Systems of Direct Purchase and Subvention Compared—The Advantages of the Latter—The Importance of Standardisation and Workshop Equipment—The Limitations of the Subsidy Scheme.
Having decided definitely that a complete system of motor transport must be employed primarily in order to secure greater efficiency and freedom of movement of troops in the field, the next step is to decide upon the best means of securing the availability of the necessary number of suitable vehicles in time of war. Evidently, the simplest procedure would be to depend solely and entirely upon the power of the Government to commandeer or requisition the required supplies.
At first sight it may appear that nothing more is needed, but any such conclusion would be highly erroneous. If we were to examine the fleet of any large motor omnibus, motor cab, or motor haulage concern, we should almost inevitably find that the vehicles employed were almost all of one make and commonly of one type. If an operating company has in the first instance decided to adopt a particular make of vehicle, and if subsequent improvement in design reduces the efficiency of the original type as compared with others of the market, then the natural move is not to change from one manufacturer to another, but to increase or partially renew the fleet by the purchase of new vehicles of the same make but of a more modern model. The change from the old to the new type does not involve alterations in by any means every part of the mechanism, but only in those parts which have in any way shown themselves capable of improvement. In the event of renewals being required, it is not then necessary to stock an entirely new set of spare parts for all portions of the car, but only to get in spares for those parts, the design of which has been changed and improved. In this way, the necessary stock of spare parts is so far as possible reduced, and the work of maintaining the cars is in a similar degree simplified. Almost every type of motor vehicle has its own peculiarities, and it is evidently easier for a mechanic to undertake the maintenance of a certain number of machines all of one make than to keep in running order a similar number of miscellaneous vehicles varying essentially from one another.
Then again, the standardisation of one make is an advantage, because for purposes of maintenance the number of workshop appliances required is reduced to a minimum, and it is possible in some cases to obtain machines specially adapted for turning out in quantity some particular part which figures largely in the maintenance of the fleet.
Yet another advantage is that the driver of any one car can, without danger or loss of efficiency, be put on to any other car, if his own is undergoing repair or overhaul, while the work of those departments concerned with the storing and issuing of parts is greatly simplified, and the accommodation required for the efficient operation of the whole concern is reduced.
If these arguments apply to an industrial organisation working under normal conditions, they apply still more strongly to a hastily enlarged temporary organisation evolved in time of war. Moreover, in the latter case the unreliable running of a fleet of cars does not represent merely a temporary financial loss or a diminution in prestige. Its result must inevitably be to cause, among the troops behind which the motor column is working, a lack of necessities either in respect of food or of warlike materials. In either case, the result is immeasureable and the consequences may well prove fatal.
Then again, military motor vehicles are required to work under peculiarly arduous and trying conditions. The very nature of their service implies frequent long runs under the worst possible conditions of weather and road surface. They may have to employ lanes or bye-ways or even routes which can hardly be described as roads at all, and added to this is the almost certain fact that the tracks over which they work will have been materially injured intentionally or otherwise.
Those who live in the vicinity of any important military centre must be well aware of the damaging effect that heavy military traffic has upon the roads, even if well-constructed, in view of the inevitable nature of the traffic. When plying on country roads never intended for such use, the transport motors themselves will soon break up the road surface. These considerations serve to show that the liability to breakdown is much greater in military than in civilian transport, and coupled with this is the certainty that the facilities for conveniently carrying out repairs and overhauls must necessarily be extremely limited. The transport columns are supported at their base by travelling workshops manned by skilled mechanics and containing small selections of those tools likely to be of the most general service. The equipment of these workshops must be reduced to a minimum in order to secure their portability, and it is highly important, if possible, to prevent jobs coming in which cannot be satisfactorily tackled with the machinery at the disposal of the mechanical staff.
