CHAPTER XV
CHILE’S UNIQUE POLITICAL HISTORY
National Life a Growth—Anarchy after Independence—Presidents Prieto, Bulnes, Montt, Perez—Constitution of 1833—Liberal Modifications—The Governing Groups—Civil War under President Balmaceda—His Tragic End—Triumph of his Policies—Political System of To-day—Government by the One Hundred Families—Relative Power of the Executive and the Congress—Election Methods Illustrated—Ecclesiastical Tendencies—Proposed Parliamentary Reforms—Ministerial Crises—Party Control.
CHILE has a political history that marks an isolated chapter among the Spanish-American Republics. Its unique and significant feature is four successive and peaceful presidencies of ten years each. The phenomenon is worthy of study. The tributes which the Chileans pay themselves are merited. Their national life has been a growth and not a series of spasms.
After independence was achieved through O’Higgins in 1818, the Liberator was sent into exile, because he sought to exert kingly powers as a dictator under the merest crust of republican forms. The riot of liberty followed for ten or twelve years with frequent revolutions, changes of rulers, and unavailing efforts to form a stable government. The anarchy of license under the mask of popular institutions reached its height during the period from 1828 to 1833, when the Liberal party—that is, liberal in name—was in power. Then came the Conservatives, or reactionists. They forced the adoption of the Constitution of 1833, which remained unchanged for thirty-seven years. Order and tranquillity was the motto, and genuine republicanism was choked in order that a government of law might live.
Under this Constitution the colonial despotism differed only from that of Spain in that it was exercised by family groups, who controlled the Executive, rather than by a viceroyal representative of the distant monarchy. It was easy to suspend the Constitution and to put the whole country under martial law. The promptness with which this was done in the emergencies undoubtedly prevented the series of revolutions that cursed other South American countries. It was constitutional for the Executive to abrogate the organic law when the opposition got too active. The party in control under this Constitution of 1833 always was known as the Conservatives, and the opposition in a general way as the Liberals. Sometimes a faction of the Conservatives would split off and attempt a revolution; sometimes the conservative element was really liberal in character, but not in name.
From 1833 to 1873 Chile had four presidents, all elected and reëlected under constitutional forms. These chief magistrates were Joaquin Prieto, Manuel Bulnes, Manuel Montt, and José Joaquin Perez. During General Bulnes’ administration an army uprising was attempted; during that of President Montt a revolution started at Copiapo in the North. There were also other disturbances. But all of them were suppressed without long periods of civil dissensions, and though liberty seemed to be smothered under councils of war and the absolute suspension of individual rights, it was a hardy plant and after a brief period would begin to grow again.
Under the Constitution of 1833 the presidential term was five years, and there was no prohibition against a second term. In this manner each president reëlected himself and enjoyed a ten years’ tenure. But he could not have done this if the privileged classes, the family groups, had not sustained him. They were aggressive in defending their share in the oligarchy, and their individual independence they maintained as sturdily as did the English barons who forced the Magna Charta from King John. With the national development assured, the country began to chafe under the recognition of the autocratic power which was vested in the Executive, and to feel that the growth which would not have been possible without the colonial despotism under republican form had now reached the full measure. Consequently the agitation for liberalizing the Constitution began and was continued persistently instead of intermittently. In the decade from 1860 to 1870 the Conservative reactionaries were pressed so vigorously and were on the defensive so constantly that the harsh features of the Constitution were modified in the spirit if not in the letter.
During the life of this old parchment and the four Executives who put it into practice,—for there never was a dictator among them,—Chile consolidated her domestic interests, inaugurated the building of railways, and by the navy and other means prepared for the war which it was felt one day would be had with Peru and Bolivia. In view of all that was accomplished, it can hardly be said that the Constitution of 1833 and the power of the one hundred families as exerted under that instrument, were bad for the country. But a change was inevitable, and in 1870 the Constitution was reformed in a manner to bring it within the sphere of modern principles of government and remove its aggressive antagonism to republican institutions. Greater independence was conceded to the judicial power, and larger liberty of action to the municipal authorities, while the electoral right of the citizen was broadened. The presidential term remained at five years, but successive elections were prohibited so that the ten-year tenure could not continue.
Frederico Errazuriz was the first of the Executives to serve under the amended Constitution. His term was peaceful and progressive, but was devoted chiefly to preparing for war by ordering the construction of the armored cruisers which rendered the Chilean navy so formidable. He was succeeded by Anibal Pinto, who had served in the cabinet as Minister of War. A financial and economic crisis supervened during his administration, and in its closing year was fought the war of the Pacific, with Chile as the antagonist of allied Bolivia and Peru. Chile’s sweeping victories not only gave her the nitrate territory which she exacted as war indemnity; it made her the most aggressive and the most feared Power in South America.
