The answer appears to be found in the simple solution of good training. We must teach our men that when they get into such positions they must use the cover afforded, but for no longer than any other fire-position, and that they must get into the habit in peace of looking upon such localities with suspicion, and with the knowledge that they are not suitable for lengthy occupation in war, if the battle is to be won.
We now come to a still more difficult question of training, namely, how far can the company get forward from the bank without being compelled to stop in order to gain superiority of fire over the defense? In war we want to get as close as possible; the moral effect on the defense is greater, our fire is more effective, and we are likely to gain our object more rapidly. In peace there is no fire to stop us, and we move forward to ridiculous positions which we could not possibly reach in war without first gaining superiority of fire. The result of this is that we try to do the same thing when first we go to war, and we are stopped, probably much further back than we should have been if we had studied the question in peace.
Even on the most open ground we must get to within 600 yards of the enemy, and if the ground affords any cover in front, the exposed space must be rushed and the more forward position gained. Having pointed out this difficulty to the company during the previous lecture, and reminded them of it on the ground, we can now extend the whole company and move forward from the bank, using covering fire and letting each platoon commander decide how far he can get to the front after a series of rushes, the company acting as a whole.
The captain can then go down the line and discuss with each platoon the position it has reached. Whilst he is doing this, the remaining platoons can be trained in fire direction and control, which should be carefully watched and criticized by the platoon commanders. One platoon, owing to the nature of the ground in front of it, can get forward further than other platoons, and this should be brought home to each platoon, so as to avoid the possibility of playing the game of follow your leader, and one platoon halting merely because another has halted.
If there is still time available, and the ground is suitable, the company can be moved to a flank to choose a similar fire-position where the ground is more favorable to an advance, and where the company could get within 300 yards of the enemy, or even less, before it would be absolutely necessary to stop in order to gain superiority of fire.
If there is still time available, and the ground is suitable, the whole operation can be carried out in the opposite direction or in some other direction, and the platoons can thus be trained to appreciate that fire-positions which are good in one place are bad in another.
936. Defense. Demonstrations in defense can be carried out in a similar manner, the captain explaining to the company the general line of defense to be taken up, the portion allotted to the company, and the probable direction of the enemy's attack.
The coöperation of the artillery and infantry will have been pointed out in the previous lecture: how some part of the enemy's advance will be dealt with by artillery alone, some part by both artillery and infantry, and some part by infantry alone.
This can now be pointed out to the men on the ground. Having considered the assistance provided by the artillery, the next point to decide upon is the exact position of the fire trench. The best way to proceed is to allot a certain portion of the front occupied by the company to each platoon and to let the platoon commanders take charge of the operations. The platoon commander can direct one of his squads to select a position for the trench, and that squad can lie down there. The remaining squads will then select a position in turn. If two squads select the same they can lie down together. The platoon commander will then fall in his platoon, and make them lie down in the most retired position chosen; he will ask the squad leader why the squad chose that locality in preference to any other, why they did not go ten yards further forward or ten yards further back; and he will explain to the whole platoon the advantages and disadvantages of selecting this locality. He will then move the whole platoon forward to the next position chosen by another squad and deal with that locality. Finally, he will select the position he thinks the best, giving his reasons why he has decided upon it, and place the whole platoon on it. When all the platoons have decided upon their line of defense, the captain will move the whole company in turn from the ground occupied by one platoon to that occupied by another, asking the platoon commander in each case to explain why the position was chosen in preference to any other.
He will give his decision as regards each platoon, and he will finally arrange for the position to be occupied by the whole company. One platoon, for some good reason, may have chosen a place which it would not be safe to occupy, owing to the fire of another platoon on the flank. Another platoon may have chosen a place which was very good as regards the field of fire in a direction which was already adequately defended by another platoon, but which had a bad field of fire over ground which no other platoon could fire upon. The company commander would adjust all these matters, and in the end one or more platoons might not be placed in the best position as regards their own particular front, but in the best as regards the whole company.