It will thus be seen that everything points to the extreme inadvisability of depending upon motor transport and supply columns formed of a miscellaneous collection of vehicles of all types, all makes and all ages. Looking at the other side of the question, the ideal conditions are reached when every vehicle of the column is identical and represents the very best make and type, and when all the drivers are thoroughly acquainted with the idiosyncrasies of this particular type of vehicle, and the mechanics responsible for repairs equally experienced as regards every feature of the mechanism of the machines.
To secure something approaching true standardisation in a fleet of transport vehicles, either one or two alternative methods may be adopted. The first and most obvious is that of direct purchase by Government. At the moment of writing, this system is being extensively adopted in Great Britain, and doubtless also in all other belligerent countries in which it has been possible to keep suitable motor manufacturing works in operation. Such steps are, however, being taken, in order to meet a great emergency which has arisen before alternative schemes have had time fully to mature. The establishment of an army in time of peace is very much less than it is in war time, and in time of war an army must be far more self-supporting than it is in time of peace, when considerable quantities of supplies can be brought regularly by civilian contractors to depôts where the troops are stationed, and the military authorities require only to secure the distribution of such supplies in detail. In time of war the whole of the supplies must be delivered in bulk to a very limited number of points, and from that time onwards the military authorities must be responsible for what may be described as their wholesale as well as their retail distribution.
Added to this are a number of other considerations, as, for example, the fact that when on active service the scale of rations of the men is increased, and supplies of warlike stores are rapidly expended and have to be perpetually renewed. It is clear, then, that if the method of direct purchase alone is depended upon, either the supply of motor vehicles will be immensely greater than the useful requirement in times of peace, or else facilities must be created for increasing their supply instantaneously when mobilisation occurs, or the organisation of new armies becomes essential.
Now, as in the present instance, it is possible after a war has begun to provide for a steady and considerable supply of transport motors to be handed over to the military authorities week by week, provided always that the process of manufacturing is not seriously interfered with either by the propinquity of military operations, or by the need of drafting men in excessive numbers from the works to the active forces. In our own case, it is quite within the bounds of possibility to produce motors for the transport columns of new armies just as rapidly as it is possible to make the personnel of those new armies effective. This fact, however, does not cover the difficulty occasioned by the necessary increase in transport facilities for the standing army directly war breaks out. It has been suggested that the difficulty might be overcome if the War Department were to purchase large numbers of suitable motor lorries, and to employ the greater part of them in time of peace for the carriage of general goods. This scheme has the advantage that it not only provides the necessary fleet, but simultaneously trains the necessary drivers; nevertheless, it has the grave drawback that profitable employment of the kind required could not be found unless the Government were to enter into serious competition with haulage and delivery companies. It has been proposed also that numbers of suitable motors might be used normally in the service of the Post Office, and transferred on emergency to the War Department, but this again is open to objection. The Post Office fleets would have to be renewed hurriedly and under difficulties, and a certain amount of disorganisation would almost certainly result. Furthermore, the number of vehicles which could be usefully kept in service by the postal authorities is small compared with the increased military requirements occasioned by the outbreak of war.
We may take it, then, that the principle of maintaining in the possession of the War Department in time of peace sufficient motor vehicles to fill the whole of the needs in time of war is unworkable except at enormous cost, since the majority of the vehicles could be put to no useful work and would merely deteriorate and become obsolete and, therefore, comparatively speaking, valueless were they to stand idle. The whole of such a fleet would have to be replaced every three or four years, and if this were not done an enemy equipped with more modern vehicles would possess a marked advantage, since—though the motor industry has now assumed enormous proportions—it is still so young that progress in design is by no means stationary.
We now come to the question of whether it is possible to maintain in time of peace only the number of vehicles actually required, and to fill up the requirement in excess of this number as promptly as possible, but nevertheless with some delay, when war breaks out. On this point, Captain A. E. Davidson, R.E., a former Secretary of the Mechanical Transport Committee of the War Office, has given the following very definite opinion in a paper read by him at the Imperial Motor Transport Conference, in his official capacity as representative of the War Department:
“Emphasis must be laid on the necessity for obtaining the transport immediately. The army which can mobilise in the shortest space of time gains an immense advantage by being able to take the initiative before the opposing armies are prepared, and the army which mobilises most rapidly will be able to gain a decisive advantage. This question has now been so carefully worked out in detail that the complete mobilisation of an army can be arranged for within a period that is reckoned in hours.”