It is only with the internal political history that I propose to deal. A Chilean historian naively remarks that it had been the practice for the outgoing president to intervene in the elections in order to insure the election of a candidate of his own choosing. President Pinto announced his purpose of repudiating this practice, yet he was succeeded by Domingo Santa Maria, who had held the portfolio of Foreign Relations in his cabinet. President Santa Maria found himself antagonized by the Conservatives and one wing of the Liberals. He tried to organize an administration party and to control the election of senators and deputies in the Congress, but failed. This was a clear manifestation of the inability of the Executive to rule without the consent of the families who composed the various political groups. But the issue between the Executive and the families was to be forced by a more resolute hand. Its outcome was dramatic, a tragedy for the nation and a tragedy for one of the country’s greatest men.
José Manuel Balmaceda was chosen president in 1886, after a sharp electoral struggle in which the Conservatives and the reactionary faction of the Liberals opposed him. He sought to conciliate the latter by calling some of them to his cabinet. He had grand plans for the development of the nation, and he wanted a united support.
President Balmaceda strengthened the naval and military establishment out of the nitrate proceeds; but his guiding ambition was to apply them to public improvements, railways, roads, harbors, and schools. The Conservative-Liberal fusion thwarted him. It prevailed in the Congress, and demanded that he name ministers satisfactory to the majority. This he claimed was in violation of his constitutional prerogatives. The Congress refused to authorize the taxes and appropriations necessary for carrying on the government. When for any reason this was not done at the regular session, the practice had been to convoke the Congress in extra sessions. President Balmaceda, wearied with the controversy, abstained from taking this action. On January 1, 1891, he announced that the appropriations for the current year would be the same as during the previous year.
Bloody, merciless civil war followed. The Congressionalists proclaimed that their contest was against Executive usurpation. They removed to Valparaiso, and took refuge on the warships which had been prepared for them. They named Captain Jorge Montt as Commander of the National Squadron. President Balmaceda declared Montt and the naval commanders who obeyed his orders traitors. The President organized an army, while the navy sailed for Iquique and seized the nitrate provinces.
The Congressionalists instituted their provisional government there to carry on the war against President Balmaceda. They organized troops which were transported to Valparaiso and defeated the garrison. A second victory at Placilla and they were in control of the capital, welcomed by the populace as liberators.
Balmaceda took refuge in the Argentine Legation. Flight across the Andes was open to him, but he disdained it. He waited calmly till September 19, the day on which his constitutional term as president ended, wrote farewell letters to his family and friends, arrayed himself in black, pointed a revolver at his right temple, discharged it, and died instantly. His policies live.
I have recalled these swiftly tragic events without any intention of opening up controverted subjects. My purpose has been to sketch them only in their relations to the political system of Chile as it exists to-day, for they influenced it and caused modifications of the Constitution restrictive of the Executive power.
By the books the form of Chilean government is popular representative. To the foreign observer the wonder grows that a system which gives such inordinate power to small groups of families, who call themselves political parties, and which binds the Executive hand and foot, can prove satisfactory. But it suits Chile, or has suited her, and the country progresses. That is the conclusive answer. If Chile chooses to make a strait-jacket for herself, that is her own concern, and if in that strait-jacket she expands and develops a progressive national life she may be permitted to take her own way and her own time for freeing herself.
But what of the governing classes? Who compose them? The Chilean professional man or merchant or government official will tell you, as he told me, that there are no class distinctions, and at the same time will take pride in drawing himself and his fellows far apart from the masses. It has been said that a hundred families have ruled Chile for seventy-five years. The numeral might be doubled or trebled, but the truth would not be changed. The landed interests, the commercial community, and the Church have ruled the country, and it must be said that they have ruled well. They may accuse one another of being false to their trusteeship, but the foreign observer is not impressed with this charge. All of them have worked together to make Chile the powerful and aggressive little nation that she is, and have secured her the respect that the rest of South America has given her. But they have taken all the benefits for themselves,—the honors and emoluments of public office, the opportunities for wealth that came from the nitrate fields, the chances for careers that have been afforded by the army and the navy. It may almost be said that the army and navy exist for the employment of the one hundred families.
Chile herself is not a country of great private fortunes. One or two families have been enriched by mines, a half-dozen by banking and commercial development, a larger number by the nitrates. But when it is all said, the Chilean hundred families are kin of moderate means. Their main sources of income are from their landed estates. These land-owners do not tax themselves heavily. As in the majority of countries of Spanish America, the government imposts are laid on the revenue from the land and not on the land itself. The landed proprietors contrive that these imposts shall be light.
The existing regimen, as studied on paper, is almost a complete reversal of the regimen under which for nearly half a century Chilean nationality was developed and the little ribbon of a republic was consolidated and made strong. The old form was a colonial despotism, with monarchical powers for the Executive. The present system is congressional despotism without republican powers for the Executive, but under both forms the one hundred families have ruled. The president is selected by electors chosen in the provinces through direct suffrage, since there is no such thing as provincial legislatures.