Having decided upon the exact site of the trenches and the general distribution of fire, the next matter to consider is the amount of clearing that is necessary, and the position and nature of any obstacles which may be required. Each platoon commander having been allotted a definite fire zone, can point out to his platoon what clearance is necessary; he can then ask each squad, as before, to choose the position for the obstacle. The company commander can then take the whole company to the position occupied by each platoon and tell the platoon commander to explain what ground they propose to clear, where they propose to place their obstacle, the material available for its construction, and in every case the reason why the decision has been arrived at. If digging is permitted, the trenches will now be constructed, and care will be taken that they are actually finished. It is far better to work overtime than to construct trenches which would be of little use in war and could not be properly defended. It is the exception rather than the rule to see trenches properly finished, fit for occupation, and capable of resisting a heavy attack. If the trenches cannot be dug the company can be taken to another part of the same position, where the ground in front is totally different, and the exercise can be repeated, the platoon and company commanders pointing out why a fire trench which was well sited in the first case would be badly sited if a similar position was selected in the second case.
937. Outpost. We can now turn to the method of training the company in outpost duty, making use of the same system of demonstration. Having pointed out to the company the locality where the main body is bivouacked, the fighting position which the main body will occupy in case a heavy attack is made against the outposts, and the general line of the outposts, the company commander will indicate on the ground the extent of front which is to be guarded by his company, stating whether imaginary companies continue the position on one or both flanks. He will point out the possible avenues of approach from the direction of the enemy to that portion of the position to be occupied by the company, and state from which direction the enemy is most likely to advance and why.
The first point to decide is the number of outguards and their exact position. In war this would always be done by the company commander, but if it is desired to give the junior officers of the company some instruction in this important detail, they should be sent out before the company arrives on the ground to reconnoiter the position and make their decisions. The exact siting of the trenches for the outguards, the construction of obstacles, and the clearance of the foreground having been decided upon and the positions selected for each outguard discussed, and a definite site selected, the next question to decide is the number and position of the sentries.
The platoon commander would then take each scheme in turn, visit with the whole platoon each position selected for the sentry, and decide finally what it would be best to do, giving, as usual, his reasons.
Having decided upon the positions of the sentries, and their line of retreat, so as not to mask the fire of the outguard, the next matter to consider would be the number of patrols that are required, and the particular areas of ground that must be examined by them periodically. The necessary trenches, obstacles, etc., would then be constructed.
Finally, the whole company should be assembled, marched to the position chosen for each outguard and the reasons for selecting the position explained by the company commander. The company should then be told off as an outpost company, and divided into outguards, supports, if any, and the necessary sentries over arms, patrols, etc., and marched to their respective posts.
If there is still time available each platoon commander can reconnoiter the ground for suitable positions for his outguards by night, take the outguards there, explain why the change of position is desirable, and direct the outguard commanders with their outguards to select positions for the sentries, following the same procedure as by day.
Although it is quite correct to select positions for night outposts during daylight, when possible, they should never be definitely occupied by the company before dark, when the forward movement could not be observed by the enemy. To practice night outposts by day is bad instruction, outguards and sentries are placed in positions which appear ridiculous to the ordinary mind, and the men get confused ideas on the subject. When it is desired to practice day and night outposts as an advanced exercise it is advisable to commence work in the afternoon, establish the day outposts, reconnoiter for the night outposts, make the change after dark and construct the necessary trenches, obstacles, etc., after dark.
It is, however, extremely important that the patrols should get to know their way about the country in front during the daylight, when possible, so that they will have some practice in recognizing land marks by night.
It frequently occurs, when training the company in outpost duties, that periods elapse during which the outguards are doing nothing. These opportunities should be taken to instruct the men in their duties when ordered to patrol to the front, the same system of demonstration being employed. For instance, the officer or noncommissioned officer commanding a piquet can select three men, point out certain ground in front which the sentries cannot see and which must be examined by a patrol, and proceed to instruct the whole picket in the best manner of carrying out this work. We will suppose that the patrol is working by day and that the ground to be visited is behind a small hill some 500 yards in front of the sentry. The commander of the picket will then explain to the men that the first object of the patrol is to reach the ground to be examined without being seen by any hostile patrols which may be moving about in front. Before proceeding further it is necessary for the patrol to decide upon the best line of advance. The various lines of advance will be discussed and the patrol asked to decide which they would select. Three other men can then be asked to give their opinion, and so on until all the men of the picket have expressed their views. The commander of the picket will then state which he considers the best line and give his reasons.
