Captain: No, but tell me first why you do not go along this high ground that overlooks the valley?
Corporal James: Because our patrol that started out the Valley Pike is probably near Twin Hills and I want to cover other country. The orchard at Mason's would obstruct my view from the hills.
Captain: The hostile patrol goes on south. Describe briefly your next movements.
Corporal James: I lead my patrol over to Mason's and, concealing two of the men so that both roads and the house can be watched, I take one man and reconnoiter around the farm yard and go up to the house to question the inhabitants. (Par. 996.)
Captain: You find one woman there who says some other soldiers, on foot, passed there a few minutes ago, marching south. She gives you no other information about the enemy or country.
Corporal James: I would send Amos over to see how deep and wide Sandy Creek is (Par. 1001.) When he returned I would take the patrol over to Twin Hills, follow the ridge south to the stone wall on the County Road, watching the valley for signs of the hostile patrol, and follow the road back to York; then make my report to the Captain, telling him where I had gone, all I had seen, including a description of the country. If I had not been hurried, I would have made a sketch of the valley. I can make a rough one after I get in. (Par. 1015.)
Captain: Suppose on your way back you saw hostile troops appearing on the County Road, marching west over Sandy Ridge. Would you stay out longer or would you consider that you should reach Oxford by 5 o'clock?
Corporal James: I would send a message back at once, and remain out long enough to find out the strength and probable intention of the new enemy.
Captain (to one platoon of his troop of cavalry): We will suppose that this troop has just (9 A. M.) arrived in Boling (Elementary Map) on a clear, dry, summer day. The enemy is supposed to be near Salem and we have seen several of his patrols this morning on our march south to Boling. Sergeant Allen, I call you up and give you these instructions: "Take Corporal Burt's squad (eight men) and reconnoiter south by this road (indicates the Boling-Morey house road) to Salem. I will take the troop straight south to Salem and you will join it there about 10:15. It is four and one-half miles to Salem. Start at once." (You have no map.)
Sergeant Allen: I would like to know just what the Captain wishes my patrol to do. (Par. 965.)
Captain: We will suppose that this is one of the many occasions in actual campaign where things must be done quickly. Where there is no time for detailed orders. You know that the troop has been marching south towards Salem where the enemy is supposed to be. You also know we have seen several of his patrols. I have told you what the troop is going to do, and from all this you should be able to decide what your mission is in this case. We will, therefore, consider that there is no time to give you more detailed orders, and you have to decide for yourself. Of course, if you had failed to hear just what I said, then, in spite of the necessity for haste, I would repeat my instructions to you. (Par. 963.)
Sergeant Allen: I would ride over to Corporal Burt's squad and lead it out of the column to the road leading to the Morey house, and say, "The troop is going on straight south to Salem, four and one-half miles away. This squad will reconnoiter south to Salem by this road, joining the troop there about 10:15. In case we become separated, make for Salem. Corporal, take Brown and form the point. I will follow with the squad about 300 yards in rear. Regulate your gait on me after you get your distance. Move out now at a trot." (Par. 963.)
After Corporal Burt had gotten 150 yards out I would say, "Carter, move out as connecting file." I would then say, "Downs, you will follow about 150 yards behind us as rear guard." When Carter had gone 150 yards down the road I would order, "1. Forward; 2. Trot; 3. March," and ride off at the head of the four remaining men (in column of twos.) (Par. 968.)
Captain: Sergeant, tell me briefly what is your estimate of the situation—that is, what sort of a proposition you have before you and how you have decided to handle it.
Sergeant Allen: As the enemy is supposed to be near Salem and we have already seen his patrols, I expect to encounter more patrols and may meet a strong body of the enemy, on my way to Salem. As I have no map, I cannot tell anything about the road, except that it is about four and one-half miles by the direct road the troop will follow, therefore my route will be somewhat longer. I have been given an hour and fifteen minutes in which to make the trip, so, if I move at a trot along the safer portions of the road. I will have time to proceed very slowly and cautiously along the dangerous portions. My patrol will be stretched out about 500 yards on the road, which should make it difficult for the enemy to surprise us and yet should permit my controlling the movements of the men. (Par. 968.)
I consider that my mission is to start out on this road and find my way around to Salem in about an hour and, particularly, to get word across to the Captain on the other road of anything of importance about the enemy that I may learn.
Captain: Very well. When you reach the cut in the road across the south nose of Hill 38, your point has almost reached the Morey house. Do you make any change in your patrol?
