"(1) We are prepared to surrender our independence as regards foreign relations. (2) We wish to retain self-government under British supervision. (3) We are prepared to surrender a part of our territory."
What then happened can be told in the words of Lord Kitchener's telegram to the Secretary for War:
"Lord Milner and I refused to accept these terms as a basis for negotiation, as they differ essentially from the principles laid down by His Majesty's Government. After a long discussion, nothing was decided, and it was determined to meet in the afternoon. The Commission met again at 4 p.m., when Lord Milner proposed a form of document that might be submitted to the burghers for a 'Yes' or 'No' vote. There was a good deal of objection to this, but it was agreed finally that Lord Milner should meet Smuts and Hertzog with a view of drafting, as far as possible, an acceptable document on the Botha lines.[331] They will meet to-morrow for that purpose. Lord Milner stipulated for the assistance of Sir Richard Solomon in the preparation of the draft document."[332]
The "long discussion" of May 19th, to which Lord Kitchener refers, is to be found in the minutes of the conferences held at Pretoria between May 19th and 28th. It affords an exhibition of gross disingenuousness on the part of the Boer commissioners. Almost in the same breath they allege that their proposal is "not necessarily in contradiction to"[333] the Middelburg terms; admit that there is a "fundamental difference" between the two proposals, but ask that their own may be accepted, nevertheless, as the basis of negotiation;[334] and finally maintain that, as it is "nearly equivalent"[335] to the Middelburg terms, they need not "insist so much" upon it.[336] To all this Lord Milner has but one answer: "It is impossible for us to take your proposal into consideration."
On May 21st the document drafted by Lord Milner and Sir R. Solomon in consultation with Mr. Smuts (General and ex-State Attorney of the Transvaal) and Mr. Hertzog (General and late Judge of the Free State High Court) on the preceding day, was read at a plenary meeting of the negotiators. In the main the document was accepted with little demur; but a long discussion arose on the question of the degree in which the the British Government would recognise the debts incurred by military and civil officers of the late Republics in the course of the war. The Boers desired that all Government notes and all receipts given by their officers for goods, whether commandeered or not, should be recognised to be part of the liabilities of the Republican Governments for which the new Government was to become responsible. Lord Milner, on the other hand, expressed the opinion that such a demand was very unreasonable. The British Government would take over, with the assets of the Republican Governments, all liabilities existing at the time when the war broke out, but it could not be expected to pay for expenses actually incurred by the Boer leaders in carrying on a war against itself, which was, in its later stages, at any rate, utterly indefensible. The British people, he said—
"would much prefer to pay a large sum at the conclusion of hostilities with the object of bettering the condition of the people who have been fighting against them, than to pay a much smaller sum to meet the costs incurred by the Republics during the war."
As, however, the principle of the recognition of these notes and receipts had been conceded in the Middelburg terms, he was willing, with Lord Kitchener's concurrence, to refer the matter to the Home Government, although he disapproved of the clause in question in the Middelburg terms.
This point was thus left to be settled by the Home Government, and the clause which they drafted to deal with it was that which ultimately became Article X. of the Terms of Surrender. That clause represented a compromise between the desire of the Boer leaders to have a definite sum allotted for the payment of debts contracted by them in the course of the war, and Lord Milner's desire to ignore these debts but to make a free grant for the relief of the Boer people. The British Government followed Lord Milner in making such a free grant—£3,000,000—and in rejecting the claim of the Boer leaders that this sum should be devoted to the payment of the promissory notes and receipts issued by them but it nevertheless allowed such notes and receipts to be submitted "as evidence of war losses" to the commissioners who were to be appointed to distribute the £3,000,000 grant.
The minutes of these discussions reveal very clearly the difference in the respective attitudes of the High Commissioner and the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Kitchener was the humane and successful general, anxious to bring the miseries of the war to an end, and anxious, too, to close a campaign which, in spite of its difficult and arduous character, had afforded little or no opportunity of reaping military honours commensurate to the skill and endurance of the army or the sacrifices of the nation. Lord Milner was the far-sighted statesman, responsible for the future well-being of British South Africa, and, above all, the jealous trustee of the rights and interests of the empire. At this meeting, when the draft terms are being discussed before they are telegraphed to London, Lord Milner is exceedingly careful to point out to the Boer commissioners that the actual text of the document, as expressed in English, when once accepted, must be regarded as the sole record of the terms of surrender. After reading the proposed draft, he says: "If we come to an agreement, it will be the English document which will be wired to England, on which His Majesty's Government will decide, and which will be signed." To Mr. Smuts' suggestion that it is not necessary to place a "formal clause" in the draft agreement, if the British Government is prepared to meet the Boer commissioners in a particular matter, he replies:
"As I look at the matter, the Government is making certain promises in this document, and I consider that all promises to which a reference may be made later should appear in it. Everything to which the Government is asked to bind itself should appear in this document, and nothing else. I do not object to clauses being added, but I wish to prevent any possible misunderstanding."