“The Autocar” photograph.
A FRENCH MOTOR WORKSHOP, ESPECIALLY EQUIPPED FOR THE
SERVICE OF THE FLYING CORPS.
A GERMAN WORKSHOP CAR, CLOSED TO TAKE THE ROAD.
TWO VIEWS OF PARTS OF THE BRITISH “KARRIER” SUBVENTION
TYPE LORRY, INDICATING THE EFFORTS MADE TO FACILITATE
INSPECTION AND REPLACEMENTS.
THE ENGINE VALVES WITH INSPECTION COVER REMOVED.
HOW THE AXLE SHAFTS CAN BE WITHDRAWN. BY REMOVING THE TOP AND BOTTOM CASING, THE WHOLE OF THE FINAL GEARING, INCLUDING THE DIFFERENTIAL, CAN BE REMOVED WITHOUT JACKING UP THE VEHICLE OR TAKING OFF THE LOAD.
To meet this requirement, the additional motor transport columns must also be capable of being mobilised with similar rapidity, and we are forced back either on to the last resort of commandeering any vehicle that comes handy, or else on to the preparation of a scheme which will provide a substantial reserve of vehicles of approved make and type, able to be made available at any instant at a few hours’ notice. Such a scheme evidently involves the payment to the owners of these vehicles of some sum intended to make up to them such loss as may result from their liability to have their vehicles immediately commandeered. These payments, moreover, must provide that the War Department shall have the right of periodical inspection of the cars, so that they may be well informed as to their condition, and may have certain knowledge as to whether they are being properly driven and maintained in such a way as to make them useful units of a fleet on active service. A scheme of this sort is called a “subvention” or “subsidy” scheme, and it is very generally admitted that such a scheme forms an essential part of the organisation of transport and supply in every country in which the civilian use of heavy motor vehicles is sufficiently extensive to make the principle of subsidy applicable on a working scale. Clearly, the amount of the subsidy which is offered to owners of motor vehicles of a suitable type must depend, in the first instance, on the conditions accompanying the payments. If—as to some extent in the case of Great Britain—the subsidy scheme applies only to vehicles of types which would not be employed for trade purposes were definite encouragement not offered by the Government, the payments must be more than sufficient to balance any disadvantages resulting from the use of the subsidy type vehicle, as well as the inconvenience of undergoing inspections.
Again, if the War Department makes various stipulations as to features to be embodied in the design of subsidy vehicles, it is more or less certain that these stipulations will entail manufacturing expenditure resulting in an increase in the sale price of the machines as compared with the price of ordinary models of similar carrying capacity. Thus, the subsidy must also be sufficient to cover any increase in first cost to the user. If this increase is, let us say, £50, and the inconveniences entailed by adopting the type result in a loss of efficiency estimated, let us say, at £30 a year, the subsidy, if it is to form any real inducement, must evidently amount to a payment on purchase of about £60 at the least, followed by a payment of, let us say, £40 a year for three or four years.
In countries where heavy motor vehicles are not—unless some abnormal encouragement is given—sufficiently extensively used for trade purposes, the subsidy must of course be considerably higher. If the conditions of service are so unfavourable to the use of mechanical transport as to convince the trader that in changing, let us say, from twenty horses and five waggons to a couple of 3-ton motor lorries, his expenses will be increased by £100 or £200 a year, the scheme must take this prospective loss into account. In that case, the scheme becomes something more than mere subsidy, and partakes more of the nature of a scheme designed artificially to encourage the use of a particular form of transport solely on account of its utility to the Government in case of war.