Sergeant Allen: I order, "1. Walk, 2. MARCH," and watch to see if the connecting file observes the change in gait and comes to a walk.
Captain: Suppose he does not come to a walk?
Sergeant Allen: I would say, "Smith, gallop ahead and tell Carter to walk and to keep more on the alert."
Captain: Corporal Burt, you reach the road fork at Morey's. What do you do?
Corporal Burt: I say, "Brown, wait here until Carter is close enough to see which way you go and then trot up to me." I would walk on down the road.
Captain: Wouldn't you make any inspection of the Morey house?
Corporal Burt: Not unless I saw something suspicious from the road. I would expect the main body of the patrol to do that.
Captain: Don't you make any change on account of the woods you are passing?
Corporal Burt: No, sir. It has very heavy underbrush and we would lose valuable time trying to search through it. A large force of the enemy would hardly hide in such a place.
Captain: Sergeant Allen, you reach the road fork. What do you do?
Sergeant Allen: I would have two men go into the Morey house to question anyone they found there. I would order one of the other two men to trot up (north) that road 200 yards and wait until I signaled to him to return. With the other man I would await the result of the inspection of the Morey house. Corporal Burt should have gone ahead without orders to the cut in the road across Long Ridge, leaving Brown half way between us. (Pars. 987 to 996.)
Captain: You find no one at the Morey house.
Sergeant Allen: I would signal the man to the north to come in. I would then order two men to "find a gate in the fence and trot up on that hill (indicating Long Ridge), and look around the country and join me down this road." (Par. 968.) I would then start south at a walk, halting at the cut to await the result of the inspection on the country from the hill.
Captain: Foster, you and Lacey are the two men sent up on Long Ridge. When you reach the hilltop you see four hostile cavalrymen trotting north on the Valley Pike, across the railroad track.
Private Foster: I signal like this (enemy in sight), and wait to see if they go on north. (Par. 978.) Do I see anything else behind or ahead of them?
Captain: You see no other signs of the enemy on any road. Everything looks quiet. The hostile cavalrymen pass the Baker house and continue north.
Private Foster: I would then take Lacey, trot down the ridge to Sergeant Allen, keeping below the crest and report, "Sergeant, We saw four hostile mounted men trotting north on the road about three-quarters of a mile over there (pointing), and they kept on north, across that road (pointing to the Brown-Baker-Oxford road). There was nothing else in sight." I would then tell him what the country to the south looked like, if he wanted to know.
Captain: Sergeant Allen, what do you do now?
Sergeant Allen: I would continue toward the Brown house at a trot. I would send no message to you as you already know there are hostile patrols about and therefore this information would be of little or no importance to you. (Par. 981.)
Captain: You arrive at Brown's house.
Sergeant Allen: I would send two men in to question the people and I would continue on at a walk. I would not send any one up the road towards Oxford as Foster has already seen that road.
Captain: You should have sent a man several hundred yards out the Farm Lane. (Par. 989.) If he moved at a trot it would only have taken a very short time. Continue to describe your movements.
Sergeant Allen: I would halt at the railroad track until I saw my two men coming on from the Brown house. I would then direct the other two men who were with me to go through the first opening in the fence to the west and ride south along that ridge (62—Lone Hill—Twin Hills' ridge) until I signaled them to rejoin. I would tell them to look out for our troop over to the east. If there were a great many fences I would not send them out until we were opposite the southern edge of that woods ahead of us. There I would send them to the high ground to look over the country, and return at once.
Captain: There are a great many fences west of the road and practically none east of the road to Sandy Creek. Just as you arrive opposite the southern edge of those woods and are giving orders for the two men to ride up the hill, you hear firing in the direction of Bald Knob. In the road at the foot of the south slope of Bald Knob, where the trail to the quarry starts off, you can see quite a clump of horses. You see nothing to the west of your position or towards Mason's. What do you do?
Sergeant Allen: I signal "RALLY" to Carter and Downs. If there is a gate nearby I lead my men through it. If not, I have them cut or break an opening in the fence and ride towards the railroad fill at a fast trot, having one man gallop ahead as point.
When we reach the fill, the point having first looked beyond it, I order, "DISMOUNT. Lacey, hold the horses. 1. As skirmishers along that fill, 2. MARCH." When Corporal Burt, Brown, Carter and Downs come up Lacey takes their horses and they join the line of skirmishers. Captain, what do I see from the fill?
Captain: There appear to be about twenty or thirty horses in the group. The firing seems to come from the cut in the road just north of the horses and from the clump of trees by the Quarry. You can also hear firing from a point further north on the road, apparently your troop replying to the fire from Bald Knob. You see nothing in the road south of the horses as far as Hill 42, which obstructs your view. What action do you take?