And again, in the course of the same meeting, we find him saying: "You must put in writing every point that strikes you, and let them be laid before His Majesty's Government." And, to prevent any possible misconstruction of Lord Kitchener's statement, "there is a pledge that the matter [the question of the payment of receipts] will be properly considered," he says:
"Yes, naturally, if we put anything down in writing. I am convinced that it is necessary to make it quite clear that this document must contain everything about which there is anything in the form of a pledge."
And before telegraphing the draft agreement to the Home Government he draws the attention of the commissioners in the most explicit language to the fact that the Middelburg proposal has been "completely annulled"; and that, therefore, if the draft agreement should be signed, there must be "no attempt to explain the document, or its terms, by anything in the Middelburg proposal."
The greatness of the debt owed by England and the empire to Lord Milner for the inflexible determination with which he penetrated, unmasked, and finally baffled the tortuous diplomacy of the Boer commissioners may be estimated from the fact that within three months of the signing of the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria, three out of their number asked the British Government to re-open the discussion and make, what Mr. Chamberlain rightly termed, "an entirely new agreement." As it was, Lord Milner's faultless precision during the whole progress of the negotiations at Pretoria provided the Home Government with a complete answer to the representatives of the Boer "delegates."
"It would not be in accordance with my duty," wrote Mr. Chamberlain,[337] "to enter upon any discussion of proposals of this kind, some of which were rejected at the conferences at Pretoria; while others, which were not even mentioned on those occasions, would certainly not have been accepted at any time by His Majesty's Government."
At the close of the afternoon meeting (May 21st) the draft agreement was telegraphed to the Home Government. On the 27th Mr. Chamberlain informed Lord Milner by telegram that the Cabinet approved of the submission of this document with certain minor alterations, and with the new clause dealing with the grant of £3,000,000, to the Assembly at Vereeniging. Meanwhile the nature of the penalties to be inflicted upon the colonial rebels, a subject which had been discussed in private conversations between the Boer leaders and Lords Kitchener and Milner, but which was excluded from the "Terms of Surrender," had been settled by communications which had passed between Lord Milner and Mr. Chamberlain and the Governments of the Cape and Natal. The reason for this course was that the Home Government and Lord Milner, while they objected on principle to the treatment of rebels being made part of the agreement with the surrendering enemy, were nevertheless quite willing that the latter should be informed of the clemency which it was, in any case, intended to show to the rebels. The Terms of Surrender, in the form given to them by the Home Government, and the statement of the treatment to be meted out to the rebels by their respective Governments, were communicated to the Boer commissioners on May 28th. At the same time they were distinctly told that His Majesty's Government was not prepared to listen to any suggestion of further modifications of the Terms, but that they must be submitted to the assembly for a "Yes" or "No" vote as an unalterable whole. The Boer commissioners left at 7 o'clock in the evening of the same day for Vereeniging, and on the day following the Terms of Surrender were submitted to the "Yes" or "No" vote of the burgher representatives. One other point had been raised and settled between Lord Milner and the Home Government. Under the Proclamation of August 7th, 1901, certain of the Boer leaders were liable to the penalties of confiscation and banishment. Lord Milner was of opinion, however, that in view of the general surrender this proclamation should be "tacitly dropped," although property already confiscated under its terms could not, of course, be restored; and in this view the Home Government concurred.
The text of the document submitted to the burgher representatives at Vereeniging on May 29th was as follows:
"Draft Agreement as to the Terms of Surrender of the Boer Forces in the Field, approved by His Majesty's Government.
