, and predestined them to bless mankind. Immediately after the adoption of the Constitution, order arose out of confusion; and a settled Government, capable of performing all its duties to its constituents with energy and effect, succeeded to the chaos and disorder which had previously existed under the Articles of Confederation. For more than half a century, under this Constitution, we have enjoyed a greater degree of liberty and happiness than has ever fallen to the lot of any other nation on earth. Under such circumstances, the Senator from Kentucky, before he can rightfully demand our votes in favor of a radical change of this Constitution, in one of its fundamental articles, ought to make out a clear case. He ought not only to point out the evils which the country has suffered from the existence of the veto power, but ought to convince us they have been of such magnitude, that it is not better “to bear the ills we have, than fly to others that we know not of.” For my own part, I believe that the veto power is one of the strongest and stateliest columns of that fair temple which our ancestors have dedicated to liberty; and that if you remove it from this time-honored edifice, you will essentially impair its strength and mar its beauty. Indeed there will then be great danger that in time it may tumble into ruins.
Sir, in regard to this veto power, as it at present exists, the convention which framed the Constitution, although much divided on other subjects, were unanimous. It is true that in the earlier stages of their proceedings, it was considerably discussed, and presented in different aspects. Some members were in favor of an absolute veto, and others were opposed to any veto, however qualified; but they at length unanimously adopted the happy mean, and framed the article as it now stands in the Constitution. According to Mr. Madison’s report of the debates and proceedings in the convention, we find that on Saturday the 21st July, 1787, “the tenth resolution giving the executive a qualified veto, requiring two-thirds of each branch of the legislature to overrule it, was then agreed to nem. con.” The convention continued in session for nearly two months after this decision; but so far as I can discover, no member ever attempted to disturb this unanimous decision.
A principle thus settled ought never to be rashly assailed under the excitement of disappointed feelings occasioned by the veto of two favorite measures at the extra session, on which Senators had fixed their hearts. There ought to have been time for passion to cool and reason to resume her empire. I know very well that the Senator from Kentucky had announced his opposition to the veto power so far back as June, 1840, in his Hanover speech; but that speech may fairly be considered as a declaration of his own individual opinion on this subject. The great Whig party never adopted it as one of the cardinal articles of their faith, until, smarting under disappointment, they saw their two favorite measures of the extra session fall beneath this power. It was then, and not till then, that the resolution, in effect to abolish it, was adopted by them as a party, in their manifesto. The present amendment proposes to carry this resolution into execution.
I should rather rely upon the judgment of the Senator from Kentucky on any other question, than in regard to the veto power. He has suffered so much from its exercise as to render it almost impossible that he can be an impartial judge. History will record the long and memorable struggle between himself and a distinguished ex-President, now in retirement. This was no common party strife. Their mighty war shook the whole Republic to its centre. The one swayed the majority in both Houses of Congress; whilst the other was sustained by a majority of the people. Under the lead of the one, Congress passed bills to establish a Bank of the United States;—to commence a system of internal improvements;—and to distribute the proceeds of the public lands among the several States; whilst the other, strong in his convictions of duty, and strong in his belief that the voice of the sovereign people would condemn these measures of their representatives, vetoed them every one. And what was the result? Without, upon the present occasion, expressing an opinion on any one of these questions, was it not rendered manifest that the President elected by the mass of the people, and directly responsible to them for his conduct, understood their will and their wishes better than the majority in the Senate and House of Representatives? No wonder then that the Senator from Kentucky should detest the veto power. It ought never to be torn from its foundation in the Constitution by the rash hands of a political party, impelled to the deed under the influence of defeated hopes and disappointed ambition.
I trust now that I shall be able to prove that the Senator from Kentucky has entirely mistaken the character of the veto power; that in its origin and nature it is peculiarly democratic; that in the qualified form in which it exists in our Constitution, it is but a mere appeal by the President of the people’s choice from the decision of Congress to the people themselves; and that whilst the exercise of this power has done much good, it never has been, and never can be, dangerous to the rights and liberties of the people.
