THE DEVIL'S ADVOCATE
Intelligence and enterprise of the Germans 149
They are nevertheless devoted to their own institutions 150
German system is not reactionary but the reverse 151
Experts are honoured and trusted 151
German esteem for men of learning 152
And for the military caste 153
And for their Kaiser 155
German contempt for party government 156
And for the character of British official news 157
And for the failure of the British Government to trust the people 160
And for its fear of asking the people to make sacrifices 161
And for the voluntary system 162
Their pride in the successes of German arms 163
And in the number and spirit of their new levies 163
Which they contrast with British recruiting 164
The methods of which they despise 165
What is meant by 'a popular basis' of government? 166
THE CONFLICTS OF SYSTEMS AND IDEAS
Two issues between England and Germany 167
Democracy cannot endure unless capable of self-defence 168
Democracy good and bad 169
Self-criticism may be carried too far 171
The two dangers of democracy—German Arms and German Ideas 173
Fundamental opposition between the spirit of German policy and our own 173
German people have not accepted the moral ideas of their priesthood 174
Recantation among 'the brethren' themselves on outbreak of war 175
The cult of war 176
THE SPIRIT OF BRITISH POLICY
A REVOLUTIONARY PERIOD (JANUARY 1901-JULY 1914)
In this war Democracy is fighting for its existence 181
Against highly organised materialism 183
The opening of the twentieth century 186
Spirit of constitutional change 188
Disappearance of great figures from the scene 189
Change in character of the House of Commons 192
Dearth of leadership 194
Consequent demoralisation of parties 195
And widespread anxiety 196
Pre-eminence of Mr. Asquith 197
His Parliamentary supremacy 198
His maxim—wait-and-see 199
Character of his oratory 199
Increasing prominence of lawyers in politics 200
Their influence on Parliamentary institutions and national policy 201
Mr. Asquith's limitations 203
THREE GOVERNING IDEAS
Situation at the death of Queen Victoria 207
Comfort and security are not synonymous 208
Two problems absorbed public attention 209
Social and Constitutional Reform 209
A third problem, security, was overlooked 210
Social Reform intrinsically the most important 211
The urgent need of peace 212
Earnestness of public opinion 212
How it was baulked by circumstances 213
Limitations of popular judgment 214
Want of leadership 216
Strangulation of sincerity by party system 218
The artificial opposition of three great ideas 221
POLICY AND ARMAMENTS
The aim of British policy 223
Organised and unorganised defences 223
Policy depends on armaments, armaments on policy 225
Difficulty of keeping these principles in mind 226
Diplomacy to-day depends more than ever on armaments 228
The sad example of China 229
Policy should conform to national needs 230
Dangers threatening British security (1901-1914) 231
The Committee of Imperial Defence 232
Reasons of its comparative failure 234
Parliament and the people were left uneducated 235
Naval preparations were adequate 236
Military preparations were absurdly inadequate 237
Our Foreign policy rested on an entirely false assumption as regards the adequacy of our Army 238
THE BALANCE OF POWER
Security required that we should take account of Europe 241
German aim—the suzerainty of Western Europe 243
Maintenance of the Balance of Power 244
This is the unalterable condition of British security 245
This need produced the Triple Entente 247
Splendid isolation no longer compatible with security 249
Meaning of a defensive war 249
Defence of north-eastern frontier of France essential to British security 250
THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1911)
The British 'Expeditionary Force' 252
Numbers as a test of adequacy 253
Relations of Italy with Germany and Austria in event of war 254
Troops for defence of coasts and neutral frontiers 256
Germany must hold Russia in check with superior numbers 256
Germany would then endeavour to crush France 257
Having a superiority of 500,000 men available for this purpose 257
Why neutrality of Holland was a German interest 258
Why neutrality of Belgium was an obstacle to Germany 259
Inadequacy of our own Army to turn the scales 260
Our armaments did not correspond with our policy 261
Ministerial confidence in the 'voluntary system' 261
Three periods of war—the onset, the grip, and the drag 263
In 1870 the onset decided the issue 264
By 1914 the power of swift attack had increased 265
Forecasts confirmed by experience (Aug.-Sept. 1914) 266
Immense value of British sea-power 266
No naval success, however, can win a European war 267
