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Phrenology Examined

Chapter 18: NOTE VI.
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About This Book

The author examines phrenology by scrutinizing its central claims that mental activity resides exclusively in the brain and that each faculty corresponds to a discrete cerebral organ. The critique evaluates Gall’s evidence and methods, questions proposed anatomical correlations, and discusses distinctions between instinct and understanding as well as the role attributed to animal spirits. It surveys the positions of Spurzheim and Broussais, assessing their psychological and physiological extensions and pointing out methodological exaggerations and errors. While noting some empirical observations of value, the analysis concludes that the strict localizationist system advanced by phrenologists is unsupported by the evidence presented.

NOTE VI.

Contractility of Broussais.

Page 126. He assigns it to every tissue, and, like them, he explains every thing by means of it.

He assigns it to every tissue. Haller attributed this property to the muscles alone, “but it is a common property of the tissues.”[207]

He explains every thing by means of it: every thing, even innervation itself. But he is constrained to add: “Doubtless something more occurs in the interior of the nervous tissue; doubtless we are unacquainted and ignorant as to how that other thing is connected with the motions in question, and how it may employ them in the act of innervation,” &c.[208]

So we perceive, in the first place, contractility explains innervation; and then, that something more is wanting. And as nervous contractility is nothing but a mental fiction (a nerve never moves, never contracts, when it is touched) the whole matter tapers down to this something more, or to that other thing.

See how very far from being rigorous are those who construct systems.