Sergeant Allen: I order, "AT THE FEET OF THOSE HORSES. RANGE, 850. CLIP FIRE."
Captain: What is your object in doing as you have done?
Sergeant Allen: I know the captain intended to go to Salem with the troop. From the fact that he is replying to the hostile fire I judge he still wishes to push south. I was ordered to reconnoiter along this road, but now a situation has arisen where the troop is being prevented or delayed in doing what was desired and I am in what appears to be a very favorable position from which to give assistance to the troop and enable them to push ahead. I am practically in rear of the enemy and within effective range of their lead horses. I therefore think my mission has at least temporarily changed and I should try and cause the twenty or thirty hostile troopers to draw off (Par. 1011). Besides, I think it is my business to find out what the strength of this enemy is and whether or not he has reinforcements coming up from Salem, and send this information to the captain. From my position I can still watch the Chester Pike.
Captain: After you have emptied your clips you see the enemy running down out of the cut and from among the trees mount their horses and gallop south. What do you do?
Sergeant Allen: I would send Foster across the creek above the trestle (south of trestle), to ride across to that road (pointing towards the cut on Bald Hill) and tell the captain, who is near there, that about thirty men were on the hill and they have galloped south, and that I am continuing towards Salem. I would have Foster repeat the message that I gave him. I would then trot back to the Chester Pike and south to Mason's, taking up our old formation.
Captain: You see nothing unusual at Mason's and continue south until you reach the cross roads by the Smith farm. Corporal Burt and Private Brown are near the stone bridge south of Smith's; Private Carter is half way between you and Corporal Burt; and Private Downs is 100 yards north of Smith's. You have three men with you. What do you do?
Sergeant Allen: What time is it now?
Captain: It is now 9:45 A. M.
Sergeant Allen: I would say, "Lacey, take Jackson and gallop as far as that cut in the road (points east) and see if you can locate the enemy or our troop in the valley beyond. I will wave my hat over my head when I want you to return." I would then say to Private Moore, "Gallop down to Corporal Burt and tell him to fall back in this direction 100 yards, and then you return here bringing the other two men with you." I would then await the result of Private Lacey's reconnaissance, sending Carter to the turn in the road 200 yards west of the cross roads.
Captain: Lacey, what do you do?
Private Lacey: I order Jackson, "Follow 75 yards behind me and watch for signals from Sergeant Allen," and I then gallop across the steel bridge and half way up the hill. I then move cautiously up to the cut and, if the fences permit, I ride up on the side of the cut, dismounting just before reaching the crest of the ridge, and walk forward until I can see into the valley beyond.
Captain: You see no signs of the enemy in the valley, but you see your own troop on the road by the Gibbs farm with a squad in advance in the road on Hill 42.
Private Lacey: I look towards Sergeant Allen to see if he is signaling. I make no signals.
Captain: What do you do, Sergeant?
Sergeant Allen: I wave my hat for Private Lacey to return. I wave to Private Downs to join me and when Private Lacey arrives I signal "ASSEMBLE" to Corporal Burt and then say, "Lacey, join Corporal Burt and tell him to follow me as rear guard. Martin, join Carter and tell him to trot west. We will follow. You stay with him." After he got started I would order, "Follow me. 1. Trot; 2. MARCH."
Captain: When Private Carter reaches the crest of the ridge about one-half mile west of Smith's he signals, "Enemy in sight in large numbers," and he remains in the road with Martin fifty yards in rear. (Par. 978.)
Sergeant Allen: I order, "1. Walk; 2. MARCH. 1. Squad; 2. HALT," and gallop up to Private Carter, dismount just before reaching the crest, give my horse up to Private Martin, and run forward.
Captain: Carter points out what appears to be a troop of cavalry standing in the road leading north out of York, just on the edge of the town. You see about four mounted men 200 yards out of York on your road, halted, and about the same number on the Valley Pike near where it crosses the first stream north of York. What do you do?
Sergeant Allen: I wait about three minutes to see if they are going to move.
Captain: They remain halted, the men at York appear to be dismounted.
Sergeant Allen: I write the following message:
Hill 1/2 mile N. E. of York,
10 A. M.
Captain X:
A hostile troop of cavalry is standing in road at YORK (west of SALEM) with squads halted on N. and N. E. roads from YORK. Nothing else seen. Will remain in observation for the present.
Allen,
Sgt.