This is not “an arbitrary and monarchical power;” it is not “a monarchical prerogative,” as it has been designated by the Senator. If it were, I should go with him, heart and hand, for its abolition. What is a monarchical prerogative? It is a power vested in an emperor or king, neither elected by, nor responsible to, the people, to maintain and preserve the privileges of his throne. The veto power in the hands of such a sovereign has never been exerted, and never will be exerted, except to arrest the progress of popular liberty, or what he may term popular encroachment. It is the character of the public agent on whom this power is conferred, and not the nature of the power itself, which stamps it either as democratic or arbitrary. In its origin we all know that it was purely democratic. It owes its existence to a revolt of the people of Rome against the tyrannical decrees of the Senate. They retired from the city to the Sacred Mount, and demanded the rights of freemen. They thus extorted from the aristocratic Senate a decree authorizing them annually to elect tribunes of the people. On these tribunes was conferred the power of annulling any decree of the Senate, by simply pronouncing the word “veto.” This very power was the only one by means of which the Democracy of Rome exercised any control over the government of the republic. It was their only safeguard against the oppression and encroachments of the aristocracy. It is true that it did not enable the people, through their tribunes, to originate laws; but it saved them from all laws of the Senate which encroached on their rights and liberties.
Now, sir, let me ask the Senator from Kentucky, was this an arbitrary and monarchical power? No, sir; it was strictly democratic. And why? Because it was exercised by tribunes elected by the people, and responsible annually to the people; and I shall now attempt to prove that the veto power, under our Constitution, is of a similar character.
Who is the President of the United States, by whom this power is to be exercised? He is a citizen, elected by his fellow-citizens to the highest official trust in the country, and directly responsible to them for the manner in which he shall discharge his duties. From the manner in which he is elected, he more nearly represents a majority of the whole people of the United States than any other branch of the Government. Sir, one-fourth of the people may elect a decided majority of the Senate. Under the Constitution, we are the representatives of sovereign States, and little Delaware has an equal voice in this body with the Empire State. How is it in regard to the House of Representatives? Without a resort to the gerrymandering process which of late years has become so common, it may often happen, from the arrangement of the Congressional districts, that a minority of the people of a State will elect a majority of representatives to Congress. Not so in regard to the President of the United States. From necessity, he must be elected by the mass of the people in the several States. He is the creature of the people—the mere breath of their nostrils—and on him, as the tribune of the people, have they conferred the veto power.
Is there any serious danger that such a magistrate will ever abuse this power? What earthly inducement can he have to pursue such a course? In the first place, during his first term, he will necessarily feel anxious to obtain the stamp of public approbation on his conduct, by a re-election. For this reason, if no other existed, he will not array himself, by the exercise of the veto power, against a majority in both Houses of Congress, unless in extreme cases, where, from strong convictions of public duty, he may be willing to draw down upon himself their hostile influence.
In the second place, the Constitution leaves him in a state of dependence on Congress. Without their support, no measure recommended by him can become a law, and no system of policy which he may have devised can be carried into execution. Deprived of their aid, he can do nothing. Upon their cordial co-operation the success and glory of his administration must, in a great degree, depend. Is it, then, at all probable that he would make war upon Congress, by refusing to sanction any one of their favorite measures, unless he felt deeply conscious that he was acting in obedience to the will of the people, and could appeal to them for support? Nothing short of such a conviction, unless it be to preserve his oath inviolate to support the Constitution, will ever induce him to exercise a power always odious in the eyes of the majority in Congress, against which it is exerted.
But there is still another powerful influence which will prevent his abuse of the veto power. The man who has been elevated by his fellow-citizens to the highest office of trust and dignity which a great nation can bestow, must necessarily feel a strong desire to have his name recorded in untarnished characters on the page of his country’s history, and to live after death in the hearts of his countrymen. This consideration would forbid the abuse of the veto power. What is posthumous fame in almost every instance? Is it not the voice of posterity re-echoing the opinion of the present generation? And what body on the earth can give so powerful an impulse to public opinion, at least in this country, as the Congress of the United States? Under all these circumstances, we must admit that the opinion expressed by the Federalist is sound, and that “it is evident that there would be greater danger of his not using his power when necessary, than of his using it too often or too much.” Such must also have been Mr. Jefferson’s opinion. When consulted by General Washington in April, 1792, as to the propriety of vetoing “the act for an apportionment of Representatives among the several States, according to the first enumeration,” what was his first reason in favor of the exercise of this power upon that occasion? “Viewing the bill,” says he, “either as a violation of the Constitution, or as giving an inconvenient exposition to its words, is it a case wherein the President ought to interpose his negative?” “I think it is.” “The non user of his negative power begins already to excite a belief that no President will ever venture to use it; and consequently, has begotten a desire to raise up barriers in the State legislatures against Congress throwing off the control of the Constitution.” I shall not read the other reasons he has assigned, none of them being necessary for my present purpose. Perilous, indeed, I repeat, is the exercise of the veto power, and “no President will ever venture to use it,” unless from the strongest sense of duty, and the strongest conviction that it will receive the public approbation.