Naval supremacy not the only essential to British security 268
THE MILITARY SITUATION (AUGUST 1914)
Changes between August 1911 and August 1914 269
Sensational German increases in 1913 took full effect within a year 270
Inability of France to counter this effort unaided 270
French increase could not take effect till 1916 271
Russian and Austrian increases 272
No attempt to increase British Army though it is below strength 273
Balkan wars (1912-1913) 273
Their effect on Balance of Power 274
Reasons why they did not lead to general conflagration 275
Germany's two dates: June 1914-June 1916 275
A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS
Why should we suspect Germany of evil intentions? 277
The German Fleet was a challenge to British security 278
Candour of German publicists 278
British Government finds comfort in official assurances of Berlin 279
Disregarded warnings 279
First Warning 279
(1905-1906) Morocco incident 279
After which British naval programme was reduced 280
Second Warning 281
(1908-1909) Secret acceleration and increase of German naval programme 281
Imperial Defence Conference 281
Third Warning 282
(1910) German sincerity under suspicion 282
The Constitutional Conference 283
Secret de Polichinelle 283
Failure of British Government to trust the people 284
Fourth Warning 285
(1911) The Agadir incident 285
Mr. Lloyd George's speech 285
Consequences of various kinds 286
Fifth Warning 287
(1912) Lord Haldane's rebuff 287
Menacing nature of German proposals 288
Dangers of amateur diplomacy 289
German love of irregular missions 290
Sixth Warning 294
(1913) German Army Bill and War Loan 294
British Government ignore the danger 295
Neglect military preparations 297
Shrink from speaking plainly to the people 298
Difficulties of Sir Edward Grey 298
Enemies in his own household 299
Radical attacks on Foreign Secretary and First Lord of Admiralty fomented by Germany 299
Attitude of a leaderless Cabinet 300
Parallelogram of fears determines drift of policy 301
Evil effects of failure to educate public opinion 302
Danger of breaking the Liberal party 303
Occasional efficacy of self-sacrifice 303
War not inevitable had England been prepared 304
DEMOCRACY AND NATIONAL SERVICE
THE BRITISH ARMY AND THE PEACE OF EUROPE
Public opinion puzzled by military problems 309
The nation's growing anxiety and distrust (1909-1914) 310
Army affairs a shuttlecock in the political game 312
'The blood taxes' 313
The nation realised it had not been treated with candour 313
Powerful British Army the best guarantee for European peace 314
Alone among European nations Britain had not an army commensurate to her population, policy, and resources 316
THE COMPOSITION OF THE BRITISH ARMY
The Regular Army 317
Three classes of reserves 318
The Army Reserve 318
The Special Reserve 319
The Territorial Army 320
The numbers of trained soldiers immediately available for war 321
These were inadequate to redress the balance against the Triple Entente 322
In the onset period untrained and half-trained troops were of no use 322
Shortage of officers capable of training raw troops 323
Lord Haldane's failure to carry out his own principles 324
Moral effect of our support of France at Agadir crisis 326
Adverse changes between 1911 and 1914 326
Size of British striking force necessary as complete were of against a coolly calculated war 327
Reserves required behind this striking force 328
South African War no precedent for a European war 330
LORD ROBERTS'S WARNINGS
The Manchester speech (October 22, 1912) 332
Liberal denunciation and Unionist coolness 332
Attack concentrated on three passages 333
Two of these have been proved true by events 334
The other was misinterpreted by its critics 335
Liberal criticism 336
Unionist criticism 341
Ministerial rebukes 343
No regret has ever been expressed subsequently for any of these attacks 347
LORD KITCHENER'S TASK
All Lord Roberts's warnings were proved true 350
Many people nevertheless still believed that the voluntary system was a success 351
Lord Kitchener as Secretary of State for War 353
His previous record of success 354
His hold on public confidence 354
His grasp of the simple essentials 355
His determination to support France and make a New Army 355
His remarkable achievements 356
His want of knowledge of British political and industrial conditions 356
His colleagues, however, understood these thoroughly 357
MATERIAL OF WAR
Industrial congestion at the outbreak of war 358
Need for looking far ahead and organising production of war material 359
The danger of labour troubles 360
Outcry about shortage of supplies 360
Official denials were disbelieved 361
METHODS OF RECRUITING
The first need was men 364