Intense jealousy of the power of the Executive is shown. Politically the president of Chile is a cipher, though he has vast power in relation to public contracts. But he can rule only as the instrument of the Congress. Not only does the ministerial system prevail in its most extreme form, so that it is not unusual for the cabinet to be changed half a dozen times within a short period, as happened in 1903 and 1904, but a further limitation is put on the president’s authority by the Council of State. He governs through this body, which is composed of eleven members, the majority of whom are selected by the Congress, each branch naming three. The remaining five can be chosen by the president only from designated functionaries, one of them always being the Archbishop. Thus it cannot be said that there are three coördinate powers, legislative, executive, and judicial, in the Chilean government.
In operation there is no equilibrium of executive and legislative powers, because Chile is governed, ruled or misruled, by the legislative branch. The authority of the Congress is very extensive, and it never sleeps on its rights. Usually it keeps the president awake seeing how they can be respected and executive policies at the same time be carried out. An election for Congress is not greatly different from a similar event in the United States. The parties nominate their candidates, usually after a caucus. Minority representation obtains. Electioneering is done through the newspapers, through meetings, and through placards. The placards cut a very extensive figure. The manifestoes of the candidates, their allocutions and appeals to the voters, are printed in type so big that the one-eyed man must see and stop to read.
Election methods in many respects are patterned after the United States, and it is considered fair politics for the party which gets control of the voting machinery to use its advantage without particular regard for the will of the voters as manifested in the ballots. An example of this was given me which showed that Chilean politicians have a fine sense of humor,—one which would be appreciated by Tammany or by Philadelphia. Mr. George Asta-Barragua, who related the incident, had lived in Washington when his father was minister to the United States, and could enjoy the pleasantries of politics in either country.
The contest was very bitter between two candidates who might be disguised as Lopez and Martinez, those names being as common as Smith and Jones. The friends of Martinez secured a majority in the election board, but Lopez had the privilege of naming the minority member, one Rodriguez. The ballots deposited were evenly distributed. The majority of the board calmly counted all of them for Martinez. Rodriguez protested, but without avail. The Martinez faction had determined that in this precinct there should not be one vote for Lopez. After numerous energetic and violent protests, Rodriguez saw that the game was against him, and only varied the proceedings by violent protests in the nature of shaking his fist under the noses of his co-judges. Finally he contented himself with shrugging his shoulders, and the proceedings went on good-naturedly. His co-judges joked him, and he jested with them.
The last thing to be done was for the judges themselves to cast their ballots. Then Rodriguez made his final stand and delivered a little speech to the other judges. It was in substance as follows: “Gentlemen, I recognize that you are two against one. I won’t say that we wouldn’t have done the same if we had been two against one. But now that the farce is nearly over, I have one request to make, which as honorable gentlemen you surely will grant. It would be scandalous if, with myself as the representative of Lopez, the word was circulated that I did not vote for him. Therefore my request, honorable associates, is that I may cast my ballot and have it counted for Lopez.”
His honorable associates conceded that it was his duty to cast his ballot. He did it with the name LOPEZ in great black letters. His honorable associates calmly counted the ballot for Martinez. Rodriguez protested energetically. Colleague No. 1 picked up the ballot, remarking, “There is no vote here for Lopez,” Then he held it up and said to Colleague No. 2, “Do you see anything of the name of Lopez here?” Colleague No. 2 slowly spelled out, “M-A-R-T-I-N-E-Z.” Rodriguez then gave it up, and the vote of the precinct as returned showed, for Martinez, 267; for Lopez, 0.
I was assured that this was an actual occurrence, and it certainly was a fine exhibition of campaign humor.
The Roman Catholic Church is a part of the political system, and is a political power in Chile, although there is no discrimination against Protestant forms of worship. In 1813, during the struggle for independence, Bishop Villadres preached in the name of God war against the patriots. Bishop Andreu preached war against the King’s soldiers. Thus the Church was not arrayed wholly against the patriots. They recognized it in the Constitution, and it receives State aid.
While the influence of the hierarchy in the main has been reactionary, the ecclesiastical authorities have been politic enough not to antagonize the ruling family groups. When they have sought to do so, they have been worsted.
The Chilean government is measurably independent of ecclesiastical dictation. It always has insisted on its right to nominate the Archbishop, and when Rome has been unwilling to recognize this nomination the Archbishopric has remained vacant. That was the condition for several years previous to Balmaceda’s election as president. Then a compromise was effected by the Vatican recognizing the choice of the administration. A Papal legate is maintained at Santiago, and the intrigues and manœuvres to give him precedence have caused unpleasantness in the Diplomatic Corps. Of late years the Church influence has been decidedly reactionary. This was accentuated on the death of Pope Leo, when the Bishop took occasion to preach a political sermon, aimed not only at the Italian government but at Liberal governments everywhere. The leading public men resented this reactionary tendency. When the priests expelled from France sought an asylum in Chile, they were frigidly received.