I would give the message to Martin, who had previously brought my horse up close in rear of the crest, and would say to him, "Take this message to the captain, straight across to the road the troop is on, and turn south towards Salem if you do not see them at first. Take Lacey with you. Tell him what you have seen. He knows where the troop is." I would have Carter hold my horse, and watch the remainder of the patrol for signals, while I observed the enemy.
Captain: At the end of five minutes the hostile troop trots north on the Valley Pike, the patrol on your road rides across to the Valley Pike and follows the troop.
Sergeant Allen: I would wait until the troops had crossed the creek north of York and would then face my patrol east and trot to the cross roads at Smith's, turn south and continue to Salem, sending one man to ride up on Sandy Ridge, keeping the patrol in sight.
Captain: We have carried out the problem far enough. It furnishes a good example of the varying situations a patrol leader has to meet. Good judgment or common sense must be used in deciding on the proper course to follow. You must always think of what your chief is trying to do and then act in the way you think will best help him to accomplish his object. If you have carefully decided just what mission you have been given to accomplish, you cannot easily go wrong. In handling a mounted patrol you must remember that if the men become widely separated in strange country, or even in country they are fairly familiar with, they are most apt to lose all contact with each other or become lost themselves.
Problem No. 2. (Infantry)
1019. Captain (to one platoon of his company): We will suppose it is about half an hour before dawn. One platoon of the company is deployed as skirmishers, facing north, in the cut where the County Road crosses Sandy Ridge. It is the extreme right of a line of battle extending west along the line of the County Road. The fight was not commenced. This platoon is resting in a wheat field between the railroad and the foot of the slope of Sandy Ridge, 200 yards south of the County Road. Sergeant Allen, I call you up and give you these instructions: "The enemy's line is off in that direction (pointing northwest). Take six men and work north along the railroad until it is light enough to see; then locate the hostile line and keep me informed of their movements. I will be in this vicinity. You have a compass. Start at once." Describe briefly the formation of your patrol while it is moving in the dark.
Sergeant Allen: One man will lead. A second man will follow about fifteen yards in rear of him. I will follow the second man at the same distance with three more men, and the last man will be about twenty yards in rear of me. All will have bayonets fixed, loaded and pieces locked. One short, low whistle will mean, Halt, two short whistles will mean, Forward, and the word "Sandy" will be the countersign by which we can identify each other.
Captain: Very well. We will suppose that you reach the steel trestle over Sandy Creek just at dawn and have met no opposition and heard nothing of the enemy. On either side of Sandy Creek are fields of standing corn about six feet tall. In the present dim light you can only see a few hundred yards off.
Sergeant Allen: The patrol being halted I would walk forward to the leading man (Brown) and say, "Brown, take Carter and form the point for the patrol, continuing along this railroad. We will follow about 150 yards in rear." I would then rejoin the main body of the patrol and order the man in rear to follow about 75 yards in rear of us. When the point had gained its distance I would move forward with the main body, ordering one man to move along the creek bank (west bank), keeping abreast of us until I signaled to him to come in.
Captain: Just as you reach the northern end of the railroad fill your point halts and you detect some movement in the road to the west of you. It is rapidly growing lighter.
Sergeant Allen: I would move the main body by the left flank into the corn, signaling to the man following the creek to rejoin, and for the rear guard to move off the track also. I would expect Brown to do the same, even before he saw what we had done. I would then close up on the point until I could see it and, halting all the patrol, I would order Foster to take Lacey and work over towards the road to see what is there and to report back to me immediately.
Captain: In a few minutes Foster returns and reports, "The enemy is moving south in the road and in the field beyond, in line of squads or sections. A hostile patrol is moving southeast across the field behind us. We were not seen."
(Note: This situation could well have been led up to by requiring Private Foster to explain how he conducted his reconnaissance and having him formulate his report on the situation as given.)
Sergeant Allen: I would then work my patrol closer to the road, keeping Foster out on that flank, and prepare to follow south in rear of the hostile movement.
Captain: The information you have gained is so important that you should have sent a man back to me with a verbal message, particularly as you are in a very dangerous position, and may not be able to send a message later. While you have not definitely located the left of the enemy's line, you have apparently discovered what appears to be a movement of troops forward to form the left of the attacking line. Your action in turning south to follow the troops just reported, is proper, as you now know you are partly in rear of the hostile movement and must go south to locate the hostile flank that your mission requires you to report on.