A call for volunteers the only way of meeting it 364
The second need was a system to provide men as required over the period of the war 365
No system was devised 365
The Government shrank from exercising its authority 366
Trusted to indirect pressure 366
And sensational appeals 367
They secured a new army of the highest quality 368
But they demoralised public opinion by their methods 369
Public opinion at the outbreak of war was admirable 372
It was ready to obey orders 373
No orders came 374
The triumph of the voluntary system 376
From the point of view of a Belgian or a Frenchman the triumph is not so clear 377
The voluntary system is inadequate to our present situation 379
Folly of waiting for disaster to demonstrate the necessity of National Service 380
PERVERSITIES OF THE ANTI-MILITARIST SPIRIT
British methods of recruiting in normal times 382
The Conscription of Hunger 382
The cant of the voluntary principle 384
The 'economic' fallacy 385
The fallacy of underrating the moral of conscript armies 387
The army which we call 'voluntary' our enemies call 'mercenary' 389
'Mercenary' describes not the British Army but the British People 389
The true description of the British Army is 'Professional' 390
The theory of the British Army 391
That officers should pay for the privilege of serving 391
That the rank and file should contract for a term of years 392
Under pressure of want 392
At pay which is below the market rate 392
This contract is drastically enforced 393
With the full approval of anti-militarist opinion 393
Inconsistencies of the anti-militarists 394
Their crowning inconsistency 395
Other industries put pressure on society 396
Why should not a professional army? 396
The example of Rome 397
A professional army when it first interferes in politics usually does so as a liberator 397
Then military despotism follows speedily 399
A fool's paradise 399
SOME HISTORICAL REFLECTIONS
Bugbears 401
Conflict of 'opinion' with 'the facts' 402
An army is no defence unless it is available for service abroad 402
The Industrial Epoch (1832-1886) 403
Its grudging attitude towards the Army 403
Honour paid by conscript nations to their armies 406
Democracy cannot subsist without personal service 406
During the Industrial Epoch exemption from Personal Service was regarded as the essence of Freedom 408
War was regarded as an anachronism 409
Since 1890 there has been a slow but steady reaction from these ideas 410
Volunteer movement and Territorial Army compared 411
Effect of the Soudan campaign and South African War 411
Effect of more recent events 412
Have we passed out of a normal condition into an abnormal one, or the reverse? 412
Germany's great grievance against Britain: we thought to hold our Empire without sacrifices 413
The Freiherr von Hexenküchen's views—
(1) On our present case of conscience 416
(2) On our voluntary system 416
The American Civil War 417
Lincoln insisted on conscription (1863) 418
His difficulties 418
Results of his firmness 419
Difference in our own case 419
Our need for conscription is much greater 419
It is also far easier for our Government to enforce it 420
THE CRUCIBLE OF WAR
The objects of this book 421
Criticism of naval and military strategy is no part of its purpose 422
Nor the ultimate political settlement of Europe 424
Nor an inquisition into 'German atrocities' 424
But the basis of Germany's policy must be understood 425
And what we are fighting for and against 425
The causes of German strength 427
The causes of British weakness 427
Illusions as to the progress of the war 428
The real cause of our going to war 430
Democracy is not by its nature invincible 431
Leadership is our chief need 433
The folly of telling half-truths to the People 435
PART I
THE CAUSES OF WAR
Then Apollyon strodled quite over the whole breadth of the way, and said, I am void of fear in this matter, prepare thyself to die; for I swear by my infernal Den, that thou shalt go no further; here will I spill thy soul.
And with that he threw a flaming Dart at his breast, but Christian had a shield in his hand, with which he caught it, and so prevented the danger of that.
Then did Christian draw, for he saw 'twas time to bestir him: and Apollyon as fast made at him, throwing Darts as thick as Hail; by the which, notwithstanding all that Christian could do to avoid it, Apollyon wounded him in his head, his hand, and foot: this made Christian give a little back; Apollyon therefore followed his work amain, and Christian again took courage, and resisted as manfully as he could. This sore Combat lasted for above half a day, even till Christian was almost quite spent; for you must know that Christian, by reason of his wounds, must needs grow weaker and weaker.