"His Excellency General Lord Kitchener and his Excellency Lord Milner, on behalf of the British Government, and Messrs. M. T. Steyn, J. Brebner, General C. R. De Wet, General C. Olivier, and Judge J. B. M. Hertzog, acting as the Government of the Orange Free State, and Messrs. S. W. Burger, F. W. Reitz, Generals Louis Botha, J. H. Delarey, Lucas Meyer, Krogh, acting as the Government of the South African Republic, on behalf of their respective burghers desirous to terminate the present hostilities, agree on the following articles:
The surrender agreement."1. The burgher forces in the field will forthwith lay down their arms, handing over all guns, rifles, and munitions of war in their possession or under their control, and desist from any further resistance to the authority of His Majesty King Edward VII., whom they recognise as their lawful Sovereign. The manner and details of this surrender will be arranged between Lord Kitchener and Commandant-General Botha, Assistant Commandant-General Delarey, and Chief Commandant De Wet.
"2. All burghers in the field outside the limits of the Transvaal or Orange River Colony, and all prisoners of war at present outside South Africa who are burghers will, on duly declaring their acceptance of the position of subjects of His Majesty King Edward VII., be gradually brought back to their homes as soon as transport can be provided, and their means of subsistence ensured.
"3. The burghers so surrendering or so returning will not be deprived of their personal liberty or their property.
"4. No proceedings, civil or criminal, will be taken against any of the burghers surrendering or so returning for any acts in connection with the prosecution of the war. The benefit of this clause will not extend to certain acts, contrary to usages of war, which have been notified by the Commander-in-Chief to the Boer generals, and which shall be tried by court-martial immediately after the close of hostilities.
"5. The Dutch language will be taught in public schools in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony where the parents of the children desire it, and will be allowed in courts of law when necessary for the better and more effectual administration of justice.
"6. The possession of rifles will be allowed in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony to persons requiring them for their protection, on taking out a licence according to law.
"7. Military administration in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony will at the earliest possible date be succeeded by civil government, and, as soon as circumstances permit, representative institutions, leading up to self-government, will be introduced.
"8. The question of granting the franchise to the natives will not be decided until after the introduction of self-government.
"9. No special tax will be imposed on landed property in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony to defray the expenses of the war.
"10. As soon as conditions permit, a Commission, on which the local inhabitants will be represented, will be appointed in each district of the Transvaal and Orange River Colony, under the presidency of a magistrate or other official, for the purposes of assisting the restoration of the people to their homes, and supplying those who, owing to war losses, are unable to provide themselves with food, shelter, and the necessary amount of seed, stock, implements, etc., indispensable to the resumption of their normal occupation.
"His Majesty's Government will place at the disposal of these Commissions a sum of £3,000,000 for the above purposes, and will allow all notes issued under Law 1 of 1900 of the South African Republic, and all receipts given by officers in the field of the late Republics, or under their orders, to be presented to a Judicial Commission, which will be appointed by the Government, and if such notes and receipts are found by this Commission to have been duly issued in return for valuable considerations, they will be received by the first-named Commissions as evidence of war losses suffered by the persons to whom they were originally given.
"In addition to the above-named free grant of £3,000,000, His Majesty's Government will be prepared to make advances on loan for the same purposes free of interest for two years, and afterwards repayable over a period of years with 3 per cent. interest. No foreigner or rebel will be entitled to the benefit of this clause."[338]
To this must be added the following statement as to the punishment of the colonial rebels, a copy of which was handed to the Boer commissioners on May 28th, after it (together with the Terms of Surrender) had been read to them by Lord Milner.
"His Majesty's Government must place it on record that the treatment of Cape and Natal colonists who have been in rebellion and who now surrender will, if they return to their colonies, be determined by the colonial Governments and in accordance with the laws of the colonies, and that any British subjects who have joined the enemy will be liable to trial under the law of that part of the British Empire to which they belong.
"His Majesty's Government are informed by the Cape Government that the following are their views as to the terms which should be granted to British subjects of Cape Colony who are now in the field, or who have surrendered, or have been captured since 12th April, 1901:
"With regard to the rank and file, they should all, upon surrender, after giving up their arms, sign a document before the resident magistrate of the district in which the surrender takes place acknowledging themselves guilty of high treason, and the punishment to be awarded to them, provided they shall not have been guilty of murder or other acts contrary to the usages of civilised warfare, should be that they shall not be entitled for life[339] to be registered as voters or to vote at any Parliamentary Divisional Council, or municipal election. With reference to justices of the peace and field-cornets of Cape Colony and all other persons holding an official position under the Government of Cape Colony or who may occupy the position of commandant of rebel or burgher forces, they shall be tried for high treason before the ordinary court of the country or such special court as may be hereafter constituted by law, the punishment for their offence to be left to the discretion of the court, with this proviso, that in no case shall the penalty of death be inflicted.