The next matter to decide is the method of advance to be adopted by the patrol. Are the three men to march past the sentry in one body and walk straight over the hill in front? If they do this there may be a hostile patrol hiding just behind the crest, watching the movements of our patrol, and directly the latter reach the hill they will be covered by the rifles of the hostile patrol at a few yards' range and will be captured or shot.
If the patrol is not to advance in one body how is it to act? There is plenty of time available, so that there are no objections to deliberate methods. The patrol should advance from cover to cover with one man always going forward protected by the rifles of the remaining two men who have halted in a good position to fire on any enemy that can fire on the leading man. The leading man having readied the cover in front will signal back all clear, and the two men in the rear will join him. They will then make their next advance in a similar manner.
By looking at the hill the patrol can make a good guess at the locality which a hostile patrol would select if it was on the hill. It would be a place where it could get a good view towards our outpost line, and where the patrol could not be seen itself from the outpost line. If the hill was quite bare with nothing but grass on it and flat round top, the best place for the enemy's patrol would be exactly on the top just behind the crest. In such a position he could not be seen by any sentry to the right or left of our picket. For example, if the hostile patrol chose a place on the side of the bare slope of the hill and looked over the crest line it would not be seen by our sentry, but it might be seen by another one on the flank.
The object of our patrol would be to approach the hill, not direct from the outguard, but either from the left or right of the hill and thus come on the flank of the enemy's patrol if he was there.
The whole picket can then be taken out to the front and follow the movements of the patrol from cover to cover until the hill is reached.
The next step will be to ascertain if there is any one on the top of the hill. If the hill is perfectly bare with a somewhat convex slope, it would be best for the three men to extend to about twenty yards interval and move forward together, prepared to drop on the first sign of the enemy, so that they can creep up and open fire on him without exposing themselves. Three men with magazine rifles extended in this manner, opposed to a hostile patrol collected in one party, should be able to deal with the latter without much difficulty. Their fire would be converging, and coming from different directions would confuse the hostile patrol, especially if the advance was made from a flank. The men of the patrol when creeping up the hill should avoid exposing themselves in the direction of the ground behind the hill, if possible, because they want to examine that ground later on, and if seen by the enemy they might fall into an ambuscade. If it is impossible to avoid being seen from the ground beyond, it would be best for the patrol to retire as though they were going back to the outposts, and then move round the flank of the hill and advance to the ground beyond from an unexpected direction. All this would be considered by the officer or noncommissioned officer commanding the picket, together with many other points.
Sufficient has been said to explain how this system of demonstration can be worked in connection with any class of operation in the field. It is certainly slow, and takes a long time, but no one is ever idle and every one is constantly learning something fresh, for the simple reason that, although one may know every detail of the subject, the ground constantly differs and requires to be dealt with in a common sense and skillful manner. The men are interested throughout, and one morning spent on this kind of work is worth several days of practice in the ordinary manner.
It should be remembered that this system of demonstration is only required to teach the men their work; when they have once learned it and thoroughly understand the necessary details they must be practiced in it, the company or platoon commander indicating what has been well done, what has been badly done, and what requires improvement. (See "Outposts," Par. 1051.)
OTHER EXAMPLES OF THE OCULAR DEMONSTRATION METHOD
938. The following illustrations will suggest other examples of the employment of the ocular demonstration method of instruction:
The advantages and disadvantages of close and extended order. Send a lieutenant or a noncommissioned officer with two or three squads of the older soldiers some distance to the front of the company, and have them advance toward the company, first in close order and then in extended order.
By ocular demonstration show the men who are watching the approach of the company how easy it would be even for the poorest shots to land bullets in the thick of a closed body, but how much of a less distinct target the extended order offers and how many spaces there are in the skirmish line for the bullets to pass through; also, how much more easily cover can be employed and the rifle used in the extended order. Let them see also how much more difficult it is for the officers and noncommissioned officers to maintain control over the movements of troops in extended order, and the consequent necessity and duty of every soldier, when in extended order, doing all he can, by attention and exertion, to keep order and help his officers and noncommissioned officers to gain success.
939. The Use of Cover. Send a lieutenant or noncommissioned officer with a couple of squads of old soldiers a few hundred yards to the front and have them advance on the company as if attacking, first without taking advantage of cover and then taking advantage of all available cover, the part of the company that is supposed to be attacked lying down and aiming and snapping at the approaching soldiers. Then reverse the operation—send the defenders out and have them advance on the former attackers. Explain that the requisites of good cover are: Ability to see the enemy; concealment of your own body; ability to use the rifle readily. Then have a number of men take cover and snap at an enemy in position, represented by a few old soldiers. Point out the defects and the good points in each case.