The efforts to reform the political system relate both to the executive and to the legislative branches. One group wants the vice-president chosen, as in the United States, to succeed to the Executive functions on the death or incapacity of the president. Under the present form there is no elected vice-president. That functionary is the Minister of the Interior, and usually he is a member of the House or of the Senate. When the president desires to forego temporarily the responsibilities of office or becomes ill, he can withdraw and turn the administration over to the vice-president. The latter official during the interim exercises all the powers of the chief magistrate, but in case of the president’s death a new Executive is chosen to fill out the term. The agitation for an elective vice-president is not very pronounced, though it may be made a part of the programme of one or the other of the political groups.
The movement for a change with regard to the Congress is more definite. One phase of it relates to the form. Some want to dispense with the formality which takes place at the opening of Congress when the president is escorted to the hall of the Sessions by the troops, is attended by the cabinet, and delivers his message in person in the presence of the Diplomatic Corps and of distinguished officials. It is not a live question. I attended an opening session in company with Minister Wilson, and thought that the message acquired dignity through its ceremonial delivery.
The vital reform which many Chilean public men think necessary in order that national policies may be carried forward and the government placed in harmony with popular sentiment, is a complete overturning of the present parliamentary system, with its frequent and ridiculous ministerial crises, the consequent cabinet changes, and the interruptions in the Executive’s policy. The theory of parliamentary government is carried to an extreme which hardly could be conceived of in England. It would make a Frenchman envious of the ease with which ministries can be upset and new ministries set up to be overthrown in their turn.[12] It is a panorama of lightning parliamentary changes. The consequence of the present system is to continue the power of the family groups who call themselves by various names and who may or may not reflect distinct political tendencies. All of them must be represented in the cabinet. Occasionally by means of a coalition or a fusion the Executive may secure something like a political majority, but it does not hold, because the elements composing it have too many selfish interests and too many individual ambitions to gratify. Sometimes, too, the House may be satisfied with the cabinet, while the Senate refuses to accept it. That was the condition in the Fall of 1904, when the Liberal Alliance was the power behind the ministries.
12 The Chilean correspondent of a London newspaper gave this illustration: “Valparaiso, February 11. The changes effected in the composition of the Chilean Ministry, and especially the Finance Department, have at times been so frequent that not very long ago both the British and the United States Ministers informed the President that for the future they would be unable to recognize any change. They complained, not without sufficient reason, that no sooner had they entered into arrangements with one Minister of Finance than these had to be suspended and commenced de novo with his successor, who, again, at the final stages, referred the foreign representatives to his successor at the Treasury Department.”
The leading men who are agitating for a reform are radical in their programme, for they want Chile to adopt the practice of the United States, and nothing can be more opposite than our own system and that which now obtains in Chile. These reformers would have the Executive sustained by a political party in the Congress; but even when he may not have a partisan majority back of him, they would have his administration, chosen as it is for five years, assured the voting of the necessary appropriations and the power to continue the policy on which he was elected. That, they argue, would give continued internal tranquillity and strength abroad. This was lacking to Balmaceda, and its lack caused him to defy the Congress and go outside the Constitution. A long time must pass before Chilean public sentiment can be educated up to the point where a hostile partisan majority in the Congress will not dare to refuse to vote the ordinary appropriations of the government. When that point is reached, there will be simply two political parties instead of half a dozen groups centring around individuals.
When I was in Chile in 1903, there were four parties who were recognized, and these were split into so many sections that it was hard to distinguish them. The parties were the Liberals, the Radicals, the Conservatives, and the Social Democrats, or Populists. But the Liberal party was composed of middle-of-the-road Liberals, moderate Liberals, and liberal Democrats, while the Conservatives were divided into regular Conservatives and clerical Conservatives, with a shading off into minor groups. The general tendencies were clear, and an alignment was forming between Liberals of all shades in order to combat the Conservatives. The growth of the Liberals is a revival of the Balmaceda policies. Their success means reforms in the parliamentary system, more freedom for the Executive, and perhaps a broader foreign policy including the frank recognition of the influence on the Panama Canal on all the Pacific coast of South America. It is generally assumed that no president can now be elected in Chile who is not satisfactory to the Balmacedists. President Jerman Riesco, who was chosen in 1901, gave a liberal and temperate administration.
But these tentative suggestions of reform in the political system, and even the tendencies in regard to public policies are only surface ebullitions if they are studied without an insight into the deeper social and economic conditions, for Chile has social and economic questions of a more pronounced character than any other country in South America. I defer their analysis for another chapter.