You men must picture in your minds the appearance of the country the sergeant is operating through. His patrol is now in a field of high standing corn. Unless you are looking down between the regular rows of corn you can only see a few yards ahead of you. The road has a wire fence and is bordered by a fairly heavy growth of high weeds and bushes. The ground is dry and dusty. Sergeant, how do you conduct your movement south?
Sergeant Allen: As my patrol is now in a very dangerous neighborhood and very liable to be caught between two hostile lines, with a deep creek between our present position and our platoon, I think it best to move cautiously southeast until I reach the creek bank (I cannot see it from where I now am), and then follow the creek south. I think I am very apt to find the enemy's left resting on this creek. Besides, if I do not soon locate the enemy, I can hold the main body of my patrol close to the creek and send scouts in towards the road to search for the enemy. It will also be much easier to send information back to the platoon from the creek bank, as a messenger can ford it and head southeast until he strikes the railroad and then follow that straight back to our starting point. It would thus be very difficult for him to get lost.
Captain: You move southeast and strike the creek bank just south of the railroad trestle. You now hear artillery fire off to the west and a rifle fire to the southwest which gradually increases in volume. You see a high cloud of dust hanging over the road on the hill west of Mason's and south of this road on the north slope of the northern-most knoll of the Twin Hills, you can occasionally see the flash of a gun, artillery being discharged. There seems to be no rifle firing directly in your front.
Sergeant Allen: I hurriedly write the following message:
At Ry. trestle 1 mi. N. of Platoon,
5:15 A. M.
Captain X:
Can see arty. firing from position on N. slope of knoll on high ridge to W. of me, and 1/4 mi. S. of E. and W. road. Hostile line is S. of me. Have not located it. Will move S.
Allen,
Sgt. (Par. 974.)
I hand this to Private Smith and say to him. "Carry this quickly to the captain. Follow the railroad back until you cross a wagon road. Our platoon should be to the west of the track just beyond the road." I also read the message to Smith and point out the hostile artillery. I have considered that I sent a message before telling about the hostile advance.
I then continue south, moving slowly and with great caution. I instruct the remaining four men that in case we are surprised to try to cross the creek and follow the railroad back to the platoon.
Captain: Your information about the hostile artillery position was important and should have been sent in, provided you think your description of the hostile position was sufficiently clear to be understood by an observer within your own lines.
There is some question as to the advisability of your remaining on the west bank of the creek. Still you would not be able to tell from where you were what direction the creek took, so you probably would remain on the west bank for the present.
You continue south for about 150 yards and your leading man halts, comes back to you, and reports that the corn ahead is broken and trampled, showing it has been passed over by foot troops. About the same time you hear rifle fire to your immediate front. It sounds very close.
Sergeant Allen: I say, "Cross this creek at once," and when we reach the other bank and the patrol forms again, we move slowly south, all the men keeping away from the creek bank, except myself, and I march opposite the two men constituting the main body.
Captain: About this time you detect a movement in the corn across the creek in rear of the place you have just left. You think it is a body of troops moving south. The firing in front seems to be delivered from a point about two or three hundred yards south of you and you can hear heavy firing from off in the direction of your company, a few bullets passing overhead. There are scattered trees along the creek and some bushes close to the edge.
Sergeant Allen: I would conceal myself close to the bank, the patrol being back, out of sight from the opposite bank, and await developments.
Captain: Sergeant, your patrol is in a dangerous position. The enemy will very likely have a patrol or detachment in rear and beyond his flank. This patrol would probably cross the railroad trestle and take you in rear. You should have given the last men in your patrol particular instructions to watch the railroad to the north. It would have been better if you had sent one man over to the railroad, which is only a short distance away, and had him look up and down the track and also make a hurried survey of the country from an elevated position on the fill.
I also think it would be better not to await developments where you now are, but to push south and make sure of the position of the left of the enemy's firing line, later you can devote more time to the movements in rear of the first line. You are taking too many chances in remaining where you are. I do not mean that you should leave merely because you might have some of your men killed or captured, but because if this did occur you would probably not be able to accomplish your mission. Later you may have to run a big chance of sacrificing several of your men, in order to get the desired information, which would be entirely justifiable. Tell me how your men are arranged and what your next movement would be.
Sergeant Allen: I have four men left, I am close to the stream's bank, under cover; two men are about 25 yards further away from the stream; Private Brown is up stream as far off as he can get and still see the other two men, and Private Foster is down stream the same distance. Both Brown and Foster are well back from the stream. The two men in the middle, the main body of the patrol, make their movements conform to mine, and Brown and Foster regulate their movements on the main body. I will move south until I can locate the enemy's advance line.