940. Practice in Commanding Mixed Squads. In order to practice noncommissioned officers in commanding mixed firing squads, and in order to drill the privates in banding themselves together and obeying the orders of anyone who may assume command, it is good training for two or more companies to practice reënforcing each other by one company assuming a given fire-position and the other sending up reënforcements by squads, the men being instructed to take positions anywhere on the firing line where they may find an opening. However, explain to the men that whenever possible units should take their positions on the firing line as a whole, but that in practice it is very often impossible to do this, and that the drill is being given so as to practice the noncommissioned officers in commanding mixed units on the firing line and also to give the privates practice in banding themselves into groups and obeying the command of any noncommissioned officer who may be over them.
941. Operating Against Other Troops. There is no better way of arousing interest, enthusiasm, and pride in training troops than by creating a feeling of friendly rivalry and competition amongst the men, and the best way to do this is to have one part of the company operate against the other in all such practical work as scouting, patrolling, attacking, etc. Whenever practicable, blank ammunition should be used. One of the sides should wear a white handkerchief around the hat or some other distinguishing mark. The troops that are sent out must be given full and explicit instructions as to just exactly what they are to do, so that the principles it is intended to illustrate may be properly brought out.
FOOTNOTES:
[10] This chapter is based on "Company Training," by General Haking, British Army, which is the best book the author has ever seen on the subject of company training. "Field Training of a Company of Infantry," by Major Craufurd, British Army, an excellent little book, was also consulted.
CHAPTER II
GENERAL COMMON SENSE PRINCIPLES OF APPLIED MINOR TACTICS[11]
942. To begin with, you want to bear in mind that there is nothing difficult, complicated or mysterious about applied minor tactics—it is just simply the application of plain, every-day, common horse sense—the whole thing consists in familiarizing yourself with certain general principles based on common sense and then applying them with common sense. Whatever you do, don't make the mistake of following blindly rules that you have read in books.
943. One of the ablest officers in the Army has recently given this definition of the Art of War:
- One-fifth is learned from books;
- One-fifth is common sense;
- Three-fifths is knowing men and how to lead them.
The man who would be successful in business must understand men and apply certain general business principles with common sense; the man who would be a successful hunter must understand game and apply certain general hunting principles with common sense, and even the man who would be a successful fisherman must understand fish and apply certain general fishing principles with common sense. And so likewise the man who would lead other men successfully in battle must understand men and apply certain general tactical principles with common sense.
Of course, the only reason for the existence of an army is the possibility of war some day, and everything the soldier does—his drills, parades, target practice, guard duty, schools of instruction, etc.—has in view only one end: The preparation of the soldier for the field of battle.
944. While the responsibilities of officers and noncommissioned officers in time of peace are important, in time of battle they are much more so: for then their mistakes are paid for in human blood.
What would you think of a pilot who was not capable of piloting a boat trying to pilot a boat loaded with passengers; or, of an engineer who was not capable of running a locomotive trying to run a passenger train? You would, of course, think him a criminal—but do you think he would be more criminal than the noncommissioned officer who is not capable of leading a squad in battle but who tries to do so, thereby sacrificing the lives of those under him?
You can, therefore, appreciate the importance, the necessity, of every officer and noncommissioned officer doing everything that he possibly can during times of peace to qualify himself for his duties and responsibilities during times of war.
If we are going to have a good army we must have good regiments; to have good regiments we must have good battalions; to have good battalions we must have good companies—but to have good companies we must have efficient company officers and noncommissioned officers.
As stated before, everything in the life of the soldier leads to the field of battle. And so it is that in the subject of minor tactics all instruction leads to the battle. First we have map problems; then terrain exercises; next the war game; after that maneuvers, and finally the battle.
945. Map Problems and Terrain Exercises. In the case of map problems you are given tactical problems to solve on a map; in the case of terrain exercises you are given problems to solve on the ground. (The word "Terrain," means earth, ground.) These are the simplest forms of tactical problems, as you have only one phase of the action, your information is always reliable and your imaginary soldiers always do just exactly what you want them to do.