Then Apollyon espying his opportunity, began to gather up close to Christian, and wrestling with him, gave him a dreadful fall; and with that Christian's sword flew out of his hand. Then said Apollyon, I am sure of thee now: and with that he had almost pressed him to death, so that Christian began to despair of life. But as God would have it, while Apollyon was fetching of his last blow, thereby to make a full end of this good man, Christian nimbly reached out his hand for his Sword, and caught it, saying, Rejoice not against me, O mine enemy! when I fall I shall arise; and with that gave him a deadly thrust, which made him give back, as one that had received his mortal wound: Christian perceiving that, made at him again, saying, Nay, in all these things we are more than conquerors through him that loved us. And with that Apollyon spread forth his dragon's wings, and sped him away, that Christian for a season saw him no more.
In this Combat no man can imagine, unless he had seen and heard as I did, what yelling and hideous roaring, Apollyon made all the time of the fight; he spake like a Dragon....
The Pilgrim's Progress.
CHAPTER I
PEACE AND WAR
It is a considerable number of years since the most distinguished Tory statesman of his time impressed upon his fellow-countrymen as a maxim of policy, that Peace is the greatest of British interests. There was an unexpectedness about Lord Salisbury's words, coming as they did from the leader of a party which had hitherto lain under suspicion of jingoism, which gave the phrase almost the colour of an epigram. The truth of the saying, however, gradually became manifest to all men; and thereupon a new danger arose out of this very fact.
As a nation we are in some ways a great deal too modest; or it may be, looking at the matter from a critical standpoint, too self-centred. We have always been inclined to assume in our calculations that we ourselves are the only possible disturbers of the peace, and that if we do not seek war, or provoke it, no other Power will dream of forcing war upon us. This unfortunately has rarely been the case; and those persons who, in recent times, have refused most scornfully to consider the lessons of past history, have now at last learned from a sterner schoolmaster the falseness of their favourite doctrine.
The United Kingdom needed and desired peace, so that it might proceed undistracted, and with firm purpose, to set its house in order. The Dominions needed peace, so that they might have time to people their fertile but empty lands, to strike deep roots and become secure. To the Indian Empire and the Dependencies peace was essential, if a system of government, which aimed, not unsuccessfully, at giving justice and fostering well-being, was to maintain its power and prestige unshaken. The whole British race had nothing material to gain by war, but much to lose, much at any rate which would be put in jeopardy by war. In spite of all these weighty considerations which no man of sense and knowledge will venture to dispute, we should have been wiser had we taken into account the fact, that they did not apply to other nations, that in the main they affected ourselves alone, and that our case was no less singular than, in one sense at all events, it was fortunate.
We did not covet territory or new subjects. Still less were we likely to engage in campaigns out of a thirst for glory. In the latter particular at least we were on a par with the rest of the world. The cloud of anxiety which for ten or more years has brooded over the great conscript nations, growing steadily darker, contained many dangers, but among these we cannot reckon such antiquated motives as trivial bravado, light-hearted knight-errantry, or the vain pursuit of military renown.
What is called in history books 'an insult' seemed also to have lost much of its ancient power for plunging nations into war. The Chancelleries of Europe had grown cautious, and were on the watch against being misled by the emotions of the moment. A sensational but unintended injury was not allowed to drive us into war with Russia in 1904, and this precedent seemed of good augury. Moreover, when every statesman in Europe was fully alive to the electric condition of the atmosphere, a deliberate insult was not very likely to be offered from mere ill-manners or in a fit of temper, but only if there were some serious purpose behind it, in which case it would fall under a different category.
Fear was a great danger, and everybody knew it to be so—fear lest this nation, or that, might be secretly engaged in strengthening its position in order to crush one of its neighbours at some future date, unless that neighbour took time by the forelock and struck out forthwith. Among the causes which might bring about a surprise outbreak of war this was the most serious and probable. It was difficult to insure against it. But though perilous in the extreme while it lasts, panic is of the nature of an epidemic: it rages for a while and passes away. It had been raging now with great severity ever since 1909,[1] and by midsummer 1914 optimists were inclined to seek consolation in the thought that the crisis must surely be over.
DANGERS TO PEACE
More dangerous to peace in the long run even than fear, were certain aims and aspirations, which from one standpoint were concrete and practical, but regarded from another were among the cloudiest of abstractions—'political interests,' need of new markets, hunger for fresh territory to absorb the outflow of emigrants, and the like; on the other hand, those hopes and anxieties which haunt the imaginations of eager men as they look into the future, and dream dreams and see visions of a grand national fulfilment.