"The Natal Government are of opinion that rebels should be dealt with according to the law of the Colony."[340]
With the departure of the Boer commissioners from Pretoria the final stage of the protracted negotiations had been reached, but it still required three days of discussion (May 29th-31st) before the assembly at Vereeniging could be brought to accept the inevitable. On the morning of the 29th the delegates assembled in the tent provided by the British military authorities, and a report of the proceedings of the peace conferences at Pretoria, drawn up by the Boer commissioners on the preceding evening, was read. Mr. Schalk Burger, as Acting President of the South African Republic, then announced that the meeting was called upon to decide which of three possible courses should be taken—to continue the war, to accept the British terms, or to surrender unconditionally.[341] The rest of the morning sitting, and part of the afternoon sitting, were occupied by the delegates in questioning the commissioners as to the meaning of the various Articles in the Terms of Surrender. According to the understanding between the Boer commissioners and the British authorities, the Surrender Agreement should have been submitted forthwith to the delegates for acceptance or rejection. This course was actually proposed, but a resolution to that effect was immediately negatived on the ground that "the matter was too important to be treated with so much haste." The explanation of the delay is probably to be found in the circumstance that, although the Boer leaders had left Pretoria convinced, as a body, of both the desirability and the necessity of accepting the British terms, Accepting the inevitable. each of them was anxious, individually, to avoid any action which would fix the responsibility of the surrender upon himself. They refrained, therefore, as long as possible from any decisive declaration, each one desiring that his neighbour should be the first to speak the final word. And so, instead of the question of submission being put to the vote immediately after the delegates had acquainted themselves with the actual meaning of the Surrender Agreement, two days were consumed in a long and protracted discussion, and the British terms were not accepted until the afternoon of Saturday, the 31st, the latest possible moment within the limit of time fixed by the British Commander-in-Chief. In this long debate Louis Botha consistently advocated submission; but De Wet spoke more than once in favour of continuing the war. One of the arguments used by the Free State Commander-in-Chief is instructive. "Remembering that the sympathy for us, which is to be found in England itself," he said, "may be regarded as being, for all practical purposes, a sort of indirect intervention, I maintain that this terrible struggle must be continued." The really decisive utterance seems to have come in the form of a long and eloquent speech delivered by Mr. Smuts, the substance of which lies in the fine sentence: "We must not sacrifice the Afrikander nation itself upon the altar of independence." From this moment the discussion increased in vehemence, until, in the words of the minutes, "after a time of heated dispute—for every man was preparing himself for the bitter end—they came to an agreement." Then a long resolution, drawn up by Hertzog and Smuts, and empowering the commissioners to sign the Surrender Agreement, was adopted by 54 to 6 votes.
After the vote on the British terms had been taken, a resolution constituting a committee[342] to collect funds for the destitute Boers was passed; and the Peace Commissioners, having telegraphed the decision of the delegates to Lord Kitchener, hastened back by train to sign the Surrender Agreement at Pretoria.
Late in the afternoon of May 31st, Lord Milner, who had returned to Johannesburg on the 28th, and had been busily engaged on administrative matters while the discussion at Vereeniging was going on, was informed that Lord Kitchener wished to speak to him on the telephone. Then, along the wire, in the familiar voice of the Commander-in-Chief, came the welcome words: "It is peace." There was just time to pack up and catch the half-past six train, which brought the High Commissioner to Pretoria at a quarter past eight. Lord Milner and his staff, when at Pretoria, habitually stayed at the former British Agency, but this night he dined with Lord Kitchener; and here, at Lord Kitchener's house, the Boer commissioners appeared at about 10 o'clock, and just before eleven (May 31st) the Surrender Agreement was signed.[343]
The words used by the Boer leaders in the course of the debates at Vereeniging afford culminating and conclusive evidence of the hollowness of the two allegations upon which both the Boer sympathisers in England and the hostile critics of the British people abroad, based their denunciations of the policy and conduct of the war in South Africa. The war was unnecessary; it was a war of aggression forced upon the Boers by the British Government, said the enemies of England, and those Englishmen who, like Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, wrote and spoke as though they belonged to the enemy. Very different is the account of the origin of the war, which Acting President Schalk-Burger gave to the remnant of his fellow countrymen in this day of truth-telling.