946. War Game. Next comes the war game, which consists of problems solved on maps, but you have an opponent who commands the enemy—the phases follow one another rapidly and the conditions change—your information is not so complete and reliable. However, your men being slips of cardboard or beads, they will, as in the case of your imaginary soldiers in the map problems and terrain exercises, go where you wish them to and do what you tell them to do—they can't misunderstand your instructions and go wrong—they don't straggle and get careless as real soldiers sometimes do.
Map problems, terrain exercises and war games are but aids to maneuvers—their practice makes the maneuvers better; for you thus learn the principles of tactics and in the simplest and quickest way.
947. Maneuvers. In the case of the maneuver the problem is the same as in the war game, except that you are dealing with real, live men whom you can not control perfectly, and there is, therefore, much greater chance for mistakes.
948. The battle. A battle is only a maneuver to which is added great physical danger and excitement.
General rules and principles that must be applied in map problems, terrain exercises, the war game and maneuvers
949. Everything that is done must conform in principle to what should be done in battle—otherwise your work is wasted—your time is thrown away.
In solving map problems and in the war game, always form in your mind a picture of the ground where the action is supposed to be taking place—imagine that you see the enemy, the various hills, streams, roads, etc., that he is firing at you, etc.—and don't do anything that you would not be able to do if you were really on the ground and really in a fight.
Whether it be a corporal in command of a squad or a general in command of an army, in the solution of a tactical problem, whether it be a map problem, a terrain exercise, a war game, maneuver or battle, he will have to go through the same operation:
- 1st. Estimate the situation;
- 2d. Decide what he will do;
- 3d. Give the necessary orders to carry out his decision.
At first these three steps of the operation may appear difficult and laborious, but after a little practice the mind, which always works with rapidity in accustomed channels, performs them with astonishing quickness.
The child beginning the study of arithmetic, for example, is very slow in determining the sum of 7 and 8, but later the answer is announced almost at sight. The same is true in tactical problems—the process may be slow at first, but with a little practice it becomes quick and easy.
950. Estimating the Situation. This is simply "sizing up the situation," finding out what you're "up against," and is always the first thing to be done. It is most important, and in doing it the first step is to determine your MISSION—what you are to do, what you are to accomplish—the most important consideration in any military situation.
Consider next your own forces and that of the enemy—that is, his probable strength and how it compares with yours.
Consider the enemy's probable MISSION[12] and what he will probably do to accomplish it.
Consider the geography of the country so far as it affects the problem—the valleys to cross, defiles to pass through, shortest road to follow, etc.
Now, consider the different courses open to you with the advantages and disadvantages of each.
You must, of course, in every case know what you're up against before you can decide intelligently what you're going to do.
In making your plan always bear in mind not only your own MISSION, but also the general mission of the command of which you form a part, and this is what nine men out of ten forget to do.
951. The Decision. It is important that you should come to a clear and correct decision—that you do so promptly and then execute it vigorously.
The new Japanese Field Service Regulations tell us that there are two things above all that should be avoided—inaction and hesitation. "To act resolutely even in an erroneous manner is better than to remain inactive and irresolute"—that is to say do something.
You are now ready to come to a decision, which is nothing more or less than a clear, concise determination of what you're going to do and how you're going to do it. Frederick the Great, expressed the same idea in fewer words: "Don't haggle."
Having settled on a plan, push it through—don't vacillate, don't waver. Make your plan simple. No other has much show. Complicated plans look well on paper, but in war they seldom work out. They require several people to do the right thing at the right time and this under conditions of excitement, danger and confusion, and, as a result, they generally fail.
952. The Order. Having completed your estimate of the situation and formed your plan, you are now ready to give the orders necessary to carry it out.
You must first give your subordinates sufficient information of the situation and your plan, so that they may clearly understand their mission.
The better everyone understands the whole situation the better he can play his part. Unexpected things are always happening in war—a subordinate can act intelligently only if he knows and understands what his superior wants to do.
Always make your instructions definite and positive—vague instructions are sometimes worse than none.
Your order, your instructions, must be clear, concise and definite—everyone should know just exactly what he is to do.
A Few General Principles
953. The man who hunts deer, moose, tigers and lions, is hunting big game, but the soldier operating in the enemy's territory is hunting bigger game—he's hunting for human beings—but you want to remember that the other fellow is out hunting for you, too; he's out "gunning" for you. So, don't fail to be on the alert, on the lookout, all the time, if you do he'll "get the drop" on you. Remember what Frederick the Great said: "It is pardonable to be defeated, but never to be taken by surprise."