If the British race ever beheld a vision of this sort, it had been realised already. We should have been wise had we remembered that this accomplished fact, these staked-out claims of the British Empire, appeared to fall like a shadow across visions seen by other eyes, blotting out some of the fairest hopes, and spoiling the noble proportions of the patriot's dream.
There is a region where words stumble after truth, like children chasing a rainbow across a meadow to find the pot of fairy gold. Multitudinous volumes stuffed with the cant of pacifism and militarism will never explain to us the nature of peace and war. But a few bars of music may sometimes make clear things which all the moralists, and divines, and philosophers—even the poets themselves for the most part, though they come nearer to it at times than the rest—have struggled vainly to show us in their true proportions. The songs of a nation, its national anthems—if they be truly national and not merely some commissioned exercise—are better interpreters than state papers. A man will learn more of the causes of wars, perhaps even of the rights and wrongs of them, by listening to the burst and fall of the French hymn, the ebb and surge of the Russian, in Tschaikovsky's famous overture, than he ever will from books or speeches, argument or oratory.
IMPOTENCE OF LOGIC
Yet there are people who think it not impossible to prove to mankind by logical processes, that the loss which any great nation must inevitably sustain through war, will far outweigh any advantages which can ensue from it, even if the arms of the conqueror were crowned with victories greater than those of Caesar or Napoleon. They draw us pictures of the exhaustion which must inevitably follow upon such a struggle conducted upon the modern scale, of the stupendous loss of capital, destruction of credit, paralysis of industry, arrest of progress in things spiritual as well as temporal, the shock to civilisation, and the crippling for a generation, probably for several generations, possibly for ever, of the victorious country in its race with rivals who have wisely stood aside from the fray. These arguments may conceivably be true, may in no particular be over-coloured, or an under-valuation, either of the good which has been attained by battle, or of the evils which have been escaped. But they would be difficult to establish even before an unbiassed court, and they are infinitely more difficult to stamp upon popular belief.
It is not sufficient either with statesmen or peoples to set before them a chain of reasoning which is logically unanswerable. Somehow or other the new faith which it is desired to implant, must be rendered independent of logic and unassailable by logic. It must rise into a higher order of convictions than the intellectual before it can begin to operate upon human affairs. For it is matched against opinions which have been held and acted upon so long, that they have become unquestionable save in purely academic discussions. At those decisive moments, when action follows upon thought like a flash, conclusions which depend upon a train of reasoning are of no account: instinct will always get the better of any syllogism.
So when nations are hovering on the brink of war, it is impulse, tradition, or some stuff of the imagination—misused deliberately, as sometimes happens, by crafty manipulators—which determines action much more often than the business calculations of shopkeepers and economists. Some cherished institution seems to be threatened. Some nationality supposed—very likely erroneously—to be of the same flesh and blood as ourselves, appears—very likely on faulty information—to be unjustly oppressed. Two rival systems of civilisation, of morals, of religion, approach one another like thunder-clouds and come together in a clash. Where is the good at such times of casting up sums, and exhibiting profit-and-loss accounts to the public gaze? People will not listen, for in their view considerations of prosperity and the reverse are beside the question. Wealth, comfort, even life itself, are not regarded; nor are the possible sufferings of posterity allowed to count any more than the tribulations of to-day. In the eyes of the people the matter is one of duty not of interest. When men fight in this spirit the most lucid exposition of material drawbacks is worse than useless; for the national mood, at such moments, is one of self-sacrifice. The philosopher, or the philanthropist, is more likely to feed the flames than to put them out when he proves the certainty of loss and privation, and dwells upon the imminent peril of ruin and destruction.
The strength of the fighter is the strength of his faith. Each new Gideon who goes out against the Midianites fancies that the sword of the Lord is in his hand. He risks all that he holds dear, in order that he may pull down the foul images of Baal and build up an altar to Jehovah, in order that his race may not be shorn of its inheritance, in order that it may hold fast its own laws and institutions, and not pass under the yoke of the Gentiles. This habit of mind is unchanging throughout the ages. What moved men to give their lives at Marathon moved them equally, more than a thousand years later, to offer the same sacrifice under the walls of Tours. It is still moving them, after yet another thousand years and more have passed away, in the plains of Flanders and the Polish Marshes.
THE MOTIVES OF NATIONS