Captain: When you are opposite the Mason house, Brown comes back to you, having signaled halt, and reports he can see the enemy's firing line about 100 yards ahead on the other side of the stream, and that a small detachment is crossing the stream just beyond where he was. What do you do?
Sergeant Allen: I creep forward with Brown to verify his report. The remainder of the patrol remains in place.
Captain: You find everything as Brown reported. You see that the firing line extends along the southern edge of the cornfield, facing an uncultivated field covered with grass and frequent patches of weeds two or three feet high. You cannot determine how strong the line is, but a heavy fire is being delivered. You cannot see the detachment that crossed the creek south of you because of the standing corn.
Sergeant Allen: I crawl back to the main body, leaving Brown, and write the following message:
5/6 mi. N. of Platoon,
5:32 A. M.
Captain X:
Enemy's left rests on creek 3/4 mile to your front, along S. edge of cornfield. Creek is 5 ft. deep by 60 ft. wide. Hostile patrols have crossed the creek. Will watch their rear.
Allen,
Sgt.
I give this to Private James and say, "Go over to the railroad (pointing), then turn to your right and follow the track until you cross a wagon road. Our platoon is just beyond that, on this side of the track. Give this message to the captain. Hurry."
Captain: You should have either read the message to James or had him read it. You should also have cautioned him to watch out for that hostile detachment. It might be better to send another man off with a duplicate of the message, as there is quite a chance that James may not get through and the message is all-important. James, you get back to the wagon road here (pointing) and find yourself in the right of your battle line, but cannot locate me or the company right away.
Private James: I would show the note to the first officer I saw in any event, and in this case, I would turn it over to the officer who appeared to be in command of the battalion or regiment on the right of the line, telling him what company the patrol belonged to, when we went out, etc.
Captain: What do you do, sergeant?
Sergeant Allen: I start to move north a short distance in order to find out what reënforcements are in rear of the hostile line.
Captain: After you have moved about 75 yards you are suddenly fired into from across the creek, and at the same time from the direction of the railroad trestle. Your men break and run east through the corn and you follow, but lose sight of them. When you cross the railroad fill you are fired on from the direction of the bridge. You finally stop behind the railroad fill on the quarry switch, where two of your men join you.
Sergeant Allen: I would start south to rejoin the company and report.
Captain: That would be a mistake. It would require a long time for a second patrol to make its way out over unknown ground, filled with hostile patrols, to a point where they could observe anything in rear of the hostile flank. You are now fairly familiar with the ground, you also know about where the hostile patrols are and you have two men remaining. After a brief rest in some concealed place nearby, you should start out again to make an effort to determine the strength of the troops in rear of the hostile flank near you, or at least remain out where you could keep a sharp lookout for any attempted turning movement by the enemy. Should anything important be observed you can send back a message and two of you remain to observe the next developments before returning. The information you might send back and the additional information you might carry back, would possibly enable your own force to avoid a serious reverse or obtain a decided victory.
Your work would be very hazardous, but it is necessary, and while possibly resulting in loss of one or two of your men, it might prevent the loss of hundreds in your main force.
CHAPTER V
THE SERVICE OF SECURITY
(Based on the Field Service Regulations.)
General Principles
1020. The Service of Security embraces all those measures taken by a military force to protect itself against surprise, annoyance or observation by the enemy. On the march, that portion of a command thrown out to provide this security is called an advance, flank or rear guard, depending on whether it is in front, to the flank or in rear of the main command; in camp or bivouac, it is called the outpost.
The principal duties of these bodies being much the same, their general formations are also very similar. There is (1) the cavalry covering the front; next (2) a group (4 men to a platoon) or line of groups in observation; then (3) the support, or line of supports, whose duty is to furnish the men for the observation groups and check an enemy's attempt to advance until reinforcements can arrive; still farther in rear is (4) the reserve.
In small commands of an infantry regiment or less there usually will not be any cavalry to cover the front, and the reserve is generally omitted. Even the support may be omitted and the observation group or line of groups be charged with checking the enemy, in addition to its regular duties of observation. But whatever the technical designation of these subdivisions, the rearmost one is always in fact a reserve. For example, if the command is so small that the subdivision formally designated as the reserve is omitted, the rear element (squad or platoon or company, etc.) is used as a reserve. As this text deals principally with small commands and only those larger than a regiment usually have the subdivision termed the reserve, this distinction between the element in the Field Service Regulations called the reserve and the actual reserve, must be thoroughly understood.