Do not separate your force too much; if you do, you weaken yourself—you take the chance of being "defeated in detail"—that is, of one part being defeated after another. Remember the old saying: "In union there is strength." Undue extension of your line (a mistake, by the way, very often made) is only a form of separation and is equally as bad.
While too much importance can not be attached to the proper use of cover, you must not forget that sometimes there are other considerations that outweigh the advantages of cover. Good sense alone can determine. A certain direction of attack, for instance, may afford excellent cover but it may be so situated as to mean ruin if defeated, as where it puts an impassable obstacle directly in your rear. And don't forget that you should always think in advance of what you would do in case of defeat.
What is it, after all, that gives victory, whether it be armies or only squads engaged? It's just simply inflicting on the enemy a loss which he will not stand before he can do the same to you. Now, what is this loss that he will not stand? What is the loss that will cause him to break? Well, it varies; it is subject to many conditions—different bodies of troops, like different timbers, have different breaking points. However, whatever it may be in any particular case it would soon come if we could shoot on the battlefield as we do on the target range, but we can not approximate it.
There are many causes tending to drag down our score on the battlefield, one of the most potent being the effect of the enemy's fire. It is cited as a physiological fact that fear and great excitement cause the pupil of the eye to dilate and impair accuracy in vision and hence of shooting. It is well established that the effectiveness of the fire of one side reduced proportionately to the effectiveness of that of the other.
Bear in mind then these two points—we must get the enemy's breaking point before he gets ours, and the more effective we make our fire the less effective will be his.
Expressed in another way—to win you must gain and keep a fire superiority.
This generally means more rifles in action, yet a fire badly controlled and directed, though great in volume, may be less effective than a smaller volume better handled.
The firing line barring a few exceptional cases, then, should be as heavy as practicable consistent with the men's free use of their rifles.
This has been found to be about one man to the yard. In this way you get volume of fire and the companies do not cover so much ground that their commanders lose their power to direct and control.
If it becomes necessary to hold a line too long for the force available, it is then better to keep the men close together and leave gaps in the line. The men are so much better controlled, the fire better directed, the volume the same, and the gaps are closed by the cross fire of parties adjacent.
FOOTNOTES:
[11] In the preparation of the first part of this chapter, extracts of words and of ideas, were made from a paper on Applied Minor Tactics read before the St. Louis convention of the National Guard of the United States in 1910, by Major J. F. Morrison, General Staff, U. S. Army.
[12] The word "mission" is used a great deal in this text. By your "mission" is meant your business, what you have been told to do, what you are trying to accomplish.
CHAPTER III
GENERAL PLAN OF INSTRUCTION IN MAP PROBLEMS FOR NONCOMMISSIONED OFFICERS AND PRIVATES—INSTRUCTION IN DELIVERING MESSAGES
(The large wall map to be used for this instruction can be obtained from the George Banta Publishing Co., Menasha, Wis., at a cost of $1.50.)
954. The noncommissioned officers and the privates of the squad, section, platoon or company are seated in front of the instructor, who, with pointer in hand, is standing near the map on the wall.
The instructor assumes certain situations and designates various noncommissioned officers to take charge of squads for the purpose of accomplishing certain missions; he places them in different situations, and then asks them what they would do. He, or the noncommissioned officer designated to perform certain missions, designates certain privates to carry messages, watch for signals, take the place of wounded noncommissioned officers, etc. For example, the instructor says: "The battalion is marching to Watertown (see Elementary Map in pocket at back of book) along this road (indicating road): our company forms the advance guard; we are now at this point (indicating point). Corporal Smith, take your squad and reconnoiter the woods on the right to see if you can find any trace of the enemy there, and rejoin the company as soon as you can. Corporal Jones, be on the lookout for any signals that Corporal Smith may make."
Corporal Smith then gives the command, "1. Forward, 2. March," and such other commands as may be necessary.
Instructor: Now, when you reach this point (indicating point), what do you see?
(Corporal Smith holds his rifle horizontally above his head.)
Corporal Jones: Captain, Corporal Smith signals that he sees a small body of the enemy.