"Undoubtedly we began this war strong in the faith of God," he said; "but there were also one or two other things to rely upon. We had considerable confidence in our own weapons; we under-estimated the enemy; the fighting spirit had seized upon our people; and the thought of victory had banished that of the possibility of defeat."
And Mr. J. L. Meyer, a member of the Government of the Republic, and one of the few progressive Boers whose judgment had not been clouded by the fever of war passion, said: "In the past I was against the war; I wished that the five years' franchise should be granted;" and this "although the people had opposed" the measure. And Mr. Advocate Smuts, State-Attorney to the late South African Republic, and then a general of the Boer forces in the field, said: "I am one of those who, as members of the Government of the South African Republic, provoked the war with England." This is evidence which we may believe, since in the circumstances in which these men met the Father of Lies himself would have found no occasion for departing from the truth.
No less conclusive is the admission, made with perfect frankness now that shifts and deceits and calumnies were no longer of any use, that the Boers, whatever they said, had proved by their acts that they regarded the burgher camps as havens of refuge, not "methods of barbarism"; and that it was Lord Kitchener's refusal to admit any more Boer non-combatants to the shelter of the British lines that brought the guerilla leaders to Pretoria to sue for peace. On May 29th General de Wet, in a last effort to induce the burghers to prolong the war, said:
"I am asked what I mean to do with the women and children. That is a very difficult question to answer. We must have faith. I think also we might meet the emergency in this way—a part of the men should be told off to lay down their arms for the sake of the women, and then they could take the women with them to the English in the towns."
But Commandant-General Louis Botha doubted the possibility of any longer carrying this plan into effect.
"When the war began," he said, on May 30th, "we had plenty of provisions, and a commando could remain for weeks in one spot without the local food running out. Our families, too, were then well provided for. But all this is now changed. One is only too thankful nowadays to know that our wives are under English protection. This question of our woman-folk is one of our greatest difficulties. What are we to do with them? One man answers that some of the burghers should surrender themselves to the English, and take the women with them. But most of the women now amongst us are the wives of men already prisoners. And how can we expect those not their own kith and kin to be willing to give up liberty for their sakes?"
And at the earlier meeting (May 16th) he said:
"If this meeting decides upon war, it will have to make provision for our wives and children, who will then be exposed to every kind of danger. Throughout this war the presence of the women has caused me anxiety and much distress. At first I managed to get them into the townships, but later on this became impossible, because the English refused to receive them. I then conceived the idea of getting a few of our burghers to surrender, and sending the women in with them. But this plan was not practicable, because most of the families were those of prisoners of war, and the men still on commando were not so closely related to these families as to be willing to sacrifice their freedom for them."
Equally illuminating is the testimony which General Botha bore to the efficiency of Lord Kitchener's system of blockhouses and protected areas.
"A year ago," he said on May 16th, "there were no blockhouses. We could cross and recross the country as we wished, and harass the enemy at every turn. But now things wear a very different aspect. We can pass the blockhouses by night indeed, but never by day. They are likely to prove the ruin of our commandos."
And again—
"There is a natural reason, a military reason, why [we have managed to hold out so long]. The fact that our commandos have been spread over so large a tract of country has compelled the British, up to the present time, to divide their forces. But things have changed now; we have had to abandon district after district, and must now operate on a far more limited territory. In other words, the British Army can at last concentrate its forces upon us."
To this may be added his admission (May 30th) of the impossibility of again attempting to raise a revolt in the Cape Colony.
"Commander-in-Chief de Wet ... had a large force, and the season of the year was auspicious for his attempt, and yet he failed. How then shall we succeed in winter, and with horses so weak that they can only go op-een-stap?"[344]
Elsewhere the minutes of the burgher meetings afford even more direct evidence of the fact that it was the desperate condition of the Boers, and not any desire to make friends with a generous opponent, that led them to surrender. "To continue the war," says General Botha on May 30th, "must result, in the end, in our extermination."... The terms of the English Government "may not be very advantageous to us, but nevertheless they rescue us from an almost impossible position." And Acting-President Schalk-Burger: "I have no great opinion of the document which lies before us: to me it holds out no inducement to stop the war. If I feel compelled to treat for peace" ... it is because "by holding out I should dig the nation's grave.... Fell a tree, and it will sprout again; uproot it and there is an end of it. What has the nation done to deserve extinction?" De Wet himself and the majority of the Free State representatives advocated the continuation of the war at the Vereeniging meetings. But in the brief description of the final meeting which he gives in his book,[345] he writes:
"There were sixty of us there, and each in turn must answer Yes or No. It was an ultimatum—this proposal of England. What were we to do? To continue the struggle meant extermination."