The arrangements or formations of all detachments thrown out from the main force to provide security against the enemy, are very flexible, varying with every military situation and every different kind of country. The commander of such a detachment must, therefore, avoid blindly arranging his men according to some fixed plan and at certain fixed distances. Acquire a general understanding of the principles of the service of security and then with these principles as a foundation use common sense in disposing troops for this duty.
ADVANCE GUARD
1021. Definition and Duties. An advance guard is a detachment of a marching column thrown out in advance to protect the main column from being surprised and to prevent its march from being delayed or interrupted. (The latter duty is generally forgotten and many irritating, short halts result, which wear out or greatly fatigue the main body, the strength of which the advance guard is supposed to conserve.)
In detail the duties of the advance guard are:
1. To guard against surprise and furnish information by reconnoitering to the front and flanks.
2. To push back small parties of the enemy and prevent their observing, firing upon or delaying the main body.
3. To check the enemy's advance in force long enough to permit the main body to prepare for action.
4. When the enemy is met on the defenses, seize a good position and locate his lines, care being taken not to bring on a general engagement unless the advance guard commander is authorized to do so.
5. To remove obstacles, repair the road, and favor in every way possible the steady march of the column.
1022. Strength: The strength of the advance guard varies from one-ninth to one-third of the total command. The larger the force the larger in proportion is the advance guard, for a larger command takes relatively longer to prepare for action than a small one. For example, a company of 100 men would ordinarily have an advance guard of from one to two squads, as the company could deploy as skirmishers in a few seconds. On the other hand, a division of 20,000 men would ordinarily have an advance guard of about 4,500 men, all told, as it would require several hours for a division to deploy and the advance guard must be strong enough to make a stubborn fight.
1023. Composition. The advance guard is principally composed of infantry, preceded if possible, by cavalry well to the front. When there is only infantry, much more patrolling is required of the front troops than when cavalry (called "Advance cavalry") is out in advance. This book does not deal with large advance guards containing artillery and engineers. Machine guns, however, will be frequently used in small advance guards to hold bridges, defiles, etc.
1024. Distance From Main Body. The distance at which the advance guard precedes the main body or the main body follows the advance guard depends on the military situation and the ground. It should always be great enough to allow the main body time to deploy before it can be seriously engaged. For instance the advance guard of a company, say 1 squad, should be 350 to 500 yards in advance of the company. The distance from the leading man back to the principal group of the squad should generally be at least 150 yards. This, added to the distance back to the main body or company, makes a distance of from 500 to 650 yards from the leading man to the head of the main body.
Examples:
These are not furnished as fixed numbers and distances, but are merely to give the student an approximate, concrete idea.
1025. Connecting Files. It should be remembered that between the advance guard and the main body, and between the several groups into which the advance guard is subdivided, connecting files are placed so as to furnish a means of communicating, generally by signals, between the elements (groups) of the column. There should be a connecting file for at least ever, 300 yards. For example, suppose the advance guard of a platoon is 300 yards in front of the main body. In ordinary rolling country, not heavily wooded, a connecting file would be placed half way between the two elements—150 yards from each one.
It is generally wiser to use two men together instead of one, because this leaves one man free to watch for signals from the front while the other watches the main body. However, in very small commands like a company, this is not practicable, as the extra man could not be spared.
FORMATION OF ADVANCE GUARDS.
1026. Subdivisions. The advance guard of a large force like a brigade or division is subdivided into a number of groups or elements, gradually increasing in size from front to rear. The reason for this is that, as has already been explained, a larger group or force requires longer to deploy or prepare to fight than a smaller one, therefore the small subdivisions are placed in front where they can quickly deploy and hold the enemy temporarily in check while the larger elements in rear are deploying. The number of these subdivisions decreases as the strength of the advance guard decreases, until we find the advance guard of a company consists of one or two squads, which naturally cannot be subdivided into more than two groups; and the advance guard of a squad composed of two men, which admits of no subdivision.
| Distance to next element in rear. | |||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Advance Cavalry | 1 to 5 miles | ||||||
| Support | Advance party | Point | 150 to 300 yds. | ||||
| (furnishes patrols) | Advance party proper | 300 to 600 yds. | |||||
| Support proper | 400 to 800 yds. | ||||||
| Reserve (usually omitted in small commands) | 500 yds. to 1 mile | ||||||
The distances vary principally with the size of the command—slightly with the character of the country.
The advance cavalry is that part of the advance guard going in front of all the foot troops. It is generally one to five miles in advance of the infantry of the advance guard, reconnoitering at least far enough to the front and flanks to guard the column against surprise by artillery fire—4,500 yards.