Corporal Smith: Lie down. Range, 700. 1. Ready; 2. AIM; 3. Squad; 4. FIRE. 1. Forward; Double time; 2. MARCH, etc.
The noncommissioned officers and the privates who are thus designated to do certain things must use their imagination as much as possible. They must look at the map and imagine that they are right on the ground, in the hostile territory; they must imagine that they see the streams, hills, woods, roads, etc., represented on the map, and they must not do anything that they could not do if in the hostile territory, with the assumed conditions actually existing.
955. The general idea of this system of instruction is to make the noncommissioned officers and the privates think, to make them use common sense and initiative in handling men in various situations, in getting out of difficulties. By thus putting men on their mettle in the presence of their comrades and making them bring into play their common sense and their powers of resourcefulness, it is comparatively easy to hold the attention of a whole squad, section, platoon or company, for those who are not actually taking part in the solution of a particular problem are curious to see how those who are taking part will answer different questions and do different things—how they will "pan out."
956. Everything that is said, everything that is done, should, as far as practicable, be said and done just as it would be said and done in the field. The commands should be actually given, the messages actually delivered, the reports actually made, the orders and instructions actually given, the signals actually made, etc., just the same as they would be if the operations were real. Of course, sometimes it is not practicable to do this, and again at other times it would be advisable not to do so. If, for instance, in the solution of a problem there were a great many opportunities to give commands to fire, to make signals, to deliver messages, etc., and if these things were actually done every time, it would not only become tiresome but it would also delay the real work and instruction. Common sense must be used. Just bear this in mind: In the solution of map problems the noncommissioned officers and the privates are to be given proper and sufficient instruction in giving commands, making signals, sending and delivering messages, making reports, etc., the instructor using his common sense in deciding what is proper and sufficient instruction. In carrying out this feature of the instruction it would be done thus, for instance:
Instead of a platoon leader saying, "I would give the order for the platoon (two, three or four squads) to fire on them," he would say, for instance, "I would then give the command, 'AT LINE OF MEN. RANGE, 600. FIRE AT WILL,' and would continue the firing as long as necessary." Should the instructor then say, for instance, "Very well; the enemy's fire has slackened; what will you do now?" The platoon leader would answer, for instance, "I would signal: 1. By squads from the right; 2. RUSH."
Instead of saying, for instance, "I would advance my squad to the top of this hill at double time," the squad leader should say, "I would give the command: '1. Forward, double time; 2. MARCH,' and upon reaching the top of this hill, I would command, '1. Squad; 2. HALT,' cautioning the men to take advantage of cover."
Instead of saying, "I would signal back that we see the enemy in force," the squad leader should take a rifle and make the signal, and if a man has been designated to watch for signals, the man would say to the captain (or other person for whom he was watching for signals): "Captain, Corporal Smith has signaled that he sees the enemy in force."
Instead of saying, "I would send a message back that there are about twenty mounted men just in rear of the Jones' house; they are dismounted and their horses are being held by horseholders," say, "Smith, go back and tell the captain (or other person) there are about twenty mounted men just in rear of the Jones' house. They are dismounted and their horses are being held by horseholders." Private Smith would then say to the captain (or other person), "Captain, Corporal Harris sends word there are about twenty men just in the rear of the Jones' house. They are dismounted and their horses are being held by horse holders."
957. For problems exemplifying this system of instruction, see Par. 1017.
The instruction may be varied a little by testing the squad leaders in their knowledge of map reading by asking, from time to time during the solution of the problem, such questions as these:
Captain: Corporal Smith, you are standing on Lone Hill (See Elementary Map), facing north. Tell me what you see?
Corporal: The hill slopes off steeply in front of me, about eighty feet down to the bottom land. A spur of the hill runs off on my right three-fourths of a mile to the north. Another runs off on my left the same distance to the west. Between these two spurs, down in front of me, is an almost level valley, extending about a mile to my right front, where a hill cuts off my view. To my left front it is level as far as I can see. A quarter of a mile in front of me is a big pond, down in the valley, and I can trace the course of a stream that drains the pond off to the northwest, by the trees along its bank. Just beyond the stream a railroad runs northwest along a fill and crosses the stream a mile and a half to the northwest, where I can see the roofs of a group of houses. A wagon road runs north across the valley, crossing the western spur of this hill 600 yards from Lone Hill. It is bordered by trees as far as the creek. Another road parallels the railroad, the two roads crossing near a large orchard a mile straight to my front.