But, after all, what is the nature of this qualified veto under the Constitution? It is, in fact, but an appeal taken by the President from the decision of Congress, in a particular case, to the tribunal of the sovereign people of the several States, who are equally the masters of both. If they decide against the President, their decision must finally prevail, by the admission of the Senator himself. The same President must either carry it into execution himself, or the next President whom they elect, will do so. The veto never can do more than postpone legislative action on the measure of which it is the subject, until the will of the people can be fairly expressed. This suspension of action, if the people should not sustain the President, will not generally continue longer than two years, and it cannot continue longer than four. If the people, at the next elections, should return a majority to Congress hostile to the veto, and the same measure should be passed a second time, he must indeed be a bold man, and intent upon his own destruction, who would, a second time, arrest it by his veto. After the popular voice has determined the question, the President would always submit, unless, by so doing, he clearly believed he would involve himself in the guilt of perjury, by violating his oath to support the Constitution. At the end of four years, however, in any and every event, the popular will must and would be obeyed by the election of another President.
Sir, the Senator from Kentucky, in one of those beautiful passages which always abound in his speeches, has drawn a glowing picture of the isolated condition of kings, whose ears the voice of public opinion is never permitted to reach; and he has compared their condition in this particular, with that of the President of the United States. Here too, he said, the Chief Magistrate occupied an isolated station, where the voice of his country and the cries of its distress could not reach his ear. But is there any justice in this comparison? Such a picture may be true to the life when drawn for an European monarch; but it has no application whatever to a President of the United States. He, sir, is no more than the first citizen of this free Republic. No form is required in approaching his person, which can prevent the humblest of his fellow-citizens from communicating with him. In approaching him, a freeman of this land is not compelled to decorate himself in fantastic robes, or adopt any particular form of dress, such as the court etiquette of Europe requires. The President, intermingles freely with his fellow-citizens, and hears the opinions of all. The public press attacks him—political parties, in and out of Congress, assail him, and the thunders of the Senator’s own denunciatory eloquence are reverberated from the Capitol, and reach the White House before its incumbent can lay his head upon his pillow. His every act is subjected to the severest scrutiny, and he reads in the newspapers of the day the decrees of public opinion. Indeed, it is the privilege of everybody to assail him. To contend that such a Chief Magistrate is isolated from the people, is to base an argument upon mere fancy, and not upon facts. No, sir; the President of the United States is more directly before the people, and more immediately responsible, than any other department of our Government: and woe be to that President who shall ever affect to withdraw from the public eye, and seclude himself in the recesses of the Executive mansion!
The Senator has said, and with truth, that no veto of the President has ever been overruled, since the origin of the Government. Not one. Although he introduced this fact for another purpose than that which now induces me to advert to it, yet it is not the less true on that account. Is not this the strongest possible argument to prove that there never yet has been a veto, in violation of the public will?
[Here Mr. Clay observed that there had been repeated instances of majorities in Congress deciding against vetoes.]
Mr. Buchanan resumed. I am now speaking of majorities, not of Congress, but of the people. I shall speak of majorities in Congress presently.
Why, sir, has no veto been ever overruled? Simply because the President has never exercised, and never will exercise, this perilous power on any important occasion, unless firmly convinced that he is right, and that he will be sustained by the people. Standing alone, with the whole responsibility of his high official duties pressing upon him, he will never brave the enormous power and influence of Congress, unless he feels a moral certainty that the people will come to the rescue. When he ventures to differ from Congress and appeal to the people, the chances are all against him. The members of the Senate and the House are numerous, and are scattered over the whole country, whilst the President is but an individual confined to the city of Washington. Their personal influence with their constituents is, and must be, great. In such a struggle, he must mainly rely upon the palpable justice of his cause. Under these circumstances, does it not speak volumes in favor of the discretion with which the veto power has been exercised, that it has never once been overruled, in a single instance, since the origin of the Government, either by a majority of the people in the several States, or by the constitutional majority in Congress.
It is truly astonishing how rarely this power has ever been exercised. During the period of more than half a century which has elapsed since the meeting of the first Congress under the Constitution, about six thousand legislative acts have been passed. How many of these, sir, do you suppose have been disapproved by the President? Twenty, sir; twenty is the whole number. I speak from a list now in my hand prepared by one of the clerks of the Senate. And this number embraces not merely those bills which have been actually vetoed; but all such as were retained by him under the Constitution, in consequence of having been presented at so late a period of the session that he could not prepare his objections previous to the adjournment. Twenty is the sum total of all!