Even more significant than these admissions is the spirit in which the question of submission is discussed. There is no recognition of the moral obliquity of the Boer oligarchy, or of the generosity of the British terms. Physical compulsion is the sole argument to which their minds are open. At the very moment when the sixty representatives agreed to accept the British terms, and thereby to acknowledge the sovereignty of the British Crown, they passed a resolution affirming their "well-founded" claim to "independence." History may well ask, On what was this claim based? Judged by the ethical standard,[346] the Boers had shown themselves utterly unworthy of the administrative autonomy conferred upon them by Great Britain. Judged by the laws of war,[347] they had been saved from the alternatives of physical annihilation or abject submission by the almost quixotic generosity of the enemy who fed and housed their non-combatant population. From a constitutional point of view, the presence of Article IV.[348] in the London Convention was in itself sufficient to refute the claim of the republic to be a "sovereign international state."
Obviously the quality of mercy was strained to the point of danger by the grant of terms to such a people. It will always remain a question whether it would not have been better policy, instead of negotiating at all, to wait for that unconditional surrender of the Boers which, as the discussion at Vereeniging clearly shows, could only have been deferred for a very few months. But, granting that the course actually pursued was the right one, little fault can be found with the terms actually agreed to. No doubt they were generous, but they gave the British Government practically a free hand to shape the settlement of the country, and left it to them to decide at what time, and by what stages, to establish self-government in the new colonies. The two respects in which the Vereeniging terms seemed at first sight dangerously lenient were the undertaking to allow the Boers to possess rifles for their protection and the recognition of the Dutch language in the law courts and public schools. Yet both of these concessions are justified by considerations of practical convenience and sound policy. In respect of the first it must be remembered that in certain districts of the Transvaal the population is composed of a very small number of Europeans, almost exclusively Boers, living in isolated homesteads, together with a native population many times as numerous and still under the immediate authority of its tribal chiefs. The refusal to allow the Boers thus circumstanced to provide themselves with the only weapons sufficient to protect them against occasional Kafir outrages and depredations would have thrown a heavy responsibility upon the new administration, or involved it in an altogether disproportionate expenditure on European and native police. At the same time, in view of the smallness of the Boer population in such districts, the necessity for obtaining a licence (required under the clause in question) provided the Government with an efficient remedy against incipient disaffection. For under the licence system—a system generally adopted as a check upon the acquisition of arms by the natives in South Africa—the number of rifles possessed by the Boers in any particular district would be known to the Government; while, at the same time, the power to refuse or withdraw the privilege of possessing a rifle from any person believed to be disaffected to British rule would form an additional safeguard.
In respect of the second concession, there could be no question, of course, as to the desirability of hastening the general adoption of English as the common language of the Europeans of both races in South Africa. But any attempt to proscribe the Dutch language would have resulted in creating an obstinate desire to preserve it on the part of the Boers, coupled with a sense of injury; and would, therefore, have retarded rather than advanced the object in view. In these circumstances the decision to rely mainly upon the natural inclination of the more enlightened Boers to secure for their children the material advantages which a knowledge of English would bring them, was the right one. And the policy which this clause allowed the new administration to pursue may be described as that of a modified "free trade in language"—that is to say, free trade up to, but not beyond, the point at which the toleration of Dutch would not impede the convenient and efficient discharge of the ordinary business of administration. It is doubtful, however, whether either of these concessions were justifiable except on the assumption that full self-government would not be granted to either of the new colonies until a British or loyalist majority was assured.
But, whatever the ultimate result of the Terms of Vereeniging, their immediate effect was to leave the High Commissioner with complete freedom of initiative, but with a no less complete responsibility for the complex and difficult task of economic and administrative reconstruction which now awaited him. How this task—at once more congenial and more especially his own—was discharged is a matter that must be left for a second volume. In the meantime the conclusion of the Surrender Agreement is no unfitting stage at which to bring the review of the first period of Lord Milner's administration to a close.[Back to Contents]