Captain: Can you see the Chester Pike where the railroad crosses it?
Corporal: No, sir.
Captain: Why?
Corporal: Because the hill "62," about 800 yards from Lone Hill, is so high that it cuts off my view in that direction of everything closer to the spur "62" than the point in the Salem-Boling road, where the private lane runs off east to the Gray house.
Captain: Sergeant Jones, in which direction does the stream run that you see just south of the Twin Hills?
Sergeant: It runs south through York, because I can see that the northern end starts near the head of a valley and goes down into the open plain. Also it is indicated by a very narrow line near the Twin Hills which becomes gradually wider or heavier the further south it goes. Furthermore, the fact that three short branch streams are shown joining together and forming one, must naturally mean that the direction of flow is towards the one formed by the three.
Captain: Sergeant Harris, does the road from the Mason farm to the Welsh farm run up or down hill?
Sergeant: It does both, sir. It is almost level for the first half mile west of the Mason farm; then, as it crosses the contour marked 20 and a second marked 40, it runs up hill, rising to forty feet above the valley, 900 yards east of the Mason farm. Then, as it again crosses a contour marked 40 and a second marked 20, it goes down hill to the Welsh farm. That portion of the road between the points where it crosses the two contours marked 40, is the highest part of the road. It crosses this hill in a "saddle," for both north and south of this summit on the road are contours marked 60 and even higher.
Captain: Corporal Wallace, you are in Salem with a patrol with orders to go to Oxford. There is no one to tell you anything about this section of the country and you have never been there before. You have this map and a compass. What would you do?
Corporal: I would see from my map and by looking around me that Salem is situated at the crossing of two main roads. From the map I would see that one leads to Boling and the other was the one to take for Oxford. Also, I would see that the one to Boling started due north out of Salem and the other, the one I must follow, started due west out of Salem. Taking out my compass, I would see in what direction the north end of the needle pointed; the road running off in that direction would be the one to Boling, so I would start off west on the other.
Captain: Suppose you had no compass?
Corporal: I would look and see on which side of the base of the trees the moss grew. That side would be north. Or, in this case, I would probably not use a compass even if I had it; for, from the map, I know that the road I wish to start off on crosses a railroad track within sight of the crossroads and on the opposite side of the crossroads from the church shown on the map; also, that the Boling road is level as far as I could see on the ground, while the Chester Pike crosses the spur of Sandy Ridge, about a half mile out of the village.
Captain: Go ahead, corporal, and explain how you would follow the proper route to Oxford.
Corporal: I would proceed west on the Chester Pike, knowing I would cross a good sized stream, on a stone bridge, about a mile and a half out of Salem; then I would pass a crossroad and find a swamp on my right, between the road and the stream. About a mile and a half from the crossroad I just mentioned, I would cross a railroad track and then I would know that at the fork of the roads one-quarter of a mile further on I must take the left fork. This road would take me straight into Oxford, about a mile and three-quarters beyond the fork.
Captain: Sergeant Washington, do the contours about a half mile north of the Maxey farm, on the Salem-Boling road, represent a hill or a depression?
Sergeant: They represent a hill, because the inner contour has a higher number 42, than the outer, marked 20. They represent sort of a leg-of-mutton shaped hill about 42 feet higher than the surrounding low ground.
Variety and interest may be added to the instruction by assuming that the squad leader has been killed or wounded and then designate some private to command the squad; or that a man has been wounded in a certain part of the body and have a soldier actually apply his first aid packet; or that a soldier has fainted or been bitten by a rattlesnake and have a man actually render him first aid.
958. The privates may be given practical instruction in delivering messages by giving them messages in one room and having them deliver them to someone else in another room. It is a good plan to write out a number of messages in advance on slips of paper or on cards, placing them in unsealed envelopes. An officer or a noncommissioned officer in one room reads one of the messages to a soldier, then seals it in an envelope and gives it to the soldier to hand to the person in another room to whom he is to deliver the message. The latter checks the accuracy of the message by means of the written message. Of course, this form of instruction should not be given during the solution of map problems by the men. (For model messages, see par. 980.)
The same slips or cards may be used any number of times with different soldiers. A soldier should never start on his way to deliver a message unless he understands thoroughly the message he is to deliver.