Let us analyze these vetoes (for I shall call them all by that name) for a few moments. Of the twenty, eight were on bills of small comparative importance, and excited no public attention. Congress at once yielded to the President’s objections, and in one remarkable instance, a veto of General Jackson was laid upon the table on the motion of the Senator from Kentucky himself. No attempt was even made to pass the bill in opposition to this veto, and no one Senator contested its propriety. Eleven of the twelve remaining vetoes upon this list, relate to only three subjects. These are, a Bank of the United States; internal improvements in different forms; and the distribution of the proceeds of the public lands among the several States. There have been four vetoes of a Bank of the United States; one by Mr. Madison, one by General Jackson, and two by Mr. Tyler. There have been six vetoes on internal improvements, in different forms; one by Mr. Madison, one by Mr. Monroe, and four by General Jackson. And General Jackson vetoed the bill to distribute the proceeds of the sales of the public lands among the several States. These make the eleven.
The remaining veto was by General Washington; and it is remarkable that it should be the most questionable exercise of this power which has ever occurred. I refer to his second and last veto, on the first of March, 1797, and but three days before he retired from office, on the “Act to alter and amend an act, entitled an act to ascertain and fix the military establishment of the United States.” In this instance, there was a majority of nearly two-thirds in the House of Representatives, where it originated, in favor of passing the act, notwithstanding the objections of the Father of his Country. The vote was fifty-five in the affirmative to thirty-six in the negative. This act provided for the reduction of the military establishment of the country; and the day will probably never again arrive when any President will venture to veto an act reducing the standing army of the United States.
Then in the range of time since the year 1789, there have been but twenty vetoes; and eleven of these related to only three subjects which have radically divided the two great political parties of the country. With the exception of twenty, all of the acts which have ever passed Congress, have been allowed to take their course without any executive interference.
That this power has never been abused, is as clear as the light of the sun. I ask Senators, and I appeal to you, sir, whether the American people have not sanctioned every one of the vetoes on the three great subjects to which I have referred. Yes, sir, every one, not excepting those on the Fiscal Bank and Fiscal Corporation—the leading measures of the extra session. Notwithstanding the solemn denunciation against the President, made by the Whig party, and their appeal to the people, there has been no election held since that session in which the people have not declared, in a voice of thunder, their approbation of the two vetoes of President Tyler. I shall not, upon the present occasion, discuss the question whether all or any of these vetoes were right or wrong. I merely state the incontrovertible fact that they have all been approved by the American people.
The character of the bills vetoed shows conclusively the striking contrast between the veto power when entrusted to an elective and responsible chief magistrate, and when conferred upon a European sovereign as a royal prerogative. All the vetoes which an American President has imposed on any important act of Congress, except the one by General Washington, to which I have alluded, have been so many instances of self-denial. These acts have all been returned, accompanied by messages remonstrating against the extension of executive power, which they proposed to grant. Exerting the influence which these acts proposed to confer upon him, the President might, indeed, have made long strides towards the attainment of monarchical power. Had a national bank been established under his control, uniting the moneyed with the political power of the country; had a splendid system of internal improvementsimprovements been adopted and placed under his direction, presenting prospects of pecuniary advantage to almost every individual throughout the land; and in addition to all this, had the States become pensioners on the bounty of the Federal Government for the amount of the proceeds of the sales of the public lands, we might soon have witnessed a powerful consolidated Government, with a chief at its head, far different from the plain and unpretending President recognized by the Constitution. The General Government might then have become everything, whilst the State governments would have sunk to nothing. Thanks to the vetoes of our Presidents, and not to Congress, that most of these evils have been averted. Had these acts been all approved by the President, it is my firm conviction that the Senator himself would as deeply have deplored the consequences as any other true patriot, and that he would forever have regretted his own agency in substantially changing the form of our Government. Had these bills become laws, the executive power would then have strode over all the other powers of the Constitution; and then, indeed, the Senator might have justly compared the President of the United States with the monarchs of Europe. Our Presidents have had the self-denying firmness to render all these attempts abortive to bestow on themselves extraordinary powers, and have been content to confine themselves to those powers conferred on them by the Constitution. They have protected the rights of the States and of the people from the unconstitutional means of influence which Congress had placed within their grasp. Such have been the consequences of the veto power in the hands of our elective chief magistrate.