1027. Support. (a) The support constitutes the principal element or group of all advance guards. It follows the advance cavalry, when there is any, and leads the advance guard when there is no cavalry. The support of a large command is subdivided within itself in much the same manner as the advance guard as a whole is subdivided. It varies in strength from one-fourth to one-half of the advance guard.
1028. (b) Advance Party. As the support moves out it sends forward an advance party several hundred yards, the distance varying with the nature of the country and size of the command. For example, the advance party of a support of one company of 108 men, would ordinarily be composed of one section of three squads, and would march about 300 yards in advance of the company in open country, and about 200 yards in wooded country.
The advance party sends out the patrols to the front and flanks to guard the main body of the support from surprise by effective rifle fire. Patrols are only sent out to the flanks to examine points that cannot be observed from the road. As a rule they will have to rejoin some portion of the column in rear of the advance party. As the advance party becomes depleted in strength in this manner, fresh men are sent forward from the main body of the support to replace those who have fallen behind while patrolling. When there is advance cavalry, much less patrolling is required of the infantry.
(c) The point is a patrol sent forward by the advance party 150 to 300 yards. When the advance party is large enough the point should ordinarily consist of a complete squad, commanded by an officer or experienced noncommissioned officer. It is merely a patrol in front of the column and takes the formation described for patrols.
(d) The commander of the support ordinarily marches with the advance party. He should have a map and control of the guide, if any is present. He sees that the proper road is followed; that guides are left in towns and at crossroads; that bridges, roads, etc., are repaired promptly so as not to delay the march of the column and that information of the enemy is promptly sent back to the advance guard commander; he verifies the correctness of this information, if possible.
1029. (a) A thorough understanding of the arrangement of the support and the duties of the leaders of its subdivisions—point, flank patrols, advance party and main body (of the support)—is of the greatest importance to a noncommissioned officer. For example, the ignorance of one noncommissioned officer leading the advance party of a column of troops six miles long can cause the entire column to be delayed. If he halts because a few shots are fired at his men, and conducts a careful reconnaissance before attacking (instead of pushing right in on the enemy, forcing him to fall back quickly, if a weak detachment; or, to disclose his strength, if strong), the entire column, six miles long, is halted, the march interrupted, valuable time lost, and what is more important, the men irritated and tired out.
(b) The leader of the point must understand that as the principal duty of an advance guard is to secure the safe and uninterrupted march of the main body, he is the first man to discharge this duty. If, for example, his squad receives a volley of shots from some point to the front, he cannot take the time and precautions the commander of a large body would take to reconnoiter the enemy's position, determine something about his strength, etc., before risking an attack. If he did he would not be securing the uninterrupted march of the main body. He has to deploy instantly and press the enemy hard until the hostile opposition disappears or the advance party comes up and its commander takes charge. The point will lose men in this way, but it is necessary, for otherwise one small combat patrol could delay the march time after time.
(c) The same problem must be met in much the same manner by the leader of the advance party. In this case there is more time to think, as the point, being in advance, will have begun the fight before the advance party arrives; but the leader of the advance party must use his men freely and quickly to force the enemy to "show his hand," thus preventing small harassing or combat detachments from delaying the march.
(d) As the subdivisions of the advance guard become larger their leaders act with increasing caution, for as soon as it develops that the enemy in front is really present in some strength, then a halt becomes obligatory and a careful reconnaissance necessary.
(e) The leader of every subdivision must always start a reconnaissance the instant the enemy develops. He may, as in the case of the point, only send one man around to discover the enemy's strength; or, if the leader of the main body of the support, he may send an entire squad. In almost every case the instant he has given his orders for deploying and firing at or rushing the enemy, he sends out his man or men to work around to a position permitting a view of the hostile force. Every noncommissioned officer should impress this on his memory so that he will not forget it in the excitement of a sudden engagement.
(f) No attempt should be made to subdivide the advance guard of a small force into all the elements previously described. For example, the advance guard of a squad is simply a point of one or two men; the advance guard of a company is usually no more than a squad acting as a point, the squad actually having several men from 100 to 150 yards in advance, who really constitute a point for the squad; the advance guard of a battalion would usually consist of a company or less distributed as an advance party proper and a point. The advance guard of a regiment would have no reserve—if, for example, a battalion were used as the advance guard of a regiment, there would be only a support, which would be distributed about as follows: A support proper of about three companies and an advance party (point included) of about one company.